Supreme Court of India
SATYA PAL ANANDversusSTATE OF M.P. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 988
- Decided
- 26 October 2016
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- RANJAN GOGOI
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petition because the registration officer lacks power to cancel the Extinguishment Deed and the appellant must pursue the statutory remedy under the Madhya Pradesh Co‑operative Societies Act.
Summary
The appellant, Satya Pal Anand, claimed inheritance of a plot allotted to his mother by a housing cooperative society, which after her death unilaterally executed and registered an Extinguishment Deed cancelling the allotment. He entered into a compromise deed receiving Rs.6.5 lakh, but also filed a dispute under the Madhya Pradesh Co‑operative Societies Act and sought a writ under Art. 226 to have the Extinguishment Deed and subsequent deeds declared void. The High Court dismissed the writ, holding that the appellant had an alternative statutory remedy and that the registration officer lacked power to cancel a registered document. A division bench of the Supreme Court split: one judge applied the Thota Ganga Laxmi principle to deem the registration void, while the other upheld the High Court’s view that the registration was valid and the remedy lay in the cooperative forum. The larger bench affirmed the latter view, stating that the Registration Act does not empower the Sub‑Registrar or Inspector General to cancel registration and that the cooperative society’s unilateral cancellation is a matter for the statutory forum, not writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The High Court's justification in dismissing the writ petition under Art. 226.
- Whether a writ can be issued to declare the Extinguishment Deed and subsequent deeds void when an alternative statutory remedy exists.
- Whether the Sub‑Registrar (Registration) or the Inspector General (Registration) have authority to cancel registration of a compulsory document under the Registration Act, 1908.
- Whether the cooperative society was competent to unilaterally cancel the allotment and execute an Extinguishment Deed under the Madhya Pradesh Co‑operative Societies Act, 1960 and its Bye‑laws.
- Whether the principle laid down in Thota Ganga Laxmi & Anr. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh applies in Madhya Pradesh in the absence of a specific rule.
- Whether the registration of the Extinguishment Deed is a nullity ab initio.
Legislation cited
- Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 62
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 59
- Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960s. 64
- Registration Act, 1908s. 17(1)(b), s. 18, s. 20, s. 21, s. 22, s. 24, s. 31, s. 32, s. 34, s. 35, s. 36, s. 37, s. 68, s. 69, s. 72, s. 87, s. 88, s. 89
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 31
Subjects
registration of extinguishment deedco‑operative societywrit jurisdictionArticle 226civil remedymultiple proceedingsstatutory remedyproperty rightsSpecific Relief ActLimitation Act
Judgment
[2016) 12 S.C.R. 26
A SATYA PAL ANAND
v.
STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6673 of2014)
B OCTOBER 26, 2016
[RANJAN GOGOi, PRAFULLA C. PANT AND
A.M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.)
Registration Act, 1908 - ss.17(1){b), 32, 34, 35, 69 and, 87 -
C ,Allotment of plot by Housing Co-operative Society - After the death
of allottee, the society executed Deed of Extinguishment unilaterally
cancelling the allotment - On the. ground of violation of Bye-laws
of the Society- Thereafter, the Society allotted the plot to respondent·
No.5 - Objection to the subsequent allotment by the appellant (son
of the allottee) - By a Compromise Deed between the Society and
D .respondent No.5 on one side and the appellant on the other,
appellant received Rs. 6.50 lakh - Appellant raised dispute uls.64
of Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act challenging Society :S
action of unilaterally registering Extinguishment Deed and also
claimed to be owner of the plot having inherited the same - During
E pendency of the dispute the plot was further ,transferred to
respondent Nos. 6 and 7 - Demand of the Society to. refund the
amount received in furtherance of compromise, was not heeded to
by the appellant - Appel/am_ also moved application before Sub-
Registrar (Registration) for cancelling the registration of the
Extinguishment Deed - The application was rejected on the grounds
F that dispute was pending with regard to the same subject matter
and that the Sub-Registrar had no jurisdiction to cancel the
registration - Application before Inspector General (Registration)
was also rejected - Writ petition seeking declaration that
Extinguishment Deed and also two subsequent deeds were void ab
G initio and sought direction for the Sub-Registrar and the Inspector
General to record "cancellation of those documents - The petition
was dismissed by High Court - Difference of opinion between the J
iudges of Division Bench of Supreme Court - One Judge, following
the exposition in Thota Ganga Laxmi case held that registration of
Extinguishment Deed was a nullity in law - Another Judge upheld
H
26
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 27
the High Court judgment and opined that the general principles A
laid down in Thota Ganga Laxmi case cannot be made applicable to
the present case in absence of specific Rule in that behalf - Matter
referred to larger Bench - Held: The Co-operative Society was
competent to unilaterally cancel the allotment made to its members
and to cancel the membership of such member due to default
B
_committed by the member - Any cause of action in that regard must
be adjudicated by the procedure prescribed in that behalf~ The
right of the appellant qua the plot would be subject to final outcome
of such action - The appellant being the legal heir of the a/lottee
cannot have any right higher than that of his predecessor -
Extinguishment Deed required compulsory registration u/s. 17(1)(b) c
of the Registration Act, 1908 - 1908 Act does not empower to recall
such registration - In absence of any express provision in that behalf.
Sub-Registrar (Registration) would not be competent to cancel the
registration of documents in question - Even the Inspector General
(Registration) does not have power to cancel the registration - The
D
1908 Act does not require presence of both the parties to the
document when presented for registration - Non-presence of the
other party to the Extinguishment Deed cannot be said to be
fraudulent action per se - However, the party aggrieved by such
registration is free to challenge its validity befo~ the Civil Court -
The decisi_on in Thota Ganga Laxmi case is with reference to an E
express provision contained in Andhra Pradesh Rules in that behalf
and in absence of such express provision in other State legislations,
the Registering Officer would be governed by the provision in 1908
Act - High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition with liberty to
pursue statutory remedy resorted to by him under 1960 Act or by
F
resorting to any other remedy - Madhya PradeshCo-operative
Societies Act, 1960.
Constitution of India :
Art.226 - Jurisdiction under - Nature and scope of - Held:
The remedy of writ u!Art. 226 is extra-ordinary and discretionary - G
The exercise of discretion to issue a writ is a matter of granting
equitable relief - In exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High Court
cannot be oblivious to the conduct of the party invoking that remedy
- No Court can be a party to a speculative litigation much less the
High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction - Remedy of writ cannot
H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016112 S.C.R.
A - be used for declaration ofprivate rights of the parties or enforcement
of their contractual rights and obligations.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court has justly dismissed the writ
petition file~ by the appellant with liberty to the appellant to
B pursue stafotory remedy resorted to by him under Madliya
Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 or by resorting to any
other remedy as may be advised and permissible in law. All
questions to be considered in those proceedings will have to be
decided on its own merits. [Para 33] (61-A-B]
c 2.1 The remedy of Writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is extra-ordinary and discretionary. In
exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot be oblivious
to the conduct ofthe party invoking that remedy. The exercise
of discretion to issue a writ is a matter of granting equitable relief.
D It is a remedy in equity. The fact that the party may have several
remedies for the same cause of action, he must elect his remedy
and cannot be permitted to indulge in multiplicity of actions. The
High Court declined to entertain the Writ Petition filed by the
appellant, which was essentially to challenge the same
Extinguishinent Deed and subsequent deeds which were sought
E by the appellant in the proceedings u/s. ()4 of Madhya Pradesh
Co-oprative Societies Act, 1960 and also before the Deputy
Registrar, Co-operative Societies. No fault can be found with the
approach of the High Court 1in -refusing to exercise .its writ
jurisdiction because of the conduct of the appellant in pursuing
F multiple proceedings for the same relief and also because the
appellant had an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy to
which he bas already resorted to. [Para 14) [47-D-F]
2.2 In the present case, the appellant not only entered into
a compromise deed with the Society and the subsequent
G purchaser but also resorted to statutory remedy. Having entered
into a compromise deed, it is doubtful whether the appellant can
be heard to complain about the irregularity in the registration of
the Extinguishment Deed, if any. The appellant has not disputed
the execution of the compromise deed, nor has he paid any heed
to the notice given by the other party to refund the amount
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 29
accepted by him in furtherance of the compromise deed. No Court A
can be party to a speculative litigation much less the High Court
in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Writ Petition filed by the
appellant deserved to be dismissed. [Para 15) f48-A-C]
2.3 The fact whether the compromise deed~entered into by
the appellant was voluntary and at his own volition or under B
duress, is essentially a question of fact. That cannot be
adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. Depending on the answer thereto,'
the other issues may become relevant and would arise for
consideration. The only relief that can be granted and which has
already been clarified by the High Court in the impugned
judgment, is to keep all questions open to enable the appellant c
to pursue the statutory remedy already invoked by him. Remedy
of writ cannot be used for declaration of private rights of the
parties or enforcement of their contractual rights and obligations.
