SATVIR SINGHversusSTATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI

                    [2014] 9 S.C.R. 247


                      SATVIR SINGH                              A
                              V.
            STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
            (Criminal Appeal No. 920 of 2011)

                     AUGUST 20, 2014
                                                                 B
     [DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: ss. 7, 13(2), 13(1)(d)
- Illegal gratification - Acquittal of appellant by trial court -
Reversal of acquittal by High Court - On appeal, held: A letter C
was written by complainant to the Department that the
appellant had not demanded any money from him when he
visited his premises for inspection and the telephonic
conversation for demand of money was made but he did not
recognize the voice to be that of the appellant - Trial court D
relied upon the said fetter and held that appellant was not
guilty of the offence - The bag containing illegal gratification
was also not recovered from the person of the appellant -
Thus, neither acceptance nor recovery of illegal gratification
was proved - Trial court was right in holding that presumption E
of innocence was in favour of appellant - High Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction had exceeded its.
parameters in reversing the acquittal order of the trial court -
Therefore, findings were not only erroneous in law but also
vitiated in law.                                                  F
    Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1. The letter-Ex.PW-1/DA was written by the
complainant-PW2 to the Collector of Customs which
showed that there was no case of illegal gratification either    G
demanded by the appellant or paid to him by the
complainant PW2. The trial court on proper appreciation
of both oral and documentary evidence par~icularly the

                              247                                H
   .,   .,




   248       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A contents of the said letter held that the appellant was not
  guilty of the offence. It is an undisputed fact that neither
  the Inspector-co-accused was arrayed as a witness nor the
  appellant by the Investigating Officer. The brother-in-law
  of the complainant-PW2 who was stated to be present at
B the time of the telephonic conversation with him was also
  not examined during the investigation to prove the fact that
  the appellant had telephonic conversation with him. [Paras
  29 and 30) [265-8-C; 266-C]

       Babu v. State of Kera/a (2010) 9 SCC 189: 2010 (9) SCR
C 1039; State of Kera/a & Anr. v.. C.P. Rao (2011) 6 SCC 450:
  2011 (6) SCR 864; Murugesan v. State through Inspector of
  Police (2012) 10 SCC 383: 2012 (13) SCR 1; K. S.
  Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 721: 2013
  (4) SCR 155 : Subash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat
D (2002) 5 SCC 86: 2002 (3) SCR 359; Mukut Bihari & Anr. v.
  State of Rajasthan (2012) 11 SCC 642: 2012 (6) SCR 710;
  C. M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kera/a (2009)
  3 SCC 779: 2009 (2) SCR 1021; M. Narsinga Rao v. State
  of Andhra Pradesh 2001 (1) SCC 691: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR
E 584 - referred to.

       2. As per the evidence of PW-2 and shadow witness
  PW-3, the illegal gratification was in a black rexine bag
  with a broken zip which was put on a steel cot. As the
F contents of the bag were not within the knowledge of the
  accused, therefore, the relevant aspect of the case that
  the appellant had accepted the illegal gratification as
  required under Section 7 of the Act was not proved by
  the prosecution. The plea of the prosecution that the said
G letter was written by PW-2 under pressure cannot be
  accepted. If the letter was written by PW-2 under
  pressure, then he should have lodged the complaint in
  this regard. The black rexine bag containing the illegal
  gratification which was kept on the steel cot at the
  residence of the accused was not recovered from the
 SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI              249


person of the accused. Therefore, neither acceptance nor       A
recovery of illegal gratification from the appellant was
proved. The trial judge rightly held that presumption of
innocence is in favour of the appellant and he was
acquitted on merits. [Paras 33, 34] [268-E-F; 269-A-F]
                                                               B
    C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India (1997) ·9
SCC 477: 1997 (1) SCR 107; State of Madras v. A
Vaidhyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 :1958 SCR 580 - referred
to.                      ·

     3. The High Court in exercise of its appellate            C
jurisdiction had exceeded its parameters in reversing the
acquittal order of the trial court. Therefore, the findings
were not only erroneous in law but also vitiated in law.
The High Court did not notice the very important lacuna
in the prosecution case that as per the evidence of PW-        D
2 and PW-3, the bribe money which was sought to be
given to the appellant was in a black rexine bag and not
in the brown rexine bag as shown to the witnesses
before the trial court by the prosecution. It further came
to notice that neither the two witnesses nor the C.B.I.        E
officials put any signature or identification mark on the
bottles containing solution which was the most crucial
evidence in the case to prove the acceptance of the
gratification by the appellant from the complainant. [Para
37, 38] [271-F-G; 277-C-D]                                     F

                    Case Law Reference:
  2010 (9) SCR 1039 ·         Referred to      Para 8
  2011 (6) SCR 864            Referred to      Para 9
                                                               G
  2012 (13) SCR 1             Referred to      Para 9
  2013 (4) SCR 155            Referred to      Para 11
  2002 (3) SCR 359            Referred to      Para 11
                                                               H
    250        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A     2012 (6) SCR 710                 Referred to       Para 11
      2009 (2) SCR 1021                Referred to       Para 12
      2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584          Referred to       Para 21

      1997 (1) SCR 107                 Referred to       Para 31
B
      1958 SCR 580                     Referred to       Para 36

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Criminal Appeal
    No.920 of 2011.
c        From the Judgment and Order dated 07.01.2011 of the
    High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 337
    of 1999.

          Altaf Ahmad, Sibo Sankar Mishra for the Appellant.
D
        Dr. Ashok Dhamija, P.K. Dey, Sonia Dhamija,                B.V.
    Balaram Das for the Respondent.

          The Judgment oNhe Court was delivered by

E       V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the
   appellant against the judgment dated 07.01.2011 and order on
   sentence dated 08.03.2011 passed in Criminal Appeal No.337
   of 1999 by the High Court of Delhi, whereby the High Court
   reversed the order of acquittal dated 11.03.1999 recorded by
 . the Trial Court in C.C No. 19 of 1993 and convicted the
F appellant for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the
   Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
  \'the Act') with rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of
   Rs.50,000/-, ;n default of payment of fine, to further undergo
   three months simple imprisonment. The appellant has prayed
G for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment
   of the High Court and to acquit him from the charge urging
   various facts and grounds in support of the questions of law
   framed in this appeal.

