Supreme Court of India

SATRUCHARLA VIJAYA RAMA RAJUversusNIMMAKA JAYA RAJU AND ORS.

Citation: 2005 INSC 532
Decided: 27 October 2005
Disposal: Dismissed
Bench: R C LAHOTI

Holding

An election petition is not a representative action; its judgment does not operate as res judicata nor as a judgment in rem, and the evidence shows the appellant does not belong to the Konda Dora tribe, rendering his election void.

Summary

The appellant, elected from the Naguru (ST) constituency in 1999, was challenged under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act on the ground that he did not belong to the "Konda Dora" Scheduled Tribe but was a Kshatriya. The appellant argued that an earlier election petition (E.P. 13 of 1983) which had dismissed a similar challenge operated as res judicata and as a judgment in rem, and that his community certificate issued under the Andhra Pradesh Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 was conclusive. The High Court rejected these contentions, held that the earlier judgment was not res judicata nor a judgment in rem, and set aside the appellant's election after finding that the evidence did not establish his belonging to the Konda Dora tribe. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view, stating that election petitions are not representative actions and their judgments cannot bind subsequent proceedings, and that the burden of proof lay with the petitioner. Consequently, the appellant was held ineligible to contest the reserved seat and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The earlier election petition judgment (E.P. 13 of 1983) operates as res judicata in the present election petition.
The earlier judgment is a judgment in rem binding on parties and the world.
The community certificate issued under the Andhra Pradesh Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 is conclusive and binding on the election petition.
Who bears the burden of proof to establish the appellant's status as a member of the Scheduled Tribe?
Whether the appellant belongs to the Konda Dora tribe for purposes of the reservation.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 105(1), s. 11
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 40, s. 41, s. 42, s. 43
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 100(1)(d)(i), s. 112, s. 5, s. 80

Subjects

Res judicataJudgment in remElection petitionScheduled TribeCommunity certificateBurden of proofRepresentation of the People ActEvidence Act

Judgment

SA TRUCHARLA VIJA YA RAMA RAJU A
v.
NIMMAKA JA YA RAJU AND ORS.

, OCTOBER 27, 2005

[R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., C.K. THAKKERAND P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.J.] B

Res Judicata :

Election Law-Representation of Peoples Act, 1951-Sections 5, 80,
100(/)(d)(i), JJ6A-CPC, 1908-Section II Expln. VI-Election petition C
challenging election of returned candidate reserved for SC candidate-
,. Candidate describing himself to be 'Kanda Dora' tribe assailed as he belonged
to 'Kshatriya' caste -challenge by another person on same ground in
earlier election petition-Held, earlier petition not being inter-parties cannot
operate as Res judicata.
D
Evidence Act-Sections 41, 42, 43-Election petition held, is not a suit
of general nature or a representative action for adjudication of the status of
a person, and the same cannot be treated as a judgment in rem-The
conclusion arrived in earlier proceedings based in evidence in that
proceedings by itself is not sufficient to rebut the present claim. E
The appellant successfully contested the State Assembly Elections in
1999 from No. 8 Naguru (ST) assembly constituency in the State of Andhra
Pradesh. His election was challenged by respondent No. I, under Section 80
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 read with Section 5 and
IOO(l)(d)(i) of the Act. The first respondent contented that the appellant was F
not qualified to contest from a constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes,
he being a 'Kshatriya'; that his claim that he belongs to the "Konda Dora"
tribe, was not true; and that since he was ineligible to contest from the
constituency, his election was liable to be declared void and set aside and that
he may be declared elected instead. G
The appellant contested the election petition. He pleaded that he
belonged to the" Konda Dora" tribe which was a notified Scheduled Tribe,
that he was neither a 'Kondaraju' nor a 'Kshatriya ', that even otherwise,
'Kondaraju' and "Kanda Dora" were synonymous and the "Konda Dora" tribe
821 II
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A was incluede in the list of Schedule Tribes; that his earlier election from
No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly constituency, the self-same constituency, was
challenged by a voter on the very same ground that he did not belong to the
"Konda Dora" tribe, and it was dismissed by the Judge and the said decision
barred a fresh enquiry into the same question in the present election petition
and the decision therein was conclusive on his status; and that his ancestors
B and himself described themselves as 'Kshatriyas' in view of the status enjoyed
by them in their tribe and not because they belonged to the 'Kshatriya'
community.

The trial Judge set aside the election of the appellant. The prayer of L

C the first respondent to declare him elected, was declined on the ground that
such relief was not liable to be granted at that point of time and in view of the
dissolution of the assembly itself.

In appeal to this Court appellant contended that the High Court was
..., .

