Holding

An accused who was under 18 years of age at the time of committing the offence must be treated as a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and the life imprisonment sentence is set aside, with the case remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for appropriate orders under s.15.

Summary

The appellant Satya Deo was convicted of murder under IPC s.302 r/w s.34 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He claimed he was a juvenile at the time of the offence (aged 16 years 7 months) and sought relief under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The Supreme Court examined the applicability of the 2000 Act, its amendments, and the 2015 Act to pending cases, holding that juvenility is determined by the age on the date of the offence and that the 2000 Act continues to govern the proceedings. Consequently, while the conviction was upheld, the life sentence was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board to pass appropriate orders under s.15 of the 2000 Act, including fine and compensation. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to pending cases where the offender was a juvenile at the time of the offence but became an adult before the Act's commencement.
The effect of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 and its Section 25 on proceedings pending under the 2000 Act.
Whether the claim of juvenility can be raised and decided at any stage of criminal proceedings, including on appeal.
The proper sentencing of a juvenile under the 2000 Act, specifically the validity of a life imprisonment sentence.
The interpretation of Sections 20, 7A, 64 and related amendments of the 2000 Act and their interaction with the General Clauses Act.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 6
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302 r/w 34
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015s. 111, s. 25
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 1986
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 15, s. 16(2), s. 20, s. 2(l), s. 64, s. 69, s. 7A

Subjects

juvenile justicejuvenilitypending casesSection 20Section 7Alife imprisonmentJuvenile Justice Act 2000Juvenile Justice Act 2015General Clauses Actcriminal appeal

Judgment

128 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 128 [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No.860 of 2019)
B OCTOBER 07, 2020
[S. ABDUL NAZEER AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
– ss.2(l), 7A, 15, 16(2), 20, 64, 69 – Scheme and applicability of
2000 Act – Appellant and co-accused persons convicted by trial
C
court in FIR dtd. 11.12.81 u/s.302 r/w s.34, IPC and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life – Confirmed by impugned judgment
– SLP in respect of co-accused persons dismissed, however in case
of appellant notice was issued on the plea of juvenility – Held:
Supreme court at this stage can decide and determine the question
D of juvenility of the appellant, notwithstanding the fact that he was
not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on the date of the
offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an adult when the
2000 Act was enforced – As the appellant was less than 18 years of
age on the date of commission of offence on 11.12.81, he is entitled
to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per the 2000 Act
E
– Further, in light of s.6, General Clauses Act r/w s.25 of the 2015
Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile
when he was less than eighteen years of age at the time of commission
of the offence, a right which he acquired and has fructified under
the 2000 Act, even if the offence was committed prior to enforcement
F of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001– In terms of s.25 of the 2015 Act,
2000 Act would continue to apply and govern the proceedings which
were pending when the 2015 Act was enforced – Appellant has
undergone incarceration for more than 2 years thus far – Conviction
of the appellant is upheld, but sentence of life imprisonment set
aside – Matter remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing
G
appropriate order/directions u/s.15 of the 2000 Act including the
question of determination and payment of appropriate quantum of
fine and compensation to be awarded to the family of deceased –
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection)
Act, 2015 – s.2, 25, 111 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.6 – Penal
H Code, 1860 – s.302 r/w s.34.
128
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 129

