Holding

The appellant was wrongfully discharged due to an erroneous AIDS diagnosis and a discriminatory policy, and is entitled to reinstatement of pension rights and compensation.

Summary

The appellant, a Havaldar in the Indian Army, was discharged in 2001 after being diagnosed with AIDS based on a medical report that linked his HIV-positive status with neuro‑tuberculosis. He challenged the discharge, arguing that the diagnosis was erroneous, his CD4 count remained above the threshold prescribed in the 2003 Guidelines, and that the Army’s policy treating HIV/AIDS as a self‑inflicted condition was discriminatory. The Supreme Court examined the medical evidence, the Army Rules, the Guidelines for HIV/AIDS management, and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, concluding that the appellant was not medically unfit and that the discharge was based on a wrong diagnosis and a biased policy. The Court held that the Armed Forces Tribunal erred in rejecting the appellant’s request for a fresh medical board and in denying disability pension. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s order, awarded the appellant a lump‑sum compensation of Rs. 50 lakh, and directed that he be granted pension as if he had continued in service. The appeal was therefore allowed.

Issues considered

The validity of the appellant's discharge from the Army on the ground of an AIDS diagnosis in view of medical evidence and the 2003 Guidelines.
Whether the Army's policy treating HIV/AIDS as a self‑inflicted disease and denying disability benefits violates constitutional and statutory provisions.
Whether the appellant is entitled to a reference to a fresh Medical Board for review of his medical condition.
Whether monetary compensation and pension can be awarded for wrongful discharge and discrimination.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Discharge from serviceCompensation for wrongful diagnosisStigma against HIV

Judgment

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 865 : 2024 INSC 236

Satyanand Singh
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 1666 of 2015)
20 March 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna & Dipankar Datta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The issue for consideration before this Hon’ble Court was a
challenge to a judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, which
rejected the Appellant’s prayer for a reference of his diagnosis of
AIDS, to a fresh Medical Board.
The matter arose out of the Appellant’s discharge from service
from the Indian Army under Rule 13(3), Item III (iii) of the Army
Rules, 1954 on the ground that he was suffering from AIDS. The
Appellant approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging
the Order of discharge from service. A Single Judge of the High
Court allowed the Appellant’s writ petition, which was reversed
by the Division Bench. On a challenge made to the Supreme
Court, the Appellant was permitted to withdraw his appeal, and
avail statutory remedies. Accordingly, the Appellant approached
the Armed Forces Tribunal, which passed the Impugned Order.

Headnotes
Service Law – Armed Forces – Discharge from service on the
ground of the Appellant suffering from AIDS – Application of
the Appellant for a reference to a fresh Medical Board rejected
by Armed Forces Tribunal – Challenge to:
Held: The Armed Forces Tribunal referred to extensive medical
literature regarding hazards of HIV – However, the Armed Forces
Tribunal failed to observe that the Appellant was not diagnosed with
any such symptoms – Nothing was brought on record to indicate
that the Appellant was unfit to continue in service – This is a case
of wrong diagnosis and false alarm with imperilling consequences
for the Appellant – The contention of the Union of India that the
doctors in 2001 [relevant time of the medical test] used their best
professional judgment to conclude that the Appellant was HIV+ve
was rejected on the ground that there were no test results to

