SATISH CHANDRA & ANR.versusSTATE OF M.P.

                       [2014] 6 S.C.R. 23


                  SATISH CHANDRA & ANR.                              A
                                v.
                        STATE OF M.P.
              (Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2010)
                          MAY 6, 2014
                                                                     B
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                  A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860 - s. 498A - Suicide by married woman
  within 3 years of marriage - Dying declaration recorded by         c
  Executive Magistrate (PW2) with certification by attending
  doctor (PW5) - Conviction of husband and mother-in-law by
  Courts below uls. 498A - If justified - Held: Deceased in her
  declaration very categorically stated that her mother-in-law
  used to fight with her regularly on account of demand of gold      D
  chain which her parents could not fulfill and that she had fight
  on the fateful day also and being tired of such regular fights
  she poured kerosene oil on her and set herself on fire -
  Clearly, immediate cause of committing suicide was regular
  fights with mot!Jer-in-law on account of dowry demand -            E
  Ingredients of s. 498A stand satisfied qua mother-in-law as
  deceased was subject to cruelty on account of unlawful
  demand for property viz. gold chain in the instant case and
  failure on her part to meet that demand - So much so, it
  ultimately drove the deceased to commit suicide - However,
                                                                     F
  deceased in her statement did not blame her husband at all
  and on the contrary, categorically stated that he was innocent
  - No conclusive proof that there was any "cruelty" on his part
  - In fact, in order to please and satisfy his wife, the husband
· was making all efforts to become something in life and was
  struggling for that - Husband given benefit of doubt for charge    G
  u/s. 498A and thus acquitted from that charge - Conviction of
  mother-in-law u/s. 498A however upheld.

      Penal Code, 1860 - s.304-8 - Suicide by married woman
                             23                                      H
    24.       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 6 S.C.R.


A - Deceased poured kerosene on her person and then put
  herself on fire - Dying declaration recorded by Executive
  Magistrate (PW2) with certification by attending doctor (PW5)
  - Conviction of husband and mother-in-law by Courts below
  u/s.3048 - If justified- Held: The death was caused by burns
B and occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances--
  It happened within 7 years of her marriage - Further, the
  trigger point for committing suicide was quarrel between
  deceased and her mother-in-law on the fateful day - There
  were regular fights between deceased and her mother-in-law
c for dowry - Statement of the deceased made it clear that on
  that fateful day also mother-in-law fought with her for that
  reason - Therefore, commission of offence u/s. 3048 against
  mother-in-law conclusively proved in view of iron clad dying
  declaration - However, husband cannot be said to have
0 committed any act of "cruelty" soon before her death which
  forced the deceased to take such a step - Deceased nowhere
  stated that on that date when her mother-in-law had quarreled
  with her, the husband was associated or even responsible for
  that - Husband thus acquitted of charge u/s.3048 while
E conviction of mother-in-law uls.3048 uphel~
                                                            -
        Sentence I Sentencing - Suicide by married woman
  within 3 years of marriage - Appellant no. 2 (mother-in-law)
  convicted by courts below ulss.3048 and 498A and sentenced
  to one year RI for; offence uls.498A /PC and 10 years for
F offence uls.3048/PC - On appeal, held: On facts, sentence
  of one year R/ for offence uls.498A /PC maintained -
  However, inspfar as s. 3048 /PC is concerned, certain
  extenuating 9nd mitigating circumstances existing - First of
  all, even wfyen the immediate cause to commit suicide was
G the fight be.tween deceased and appellant no.2(mother-in-law},
  at the SClme time deceased was not happy with her
  matrimonial fife for other reasons as well - In tact, she was
  not happy with the marriage at all which she stated in some
  of the lf/tters to her relatives - In interests of justice, sentence
H in resr:rect of offence uls.3048 /PC reduced from 10 years to
          !
        SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                   25

7 years RI - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.3048 and 498A.               A

     Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration -
Challenge to, on ground that deceased was tutored before she
made the statement - Held: Not tenable - Nothing on record
indicating that deceased may have been tutored - Deceased       B
was not happy with her matrimonial life and had expressed
so on earlier occasions as well, wf'fich fact surfaced in her
declaration as well - Dying declaration was natural and
voluntary.

     Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration -           C
Challenge to, on ground that it was not recorded in the form
of questions and answers - Held: Recording of declaration
in question-answer form is more appropriate method which
should generally be resorted to, however, if such declaration
otherwise meets all the requirements of s.32 and is found to    D
be worthy of credence, it is not to be rejected only on the
ground that it was not recorded in the form of questions and
answers.