[Para 16] [48-D-E, H; 49-A]
3.1 Merely because some,irregularity has been committed D
in registration of Extinguishment Deed unilaterally presented by
the Society for registration or in respect of the subsequent deeds
registered at the instance of third party without notice to the
appellant, that, by itself, will not result in registration of those
documents due to corrupt motives of the State Authority. More E
so, in the present case, the appellant having entered into a
compromise deed with the Society and third party (subsequent
allottees) in respect of the subject plot, it is doubtful whether it.
is open to the appellant to question the act of unilateral execution
and registration of the stated Extinguishment Deed being irregular
much less void and nullity:·{Para 17) [49-F-H; 50-A] F
3.2 The respondents-Society is a Co-operative Housing
Society Limited and is governed by its Bye-Laws. The member
is obliged-lo erect a house on the plot allotted to him within
specified time, failing which must suffer the consequence including
cancellation of allotment of plot and removal of his membership. G
At the time of allotment, the member executes an agreement
whereunder he/she undertakes to abide by the \:onditions
specified for erecting a house on the plot. allotted to him/her in
the manner prescri.bed therein. Whether the Society is justified
in proceeding against the defaulting member by cancelling fae H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A allotment of plot as well as membership, is an issue falling within
the purview of the business of the Society. The member is bound
by the stipulation contained in the agreeme1_1t executed by him/
her and in particular the Bye-laws of the Society. Any action by
the Society for breach thereof is just or otherwise can be
questioned before the statutory Forum under the Madhya
B
Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Those are matters
, which can and must be answered in the proceedings resorted to
by the appellant before the statutory Forum. [Para 17] (50-A-D)
3.3 There is distinction between ultra vires act of the
Statutory Authority and a case of a simple infraction of the
c procedural Rule. The question, whether the Society was
competent to unilaterally cancel the allotment of a plot given to
, its member and to cancel the membership of such member due
to default committed by the member, is within the purview of the
business-of the Society. Any cause of action in that regard must
D be adjudicated by the procedure prescribed in that behalf. It is
not open to presume that the Society had no authority in law to
. take a decision in that behalf. The right of the appellant qua the
plot of land would obviously be subject to the final outcome of
such action. The appellant being the legal representative of the
original allottee, cannot claim any right higher than that of his
E predecessor qua the Housing Society, which is the final authority
to decide on the issue of continuation of membership of its
member. The right of the member to remain in occupation of the
plot allotted by the Society would be entirely dependent on that
decision. [Para 18) [50-E-G)
F Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72 : 1964
SCR 733 - distinguished.
4.1 The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands
discharged, once the document is registered. Section 17 of'the
Registration Act, 1908 deals with documents which require
G compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such
document referred to in Section 17(l)(b). [Para 21) (51-G)
Government of U.P. v. Raja Moha111111ad A111ir Ah111ad
Khan AIR 1961 SC 787:1962 SCR 97 - relied on.
Yanala Malleshwari v. Ananthula Saya111111a AIR 2007
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 31
Andhra Pradesh 57 [FB) - approved. A
4.2 There is no express provision in the Act of 1908 which
empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact
whether the document was properly presented for registration
cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The
power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In B
absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to
assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent
to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly,
. the power of the Inspector General is limited to do
superintendence of registration offices and make rules in that
behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the c
registration of any document which has already been registi!red.
[Para 21) [52-A-C] ·
4.3 If the document is required to be compulsorily
registered, but while doing so, .some irregularity creeps in, that,
by itself, cannot result in a fraudulent action of the State Authority. D
Non-presence of the other party to the Extinguishment· Deed
presented by the Society before the Registering Officer by no
standard can be said to be a fraudulent action per se. The fact
whether that was done deceitly to cause loss and harm to the-
other party to the Deed, is a question of fact which must be pleaded E
and proved by the party making such allegation. That fact cannot
be presumed. In either case, the party aggrieved by such
registration of document is free to challenge its validity before
the Civil Court. [Para 23) [52-H; 53-A-C]
4.4 Admittedly, the documents in question do not fall within F
Sections 31, 88 and 89 of 1908 Act. Further, Section 32 of 1908
Act does not require presence of both parties to the document
when it is presented for registration. liI that sense, presentation
of Extinguishment Deed by the authorized person of the Society'
for registration cannot be faulted with reference to Section 34 of
the Act of 1908: That provision stipulates the enquiry to be done G
by the Registering Officer before registration of the document.
Even this provision does not require presence of both parties to
the document when presented for registration before the
Registering Officer. [Para 24) [53-D-E; 54-F]
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A 4.5 Section 35 of the 1908 Act does not confer a quasi-
judicial power on the Registering Authority. The Registering
Officer is not expected to evaluate the title or irregularity in the
document as such. The examination to be done by him is
incidental, to ascertain that there is no violation of provisions of
the Act of 1908. [Para 26] [56-G-H; 57-A)
B
Park View Enterprises " State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1990
Madras 251 - approved.
4.6 In absence of any express provision in the Act of 1908
mandating the presence of the other party to the Extinguishment
c Deed at the time of presentati_on for registration, by no stretch of
imagination, such a requirement can be considered as mandatory.
[Para 27) [57-B-C]
4.7 The error of the Registering Officer, if any, must be
regarded as error of procedure. Section 87 of the Act of 1908
D postulates that nothing done in good faith by the Registering
Officer pursuant to the Act, shall be deemed invalid merely by
reason of any defect in the procedure. In the present case, the
subject Extinguishment Deed was presented by the person duly
authorized by the Society and was registered by the Registering
Officer. Once the document is registered, it is not open to any
E Authority, under the Act of 1908 to cancel the registration. The
remedy of appeal provided under the Act of 1908, in Part XII, in
particular Section 72, is limited to the inaction or refusal by the
Registering Officer to register a document. The power conferred
on the Registrar by virtue of Section 68 cannot be invoked to
F cancel the registration of documents already registered. [Para
28) [58-H; 59-A-C] ~
4.8 The decision in the case of *Tllo/a Ganga Laxmi is with
reference to an express provision contained in the Andhra
Pradesh Rules in that behalf. In absence of such a.n express
G provision, in other State legislations, the Registering Officer would
be governed by the provisions in the Act of 1908. Going by the
said provisions, there is nothing to indicate that the Registering
Officer is required to undertake a quasi judicial enquiry regarding
the veracity of the factual position stated in the document
presented for registration or its legality, if the tenor of the
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 33
document suggests that it requires to be registered. The validity A
of such registered document can, indeed, be put in issue before
a Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the dictum in this
decision cannot have universal application to all the States (other
than State of Andhra Pradesh). [Paras 27, 31) [60-C-E; 57-DJ
4.9 No provision in the State of Madhya Pradesh enactment . B
or the Rules framed under Section 69 of the Act of 1908 has been
brought to the notice of the Court which is similar to the provision
in Rule 26(k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules framed
in exercise of power under Section 69 of the Act of 1908. That
being a procedural matter must be expressly provided in the Act
or the Rules applicable to the concerned State. [Para 28] [58-F- C
G)
4.10 In the present case, the document in question no doubt
is termed as an Extinguishment Deed. However, in effect, it is
manifestation of the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment
of the subject plot given to its member due to non fulfillment of D
the obligation by the member concerned. The subject document
is linked to the decision of the Society to cancel the membership
of the allottee of the plot given to him/her by the Housing Society.
Whereas, the case of *Tlwtll Ganga Laxmi was of cancellation of
sale deed •. Even for this reason, the case of *Tlwta Ganga La.xmi E
is distinguishable. [Para 32) [60-E-F, HJ
_*Thota Ganga Laxmi & Anr. v. Government of A11dhra
Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 15 SCC 207 - distinguished.
E.R.Kalaivan v. Inspector General of Registration,
Chennai & Am: AIR 2010 Madras 18 - disapproved. F
MRamakrishna Reddy v. Sub-Registrar. Bangalore
AIR 2000 Kar. 46 - approved.
Arunachalam v. P.S.R.Sadhanantham & Anr. (1979) 2
SCC 297 : 1979 (3) SCR 482; Ganga Kumar Shrivastav
G
v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211; CAG v. K.S.
Jagannathan (1986) 2 SCC 679 : 1986 (2) SCR 17;
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami
Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Ruda11i
(1989) 2 SCC 691 : 1989 (2) SCR 697; Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Ahmad Jshaque AIR 1955 SC 233: 1955 H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A SCR 1104; Suo Motu Proceedings against R.Karuppan,
Advocate (2001) 5 SCC 289: 2001 (3) SCR 750; R.S.