* Author
866 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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justify the diagnosis that the Appellant was suffering from AIDS.
[Paras 6 and 7]
Service Law – Armed Forces – Extreme caution and care to
ensure correct diagnosis required where Officer serving in
the army is prematurely discharged from service:
Held: The Appellant was diagnosed with neuro-tuberculosis, without
examination by a neurologist, whose opinion was elementary – The
Appellant, while serving in the army, was prematurely discharged;
thus, extreme caution and care in ensuring correct diagnoses was
required – The Union of India tried to cover up the wrong diagnosis,
in spite of the test reports of the Appellant, and the Guidelines for
Management and Prevention of HIV/AIDS Infection in the Armed
Forces, 2003 [which prescribed that for condition for invalidment
of an officer on the ground of suffering from AIDS as a CD4 Cell
Count below 200 cells/mm3] – The Medical Board arbitrarily
rejected the Appellant’s prayer for a Review Medical Board on
flimsy grounds. [Para 8]
Service Law – Armed Forces – Discharge from service –
Psychological trauma of displacement from service:
Held: The severance of the employer-employee relationship results
not only in the employee losing his livelihood, but also affects those
who depend on him for their survival – The Appellant, who was
trained to live a disciplined life since the tender age of 19, was
unnecessarily, and without cogent reason thrust into civilian life
with little warning or preparation – Such displacement also causes
psychological trauma. [Para 12]
Service Law – Armed Forces – Denial of disability status on
the ground of AIDS being a self-inflicted disease is arbitrary
and unreasonable – Systemic discriminatory practice – Deep-
rooted bias against individuals diagnosed as HIV+ve:
Held: The Court expressed its reservation with respect to a Policy
of the Army which determined AIDS as self-inflicted, and prescribed
a procedure for HIV+ve service personnel to be brought before the
Release Medical Board, on the ground that it reflected a systemic
discriminatory practice – Reliance placed on the Judgment in
CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan v. Commanding Officer [2023]
14 S.C.R. 601 : 2023 INSC 857 to hold that AIDS is not always a
self-inflicted disease. [Paras 14 to 17]
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 867

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

Constitution of India – Compensatory jurisprudence – Just
compensation:
Held: The Constitution, through its Preamble, guarantees ‘Justice’
to all its people, in the deliverance of which, Courts have developed
a nuanced compensatory jurisprudence – Reliance was placed
on the Judgments in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal [1996]
Supp. (10) SCR 284 : 1996 INSC 1508 : (1997) 1 SCC 416; P.S.R.
Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [1980] 2 SCR. 873 : 1980 INSC
16 : (1980) 3 SCC 141; and the judgment in K. Suresh v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2012] 11 SCR 414 : 2012 INSC 490:
(2012) 12 SCC 274, wherein it was held that, while determining
the quantum of compensation, the adjudicating authority has to
keep in view the sufferings of the injured person, which would
include his ability to lead a full life – Having considered the plight
of the Appellant and the social stigma attached to persons who are
diagnosed as HIV+ve patients, coupled with the position that the
Appellant’s reinstatement in service is not an available option, the
Court awarded additional monetary compensation to him. [Paras
18 to 21 and 23]
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017 –
Stigma and discrimination of HIV+ve diagnosis :
Held: The stigma and discrimination which accompanies an HIV+ve
diagnosis is still an illness which afflicts the minds of society
today – The discriminatory sentiment of deeming persons who
are HIV+ve to be unfit for employment is evident from the way
in which the Appellant was treated by various authorities – The
Court awarded the Appellant a lumpsum compensation of Rs.50
Lacs towards compensation – In addition, the Appellant was held
to be entitled to pension, as if he had continued in service – The
compensation can, in no way, compensate for the ordeal faced
by the Appellant, but it may act as a balm to soothe the mind and
steady the future. [Paras 25, 26 and 28]

Case Law Cited
CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan v. Commanding Officer
[2023] 14 SCR 601 : 2023 INSC 857; D.K. Basu v.
State of West Bengal [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 284 : 1996
INSC 1508 : (1997) 1 SCC 416; P.S.R. Sadhanantham
v. Arunachalam [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980) 3 SCC 141 :
868 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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1980 INSC 16; K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. [2012] 11 SCR 414 : (2012) 12 SCC 274 : 2012
INSC 490 – relied on.

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Army Rules, 1954; The Army
Regulations 1987; The Guidelines for Prevention and Control
of HIV Infections in the Armed Forces, 1992; The Guidelines
for Management and Prevention of HIV/AIDS Infection in the
Armed Forces, 2003; The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007; The
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017.