wrong in holding that the decision in E.P. 13of1983 did not operate as res
D judicata and was not conclusive on the status of the appellant; that the
judgment was one in rem; that alternatively the said judgment operated as a
judicial precedent and should have been accepted as such by the Judge; that
it was against judicial discipline for a subsequent Judge assigned to try an
election petition, to differ from the conclusion of the High Court rendered in
an earlier election petition on the status of the appellant and judicial discipline
E warranted that the matter should have been referred to a Division Bench for
decision, in case the judge was inclined to disagree, that the issue of the
certificate under the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act,
1993 was conclusive and binding on the proceedings under the Representation
F of the People Act, 1951; that the High Court was in error in its appreciation
of the evidence and the finding that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda
Dora" tribe was clearly erroneous; that merely because a person belonging
to a Scheduled Tribe described himself as a 'Kshatriya' or claimed to be a
'Kshatriya', he would not become a 'Kshatriya' or cease to be a tribal and
this aspect has not been properly appreciated by the Judge; that the
G appreciation of the evidence by the Judge was perverse and important pieces
of evidence have been ignored or not given the weight they deserved; that the
admissions extracted from the witnesses examined on behalf of the election
petitioner and the deposition of the witnesses examined on behalf of the .
appellant and their impact on the relevant question, have not been considered
H properly by the election judge; and that the decision under appeal suffers from
SATRUCHARLA VIJA YA RAMA RAJU r. NIMMAKAJA YA RAJU 823
innumerable infirmities and required to be set aside by this Court. A
The first respondent contended that it has been found by the order dated
13.12.2002, that the decision in E.P. 13of1983 did not operate as res judicate
and was not conclusive on the tribal status of the appellant; that the certificate
obtained under the State Act was not conclusive on the election tribunal; that
those findings have become final and have been approved by this Court by B
dismissing the petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the appellant
challenging that order; that it was not open to the appellant to raise those
questions all over again in this appeal; that the finding in E.P. 13 of 1983 was
only to the effect that the election petitioner therein, had failed to prove that
the appellant did not belong to a scheduled tribe or that he belonged to the
'Kshatriya' caste and that did not amount to a declaration of the status of the
c ·~

appellant as belonging to the "Konda Dora" tribe; that every election
furnishes a fresh cause of action and the finding in an election petition
relating to an earlier election to which the present election petitioner was
not even a party, does not operate as resjudicate and does not even have any
evidentiary value; that a series of documents have been produced which D
contained admissions by the predecessors of the appellant and by the appellant
that they were 'Kshatriyas' and those admissions were conclusive as against
the appellant, since he was not in a position to show that they were wrong or
to explain them away except stating that they wanted to claim a higher status
for prestige; that the documents were spread over for a number of years; that
the appellant had admitted that in his school leaving certificate book, his caste E
has been shown as 'Kshatriya' and since that piece of evidence was almost
conclusive, there was no reason to interfere with the finding of the Judge
that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda Dora" tribe; that in the face of
the admissions contained in documents of unimpeachable authenticity, the
burden had shifted to the appellant to show that he belongs to the "Konda F
Dora" tribe and that the admissions earlier made, were wrong; and that on a
proper appreciation of evidence in the case, the Judge has rightly come to the
conclusion that the appellant was ineligible to contest from a reserved
constituency and there was no reason for this Court to interfere with that
decision.
G
Dismissing the Appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Res judicata is nothing but the merger of a cause of action in
a decree, transit in rem judicatum. So, even if the cause of action in the earlier
election petition merged in the final adjudication therein, since according to
this Court, the subsequent election furnishes a fresh cause of action, the H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A merger of the earlier cause of action with the decision therein cannot bar the
trial of the fresh cause of action arising out of subsequent election. It is true
that the earlier election petition was filed by a voter in the constituency
concerned and he had also raised the plea that the appellant did not belong to
the "Konda Dora" community. An election petition filed, though it abates on
the death of the petitioner therein, could be pursued by another person coming
B forward to prosecute that election petition as enjoined by Section 112 of the
Act. But that does not make an election petition a representative action in the
sense in which it is understood in law. Therefore, normally, the adjudication
in an election petition, not inter-parties, cannot operate as res judicata in a
subsequent election petition challenging that subsequent election.
C [832-C, D, E]

C.M Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and Ors., [1976] l SCC 863, referred
to.

2. Though Section 112 of the Representation of the People Act gives
D any other voter the right to come forward and pursue E.P. 13of1983, the
prior election petition, in case the petitioner therein died and the election
petition abated, on that basis alone, the earlier action cannot be understood to
be a representative action so as to attract explanation VI to Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The plea of resjudicata raised by counsel for the
appellant cannot be sustained. The appellant, therefore, cannot rely on Section
E 40 of the Evidence Act. [832-G, H; 833-AI

3. In a case where the election petitioner failed to establish his claim,
it could not be said that it amounted to a declaration of the status of the
respondent in that election petition, the successful candidate and that such a
F finding on status would operate as a judgment in rem so as to bind the whole
world. It is also not one of the judgments specifically recognized by Section
41 of the Evidence Act. It has been held that the challenge to an election is
only a statutory right. An election petition is not a suit of a general nature or
a representative action for adjudication of the status ofa person. Even if it is
taken that the earlier judgment is admissible in evidence, on that, no objection
G was raised even at the trial, it could be brought in under Section 42 of the
Evidence Act on the basis that it relates to a matter of a public nature or under
Section 43 of the Evidence Act. In either case, not being inter-parties, the
best status that can be assigned to it is to say that it is of high evjdentiary
value, while considering the case of the parties in the present elfi:tion petition.
[833-G, H; 834-A
H
SATRUCHARLA VIJAYARAMARAJUr. NIMMAKAJAYARAJU 825
... Spencer Bower on "Resjudicata ", referred to. A
4. The argument that the judgment in E.P. 13of1983, should be held to
be a judgment in rem binding on the whole including the election petitioner
herein, even though he was not a party to the earlier proceeding, cannot be
sustained. (834-HI

Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa and Ors., (19591 B
SCR 611 and A. Sreenivasan v. Election tribunal, Madras and Anr., Vol.XI
E.L.R 278, referred to.

K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Ors., [1959) SCR 583, relied
on.