    A married woman committed suicide within three              E
years of her marriage by pouring kerosene on her person
and then putting herself on fire. Appellant No.1 is the
husband and appellant No.2 is the mother-in-law,
respectively, of the deceased. As per the prosecution, just
before her death, she gave a statement which was
                                                                F
recorded as Ex. P.9 in the presence of the Magistrate
(P.W.2) with certification from the Doctor (P.W.5) to the
effect that she was in a fit state of mind to give the
statement. This led to the prosecution of the two
appellants as well as father and sister of appellant No. 1
under Sections 304-8 and 498-A IPC.                             G

    The trial court convicted the two appellants as well
as sister of appellant no.1. The appellants were
sentenced to one year Rigorous imprisonment under
Section 498A IPC and 10 years rigorous imprisonment             H
    26.       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A   under Section 3048 IPC. In appeal, the High Court
    primarily relied upon the dying declaration (Exhibit P9).
    Insofar as charge under Section 498A is concerned, the
    High Court found that this was proved on the basis of Ex.
    PS, a letter written by the deceased stating she was being
B   treated with cruelty. The High Court also recorded that
    the dying declaration as well as allegations in letter (Ex.
    P.8) were duly supported by the testimony of the father
    (P.W.1), the brother (P.W.7) and the uncle (P.W.4) of the
    deceased. Consequentially, the High Court affirmed the
c   conviction and sentence of the appellants but acquitted
    the sister of appellant no.1. Hence the present appeals.

          Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

         HELD:1.1. The incident had occurred within a period
D   of 3 years from the date of marriage. Since it is within 7
    years of the marriage, presumption under Section 304 B
    of l.P.C. will stand attracted if the ingredients of the said
    Section are established. [Para 26] [43-C]

E      1.2. In the statement recorded by the Executive
  Magistrate (PW2), the deceased had given the description
  of the incident namely the manner in which she
  committed suicide. She has also given the reason for
  taking such a step and described the behaviour of her
F in laws towards her. There is a specific allegation that her
  mother-in-law (appellant No. 2) and sister-in-law use.d to
  tease her on the ground that her parents had not given
  gold. chain and they used to fight on account of dowry.
  This fact was known to her father. She had stated that
  she was putting an end to her life on account of
G continuous fight. She has also stated that her husband
  (appellant No. 1) has come under the influence of her
  mother-in-law because of which he would beat her up, but
  otherwise he was innocent.· [Para 27] [43-D-F]

H         1.3. Before the Executive Magistrate started
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                   27


  recording the statement of the deceased, the attending A
  doctor, PW5, certified that she was fully conscious and
  was in a position to give her statement. It is again testified
  by the doctor that while recording of her statement, she
  remained fully conscious. The Executive Magistrate took
  due precautions and even obtained the certificate about B
  the state of health of the deceased before recording her
  statement. He has entered the witness box as P.W.2 and
  deposed to this effect. There 'is nothing on record which
  would indicate that deceased may have been tutored by
  her Mausa. Nothing could be pointed out to show that c
  after reaching hospital, she had occasion to meet her
• Mausa and he got an opportunity to tutor her. It is also
 to be borne in mind that in some of her letters written to
  her relatives prior to the date of occurrence, she had
  categorically stated that she was not happy with her 0
  matrimonial life and may put end to same. The deceased
  was not happy with her matrimonial life and she had
  expressed so on earlier occasions as well. This fact has
  now surfaced in her statement. It is also pertinent to point
  out that she has primarily blamed her mother-in-law and E
  sister-in-law. There is no accusation against her husband
 to the effect that he was also demanding dowry. She is
;forthright in stating that whatever her husband did was.
  under tile influence of her mother-in-law, and he was
  even beating her occasionally. Otherwise, she has
  categorically stated that her husband is innocent. Had F
 there been any tutoring, it would not have come in such
  a form which appears to be more natural and voluntary.
  For all these reasons, it cannot be said that deceased
  was tutored before she made the statement. [Para 29] [43-
  G-H; 44-C-H]                                                   G

    1.4. Simply because the statement is not recorded in
the form of questions and answers, is no reason to
discard it once. It is otherwise found to be trustworthy
and can be treated as the dying declaration admissible          H
    28      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014) 6 S.C.R.