List of Keywords
Discharge from service; Compensation for wrongful diagnosis;
Stigma against HIV.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.1666 of 2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2012 in O.A. No.89 of
2010 and dated 25.02.2013 in M.A. Nos.81-82 of 2013 of the Armed
Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi
Appearances for Parties
Satya Mitra, Ms. Kawalpreet Kaur, Nayab Gauhar, Advs. for the
Appellant.
R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Rajesh Kr. Singh, Debashish Mishra,
Mohan Prasad Gupta, Sanjay Kr. Tyagi, Ms. Sweksha, Dr. N.
Visakamurthy, Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Ishan Sharma, Advs. for the
Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
THE CHALLENGE
1. The present civil appeal lays a challenge to the judgment and order
dated 05th September, 2012 (“impugned judgment”, hereafter) of the
Principal Bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal at New Delhi (“AFT”,
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 869

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

hereafter), whereby the AFT rejected the appellant’s prayer seeking
reference of his diagnosis as AIDS inflicted, to a fresh Medical Board.
BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS
2. The factual matrix of the case, insofar as is relevant for the purpose
of a decision on this appeal, is noted hereinbelow:
(i) The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army on 30th October,
1993 as a Havaldar. He continued discharging his duties on
a clerical post without impediment until the year 1999, when
he began suffering from fever, headache and vomiting. For
treatment he was referred to the Jabalpur Military Hospital.
Here, the appellant tested positive for HIV.
(ii) On 9th January, 2000, the Army Headquarters issued a Notice
(“Notice”, hereafter) stating that all persons who are HIV+ve and
are suffering from pulmonary or extrapulmonary tuberculosis,
would be considered as AIDS cases.
(iii) Thereafter, on 20th August, 2001, the appellant developed similar
symptoms yet again, for which he was referred to the Jabalpur
Military Hospital. The doctors there prescribed certain medicines
to the appellant, which he claims led to his developing double
vision. The appellant was referred to the Command Hospital
at Pune for further treatment.
(iv) In view of the appellant’s ocular afflictions, the doctors,
suspecting the same to be a symptom of neuro-tuberculosis,
began treating him for the same. Vide Medical Report dated 14th
September, 2001 (“Medical Report” hereafter), the appellant was
reported to be suffering from “AIDS defining illness in the form
of neuro-tuberculosis”, and thus was officially diagnosed with
AIDS. The appellant was then recommended to be invalided
out in the “P5” category. Per the medical categorisation of the
Army, “P5” referred to those persons who were suffering from
“gross limitations in physical capacity and stamina”.
(v) As a consequence of the report dated 14th September, 2001, the
appellant was referred to the Invaliding Medical Board (“IMB”
hereafter), which confirmed his diagnosis of suffering from AIDS.
(vi) On 26th December, 2001, after 8 years and 58 days of service, at
the young age of 27, the appellant was discharged from service
870 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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under Rule 13 (3), Item III(iii) of the Army Rules, 19541 (“Rules”
hereafter) on the ground of having been found medically unfit
for further service.
(vii) On 23 rd May 2003, the “Guidelines for Management and
Prevention of HIV/AIDS Infection in the Armed Forces” (“2003
Guidelines” hereafter) came into force. In a shift from the Notice,
the said policy included into its consideration the CD4 cell count
of the personnel, and that the condition for invalidment would
be, inter alia, a CD4 cell count below 200 cells/mm3.
(viii) The appellant approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
seeking quashing of the discharge order dated 26th December,
2001 and reinstatement with all consequential benefits. A
learned Judge of the High Court, vide order dated 20th April,
2006, allowed the appellant’s writ petition.
(ix) However, in exercise of intra-court appeal jurisdiction, an
Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court vide its order dated
28th March, 2007 reversed the order under appeal. The Division
Bench observed that in accordance with Para 355 (f)2 of the
Regulations for the Army, 1987 (“Regulations”, hereafter), the
appellant was not discharged solely on the ground of having
contracted a sexually transmitted disease. The appellant’s
discharge from service was held to be valid on the ground that
AIDS would incapacitate his physical capacity, thus coming
within the ambit of Rule 13 of the Rules. An application for
review of the said order was also dismissed vide order dated
27th August, 2007.
(x) The appellant challenged both the orders before the Supreme
Court. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court vide order dated 01st
April, 2009 allowed the appellant to withdraw his appeal,