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 A
– Applicability of vis-à-vis 2015 Act – Discussed – Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection) Act of 2015.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 – s.25 –
Scope and application of – Discussed – Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. B
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In light of the conflicting views expressed by
this Court on application of the 2000 Act to the pending
proceedings, vide decisions in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar and
Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, the matter was referred to C
a Constitution Bench and decided in the case reported as Pratap
Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another. Subsequent to the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh, several
amendments were made to the 2000 Act by the Amendment Act
No. 33 of 2006. These amendments are significant, but first D
Section 2(l) of the 2000 Act will be referred which defines “juvenile
in conflict with law” In terms of clause (l) to section 2 of the 2000
Act, appellant, being less than 18 years of age, was juvenile on
the date of commission of offence. Section 20 of the 2000 Act,
which provides a special provision in respect of pending cases,
post the amendment vide Act 33 of 2006, Section 20 is a special E
provision with respect to pending cases and begins with a limited
non-obstante or overriding clause notwithstanding anything
contained in the 2000 Act. Legislative intent clearly expressed
states that all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any
court on the date on which the 2000 Act came into force shall F
continue before that court as if the 2000 Act had not been passed.
Though the proceedings are to continue before the court, the
section states that if the court comes to a finding that a juvenile
has committed the offence, it shall record the finding but instead
of passing an order of sentence, forward the juvenile to the
Juvenile Justice Board (Board) which shall then pass orders in G
accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Act, as if the Board
itself had conducted an inquiry and was satisfied that the juvenile
had committed the offence. The proviso however states that the
Board, for any adequate and special reasons, can review the case
and pass appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile. H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A Explanation added to Section 20 vide Act 33 of 2006, which again
is of significant importance, states that the court where ‘the
proceedings’ are pending ‘at any stage’ shall determine the
question of juvenility of the accused. The expression ‘all pending
cases’ includes not only trial but even subsequent proceedings
by way of appeal, revision etc. or any other criminal proceedings.
B
Lastly, 2000 Act applies even to cases where the accused was a
juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, but had ceased
to be a juvenile on or before the date of commencement of the
2000 Act. In even such cases, provisions of the 2000 Act are to
apply as if these provisions were in force for all purposes and at
C all material time when the offence was committed. Thus, in respect
of pending cases, Section 20 authoritatively commands that the
court must at any stage, even post the judgment by the trial court
when the matter is pending in appeal, revision or otherwise,
consider and decide upon the question of juvenility. Juvenility is
determined by the age on the date of commission of the offence.
D
The factum that the juvenile was an adult on the date of
enforcement of the 2000 Act or subsequently had attained
adulthood would not matter. If the accused was juvenile, the court
would, even when maintaining conviction, send the case to the
Board to issue direction and order in accordance with the
E provisions of the 2000 Act. [Paras 9-11][136-E; 137-C-E; 138-C-
H; 139-A-C]
Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488 : [2000]
1 Suppl. SCR 69; Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan
(1982) 2 SCC 202 : [1982] 3 SCR 583; Pratap Singh
F v. State of Jharkhand and Another (2005) 3 SCC 551 :
[2005] 1 SCR 1019 – referred to.
1.2 By the amendment Act No. 33 of 2006, Section 7-A was
inserted in the 2000 Act setting-out the procedure to be followed
by the court to determine the claim of juvenility. Section 7A came
G into effect on 22.08.2006. Proviso to Section 7A is important as it
states that the claim of juvenility may be raised before ‘any court’
‘at any stage’, even after the final disposal of the case. When
such claim is made, it shall be determined in terms of the
provisions of the 2000 Act and the rules framed thereunder, even
when the accused had ceased to be a juvenile on or before
H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 131

commencement of the 2000 Act. Thus it would not matter if the A
accused, though a juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence, had become an adult before or after the date of
commencement of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001. He would be
entitled to benefit of the 2000 Act. Section 64 of the 2000 Act
was also amended by Act No. 33 of 2006 by incorporating a proviso
and explanation and by replacing the words ‘may direct’ with the B
words ‘shall direct’ in the main provision. Substitution of the words
‘may direct’ with ‘shall direct’ in the main provision is to clarify
that the provision is mandatory and not directory. Section 64 has
to be read harmoniously with the newly added proviso and
explanation and also other amendments made vide Act 33 of 2006 C
in Section 20 and by way of inserting Section 7A in the 2000 Act.
The main provision states that where a juvenile in conflict with
law is undergoing any sentence of imprisonment at the
commencement of the 2000 Act, he shall, in lieu of undergoing
the sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in a fit
institution in such manner as the state government thinks fit for D
the remainder of the period of sentence. Further, the provisions
of the 2000 Act are to apply as if the juvenile had been ordered
by the Board to be sent to the special home or institution and
ordered to be kept under protective care under sub-section (2)
of Section 16 of the Act. The proviso states that the state
government or the Board, for any adequate and special reasons E
to be recorded in writing, review the case of the juvenile in conflict
with law who is undergoing sentence of imprisonment and who
had ceased to be a juvenile on or before the commencement of
the 2000 Act and pass appropriate orders. However, it is the
explanation which is of extreme significance as it states that in F
all cases where a juvenile in conflict with law is undergoing a
sentence of imprisonment on the date of commencement of the
2000 Act, the juvenile’s case including the issue of juvenility,
shall be deemed to be decided in terms of clause (l) to Section 2
and other provisions and rules made under the 2000 Act
irrespective of the fact that the juvenile had ceased to be a G
juvenile. Such juvenile shall be sent to special home or fit
institution for the remainder period of his sentence but such
sentence shall not exceed the maximum period provided in
Section 15 of the 2000 Act. The statute overrules and modifies
the sentence awarded, even in decided cases. [Paras 12, 13][139-
H
C-H; 140-A-C; 141-B-G]
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 1.3 This court at this stage can decide and determine the
question of juvenility of appellant, notwithstanding the fact that
appellant was not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on
the date of the offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an
adult when the 2000 Act was enforced. As appellant was less than
18 years of age on the date of commission of offence on
B
11.12.1981, he is entitled to be treated as a juvenile and be given
benefit as per the 2000 Act. This brings this Court to the question
whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act of 2015
(2015 Act) would be applicable as the 2015 Act vide sub-section
(1) to Section 111 repeals the 2000 Act, albeit sub-section (2) to
C Section 111 states that notwithstanding this repeal anything done
or any action taken under the 2000 Act shall be deemed to have
been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the
2015 Act. Section 69 ‘Repeal and saving clause’ of the 2000 Act
is identical as sub-section (1) thereof had repealed the 1986 Act
and sub-section (2) provides that notwithstanding such repeal
D
anything done or any action taken under the 1986 Act shall be
deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding
provisions of the 2000 Act. However, what is important and
relevant is Section 25 of the 2015 Act which, as per the headnote
to that Section, incorporates ‘special provision in respect of
E pending cases’. Section 25 is a non-obstante clause which applies
to all proceedings in respect of a child alleged or found to be in
conflict with law pending before any Board or court on the date of
commencement of the 2015 Act, that is, 31st December 2015. It
states that the pending proceedings shall be continued in that
Board or court as if the 2015 Act had not been passed. The use
F
of the word ‘any’ before the board or court in Section 25 of the
2015 Act, would mean and include any court including the
appellate court or a court before which the revision petition is
pending. This is also apparent from the use of the words ‘a child
alleged or found to be in conflict with law’. The word ‘found’ is
G used in past-tense and would apply in cases where an order/
judgment has been passed. The word ‘alleged’ would refer to
those proceedings where no final order has been passed and the
matter is sub-judice. Further, Section 25 of the 2015 Act applies
to proceedings before the board or the court and as noticed above,
it would include any court, including the appellate court or the
H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 133

