Holding

A post‑acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard and is neither a necessary nor a proper party in compensation proceedings, and the High Court’s order allowing additional evidence and remand is invalid.

Summary

The State of Haryana acquired large tracts of land for an industrial model township, vesting the land in the State after the Collector’s award. The Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) later allotted part of this land to Maruti Suzuki India Ltd (MSIL) under a deed that required the allottee to pay any additional price if compensation was enhanced. MSIL sought to be impleaded as a party in the determination of compensation, arguing it was a "person interested" under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The High Court allowed its impleadment, permitted additional evidence and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. The Supreme Court held that a post‑acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard, is neither a necessary nor a proper party under the Act, and that the High Court’s allowance of additional evidence and remand was unwarranted. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the matter remanded to the High Court for fresh decision.

Issues considered

Whether a post‑acquisition allottee of land is a necessary or proper party or has locus to be heard in proceedings for determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Whether the High Court was justified in permitting additional evidence and remanding the matter for fresh determination of compensation.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order I Rule 10, s. Order XI Rule 27
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 3(1), s. 50, s. 54

Subjects

Land acquisitionPost‑acquisition allotteeCompensation determinationLocus to be heardNecessary partyProper partyCPC Order I Rule 10CPC Order XI Rule 27Public purposeHSIDCMaruti Suzuki India LtdAdditional evidenceRemand

Judgment

(20 l 7J 1 S.C.R. 767

SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ETC.
(CivilAppealNos.1587-1636of2017)
FEBRUARY 21, 2017 B

[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND UDAY UMESH LALLT, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, .1894 - Post-acquisition allottee of
land - If necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in
the matter of determination of compensation - Held: Mere faci that
Government chooses to determine the allotment price with reference
c
to compensation price determined by the court, does not provide
any locus to allottee to contest the claim for enhancement of
compensation - Furthe1; the lack of sincerity on the part of the
State Authority for whose benefit the acquisition was mcide, not a
valid grdund to permit po,•t-acquisition allottee to be treated as a D
necessary or property authority u/Or. I, r. 10 to such proceedings -
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. [. I'. 10 . '· ·
I
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD:l.1 The post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be
heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party. E
[Para 18] [777-H; 778-A]
1.2 The acquisition may either be for a "public purpose" as
defined u/s. 3(1) or for a company under Part-VII of the Land
Acquisition Act. If the acquisition is for a public purpose, as the
instant c_ase, the land vests in the State after the Collector makes F
an award and the possession is taken. Till the award is made, no
person other than ·state comes into the picture. Once the land
vests in the State, the acquisition is complete. Any transferee
from the State is not concerned with the process of acquisition.
The State may transfer the land by public auction or by allotment G
at any price with which the person whose land is acquired has no
concern. Mere fact that the Government chooses to determine
the allQtment price with reference to compensation determined
by the court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest
the claim for enhanced compensation.-[Para 9](773-F-G; 774-A-
B] .. H
767
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.

A 1.3 The only other justification in the. impugned judgment
which was relied upon by the respondents is lack of sincerity on
the part of the State authority for whose benefit the acquisition
was made viz. HSIDC, which by itself cannot be a valid ground to
permit post-acquisition allottee to be treated as a necessary or
B proper authority under Order I Rule 10 CPC to proceedings for
· determination of compensation. The view taken in the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained on any principle or precedent. [Para
16] [777-F]
1.4 There is l\O consideration of the principle of law and
thus, the order dated 15'" July, 2004 without there being contest
C on the principle of law could not be treated as a precedent for
deciding the legal issue at hand. (Para 17] [777-G-H]
1.5 No case was made out for permitting additional evidence
on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. It is clear
that neither the trial court refused to receive the evidence nor it
D could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not
available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be
held necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence
cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak
points in the case. There was no ground for remand in these
circumstances. While remanding the matter in the earlier round,
E
liberty was given to the MSIL to file an application for
impleadment or to act as an intervenor which implied that such
application was to be accepted. There is no merit in this contention
also. It cannot be held that any right was crystalised by the said
observation and such prayer had to be considered according to
F law. [Para 19-21] [778-A-B, E-GI
N. Kama/am v. Ayyaswami (2001) 7 SCC 503 : 2001
(1) Suppl. SCR 272 - referred to ..
1.6 The impugned order is set aside and matter is remanded
to the High Court. (Para 22( (778-G-H]
G
Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind and anr. v.
Municipal Committee, Jind and ors. 1988 (Supp) SCC
719 - relied· OI\.
Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (Dead) by legal
representatives and ors. v. State of Kar,iataka and anr.
H 2015 (9) SCR 498 : (2015) 10 sec 469; UP. A11•as
SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA 769
& ORS. ETC.

Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) by Lrs. and A
Ors. 1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 646 : (1995) 2 SCC 326; P.
Narayanappa and anr. v. State of Karnatakq and ors.·
2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 716 : (2006) 7 sCC 578 -
distinguished.
HSJDC v. Fran Sukh (2010) 11 SCC 175; HSIDC v. B
Mawasi 2012 (6) SCR 237 : (2012) 7 SCC 200; HSIDC
v. Fran Sukh (2012) 7 SCC 721; HS/DC v. Udal (2013)
14 SCC 506; ONGC v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel
2008 (11) SCR 927 : (2008) 14 SCC 745; Valliyamma/
v. Special Tehsildar (LA) 2011 (11) SCR 293 : (2011) 8
SCC 91; Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis c
Victor Coutinho (Dead) by Lrs. 1980 (3) SCR 235 :
(1980) 3 SCC 223; Santosh Kumar and ors. v. Central
Warehausing Corporation and anr. 1986 (1) SCR 603
: (1986) 2 SCC 343; Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd.
v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely and D
Ors. l994 (4) Suppl. SCR 567 : (1995) 1 SCC 221;
Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma
(dead) by Lrs. and ors.. (2011) 2 SCC 54 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
(20101 11 sec 115 referred to Para 3 E
2012 (6) SCR 237 referred to Para3
(20121 1 sec 121 referred to Para3
(20131 1.4 sec 506 referred to Para3
2008 (11) SCR 927 referred to Para3
2011 (11) SCR 293 referred to Para3 F
198~ (3) SCR 235 refe'rred to Para 7
19~6 (1) SCR 603 referred to Para 7
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 567 referred to Para 7
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 646 distinguished Para 13
G
2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 716 distinguished Para 13
2015 (9) SCR 498 distinguished Para 13
1988 (Supp) sec 719 relied on Para 14
(2011) 2 sec 54 referred to Para 15
2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 272 referred to Para 17 H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1587-
1636 of2017.
From the JUdgment and Order dated 06. l 0.2015 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RFA Nos. 4316, 3127, 4057,
3401, 4052, 3 I 79, 4368, 4312, 4599, 4343,3743, 3209, 4597, 4624, 4600,
B 4625, 4838 and 4337 of2010, RFA Nos. 4607, 6255, 2407, 4712, 2413,
4716,2439,4714,4601,6292,2419,4326,4605,6317,2440,4830,3385,
4315,5943,6324,2416,4118,4119,2442,2451,623,622,4334,3106,
3359 and 625 of2011 and RFA No. 4736 of2012
WITH
C.A.Nos.1637, 1638-1653, 1655-1658, 1659-1663, 1664, 1665-
c 1669, 1670-1675, 1677-1691, 1692, 1693, 1694, 1695, 1696, 1699-1701,
1702, 1703-1780, 1783-1852, 1853-1927, 1930-2003,2004-2058,2059-
2111, 2112-2114, 2117-2118,2123-2126, 2127-2128, 2129-2132,2133-
2138, 2139-2143, 2144-2145, 2146-2200, 2201-2203, 2204, 2205-2206,
2207-2214,2215-2219,2220,2221-2223,2224,2226-2227,2228,2232-
D 2246 AND 2249-2279 of2017.
Dhruv Mehta, R. S. Suri, Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Advs., Siddharth
Mittal, Surender Singh, Jasbir Singh Malik, Ms. Usha Nandini. V, Roh it
K. Aggarwal, Ms. Rekha Dwivedi, L. Hasan, Avinash Kumar, Anil Mittal,
Ms. Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Satish Kumar Gupta, Dr. Kailash Cnand,
E Siddharth Batra, Ravinder Kumar,Ajit Sharma, S. K. Sinha, Gagan Gupta,
Saurabh Gupta, Naresh Kaushik, Manoj Joshi, Mrs. Lalita Kaushik,
Annam D. N. Rao, AbhishekAgarwal, Sudipto Sircar, Kushank Sindhu,
Annam Ve'nkatesh, Rahul Mishra, Pankaj Kumai"Stnglt;-Ms. Varsha
Rana, Satpal Singh, Ankit Swarup, Ms. Tanya Swarup, Mrs. Arnita Gupta,
Ms. Neha Tyagi, Tarun Gupta, S. Jhanwa.r, M. S. Varma, Ram Naresh
F Yadav, Advs. for the Appellants.
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, AG, P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., Alok Sangwan,
Amit Kumar, AAGs, Dr. Monika Gusain, A. K. Thakur, Ashish Chauhan,
Shekhar Kumar, Ms. Priya Watwani, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Karanvir
Singh Khehar, Parveen, Vi pin Kumar Jai, Advs. for the Respondents:
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. These appeals have been
preferred against judgment and order dated 06'h October, 2015 passed
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.F. A. Nos.
4316 of2010 etc. etc.
H
SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA 771
· & ORS. ETC. [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