5. The decision in the earlier election petition depended upon the
c
pleadings and the evidence adduced in that case and their appreciation. The
essential finding was that the election petitioner therein had not established
the plea set up by him. It was not a case where a particular document was
interpreted in a particular manner by the highest court of the land and the
interpretation of the same document was again involved in a subsequent D
litigation between those who were not parties to the earlier litigation, that
appreciation of evidence has no relevance in the present election petition and,
the High Court rightly held that the present election petition has to be tried
on the pleadings and that evidence available in this case. (835-A, B, E]

Kharkan and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1965) SC 83, referred E
to.

6. The trial judge has rightly proceeded on the basis that the initial
burden was on the election petitioner to establish his plea that the appellant
did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. Though in a prior statement, an assertion
in one's own interest, may not be evidence, a prior statement, adverse to one's F
interest would be evidence. In fact, it would be the best evidence the opposite
party can rely upon. Therefore, in the present case, where the appellant is
pleading that he is a Konda Dora, the statement in the series of documents,
pre-constitution and post constitution, executed by his ancestors and members
of his family including himself describing themselves as 'Kshatriyas', would G
operate as admissions against the interest of the appellant in the present case.
These admissions also strengthened the admission of the appellant that in
his school leaving certificate also, he is described as a 'Kshatriya' and his
paternal uncle's son is also described as a 'Kshatriya' in his school leaving
certificate and that uncle's son was also held to be a 'Kshatriya' on an enquiry
made in that behalf. Therefore, the trial judge was correct in holding that the H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A election petitioner had discharged the initial burden placed on him and the
burden shifted to the appellant to establish that he belonged to the 'Konda
Dora' Tribe.1836-D, F, GI

7. Having gone through the evidence of RWs I to 9 the Court agrees
with the trial judge that the evidence of RWs l to 9 is totally insufficient to
B establish that the appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe. On a scrutiny
of the evidence of PWs I to 8, also, there is nothing in their evidence that
would justify holding that the appellant has established his claim. On going
through the detailed discussion therein and the materials, it is not possible
to hold that these documents establish that the appellant belonged to the 'Konda
C Dora' tribe. On going through the evidence of CWI and on scrutinizing
Exhibits Cl to CIO and the reasoning adopted by the trial judge, the Court is
satisfied that the trial judge was fully justified in discarding the caste
certificate relied on by the appellant. (837-B-E; 838-BI

8. Evidence in the case on hand also indicates that the family of the
D appellant had marital relationship mostly with the Zamindar families outside
the present State of Andhra Pradesh and their way of life was also not that of
the tribals. No positive acceptable evidence could also be adduced to show that
the family interred into marital relationship with 'Konda Dora' tribals. The
evidence also shows that the family of the appellant did not have any close
relationship with the Konda Doras of the locality. The admissions ofRW.l
E show that quite a few of the customs the family was following had no relation
to the customs generally followed by the Konda Dora Tribe and some of the
practices clearly differed from that of the tribe and was more consistent with
the practices followed by Kshatriya and higher castes. The trial judge has
carefully analysed these aspects and there is no justification in differing from
p his appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence in the case.
(836-F, G, H; 839-A]

V. V. Giri v. Dippa/a Suri Dora and Ors., 119601 l SCR 426,
distinguished.

G 9. The purpose of reservation of constituencies is to ensure
representation in the legislatures to such tribes and castes who are deemed
to require special efforts for their upliftment. The person seeking election
from such constituencies must be the true representative of that tribe. The
evidence shows that the appellant could not be considered to be a true
representative of a tribe included in the Presidential Order deserving special
H protection. f839-B.C]
SATRUCHARLA VIJA YA RAMA RAJUr. NIMMAKAJA YA RAJU[BALASUBRAMANYAN,l.] 827

CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1102 of2004. A
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.2004 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in E.P. No. 13of1999.

M.N. Rao, and C.K. Sucharita for the Appellant.
B
Bojja Tarakam, S.U.K. Sagar, Ms. Bina Madhavan, Ms. Pooja Nanekar,
Ms. Susan Zacharia and A. Venayagam, for Mis. Lawyer's Knit & Co. for the
Respondent.

Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, (NP) for the Respondents Nos. 2-4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J. I. The appellant successfully contested
the State Assembly Elections in 1999 from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly
constituency in the State of Andhra Pradesh. His election was challenged by
respondent No.l herein, in Election Petition No. 13of1999, under Se.ction 80 D
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 read with Sections 5 and I 00
• (I) (d) (i) of the Act. The contention raised by the first respondent was that
the appellant was not qualified to contest from a constituency reserved Jor
the scheduled tribes. According to respondent No. I, the election petitioner,
the appellant was a 'Kshatriya' and was not eligible to contest from a
constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes. His claim that he belongs to E
the "Konda Dora" tribe, was not true. Since he was ineligible to contest from
the constituency, his election was liable to be declared void and set aside.
The first respondent also prayed that he may be declared elected instead.