court where the revision petition is pending. In the context of A
Section 25, the expression ‘court’ is not restricted to mean a
civil court which has the jurisdiction in the matter of ‘adoption’
and ‘guardianship’ in terms of clause (23) to Section 2 of the 2015
Act. The definition clause is applicable unless the context
otherwise requires. In case of Section 25, the legislature is
B
obviously not referring to a civil court as the section deals with
pending proceedings in respect of a child alleged or found to be
in conflict with law, which cannot be proceedings pending before
a civil court. Since the Act of 2015 protects and affirms the
application of the 2000 Act to all pending proceedings, this Court
does not read that the legislative intent of the 2015 Act is to the C
contrary, that is, to apply the 2015 Act to all pending proceedings.
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,1897 that provides the
consequence of “repeal” of an enactment. Consequently, in light
of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 25 of
the 2015 Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated
D
as a juvenile when he was less than eighteen years of age at the
time of commission of the offence, a right which he acquired and
has fructified under the 2000 Act, even if the offence was
committed prior to enforcement of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001.
In terms of Section 25 of the 2015 Act, 2000 Act would continue
to apply and govern the proceedings which were pending when E
the 2015 Act was enforced. (In the present case, this Court is
not required to examine and decide the question whether 2000
Act or the 2015 Act would apply when the offence was committed
before the enactment of the 2015 Act but the charge-sheet was
filed after enactment of the 2015 Act. The answer would require
F
examination of clause (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution and
several other aspects as the 2015 Act provide an entirely different
regime in respect of children in conflict with law and the procedure
to be followed in such cases. These aspects and issues have not
been argued.) [Paras 17, 18][146-E-H; 147-A-H; 148-A-G]
Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P. (2001) 4 SCC 355 : [2001] G
2 SCR 626 – relied on.
1.4 The procedure adopted by the learned District and
Sessions Judge is not challenged and questioned. Appellant was
less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence
H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A and this remains undisputed and unchallenged. Appellant has
undergone incarceration for more than 2 years thus far. While
the conviction of appellant is uphold, the sentence of life
imprisonment is set aside. The matter is remitted to the
jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate order/directions
under Section 15 of the 2000 Act including the question of
B
determination and payment of appropriate quantum of fine and
the compensation to be awarded to the family of the deceased.
[Paras 21, 22][150-C-F]
Gaurav Kumar @ Monu v. State of Haryana (2019) 4
SCC 549 : [2019] 3 SCR 372 – distinguished.
C
Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another (2010)
5 SCC 344 : [2010] 5 SCR 137; Mumtaz v. State of U.P
(2016) 11 SCC 786 : [2016] 3 SCR 434; Hari Ram v.
State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211 : [2009]
7 SCR 623; Jitendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
D (2013) 11 SCC 193 : [2013] 13 SCR 764 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 69 referred to para 9
[1982] 3 SCR 583 referred to para 9
E
[2005] 1 SCR 1019 referred to para 9
[2010] 5 SCR 137 relied on para 14
[2016] 3 SCR 434 relied on para 15
[2009] 7 SCR 623 relied on para 16
F
[2001] 2 SCR 626 relied on para 18
[2019] 3 SCR 372 distinguished para 19
[2013] 13 SCR 764 relied on para 19
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
G
860 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.04.2018 of the High Court
of Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 994 of 1982.

