SAYGO BAIversusCHUEERU BAJRANGI
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 791
- Decided
- 19 November 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A wife is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC despite prior abandonment of the matrimonial home if the husband has taken a second marriage, and the lower courts erred by applying Section 125(4) and by perverse appreciation of evidence.
Summary
The appellant, Saygo Bai, filed a Section 125 CrPC application for maintenance for herself and her two minor children after her husband, Chueeru Bajrangi, took a second wife and threw her out of the matrimonial home. The trial court, revision court, and High Court dismissed her claim, relying on her alleged abandonment of the home for 4‑5 years and applying Section 125(4). The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misinterpreted the second proviso of Section 125(3) and the Explanation, which deem a husband's second marriage a just ground for the wife's refusal to live with him, making her entitled to maintenance regardless of her prior departure. The Court found the lower courts' appreciation of evidence perverse, read the whole evidence, and concluded the wife was thrown out due to the second marriage. It also fixed maintenance at Rs.1,500 per month payable from the date of application, setting aside all lower orders and allowing the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a wife who left the matrimonial home for several years is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC when the husband has contracted a second marriage.
- Whether the second proviso of Section 125(3) and its Explanation, rather than Section 125(4), govern the entitlement to maintenance in such circumstances.
- Whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence and in applying Section 125(4) to deny maintenance.
- Whether the Supreme Court may intervene to re‑appreciate evidence when lower courts' findings are perverse and unconscionable.
- Determination of the appropriate quantum of maintenance for the wife and children.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125(3), s. 125(4), s. 482
Subjects
Judgment
(2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1020
A SAYGO BAI
v.
CHUEERU BAJRANGI
(Criminal Appeal No. 2169 of 2010)
NOVEMBER 19, 2010
B
[V.S. SIRPURKAR AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.125(3), second
proviso; Explanation - Maintenance - Claim by abandoned
c wife for maintenance - Courts below relying upon the
admission by the wife that she herself left the matrimonial
home and when her husband came to take her back,· she
refused to go back and holding that she was not entitled to
maintenance - Correctness of - Held: Not correct - In the
0 wake of the admitted second marriage of the husband, wife
would be entitled to claim maintenance and her earlier refusal
to join the company of the husband would be of no
consequence - The orders passed by the courts below were
totally incorrect and on perverse appreciation of the evidence
E - As regards the quantum of maintenance, since the husband
was a constable in police force and earning Rs.10,000 p.m.
and having other sources of income from agricultural
properties, maintenance@ Rs.1,5001- per month would be a
proper maintenance - Maintenance to be paid from the date
F of the application - Evidence - Maintenance.
Evidence: Appreciation of - Held: The court must read
· whole evidence -- One stray admission cannot be read in
isolation with the other evidence.
G Appeal: Appeal before Supreme Court - Concurrent
findings of facts by lower courts - Scope of appreciation of
evidence - Held: Supreme Court does not go into the
evidence where the courts below have recorded concurrent
findings of fact - However. where the appreciation of evidence
H 1020
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1021
by the courts below is totally perverse, faulty and A
unconscionable findings have been arrived at, the Supreme
Court can certainly go to appreciate the evidence on record
- Evidence.
The appellant-wife filed an application under Section B
125, Cr.P.C. against her husband-respondent for claiming
maintenance for herself and for her two minor children.
She pleaded that her relation was cordial with the
respondent upto the year 1989. However, in the year
1990, the respondent brought second wife and started C
neglecting the appellant and abandoned her and the
children. The respondent claimed that it was the appellant
who abandoned the matrimonial home when the younger
child was 6 months old and went to her father's village.
He claimed that both the children were always with him.
The trial court dismissed the application holding that the D
appellant had not come to the court with clean hands.
The revision petition was also dismissed. The appellant
filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High
Court. On behalf of the respondent, it was argued before
the High Court that the respondent had contracted E
second marriage only after the refusal of the appellant to
join him and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to
any maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The High
Court relied upon the admission by the appellant that she
herself had left the house of the respondent and that her F
husband had come for taking her back with him to his
house, but she refused to go back and, therefore, held
that she failed to discharge her matrimonial obligations.
On this ground, the High Court dismissed the petition.