H         2. For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions
 SATVIR SINGH V; STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                    251
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
urged by the learned counsel for the parties and with a view to         A
find out whether this C'ourt is required to interfere with the
impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence of
the High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:
               I

    The complainant, Ramesh Suri (PW-2), was running a                  8
business of import and export of buttons, zips, etc. in the name
and style of M/s Erica Enterprises. It is alleged that the appellant
along with his colleague P.S.Saini (both Inspector Customs
(Preventive)) visited the office cum godown of the complainant
(PW2) on 4.07.1989 and that P.S.Saini demanded a bribe of               C
Rs.2 lakhs from the complainant, one lakh each for himself and
the accused as the articles kept in the godown were notified
goods and since his firm was not a notified dealer, the
complainant has violated the provisions of CustomsAct, 1962.

      3. Further, on 07 .07 .1989, it is alleged by the prosee'ution    D
that the appellant telephonically contacted the complainant (PW-
2) and reiterated the demand as made byP.S:Saini. During
the time of telephonic conversation, thebrother-in-law of the
compfainant Ram Malhotra was sitting with him. The
complainant said only an amount Rs.60,000/- could be                    E
arranged by him and the same was delivered at the residence
of the apprllant on 08.07 .1989 at 8.00 a.m. as the rest
of the amount would be arranged within 3-4 days and will be
paid to the appellant.
                                                                        F
      4. It is alleged that on the written complaint lodged in the
CBI office and on the directions of the Deputy Superintendent
of Police a raid was conducted in the house of the appellant
with the help of the complainant and a shadow witness (PW-
3), the appellant was arrested on 8. 7 .1989. The charge sheet
was filed by the prosecution under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before           G
the court of Special Judge on the basis of which it has framed
the charges against the appellant for trial for offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(d) of the Act.
                                                                       . H
       252 • ·· · SUPREME COURT REPORTS :... [2014] 9 .S.C.R.
                                    -   -.~                              . ,._.


A .·  • 5. The Trial Court after evaluating the evidence on record
  has come to the conclusion and held that the prosecution had·
  failed .to. prove the guilt of the accused under Sections 7 and.
  13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Act and recorded the, .:
  acquittal of the appellant from the charges vide its judgment and
B order dated 11.03.1999. · ·            · · '     ·
                              ··,   -·-·-.
     • 6..The respondent-prosecution, aggrieved by the judgment
  and order of the Trial Court has filed an appeal before the High
  Court of Delhi urging various grounds: After hearing the learned"·
  counsel for the parties, the High Court vide its .judgment and · ·
C order dated 07.01.2011 reversed the order of acquittal
  recorded by the Trial Court and convicted the appellant for the .
  offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act. The correctness
  of thesame is challenged in this appeal by the appellant by
  raising certain legal questions and urging grounds in support ·
D of the same.'·         . .                    .
                                              ·• ~ +'- - - . -
                                                            ' '  .   ..
                                                                     .
                                                                            ':
         · 7. It is contended by Mr: Altaf Ahmed, the learned senior :
     counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that P.S. Saini on···.
     all the occasions demanded the bribe money from the ..
E ·complainant but he was neither arrayed as· accused. nor: :
     examined as witness by the prosecution in the case. Furt~er, •" ·
     he submits that recovery memo Exh. PW-2/D is·not proved·
     because neither its author Deputy Superintendent of Police; ·:
     Darshan Singh was available rior the signatutes ofthe .other: :
F ··witnesses on the said memo have been proved. Therefore,
     recovery of money from the appellant alleged to' have been
     paid to him by the complainant-PW-2 is not proved by the ··
     prosecution. It is urged by hirri that the further lacuna in the :
     prosecution case is that Ram Malhotra,. the Brother-in~law of .. ·
G the complainant, who was stated to be presentat the tirrie of
     the telephonic demand made by the accused with· the<,•
     complainant was examined by the prosecution. The prosecution . . .
 · • could neither prove the dema·nd and acceptan'cie ·of the ' ' ·
     gratification by the appellanf'nor were they able to prove"
     conscious possession of the black rexine bag containing the'::
H
·,SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI :rHROUGH CBI                 253
       ,     [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
  GC.notes with him. Therefore, the alleged recovery of money ·A ,
  cannot be stated to be "acceptance'' of illegal gratification by
                                   .
. the appellant as alleged by the prosecution.
                                         ~
                                              ' .
                                                     : '       .

       8: It has been.further submitted by the learneci senior·
  counsel for the appellant that the appellate court in exercise of. 8 .
  its appellate '.jurisdiction. has erroneously ··re-appreciated· the
  evidence produced by the prosecution and has set aside the
              of
  valid finding     fact recorded by the learned trial judge on the .
· charg~s framed against the appellant. Therefore, the. finding ·
  recorded on this aspect of the matter in the impugned judgment: C
  by the appellate court is not only erroneous on facts but in law,·
  therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. Further, it is ·
  contended by him that the learned appellate judge·has not
  noticed a very important lacuna in the prosecution case that as . ·
  per the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 Rameshwar Nath, the bribe·
  money which was sought to be given to the accused on . D •
  08.07.1989 in a black rexine bag and.not in the brown bag as
  shown to the prosecution witnesses by the learned counsel for··
 the prosecution. :       J   , -.:- •            • ..   -~


       9. He has further urgecithat t~e Ap.pellate Co~rt call E
  exercise its. jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances·. where
. there are compelling circumstances and the judgmentunder. .
  appeal is found to be pe.rverse. In support of the· aforesaid legal ·
  submission he placed reliance upon the decisiO!l of this Court
  in the case ofBabu v. State of Kera/a,' wherein it has been_ F •
  categorically held that: .                                 ··

       "In exceptfona/ cases ,where there are compelling
       circumstances and the judgmeritunder the appeal is·.
      ~found to be peNerse, the appellate COUft can fnterfere With .
    . order of acquittal. The appellate couifshou/d bear in mind G
    .. the presumption of innocence bf the accused and further ..
     . that ttie trial Court's acquittal bolst£!rS ttie presumption· of
       innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the

 1. c201oi s sec 1es.                                                H.•.
    254        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         other view is possible should be avoided, unless there
          are good reasons for interference" (Para 19).