H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 135

Apoorv Kurup, Nirmal Ambastha, Ishan Baghel, Ms. Upma A
Bhattacharjee, Ashish Madaam, Ms. Taruna Ardhendumauli Prasad,
Parmanand Pandey, Utkarsh Pandey, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
B
1. By the order dated 17.08.2018, the Special Leave Petition,
challenging the judgment dated 20.4.2018 of the Lucknow Bench of the
Allahabad High Court, filed by Keshav Ram and Ram Kuber was
dismissed, albeit in the case of co-accused Satya Deo@ Bhoorey notice
was issued on the plea of juvenility. The impugned judgment had confirmed
the conviction of Keshav Ram, Ram Kuber and Satya Deo by the trial C
court in FIR No. 156/1981 dated 11.12.1981 Police Station Gilaula, Distt.
Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh for the offence under Section 302 read with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short) and the
order of sentence directing them to undergo imprisonment for life.
2. By order dated 02.05.2019 leave was granted in the case of D
Satya Deo.
3. By order dated 22.11.2019 the trial court was directed to conduct
an inquiry to ascertain if Satya Deo was a juvenile on the date of
occurrence i.e. 11.12.1981, on the basis of material which would be
placed on record. E
4. Pursuant to the directions, the First Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh has conducted an inquiry and
submitted the report dated 06.03.2020. As per the report, the date of
birth of Satya Deo is 15.4.1965. Accordingly, he was 16 years 7 months
and 26 days of age on the date of commission of the offence i.e. F
11.12.1981. The report relies on the Transfer Certificate (in original)
issued by Ram Narayan Singh Inter College, Ramnagar Khajuri,
Bahraich, and the Admission Register of Primary School, Pairi, which
documents were proved by Sh. Krishn Deo, Clerk at Ram Narayan
Singh Inter College, Ramnagar Khajuri, Bahraich, and Smt. Anupam
G
Singh, in-charge head-mistress of Primary School, Pairi, respectively.
Further, Satya Deo had appeared in class-10 examination vide Roll. No.
9020777, and his date of birth as recorded in the gazette relating to this
examination is 15.04.1965.

H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A 5. The report states that the complainant had died and consequently
notice was served on the heirs of the complainant, who did not appear
before the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahraich. The
prosecution had not led any evidence.
6. The date of birth of Satya Deo is undisputed and not challenged
B before us.
7. Notwithstanding this finding, the First Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Bahraich has observed that Satya Deo was not a juvenile
as per the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (1986 Act) as he was more than 16
year of age on the date of commission of the offence i.e. 11.12.1981.
C 8. The conundrum is in light of the definition of ‘juvenile’ under
the 1986 Act, which was below sixteen years in case of a boy and below
eighteen years in case of a girl on the date the boy or girl is brought for
first appearance before the court or the competent authority, whereas
the 2000 Act, as noticed below, does not distinguish between a boy or
D girl and a person under the age of eighteen years is a juvenile. Further,
under the 2000 Act, the age on the date of commission of the offence is
the determining factor.
9. In light of the conflicting views expressed by this Court on
application of the 2000 Act to the pending proceedings, vide decisions in
E Arnit Das v. State of Bihar 1 and Umesh Chandra v. State of
Rajasthan2, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench and decided
in the case reported as Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and
Another3. The Constitution Bench formulated two points for decision,
namely:

F “(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date
for determining the age of the alleged offender as juvenile offender
or the date when he is produced in the court/competent authority.
(b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a
proceeding is initiated under the 1986 Act and pending when the
Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 1-4-2001.”
G
On the second question, the Constitution Bench held that the 2000
Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding instituted under the
1
(2000) 5 SCC 488
2
(1982) 2 SCC 202
3
H (2005) 3 SCC 551
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 137
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

1986 Act in any court or authority, if the person had not completed eighteen A
years of age as on 1st April 2001, when the 2000 Act came into force.
On the first question, it was held that the reckoning date for the
determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of the offence and not
the date when he is produced before the authority or in a court.
Consequently, the 2000 Act would have prospective effect and not
B
retrospective effect except in cases where the person had not completed
the age of eighteen years on the date of commencement of the 2000
Act. Other pending cases would be governed by the provisions of the
1986 Act.
10. Subsequent to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pratap
Singh (supra), several amendments were made to the 2000 Act by the C
Amendment Act No. 33 of 2006. These amendments are significant, but
first we will begin by referring to Section 2(l) of the 2000 Act which
defines “juvenile in conflict with law” as:
“(l) “juvenile in conflict with law” means a juvenile who is alleged
to have committed an offence and has not completed eighteenth D
year of age as on the date of commission of such offence”
In terms of clause (l) to section 2 of the 2000 Act, Satya Deo,
being less than 18 years of age, was juvenile on the date of commission
of offence.
E
11. Section 20 of the 2000 Act, which provides a special provision
in respect of pending cases, post the amendment vide Act 33 of 2006,
reads:
“20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all F
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in
any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in
that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had
not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead
of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward G
the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect
of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act
as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a
juvenile has committed the offence:
H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special
reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass
appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.
Explanation.—In all pending cases including trial, revision,
appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a
B juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination
of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l)
of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before
the date of commencement of this Act and the provisions of
this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force,
for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged
C offence was committed.”
Section 20 is a special provision with respect to pending cases
and begins with a limited non-obstante or overriding clause
notwithstanding anything contained in the 2000 Act. Legislative intent
clearly expressed states that all proceedings in respect of a juvenile
D pending in any court on the date on which the 2000 Act came into force
shall continue before that court as if the 2000 Act had not been passed.
Though the proceedings are to continue before the court, the section
states that if the court comes to a finding that a juvenile has committed
the offence, it shall record the finding but instead of passing an order of
E sentence, forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice Board (Board)
which shall then pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the
2000 Act, as if the Board itself had conducted an inquiry and was satisfied
that the juvenile had committed the offence. The proviso however states
that the Board, for any adequate and special reasons, can review the
case and pass appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile. Explanation
F added to Section 20 vide Act 33 of 2006, which again is of significant
importance, states that the court where ‘the proceedings’ are pending
‘at any stage’ shall determine the question of juvenility of the accused.
The expression ‘all pending cases’ includes not only trial but even
subsequent proceedings by way of appeal, revision etc. or any other
G criminal proceedings. Lastly, 2000 Act applies even to cases where the
accused was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, but
had ceased to be a juvenile on or before the date of commencement of
the 2000 Act. In even such cases, provisions of the 2000 Act are to
apply as if these provisions were in force for all purposes and at all
material time when the offence was committed.
H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 139
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