A   under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. No doubt, it is
    emphasised by this Court that recording of such a
    statement in the form of question and answer is more
    appropriate method which should generally be resorted
    to. However1. that would not mean that if such a statement
B   otherwise meets all the requirements of Section 32 and
    is found to be worthy of credence, it is to be rejected only
    on the ground that it was not recorded in the form of
    questions and answers. All the requisite precautions
    were taken before recording the statement by the
c   Executive Magistrate (P.W.2). It has come on record that
    the deceased remained conscious even after concluding
    her statement and during the period when her statement.
    was being recorded, Certificate to this effect was also
    obtained by P.W.2. [Para 30] [45-A-D]
D       1.5. From the tenor of the letters, there may be a
  possibility that deceased was not happy with her
  matrimonial life also because of the reason that her
  husband was not well off and settled in life. Possibility
  also cannot be ruled out that she was not happy with the
E small business of Namkeen which was being carried on
  by appellant No. 1 in a small shop and her aspiratipnsr
  were much higher. She made him wind up that busirress
  and both of them viz. the husband and the deceased had
  joined service as teac;hers in a private school. Later she
F even lost that job of hers. But this was not the reason for
  her to commit suicide having regard to her statement
  made in the dying declaration. She has very categorically
  stated that her mother-in-law used to fight with her
  regularly .on account of demand of gold chain which her
G parents could not fulfill. She had fight on that day also
  and being tired of such regular fights she poured
  kerosene oil on her and set herself on fire. It is thus, clear
  that in..hiediate cause of committing suicide was regular
  fights with mother-in-law on account of dowry demand.
H It, thus, stands established that there was contim1ous
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                  29


dowry demand by appellant No.2, mother-in-law of the A
deceased and appellant No. 2 was even treating her with
cruelty for not fulfilling this demand. [Para 31] [45-F-H; 46-
A-C]

     1.6. The ingredients of Section 498A IPC stand              8
satisfied qua appellant No.2 as deceased was subject to
cruelty on account of unlawful demand for property viz.
gold chain in the instant case and failure on her part to
meet that demand. So much so, it ultimately had driven
the deceased to commit suicide. [Para 32] [46-H; 47-A]
                                                                 c
     1.7. Insofar as appellant No.1 is concerned, it is
difficult to sustain his conviction under Section 498A. The
deceased in her statement has accused only her mother-
in-law and sister-in-law for this demand. She has not
blamed her husband at all. On the contrary, she has              D
categorically stated that her husband is innocent. May be
at times appellant No. 1 had beaten his wife on the saying
of her mother-in-law but the deceased had not connected
this with demand of dowry. Therefore, it is not
conclusively proved that there was any "cruelty" on his          E
part. Here, reading the statement of the deceased along
with various letters become.s somewhat important. Tenor
of those letters, in so far as they relate to appellant No. 1,
indicates that as far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, he
is not to be blamed. In fact, in order to please and satisfy     F
his wife, appellant No. 1 was making all efforts to become
something in life and was struggling for that. Benefit of
doubt is thus given to appellant No. 1 fo~ charge under
Section 498A. As a consequence while upholding the
conviction of appellant No.2 under Section 498A of IPC,          G
appellant No.1 is acquitted from this charge. [Para 33] [47-
B-E]

    1.8. The death was caused by burns and occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances. It happened
within 7 years of her marriage. Further, the trigger point H
    30       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A   for committing suicide was the quarrel between her and
    her mother-in-law on the fateful day. At the same time it
    is not a case where appellants have poured kerosene and
    put her on fire. That is the act of deceased herself and
    thus it is a case of suicide. On the reading the statemenl
B   in totality, it becomes clear that cause/ reason for regular
    fights was dowry. It is clearly found out from the
    statement of the deceased that on that fateful day also
    appellant No. 2 fought with her for that reason. Therefore,
    commission of offence under Section 3048 against
c   appellant No. 2 stands conclusively proved in view of iron
    clad dying declaration. Here again, it cannot be said that
    appellant no.1 had committed any act of "cruelty" soon
    before her death which forced the de'Ceased to take such
    a step. She has nowhere stated that on that date when
    her mother-in-law had quarreled with her, appellant No.
0
    1 was associated or even responsible for that. Appellant
    No.1 is thus acquitted of charge under Section 3048 IPC
    as well. [Para 35] [48-C-G]

        Satkar Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana (2004) 11
E   SCC 291 and Kishori Lal vs. State of MP. 2007 (10) SCC
    797: 2007 (7) SCR 1051-referred to.

       2. In regard to the sentence of appellant No. 2, one
  year rigorous imprisonment (R.1.) for offence under
F Section 498A IPC is maintained. However, insofar as
  Section 3048 of IPC is concerned, there are certain
  extenuating and mitigating circumstances. First of all,
  even when the immediate cause to commit suicide was
  the fight, at the same time deceased was not happy with
G her matrimonial life for other reasons as well. In fact, she
  was not happy with this marriage at all which she stated
  in some of the letters to her mausi or mausa. Ends of
  justice would be sub served by reducing the sentence
  from 10 years to 7 years Rigorous Imprisonment. [Para
H 36] (48-H; 49-A-C]
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                      31


                      Case Law Reference :                          A
     c200_4) 11 sec 291         referred to            Para 19
     2007 (7) SCR 1051          referred to            Para 23

    CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal              B
No. 211 of 2010.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.2008 of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Criminal
Appeal No. 288 of 1995.
                                                                    c
     Sushil Kumar Jain, Puneet Jain, Chhaya Kirti (for Pratibha
Jain) for the appellant.