Maddanappa (DJ by LRs. v. Chandramma & Anr. AIR
1965 SC 1812 : 1965 SCR 283; Rattan Chand Hira
Chand\( Askar Nawaj Jung (DJ by Lrs. & Ors. (1991)
3 SCC 67 : 1991 (1) SCR 327; Ce111ral Inland Water
B
Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath
Ganguly & Anr. AIR 1986 SC 1571 : 1986 (2) SCR
278; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union
of India & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 161 : 2011 (9) SCR 146;
Trisha/a Jain & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Anr.
c (2011) 6 sec 47 : 2011 (8) SCR 520; Hamza Haji V.
State of Kera/a & Anr. (2006) 7 SCC 416 : 2006 (4 )
Suppl. SCR 604; S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (D) By
LRs. v. Jagannath (DJ by Lrs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853 :
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422 - referred to.
D Case Law Reference
(2010)15 sec 201 distinguished Para 2
AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 57 [FB] approved Para6
AIR 2010 Madras 18 disapproved Para6
E AIR 2000 Kar. 46 approved Para6
1962 SCR 97 relied on Para6
AIR 1990 Madras 251 approved Para 7
1964 SCR 733 distinguished Para 8
F 1979 (3) SCR 482 referred to Para8
(200~) 6 sec 211 referred to Para8
1986 (2) SCR 17 referred to Para8
1989 (2) SCR 697 referred to Para8
G
1955 SCR 1104 referred to Para8
2901 (3) SCR 750 referred to Para9
1965 SCR 283 referred to Para9
1991 (1) SCR 327 referred to Para9
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 35
1986 (2) SCR 278 referred to Para9 A
2011 (9) SCR 146 referred to Para9
2011 (8) SCR 520 referred to Para9
2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 604 referred to Para9
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422 referred to Para 9 B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6673
of2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2011 of the High Cout1
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 13505 of2008.
c
Ms. Shashi Juneja, Ms. Sylona Mohapatra, Udit Arora, C. D.
Singh (For Mishra Saurabh, Adv.), Advs. for the Appellant.
Satyajit A. Desai, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Neelmani Pant, Akash
Kakade, Advs. for the Respondents. D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. This appeal has been placed
before a three Judges' Bench in terms of order dated August 25, 2015,
consequent to the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges
of the Division Bench. E
2. Justice Dipak Misra took the view that, in the fact situation of
the pres(;Jnt case the Writ Petition filed by the appellant challenging the
order passed by the Sub-Registrar (Registration) and the Inspector
General (Registration) was rightly dismissed by the High Court. However,
His Lordship opined that a question would still arise for consideration, F
namely, whether in absence of any specific Rule in the State of Madhya
Pradesh, the general principle laid down in the case of Thota Ganga
Laxmi & Anr. vs. Government ofAmi/mi Pradesh & Ors. 1 would be
applicable?
3. Justice V.Gopala Gowda on the other hand allowed the appeal G
on the finding that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) had no authority to
register the Extinguishment Deed presented by the respondent-Society
dated 9'h August 200 I and his action of registration of that document
was void ab initio. For the same reason, the subsequent deeds in respect
' (2010) 15 sec 207 H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 12 S.C.R.
A of the property in question registered by the Sub-Registrar dated 21st
April, 2004 and 11 •h July 2006 were also without authority and void ab
initio. His Lordship held that, the High Court should have declared the
above position and set aside registration of the subject documents and
also the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar (Registration) and Inspector
General (Registration). His Lordship allowed the appeal filed by the
B
appellant with compensation amount to be paid by the respondents
quantified at Rs. I 0 Lakh.
4. Briefly stated, Plot No.7-B at Punjabi Bagh, Raisen Road,
Bhopal was allotted to the appellant's mother Smt. Veeravali Anand by
Punjabi Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
c the "Society"), vide a registered deed dated 22"d March 1962. Smt.
Veeravali Anand expired on l 2'h June 1988. After her death, the Society
through its Office Bearer executed a Deed of Extinguishment on 91h
August 2001, unilaterally, cancelling the said allotment of plot to Smt.
Veeravali Anand because of violation of the Bye-laws of the Society in
D not raising any construction 0;1' the plot so allotted within time. On the
basis of the said Extinguishment Deed, the Society executed and got
registered a deed dated 21st April, 2004 in favour of Mrs. Manjit Kaur
(Respondent No.5) in respect of the same plot. The appellant objected
to the said transaction. However, a compromise deed was executed
between the Society and Mrs. Manjit Kaur (Respondent No.5) on the
E one hand and the appellant on the other hand -whereunderthe appellant
received consideration ofRs.6.50 Lakh (Rupees Six Lakh Fifty Thousand)
- Rs.4.50 Lakh (Rupees Four Lakh Fifty Thousand) by a demand draft
and Rs.2/- Lakh by a post-dated cheque). Notwithstanding the
compromise deed, the appellant filed a dispute under Section 64 of the
F Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter ri;ferred
to ns the "Act of 1960"), before the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative
Societies bearing Dispute No. 81 of2005. The appellant challenged the
Society's action ofunilaterally registering the Extinguishment Deed dated
91h August 2001 a11d allotting the subject plot to Mrs Manjit Kaur vide
deed dated 21st April, 2004; and prayed for a declaration that he continues
G to be the owner of the subject plot allotted by the Society to his mother,
having inherited the same. In the said dispute, the appellant filed interim
applications praying for restraint order and for appointment of a Receiver.
It is not necessary to dilate on those facts to consider the issues on hand.
Suffice it to note that the said dispute is still pending adjudication.
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 37
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
5. During the pendency of the said dispute, the Society permitted A
. transfer of the subject plot in favour of Mrs. Meenakshi and Mr. S.C.
Sharma (Respondent Nos. 6 & 7) vide registered Deed dated JI th July
2006. Sin.ce the appellant was perseverating the dispute and resorting to
multiple proceedings in relation to the subject plot, the respondents issued
a notice on 12th July 2007 asking the appellant to refund the consideration
B
amount accepted by him in furtherance of the compromise deed dated
6th July 2004. The appellant did not pay any heed to that demand and
instead continued with the multiple proceedings resorted to by him before
the Authority under the Act of 1960, including criminal proceedings. The
appellant also moved an application before the Sub-Registrar
(Registration) calling upon him to cancel the registration of C
Extinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 I and the subsequent two
deeds dated 21" April 2004 and 11th July 2006 respectively. This
application was filed on 4rh February 2008 by the appellant. The Sub-
Registrar (Registration) by a speaking order rejected the said application
on 28th June 2008 mainly on two counts. Firstly, a dispute was pending D
between the parties with regard to the same subject matter. Secondly,
he had no jurisdiction to cancel the registration of a registered document
in question. For, his jurisdiction was limited to registration of the document
when presented by the executant before him for that purpose. The
appellant then approached the Inspector General (Registration) by way
of an application under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 E
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1908"). The Inspector General
(Registration) vide order dated I 91h September 2008 rejected the said
application on the ground that powers conferred on him were limited to
the general superintendence of the Registration Offices and making
Rules.
F
6. The appellant thereafter approached the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Judicature at Jabalpur, by way of Writ Petition No. I 3505/2008
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the order
passed by the Inspector General (Registration) dated 15•h September
2008 as also the order passed by the Sub-Registrar (Registration) dated
28th June 2008. The appella~1t further prayed for a declaration that the G
Extinguishment Deed dated 9' 11 August 200 I as well as the subsequent
two deeds dated 2JSI April, 2004 and 11th July 2006 are void ab initio
with a further direction to the Inspector General (Registration) and the
Sub-Registrar (Registration) to record the cancellation of those
H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 12 S.C.R.
A documents. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the Division Bench of
the High Court primarily on the ground that the appellant had already
resorted to a remedy (a dispute) before the appropriate Forum under the
Act of 1960, which was pending; and the declaration, as sought, can be
considered in those proceedings after recording of the evidence and
B production of other material to be relied on by the parties therein.
Accordingly, the High Court held that since an alternative remedy before
a competent Forum was available and was pending between the parties,
it was not feasible to invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Indeed, the High Court adverted to the reported
cases relied on by the parties to buttress their stand. The High Court
C took note of the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the case of Ymu1/a Mal/eshwari vs. Ammthula Sayamnw 2
and the decision of Madras High Court in E.R.Ka/aivan vs. Inspector
General of Registration, Clte111wi & Anr. 3 The High Court held that
the arguments of the appellant deserve to be negatived in light of the
D majority view of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court and that
the dictum in the case before the Madras High Court was distinguishable.