2. The appellant resisted the election petition. He pleaded that he F
belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe which was a notified Scheduled Tribe. He
was neither a 'Kondaraju' nor a 'Kshatriya'. Even otherwise, 'Kondaraju' and
"Konda Dora" were synonymous and the "Konda Dora" tribe was included
in the list of Scheduled Tribes. He further pleaded that his earlier election from
No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly constituency, the self-same constituency, was
challenged by a voter in Election Petition No. 13 of 1983 on the very same G
ground that he did not belong to the "Konda Dora" tribe. That election
petition, after contest, was dismissed by the learned Judge to whom it was
assigned after a regular trial and the said decision barred a fresh enquiry into
the same question in the present election petition and the decision therein
was conclusive on his status. He also explained that his ancestors and himself H
described themselves as 'Kshatriyas' in view of the status enjoyed by them
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A in their tribe and not because they belonged to the 'Kshatriya' community.
An ancestor of his had been conferred the title "Satrucharla" and it was the
surname of his family. His predecessors and his cousin had all contested in
prior elections from reserved constituencies and no objection had ever been
raised prior to 1983 regarding their status. In a similar case, where the members ...,
of the family of a candidate had described themselves as 'Kshatriya', the
B Supreme Court had held in an election petition that was filed challenging their
status, that as a maner of fact that candidate belonged to a Scheduled Tribe
and was not a 'Kshatriya'. He raised a further contention that the caste
certificate issued by the competent authority under the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of
C Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 to the effect that he belongs to the
"Konda Dora" tribe was final and binding on the court.

3. Issues were raised, inter a/ia, on pleas that the judgment in E.P. 13
of 1983 operated as res judicata with regard to the status of the appellant,
that the judgment therein was a judgment in rem and consequently conclusive
D on the status of the appellant and that the present election petition was not
maintainable, so long as the community certificate issued by the Collector
remained in force. At the instance of the appellant, the above three issues
were taken up for consideration as preliminary issues. By order dated 13.12.2002,
the assigned Judge of the High Court held that the judgment in E.P. 13of1983
E dated 16.1. 1984 did not operate as res judicata on the status of the appellant
as far as the present election petition is concerned; that the judgment in E.P.
13 of 1983 was not a judgment in rem and could not bind those who were not
parties to it and that the said adjudication did not bar the trial of the present
election petition. He held that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of
F Community Certificates Act, 1993 or the certificate issued thereunder did not
have any impact on the trial of the election petition under the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 and that the election petition had to be tried and
decided on the basis of evidence that may be adduced in it. This order of the
learned Judge was challenged before this Court in SLP (C) Nos. 1438-1439 of
2003. This Court, by order dated 7.2.2003, dismissed those petitions for
G special leave. Thereafter, evidence was taken in the election petition. Documents
were marked on the side of the parties and oral evidence was led. The learned
Judge, on an appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence in the case, came
to the conclusion that the appellant did not belong to "Konda Dora" community,
a Scheduled Tribe and was consequently ineligible to contest the election
H from a constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes. Thus, the learned
SATRUCHARLA VIJA YA RAMA RAJUv. NIMMAKAJA YA RAJU [BALASUBRAMANYAN,J.] 829

Judge set aside the election of the appellant from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly A
constituency in the general elections held on 11.9.1999. The prayer of the first
respondent to declare him elected, was declined on the ground that such relief
was not liable to be granted at that point of time and in view of the dissolution
of the assembly itself. Feeling aggrieved by the setting aside of his election
on the ground that he did not belong to a scheduled tribe, the appellant has
filed this appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, B
1951.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the learned
Judge in the High Court was wrong in holding that the decision in E.P. 13 of
1983 did not operate as res judicata and was not conclusive on the status C
of the appellant. The judgment was one in rem. He alternatively contended
that the said judgment operated as a judicial precedent and should have been
accepted as such by the learned Judge. It was against judicial discipline for
a subsequent Judge assigned to try an election petition, to differ from the
conclusion of the High Court rendered in an earlier election petition on the
status of the appellant and judicial discipline warranted that the matter should D
have been referred to a Division Bench for decision, in case the judge was
inclined to disagree. Though, he faintly raised the contention that the issue
of the certificate under the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates
Act, 1993 was conclusive and binding on the proceedings under the E
Representation of the People Act, 1951, he did not seriously pursue that
contention, obviously because of the fact that the certificate issued under
that Act served a different purpose and could not stand in the way of an
election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 being
tried in accordance with law by the High Court. On facts, he submitted that
the High Court was in error in its appreciation of the evidence and the finding F
that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda Dora" tribe was clearly
erroneous. He emphasized that merely because a person belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe described himself as a 'Kshatriya' or claimed to be a
'Kshatriya', he would not become a 'Kshatriya' or cease to be a tribal and
this aspect has not been properly appreciated by the learned Judge. He
ultimately submitted that the appreciation of the evidence by the learned G
Judge was perverse and important pieces of evidence have been ignored or
not given the weight they deserved. The admissions extracted from the
witnesses examined on behalf of the election petitioner and the deposition of
the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant and their impact on the
H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A relevant question, have not been considered properly by the election judge.
He submitted that the decision under appeal suffers from innumerable infirmities
and required to be set aside by this Court in appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, contended
that it has been found by the order dated 13.12.2002, that the decision in E.P.
B 13 of 1983 did not operate as res judicata and was not conclusive on the tribal
status of the appellant and that the certificate obtained under the State Act
was not conclusive on the election tribunal and that those findings have
become final and have been approved by this Cou11 by dismissing the petitions
for special leave to appeal filed by the appellant challenging that order. He
C submitted that it was not open to the appellant to raise those questions all
over again in this appeal. Even otherwise, the finding in E.P. 13 of 1983 was
only to the effect that the election petitioner therein, had failed to prove that
the appellant did not belong to a scheduled tribe or that he belonged to the
'Kshatriya' caste and that did not amount to a declaration of the status of
the appellant as belonging to the "Konda Dora" tribe. He submitted that
D every election furnishes a fresh cause of action and the finding in an election
petition relating to an earlier election to which the present election petitioner
was not even a party, does not operate as res judicata and does not even
have any evidentiary value. He submitted that a series of documents have
been produced which contained admissions by the predecessors of the
E appellant and by the appellant that they were 'Kshatriyas' and those
admissions were conclusive as against the appellant, since he was not in a
position to show that they were wrong or to explain them away except stating
that they wanted to claim a higher status for prestige. He pointed out that
the documents were spread over for a number r.f years. He also pointed out
that the appellant had admitted that in his school leaving certificate book, his
F caste has been shown as 'Kshatriya' and since that piece of evidence was
almost conclusive, there was no reason to interfere with the finding of the
learned Judge that the appellant did not helong to the "Konda Dora" tribe.
He finally submitted that in the face of the admissions contained in documents
of unimpeachable authenticity, the burden had shifted to the appellant to
show that he belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe and that the admissions
G earlier made, were wrong. He submitted that on a proper appreciation of
evidence in the case, the learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion
that the appellant was ineligible to contest from a reserved constituency and
there was no reason for this Court to interfere with that decision. He prayed
for a dismissal of the appeal.
H
SA TRUCHARLA VIJAYARAMARAJUv. NIMMAKAJA YARAJU[BALASUBRAMANYAN,l.] 83 J