    Aishwarya Bhati, Sanjoli Mittal (for C.D. Singh) for the
respondent.
                                                                    D
    The Judgment of the court was delivered by

     A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. The two appellants before us are the son
and the mother. Appellant No. 1 was the husband and Appellant
No. 2 was the mother-in-law, respectively, of the deceased Smt.     E
Sunita. Marriage between Appellant No. 1 and Smt. Sunita was
solemnised in April, 1988. Smt. Sunita committed suicide on
14.1.1991 i.e. within three years of the marriage. This led to
As per them they were falsely implicated in the matter. The trial
proceeded. Various prosecution witnesses were examined. On          F
the basis of the oral and documentary evidence brought on
record, the Sessions Court returned the verdict of guilty qua the
appellants herein, as well as sister of Appellant no.1.

     3. The Trial Court sentenced both the appellants as well
as Sunita, sister of Appellant no.1 to undergo one year rigorous G
imprisonment (R.I.) for offence under Section 498 A of IPC. A
fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each of the appellants was also imposed
and in default the appellants were to undergo an additional R. I. '.··   ,/
for six months. For offence under Section 304-B, both the ?.
    32       SUPREME COURT REl>ORTS                  [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A   appellants were sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment
    with Rs. 1,000/- as fine with similar default clause.

          4. The appellants filed the appeal before the High Court
    against the said conviction and sentence. By the impugned
8   judgment dated 21.10.2008 the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
    has affirmed the conviction and sentence, thereby dismissing
    the appeal qua these two Appellants. However, Sunita has
    been acquitted. Special Leave Petition was filed questioning
    the validity of the said verdict of the High Court in which leave
C   was granted. This is how the present appeal has been heard
    finally by this Court.

         5. A perusal of the judgment ·of the High Court would
    demonstrate that the High Court has primarily relied upon the
    dying declaration (Exhibit P9) which according to the High Court
D   is a strong iron clad testimony from the clutches of which the
    appellants cannot escape. It has found that the said dying
    declaration is worthy of credence which was recorded in the
    presence of the Magistrate (P.W.2) that too with certification
    from the Qoctor (P.W.5) to the effect that Sunita was in a fit state
E   of mind to give the statement, notwithstanding the fact that she
    has suffered 92 percent burns. In so far as charge under Section
    498A is concerned, the High Court has found that this was
    proved on the basis of Ex. PB, which was a letter written by the
    deceased stating she was being treated with cruelty. The High
F   Court also recorded that the dying declaration as well as
    allegations tn letter (Ex. P .8) were duly supported by the
    testimony of the father (P.W.1), the brother (P.W.7) and the
    uncle (P.W.4) of the deceased. It is·observed that even when
    they are interested witnesses being close relation of the
G   deceased, there was no reason to discard their testimony.
    More so, when their testimony was supported by written
    documents namely letters written by the deceased which were
    Exhibit P1, P3, P4 and P5.

        6. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Senior Counsel
H   appearing for the appellants endeavoured to find loopholes in
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                       33
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
the depositions of various witnesses. Thrust of his argument         A
was that their testimonies could not have been relied upon to
record the guilt of the appellants for both the charges i.e. under
Section 498A as well as 3048 of 1.P.C. In this attempt, he
referred to various portions of the testimonies of these
witnesses with the purpose to show that there was an                 B
acceptance on their part that no dowry was taken at the time
of Marriage; there was no demand of dowry even thereafter
and the deceased was not treated with cruelty at all. His further
endeavour was to show that the deceased had committed
suicide because of her own reasons and frustrations which            c
could not be attributed to the appellants and for which
appellants could not be held responsible in any manner in as
much as she was not happy with her marriage with Appellant
No. 1. which was her creation with no blemish on the part of
the appellants. Before we take note of these arguments in detail     D
and deal with them, it would be apposite to take note of the
testimonies of material witnesses as well as documentary
evidence produced. It is only thereafter the arguments of Mr.
Jain would be better discernible and appreciated for our
analysis/ discussion.
                                                                     E
     7. As per Rameshwar Dayal (P.W.1), whenever his
daughter Sunita used to come to Guna she would say that her
parents in law had persistent demand for gold chain. In the
month of Shravan in the year 1989, they had come to Jaora to
take the daughter then her mother.in-law had beaten her in his       F
presence. Rameshwar Dayal has also said that it was guessed
from the letters of the girl that her husband and parents in law
were harassing her.