The High Court also referred to the decision of the Karnataka High
Court in M.Ranwkrisluw Reddy vs. Sub-Registrar, Bangalore~. In
para 15 and 16, the High Court observed thus:
"15. In view of aforesaid discussion we are of the view
E that after registration of the extinguished deed or other
documents by the Sub-Registrar, if any application is
\
moved by any of the affected party of such document
stating that the same was not registered by practicing
the fraud with his right then Sub-Registrar in the lack
F of any specific provision in this regard could neither
entertain nor adjudicate such application under the
provisions of Section 17, 18 or 69 or some other
provisions of the Act.· Section 69 of the Act only confers
the superintending power of registration offices and to
make rules to the Inspector General respondent No.2.
G It does not give any rights to cancel the earlier
registered documents or modifying any entries in the
index or in other record at the instance of any of party.
2AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 57 [FB]
3
AIR 2010 Madras I8
H 'AIR 2000 Kar.46.
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 39
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
So, Section 17(l)(b) read with 69 of the Act is also not A
helping to the petitioner in this writ petition.
Consequently, it is held that Sub-Registrar as well as
Inspector General have not committed any fau/1 in
dismissing the application ofthe petilioner with direction
to approach the competent forum for adjudication of
B
his dispute.
16. Apart the above the alleged dispute and allegations
of the alleged fraud could not be adjudicated by this
Court under the writ jurisdiction. The same could be
adjudicated by the Civil Court under the common law
after recording the evidence of the parties and on c
appreciation of the same in a duly constituted suit."
The High Court then adverted to the decision in the case of
(
Government of U.P. vs. R£~i" Molwmnuul Amir Ahmad Klum 5• It
held that since the Registering Officer registered the document presented
to him for registration, his function is exhausted. He would then become D
functus officio and no power to impound the document under Section
33 of the Act. This decision of the High Court is the subject matter of
challenge in the present appeal.
7. When this appeal came up for hearing before the Division
Bench of the two learned Judges, as aforesaid, His Lordship Justice
0
E
Dipak Misra found that the High Court did not commit any error in
dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant. His Lordship, however,
adverted to all the relevant provisions of the Act of 1908 and also analysed
the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Mal/esltwari's case (supra) and also of the.Madras High Court in
Kalaivan (supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in M.R.Reddy F
(supra). Finally, His Lordship considered the decision of this Court in
Tlwta Gang" Laxmi (supra) and noted two aspects. That, in that case,
the Court had opined that a unilateral cancellation deed cannot be
registered with reference to Rule 2(k)(i) of the Rules framed by the
State ofAndhra Pradesh under Section 69 of the Act of 1908. His Lordship
G
was of the view that the dictum of the Cou11 in Tlwt" Ganga L"xmi
(supra) must be considered in the context ofa specific Rule framed by
the State of Andhra Pradesh, which had come into force after the
pronouncement by the Full Bench in the case of Malleshwari (supra).
His Lordship then observed that the principle stated in the case ofTlwta
'AIR 1961 SC 787 H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A Ganga Laxmi (supra) cannot be made applicable to the case on hand
in absence of a specific Rule in that regard in the State of Madhya
Pradesh. Further, on a careful reading of the provisions of the Act of
1908, there is no prohibition to register a document of cancellation of a
deed of extinguishment; and that the procedure under Section 35 of that
Act cannot be construed to confer a quasi judicial power on the Registering
B
Authority. His Lordship also referred to the decision of the Madras High
Court in Park View Enterprises vs. State of Tamil Nadu 6 wherein it
has been observed that the function of the Sub-Registrar for the purposes
ofregistration is purely administrative and not quasi-judicial. He cannot
decide whether a document which is executed by a person has had title
c as is recited in the given instrument. His Lordship found it difficult to
agree with the general principle stated in the case of Thota Ganga
Laxnii (supra) that the Registering Authority cannot register a unilateral
deed of cancellation or extinguishment, in absence of any specific Rule
in that behalf. Therefore, His Lordship opined that the general observation
in that case required reconsideration by a larger Bench. Having said
D
this, His Lordship also noted that the validity of the action taken by the
Society in execution of the extinguishment deed dated 9'h Augu~t 2001,
cancelling the deed in favour of the appellant's mother dated 22"d March
1962 was the subject matter of a dispute filed by the appellant wherein
all relevant issues could be answered appropriately. For, that Authority
E is competent to consider the validity ofaction of the Society to unilaterally
cancel the allotment of the plot made in favour of the appellant's mother.
His Lordship also adverted to the other proceedings between the parties
including the order passed by this Court in SLP (Civil) No. 13255/2012
dated July 12, 2013, taking note of the Inspecti~n Reports submitted by
the Sub-Registrar dated !3 1h March 2007 mentioning that two duplex
F
were constructed and two more were near completion standing on the
subject plot on the date of inspection. His Lordship also adverted to the
factum of compromise deed entered by the appellant with the respondents
and having received consideration in that behalf from the subsequent
purchaser and yet the appellant was pursuing remedy before the Sub-
G Registrar for cancellation of the Extinguishment Deed.
8. His Lordship Justice V.Gopala Gowda, however, formulated a
question in para 12 of the judgment as to whether the appellant was
entitled to seek relief of cancellation of the registered documents dated
9•h August 2001, 21"April2004 and l J'h July 2006, registered in respect
H 'AIR 1990 Madras 25 l
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of the immovable property in question. His Lordship, inter-alia, following A
the exposition in Tlwta Ganga Laxmi (supra) found that the Registrar
could not have permitted registration ofExtinguishment Deed dated 9'h
August 200 l, unilaterally cancelling the allotment ofthe subject plot made
to the appellant's mother. His Lordship held that the Extinguishment
Deed was a nullity, in law. His Lordship then considered the dictum in
B
Kalaivan ~case of the Madras High Court and opined that it aptly applied
to the facts of the present case and held that as the Extinguishment
Deed was unilaterally registered it ought to be rescinded. His Lordship .
proceeded to examine the issue in the light orSection 62 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. It provides that ifthe parties to a contract agree to
substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter, the original contract C
need not be performed. Thus, for any novation, rescission and alteration
of the contract, it can be made only bilaterally and with amicable consent
of both the parties. His Lordship then adverted to the scope of Clause_
43(1) of the Bye-laws of the Society as amended in the year 1991 and
opined that the said Clause can have no retrospective effect for D
cancellation of the allotment of the plot in the name ofappellant's mother
vi de Extinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 I . The latter is only a
subterfuge. Reference is then made to Section 31 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 to hold that unilateral cancellation of the deed would be in
violation of the said provision read with Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963, which requires cancellation of any instrument witl1in 3 years. In E
the present case, the deed in favour of the appellant's mother was
executed on 22nd March 1962 and registered on 30'h March 1962
concerning the subject plot; and for whiclh reason extinguishment of the
said deed after lapse of 39 years was impermissible in law. On this
finding, it has been held that the Sub-Registrar had no authority under
F
the Act of 1908 nor by virtue of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 read with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to unilaterally cancel
the said deed; and consequently, registration of the Extinguishment Deed
by the Sub-Registrar amounts to playing fraud on the power vested in
the Authority under law. Exercise of power of registering a document
by the Sub-Registrar, in the present case, was ultra vires the relevant G
provisions and the Constitution oflndia. Reference is then made to the
decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Sing/I vs.
State ofPunjab' to hold that the respondent-Society had no authority to
re-allot the subject plot to respondent No.5 by cancelling the registered
7
AIR 1964 SC 72 H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 12 S.C.R.
A deed which has become absolute and been acted upon by the parties.
As a consequence of this conclusion, His Lordship held that the deed
executed in favour of respondent No.5 or for that matter respondent
Nos.6 and 7 was also void ab initio; and also because respondent No.5
could not be allotted the subject plot as her husband was already allotted
another plot by the same Society. His Lordship then went on to observe
B
that the appellant has got a valid Constitutional right over the said plot of
land as guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution oflndia and
could not be deprived of that property without authority of law. His
Lordship was of the view that merely because the Extinguishment Deed
_ could be challenged by approaching the Civil Court cannot denude the
c appellant of the relief, as sought in the Writ Petition, qua the
Extinguishment Deed dated 9•h August 2001 which was void ab initio;
and for the same reason order could be passed against respondent No.5
to 7 - as the deeds in their favour rested on the Extinguishment Deed.
For that, His Lordship adverted to the dictum in the case of Aru11achalam
vs. P.S.R.&ullmmmtlmm & Anr.8 and Ga11ga Kumar Shrivastav vs.