Thus, in respect of pending cases, Section 20 authoritatively A
commands that the court must at any stage, even post the judgment by
the trial court when the matter is pending in appeal, revision or otherwise,
consider and decide upon the question of juvenility. Juvenility is determined
by the age on the date of commission of the offence. The factum that
the juvenile was an adult on the date of enforcement of the 2000 Act or
B
subsequently had attained adulthood would not matter. If the accused
was juvenile, the court would, even when maintaining conviction, send
the case to the Board to issue direction and order in accordance with the
provisions of the 2000 Act.
12. By the amendment Act No. 33 of 2006, Section 7-A was
inserted in the 2000 Act setting-out the procedure to be followed by the C
court to determine the claim of juvenility. Section 7A, which came into
effect on 22.08.2006, reads:
“7-A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is
raised before any court.—(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility
is raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an D
accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of
the offence, the court shall make an enquiry, take such
evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to
determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding
whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his E
age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any
court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final
disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in
terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the Rules F
made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on
or before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate G
order, and the sentence if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect.”
Proviso to Section 7A is important for our purpose as it states that
the claim of juvenility may be raised before ‘any court’ ‘at any stage’,
even after the final disposal of the case. When such claim is made, it
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A shall be determined in terms of the provisions of the 2000 Act and the
rules framed thereunder, even when the accused had ceased to be a
juvenile on or before commencement of the 2000 Act. Thus it would not
matter if the accused, though a juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence, had become an adult before or after the date of commencement
of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001. He would be entitled to benefit of the
B
2000 Act.
13. Section 64 of the 2000 Act was also amended by Act No. 33
of 2006 by incorporating a proviso and explanation and by replacing the
words ‘may direct’ with the words ‘shall direct’ in the main provision.
Post the amendment, Section 64 reads as under:
C
“64. Juvenile in conflict with law undergoing sentence at
commencement of this Act-
In any area in which this Act is brought into force, the
State Government shall direct that a juvenile in conflict with
D law who is undergoing any sentence of imprisonment at the
commencement of this Act, shall, in lieu of undergoing such
sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in fit institution
in such manner as the State Government thinks fit for the
remainder of the period of the sentence; and the provisions
of this Act shall apply to the juvenile as if he had been ordered
E by the Board to be sent to such special home or institution or,
as the case may be, ordered to be kept under protective care
under sub-section (2) of section 16 of this Act.
Provided that the State Government, or as the case may
be the board, may, for any adequate and special reason to be
F recorded in writing, review the case of a juvenile in conflict
with law undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, who has
ceased to be so on or before the commencement of this Act,
and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.
Explanation :– In all cases where a juvenile in conflict
G with law is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment at any
stage on the date of commencement of this Act, his case
including the issue of juvenility, shall be deemed to be decided
in terms of clause (l) of section 2 and other provisions
contained in this act and the rules made thereunder,
irrespective of the fact that he ceases to be a juvenile on or
H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 141
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