     8. Ashok Sharma (PW. 7) stated that he was sent a letter        G
Ex. P.5 by his sister to him. Rameshwar Dayal has also stated
letters Ex. P.3 and P4 to have been written by Sunita. It is
revealed from the statement of Ashok Sharma that Sunita had
told him in Guna and Sagar that in laws had demanded gold
                   .
chain and money. Also, she was troubled in her in-laws house.
                                                                     H
    34       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A Ashok Sharma had met Sunita about one and half months
  before death when she had gone to Sagar.

       9. Ram Behari Lal Sharma (P.W.4) is the mousa of
  deceased Sunita. The police had prepared the map of the place
8 of occurrence in his presence. The police had seized letters Ex.
  P3, P4 and PS from Ram Behali Lal Sharma. Ram Behari Lal
  Sharma had got the information of burning of Sunita when he
  was in school. Thereupon, he reached the spot and later on he
  had gone to Sunita in the Hospital.

C      10. Naib Tehsildar SPS Chauhan (P.W.2) had recorded
  the statement (Ex. P.9) of Sunita, before her death. This witness
  has proved the statement from B to B in Ex. P.9 by Sunita.
  Before taking statement, the certificate of the doctor was taken.
  Dr. S.K. Jain (PW. 5) had examined Sunita and had advised
D to take her statement. Report relating to it is Ex. P.15. After
  death Dr. Chandelkar (P.W.6) had performed postmortem of .
  Sunita. Dr. Jain has mentioned about the smell of kerosene
  from Sunita's body and that she had suffered 92% burns. As
  per him, the cause of death is the burning, flowing of water from
E the body and the state of shock arising from loss of chemicals.
  Dr. Chandelkar has also mentioned about kerosene smell from
  the body. The postmortem report given by him is Ex. P.16.

        11. The defence side produced one witness viz. Pravin
F Dixit, brother-in-law of Appellant No. 1 who is the husband of
  his sister Sunita.

       12. Perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that
  detailed submissions were made by the defence questioning
  the trustworthiness of the prosecution case. It was argued that
G deceased was not treated with cruelty, much less on the ground
  of dowry. The defence also attacked the dying declaration of
  the deceased - Sunita, on the plea that it was unreliable
  because of many loopholes therein. The Trial Court stated that
  there were two decisive questions which were to be determined
H and they were:
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                         35
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
   . "(i) Whether the accused used to behave with cruelty with         A
     Sunita wife of Satish Chandra Trivedi for illegal object of
   . getting more dowry.

     (ii) Whether the accused tortured Sunita on the night of
     14.1.1991 in fulfilment of the illegal object of getting more
                                                                       B
     dowry and Sunita died in the manner different from natural
     death?"

      13. While answering the aforesaid questions, apart from
relying on oral testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court
referred to Ex. P-3, which is a letter written by Sunita to her aunt   C
(Mausi) stating that she would do nothing except but to give up
her life. Mention was also made to Ex. P-8 which Satish had
written to his father-in-law as well as Ex. P-1 which was a letter
written by deceased Sunita to her parents 15 days before her
death, mentioning that there was no change in the atmosphere           D
and she was not happy in her matrimonial house. From these
letters coupled with oral testimonies, the Trial Court concluded
that there was a demand of dowry because of which the
deceased was harassed.
                                                                       E
     14. The Trial Court also discussed Ex. P-9, namely, the
dying statement and returned the finding that since the
statement was taken only after certifying the state of health of
Sunita by the doctor that she was in a proper state of mind to
make such a statement. The Trial Court also discarded the
theory of the defence that Sunita was tutored by her Mausa in          F
giving the statement. From the reading of this dying statement.
the trial court came to the conclusion that there was in fact a
quarrel which took place on the date of occurrence immediately
before she put herself on fire. On the basis of such discussion,
the Trial Court returned the verdict of the guilty against the         G
appellants and sister of Appellant no.1 in the manner mentioned
in the beginning of this judgment.

     15. The High Court went through the gamut of all the issues
                                                                       I-'
    36        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A   and upheld the judgment qua these two appellants recording
    the following reasons:                        ·

         "(i) On considering the above submissions, I find that there
         is no merit in the appeal, primarily, on the ground that
         because evidence of the prosecution is supported and
B
         corroborated by the documentary evidence available on
         record, the dying declaration Ex. - P/9 is a strong iron clad
         testimony from the clutches of which the accused cannot
         escape. Ex. P/9 is recorded and proved in accordance
         with law. Dr. S.K. Jain PW-5 has certified that although
c        deceased Sunita had recorded 92% burn, she was in a
         fit state of mind. The dying declaration of the deceased
         has been recorded in presence of the Magistrate Shri
         S.P.S. Chauhan PW-2 and no fault can be found in the
         same. The letter Ex. P/8 available on record also amply
D        proved that the deceased was being treated with cruelty.