2. Question for consideration is whether a post-acquisitim1 allottee A
of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the
matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land.
Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order
permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.
3. Facts giving rise to the question may be briefly noted. Huge B
chunks of land were acquired by the State of Haryana in different phases
for the public purpose of setting-up Industrial Model Townsh'p by the
Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) in Gurgaon
District in Haryana. Substantial part of the acquiredland was aliotted by
the HSIDC to Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL). One of the clauses
in the Conveyance Deed executed in favour of the allottee provided that c
if compensation was enhanced, the allottee shall be liable to pay additional
price on that basis. In HS/DC v. Pran Sukh', issue of compensation
for land acquired in Phase I was decided by this Court. Review Petitions
against the said judgment were dealt with in HS/DC v. Mawasi1 and
HS/DC v. Pran Sukh 3• Matter of determining compensation i:1 respect D
of Phase II and Phase III came-up for consideration in HS/DC v. Udat'.
As noticed in judgment of this Court in Udal (supra), the Reference
Court awarded compensation in the light of compensation determined in
the judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra) and other awards relating
to land acquired for Phase III. Against the decision of the Reference
Court, the land owners as well as the HSIDC filed appeals under Section E
54 of the Act. The High Court assessed the compensation hased on
judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra). Reference to paras 29 to
33 of the judgment of~his Court Udal (supra) shows that after referring
to the plea of the HSrDC that the annual increase of 12% for the time
.gap was erroneous in view of ONGC v. Ramesltbhai Jivanblwi Patel-' F
arid Va/liyammal v. Special Teltsildar (LA)', this Court found merit in
the arguments of the land owners that.an important piece of evidence
was not taken into account which necessitated remand. The matter
was remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal and it was also
. observed that MSIL was free to file an appropriate application for its
impleadment or for leave to act as intervenor. G
1
(20lOJ11sec175
'(2012) 1 sec 200
'l2012J7sec121
'l2013J 14 sec 506
'l200SJ 14 sec 745
'l20ll) s sec 91
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

,A 4. Thereafter, the matter was dealt with by the High Court in the
impugned judgment. The High Court held that the allottee had a right to
be imp leaded as a party for the following reasons: ·
a) The State or the local authority for whose benefit the land is
acquired may not lead proper evidence or advance effective arguments.
B b )A clause in the deed of allotment in favourofthe allottee provides
for payment of additional price as a consequence of enhancement of
compensa.tion.
c) As a result of enhancement of compensation by the Reference
Court, the company in question was required to pay about Rs.900 crores.
C d) Under Order. I Rule I 0(2) CPC the Co mt can add or delete a
party at any stage.
e) Section 50 of the Act provides a right to a local authority or a
company for whose benefit the land is acquired to be represented before
the Collector or the Court in the process of determination of compensation.