1 An enrolled person under the Army Act who has been attested on the ground of being found medically
unfit for further service could be discharged by the Commanding Officer, to be carried out only on the
recommendation of an invaliding Board.
2 “355. Contraction of sexually transmitted disease - The following principles will be observed in dealing
with OR including reservists and non - combatants, who contracts sexually transmitted disease:
f) An OR is not to be discharged from service solely on account of his having contracted sexually
transmitted disease. If, however, he has been absent from duty on account of sexually transmitted
disease for a total period of four months, whether continuous or not, his case may be brought to the
notice of the authority empowered to order his discharge from the service, for consideration as to
whether he should be discharged from the service under the table annexed to Army Rule 13 item III if
attested, and under item IV if not attested.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 871

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

while directing that he could avail of the available statutory
remedies.
(xi) The appellant availed of his statutory remedy by making an
application to the Director General Armed Forces Medical Service
(“DGAFMS” hereafter) seeking a Review Medical Board. The
DGAFMS, vide order dated 20th October, 2009, rejected the
appellant’s prayer on the ground that the criteria for discharge
was satisfied in terms of the Army’s prevailing policy at the time,
i.e., the “Guidelines for Prevention and Control of HIV Infections in
the Armed Forces” dated 30th November, 1992 (“1992 Guidelines”
hereafter). Furthermore, the appellant was also denied disability
pension, AIDS being categorised as a self-inflicted condition.
(xii) The order passed by the DGAFMS was subjected to challenge
by the appellant before the AFT which, vide the impugned
judgment, rejected his prayer on the ground that the Medical
Report had concluded after sufficient investigation and detail
that he was suffering from (i) CNS Tuberculosis and (ii) Immune
Surveillance for HIV. The IMB, which confirmed the findings of
the Medical Report, was held to have been rightly constituted
with the required experts. The appellant argued that he was
misdiagnosed with AIDS, his CD4 cell count being 379 cells/
mm3 till as late as 05.08.2012 as opposed to the benchmark
of 200 cells/mm3 set by the World Health Organisation. The
AFT rejected this argument on the ground that such a CD4 cell
count was marginal and would not entitle the appellant to be
declared AIDS free, thus obviating the need for referring him
to a Review Medical Board.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Kawalpreet Kaur, relied on
the 1992 Guidelines to argue that in terms thereof, all personnel
with HIV infection were to be retained in service, the only restriction
on their employment being, inter alia, that they would not be posted
to high altitude areas. Ms. Kaur further contended that there had
been an error in diagnosis in the Medical Report itself, since the
appellant never suffered from tuberculosis which was taken as a
defining illness for AIDS. It was urged that the appellant was merely
suffering from double vision, which cleared up by 15th November,
2001. However, the doctors misdiagnosed the appellant’s double
872 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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vision for a tuberculosis related symptom of blindness. Consequently,
in view of the Notice, the appellant having been found to be both
HIV+ve and suffering from tuberculosis, was invalided from service.
Ms. Kaul further argued that as per the Army’s 2003 Guidelines,
the appellant was fit for service since his CD4 cell count remained
above 200/mm3 till as late as 2012. This defining indicator for AIDS
was argued to have been erroneously disregarded by both, the
IMB and the AFT. In support of the same, it was further argued that
the appellant was asymptomatic till date, without undergoing any
anti-retro viral therapy as would have been prescribed for a person
suffering from AIDS; thus, establishing without a doubt, that the
appellant never developed AIDS to begin with. Ms. Kaur concluded
by arguing that the appellant’s case was one of wrongful discharge,
based on a wrong diagnosis.
4. Per contra, Mr. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel for
the respondents contended that the appellant had never been
discharged solely on the basis of his HIV+ve status, the same being
evident from his uninterrupted service from 1999 till April 2001. The
doctors at the time, on the basis of their best professional judgment
and giving due regard to the medical knowledge prevalent in 2001,
diagnosed the appellant with neuro-tuberculosis, which led to a
change in status of the appellant from HIV+ve to “AIDS related
complex”. It was further argued that the appellant responded well
to anti-tuberculosis treatment, thus confirming the diagnosis of
the time. It was further contended that his survival ought to be
attributed to be a natural variation in the course of the disease
rather than a misdiagnosis on the part of the medical professionals.
With respect to the appellant’s allegation that his double vision
was mistaken for blindness, Mr. Balasubramanian further argued
that the appellant had placed no documents on record to prove
such a claim, and that the tuberculosis diagnosis was made only
after detailed investigations. It was also argued that AIDS would
expectedly lead to a deterioration in the health of the appellant,
which is why he was discharged under the P5 category, having
been found grossly unfit for medical service.
ANALYSIS
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
impugned judgment as well as the other materials on record.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 873