The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the G
High Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. All the courts below completely
misunderstood the second proviso of Section 125(3) H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Cr.P.C. and the Explanation thereto. Instead, the courts
below relied on sub-section (4) of Section 125. They
committed a very serious error of law in holding that since
the appellant had left the house for 4-5 years, therefore,
the respondent-husband was justified in getting married
B again. The courts also erred in suggesting that since the
appellant had left the house without any reason, therefore,
even if the second marriage was contracted, the appellant
would still not be entitled to the maintenance merely
because she had left the matrimonial house earlier. This
c finding was completely erroneous. The appellant very
specifically stated that after the marriage till the children
were born, her relationship was cordial with her husband.
Thereafter, the respondent brought a second wife, where
she was residing in her matrimonial home. The appellant
was very specific in stating that when the husband
0
brought the second wife, he declared that he would not
keep the appellant and started ill-treating her and threw
her along with children out of the house. In her cross-
examination, she admitted that on her husband's request
E she was not prepared to go to his house. This question
was put to her in a very tricky manner. It was not stated
as to at what point of time, the husband came to take her
back. She also stated in her cross-examination that her
children were with her but for the last one year they were
with the respondent. She also admitted very fairly that the
F respondent was educating the children. She also
asserted that for the last 4 years her entry to the house
of her husband was stopped. In her cross-examination,
she had stated that she had not been to the house of the
respondent for 4-5 years and then the respondent entered
G into the second marriage. All the courts below relied only
on this so-called admission to hold that she had
abandoned her husband for 4-5 years and it was a result
of her refusal to come to the house of her husband that
the husband took the second wife. In fact, this was a
H totally incorrect and perverse appreciation of the
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1023
evidence. The court must read whole evidence. One stray A
admission cannot be read in isolation with the other
evidence. She had very specifically stated that she was
thrown out of the matrimonial house on account of the
second wife. All the courts below ignored all her evidence
and chose to rely on two lines in her cross-examination. 8
This was wholly perverse appreciation of evidence. The
courts below have also made a point that she did not call
for a Panchayat and, therefore, have held against her.
Even if she did not call a Panchayat, it did not mean that
the respondent was justified in throwing her out of the C
house and getting married second time. [Paras 8, 9, 10]
[1028-F; 1030-B-H; 1031-A-D]
1.2. The finding of the courts that initially the appellant
had left the company and desisted from joining the
husband for 4-5 years and, therefore, she would always D
be disentitled to claim maintenance was clearly
erroneous and incorrect. In the wake of the admitted
second marriage of the respondent, the appellant would
be entitled to claim maintenance and her earlier refusal
to join the company of the respondent would be of no E
consequence whatsoever. In fact, from the evidence it is
found that she had not forsaken the company of her
husband without any reason. She may not have filed the
maintenance application immediately on her being thrown
out, but she asserted that she had taken such action F
barely within two years after she was thrown out. She
was very clear that she was thrown out on account of the
respondent having contracted the second marriage. She
was, however, candid enough in admitting that at the time
of entering the witness box, it was the second wife who G
was taking care of the children. This suggested honesty
on her part. All this evidence was completely ignored.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not go into the
evidence where the courts below have recorded
concurrent findings of fact. However, where the
H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A appreciation of evidence by the courts below is totally
perverse and faulty, and unconscionable findings have
been arrived at, the Supreme Court would certainly go to
appreciate the evidence on record. [Para 11] (1031-E-H;
1032-A-D]
B 2. Considering that the appellant was in the state of
penury and not getting even the interim maintenance, the
matter for deciding the amount of maintenance is not
remanded and is decided by this Court. The appellant in
her evidence had claimed that the respondent-husband
C drew a monthly salary of Rs.2,000/- in the year 1993.
Besides, he also had 20 acres of land and grew 40
quintals of paddy crop, 10 quintals of wheat crop, 4
quintals of urad and rawa crops and corns etc. There was
not even a word of cross-examination on these claims
D and these claims had gone unchallenged. Even in his
own evidence, the respondent had not uttered even a
word regarding his salary and had merely claimed that
the appellant was maintaining herself by working as a
labourer and earned Rs.45 per day. He made a bald
E statement that there was no immovable property in his
name. He had also categorically admitted that after the
appellant's going out of the matrimonial house he never
maintained her. Considering, therefore, the overall
situation, it would be obvious that the respondent must
F have been earning at least Rs.10,000/- per month
presently as salary being a constable in police force and
also having other sources of income from agricultural
properties. In that view, maintenance at the rate of
Rs.1,500/- per month in favour of the appellant is proper
G maintenance. The maintenance shall be payable from the
date of the application. The three orders passed by the
courts below are set aside. [Para 13] [1032-G-H; 1033-A-
D]
CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
H No. 2169 of 2010.