D f) The principle behind giving the right ofrepresentation to a local
authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired can also
be applied to any person who is liable to pay the enhanced cpmpensation
treating such person to be the "person interested" under Sectio1i 3(b)
of the Act.
5. After permitting the allottee to be impleaded as a party, the
E High Court also allowed application to lead additional evidence on the
ground that the acquiring authority did not defend the case properly.
Similar application filed by the HSIDC to lead additional evidence was
also allowed and, thereafter, on considering the additional evidence it
was observed that it was not possible for the High Court to assess the
F compensation as there was no site plan showing the location of the
transactions relied. It was also considered necessary to give an
opportunity to MSIL, who was impleaded for the first time. On that
basis the matter was remanded to the Reference Court for fresh decision.
6. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court these ~ppeals have
been preferred. Contentions of the appellants are as follows:
G
i) The post-acquisition allottee had no right to be heard in the matter
of compensation. Reliance has been placed on Hindu Kanya
Maha Vidyalaya, Jind and a11r. v. Municipal Committee, Jim/
a11d ors.'; Harya11a Stale I11dustrial Development Corporation
H '1988(Supp)SCC7!9
SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA 773
& ORS. ETC. [ADAR3H KUMAR GOEL, J.]

v. Pran Suklt and ors. (supra)-and; Peerappa Hfmmantlta A
Harijan (Derul)·by legal representatives and ors. v. -State of
Karnataka and anr.8
ii) Applications for impleadment have been filed by MSIL 12 years
after the.acquisition and applications for additional evidence were
also filed after a long delay and for the first time after remand by B
this Court, which could not be considered within the scope of
Order XU Rule 27 ofCPC. '
(iii) Application for additional evidence was rejected by this Com t
in the earlier round. The re~and by this Court was limited to the
question whether there Y-'&3 a need for further enhancement in
the light of evidence which was not earlier considered.- c
7. On the other hand, learned ccunsel for the MSIL as well as the
HSIDC and othe_r allottees have supported the impugned judgment. They
submit that since allottees have to pay the enhanced compensation, they
ought to be treated as ''person interested" under Section 3 (o) of the
Act. Reliance has been placed on judgments of this Court in Himalayan D
Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor _Coutin/10 (Dead) by
Lrs. 9; Santoslt Kumar and ors. v. Central Warehousing Corporation
and anr.1°; Neyvely Lignite Corporation Lid. v. Special Taltsildar
(Land Acquisition) Neyvely and Ors. 11 and; U.P. Awas Evam Vikas
Paris/tad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. 11•
E
8. We have given our due consideration to the rival submissions.
9. To determine the question whetherthe post-acquisition allottee
of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus' to be heard in the
matter of determination of compensation, we may refer to the scheme
of the Act. The acquisition may either be for a "public purpose" as
F
defined under Section 3(1) or for a company under Part-VII of the Act.
If the acquisition is for a public purpose (as the present case), the land
vests in the State after the Collector makes an award and the possession
_ is taken. Till the award is made, no person-other than State comes into
the picture. Once the land vests in the State, the acquisition is complete.
Any transferee from the State is not concerned with the process of G
acquisition. The State may transfer the land by public auction or by
• (2015) w sec 469
' ( 1980) 3 sec 223
"' ( 1986) 2 sec 343
"(1995) 1sec221
"(l 995J 2 sec 326 H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A allotment a.t any price with which the person whose land is acquired has
no concern. The mere fact that the Government chooses to determine
the allotment price with reference to compensation price determined by
the Court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest the claim
for enhancement of compen~gn.
B 10 . .:J:his legal position is well settled on principle as well as the
precedent. In Hindu Kllnyll Mllhll Vidyllillyll (supra) it was observed:
'"3. ...... ... Indisputably the land in dispute was not acquired
for the purpose of appellants instead the land was acquired
for the Municipal Committee for the purpose of developing
its Scheme No. 5.. After the declaration of award Municipal
c Committee- ttf01< possession of the land and thereafter
transferred a portion of the same to the appellants under an
agreement. In the_se circumstances the ratio laid down by this
Court in Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor
Countinho [(1980) 3 SCC 223} does not apply as the
D appellants are not interested persons and they have no right
to question the award. ......... "
11. Again, in Peemppll Hllnmttntlrn (supra) inter ali11 the
following questions were framed for consideration.
"30.J. (i) Whether the al/ottee Company (Mis. Ultra Tech
E Cement Ltd.) is either a beneficiary or interested person
entitled for hearing before determination of the market value
to award just and reasonable compensation in respect of the
acquired land of the appellants either before the Deputy
Commissioner or Reference Co":rt?
(ii) Whether the writ petition filed by the· allottee Company
F
before the High Court is maintainable in law?
(iii) Whether the order of remand allowing the writ petition of
the a/lo/tee Company to the Reference Court is legal and
valid?'.'
12. The above questions were answered as follows:
G
"63. In view of the foregoing reasons recorded by us ·on the
basis of the acquisition notifications issued by the State
Government under the statutory provisions of the KlAD Act
and therefore, we have to answer Points (i), (ii) and (iii) in
favour of the landowners holding that the Coinpany is neither
H the. beneficiary nor interested person of the acquired .land,
SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA 775
& ORS. ETC. [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.)