           The presumption of innocence of the appellant is further
    strengthened by the order of acquittal recorded by the trial judge
    on proper appreciation of evidence on record. He had the
8
    occasion to examine thellemeanor of the prosecution
    witnesses. The Trial Court came to the right conclusion on facts·
    and evidence on record and it has recorded a finding of fact
    holding that the accused is innocent of the charges leveled
    against him and consequently acquitted him from the said
C   charges. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel
    that the Appellate Court could only interfere in rare cases where
    it is found that the order of acquittal is erroneous or error in law.
    Therefore, he submits that the High Court should not have
    interfered with the judgment and order of the Trial Court. The
D   learned senior counsel for the appellant has further placed
    reliance on the following judgments of this Court, namely, 1)
    State of Kera/a & Anr. v. C.P. Rao 2 , 2) Murugesan & Ors. v.
    State through Inspector of Po/ice 3.in support of his submission .
    that the High Court has exceeded its parameters laid down by
E   this Court in reversing the judgment and order of acquittal of
    the accused. The relevant paragraphs from the above
    judgments are extracted in the answering portion of the
    contentious points.                                        '

F      10. The learned senior counsel further submits that
  'presumption' of offence committed by the appellant under
  Section 20 of the Act can be invoked against him by the
  prosecution, only if the prosecution successfully proves the
  foundational facts. In the case in hand, since the demand,
G acceptance of bribe money and recovery of the same from him
  has not been proved by the prosecution, the statutory
  presumption under-Section 20 of the Act against the guilt of the
  accused does not arise and therefore rebuttal of such-

    2.   (2011) 6 SCC450.
H   3.   (2012) 10 sec 383.
 SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                  255
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
presumption by the appellant also did not arise in this case.        A

      11. The other legal contention urged by the learned senior
counsel is that mere recovery of the alleged tainted money
without there being any demand and acceptance by the
appellant from the complainant does not prove the guilt of the
                                                                     B
appellant. In support of his aforesaid legal submission, he has
placed reliance upon the following decisions of this Court: (1)
K. S. Panduranga Vs. State of Karnataka 4 (2) Subash Parbat
Sonvane Vs. State of Gujarat5 and (3) Mukut Bihari & Anr. Vs.
State of Rajasthan 6 • In Mukut Bihari & Anr., this Court has held
thus:
                                                                     c

     "11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of
     illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an
     offence under the 1988 Act. Mere recovery of taint(;ld          D
     money is not sufficient to convict the accused, when the
     substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless
     there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show
     that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe. Mere
     receipt of amount by the accused is not sufficient to           E
     fasten the guilt, in the absence of any evidence with
     regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as
     illegal gratification, but the burden rests on the accused
     to displace the statutory presumption raised under
     Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record               F
     evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with
     reasonable proba.bility, that the money was accepted by
     him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in
      Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions
      of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to
                                                                     G
     consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any,
      only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability
4.   (2013) 3 sec 721.
5.   (2002) 5 sec 86.
6.   (2012) 11 sec 642.                                              H
    256       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable
          doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to
          explain as to how the amount in question was found in
          his possession, the foundational facts must be
          established by the prosecution. The complainant is an
B         interested and partisan witness concerned with the
          success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in
          the same way as that of any other interested witness and
          in a proper case the court may look for independent
          corroboration before convicting the accused person."
c      12. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has further
  contended that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge
  against the accused and placed reliance upon the decision of
  this Court in C.M. Girish Babu Vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court
  of Kerala 7• The relevant paragraph is extracted in the reasoning
D portion.

         13. In view of the aforesaid legal contentions urged by the
    learned senior counsel he has prayed this Court to set aside
    the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and restore
E   the trial court judgment and order by allowing this appeal.

       14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
  respondent Dr. Ashok Dhamija has strongly relied upon the
  version of PW-3, who is an independent witness and sought
  to justify the impugned judgment and order as the High Court
F has rightly reversed the judgment and order of acquittal passed
  by the Trial Court. It has been urged by the learned counsel for
  the respondent that even though the complainant-PW2 has
  turned hostile in the case he has admitted his version in the
  cross-examination and corroborated the evidence of PW-3.
G
       15. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent has
  contended that the complainant, PW-2 called PW-3 inside the
  residence of the accused introducing him as his uncle. When

H   ?. (2009) 3 sec 779.
 SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 257
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
PW-3 went inside, the appellant enquired with the complainant         A
if he had brought the money. PW-2, thereafter asked if there
was anything to worry about and whether his work would be
done. PW-2 handed over the handbag containing the notes
towards gratification to the accused who touched the notes with
his right hand and placed the hand bag containing the money           8
on the cot made up of steel. Thus, the demand and acceptance
of gratification by the appellant from the complainant is duly
proved by the witness-PW3.

      16. Further, he has contended that the testimony of PW-3        C
is corroborated by the testimony of PW-4 R.S.Manku, the
Deputy Superintendent of Police who had conducted the trap
and also PW-8 AS.Chhabra, the Senior Scientific Officer who
gave the report that the right- hand wash solution of the appellant
gave positive test for Phenolphthelin and sodium. Therefore, the
fact that the money was demanded and given to the appellant           D
for illegal gratification, which fact is further corroborated by
another fact that money was withdrawn from the bank account
of PW-2 who has clearly deposed about it before the court in
his evidence.
                                                                      E
     17. The High Co'Urt has concluded on the material
evidence on record and held thatthe reasons of the Trial Court
on the charge against the appellant is erroneous; stating that,
at the time of demand, normally nobody else, except the
complainant-PW2 would be present. Therefore, rejecting his            F
testimony by the Trial Court for want of corroboration of his
evidence by recording the findings
                               I
                                   of fact by him stating that it
was unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of the complainant-
PW-2, to convict the appellant would be contrary to the settled
principles of appreciation of evidence on record.
                                                                      G
     18. Further, the findings of the trial court that there was no
motive for the appellant to demand the gratification from the-
complainant as Sudan, the Custom (Supdt.) had satisfied
himself that the complainant had valid documents in support of
his claim and that he was not a notified dealer is also perverse      H
      258        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


 A    as the complainant, PW-2 in his testimony has clearly stated
      that the money was given to the appellant so that no harassment
      would be caused to him in his business in future.