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1025.
From the Judgment & Order dated 14.7.2009 of the High A
Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in M.CR.C. No. 992 of 2003.
Laxmi Arvind, Poonam Prasad, Anuj Kumar, Pradeep
Kumar Mathur for the Apellant.
Dr. Rajesh Pandey, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj for the B
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Leave granted. c
2. The appellant Saygo Bai, wife of Chueeru Bajrangi
along with her two minor children Jivti (daughter) and Basant
(son) filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. against
her husband Chueeru Bajrangi. She pointed out therein that her
husband had taken a second wife, namely, one Smt. Guiab Bai D
and that he was a salaried employee in a Government
department. However, he was neglecting to maintain Saygo Bai
and her two children. She also pleaded that she had cordial
relationship with her husband upto year 1989. However, the
respondent-husband started avoiding the family. During the year E
1990, he took Guiab Bai as his second wife. As a result, the
appellant and her children were thrown out. She claimed the
maintenance of Rs.3,000/- per person per head. The
respondent-husband resisted this application claiming that he
always maintained good relations with Saygo Bai and used to F
visit his village Chalani, where his wife and children resided
with his parents, off and on. He claimed that when Basant, the
younger child was only six months old, Saygo Bai left her
matrimonial house without any rhyme or reason and went to her
father's place at village Banda. He further pleaded that he tried G
to bring back the appellant and had gone to that village along
with one Shobha and Haria of his village but she refused to
come back. All this, according to him, happened five years prior
to the second marriage which he had performed for taking care
.of his two children. In short, he claimed that two children were H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A always with husband and, therefore, there was no question of
abandoning them. The claim of the respondent-husband was
that the wife left his company without any rhyme or reason. He
then pointed out that it was only after five years of abandonment
of matrimonial house that his wife Saygo Bai had filed the
B application for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. thereby
he further pointed out that she was not entitled to any
maintenance as she had left his company without any
justification.
3. Saygo Bai examined herself in support of her claim and
C pointed out that till 1989 she used to live along with her two
children and the respondent-husband used to visit off and on.
However, after he took his second wife, he stopped coming
altogether to the village. She also examined one other witness
PW-2, Naua. She also spoke about the second marriage of the
D non-applicant. The third witness Kahru Ram (PW-3) was also
examined who was her near relation. She also asserted that
the husband Chueeru Bajrangi had contracted the second
marriage while the appellant Saygo Bai was living with him. She
admitted that the second wife used to take care of the father
E of the respondent-husband. Kahru Ram was also examined to
support the story of the appellant being thrown out of the
matrimonial house.
4. On behalf of the respondent-husband, he examined
F himself and claimed that when he had came to his village from
Balangi, where he was posted, his both children were lying
unattended in the house and old parents were also not being
taken care of and, therefore, he along with one Sona Ram (DW-
2) and Jharia Ram (DW-3) went to bring her back and asked
her to come back and take care of children and parents but
G she refused to come back. He, therefore, left the children to the
care of his parents and thereafter the appellant waited for 4-5
years and approached the Court only after he got married with
Guiab Bai. The two other witnesses supported the evidence of
the respondent-husband.
H
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1027
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
5. The Trial Court has returned a finding that Saygo Bai A
(appellant herein) had not come to the Court with clean hands.
A strange observation has been made that the appellant used
to visit her matrimonial house and also used to meet Guiab Bai
but she never made any complaint in the village regarding her
being driven out of the matrimonial house. Again, the Trial B
Court, very strangely, gave a finding that the wife-Saygo Bai
never tried to hold Panchayat nor made public the reason for
her living in her parents' house. Lastly, the Trial Court found that
the children were not living with her and the claim of the
petitioner (appellant herein) in her evidence that the c
respondent-husband abducted away the children secretly was
also not correct. On account of her not mentioning so in her
application the Trial Court found fault with her and strangely
gave a finding that Saygo Bai had no sufficient reason to live
separately from respondent-husband Chueeru Bajrangi. The
0
Trial Court also held that the children, being appellant Nos.2 and
3 before the Trial Court were not dependent upon Saygo Bai.
It also found that the respondent husband was justified in getting
married again since the appellant did not go to her husband
for 4-5 years and, therefore, it could not be said that the
E
respondent neglected or avoided to maintain his wife. On the
basis of these findings, the Trial Court dismissed the
application.