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

6. The AFT, in the impugned judgment, has referred to extensive
medical literature citing the hazards of HIV and how it can lead to a
deterioration in the physical condition of those who get detected as
HIV+ve. However, while the medical literature contemplates myriad
infirmities which accompany such a disease and consequently render
an individual unfit for military service, the AFT failed to observe that
the appellant in the present case was not diagnosed with any such
symptoms. The appellant was treated by the Command Hospital
at Pune in 2001, and by the respondents’ admission, successfully
responded to the treatment administered. Nothing has been brought
on record to indicate that the appellant was thereafter unfit to continue
in service as a Clerk.
7. We have no doubt in our mind that this is a case of wrong diagnosis
and false alarm with imperilling consequences for the appellant.
The respondents’ contention that doctors in 2001 have used their
best professional judgment to opine that the appellant was HIV+ve,
in our opinion, should be rejected, in the absence of any medical
literature to show that the test results as per then prevailing medical
standards justify the diagnosis that the appellant was suffering from
AIDS defining illness. On the other hand, there are lapses galore on
the part of the respondents. They were, in spite of being aware of
the adverse and pernicious impact on the appellant, grossly careless
and negligent.
8. The appellant was diagnosed with neuro tuberculosis, which diagnosis
was without examination by a neurologist whose opinion, according
to us, would seem to be elementary. The AFT’s opinion that the
need of the medical specialist was fulfilled by placing an oncologist
on Board is something with which we cannot agree. The appellant
while serving in the army was being prematurely discharged; thus
extreme caution and care in ensuring correct diagnoses was required.
The respondents have deliberately tried to cover up the wrong
diagnosis in spite of the 2003 Guidelines and the test reports of the
appellant. The respondents had the opportunity from 2007 onwards
to rectify and correct themselves after the order of the single Judge
of the High Court dated 20th April, 2006. The Medical Board, which
was constituted upon the appellant availing the statutory remedy,
arbitrarily, wrongly and in our opinion deliberately vide order dated
20th October, 2009 rejected the appellant’s prayer on flimsy and wrong
grounds by applying the 1992 Guidelines. Even disability pension
874 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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was denied by categorising the appellant as suffering from AIDS, a
self-inflicted condition.
9. Significantly, the appellant had submitted between the period of 2007
and 2012, as many as four diagnostic reports, showing that his CD4
cell count was above 300 cells/mm3, as opposed to the respondents’
2003 Guidelines defining an AIDS illness to be one where the CD4
cell count is below 200 cells/mm3.
10. The apathetic attitude of the respondents to the appellant’s plight is
evident in the repeated submission that has been made before all
fora, i.e., the appellant’s case had been re-examined several times
and thus did not merit another look. It is borne out from the record
that other than the Medical Report, which the appellant alleges was
made by a doctor who did not treat him, and the review of such report
by the IMB, his case was never again considered on its merits. The
dismissal of the appellant’s application by the DGAFMS vide order
dated 20th October, 2009 can only be called perfunctory at best,
since it did not take into account any of the material subsequently
produced by the appellant.
11. The respondents’ submissions, as elaborate as they may be, in
defence of the AIDS diagnosis which was used to discharge the
appellant from service, are rendered unworthy of acceptance on the
face of his existence today, as an asymptomatic HIV+ve individual
without the intervention of any anti-retroviral therapy.
12. The severance of the employer – employee relationship can never
be said to be an easy choice, for it not only results in the employee
losing his livelihood, but also affects those who depend on him for
their survival. And if the employer happens to be the Indian Army,
the loss is even greater, since it has the effect of suddenly displacing
a soldier from the regimented lifestyle of the military. The appellant,
who was trained to live a disciplined life since the tender age of 19,
was unnecessarily and without cogent reason thrust into civilian life
with little warning or preparation. The psychological trauma that such
displacement can bring about needs no elaboration. However, the
cruel passage of time has unfortunately rendered the appellant’s
original hopes of reinstatement an unrealised dream.
13. The appellant, as an alternative relief, has consistently prayed for
disability pension but was denied the same on the ground that the
disease is self-inflicted.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 875