         (ii) It would be profitable to rely on the decision of the
         Supreme Court in the matter of Muthu Kutty and another
         v. State of T.N. (2005) 9 SCC 113 whereby the Apex Court
E        has held that conviction can be accorded solely on the
         basis of dying declaration, if it is worthy and reliable and
         there is no infirmity in it reinforcing ·the maxim 'Nemo
         Moriturus praesumitur', which means that a person will not
         meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.
F        (iii) Then, in this light it is important to consider the fact that
         the dying declaration is duly supported by the testimony
         of Rameshwar Dayal PW-1; Ashok Sh~rma PW-7 and
         Rambiharilal Sharma P4-4 the father, the brother and uncle
         of the deceased and although they are interested
G        witnesses being related to the deceased. It is only natural
         in the circumstances since the offence under Section 498-
         A pertains to cruelty being meted out to the deceased soon
         before her death and she was bound to report the same
         to these persons only. Besides their testimony is duly
H        supported by written documents, letters Ex. P1, P3, P4 and
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                    37
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
     P5 by the deceased Sunita. The fact that Rameshwar A
     Dayal PW-1 has stated in his deposition that accused
     Sohanbai had slapped .his d~ughter in his presence is
     corroborated by letter Ex .. P5 to the brother that she
     (deceased Sunita) was aboused in front of her father who
     had watched helplessly and the situation could never be s
     rectified."

     16. However, in so far as sister of Appellant No. 1 is
 concerned, benefit of doubt was given as after the marriage
 she had been living separately at Indore.
                                                                 c
       17. We now proceed to take note of the detailed
  submissions of Mr. Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the
  appellants. He began his submission by arguing that at the time
  of marriage the father of the deceased did not consider the fact
  that Appellant No. 1 was not in service. He was under the wrong D
  impression that boy's father was a wealthy person and his
  daughter would be happy in the matrimonial house even if
  Appellant No. 1 was earning his livelihood only by running a
. small shop i.e. namkeen selling business. He further submitted
  that there was no question of demanding any dowry as E
  marriage between the parties was a part of group marriage
  solemnised on that day.

      18. According to him, reading of the letters as well as
 testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would bring out that F
.the real problem was ·the unemployment of Appellant No. 1
 which l;>ecame the villain of the peace. Thus, he tried to weave
 the story in his own way, presenting the events in the following
 manner:-

     Appellant No.1 was continuing his studies (he was doing G
     LLB) which is clear from the letter dated 29.1.1998 written
     by the brother of the deceased. In this letter Shri Ashok,
     brother of the deceased also wrote that deceased was
     kept with affection. The deceased Sunita was a graduate.
     She did not like the business of Namkeen being run by H
    38       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A        Appellant No. 1 in a small shop. She forced Appellant No.
         1 to close the said business. The fact that the said
         business was closed at the instance of the deceased and/
         or her brother is clear from the letter dated 29.1.1989
         written by Ashok Kumar Sharma, the brother of the
B        deceased to Appellant No. 1's family, wherein he wrote:-

         "Ch. Satish ji how your business is going on. You had told
         to close the shop. How it is going on? LLB result would
         have not been out yet."

C        In another letter dated 22.9.1989 the deceased brother
         Ashok Kumar Sharma had written to the deceased -

         "How the shop is functioning. The shop must have been
         closed."
D        After closing of the shop, Appellant No. 1 and the
    deceased, who was a graduate, took job as teachers in private
    school as is evident from the statement of Rameshwar Dayal
    Sharma P.W.1, the father of the deceased, himself. Further at
    the instance of the deceased, Appellant No. 1 started living
E   separately from his parents. This was done at the advice of the
    deceased brother Ashok Kumar Sharma, who has admitted this
    in his statement.

          The deceased lost her job. This is evident from Ex. D-6
F   wherein P.W. 7 Ashok Kumar Sharma, brother of deceased
    had asked Sunita to prepare a certificate of domicile of any
    district of Madhya Pradesh and send the same to him. Mr. Jain
    argued that this letter also shows that deceased's brother was
    also trying to find a job for the deceased. On account of losing
G   the job by the deceased, Appellant No. 1 and the deceased
    trapped in a financial crisis. With the meager income as
    primary school teacher in private school, it was difficult for
    Appellant No. 1 to carry on the family. On account of financial
    crisis Appellant No. 1 again came back to his parents, as is '
    evident from the testimony of P.W.1 Rameshwar Dayal
H
        SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                      39
                 [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
Sharma, father of the deceased. He thus, argued that it is this    A
financial crisis which led the deceased go into depression.
Otherwise, various letters written by the relatives show their
cordial relations.