6. A revision was filed against this order. It was pointed
out on behalf of the petitioner (appellant herein) that even if it F
is accepted that she stayed away from husband for 4-5 years,
she was still entitled to the maintenance, at least from the date
of the application on account of the respondent having married
again and she could refuse to stay with him on account of the
second marriage. This argument was repelled by the G
respondent on the ground that the petitioner (appellant herein)
had compelled the respondent to enter into the second
marriage by not staying with him for 4-5 years. The Revisional
Court very strangely in paragraph 12 observed that the
respondent had become helpless and, therefore, got married H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A only for his family. On that ground, the Revisional Court
dismissed the revision.
7. The appellant, therefore, approached the High Court by
way of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was pointed out
to the High Court by her that she was the legally wedded wife
8
of the respondent and admittedly the respondent had taken a
second wife and, therefore, she was bound to be granted some
maintenance. On behalf of the respondent, it was argued before
the High Court that the respondent had contracted second
C marriage only after refusal· of the appellant to join him and,
therefore, she was not entitled to any maintenance under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. and she may avail remedy before the Civil
Court. The High Court relied upon the so-called admission by
the appellant that she herself had left the house of the
respondent and her husband had come for taking her back with
D him to his house. The High Court then made a very strange
observation that the appellant had not left the house on the
ground of second marriage performed by the respondent but
the respondent had contracted the marriage on the ground that
the appellant left the house and failed to discharge her
E matrimonial obligations. On this ground, the High Court
dismissed the petition. The appellant is now before us.
8. To say that we are shocked by the orders passed by all
the thr-ee Courts below would be an understatement. All the
F Courts below have completely misunderstood the second
proviso of Section 125 (3) Cr.P.C. and the Explanation thereto.
Section 125 (3), Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"125.(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient
cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may,
G for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying
the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines,
and may sentence such person, for the whole, or any part
of each month's 4[allowance for the maintenance or the
interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the
H case may be,] remaining unpaid after the execution of the
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1029
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to A
one month or until payment if sooner made:
Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery
of any amount due under this section unless application
be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period B
of one year from the date on which it became due:
Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his
wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to
live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds
of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this C
section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that
there is just ground for so doing.
Exp/anation.-lf a husband has contracted marriage with
another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered D
to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him."
Instead the Courts below have relied on sub-section (4)
which is as under:
"(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an E
4[allowance for the maintenance or the interim
maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case
may be,] from her husband under this section if she is living
in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses
to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by F
mutual consent."
9. In our opinion, all the Courts below have shown scant
disregard for the second proviso to Section 125 (3) and the
Explanation. It was an admitted position that the respondent G
had taken a second wife, namely, Guiab Bai. The respondent
not only admitted this position in his written statement and .
evidence but also tried to justify his second marriage on the
ground that the appellant had left his company and had refused
to come back to him and had also not cared for the children.
He had to keep the children with his parents at village Chalani. H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A He has, in his examination-in-chief itself, stated that he waited
for 5-6 years in the hope that his wife would come back and
take care of his children and his parents but he took the second
wife since she did not come back. In fact, with this specific
admission in the examination-in-chief itself, there was no
B question of a finding that the appellant was not justified in
claiming the maintenance. All the Courts have committed a very
serious error of law in holding that since the appellant had left
the house for 4-5 years, therefore, the respondent-husband was
justified in getting married again. Things did not stop here. The
c Courts have gone ahead to suggest that since the appellant had
left the house without any rhyme or reason, therefore, even if
the second marriage had been contracted, the petitioner
(appellant herein) would still not be entitled to the maintenance
merely because she had left the matrimonial house earlier. This
is completely erroneous. ·
0
10. We are not satisfied on the appreciation of evidence
by the lower Courts. We have gone through the evidence of the
appellant and the other witnesses. She has very specifically
stated that after the marriage till the children were born, her
E relationship was cordial with her husband. Thereafter, the
respondent brought a second wife, namely, Guiab Bai at village
Chalani where she was residing in her matrimonial home. She
was very specific in stating that when the husband brought the
second wife, he declared that he would not keep the appellant
F and started ill-treating her and threw her along with children out
of the house. In her cross-examination, she admitted that on her
husband's request she was not prepared to go to his house.