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

14. At this juncture, we consider it apposite to refer to certain provisions
of the Notice published by the Army:
“4. Pulmonary Tuberculosis and HIV infection will not be
assessed separately for attributability / aggravation. HIV
aggravation is a ‘STD’ and hence AIDS is self-inflicted,
neither attributable nor aggravated.
5. The policy on awarding longevity and percentage of
disability for HIV+ve service personnel brought before
release medical Board is as follows :-
‘As per existing instructions, JCOs/ORs or their
equivalent in the Navy/Air Force placed in permanent
low Medical category are permitted to continue in
service only in case the Unit COs render a certificate
to the effect that sheltered appointment shall be
provided. Otherwise such individuals are brought
before Release Medical Board for releasing from
service. It is unlikely that HIV positive cases in perm
low Medical Category would be given sheltered
appointment and recommended for retention in
service by unit cos’.
6. Following procedure will be followed in HIV+ve service
personnel brought before Release Medical Board.
a) Longevity: By the time HIV+ve case is brought before
Release Medical Board, it is likely that he had acquired
the infection about 1-2 years earlier. Therefore, it is likely
that he would develop AIDS within next 6-8 years. After
development of AIDS the average life span is only 1-2
years. Therefore loading of age by 2 years at the time
of Release Medical Board is considered appropriate.
b) Percentage of disability: In fact viral multiplication
during this period is average and the immune system
being systematically destroyed. Apart from infection,
HIV+ve cases will suffer emotionally, psychologically
and socially. Taking all these factors in consideration,
40% disability for asymptomatic cases and upto 100%
for symptomatic cases will be awarded.”
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15. A perusal of the Notice reveals that in terms of Para 6A, a person who
has been diagnosed as HIV+ve was expected to develop AIDS within
6-8 years, and thereafter, have a limited lifespan of only 1-2 years. We
cannot help but record reservation as the policy reflects the systemic
discriminatory practice and predisposition treating HIV as aggravation
of STD and AIDS is self-inflicted. In arguendo, even going by the
respondents’ own policy, the appellant could not be said to be suffering
from AIDS since, in flagrant defiance of the policy assessment, the
appellant is reportedly still alive and suffering from no serious ailment.
16. A further examination of the respondents’ policy reveals that though
AIDS was always deemed to be a self-inflicted disease, there was still a
provision for conferring disability status to those afflicted with the same.
Yet, time and again, we find the respondents here have mechanically
denied the appellant’s request for disability status in a most arbitrary and
unreasonable manner. It is pertinent to note that in yet another instance
of the deep-rooted bias against individuals diagnosed as HIV+ve, the
Notice allows for sheltered appointments to those diagnosed with such
a condition, while in the same breath stating that the provision of such
sheltered appointments is an unlikely possibility.
17. We may note here that in CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan v.
Commanding Officer3, the concerned member of the Air Force
was diagnosed as HIV+ve because of a blood transfusion that did
not proceed along laid down protocol and went awfully wrong for
which this Court had to award appropriate quantum of compensation.
Reference is made to the said decision at this stage only to highlight
that AIDS is not always a self-inflicted disease and there appears
to have been no worthy attempt on the part of the respondents to
ascertain the root cause of the appellant’s physical distress.
18. The Constitution, through its Preamble, guarantees to all its people
‘Justice’, in the deliverance of which, the Courts of the land have
developed a nuanced compensatory jurisprudence through a catena
of judgments, for a wide compass of situations.
19. This Court, towards the end of the last century held in D.K. Basu
v. State of West Bengal4 that:

3 [2023] 14 SCR 601 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1220
4 [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 284 : (1997) 1 SCC 416
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 877

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

“54. Thus, to sum up, it is now a well-accepted proposition
in most of the jurisdictions, that monetary or pecuniary
compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and
sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal
of the established infringement of the fundamental right
to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is
vicariously liable for their acts.”
20. In P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam 5, this Court while
emphasising its power to do full and complete justice, ruminated:
“6. The jural reach and plural range of that judicial process
to remove injustice in a given society is a sure index of
the versatile genius of law-inaction as a delivery system
of social justice. By this standard, our constitutional order
vests in the summit Court of jurisdiction to do justice, at
once omnipresent and omnipotent but controlled and
guided by that refined yet flexible censor called judicial
discretion. This nidus of power and process, which master-
minds the broad observance throughout the Republic of
justice according to law, is Article 136.”
21. While discussing award of ‘just compensation’ in a personal injury
case, this Court in K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.6
had the occasion to observe that:
“10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority,
while determining the quantum of compensation, has to
keep in view the sufferings of the injured person which
would include his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to
enjoy the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed
but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he
used to earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing
compensation the approach of the Tribunal or a court
has to be broad based. Needless to say, it would involve
some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical
exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum
of compensation. In determination of compensation the

5 [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980) 3 SCC 141
6 [2012] 11 SCR 414 : (2012) 12 SCC 274
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fundamental criterion of “just compensation” should be
inhered.”
22. Not too long ago, in CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan (supra), this
Court while awarding compensation to a person discharged from
the Indian Air Force, ruled:
“103. ***People sign up to join the armed forces with
considerable enthusiasm and a sense of patriotic duty.
This entails a conscious decision to put their lives on the
line and be prepared for the ultimate sacrifice of their lives.
A corresponding duty is cast upon all state functionaries,
including echelons of power within the armed forces to
ensure that the highest standards of safety (physical/
mental wellbeing, medical fitness as well as wellness) are
maintained. This is absolutely the minimum required of the
military/air force employer for not only assuring the morale
of the forces but also showing the sense of how such
personnel matter and their lives count, which reinforces
their commitment and confidence. Any flagging from
these standards - as the multiple instances in the present
case have established, only entails a loss of confidence
in the personnel, undermines their morale and injects a
sense of bitterness and despair not only to the individual
concerned but to the entire force, leaving a sense of
injustice. When a young person, from either sex (as is
now a days the case) enrols or joins any armed forces,
at all times, their expectation is to be treated with dignity
and honour. The present case has demonstrated again
and again how dignity, honour and compassion towards
the appellant were completely lacking in behaviour by
the respondent employer. Repeatedly the record displays
a sense of disdain, and discrimination, even a hint of
stigma, attached to the appellant, in the attitude of the
respondent employer. Although this court has attempted
to give tangible relief, at the end of the day it realizes
that no amount of compensation in monetary terms can
undo the harm caused by such behaviour which has
shaken the foundation of the appellant›s dignity, robbed
him of honour and rendered him not only desperate
even cynical.”
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 879