before such date and accordingly he shall be sent to the A
special home or a fit institution, as the case may be, for the
remainder of the period of the sentence but such sentence
shall not in any case exceed the maximum period provided in
section 15 of this act.”
Substitution of the words ‘may direct’ with ‘shall direct’ in the B
main provision is to clarify that the provision is mandatory and not
directory. Section 64 has to be read harmoniously with the newly added
proviso and explanation and also other amendments made vide Act 33
of 2006 in Section 20 and by way of inserting Section 7A in the 2000
Act. The main provision states that where a juvenile in conflict with law
is undergoing any sentence of imprisonment at the commencement of C
the 2000 Act, he shall, in lieu of undergoing the sentence, be sent to a
special home or be kept in a fit institution in such manner as the state
government thinks fit for the remainder of the period of sentence. Further,
the provisions of the 2000 Act are to apply as if the juvenile had been
ordered by the Board to be sent to the special home or institution and D
ordered to be kept under protective care under sub-section (2) of Section
16 of the Act. The proviso states that the state government or the Board,
for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in writing, review
the case of the juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing sentence
of imprisonment and who had ceased to be a juvenile on or before the
commencement of the 2000 Act and pass appropriate orders. However, E
it is the explanation which is of extreme significance as it states that in
all cases where a juvenile in conflict with law is undergoing a sentence
of imprisonment on the date of commencement of the 2000 Act, the
juvenile’s case including the issue of juvenility, shall be deemed to be
decided in terms of clause (l) to Section 2 and other provisions and rules F
made under the 2000 Act irrespective of the fact that the juvenile had
ceased to be a juvenile. Such juvenile shall be sent to special home or fit
institution for the remainder period of his sentence but such sentence
shall not exceed the maximum period provided in Section 15 of the 2000
Act. The statute overrules and modifies the sentence awarded, even in
decided cases. G

14. This Court in Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
Another4 had analysed the scheme and application of the 2000 Act to
the accused who were below the age of eighteen years on the date of
4
(2010) 5 SCC 344 H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A commission of offence which was committed prior to the enactment of
the 2000 Act, to opine and hold:
“14. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7-A contemplates
that a claim of juvenility can be raised before any court and
has to be recognised at any stage even after disposal of the
B case and such claim is required to be determined in terms of
the provisions contained in the Act of 2000 and the Rules
framed thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so
on or before the date of the commencement of the Act of 2000.
The effect of the proviso is that a juvenile who had not
completed eighteen years of age on the date of commission
C of the offence would also be entitled to the benefit of the Act
of 2000 as if the provisions of Section 2(k) of the said Act,
which defines “juvenile” or “child” to mean a person who
has not completed eighteenth year of age, had always been
in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act.
D 15. It is, thus, manifest from a conjoint reading of Sections
2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 of the Act of 2000, read with Rules
12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007 that all persons who were below the
age of eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence
E even prior to 1-4-2001 would be treated as juveniles even if
the claim of juvenility is raised after they have attained the
age of eighteen years on or before the date of the
commencement of the Act of 2000 and were undergoing
sentences upon being convicted. In the view we have taken,
we are fortified by the dictum of this Court in a recent decision
F in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan [(2009) 13 SCC 211: (2010)
1 SCC (Cri) 987].”
15. In Mumtaz v. State of U.P 5, while referring to several earlier
decisions, this court dealt with effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act and
its inter-play with the 1986 Act, to elucidate:
G
“18. The effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act was considered
in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [Pratap Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551: 2005 SCC (Cri) 742] and
it was stated as under: (SCC p. 570, para 31)

H 5
(2016) 11 SCC 786
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 143
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

“31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the A
special provision in respect of pending cases and begins
with a non obstante clause. The sentence ‘notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect
of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date
on which this Act came into force’ has great significance.
B
The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any
court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are relatable to
proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force
and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force.
The term “any court” would include even ordinary criminal
courts. If the person was a “juvenile” under the 1986 Act C
the proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts.
They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy
had crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 years.
This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person
had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had
D
not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case
shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act has not been
passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed
an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of
passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders E
in respect of that juvenile.”
19. In Bijender Singh v. State of Haryana [Bijender
Singh v. State of Haryana, (2005) 3 SCC 685 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 889] , the legal position as regards Section 20 was stated
in the following words: (SCC pp. 687-88, paras 8-10 & 12): F
“8. One of the basic distinctions between the 1986 Act
and the 2000 Act relates to the age of males and females.
Under the 1986 Act, a juvenile means a male juvenile who
has not attained the age of 16 years, and a female juvenile
who has not attained the age of 18 years. In the 2000 Act, G
the distinction between male and female juveniles on the
basis of age has not been maintained. The age-limit is 18
years for both males and females.
9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was
not a juvenile. In that view of the matter the question H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A whether a person above 16 years becomes “juvenile”
within the purview of the 2000 Act must be answered having
regard to the object and purport thereof.
10. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile
could be tried in any court. Section 20 of the 2000 Act
B takes care of such a situation stating that despite the same
the trial shall continue in that court as if that Act has not
been passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of
commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be
recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead
of passing any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would
C be forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board (in short “the
Board”) which shall pass orders in accordance with the
provisions of the Act as if it has been satisfied on inquiry
that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction
has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction
D as is well known must be given its full effect although it
has its limitations. …
11.***
12. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although
not a juvenile, has to be treated to be one by the Board for
E the purpose of sentencing, which takes care of a situation
that the person although not a juvenile in terms of the 1986
Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000 Act
for the said limited purpose.”
20. In Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Dharambir v. State
F (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1274]
the determination of juvenility even after conviction was one
of the issues and it was stated: (SCC p. 347, paras 11-12)
“11. It is plain from the language of the Explanation to
Section 20 that in all pending cases, which would include
G not only trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of
revision or appeal, etc., the determination of juvenility of
a juvenile has to be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2,
even if the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on or before 1-
4-2001, when the 2000 Act came into force, and the
provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provision
H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 145
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