         19. It has been further held by the High Court that the Trial
• · Court has also failed to apply the settled legal principles of law
  9
    laid down by this Court. The Trial Court has erred in not
    accepting the testimony of a hostilewitness-PW2, his evidence
    cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record
    altogether; part of his evidence which is otherwise acceptable
  C could have been. acted upon at the time of recording his findings
    on the charges.

         20. Further, it is urged by him that it has been further held
    by the High Court that since the illegal gratification is large, the
    same could not have been accepted by the appellant as cash-
  D in-hand and the same was handed over to him by keeping in
    bags, suitcases, etc ... which can never be recovered from the
    person of an accused.

           2~, The f-:!igh Court further held that once demand and
  E   acceptance by the accused has been proved then the statutory
      presumption under Section 20 of the Act arisE!S against him and
      the onus of proof shifts on him to rebut the presumption by
      adducing acceptable evidence to prove that he is not guilty of
      offence. In support of the aforesaid contention, the decision of
      this Court in the case of M. Narsinga Rao v. State of Andhra
  F   Pradesh, 8 was relied upon wherein it was held thus:

            "13. Before proceeding further, we may point out that the
            expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" are
            defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. The
  G         presumptions falling under the former category are
            compendiously known as "factual presumptior.s" or
            "discretionary presumptions" and those faffing under the
            latter as. "legal presumptions" or "compulsory

  H   a.   2001 (1) sec 691.
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI               259
           [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
  presumptions". When the expression "shall be                   A
  presumed" is employed in Section 20(1) of the Act it
  must have the same import of compulsion.

  14. When the sub-section deals with legal presumption
  it is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a
                                                                 8
  command that it has to be presumea that the accused
  accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing
  or forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition
  envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied.
  The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption        C
  under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved
  that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any
  gratification. The section does not say that the said
  condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its
  only requirement is that it must be proved that the
  accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification.        D
  Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact
   can be proved. But that is not the only mdde envisaged
  in the Evidence Act.

  15. The word ''proof" need ·be understood in the sense         E
  in which it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof
  depends upon the. admissibility of evidence. A fact is said
  to be prov.ed when, after considering the matters before
  it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its
  existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under          F
  the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
  supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for
  the word ''proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required
  is production of such materials on which the court can
  reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists.    G
  Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability
   of its having existed. The standard required for reaching
   the .supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any
   important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J.

                                                                 H
    260       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd.
          observed like this:

          "Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical
          demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean
          such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to
B
          come to a particular conclusion. "

        16. The said observation has stood the test of time and
        can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching
        the conclusion the court can use the process of
c     · inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved.
        Such ·inferences are akin to presumptions in law. Law
        gives absolute discretion to the court to presume the
        existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
        happened. In that process the court may have regard to
D       common course of natural events, human conduct, public
        or private ,business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular
        case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Seation 114
        of the Evidence Act.

          17. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn
E
          from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of
          a fact from another, the court is only applying a process
          of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent
          man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption
          is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts.
F         But it could as well be final ifit remains undisturbed later.
          Presumption in law of evidence is a rule indicating the
          stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact
          or facts the court can draw an inference and that would
          remain .until such inference is either disproved or
G         dispelled.
       18. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the court
       can rely on a factual presumption. Unless the
       presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted, the
H     ·court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof.
  SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                 261
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
     However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe            A
     that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet
     another discretionary presumption unless there is a
     statutory compulsion .. This Court has indicated so in
     Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra. "A
     presumption can be drawn only from facts - and not from         B
     other presumptions - by a process of probable and logical
     reasoning."

     22. The High Court further held that in view of the
presumption as envisaged under Section 20 of the Act, it was
the duty of the accused to have rebutted the same by producing       C
cogent evidence on record. The accused has failed to
discharge that onus. No doubt as held in the case of Subash
Parbat (supra); "The Statutory presumption cannot be raised
for an offence u/s 13(1) (d) of the Act." However, for an offence
under section 7 of the Act this presumption would arise.             D


     23. On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal contentions
urged on behalf of the parties, the following points would arise
for consideration of this Court.                                     E
     (1) Whether the demand, acceptance and recovery .of
gratification are proved by the prosecution and whether the
presumption of offence alleged to have been committed by the
appellant would arise in this case?
                                                                     F
      (2) Whether the findings and reasons recorded on the
· charges by the High Court in reversing the findings of acquittal
  recorded by the Trial Court are based on proper re-
  appreciation of legal evidence on record and within the legal
  parameters laid down by this Court in its decisions?               G
     (3) What order?

     24. The point Nos. 1 and 2 are inter-related and therefore,
 the same are answered together by assigning the following
 reasons:. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant     H
        262        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A has rightly placed reliance upon the evidence elicited in the
  cross examination of PW-2 by the prosecutor. The relevant
  portion from translation of deposition of PW-2 made by
  appellant is extracted hereunder:

              "One P.S.Saini from the customs department asked me
B
              to pay Rs. 2 lakhs and _at that time the appellant/accused
              Satvir Singh was checking the goods in the godown. On
              the sal'T!e day, at abouf 4.00 p.m. they took me to Customs
              House at C.R. Building, and produced me before Shri
              Sudan, Custom (Suptd.) who checked my papers.
c             Thereafter, I was advised to keep cordial relations with his
              subordinates. Thereafter, when I came out of the office of
              the superintendent, the accused Satvir Singh was standing
              outside the office with P.~. Saini who again demanded
              money from me. I refused to pay the same. On 7th July,
D             1989, I received a telephone call from the accused Satvir
              Singh. At about 5-6 p.m. the accused told me over the
              telephone, either to make the payment or otherwise they
              would seize the goods from my premises. The accused
              further asked me to make the payment at Gagan Vihar
E             residence. The accused asked me to pay Rs.60,000/- first
              on 8.7.1989 at 8.00 a.m. as I could not arrange the entire _
              amount. The accused further asked to make tbe payment
              of the remaining balance amount within three-four days. My
              brother in law, Shri Ram Malhotra was sitting with me at
F             the time of the telephonic conversation."

