Holding

Respondents 3‑5 were necessary and proper parties to the suit and their impleadment was warranted.

Summary

Savitri Devi filed a civil suit against her four sons for maintenance and a charge over ancestral property, and the court issued an interim injunction restraining any alienation of the suit property. The first son subsequently sold one‑fourth shares of three parcels to three third‑party purchasers (respondents 3‑5). The purchasers applied to be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 and Section 151 CPC, but the plaintiff opposed, arguing the sales violated the injunction and were void. The trial court, the District Court and the High Court all allowed the impleadment, holding the third parties were necessary and proper parties. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the sales were void and whether the respondents should be joined to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It held that the respondents were indeed necessary and proper parties and their impleadment was justified to prevent separate suits, despite the alleged breach of the injunction. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether respondents 3‑5 are necessary and proper parties to be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 and Section 151 of the CPC.
Whether the sales made in contravention of the interim injunction render the transferees' title void, precluding their impleadment.
Whether the court may suo motu join parties to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order I Rule 10, s. Section 151
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 340
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 52

Subjects

impleadmentnecessary and proper partiesOrder I Rule 10interim injunctionmultiplicity of proceedingscivil suitmaintenancetransfer of property

Judgment

). SAVITRI DEVI A
v.
DISTRICT JUDGE, GORAKHPUR AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 18, 1999

(DR. A.S. ANAND, 0., M. SRINIVASAN AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.] B

Code of Civil procedure 1908, 0.1 R. JO r/w s.151-Necessary and
proper parties to suit-Appellant-plaintiff filing suit for maintenance-By con-
sent interim order passed restraining her sons from alienating suit proper-
ty-Thereafter first defendant selling one fourth suit property each to c
respondents 3 to 5-fl.espondents 3 to 5 applying to get impleaded as parties
to suit-Plaintiff resisting impleadment on ground that sales were in violatio11
of cowt order and therefore void-Trial Judge allowing application-District
Coult and High Coult affirming order and holding Respondents 3 to 5 were
necessary and proper parties to suit-Held, 011 facts, to avoid multiplicity of
proceedings, impleadment of respondents 3 to 5 was wa"anted.
D
)"
The appellant plaintiff filed a civil suit against her four sons for a
decree of maintenance and for creation of a charge over the ancestral
property of the family. By consent of parties, civil court passed an int~rim
order directing parties not to transfer the suit property in favour of any E
person till disposal of the suit.

Thereafter the first defendant sold one fourth share of three parcels
of land comprising the suit property each to Respondents 3 to 5 by
registered sale deeds. Respondents 3 to 5 then applied to the civil court
for being impleaded as parties to the suit. The plaintiff resisted this on the F
)- ground that the sales were in breach of the order of injunction and that
the transferees got no valid title to the suit properties. The trial court
allowed the applif.ation of Respondents 3 to 5 and directed them to be
fmp~ded as parties to the suit. The District Court in revision and the
High Court in a further writ petition filed by the appellant upheld the
G
order of the trial court_

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : Respondents 3 to 5 were necessary and proper parties to the
suit and their impleadment was warranted. Avoidance of multiplicity of H
725
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] l S.C.R.

A proceedings was one of the objects of order I Rule 10 CPC and if the -"
application for impleadment was thrown out Respondents 3 to 5 would
certainly come up with a separate suit to enforce their alleged rights.
[728-G]
Khemchand Shankar Choudhmi v. Vishnu Hari Patil, [1983] 1 SCC
B 18; Ramesh Hiracliand Kundanmal v. Municipal C01poration of Greater
Bombay, [1992] 2 SCC 524; Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, [1959] SCR
1111 and Swjit Singh v. Harbal's Singh, [1995] 6 SCC 50, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 932 of
1999.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.97 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 33123 of 1997.

Rajesh Tyagi and Praveen Jain for the Appellant.

D B.L Yadav and Ms. Sandhya Goswami for the Respondents Nos. 3-5.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SRINIVASAN, J. Leave granted.

E 2. The appellant has filed a civil suit bearing No. 1586/92 in the Court
of Munsif, Gorakhpur against her four sons for a decree for maintenance
and for creation of a charge over the ancestral property of the family. The
suit was filed on 14.8.92 and was fixed for hearing on 31.8.92. She applied
for an interim order of injunction restraining her sons from alienating the
suit property during the pendency of the suit. But on 18.8.92, a Vakalat was
F filed on .behalf of the defendants and 4th defendant also filed an affidavit
in the Court purporting to be on behalf of the defendants. The counsel
appearing for the parties expressed their consent before the Court that
during the pendency of the case the parties could be directed not to sell
the suit property to any third person. In the light of the consent of the
G counsel, the Court passed an order on that date directing the parties not
to transfer the disputed property described in the plaint in favour of any
other person till the final disposal of the suit.