D
State ofBi/1ar9 • Further, having noticed that the septuagenarian appellant
had been litigating for last 14 years because of the untenable action of
the Society and also of the Sub-Registrar, affecting his valuable
Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution oflndia, His
Lordship was of the opinion that the relief claimed by him in the Writ
E Petition deserved to be granted. As regards the observation made by
this Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition No.13255/2012 vi de
order dated l 7'h July 2013, His Lordship held that the same will be of no
avail much less to denude the appellant of the reliefs due to him. His
Lordship then held that the compromise executed by the appellant on 6th
July 2004 also cannot denude the appellant of the relief - because it is an
F
admitted position that the respondent No.5 through Advocate had sent a
legal notice dated 12th July 2007 to rescind the said agreement and called
upon the appellant to refund the amount of Rs.6.50 Lakh received by
him with interest. His Lordship also adverted to the decisions of this
Court in CA G vs._K.S.Jaga1111atlu111 10 ; A11di M uklfi Sa(/guru Shree
G Muktajee Va11das Swami Suvama Jayallli Malwtsav Smarak Trust
vs. V.R. Rudfmi" and Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Almuul lslwque 12 to
'(1979) 2 sec 297
' c2oos) 6 sec 211
'° (1986) 2 sec 679
" (1989) 2sec 691
H "AIR 1955 SC 233
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 43
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
hold that the High Court failed to exercise its discretionary power which A
has resulted in grave miscarriage ofjustice and entailing in denial of the
valuable right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution oflndia
to the appellant. Accordingly, His Lordship held that the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the impugned
instruments i.e. Extinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 I and the
B
subsequent deeds dated 21"April,2004 ai1d 11 <h July 2006 respectively,
are quashed and set aside. Further direction is given to respondent Nos.
6 and 7 to vacate the s.ubject property and hand over possession thereof
to the appellant forthwith. His Lordship was of the, view that the appellant
was entitled to further relief of compensation amount of Rs. I 0,00,000/-
(Rupees Ten Lakhs) to be paid to the appellant for his suffering and the c
injustice caused to him by the respondents for the last 14 years.
9. The appellant appeared in person. He adopted the view taken
by His Lordship Justice V. Gopala Gowda as his argument. He placed
reliance on the decisions noted hereinabove and adverted to in the two
separate judgments given by Their Lordships. In substance, his argument D
was that the respondent-Society could not have unilaterally executed
the Ext!nguishment Deed dated 9m August 200 I in relation to the subject
plot. That action of the respondent-Society was in violation of the
governing laws and void ab initio. Further, the Sub-Registrar had no
authority to register such a document and in any case unilaterally. Hence,
the act of registration of Extinguishment Deed was also void ab initio. E
As a consequence, the Society had no authority, in law, to execute the
subsequent deed in favour of respondent No.5 or to put her in possession
of the subject plot and the respondent No.5 in turn could not have executed
the deed in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7. In other words, the
deeds executed between the respondent No. 4 - Society and respondent F
No. 5 and also respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were void ab initio. That
declaration must follow and the High Court was duty bound to allow the
Writ Petition filed by him, as the action of the respondent No.4-Society
was replete with fraud on the Statute and also on the Constitutional right
guaranteed to the appellant. In all fairness to the appellant, it must be
mentioned that he has additionally relied on Su() Motu Proceedings G
against R.Karuppan, Advocate 13 , R.S.M"ddmwppa (D) by LRs. vs.
Chandramma & Anr. 14 , Rattan Cluuul Hira Cluuul vs. Askar Nmvaj
Jung (D) by Lrs. & Ors.1-', Central lnla11d W"ter Transport
"(2001 J s sec 289
"AIR 1965 SC 1812
"(1991) 3 sec 67 H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 12 S.C.R.
A Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. Brojo Natft Gtmguly & Anr. 16 , Indian
Cou11ci/ for E11viro-Legal Actio11 vs. Union of India & Ors. 17,
Tris/ta/a Jain & Anr. vs. State of Uttartmclwl & Anr. 18, Hamza Haji
vs. State of Kera/a & A11r.' 9 and S.P.Clten1:alvaraya Naidu (D) By
LRs. vs. Jagamwtli (D) by Lrs. & Ors. 10 , during the arguments. Besides
the oral arguments, the appellant has filed written submissions on 11 'h
B
July 2016 and additional written submissions on 12'h August 2016 which
make reference to several reported cases. The decisions referred to in
the written submissions are essentially multiplying the cases on the
contention already answered in favour of the appellant by His Lordship
Justice V.Gopala Gowda.
c 10. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Writ
Petition has been justly rejected by the High Court on the ground that
the appellant was pursuing remedy for the same reliefs in substantive
proceedings by way of a dispute filed under Section 64 of the Act of
1960 before the competent Forum. Besides the said proceedings, it was
D open to the appellant to take recourse t9 other appropriate remedy before
the Civil Court, to the extent necessary. The High Court in exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia not only exercises
an equitable jurisdiction but also an extraordinary jurisdiction. The High
Court in any case is not expected to enter upon the plea of declaring
agreements and documents executed between private parties as illegal
E or for that matter void ab initio, which remedy is available before the
cooperative Forum or the Civil Court. It was contended that if this
contention is accepted, it may not be necessary to answer the other
issue noted in the judgment of Justice Dipak Misra as the same can be
considered in an appropriate proceedings, if and when the occasion arises.
F Alternatively, it was contended that the dictum of this Court in Tliot<t
Ganga Laxmi's case (supra) must be understood as applicable to the
express procedure prescribed for registration of an Extinguishment Deed
or cancellation deed in the State of Andhra Pradesh in terms of statutory
Rules. Inasmuch as, in absence of any express provision about the
procedure for registration of such document, that requirement cannot be
G considered as mandatory. For, it is not possible to hold that no
Extinguishment or cancellation deed can ever be executed by the party
16
AIR 1986 SC 1571
17 (2011) s sec 161
18 (2011) 6 sec 47
19 (2006) 1 sec 416
H '"AIR 1994 SC 853
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. ·45
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
to the earlier concluded contract, considering the express provision in A
that behalf in Section l 7(l)(b) of the Act of 1908 read with other enabling
provisions in the same Act or other substantive law. According to the
respondents, the questions posed in the judgment of Justice V. Gopala
Gowda would be relevant and can be conveniently answered in the
substantive proceedings already resorted to by the appellant, by way of B
a dispute under Section 64 of the Act of 1960. The answer·to the said ·
questions may require adjudication of disputed facts and also application
of settled legal position. It is not a pure question of law. Being disputed
question of facts, the High Court w~s right in refusing to interfere and
exercise its writ jurisdiction.
11. The counsel for the State in particular submitted that the legal
· position is well-settled. That, the Sub-Registrar is p.ot expected to decide
the title or rights of the parties to the agreement nor is expected to
examine the document to ascertain whether the same is legal and
permissible in law or undertake an analytical analysis thereof. If the
document registered by the Sub-Registrar is illegal or there is any D
irregularity, that must be challenged by invoking an appropriate
proceedings before a Court of competent jurisdiction. If any cause of
action accrues to a member of the Society, in relation to the bu~hess of
the Society, can be pursued before the c.ooperative Forum. The appellant
has already invoked such remedy.
E
12. The respondent Nos. 6 and 7 additionally submit that they are
purchasers of the subject plot for consideration. They have acted to
their detriment in good faith by going ahead with the construction on the
plot with the permission of the Society and after obtaining approvals
from the Mllnicipal Authorities. They have spent their fortune in doing
so. Besides supporting the stand taken by the other respondents, they F
submit that in the fact situation of the present case no relief in equity is
warran~ed in favour of the appellant. Thus, the Writ Petition filed by the
appellant has been justly dismissed with liberty to pursue appropriate
remedy,
13. Having considered the rival submissions, including keeping in G
mind the view taken by the two learned Judges of this Court on the
matters in issue, in our opinion, the questions to be answered by us in the
fact ~ituation of the present case, can.be formulated as under:
"(a) Whether in the fact situation of the present case,
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r2o 161 12 s.c.R.
A the High Court was Justified in dismissing the Writ
Petition?
(b) Whether the High Court in exercise of writ
;urisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is duty bound to declare the registered Deeds
B (between the private parties) as void ab initio and to
cancel the same, especially when the aggrieved party
(appellant) has already resorted to an alternative
efficacious remedy under Section 64 of the Act of 1960
before the competent Forum whilst questioning the
action of the Society in cancelling the allotment of the
c subject plot in favour of the original allottee and
unilateral execution of-an Extinguishment Deed for that
purpose?
(c) Even if the High Coui:.t is endowed with a wide power
including to examine the validity of the registered
D Extinguishment Deed and the subsequent registered
deeds, should it foreclose the issues which involve
disputed questions offact and germane for adjudication
by the competent Forum under the Act of 1960?
(d) Whether the Sub-Registrar (Registration) has
E authority to cancel the registration of any document
including an Extinguishment Deed after it is registered?
Similarly, whether the Inspector General (Registration)
can cancel the registration of Extinguishment Deed in
exercise of powers under Section 69 of the Act of 1908?