had been in force for all purposes and for all material A
times when the alleged offence was committed.
12. Clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act provides that
“juvenile in conflict with law” means a “juvenile” who is
alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed
eighteenth year of age as on the date of commission of B
such offence. Section 20 also enables the court to consider
and determine the juvenility of a person even after
conviction by the regular court and also empowers the
court, while maintaining the conviction, to set aside the
sentence imposed and forward the case to the Juvenile
Justice Board concerned for passing sentence in C
accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Act.”
21. Similarly in Kalu v. State of Haryana [Kalu v. State of
Haryana, (2012) 8 SCC 34 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 761] this
Court summed up as under: (SCC p. 41, para 21)
D
“21. Section 20 makes a special provision in respect of
pending cases. It states that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Juvenile Act, all proceedings in respect
of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date
on which the Juvenile Act comes into force in that area
shall be continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had E
not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile
has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and
instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions F
of the Juvenile Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry
under the Juvenile Act that the juvenile has committed the
offence. The Explanation to Section 20 makes it clear that
in all pending cases, which would include not only trials
but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision or
appeal, the determination of juvenility of a juvenile would G
be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile
ceased to be a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when the
Juvenile Act came into force, and the provisions of the
Juvenile Act would apply as if the said provision had been
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A in force for all purposes and for all material times when
the alleged offence was committed.”
16. This position of law and principle was affirmed by this court
for the first time in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan6 in the following
words:
B “39. The Explanation which was added in 2006, makes it very
clear that in all pending cases, which would include not only
trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision or
appeal, the determination of juvenility of a juvenile would be
in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased
C to be a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when the Juvenile
Justice Act, 2000, came into force, and the provisions of the
Act would apply as if the said provision had been in force for
all purposes and for all material times when the alleged offence
was committed. In fact, Section 20 enables the court to
consider and determine the juvenility of a person even after
D conviction by the regular court and also empowers the court,
while maintaining the conviction, to set aside the sentence
imposed and forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board
concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the
provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.”
E 17. In light of the legal position as expounded above and in the
aforementioned judgments, this court at this stage can decide and
determine the question of juvenility of Satya Deo, notwithstanding the
fact that Satya Deo was not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on
the date of the offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an adult
F when the 2000 Act was enforced. As Satya Deo was less than 18 years
of age on the date of commission of offence on 11.12.1981, he is entitled
to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per the 2000 Act.
18. This brings us to the question whether the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection) Act of 2015 (2015 Act) would be applicable as
the 2015 Act vide sub-section (1) to Section 111 repeals the 2000 Act,
G
albeit sub-section (2) to Section 111 states that notwithstanding this repeal
anything done or any action taken under the 2000 Act shall be deemed
to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the
2015 Act. Section 69 ‘Repeal and saving clause’ of the 2000 Act is
6
H (2009) 13 SCC 211
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 147
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

identical as sub-section (1) thereof had repealed the 1986 Act and sub- A
section (2) provides that notwithstanding such repeal anything done or
any action taken under the 1986 Act shall be deemed to have been done
or taken under the corresponding provisions of the 2000 Act. However,
what is important and relevant for us is Section 25 of the 2015 Act
which, as per the headnote to that Section, incorporates ‘special provision
B
in respect of pending cases’ and reads:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings
in respect of a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law
pending before any Board or court on the date of commencement
of this Act, shall be continued in that Board or court as if this Act
had not been enacted.” C

Section 25 is a non-obstante clause which applies to all proceedings
in respect of a child7 alleged or found to be in conflict with law pending
before any Board or court on the date of commencement of the 2015
Act, that is, 31st December 2015. It states that the pending proceedings
shall be continued in that Board or court as if the 2015 Act had not been D
passed. In Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P.8, it was observed that the right to
appeal being a statutory right, the trial court’s verdict does not attain
finality during the pendency of the appeal and for that purpose the trial is
deemed to be continuing despite conviction. Thus, the use of the word
‘any’ before the board or court in Section 25 of the 2015 Act, would E
mean and include any court including the appellate court or a court before
which the revision petition is pending. This is also apparent from the use
of the words ‘a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law’. The
word ‘found’ is used in past-tense and would apply in cases where an
order/judgment has been passed. The word ‘alleged’ would refer to those
proceedings where no final order has been passed and the matter is sub- F
judice. Further, Section 25 of the 2015 Act applies to proceedings before
the board or the court and as noticed above, it would include any court,
including the appellate court or the court where the revision petition is
pending. In the context of Section 25, the expression ‘court’ is not restricted
to mean a civil court which has the jurisdiction in the matter of ‘adoption’ G
and ‘guardianship’ in terms of clause (23) to Section 2 of the 2015 Act 9.
The definition clause is applicable unless the context otherwise requires.
7
The expression ‘child’ as per clause (12) to Section 2 of the 2015 Act reads – ‘a person
who has not completed eighteen years of age’.
8
(2001) 4 SCC 355
9
“(23) – “court” means a civil court, which has jurisdiction in matters of adoption and
guardianship and may include the District Court, Family Court and City Civil Courts’;” H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A In case of Section 25, the legislature is obviously not referring to a civil
court as the section deals with pending proceedings in respect of a child
alleged or found to be in conflict with law, which cannot be proceedings
pending before a civil court. Since the Act of 2015 protects and affirms
the application of the 2000 Act to all pending proceedings, we do not
read that the legislative intent of the 2015 Act is to the contrary, that is,
B
to apply the 2015 Act to all pending proceedings.