hence, it has no right to participate in the award proceedings A
for determination of the market value ,and award the
· compensation amount of the acquired land of the appellants.
Hence, the writ petition filed by the Company questioning the
correctness of the award passed by the Reference Court which
··is affirmed by the High Court is not at all maintainable in
B
law. On this ground itself, the writ petition filed by the
Company should have been rejected by the High Court,
instead it has allowed and remanded the case to the Reference
Court for reconsideration of the claims after affording
opportunity to the Company, which order suffers from error
in law and therefore, the same is liable to be sei aside. " c
13. Judgments in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra),
· Himalayan Tiles (supra) and P. Narayanappa and anr. v. State of
Karnataka and ors.'-' as mentioned in para 61 of the judgment in
Peerappa Hanmantha (supra) were held to be not applicable as the
same applied only when the acquisition is for a company or for the
D
beneficiary of the acquisition as mentioned in the notification foracquisition
itself. This is clear from the following:
"61. Further, both the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of
!pADB and the Company 'have placed reliance on various
decisions rendered by this Court in support of their above
respective legal submissions that the Company is an interested E
person and, therefore, it has got right to participate in the
proceedings before the Reference Court for determination of
compensation before passing the award either by the Land
Acquisition Officer or the Deputy Commissioner or the
Reference Court at the instance of the owner or any other F
interested person. These include judgments rendered by this
Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi,
Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor
Coutinho and P. Narayanappa v. State of Karna/aka and other
decisions which are not required to be mentioned in this
iudgment as they are all reiteration of the law laid down in G
the above cases.
62. The reliance placed on the various decisions of this Court
by both the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of KIADB and
the Company, is misplaced as none of the said judgments relied
"(2006) 7 sec 578 H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A . upon are applicable to the fact situation in the present case
for the reason that those cases dealt with reference to the
acquisition of land under the provisions of the LA Act, either
in favour of the company or de.velopment authorities, whereas
in the case on hand, the acquisition proceedings have been
initiated under the KIAD Act for industrial development by
B
KIADB. Further, the original acquisition record in respect of
the acquired land involved in the proceedings by the learned
Standing Counsel on behalf of the State of Karnataka as per
our directions issued vide our orders dated 17-11-2014" and
24-3-201 J1 5, do not disclose the fact that the acquisition of
c lands covered in the acquisition notifications are in favour
of the Company. Thus, the acquisition of land in favour of
KIADB is abunda!iily clear from the preliminary and final
notifications issued by the State Government and thereafter
following the procedure under sub-sections (6) and (7) of
Section 28 of the KIAD Act, it took possession of the acquired
D
land from the owners who were in possession of the sam? and
was tram/erred in favour of KIADB for its disposal for the.
purpose for which lands were acquired as provided under
Section 32(2) of the KIAD Act read with the Regulations
referred to supra framed by KIADB under Section 41 (2){b)
E 1
~ Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karna/aka, SLP{C)No. 19819 of2013. order
dated 17-11-2014 (SC). \\·herein it \ras directed: .. Issue notice 10 rile Stare·Go\·ernment.
The learned counsel for the pelitioners to take out notice lo the learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the State Co1•er11111e11t. Dasli, in addition. is also permi_fled. A.'r. 1:./\:.
Raghupathy. learned co1111sel accepts notice for the State of KGrnataka and .Hr. .\'ishanth
Patil. learned counsel accepts notice for Karna/aka l11dus1rtal rlrea Development Board
(jor short -.KIADB}. The learned counsel apjJearing for the Stare GOvernument and the
learned counsel appearing for KIA.DB are directed to produce !he relevant records in
F respect of the proceedings relating to land acquisition inl'o/ved in these maflers. There
shall be stay of the effect and operation of 1he impugned order during the pendency of
these petitions. list the mailers after four weeks. In the meanll'hile. aJ(the respoitdents are
at liberty to file irritten statements, if any. ". _
is Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karnataka, SLP(C)No.--19819 of 2013. order
dated 24-3-2015(SC). wherein it was directed: "Heard .\ls. Kiran Suri. !earned.Senior
Counsel for the petirioners in SLPS(C)1\'os. 3~62-1-25 of201-I in pan, list all the-maflers
G ·as part for further hearing. fide order dated 17-11-201./. learned co11nse/ for the State as
H"ell as the learned counsel for KIADB irere direcled to produce the rele:·,111t records in
respect of the proceedings relating 10 land acquisition involved in. these molters._ record as
11'el! as the records relating to allotment of land. However. as per office records. nothing
has been produced s.o far. In this riew of the mailer. the learned counsel for thi State as
l!'e/l as the learned counsel for KIADB are directed to comply with the order dated J 7-11: ...
201-1 and produce the relevant recOrds in respect of the proceedings relating to land
acquisition and the allotment of land invofred in t_hese marters before rhe next date of
H hearing, List the mailers on 15-4-2015. •·
SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA 777
& ORS. ETC. [ADARSHKUMAR GOEL, J.]