F (e) Whether the Sub-Registrar (Registration) had no
authority to register the Extinguishment Deed dated 9'"
August 2001, unilaterally presented by the Respondent
Society for registration?
(/) Whether the dictum in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi
G (supra) is with reference to the express statutory Rule
framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh or is a general
proposition of law applicable even to the State of
Madhya Pradesh, in absence' of an express provision
in that regard? "
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 47
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Regarding Issue Nos. (a) to (c): A
14. The answer to the first three questions will have to be given in
the backdrop of the factual m:»rix of the present case. Indisputably, the
appellant entered into a compromise deed and accepted the consideration
amount of Rs.6.50 Lakh. Despite that, he chose to file a dispute under
Section 64 of the Act of 1960 before the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative B
Societies challenging the action of the Society in unilaterally executing
and causing registration of the subject Extinguishment Deed dated 9th
August 2001 and also the allotment of the subject plot to third party.
Pending that dispute, he filed an application before the Sub-Registrar
(Registration) for the same relief of cancellation of registration of the
Extinguishment Deed and the subsequent deeds in favour of third parties. - C
In addition, the appellant resorted to criminal complaint with reference
· to the same Extinguishment Deed and the subsequent deeds in favour of
third parties. In this backdrop, th_e High Court declined to entertain the
Writ Petition filed by the appellant, which was essentially to challenge
the same Extinguishment Deed and subsequent deeds. It is a well D
established position that the remedy of Writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution oflndia is extra-ordinary and discretionary. In exercise of
'writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot be oblivious to the conduct of the
party invoking that remedy. The fact that the party may have several
remedies for the same cause of action, he must elect his remedy and
cannot be permitted to indulge in multiplicity of actions. The exercise E
of discretion to issue a writ is a matter of granting equitable relief. It is a
remedy in equity. In the present case, the High Court declined to interfere
at the instance of the appellant having noticed the above clinching facts.
No fault can be found with the approach of the High Court in refusing to
exercise its writ jurisdiction because of the conduct of the appellant in F
pursuing multiple proceedings for the same relief and also because the
appellant had an alternative and efficaci9us statutory remedy to which
he has already resorted to. This view of the High Court has foundfavour
with Justice Dipak Misra. We respectfully agree with that view.
15. The other view of Justice V. Gopala Gowda, however, is that G
it was the duty of the High Court to answer the matters in issue because
of the uni-lateral registration of the Extinguishment Deed by the Society
without authority and a nullity. Ordinarily, ifthe party had not resorted to
any other remedy provided by law and had straightway approached the
High Court to question the action of the statutory Authority ofregistering
H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016l 12 S.C.R.
A a document improper.ly and in particular in disregard of the prescribed
procedure, that would stand on a different footing. In the present case,
however, the appellant not only entered into a compromise deed with the
Society and the subsequent purchaser but also resorted to statutory
remedy. Having entered into a compromise deed, it is doubtful whether
the appellant can be heard to complain about the irregularity in the
B
registration of the Extinguishment Deed, if any. It is noticed that the
appellant has not disputed the execution of the compromise deed, nor
has he paid any heed to the notice given by the other party to refund the
amount accepted by him in furtherance of the compromise deed. No
Court can be party to a speculative litigation much less the High Court in
c exercise of writ jurisdiction. Having said this it must necessarily follow
that the Writ Petition filed by the appellant deserved to be dismissed, as
was rightly dismissed by the High Court.
16. As the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed with liberty to
the appellant to pursue other statutory remedy already invoked by him,
examining any other contention at his instance would be awarding
D
premium to a litigant who does not deserve such indulgence. The fact
whether the compromise deed entered into by the appellant was voluntary
and at his own volition or under duress, is essentially a question of fact.
That cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. Depending on the answer
thereto, the other issues may become relevant and would arise for
E • consideration. The only relief that can be granted and which has already
been clarified by the High Court in the impugned judgment, is to keep all
questions open to enable the appellant to pursue the statutory remedy
already invoked by him. It is open to the appellant to contend in those
proceedings that the Extinguislunent Deed could not have been unilaterally
executed by the Society. That plea can be examined by the statutory
F
Forum provided for that purpose. The decision of the Society to cancel
the allotment of a plot to its member or to rescind his membership and to
allot the plot to another member, is undoubtedly the business of the Society.
Any C\lUSe of action in that behalf,° indeed, can be pursued before the
Competent Forum by the aggrieved membernr his legal representative.
G That will require examination of the governing cooperative laws and the
Bye-laws of the Society- to ascertain whether it is open to the Society
to cancel the allotment of a plot to its members including to cancel the
membership of such person. If that action of the Society is held to be
just and permissible in law, the appellant may not be entitled to any other
relief much less the declaration as sought. Further, remedy of writ cannot
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 49
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
be used for declaration of private rights of the parties or enforcement of
their contractual rights and obligations. In our considered opinion, it would
be unnecessary if not inappropriate to examine any other contention at
the instance of this appellant as we ~gree with the view taken by the
High Court in summarily dismissing the Writ Petition with liberty to the
appellant to pursue statutory remedy. At best, further observation or
B
clarification would suffice to the effect that the competent Forum before
whom the dispute has been filed by the appellant shall consider all
contentions available to the parties, uninfluenced by the factum of
registered Extinguishment Deed. In that, ifthe competent Forum was to
hold that it wns open to the Society to cancel the allotment and
membership of the concerned member and thereafter to allot the same c
plot to another person enrolled as a member of the society, no other
issue would arise for consideration. On the other hand, ifthe competent
Forum was to answer the relevant fact in favour of the appellant, only
then the argument of the effect of unilateral registration of the
Extinguislunent Deed followed by compromise deed voluntarily executed
by the appellant may become available to the Society and to the D.
subsequent purchasers/allottees of the subject plot. At their instance,
those issues can be examined on the basis of settled legal position. Neither
the observation or the opinion recorded by one of the dissenting Judge of
this Court need any further dissection nor would it be appropriate to
enlarge the scope of the proceedings before this Court on those aspects. E
This would subserve the twin requirements. Firstly, to avoid an exposition
on matters and questions which do not arise for our consideration in the
fact situation of the present case at this stage; and secondly, also provide
an opportunity to the parties to pursue all contentions and other remedies
as may be permissible in law.
F
17. The exposition of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pmt"P
Singh (suJmfyatlverted to in the dissenting opinion would be attracted in
cases where the State Authority acts in bad faith or corrupt motives.
Merely because some irregularity has been committed in registration of
Extinguishment Deed unilaterally presented by the Society for registration
or in respect of the subsequent deeds registered at the instance of third G
party without notice to the appellant, that, by itself, will not result in
registration of those documents due to corrupt motives of the State
Authority. Moreso, in the present case, the appel !ant having entered into
a compromise deed with the Society and third party (subsequent allottees)
in respect of the subject plot, it is doubtful whether it is open to the H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A appellant to question the act of unilateral execution and registration of
the stated Extinguishment Deed being irregular much Jess void and nullity.
Indisputably, the respondents-Society is a Cooperative Housing Society
Limited and is governed by its Bye-Laws. According to the counsel for
the Society, the member is obliged to erect a house on the plot allotted to
him within specified time, failing which must suffer the consequence
B
including of cancellation of allotment of plot and removal of his
membership. At the time of allotment, the melnber executes an agreement
whereunder he/she undertakes to abide by the conditions specified for
erecting a house on the plot allotted to him/her in the manner prescribed
therein. Whether the Society is justified in proceeding against the defaulting
c member by cancelling the allotment of plot as well as membership, is an
issue falling within the purview of the business of the Society. The member
is bound by the stipulation contained in the agreement executed by him/
her and in particular the Bye-laws of the Society. Any action by the
Society for breach thereof is just or otherwise can be questioned before
the statutory Forum under the Act of 1960. Those are matters which
D
can and must be answered in the proceedings resorted to by the appellant
before the statutory Forum.
18. The aforementioned reported decision has noted the subtle
distinction between ultra vires act of the Statutory Authority and a case
of a simple infraction of the procedural Rule. The question, whether the
E Society was competent to unilaterally cancel the allotment of a plot given
to its member and to cancel the membership of such member due to
default committed by the member, is within the purview of the business
of the Society. Ahy cause of action in that regard must be adjudicated by
- the procedure prescribed in that behalf. It is not open to presume that
the Society had no authority in law to take a decision in that behalf. The
F
right of the appellant qua the plot of land would obviously be subject to
the final outcome of such action. The appellant being the legal
representative of the original allottee, cannot claim any right higher than
that of his predecessor qua the Housing Society, which is the final
authority to decide on the issue of continuation of membership of its
G member. The right of the member to remain in occupation of the plot
allotted by the Society would be entirely dependent on that decision.
19. Reference made to the other decisions of this Court with
regard to the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia in the case
of Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadluuumtlutm and Anr. and Ganga K.