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 that provides the
consequence of “repeal” of an enactment reads:

C 6. Effect of repeal. Where this Act, or any Central Act or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals
any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then,
unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:

xxx
D
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;

Consequently, in light of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
read with Section 25 of the 2015 Act, an accused cannot be denied his
E right to be treated as a juvenile when he was less than eighteen years of
age at the time of commission of the offence, a right which he acquired
and has fructified under the 2000 Act, even if the offence was committed
prior to enforcement of the 2000 Act on 01.04.2001. In terms of Section
25 of the 2015 Act, 2000 Act would continue to apply and govern the
F proceedings which were pending when the 2015 Act was enforced. (In
the present case, we are not required to examine and decide the question
whether 2000 Act or the 2015 Act would apply when the offence was
committed before the enactment of the 2015 Act but the charge-sheet
was filed after enactment of the 2015 Act. The answer would require
examination of clause (1) to Article 20 of the Constitution and several
G other aspects as the 2015 Act provide an entirely different regime in
respect of children in conflict with law and the procedure to be followed
in such cases. These aspects and issues have not been argued before
us.)

H
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 149
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

19. Decision of this court in Gaurav Kumar @ Monu v. State of A
Haryana10, which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the state
is of no avail as this decision is on interpretation and application of Rule
12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007,
for the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The procedure
adopted by the learned District and Sessions Judge is not challenged and
B
questioned before us. We would again record that Satya Deo was less
than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence and this
remains undisputed and unchallenged.
20. Satya Deo has undergone incarceration for more than 2 years
thus far. In Mumtaz @ Muntyaz (supra), dealing with quantum and
nature of punishment which should be given to a person who was a C
juvenile on the date of commission of offence, this court, while placing
reliance upon an earlier decision in Jitendra Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh11, had held:
22. It is thus well settled that in terms of Section 20 of the
2000 Act, in all cases where the accused was above 16 years D
but below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence, the
proceedings pending in the court would continue and be taken
to the logical end subject to an exception that upon finding
the juvenile to be guilty, the court would not pass an order of
sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred to E
the Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. What
kind of order could be passed in a matter where claim of
juvenility came to be accepted in a situation similar to the
present case, was dealt with by this Court in Jitendra
Singh v. State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013)
11 SCC 193 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725] in the following terms: F
(SCC pp. 210-11, para 32)
“32. A perusal of the “punishments” provided for under
the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature
of the offence committed by the appellant, advising or
admonishing him [clause (a)] is hardly a “punishment” G
that can be awarded since it is not at all commensurate
with the gravity of the crime. Similarly, considering his
age of about 40 years, it is completely illusory to expect
10
(2019) 4 SCC 549
11
(2013) 11 SCC 193 H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 12 S.C.R.

A the appellant to be released on probation of good conduct,
to be placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit
person [clause (b)]. For the same reason, the appellant
cannot be released on probation of good conduct under
the care of a fit institution [clause (c)] nor can he be sent
to a special home under Section 10 of the Juvenile Justice
B
Act, 1986 which is intended to be for the rehabilitation
and reformation of delinquent juveniles [clause (d)]. The
only realistic punishment that can possibly be awarded to
the appellant on the facts of this case is to require him to
pay a fine under clause (e) of Section 21(1) of the Juvenile
C Justice Act, 1986.”
21. Following the aforesaid ratio and the legal position elucidated
above, while we uphold the conviction of Satya Deo, we would set aside
the sentence of life imprisonment. We would remit the matter to the
jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate order/directions under
D Section 15 of the 2000 Act including the question of determination and
payment of appropriate quantum of fine and the compensation to be
awarded to the family of the deceased. We make no affirmative or
negative comments either way on the order/direction under Section 15
of the 2000 Act.
E 22. We would, accordingly, direct the jail authorities to produce
Satya Deo before the Board within seven days from the date of receipt
of a copy of this judgment. The Board shall then pass appropriate order
regarding detention and custody and proceed thereafter to pass order/
directions under the 2000 Act. -

F 23. The appeal filed by the Satya Deo is partly allowed in the
aforesaid terms and all the pending application are disposed of.

Divya Pandey Appeal partly allowed.

G

H