of the KIAD Act. Therefore, t.he reliance placed upon the A
iudgments of this Court by the learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of the Company and KIADB, are wholly inapplicable
to the fact situation and do not support the case of the
Company."
14. We are in respectful agreement with the above view in Hindu B
Kanya Malia Vidyalaya (supra) and Peerappa Hanmantlw (supra).
No contrary view of this Court has been brought to our notice. The
judgments relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable as alreaay
held by !his Court.
15. Jn Himalayd'n Til~s (supra) the acquisition ,was under Part-
VII of the Act. In Santoslt Kumar (supra) the question was whether
c
award of the Collector could be challcagcd, to which this Court answered
in the negative except onthe ground of fraud, corruption or collusion. In
Neyvely Lignite (supra) again the acquisition was under Part-VII of
the Act and in thatcontext this Court held that the expression "person
interested" cou Id include a company or local authority for whose benefit D
the lane! was acquired. The post-acquisition allottee cannot by any stretch
of imagination be treated at par with beneficiary for whom the land was
acquired. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parislutd (supra), the matter
dealt with was in the context of statutory authority for whom the land
was acquired. Del/ti Development Authority v. Blto/a Natlt Sfutrma
.E
(dead) by Lrs. and ors. 16 was a case in the context of beneficiary for
whom the land was acquired. ·
16. The only other justification in the impugned judgment which
has been relied upon by the respondents is lack of sincerity on the part
of the State authority for whose benefit the acquisition has been made
viz. HSIDC, which by itself cannot be a valid ground to permit post- F
acquisition allottee to be treated as a necessary or proper authority under
Order I Rule 10 of CPC to proceedii1gs for determination of
compensation. The view taken in the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained on any principle or precedent.
17. We may now refer to an order of this Court dated 15" July, G
2004 which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment in para 31.
There is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, tile said ord'er
without there being contest on the principle oflaw could not be treated·
_as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand. .
18. Accordingly; we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus
"(2011)2 sec 54 H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 1 S.C.R.

A to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party.
19. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence
and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was.madt!
out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XL!
Rule 27 ofCPC. The provision is reproduced below:- '
"27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- {l) The
B parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional
evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if
'---

(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused
to admit evidence which ought to have been admi(ted, or
(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes
c that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence wa~
not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise ofdue diligence,
be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was
~~w . -
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or
any witness to be f!XOmined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for
D any other substantial cause,
The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be
produced, or witness to be examined
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an
Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission."
20. It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the
E evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not
available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary
to pronounce the judgment Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in
the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case". There was no ground
for remand in these circumstances.
21. We may also refer to the argument that this Court, while remanding
F
the matter in the earlier round, had given liberty ;o the MSIL to file an application
for impleadment or to act as an intervenor which iipplied that such appli:ation
was to be accepted. We do not find any merit in this contention also .. ,It cannot
be held that any right »'as crystalised by the said observation and sui:h prayer
had to be considered according to law. We have already held that the post-
acquisition allottee had no right in the matter.
G
22. For the above reasons, we allow these appeals and set aside the
impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court once again for fresh
decision in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear"before the
High Court on 27"' March, 2017.
Nidhi Jain Appeals a!ld\'ved.
H "N. Kamalam v. Ayyaswami (2001) 7 SCC 503·: para 19