        25. During the cross-examination of PW-2, he has stated
  that the demand of Rs.2 lakhs was made by P.S. Saini on
  4.7.1989 at his godown between 11.30 to 12.30 p.m. On the
  very same day, he was taken to office of Customs department
G where Saini demanded the money at two places i.e. firstly just
  outside the office of Superintendent and secondly, at the
  staircase_ of the office building and on both the occasions, the
  accused had not demanded the money from the complainant,
  PW-2 at any time. It has been further stated by him during his
H   r
  SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                    263
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
  cross-examination that on both the occasions, the accused was         A
  at a distance of three-four feet. It has been further stated by him
· that he did not have any direct talk with the accused either at
  the C.R. Building or at his godown. He has further stated that
  he had met the accused only once, so he had neither
  conversant with the voice of the accused nor knows his style          B
; of talking.


      26. It has been further stated by PW-2 in his evidence that,
 when he had gone to the house of the accused along w i t h
 the punch witness, during the entire conversation, there was no        C
 talk about the contents of the rexine bag which he was carrying
 and neither did the accused enquire about the money nor
 received the same from the complainant.

     27. Further, the learned senior counsel for the appellant          D
 has rightly placed reliance upon the questions put to the
 appellant by the Court seeking the explanation from him under
 Section 313, CrPC which reads thus:

      "Question: It is further in evidence against you that while
      you were checking the goods on the same day, Mr. P.S.             E
      Saini of the Customs Department demanded a bribe of
      Rs. 2 lakhs from the complainant, one lakh each for himself
      and the accused failing which he threatened the seizure
      of the said goods. What have you to say?
                                                                        F
      Ans: It is incorrect. No Customs officer demanded any
      money in my presence."

      A reading of the question framed by the learned trial Judge
 for seeking explanation from the appellant, would certainly go         G
 to show that he has not demanded illegal gratificatior:i from the
 complainant.

       28. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant
  has further rightly placed reliance upon the letter written by ?W-
                                                                        H -
    264        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   2 Exh. PW-1/DA dated 15.11.1989 to the Collector of Customs,
    which reads thus:

          "In this connection, it is submitted that as written earlier Shri
          Satvir Singh, Inspector has never demanded any money
          on 4.7.1989 when they visited my premises. As far asl
B         telephone of 7.7.1989 is concerned, someone telephoned:
          me in the name of Satvir Singh, but I could not recognize •
          his voice as I have met Satvir Singh only once and that on
          4.7.1989. However, when I visited his house on 8. 7.1989,
          Satvir Singh did not demand any money nor accepted the
c         same. This is for your information please."          ·

       In this regard, the relevant portion of the evidence of Shri
    AGL Kaul, PW-9, Inspector, CBI, is extracted hereunder:

         "During the course of investigation conducted by him, he
D
         came across the letter Exh. PW-1/DAwhich was already
         in the investigation file. He further stated that he cannot tell
         whether or not this letter was referred by the Customs
          Department to the CBI for verification because the letter
         was neither received nor seized by him. He recorded the
E        statements-of Chamanlal Marwaha and Shri Sharwan
          Kumar Marwaha during the investigation and after
          recording their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the
          said witnesses stated that they were told by the
          complc;tinant that he has got the accused falsely implicated
F       . in this. case. After consulting the crime file, witnesses have
          stated that it is correct that initially this case was
          recommended for being sent for departmental action and
          npt for criminal prosecution. This recommendation was
          tnade after obtaining legal opinion."
G
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

          29. It is clear from the contents of the aforesaid
    documentary evidence on record upon which appellant has
    rightly placed strong reliance that he is innocent is evident from
H
 SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                 265
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
the version of the investigating officer PW-9, who had examined A
those witnesses at the time of the investigation of the case.
They have stated that initially this case was recommended for
being sent for departmental action and not for criminal
prosecution against the appellant. The said evidence would
clearly go to show that there is no case of illegal gratification B
either demanded by him or paid to him by the complainant PW-
2. This important aspect of the matter has been over..looked
by the High Court at the time of exercising its appellate
Jurisdiction for setting aside the order of acquittal passed in
favour of the appellant. In fact, the Trial Court on proper c
appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence particularly
the contents of ttie said letter-Ex.PW-1/DA as admitted by PW-
9 was considered by him and come to the right conclusion to
hold that the appellant is not guilty of the offence and rightly
passed the order of acquittal which has been erroneously . 0
reversed by the High Court as the same is contrary to the laws
laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra which
relevant paragraphs are extracted while. adverting to the
submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant.
Therefore, this Court has to hold that the High Court has
                                                                  E
exceeded its jurisdictionJ>y not adhering to the legal principles
 laid down by this Court in reversing the judgment and order of
the Trial Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

     30. Further, the learned senior counsel for the appellant
has relied upon the statement of PW-3 who in his testimony has      F
stated thus:                       ·

     "He along with the complainant left the CBI office at 7.35
     a.m. and reached the residence of the accused at 8.00
     a.m. The government vehicle was parked at a distance and       G
     he was instructed to remain sitting in the car of the
     complainant while the complainant would go to the
     residence of the accused in order to find out if the accused
     is available or not. The other members of the raiding party
     took their positions here and there at a distance. The
                                                                    H
    266        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         complainant came back after an hour and asked him to
          accompany him. They both entered the residence of the
          accused. The complainant was carrying the bag containing
          the money:"

          [Extracted from the translation made by the appellant]
B
          It is also an undisputed fact that neither Inspector P.S.
          Saini was arrayed as a witness nor accus~f! by the
          Investigating Officer. Ram Malhotra, the brother-in-law of
          the complainant-PW2 who was stated to be present at the
c         time of the telephonic conversation with him was also not
          examined during the investigation to prove the fact that the
          appellant had telephonic conversation with him.