6. First, we will deal with the contention based on the adjudication in A
E.P. 13 of 1983. That was an election petition relating to an earlier election in
respect of the same assembly constituency filed by a voter challenging the
eligibility of the appellant to contest as belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. The
learned Judge noticed that the election petitioner had not examined anyone
belonging to the 'Kshatriya' community to show that the appellant had been B
accepted as a 'Kshatriya' and had also not led adequate evidence to show
that the appellant was not accepted as a member of the "Konda Dora" tribe.
In his view, the explanation of the appellant that they had claimed the status
as 'Kshatriyas' only for prestige was adequate to wipe out the effect of the
consistent admissions contained in some documents and the entry in the
secondary school leaving certificate. It was thus held that the election petitioner C
therein, had not chosen to lead any evidence worth the name to show that
the appellant was a 'Kshatriya' and he had only tried to pick holes in the
evidence adduced on the side of the appellant. In the light of the evidence
on the side of the appellant, it had to be held that the appellant belonged to
' the "Konda Dora" tribe and that his nomination was rightly accepted.
D
7. Before proceeding to consider this question, it requires to be noticed
that at the instance of the appellant, the learned Judge had held by his order
dated 13.12.2002, that the adjudication in E.P. 13of1983 did not operate as
res judicata and was not conclusive on the question of the status of the
appellant. That order had been challenged before this Court in Petitions For E
_Special Leave To Appeal (Civil) Nos. 1438-1439 of2003. Though, this Court
· had not given reasons, this Court had dismissed those Petitions for Special
Leave to Appeal by order dated 7.2.2003 without granting liberty to the
appellant to challenge the findings while challenging the final decision, if it
became necessary. Whether there be a merger of the order of the High Court
with the order of this Court or not (the present view is that there is no merger), F
as far as the present proceedings are concerned, would it not be conclusive
as against the appellant? This Court is only a court of co-equal jurisdiction
and is normally bound to respect its own earlier orders. Similarly, the High
Court also cou Id not reconsider the issues after trial. If the appellant had not
challenged the order made by the learned Judge then and there, he could have
set out a challenge to the order dated 13.12.2002 in the present memorandum G
of appeal as envisaged by the principle recognized in Section 105 (I) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code, of course, does not stricto sensu
apply to these proceedings). In the present appeal, though the appellant had
raised a ground that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 is a judgment in rem and
it consequently precluded the High Court from going against that decision, H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
'
A he has not set out a specific challenge to the order dated 13.12.2002. Really,
it is possible to say that as far as the present appeal is concerned, the
appellant is not entitled to raise the questions covered by the order leading,_
to SLP (C) Nos. 1438-1439 of2003, in view of the dismissal of those petitions.

8. But, we do not think it necessary to rest our decision on that ground
B alone. Even otherwise, the plea that the earlier adjudication operated as res
judicata is difficult of acceptance. The first respondent herein, the petitioner
in the present election petition, was not a party to the prior election petition.
This Court in C.M Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and Ors., [1976) l SCC 863) has
held that every election furnishes a fresh cause of action for a challenge to
C that election and an adjudication in a prior election petition cannot be
conclusive in· the subsequent proceeding. Res judicata is nothing but the
merger of a cause of action in a decree, transit in rem judicatum. So, even if
the cause of action in the earlier election petition merged in the final
adjudication therein, since according to this Court, the subsequent election
furnishes a fresh cause of action, the merger of the earlier cause of action with
D the decision therein cannot bar the trial of the fresh cause of action arising
out of subsequent election. It is true that the earlier election petition was filed
by a voter in the constituency concerned and he had also raised the plea that
the appellant did not belong to the "Konda Dora" community. An election
petition filed, though it abates on the death of the petitioner therein, could
E be pursued by another person coming forward to prosecute that election
petition as enjoined by Section 112 of the Act. But that does not make an
election petition a representativ~ action in the sense in which it is understood
in law. Therefore, normally, the adjudication in an election petition, not inter-
parties, cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent election petition
challenging that subsequent election.
F
9. The appellant could have invoked explanation VI to Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure if it were possible to hold that the person who was
the petitioner in E.P. l 3of1983, was litigating in respect of a public right or
of a private right claimed in common for himself and others and he was also
bona fide litigating therein. Though, as noticed earlier, Section I I2 of the
G Representation of the People Act gives any other voter the right to come
forward and pursue E.P. I 3 of I 983, the prior election petition, in case the
petitioner therein died and the election petition abated, on that basis alone,
the earlier action cannot be understood to be a representative action so as
to attract explanation VI to Section I I of the Code of Civil Procedure. We do
H not think it necessary to advert to the authorities on the scope of explanation
SATRUCHARLA VIJA YA RAMARAJUv. NJMMAKAJA YA RAJU [BALASUBRAMANY AN,J.J833