This question was put to her in a very tricky manner. It was not
stated as to at what point of time the husband came to take
G her back. She has also stated in her cross-examination that her
children were with her but for the last one year they were with
the respondent. She also admitted very fairly that the respondent ·
was educating the children. She also asserted that for the last
4 years her entry to the house of her husband was stopped. It
H is true that in paragraph 13 of the cross-examination she had
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1031
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
stated that she had not been to the house of the non-applicant A
(respondent herein) for 4-5 years and then the non-applicant
i.e. the respondent herein entered into the second marriage with
Guiab Bai. All the Courts below have relied only on this so-called
admission to hold that she had abandoned her husband for 4-
a
5 years and it is as' result of her refusal to come to the house B
of her husband that the husband took the second wife. In fact,
this is a totally incorrect and perverse appreciation of the
evidence. The Court must read whole evidence. One stray
admission cannot be read in isolation with the other evidence.
She has very specifically stated that she was thrown out of the c
matrimonial house on account of the second wife. All the Courts
below have ignored all her evidence and chosen to rely on two
lines in paragraph 13 of her cross-examination. In our opinion,
this was wholly perverse appreciation of evidence. The Courts
have also made a point that she did not call for a Panchayat
0
and, therefore, have held against her. We do not understand
the implication of this. Even if she did not call a Panchayat, it
did not mean that the respondent was justified in throwing her
out of the house and getting married second time.
11. The finding of the Courts that initially she had left the E
company and desisted from joining the husband for 4-5 years
and, therefore, she would always be dis-entitled to claim
maintenance is clearly erroneous and incorrect. In the wake of
the admitted second marriage of the respondent, the appellant
would be entitled to claim maintenance and her earlier refusal F
to join the company of the respondent would be of no
consequence whatsoever. In fact from the evidence we find that
she had not forsaken the company of her husband without any
reason. She was very clear in her evidence that the respondent
stopped visiting the matrimonial house after his second G
marriage. She may not have filed the maintenance application
immediately on her being thrown out but she asserted that she
had taken such action barely within two years after she.was
thrown out. She was very clear that she was thrown out on
account of the respondent having contracted the second H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A marriage. It is nowhere brought on record that she had left the
house without any rhyme or reason. In fact, it would be
completely unnatural for her to leave the house leaving her
children as is claimed by the respondent. In that backdrop, the
claim of the appellant appears· to be correct that she was thrown
B out along with children and it was thereafter that the children
were brought by the husband. She was candid enough in
admitting that at the time of entering the witness box, it was the
second wife who was taking care of the children. This suggested
honesty on the part of the appellant. All this evidence was
c completely ignored. We are quite aware that this Court does
not go into the evidence where the Courts below have recorded
concurrent findings of fact. However, where we find that the
appreciation of evidence by the Courts below is totally
perverse, faulty and unconscionable findings have been arrived
at, this Court would certainly go to appreciate the evidence on
0
record and that is precisely what we have done.
12. We hold that the orders of the Courts below are wholly
incorrect. Firstly, the Courts erred in holding that she left the
matrimonial house for 4-5 years and refused to join the
E company of her husband and, secondly, the Courts are totally
in error in holding that on that count she has lost the right of
maintenance. In our opinion, the application, at least insofar as
the appellant was concerned, was liable to be allowed. We
allow that application.
F
13. Ordinarily, we would have remanded the matter for
deciding the amount of maintenance. However, considering that
the appellant is in the state of penury and not getting even the
interim maintenance, we proceed to decide that issue
G ourselves. The appellant in her evidence has claimed that the
respondent-husband drew a monthly salary of Rs.2,000/- in the
year 1993. Besides, he also had 20 acres of land and grew
40 quintals of Paddy crop, 10 quintals of Wheat crop, 4 quintals
of Urad and Rawa crops and Corns etc. There is not even a
word of cross-examination O[l these claims and these claims
H
SAYGO BAI v. CHUEERU BAJRANGI 1033
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
have gone unchallenged. Even in his own evidence, the A
respondent has not uttered even a word regarding his salary
and has merely claimed that Saygo Bai was maintaining herself
by working as a labourer and earned Rs.45 per day. He made
a bald statement that there was no immovable property in his
name. He had also categorically admitted that after coming out B
of the matrimonial house he never maintained Saygo Bai:
Considering, therefore, the overall situation, it is obvious that
the respondent must be earning at least Rs.10,000/- per month
presently as salary being a Constable in police force and also
has other sources of income from agricultural properties. In that c
view, we are of the opinion that maintenance at the rate of
Rs.1,500/- per month in favour of the appellant would be a
proper maintenance. The maintenance shall be payable from
the date of the application. The three orders passed by the
Courts below are set aside. The appeal is allowed in the above 0
terms.
D.G. Appe~I allowed.
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