. 3. On 19.8.1992 the first defendant sold his I/4th share in one of the
lands to the third respondent and 1/4th share in another land to the 4th
H respondent. On 27.8.92 he sold 1/4th share in yet another land to the 5th
SAVITRIDEVI v. DISTT.JUDGE[SRINIVASAN,J.] 727
respondent. All the three sales were by registered sale deeds. On 1.1.93 A
respondents 3 to 5 filed an application before the trial Court under Order
1, Rule 10 and Section 151 C.P.C. for impleading them as parties to the
suit. In the application they had stated that the first defendant had received
sale consideration before executing the sale deeds and handed over pos-
session of the subject-matter of the sale deeds to them. It was also alleged
that the plaintiff and the defendants had colluded together in order to
B
cause loss to them. That application was opposed by the appellant. In the
statement of objections, it was stated that the sales were in breach, con-
tempt and disregard of the order of injunction passed by the Court and
the transferees under such sales got no ti.tie to the p,roperty in order to get
impleaded as parties to the suit. c
4. The trial Court passed a detailed order on 14.7.97 granting the
application of respondents 3 to 5 and directed the plaintiff to implead them
as defendants in the suit. In the order of the trial court reference has been
made to an application filed by the first defendant to. the effect that .he was D
not earlier aware of the case and the 4th defendant had forged his signature
and filed a bogus vakalatnama. He had also alleged that the order of
injunction was obtained fraudulently on 18.8.92. The trial court has also
referred to an application under Section 340 Cr. P .C. filed by the first,
defendant and observed that the same had been dismissed by order dated
20.12.92. There is also a reference in the order of the trial court to a E
proceeding in the High Court filed by the plaintiff for quashing orders
dated 10.11.95 and 19 .4.96 passed in the suit and a miscellaneous civil
appeal arising from the suit wherein respondents. 3 to 5 had been im-
pleaded as parties. It is seen from the order of the trial court that certain
proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A C.P.C. concerning the question F
of attachment of the properties sold were also pending. It is only after
I' taking note of all those facts, the trial court allowed the application of
respondents 3 to 5 to implead them as parties to the suit. \ ' \

5. A revision by the plaintiff in the Court of District Judge, G
Gorakhpur suffered a dismissal though the District Judge passed. certain
strictures against the conduct of the first defendant on .the assumption that
he had knowledge of the order of injunction dated 18.8.92. However, the
District Judge proceeded on the Footing that respondents 3 to 5 who were
third parties had no knowledge of the proceedings in the Court. H
4-
(
7'28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R. L

A 6. The said order of the District Judge was challenged in writ petition ,. ,..,
by the appellant in the High Court. By order dated 29.9.97, the High Court
dismissed the same refusing to accept the contention of the appellant that
respondents 3 to 5 were not proper and necessary parties. The High Court
also observed that the Court below had power even suo moto to implead
a person whom it considered as proper and necessary party.
B
7. The order of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal. It
is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the sales in
favour of respondents 3 to 5 are non est in the eye of law and could not
convey any interest to the purchasers as they were executed in violation of
c the court order restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property
till the disposal of the suit. Strong reliance has been placed upon the ruling
in Surjit Singh and Others v. Harbans Singh and Others, (1995) 6 S.C.C. 50,
It is submitted that if a person who purchases the property during the
pendency of the suit is allowed to get impleaded in the suit, there will be
D no end to such impleadment as the parties will indulge in further transfers
of the suit property and the plaintiff as 'dominus litis' cannot be made to
fight against such persons indefinitely and endlessly. ~

8. The facts set out by us in the earlier paragraphs are sufficient to
E show that there is a dispute as to whether the first defendant in the suit
was party to the order of injunction made by the Court on 18.8.92. The
proceedings for punishing him for contempt are admittedly pending. The
plea raised by him that the first respondent had played a fraud not only
against him but also on the Court would have to be decided before it can
be said that the sal~s effected by the first defendant were in violation of
F the order of the Court. The plea raised by respondents 3 to 5 that they
r
were bona fide transferees for value in good faith may have to be decided -.
before it can be held that the sales in their favour created no interest in
the property. The aforesaid questions have to be decided by the Court ,.-
either in the suit or in the application filed by respondents 3 to 5 for '
G impleadment in the suit. If the application for impleadment is thrown out
without a decision on the aforesaid questions respondents 3 to 5 will
certainly come up with a separate suit to enforce their alleged rights
which means multiplicity of proceedings. In such circumstances, it ~

cannot be said that respondents 3 to 5 are neither necessary nor
H proper parties to the suit.
r
SAVITRI DEVI v. DISlT. JUDGE [SRINIVASAN, J.] 729

-.r
. 9. Order I, Rule 10 C.P.C. enables the Court to add any person as
party at any stage of the proceedings if the person whose presence before
A

,.d' the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and
completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the
said provision in the Code.
B
10. In Khemchand Shankar Choudhali and Another v. Vishnu Ha1i
Patil and Others, (1983) 1 S.C.C. 18 this Court held that a transferee
'>"
' pendente lite of an interest in an immovable property which is the subject
matter of suit is a representative in interest of the party from whom he has
acquired that interest and has a right to be impleaded as a party to the c
proceedings. The Court has taken note of the provisions of Section 52 of
the Transfer of Property Act as well as the provisions of Rule 10 of Order
XXII C.P.C. The Court said:

".. .It may be that if he does not apply to be impleaded, he may
suffer by default on account of any order passed in the proceed- D
ings. But if he applies to be impleaded as a party and to be heard
• he has got to be so impleaded and heard ..."