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 51
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Slirivastav vs. State of Bilwr (supra); will be of no avail in the fact A
situation of the present case. Similarly, The other decisions adverted to
in the dissenting opinion under consideration in the case of CAG vs.
K.S. Jagamwtlian and Amii Mukta Sm/guru Shree Muktajee Vmulas
Swami Suvarna Jayanti Malwtsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudm1i
(supra), Hari Vishnu Manwill (supra) will be of no avail in the fact
B
situation of the present case. Suffice it to observe that the High Court
had, in our opinion, justly, summarily dismissed the writ petition with
liberty to the appellant to pursue statutory remedy under the provisions
of the Act of 1960 or by way of a civil suit. Thus understood, it may not
be necessary or appropriate to dwelve upon the other issues regarding
the merits of the controversy which may have to be adjudicated by the c
c;ompetent Forum.
Regarding issue Nos. (d) to (Q
20. It is common ground that the deed regarding allotment of plot
to a member of the Society required registration. The allotment of the
subject plot in favour of the appellant's mother was accordingly, registered D
in the office of the Sub-Registrar (Registration). The subject plot was
allotted to the appellant's mother consequent to her admission ·as a
member of the Society. As the allotment of the plot by the Society
creates and transfers rights in an immovable property, the deed of
allotment was required to be registered. But if the member failed to E
comply with the stipulation Of allotment, it would be open to the Society
to cancel such allotment and including the membership of that member.
In that event, it may become necessary for the Society to execute an
Extinguishment Deed qua such allotment deed operating in favour of the
concerned member. For, mere cancellation of membership may not be
enough. The Society could extinguish the right, title or interest in the F
immoveable property belonging to the Housing Society, by executing an
Extinguishment Deed for that purpose.
21. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged,
once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad
Khan (supra). Section 17 of the Act of 1908 deals with documents G
which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such
document referred to in Section 17( 1)(b ). Section 18 of the same Act
deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of·
the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures
or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by
reference to Government maps and surveys. There is no express provision
in the Act of 1908 which empowers· the Registrar to recall such
registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for
registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration.
The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence
B
of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the
Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the
registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the
Inspector General is limited to do superintendence ofregistration offices
and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power
c to cancel the registration of any document which has already been
registered.
22. The procedure for registration of documents is spelt out, inter
alia, in part VI of the Act of 1908. Section 32 of the said Act reads thus:
PART VI
D
OF PRESENTING DOCUMENTS FOR
REGISTRATION
"32. Persons to present documents for registration.-
Except in the cases mentioned in 24[sections 31, 88
E and 89}, every document to be registered under this
Act, ~hether such registration be compulsory or
optional, shall be presented at the proper registration
office-
(a) by some person executing or claiming under the same;
F. or, in the case of a copy of a decree or orde1; .claiming
under the decree or order, or
(b) by the representative or assignee of such a person,
or
(c) by the agent of such a person, representative or
G
assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed
and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned. "
23. lfthe document is required to be compulsorily registered, but
while doing so some irregularity creeps in, that, by itself, cannot result in
a fraudulent action of the State Authority. Non-presence of the other
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 53
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
party to the Extinguishment Deed presented by the Society before the A
Registering Officer by no standard can be said to be a fraudulent action.
per se. The fact whether that was done deceitly to cause loss and harm
to the other party to the Deed, is a question of fact which must be
pleaded and proved by the party making such allegation. That fact cannot
be presumed. Suffice it to observe that since the provisions in the Act of B
1908 enables the Registering Officer to register the documents presented
for registration by one party and execution thereof to be admitted or
denied by the other party thereafter, it is unfathomable as to how the
registration of the document by following procedure specified in the Act
of 1908 can be said to be fraudulent. As aforementioned, some irregularity
in the procedure committed during the registration process would not C
lead to a fraudulent execution and registration of the document, but a
case of mere irregularity. In either case, the party aggrieved by such
registration of document is free to challenge its validity before the Civil
Court.
24. Admittedly, the documents in question do not fall within Sections D
31, 88 and 89. Further, Section 32 does not require presence of both
parties to the document when it is presented for registration. In that
sense, presentation ofExtinguishment Deed by the authorized person of
the Society for registration cannot be faulted with reference to Section
34 of the Act of 1908. That provision stipulates the enquiry to be done by
the Registering Officer before registration of the document. The same E
reads thus:
"34. Enquiry before registration by registering officer.-
(1) Subject to the provisions contained in this Part and
in sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 and 89, no F
document shall be registered under this Act, unless the
person executing such document, or their
representatives, assigns or agents authorised as
aforesaid, appear before the registering officer within
the time allowed for presentation under sections 23, 24,
25 and 26: G
PROVIDED that, !f owing to urgent necessity or
unavoidable accident all such persons do not so appem;
the Registrar, in cases where the delay in appearing
does not exceed four months, may direct that on payment
H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 12 S.C.R.
A of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the
proper registration fee, in addition to the fine, if any,
payable under section 25, the document may be
registered.
(2) Appearances under sub-section (/) may be
B simultaneous or at different times.
(3) The registering officer shall thereupon-
(a) enquire whether or not such document was executed
by the person by whom it purports to have been
executed;
c
(b) satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons
appearing before him and alleging that they have
executed the document; and ,•
' '
(c) in the case of any person appearing as a
D representative, assignee or agent, satisfy himself of the
right of such person so to appem:
(4) Any application for a direction under the proviso to
sub-section (1) may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar. who
shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is
subordinate.
E
(5) Nothing in this section applies to copies of decrees
or orders. "
Even this provision does not require presence of botl1' parties to
the document when presented for registration before the Registering
F Officer. Section 35 of the Act of 1908 provides for procedure ofadmission
or denial of execution. respectively. The same reads thus:
"35. Procedure on admission wul denial of execution
respectively
(1) (a) if all the persons executing the document appear
G personally before the registerilig officer and are
personally known to him, or if he be othenvise satisfied
that they are the persons they represent themselves to
be, and if they all admit the execution of the document,
or
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 55
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
(b) If in the case of any person appearing by a A
representative, assignee or agent, such representative,
assignee or agent admits the execution, or
(c) If the person executing the document is dead. and
his representative or assignee appears before the
registering officer and admits the execution, B
the registering officer shall register the document as
directed in sections 58 to 61, inclusive.
(2) The registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself
that the persons appearing before him are the persons
they represent themselves to be, or for any other purpose c
contemplated by this Act, examine any one present in
his office.
(3}(a) If any person by whom the document purports to
be executed denies its execution, or
D
(b) if any such person appears to the registering officer
to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or
(c) if aiiy persOf/ by whom the document purports to be
executed is dead, and his representative or assignee
denies its execution,
E
the registering officer shall refuse to register: the
document as to the person so denying, appearing or
dead:
PROVIDED that, where such officer is a Registrai; he
shall follow the procedure prescribed in Part XII: F
28[PROVIDED FURTHER that the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that
any Sub-Registrar named in the notification shall, in
re;,pect of documents the execution of which is denied,
be deemed to be a Registrar for the purposes of this G
sub-section and of Part XII. ] "
Section 36 o~ the Act of 1908 provides for procedure when
appearance of the executant or witness is insisted upon. The same reads
thus:
H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016l 12 S.C.R.
A .PART VII
OF ENFORCING THE APPEARANCE OF
EXECUTANTS AND WITNESSES
"36. Procedure where appearance of executant or
witness is desired.-lj any person presenting any
B document for registration or claiming under any
document, which is capable of being so presented,
desires the appearance of any person whose presence
or testimony is necessary for the registration of such
document, the registering officer may, in his discretion,
c call upon such officer or court as the State Government
directs in this behalf to issue a summons requiring him
to appear at the registration-office, either in person or
by duly authorised agent, as in the summons may be
mentioned, and at a time named therein. "
D 25. The Andhra.Pradesh High Court, in the case of Ymw/a
Ma/lesllwari (supra) was called upon to consider whether a person can
nullify the sale by executing and registering a cancellation deed and
whether
.
the Registering Officer like District Registrar - and/or
.
Sub-
Registrar appointed by the State Government is bound to refuse
registration when a cancellation deed is presented. The fact remains
E that if the stipulation contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Act of 1908
are fulfilled, the Registering Officer is bound to register the document.
The Registering Officer can refuse to register a document only in
situations mentioned in Sections such as 19 to 22, 32 and 35. At the
same time, once the document i~ registered, it is not open to the Registering
F Officer to cancel that registration even if his attention is invited to SOIT\e
irregularity committed during the registration of the document. The
aggrieved party can challenge the registration and valiaity of the document
before the Civil Court. The majority view of the Full Bench was that if a
person is aggrieved by the Extinguishment Deed or its registration, his
remedy is to seek appropriate relief in the Civil Court and a Writ Petition
G is not the proper remedy.