         31. The learned counsel for the prosecution has also relied
0   upon the case of C.K. Damodaran Nair Vs. Government of
    lndia 9 in support of presumption of offence alleged against the
    appellant which reads thus:

          "Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section
          7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section
E         (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has
          accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or
          attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any
          gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable
          thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the
F         contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed
          to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that
          valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward
          such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be,
          without consideration or for consideration which he knows
G         to be inadequate."

         32. This Court, in K.S. Panduranga's case (supra) has held
    that the demand and acceptance of the amount of illegal
    gratification by he accused is a condition precedent to
H 9. (1997) 9 sec 477.
 SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                     267
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
constitute an offence, the relevant paragraph in this regard from       A
the above-said decision is extracted hereunder:

     "39. Keeping in view that the demand and acceptance of
     the amount as illegal gratification is a condition precedent
     for constituting an offence under the Act, it is to be noted
                                                                        8
     that there is a statutory presumption under Section 20 of
     the Act which can be dislodged by the accused by bringing
    ·on record some evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
     that money was accepted other than for the motive or the
     reward as stipulated under Section 7 of the Act. When
     some explanation is offered, the court is obliged to               C
     consider the explanation under Section 20 of the Act and
     the consideration of the explanation has to be on the
     touchstone of preponderance of probability. It is not to be
     proven beyond all reasonable doubt. In the case at hand,
     we are disposed to think that the explanation offered by           D
     the accused does not deserve any acceptance and,
     accordingly, we find that the finding recorded on that score
     by the learned trial Judge and the stamp of approval given
     to the same by the High Court cannot be faulted."
                                                                        E
                                             (emphasis supplied)

     33. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
placed reliance upon the case of Banarsi Das referred to supra
wherein it was held that:
                                                                        F
     "24. In M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala this Court in
     somewhat similar circumstances, where the tainted money
     was kept in the drawer of the accused who denied the
     same and ·said that it was put in the drawer without his
     knowledge, held as under:                                          G

    · "8 .... It is in this context the courts have cautioned that as
      a rule of prudence, some corroboration is necessary. In all
      such type of cases of bribery, two aspects are important.
      Firstly, there must be a demand and secondly, there must          H
    268       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained
          the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not
          sufficient to establish the offence. Therefore, the other
          aspect, namely, acceptance is very important and when the
          accused has come forward with a plea that the currency
B         notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then
          there must be clinching evidence to show that it was with
          the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been
          put in the drawer as an illegal gratification."

        The above-said paragraph from the above mentioned case
C would go to show that the divergent findings recorded by the
  High Court on the faCtum of demand and acceptance of illegal
  gratification by the appellant is not proved in this .case. In the
  said case this Court in. unequivocal terms has held that mere
  demand by itself is not sufficient to establish the offence under
D the Act. The other aspect, namely acceptance is also very
  important. There must be clinching evidence with the tacit
  approval of the accused that money was put by PW-2 on the
  steel cot as stated by him in his evidence as illegal gratification.
  In the case in hand, as per the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3,
E the illegal gratification was in a black rexine bag with a broken
  zip which was put on a steel cot. As the contents of the bag
  were not within the knowledge of the accused, therefore, the
  relevant aspect of the case that the appellant has accepted the
  illegal gratification as required under Section 7 of the Act is not
F proved by the prosecution by adducing cogent evidence in this
  regard.

       34. We have examined the evidence on record as a whole,
  the said evidence is read along with documentary evidence of
  Exh.PW-1/DA, the contents of which are extracted above. The
G said document is written by PW-2 in the year 1989, therefore,
  reliance should be placed on the said evidence. The
  explanation which is sought to be elicited from the appellant by
  the prosecution to discard the said positive evidence in favour
  of the appellant would further support his plea that he has not
H
  SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 269
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
  demanded gratification from the complainant, PW-2. We are A
  not at all impressed with the plea of the prosecution that the
  said letter was written by PW-2 under pressure as stated by
  him in his cross examination in the year 1993. If it is true that
  the letter was written by PW-2 under pressure, then he should
   have lodged the complaint in this regard with the jurisdictional B
   police or to the higher officers at that relevant point of time or
  to the Trial Court when the case was pending. Therefore, the
   said portion of the evidence of PW-2 cannot be accepted by
   us as the same is untrustworthy. The black rexine bag
   containing the illegal gratification which was kept on the steel      c
   cot at the residence of the accused on 08.07 .1989 was not
   recovered from the person of the accused. Therefore, neither
. acceptance nor recovery of illegal gratification from the
   appellant is proved. Further, the reliance placed upon the
   relevant paragraphs extracted above from the judgments of this D
   Court by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant
. applies aptly to the factual situation. Therefore, the demand,
: acceptance and recovery of the illegal gratification alleged to
   have been paid to the appellant is not proved by the
 ; prosecution. Thus, the Trial Court on overall appreciation of the E
   oral and documentary evidence on record has come to the right
 . conclusion and recorded its findings of fact and held that the
   demand, acceptance and recovery of gratification from the
 , appellant is not proved, therefore there is no presumption under
 . Section 20 of the Act. The learned trial jtJdge in his judgment
 · has rightly held that presumption of innocence is in favour of F
 . the appellant and he was acquitted on merits.

      35. The evidence of PW-3, who is an independent witness,
 who had participated in the proceedings of the raid at the
 appellant's house, the relevant portion of his deposition before        G
·the Trial Court is extracted hereunder:

      "The complainant went to the residence of the accused
      while I remained sitting in the car ... .Thereafter I along with
      the accused went inside the house of the
                                                                         H
    270        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         accused ......... The accused Satbir Singh inquired from the
          complainant if he had brought the money. He further
          enquired about me. Complainant introduced me as his
          uncle. The complainant told the accused that there was
          nothing to worry and that his work would be done ...... The
B         accused took the money. The complainant handed over
          the hand-bag containing the GC notes to the accused. The
          accused touched ten toes with his right hand and placed
          that hand bag containing the money on the cot made of
          steel. ...... The complainant told that the bag was containing .
c         Rs. 60,000/-..