11. In Ramesh lfiraclzand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay and Others, [1992] 2 S.C.C. 524 this Court discussed the
E
matter at length and held that though the plaintiff is a 'dominus litis' and
not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit, the
Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties and generally
it is a matter of judicial discretion which is to be exercised in view of the
facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Court said:
F
"The case really turns on the true construction of the rule in
~
particular the meaning of the words "whose presenc.::. before the
Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually
and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions
involved in the suit".
G
.... "The Court is empowered to Join a person whose presence is
necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule
.. direct, the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary
for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the
plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the
primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of
actions."

The Court also observed that though prevention of actions cannot be said
to be main object of the rule, it is a desirable consequence of the rule. The
B test for impleading parties prescribed in Razia Begum v. A11war Begum,
(1959) S.C.R. 1111 that the person concerned must be having a direct
interest in the action was reiterated by the Bench.

12..Jn Swjit Si11gh a11d Others v. Harbans Si11gh and Others, (1995) 6
C S.C.C. 50 which is relied on by the appellant, a preliminary decree was
passed relating to immovable property in favour of the appellants. While
proceedings for passing a final decree was pending, the parties moved for
accounting and preservation of mesne profits. The trial court passed an
order restraining all parties from alienating or otherwise transferring in any
D manner any part of the property involved in the suit. Nearly two years
thereafter, one of the sharers assigned his rights under the preliminary
decree by a registered deed partly in favour of the wife of his lawyer and
partly in favour of others in the teeth of the restraint order passed by the
Court. On the basis of the assignment deed, the assignees made an applica-
tion under Order XXII, Rule 10 C.P.C. for impleadment as parties to the
·E final decree proceedings. It was contended on their behalf that assignment
of decree was different from alienation of property and the same was not
prohibited by the order of injunction. The application for impleadment was
allowed by the trial court and the appeal filed by the plaintiffs was dis-
missed by the Additional District Judge. The High Court dismissed their
F revision and the matter came to this Court. There was no dispute in that
case that the assignors and the assignees had knowledge of the order of
the injunction passed by the Court. On those facts, this Court held that the
deed of assignment was not capable of conveying any right to the assignees
and the order of impleadment of the assignees as parties was unsustainable.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The relevant passage in the judg-
G ment reads thus:

"As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed.
The assignment had taken place after the passing of the prelimi-
nary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share.
H His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree
SAVITRI DEVI v. DISTI. JUDGE [SRINIVASAN, J.] 731

relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, A
if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly
been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable
property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the
ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreci-
able difference whether property per se had been alienated or a
decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint
B
order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go
as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public
policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist
while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required
to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders c
otherwise. The Court in these circumstances has the duty as also
the right to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken
place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his
assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as
parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees- D
respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial court as
)
parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of
!is pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not
propose to examine their involvement presently. All that is em-
phasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstan-
ces had no Lause to be impleaded as parties to the suit." E

13. The said ruling has no application whatever in the present case.
As stated earlier, on the facts of this case, the impleadment of respondents
3 to 5 as parties to the suit was warranted. We do not find any justification
to interfere with the orders of the Courts below. The appeal fails and is F
hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

14. Before parting with this case it is necessary for us to point out
one aspect of the matter which is rather disturbing. In the writ petition filed
in the High Court as well as the Special Leave Petition filed in this Court,
the District Judge, Gorakhpur and the 4th Additional Civil Judge (Junior G
Division) Gorakhpur are shown as respondents and in the Special Leave
Petition they are shown as contesting respondents. There was no necessity
for impleading the judicial officers who disposed of the matter in a civil
proceeding when the writ petition was filed in the High Court; nor is there
any justification for impleading them as parties in the Special Leave H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A Petition and describing theln as contesting respondents. We do not ap-
prove of the course adopted by the petitioner which would cause unneces-
sary disturbance to the functions of the concerned judicial officers. They
cannot be iJ,1 any way equated to the officials of the Government. It is high
time that the practice of impleading judicial officers disposing of civil
B proceedings as parties to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitu-
tion of India or Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitu-
tion of India was stopped. We are strongly depricating such a practice. ·

S.M. Appeal dismissed.

t