VI to Section 11 and the nature of litigations prior and subsequent, to which A
that explanation would have relevance. Suffice it to say that the plea of res
judicata raised by counsel for the appellant cannot be sustained. The appellant,
therefore, cannot rely on Section 40 of the Evidence Act.

10. The contention that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 is a judgment
in rem also cannot be accepted. Under the Indian Evidence Act Section 41 B
is said to incorporate the law on the subject. A judgment in rem is defined
in English Law as "an adjudication pronounced (as its name indeed denotes)
by the status, some particular subject matter by a tribunal having competent
authority for that purpose". Spencer Bower on Res judicata defines the term
as one which "declares, defines or otherwise determines the status of a C
person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person or thing
to the world generally''. An election petition under Section 80 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 cannot be held to lead to an adjudication
•; which declares, defines or otherwise determines the status of a person or a
jural·relation of that person to the world generally. It is merely an adjudication
of a statutory challenge on the question whether the election of the successful D
candidate is liable to be voided on any of the grounds available under Section
I 00 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is not an action for
establishing the status of a person. It is not an action initiated by a persoo
to have his status established or his jural relationship to the world generally
established, to borrow the language of Spencer Bower. No doubt in E.P. 13 E
of 1983, the question was whether the election petitioner therein who alleged
that the appellant before us was not qualified to contest as a candidate
belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, in a constituency reserved for that tribe and
to that extent, having relationship to the status of the appellant. In such an
action under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 what is decided is
whether the election petitioner had succeeded in establishing that the F
successful candidate belonged to a caste or community, that was not included
in the Scheduled Tribes Order. In a case where the election petitioner failed
to establish his claim, it could not be said that it amounted to a declaration
of the status of the respondent in that election petition, the successful
candidate and· that such a finding on status would operate as a judgment in G
rem so as to bind the whole world. It is also not one of the judgments
specifically recognized by Section 41 of the Evidence Act. It has been held
that the challenge to an election is only a statutory right. An election petition
is not a suit of a general nature or a representative action for adjudication of
the status of a person. Even if we take it that the earlier judgment is admissible
in the evidence, on that, no objection was raised even at the trial, it could H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A be brought in under Section 42 of the Evidence Act on the basis that it relates
to a matter of a public nature or under Section 43 of the Evidence Act. In -
either case, not being inter-parties, the best status that can be assigned to
it is to say that it is of high evidentiary value, while considering the case of
the parties in the present election petition.

B 11. In fact, learned senior counsel concentrated his fire on the contention
that the earlier judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 is a judgment in rem. He referred
to the decision in lnamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa
and Ors. [ 1959] SCR 611. He relied on the portions of the judgment wherein
their Lordships indicated the nature and scope of an election petition. Quoting
C from the decision in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Ors., [1959]
SCR 583 their Lordships held that an election petition is not a matter in which
the persons interested are the candidates who strove against each other at
the elections. The public also are substantially interested in it and this is not
merely in the sense that an election has news value. An election is an
essential part of democratic process. An election petition is not a suit between
D two persons but is a proceeding in which the constituency itself is the
principal party interested. He also referred to the decision of the Madras High
Court in A. Sreenivasan v. Election tribunal, Madras and Anr. (Vol. XI E.L.R.
278) wherein the above two decisions were followed.

12. With respect to learned senior counsel, these decisions do not show
E that the judgment in an election petition could be treated as a judgment in
rem. Obviously, the whole of the constituency concerned is interested in the
outcome of an election petition, since it either affects the choice they have
already made, or their right to have the freedom of a fresh choice. But since
a challenge to an election petition is only a st~~tory challenge under the
F Representation of the People Act and since the acceptance of the challenge
or the rejection of it in a given case would be based on facts and law available ·
therein, and since an adjudication therein is not one which comes directly
within the purview of Section 4 I of the Act, the same could not be treated
as a judgment in rem. In fact, if it were a judgment in rem, the ratio of the
decision of this Court in C.M Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and Ors., [1976] I
G sec 863 earlier referred to, would not have been rendered, since the
adjudication in the earlier election petition would have barred the consideration
of the question even if it be based on additional facts. We, therefore, overrule
the argument that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983, should be held to be a
judgment in rem binding on the whole world including the election petitioner
H herein, even though he was not a party to the earlier proceeding.
SATRUCHARLA VIJA YARAMARAJU\'. NIMMAKAJAYARAJU[BALASUBRAMANYAN,J.J 835