26. Section 35 of the Act does not confer a quasi-judicial power
on the Registering Authority. The Registering Officer is expected:to
reassure that the document to be registered is accompanied by supporting
documents. He is not expected to evaluate the title or irregularity in the
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 57
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
document as such. The examination to be done by him is incidental, to A
ascertain that there is no violation of provisions of the Act of 1908. In
the case of Pt1rk View Enterprises (supra) it has been observed that
the function of the Registering Officer is purely administrative and not
quasi-judicial. He cannot decide as to whether a document presented
for registration is executed by person having title, as mentioned in the B
instrument. We agree with that exposition.
"
27. In absence of any express provision in the Act of 1908
mandating the presence of the other party to the Extinguishment Deed
at the time of pnisentation for registration, by no stretch of imagination,
such a requirement can be considered as mandatory. The decision in the
case of Tlwta Ganga Laxmi (supra) is with reference to an express c
provision contained in the Andhra Pradesh Rules in that behalf. That
Rule .Was framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh after the decision of
Full Bench of the High Court. Therefore, the dictum in this decision
cannot have universal application to all the States (other than State of
Andhra Pradesh). It is apposite to reproduce paragraphs 4 and 5 of the D
said judgment which read thus:
"4. In our opinion, there was no need for the Appellants to
approach the civil Court as the said cancellation deed dated
4.8.2005 as well as registration of the same was wholly
void and non est and can be ignored altogether. For . E
illustration, if 'A' transfers a piece of land to 'B' by a
registered sale deed, then, if it is not disputed that 'A' had -
the title to the land, that title passes to 'B' on the registration
of the sale deed (retrospectively from the date of the
execution of the same) and 'B' then becomes the owner of
the land. If 'A' wants to subsequently get the sale deed F
cancelled, he has to file a civil suit for cancellation or else
he can request 'B' to sell the land back to 'A' but by no
stretch ofimagination, can a cancellation deed be executed
or registered. This is unheard of in law.
5. In this connection, we may also refer to Rule 26(i)(k) G
relating to Andhra Pradesh under Section 69 of the
Registration Act, which states:
"(i) The registering officer shall ensure at the time of
preparation for registration of cancellation deeds of
H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r2o 161 12 s.c.R.
A previously registered deed of conveyances on sale before
him that such cancellation deeds are executed by all the
executant and claimant parties to the previously registered
conveyance on sale and that su~h cancellation deed is
accompanied by a declaration showing natural consent or
orders of a competent civil or High Court or State or Central
B
Government annulling the transaction contained in the
previously registered deed of conveyance on sale:
Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with the
execution of cancellation deeds by executant and claimant
parties to the previously registered deeds of conveyances
c on sale before him ·if the cancellation deed is executed by a
Civil Judge or a Government Officer competent to execute
Government orders declaring the properties contained in
the previously registered conveyance on sale to be
Government or Assigned or Endowment lands or properties·
D not register able by any provision oflaw.
A reading of the above rule also supports the observations
we have made above. It is only when a sale deed is
cancelled by a competent Court that the cancellation deed
can be registered and that too after notice to the concerned
E parties. In this case, neither is there any declaration by a
competent Court nor was there any notice to the parties.
Hence, this rule also makes it clear that both the cancellation
deed as well as registration thereof were wholly void and
non est and meaningless transactions."
F 28. No provision in the State of Madhya Pradesh enactment or
the Rules framed under Section 69 of the Act of 1908 has been brought
to our notice which is similar to the provision in Rule 26(k)(i) of the
Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules framed in exercise of power under
Section 69 of the Act of 1908. That being a procedural matter must be
expressly provided in the Act or the Rules applicable to the concerned
G State. In absence of such an express provision, the registration of
Extinguishment Deed in question cannot be labelled as fraudulent or
nullity in law. As aforesaid, there is nothing in Section 34 of the Act of
1908 which obligates appearance of the other party at the time of
presentation of Extinguishment Deed ·for registration, so as to declare
H that such registration of document to be null and void. The error of the
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 59
[A. M, KHANWILKAR,_J.]
Registering Officer, if any, must be regarded as error of procedure. A
Section 87 of the Act of 1908 postulates that nothing done in good faith
by the Registering Officer pursuant to the Act, shall be deemed invalid
merely by reason of any defect in the procedure. In the present case,
the subject Extinguishment Deed was presented by the person duly
authorized by the Society and was registered by the Registering Officer. B
Once the document is registered, it is not open to any Authority, under
the Act of 1908 to cancel the registration. The remedy of appeal provided
under the Act of 1908, in Part XII, in particular Section 72, is limited to
the inaction or refusal by the Registering Officer to register a document.
The power conferred on the Registrar by virtue of Section 68 cannot be
invoked to cancel the registration of documents already registered. C
29. In the dissenting opinion, reference has been made to the
decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of
E.R. Ka/aivan (supra). It was a case where the Registering Officer
refused to n,:gister the deed of cancellation presented before him on the
ground that the cancellation deed was sought to be registered without o
there being a consent from the purchaser. The aggrieved person
approached the Inspector General of Registration who in turn issued a
circular dated 5.10.2007 addressed to all the Registering Officers in the
State, that the deed of cancellation should bear the signatures of both
the vendor and the purchaser. The validity of this circular was challenged
by way of Writ Petition before the High Court. In the present case, our E
attention has neither been invited to any express provision in the Act of
1908, Rules framed by the State of Madhya Pradesh nor any circular
issued by the Competent Authority of the State of Madhya Pradesh to
the effect that the Extinguishment Deed should bear the signatures of
both the vendor and the purchaser and both must be present before the F
Registering Officer when the document is presented for registration.
Absent such an express provision, insistence of presence of both parties
to the documents by the Registering Offic,er, may be a matter o(prudence.
It cannot undermine the procedure prescribed for registration postulated
in the Act of 1908.
G
30. The moot question in this case is: whether the action of the
Society to cancel the allotment of the plot followed by execution of an
Extinguishment Deed was a just action? That will have to be considered
keeping in mind the provisions of the Act of 1960 and the Bye-laws of
the Society which are binding on the members of the Society. The
H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R.
A interplay of the provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief
Act and of the Co-operative Laws and the Bye Laws of the Society
permitting cancellation of allotment of plot or the membership of the
concerned member will have to be considered in appropriate proceedings.
Whether the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of plot made
in favour of its member is barred by the law of Limitation Act, is again a
B
matter to be tested in the proceedings before the Cooperative Forum
where a dispute has been filed by the appellant, ifthe appellant pursues
that contention.
31. In our· considered view, the decision in the case of Tlwta
Ganga Laxmi (supra) was dealing with an express provision, as
c applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh and in particular with regard
to the registration of an Extinguishment Deed. In absence of such an ·
express provision, in other State legislations, the Registering Officer would
be governed by the provisions in the Act of 1908. Going by the said
provisions, there is nothing to indicate that the Registering Officer is
D required to undertake a quasi judicial enquiry regarding the veracity of
the factual position stated in the document presented for registration or
its legality, if the tenor of the document suggests that it requires to be
registered. The validity of such registered document can, indeed, be put
in issue before a Co mt of competent jurisdiction.
E 32. In the present case, the document in question no doubt is
termed as an Extinguishment Deed. However, in effect, it is manifestation
of the decision of the Society to cancel the allotment of the subject plot
given to its member due to non fulfillment of the obligation by the member
concerned. The subject document is linked to the decision of the Society
to cancel the membership of the allottee of the plot given to him/her by
F the Housing Society. In other words, it is the decision of the Society,
which the Society is entitled to exercise within the frame work of the
- governing cooperative laws and the Bye-laws which are binding on the
members of the Society. The case of Tltota Ganga Laxmi (supra),
besides the fact that it was dealing with an express provision contained
G in the Statutory Rule, namely Rule 26 (k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh
Registration Rules 1960, was also not a case of a deed for cancellation
ofallotment of plot by the Housing Society. But, of a cancellation of the
registered sale deed executed between private parties, which was sought
to be cancelled unilaterally. Even for the latter reason the exposition in
the case of Tltota Ganga Laxmi (supra) will have no application to the
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 61
(A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
fact situation of the present case. A
33. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, we are of the
considered opinion that, the High Court has justly dismissed the writ
petition filed by the appellant with liberty to the appellant to pursue
statutory remedy resorted to by him under the Act of 1960 or by resorting
to any other remedy as may be advised and permissible in law. All B
questions to be considered in those proceedings will have to be decided
on its own merits.
34. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal in the above terms with
no order as to costs.
c
Kalpana K. Tripathy A,ppeal dismissed.
'-·
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "registration of extinguishment deed"Sign in to search