     19. Coming specifically to charge under Section 498A of
                                                                   8
l.P.C. namely that of harassment, Mr. Jain submitted that even
P.W.1 in his cross-examination had stated:

    "11. Ex. P-8 letter was written by my son-in-law Satish
    Chandra before the death of my daughter. It is correct that
    my daughter Sunita did not make any complaint to me with       C
    regard to the behaviour of her husband i.e. accused Satish
    or any other complainant whatsoever."

    P.W.7 Ashok Kumar Sharma, brother of the deceased
    Sunita also admitted:                                          D
    "6 ........ My sister never told or complained me about her
    husband i.e, accused Satish Chandra that he ever tortured
    her or ever demanded dowry or torment her. She has
    certainly said that her husband does not say anything when
    her mother-in-law does such things."                           E

    ·Mr. Jain submitted that in view of the aforesaid statements
of none else than the father and brother of the deceased, the
conviction of Appellant No. 1 under Section 498A and thereby
under Section 304-B 1.P.C. is ex-facie untenable.                  F
     For this he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court
in the case of Satkar Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana
reported in (2004) 11 sec 291 wherein it is, inter alia, held:-

    "23. It is based on these erroneous inference drawn on         G
    unproved facts and placing reliance on statements of
    interested witnesses whose evidence has not stood the
    test of cross-examination, the trial court came to a wrong
    conclusion as to the guilt of the accused persons. It is to
    be noted that 3 letters, Exts. P-28, DA and DB which           H
    40       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 6 S.C.R.

A        though not very proximate in time clearly show that there
         was no demand as has been alleged by the prosecution
         by the accused and the contents of the said letter clearly
         show that the allegation made after the death of Devinder
         Kaur of dowry demand or harassment leading to cruelty
8        is unsubstantiated. For all these reasons we are of the
         opinion that the trial Court committee serious error in
         coming to the conclusion that the prosecution had
         established its case against the appellants."

C      20. It was argued by Mr. Jain that the learned Trial Court
  has not found Appellant No. 1 ever made any demand of dowry.
  The High Court has further acquitted Sunita (sister) and,
  therefore, so far as Appellant No. 1 (husband) is concerned,
  neither there is any evidence nor any finding by the learned trial
  court or the High Court that he ever demanded dowry. In the
D absence of any evidence with regard to dowry, the conviction
  of Appellant No. 1 (husband) under Section 304 (8) IPC is ex-
  facie untenable in as much as Section 304 (8) IPC envisages
  "that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
  harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for,
E or in connection with, any demand for dowry."

       21. Questioning the veracity of the dying declaration, Mr.
  Jain argued that it was tutored one in as much as the same
  was recorded in the presence of fam'ily members of the
F deceased and when Appellant No. 2 was sitting outside. More
  over, in this very statement the deceased had stated about
  Appellant No. 1 that "11e is innocent". He also argued that this
  dying cfeclaration was not recorded in er proper manner namely
  in the form of questions and answers.
G      22. Mr. Jain concluded his submission by arguing that the
  afor-esaid facts amply prove that this is not a case of demand
  of dowry but is a case where on account of family
  circumstances the deceased did not adjust herself and placed
  herself in a situation where first she forced her husband to close
H his business of Namkeen, forced her husband to separate from
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                         41
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
his parents and to take up· a job in a private school and she           A
also joined service in a private school. On account of the fact
that when the deceased became unemployed and it was
difficult for the couple to bear the expenses, this resulted in
financial problem and forced the Appellant No. 1 to go back to
the house of parents, which he left before marriage of his sister.      B
In the present matter it is also borne out from the record that
the deceased tried to take. away all the ornaments of the family
resulting in some altercation between Appellant No. 2 and the
deceased which was the solitary incident where allegation of
physical assault was made. He submitted that under the                  c
circumstances no case under Section 498A or 304-8 was
made out. He referred to the decision in the case of Mahendra
Singh reported in 1005 Supp. (3) SCC 371 wherein the Court
has observed as under:-

    "Abetment has been defined in Section 107 IPC to mean               D
    that a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly
    instigates any person to do a thing, or secondly, engages
    with one or more persons in any conspiracy for the doing
    of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
    pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of          E
    that thing, or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
    omission, the doing of that thing. Neither of the ingredients
    of abetment are under Section 306 IPC merely on the
    allegation of harassment to the deceased is not
    sµstainable. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the          F
    charge."                                                      ·

     23. He also drew sustenance from another judgment of the
 case of Kishori Lal vs. State of MP. reported in 2007 (10)
'sec 797 observing as under:                                            G
     "7. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be
     proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the
     commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband
     treated the deceased wife with cruelty is not enough.
     Merely on the allegation of harassment conviction in terms         H
    42       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A        of Section 306 IPC is nqt sustainable. There is ample
         evidence on record that the deceased was disturbed
         because she had not given birth to any child. Pws 8, 10
         and 11 have categorically stated that the deceased was
         disappointed due to the said fact that her failure to beget
B        a child and she was upset due to this."