13. The argument that the earlier decision must be treated to be a A '
judicial precedent cannot also be accepted. The decision in the earlier election
petition depended upon the pleadings and the evidence adduced in that case
and their appreciation. The essential finding was that the election petitioner
therein had not established the plea set up by him. It was not a case where
a particular document was interpreted in a particular manner by the highest
court of the land and the interpretation of the same document was again B
involved in a subsequent litigation between those who were not parties to
the earlier litigation. In Kharkan and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR
(1965) SC 83 this Court held that an earlier judgment can only be relevant if
it fulfills the conditions laid down by the Indian Evidence Act in Sections 40
to 43. The earlier judgment is, no doubt, admissible to show the parties and C
the decision but it is not admissible for the purpose of relying upon the
appreciation of the evidence. What happened in E.P. 13 of 1983 was that the
documentary and oral evidence adduced in that case were appreciated by the
High Court and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the election
petitioner had failed to prove that the present appellant did not belong to a
Scheduled Tribe. No doubt, at the end of the judgment, there was also a D
sentence to the effect that the appellant belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. What
we intend to point out is that, that appreciation of evidence has no relevance
in the present election petition and, in our view, the High Court rightly held
that the present election petition has to be tried on the pleadings and the
evidence available in this case. E
14. Now we will come to the merits of the case. The evidence on the
side of the election petitioner consisted of Exhibits A I to A27 and the oral
evidence of PWs I to 8. Exhibits Cl to Cl 0 were also cited and marked
through CW I. On behalf of the appellant, Exhibits BI to B5 were marked and
RWs I to 9 were examined. The learned Judge trying the election petition, held F
rightly that the initial burden was on the election petitioner to substantiate
his assertion that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe and was
not entitled to contest from a constituency reserved for Scheduled Tribes. On
the basis of Exhibits A2toA11 read with Exhibits A23, the oral evidence on
the side of election petitioner, the learned Judge held that the burden had G
shifted to the appellant to show that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe,
namely, the Konda Dora Tribe. The learned Judge noticed that the appellant
had not adduced any documentary evidence to establish that he belonged to
the Konda Dora Tribe. He held that the Gazetteer and the other historic
materials produced by the appellant, did not show that the family of the
appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe. The oral evidence on the side H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A of the appellant was not sufficient to establish that the appellant belonged
to the Konda Dora Tribe. On the other hand, there were a series of documents
executed by the members of the family of the appellant and by the appellant
containing an assertion that the family was a 'Kshatriya' family and the
school leaving certificates of the appellant and that of his paternal cousin,
indicated that he and the appellant were 'Kshatriyas' and hence did not
B belong to a Scheduled Tribe and since these assertions were admissions in
the present case and were not rebutted or shown to be a wrong by the
appellant, it must be held that the election petitioner had established that the
appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. The learned Judge, therefore,
allowed the election petition and declared the election of the appellant from
C the concerned constituency, void.
15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant made a strenuous attempt
to contend that the learned Judge of the High Court had wrongly placed the
burden of proof in the case. We cannot agree. The trial judge has rightly
proceeded on the basis that the initial burden w~s on the election petitioner
. D to establish his plea that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe.
Though in a prior statement, an assertion in one's own interest, may not be
evidence, a prior statement, adverse to one's interest would be evidence. In
fact, it would be the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon. Therefore,
in the present case, where the appellant is pleading that he is a Konda Dora,
E the statement in the series of documents, pre-constitution and post
constitution, executed by his ancestors and members of his family including
himself describing themselves as 'Kshatriyas', would operate as admissions
against the interest of the appellant in the present case. These admissions
also strengthened the admission of the appellant that in his school leaving
certificate also, he is described as a 'Kshatriya' and his paternal uncle's son
F is also described as a 'Kshatriya' in his school leaving certificate and that
uncle's son was also held to be a 'Kshatriya' on an enquiry made in that
behalf. Therefore, in our view, the trial judge was correct in holding that the
election petitioner had discharged the initial burden placed on him and the
burden shifted to the appellant to establish that he belonged to the 'Konda
Dora' Tribe.
G
16. Appreciating the evidence on the side of the appellant, the trial
judge held that no document has been produced by him to show that the
appellant belonged to a Scheduled Tribe or that earlier, their claims have been
recognized as a Scheduled Tribe except the judgment in E.P. 13of1983. The
H trial Judge having taken the view thatthejudgment in E.P. 13of1983 would
SATR\JCHARLA VIJA YA RAMA RAJ\Jv. NIMMAKAJA YARA.IU[BALASUBRAMANYAN,J.] 837

not operate as a res judicata and could not be taken to be a judgment in rem, A .
proceeded to hold that even though in that case an election petitioner therein
had failed to establish that the appellant was not a Konda Dora, in the present
case, the available' evidence indicated that the family of the appellant did not
belong to the Konda Dora Tribe. The trial judge found that the evidence of
RWs I to 9 was not adequate to establish that the appellant was a Konda
Dora. Having gone through the evidence of RWs 1 to 9 we also agree with B
the trial judge that the evidence of RWs 1 to 9 is totally insufficient to
establish that the appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe. On a scrutiny
of the evidence of PWs 1 to 8, also, we do not see anything in their evidence
that would justify our holding that the appellant has established his claim.
c
17. In this position, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
gazetteer and the historical documents produced on the side of the appellant
clearly showed that the appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe. We must
say that the High Court has considered these materials in detail and has
found that even going by those materials the best that could be said on
behalf of the appellant was that the family of the appellant, the Marangi D
family, belonged to Konda Raju caste, but the very material relied by the
appellant to show that he belonged to the 'Konda Raju' tribe, also showed
that the tribe 'Konda Raju' was different from the tribe 'Konda Dora'. In
paragraphs 84 and 85 of his judgment the trial judge has dealt with this
aspect. On going through the detailed discussion therein and the materials E
read out to us by leaned counsel for the appellant, it is not possible to hold
that these documents establish that the appellant belonged to the 'Konda
Dora' tribe.