Satyanand Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

23. It has been submitted by the counsel for the appellant that he is
presently aged 50 years and is into a small business of his own.
Having considered the plight of the appellant, which his employer
failed to address, as well as the social stigma attached to persons
who are diagnosed as HIV+ve patients, coupled with the position
that the appellant’s reinstatement in service is not an available option
now and also that direction for grant of pension, which we propose
to make, cannot be considered an equitable restitution of what the
appellant has suffered by reason of psychological, financial and
physical trauma, we deem it fit to additionally award him monetary
compensation.
24. Having been discharged from the services of the Indian Army at
the prime age of 27, the appellant was robbed of the opportunity of
further serving the nation for many more years on account of a most
unfortunate turn of events, the responsibility for which can lie on no
shoulders other than the respondents 2 to 4. It is also borne from
the record that the appellant neither received his leave encashment,
nor received reimbursement for the expenses incurred by him in
medical tests.
25. We would be remiss in not recognising the particular circumstances of
the appellant’s discharge from service which compounded the agony
of the process, i.e., a wrongful diagnosis of AIDS and subsequent
termination of services on the same ground. It is no secret that despite
the enactment of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017,
and the slew of awareness measures taken by Governments in recent
times, the stigma and discrimination which lamentably accompanies
an HIV+ve diagnosis is still an illness that afflicts the minds of society
today. The discriminatory sentiment of deeming persons who are
HIV+ve to be unfit for employment, is starkly evident from the way
in which the appellant has been responded to and treated by the
various authorities. By misdiagnosing the appellant with AIDS, the
respondents indubitably subjected the appellant to further misery
in not only combating social stigma against a disease which the
appellant never suffered from but also from the dreadful thought of
an imminent death resulting from an incurable disease.
26. In view of the extreme mental agony thus undergone by the appellant,
in not only facing the apathetic attitude of the respondents 2 to 4 but
880 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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in facing the concomitant social stigma and the looming large death
scare that accompanied such a discharge from the armed forces,
we deem it fit to award a lumpsum compensation of Rs.50,00,000/-
(Rupees fifty lakh only) towards compensation on account of wrongful
termination of services, leave encashment dues, non-reimbursement
of medical expenses and the social stigma faced, to be paid by
the respondents 2 – 4 to the appellant within eight weeks from
the date of this judgment without fail. In addition to the above, the
appellant shall be entitled to pension in accordance with law as if
he had continued in service as Havaldar and on completion of the
required years of service retired as such, without being invalided.
We make it clear that since the appellant had not continued in
service beyond 26th December, 2001 and there was no occasion to
assess his performance for securing a promotion, he shall not be
entitled to raise any plea in relation thereto. However, in computing
the quantum of pension payable to the appellant, the respondents
shall take into account allowances / increments that the appellant
would have been entitled to, had he continued in service till the date
of his retirement as Havaldar.
27. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment is set aside and
the civil appeal stands allowed.
28. We are conscious that whatever amount by way of compensation
has been directed to be paid to the appellant, by the respondents
2 to 4, can in no manner compensate for the ordeal he had to face
over the years; there could never be an appropriate substitute for
such adversity but such financial compensation might act as a balm
to soothe the mind and steady the future. Now that we have been
informed that the appellant is active and involved in a business of
his own, our prayers are with him to lead a long and healthy life.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:
Vidhi Thaker, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal allowed.
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)