       36. The prosecution has placed reliance upon the judgment
  of this Court viz. State of Madras v. A Vaidhyanatha lyer10 in
  support of the prosecution to justify the findings and reasons
  recorded by the High Court on the charges leveled against the
D appellant, to reverse the acquittal and to convict and sentence
  him for the offence, the relevant portion from the above referred
  case reads thus:

           "13 ..... Where it is proved that a gratification has been
E          accepted, then the presumption shall at once arise under
           the section. It introduces an exception to the general rule
           as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the
           onus on to the accused. It may here be mentioned that the
           legislature has chosen to use the words "shall presume"
F          and not "may presume", the former a presumption of law
           and latter of fact. Both these phrases have been defined
          ·in the Indian Evidence Act, no doubt for the purpose of that
           Act, but Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is
           in pari materia with the Evidence Act because it deals with
           a branch of law of evidence e.g. presumptions, and
G
           therefore should have the same meaning. "Shall presume"
            has been defined in the Evidence Act as follows:

          Whenever it is directed by this Act that the court shall

H 10. AIR 1958 SC 61.
 SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                 271
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
    presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless      A
    and until it is disproved.

    It is a presumption of law and therefore it is obligatory on
    the court to raiSE:1 this presumption in every case
    brought under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption
                                                                    8
    Act because unlike the case of presumption of fact,
    presumptions of law constitute a branch of jurisprudence.
    While giving the finding quoted above the learned Judge
    seems to have disregarded the special rule of burden of
    proof under Section 4 and therefore his approach in this        C
    case has been on erroneous lines."

     It is rightly contended by the learned senior counsel on
behalf of the appellant that the presumption of the guilt is not
proved in the case on hand as the prosecution has failed to
prove the ingredients of the provision of Section 7 of the Act,     D
viz. demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
appellant to constitute an offence alleged to have commit.ted
by him. Therefore, the reliance placed on the evidence of
prosecution witnesses i.e. PW-2, PW-3 and others by the
respondent's counsel, the relevant portion of which is extracted    E
in the aforesaid portion of the judgment, does not amount to
presumption of offence as provided under Section 20 of the Act.
Therefore, the question of onus of proof to disprove the
presumption did not arise at all on the part of the appellant.

     37. The High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction   F
has exceeded its parameters laid down by this Court in
reversing the acquittal order of the trial court. Therefore, the
findings are not only erroneous in law but also vitiated in law.
The relevant paragraphs from the judgment in State of Kera/a
v. C.P.Rao (supra) are extracted hereunder:                         G

    "13. In co.ming to this conclusion, we are reminded of the
    well-settled principle that when the Court has to exercise
    its discretion in an appeal arising against an order of
    acquittal, the Court must remember that the innocence of        H
    272       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         the accused is further re- established by the judgment of
          acquittal rendered by the High Court. Against such decision
          of the High Court, the scope of interference by this Court
          in an order of acquittal has been very succinctly laid down
          by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh ,
B         v. State of Rajasthan. At SCR p. 129, Subba Rao, J. (as
          His Lordship then was) culled out the principles as follows:

                 "9. The foregoing discussion yields the following
                 results: (1) an     appellate court has full power to
                 review the evidence upon which the             order of
c                acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in
                 Sheo Swarup case, afford a correct guide for the
                 appellate court's approach to a case in disposing
                 of such an appeal; and (3) the different
                 phraseology used in the judgments of this Court,
D                such as,(i)'substantial and compelling reasons', (ii)
                 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii)
                 'strong reasons', are not intended to curtail the
                 undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal
                 against acquittal to review the entire evidence and
E                to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it
                 should not only consider every matter on record
                 having a bearing on the questions of fact and the
                 reasons given by the court below in support of its
                 order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on
F                those facts, but should also express those reasons
                 in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal
                 was not justified."

        Further, in the case of Murugesan,(supra) it is held as
    under:
G
          19. An early but exhaustive consideration of the law in this
          regard is to be found in the decision of Sheo Swarup v.
          King Emperor wherein it was held that the power of the
          High Court extends to a review of the entire evidence on
H         the basis of which the order of acquittal had been passed
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 273
           [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
  by the trial court and thereafter to reach the necessary . A
  conclusion as to whether order of acquittal is required to
  be maintained or not. In the opinion of the Privy Council
  no limitation on the exercise of power of the High Court in
  this regard has been imposed by the Code though certain
  principles are required to be kept in mind by the High B
  Court while exercising jurisdiction in an appeal against an
  order of acquittal. The following two passages from the
  report in Sheo Swarup adequately sum up the situation:

         'There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view,   C
         apparently supported by the judgments of some
         courts in India, that the High Court has no power or
       · jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a
         matter of fact. except in cases in which the lower
         court has 'obstinately blundered'. or has 'through
         incompetence. stupiditv or perversitv' reached such        D
         'distorted conclusions as to produce a positive
         miscarriage of justice.' or has in some other way
         so conducted itself as to produce a glaring
         miscarriage of justice. or has been tricked by the
         defence so as to produce a similar result.                 E

                                         (emphasis supplied)

         Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the
         High Court full power to review at large the evidence
                                                                    F
         upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and
         to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the
         orderof acquittal should 6e reversed. No limitation
         should be placed upon that power, unless it be
         found expressly stated in the Code. But in
         exercising the power conferred by the Code and             G
         before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High
         Court should and will always give proper weight and
         consideration to such matters as (1) the views of
         the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses;
         ( 2) the presumption qf innocence in favour of the         H
    274       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A               accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by
                the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3)
                the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;
                and (4) the slowness of an appellate court 'in
                disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge
B               who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To
                state this, however, is only to say that the High Court
                in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in
                accordance with rules and principles well known
                and recognised in the administration of justice."
c               20. The. principles of law laid down by the Privy
          Council in Sheo Swarup have been consistently followed
          by this Court in a series of subsequent pronouncements
          of which reference may be illustratively made to the
          following: Tulsiram Kanu v. State, Balbir Singh v. State
D         of Punjab, M. G.Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, Khedu
          Mohton v. State of Bihar, Sambasivan v. State of Kera/a,
          Bhagwan Singh v. State of M. P. and State of Goa v.
          Sanjay Thakran.
          21. A concise statement of the law on the issue that had
E         emerged after over half a century of evolution since Sheo
          Swarup is to be found in para 42 of the Report in
          Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka. The same may,
          therefore, be usefully noticed below:

F                "42. From the above decisions, in our considered
                 view, the following general principles regarding
                 powers of the appellate court while dealing with an
                 appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
                 (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-
G                appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which
                 the order of acquittal is founded.
                 (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
                 limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
                 such power and an appellate court on the evidence
H
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI                275
           [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
         before it may reach its own conclusion, both on          A
         questions of fact and of law.
         (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and
         compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds',
         'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions',
         'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail     B
         extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
         against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in
         the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise
         the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
         acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to      C
         review the evidence and to come to its own
         conclusion.
         (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
         that in case of acquittal, there is double
         presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the       D
         presumption of innocence is available to him under
         the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
         that every person shall be presumed to be innocent
         unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
         law. Secondly, the accused having secured his            E
         acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
         reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
         court.
         (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
         the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate · F
         court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
         recorded by the trial court."
                                         (emphasis supplied)
  22. Another significant aspect of the law in this regard        G
  which has to be noticed is that an appeal to this Court
  against an order of the High Court affirming or reversing
  the order of conviction recorded by the trial court is
  contingent on grant of leave by this Court under Article 136
  of the Constitution. However, if an order of acquittal          H
    276       SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         passed by the trial court is to be altered by the High Court
          to an order of conviction and the accused is to be
          sentenced to death or to undergo life imprisonment or
          imprisonment for more than 10 years, leave to appeal to
          this Court has been dispensed with and Section 379 of
8         the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides a statutory
          right of appeal to the accused in such a case. The
          aforesaid distinction, therefore, has to be kept in mind and
          due notice must be had of the legislative intent to confer a
          special status to an appeal before this Court against an
          order of the High Court altecing the acquittal made by the
c         trial court. The issue had been dealt with by this Court in
          State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Mannan in the following terms,
          though in a different context: (SCC pp. 70-71, para 12)
                 "12. As is evident from the above recorded
D                findings, the judgment of conviction was converted
                 to a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. Thus,
                 the first and foremost question that we need to
                 consider is in what circumsfcinces this Court should
                 interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Against an
                 order of acquittal, an appeal by the State is
E
                 maintainable to this Court only with the leave of the
                 court. On the contrary, if the judgment of acquittal
                 passed by the trial court is set aside by the High
                 Court, and the accused is sentenced to death, or
                 life imprisonment or imprisonment for more than 10
F
                 years, then the right of appeal of the accused is
                 treated as an absolute right subject to the provisions
                 of Articles 134(1) (a) and 134(1)(b) of the
                 Constitution of India and Section 379 of the Code
                 of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In light of this, it is
G                obvious that an appeal against acquittal is
                 considered on slightly different parameters
                 compared to an ordinary appeal preferred to this
                 Court."
          23. Having dealt with the principles of law that ought to be
H
  SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 277
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
     kept in mind while considering an appeal against an order      A
     of acquittal passed by the trial court, we may now proceed
     to examine the reasons recorded by the trial court for
     acquitting the accused in the present case and those that
     prevailed with the High Court in reversing the said
     conclusion and in convicting and sentencing the appellant-     B
     accused."
       38. Further, as contended by the learned senior counsel
 for the appellant, the High Court has not noticed the very
  important lacuna in the prosecution case that as per the
  evidence 9f PW-2 and PW-3 Rameshwar Nath, the bribe               C
 money which was sought to be given to the accused on
  08.07 .1989 was in a black rexine bag and not in the brown
· rexine bag as shown to the witnesses before the trial .court by
  the prosecution. It has further come to our notice that neither
  the two witnesses nor the C.B.I. officials put any signature or   D
  identification mark on the bottles containing solution which is
  the most crucial evidence in the case to prove the acceptance
  of the gratification by the appellant from the complainant. As
  per the statements of PW-2 and C.B.I. officials, the GC notes
  were not counted. However, it is a matter of serious doubt of     E
  acceptance the notes containing in the black rexine bag were
  touched by the accused.
     The aforesaid findings and reasons recorded by the High
Court are supported with the statements of law laid down by
this Court in C.M. Girish Babu (supra) upon which the learned       F
senior counsel on behalf of the appellant has rightly placed
reliance. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:
     "18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) this Court took
     the view that mere recovery of tainted money divorced from
     the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient     G
     to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in
     the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itselfcannot
     prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused,
     in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe
     or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money     H
    278       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         knowing it to be bribe."
        39. After careful observation of the above-mentioned facts
  and evidence on record and on careful examination of the
  aforesaid rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties,
  with reference to the extracted portion of the evidence of PW-
B 2, PW-3 and PW-9, we are of the considered view that the
  prosecution has failed to prove the demand and acceptance
  of illegal gratification by the appellant from the complainant
  PW-2, upon whose evidence much reliance has been placed
  by the learned counsel for the respondent.
c        40. We, accordingly answer the point No. 2 in favour of the
    appellant that exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High
    Court to reverse the judgment and order of acquittal is not only
    erroneous but also suffers from error in law and liable to be set
    aside. Accordingly, we answer the point Nos. 1 and 2 in favour
0   of the appellant.
    Point No. 3.
         41. We have answered the point Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of
    the appellant after adverting to the legal evidence and rival legal
E   contentions urged on behalf of the parties. We have arrived at
    the aforesaid·conclusions after accepting the well founded
    submissions made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of
    the appellant. In view of our findings and reasons on point Nos.
    1 and 2, the submissions made by the learned counsel on
F   behalf of the respondent are rejected as the same are wholly
    untenable in law.
      For the foregoing reasons, we have to· restore the
  judgment and order of acquittal of the trial court by setting aside
  the impugned judgment dated 07.01.2011 and order on
G sentence dated 08.03.2011 of the High Court of Delhi in
  Criminal Appeal No.337 of 1999.
          42. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is on
    bail. The bail bonds shall stand discharged.
H Devika Gujral                                         Appeal allowed.