I 8. As against the admissions contained in Exhibits A2 to A I I and the
evidence furnished by the other documents produced on behalf of the election p
petitioner, no positive evidence could be adduced by the appellant to show
that he belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe. He relied on a caste certificate
issued to him under the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribe
and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificate Act,
1993 in support of his claim. The trial judge found that there was no due
enquiry on the application of the appellant for the issue of a caste certificate G
as prescribed under this Act, and the certificate was issued to him based on
a recommendation made the same day as the date of the application, by the
concerned authority. On an appreciation of the evidence of CW! in the light
of Ex. C. I to C. I 0 the trial judge found that even the application for issuance
of the certificate was filled up by the official concerned after obtaining the H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A signature of the applicant therein, the appellant, in a blank form and the
certificate was issued without following the proper procedure. CW I in fact
confessed in the court that the certificate was issued because he was told that
in view of the decisiort in E.P. 13of1983 he was bound to issue the certificate
asked for by the appellant. On going through the evidence of CW! and on
scrutinizing Exhibits CI to C 10 and the reasoning adopted by the trial judge,
B we are satisfied that the trial judge was fully justified in discarding the caste
certificate relied on by the appellant.

19. The evidence of the appellant examined as RWl clearly shows that
the family of the appellant had always considered itself to belong to a
C superior strata of society and as a ruling or satrap family. The title of
'Satrucharala', conqueror of enemies, had been conferred on an ancestor of
the appellant and the members of the family were using that title. The evidence
of PWs I to 8 and RWs I to 9 shows that most of the practices followed by
the family differed from that of'Konda Doras'. In fact, learned counsel for the
appellant could only emphasis that there was no evidence to show that
D 'Homa' and 'Saptapadi', the essentials of a 'Kshatriya' marriage were being
performed in the marriages in the family. But learned counsel could not
contradict that the male members were having thread ceremony. No doubt,
mere assertion or a claim by a tribal that he is a 'Kshatriya' cannot make him
a 'Kshatriya'. But what is involved here is a series of assertions which are
E admissions in terms of the Evidence Act and other evidence that tribal
customs differed from the practices of the family of the appellant. The position
in V V. Giri v. Dippala Suri Dora and Ors., [1960] l SCR 426 differs, in that,
in that case, Dora was admitted to be originally a tribal and what was asserted
was that subsequently, he had become a 'Kshatriya', having adopted their
customs and practices. That is not the case here and there is no admission
F in this case that the family of the appellant originally was tribal. Evidence in
the case on hand also indicates that the family of the appellant had marital
relationship mostly with the Zamindar families outside the present State of
Andhra Pradesh and their way of life was also not that of the tribals. No
positive acceptable evidenc.e could also be adduced to show that the family
entered into marital relationship with 'Konda Dora' tribals. The evidence also
G shows that the family of the appellant did not have any close relationship
with the Konda Doras of the locality. The admissions ofRW.1 show that quite
a few of the customs the family was following had no relations to the customs
generally followed by the Konda Dora Tribe and some of the practices clearly
differed from that of the tribe and was more consistent with the practices
H followed by Kshatriya and higher castes. The trial judge has carefully analysed
SATRUCHARLA VI.JAY A RAMA RAJU1·. NIMMAKAJA YARAJU[BALASUBRAMANYAN.l.] 839

these aspects and we do not see any justification in differing from his A
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence in the case.

20. In a sense, the appellant wants the best of two worlds. Though, he
would like to contest from a constituency reserved for the Scheduled Tribes,
he would want to lead the life of a forward caste and have the trappings of
that caste. The purpose of reservation of constituencies is to ensure B
representation in the legislatures to such tribes and castes who are deemed
to require special efforts for their upliftment. The person seeking election from
such constituencies must be the true representative of that tribe. The evidence
shows that the appellant could not be considered to be a true representative
of a tribe included in the Presidential Order deserving special protection. C
21. What we are left with is the high evidentiary value that may be
attached to the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983. It is true that some of the
documents produced in the present election petitiori, were also available
before the judge assigned to try the previous case. But ultimately the
conclusion in the previous case was based on an appreciation of the evidence D
adduced in that case. Some evidence may be common. But, since it is not
possible to accept the contention that the earlier judgment is a judgment in
rem or that it would operate as res judicata, we can at best pro~eed on the
basis that on an earlier occasion, it was adjudicated that he was not shown
to be disqualified to contest from a reserved constituency. But as emphasized
by learned counsel for the election petitioner-respondent, that was a conclusion E
arrived at based on an appreciation of the evidence in that case and once that
judgment could not be held to be a judgment in rem binding on the whole
world or a judgment that bars the trial of the issue in the present election
petition or would operate as res judicata between the parties, that judgment
by itself is not sufficient to rebut the evidence available in the present case F
based on which the finding has been rendered.

22. Thus, on the whole, on a re-appreciation of the pleadings and the
evidence in the case, in the light of the law governing the matter, we are
satisfied that the decision of the trial court does not call for any interference.
We, therefore, confirm the decision of the trial court and dismiss this appeal G
with costs.

VM Appeal dismissed.

Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "Res judicata"Sign in to search