         If the background facts analysed it is crystal clear that the
         prosecution has failed to establish its case. That being so,
         the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct."

c         24. The learned Counsel for the State, countered the
    aforesaid submissions by arguing that there was clinching
    evidence against both the appellants, thereby proving the
    charges of commission of offences under Sections 304 B and
    498 A of 1.P.C., beyond any reasonable doubt. He referred to
D   the testimony of P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.7 in support of the
    charges of demand of dowry and harassment on that account.·
    He also read out from the letters Exhibits P1, P3, P4 and P5
    of the deceased and her relatives, which according to him,
    proved that the deceased was living in a miserable condition
E   because of the harassment meted out at her at the hands of
    the appellants. He further submitted that there was no reason
    to disbelieve the dying declaration of the deceased which was
    rightly acted upon by the Courts below. He also referred to the
    reasons advanced by the Trial Court as well as High Court in
F   holding the appellants guilty of the aforesaid offences. He
    further submitted that the truthfulness of the aforesaid
    prosecution witnesses namely P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.7 could
    be gauged from the fact that they never indulged in over stating
    the events and fairly accepted some of the suggestions put forth
    in cross-examination to them truthfully. His submission was that
G
    the entire statement of these witnesses was to be read to arrive
    at correct conclusion which was done by the Courts below.

        25. We have given our due consideration to the aforesaid
    submissions of the Counsel for the parties with reference to the
H   record. It is now time to have analytical critique of these
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                    43
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
submissions to find out as to whether the conviction and A
sentence as recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court for these appellants is sustainable or not.

      26. There is no dispute about the fact that Smt. Sunita
committed suicide on 14.1.1991 by pouring kerosene on her
                                                                  8
person and then putting herself on fire. Marriage between her
and Appellant No. 1 was solemnised sometime in April 1988.
Thus, this incident had occurred within a period of 3 years from
the date of marriage. Since it is within 7 years of the marriage,
presumption under Section 304 B of l.P.C. will stand attracted
if the ingredients of the said Section are established.           C

      27. In the statement, the deceased had given the
description of the incident namely the manner in which she
committed suicide. She has also given the reason for taking
such a step and described the behaviour of her in laws towards D
her. There is a specific allegation that her mother-in-law
(Appellant No. 2) and Sister-in-law used to tease her on the
ground that her parents had not given gold chain and they used
to fight on account of dowry. This fact was known to her father.
She had stated that she was putting an end to her life on E
account of continuous fight. She has also stated that her
husband (Appellant No. 1) has come under the influence of her
mother-in-law because of. which he would beat her up, but
otherwise he was innocent.

     28. In view of the above disclosure in the said dying        F
declaration, according to us starting point should be to decide
as to whether deceased had made such a statement and it is
believable or not.

     29. The said statement is recorded by the Executive G
Magistrate, Jawra. As per this document at the time when the
statement was recorded, no police officer was present. Before
the Executive Magistrate started recording the statement of
Sunita, Dr. S.K. Jain certified that she was fully conscious and
                                                                  H
    44        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] .6 S.C.R.


A   was in a po"sition to give her statement. It is again testified by
    the doctor that while recording of her statement, she remained
    fully conscious. Primarily, two objections are raised questioning
    the veracity of this dying declaration. It is stated that Sunita was
    tutored before she made the statement as it was made in the
B pfeseflce of the family members of the 'deceased and Appellant
    No. 2 was made to sit outside when the statement was being
    recorded. Secondly, it is not recorded in the form of questions
    and answers. On the facts of this case both these contentions
    are to be rejected. It is clear that the Executive Magistrate took
c   due precautions and even obtained the certificate about the
  . state of health of Sunita before recording her statement. He has
    enteredJbe witness box as P.W.2 and deposed to this effect.
    There is nothing on record which would indicate that Sunita may
    have been tutored by her Mausa. Nothing could be pointed out
    to show that after reaching hospital, she had occasion to rneet
0
    he[JYlausa and he got.an opportunity to tutor heL It is also to
    be borne in mind that in some of her letters writte(l to her
    relafr°'es prior to the date of occurrence, she had categorically
    stated that she was not happy with her matrimonial life and may
    put end to same. There is a different slant which is sought to
E be given by the defence, to these letters. We will revert to that
    aspect at the appropriate stage. At this juncture we are only
    highlighting that Sunita was not happy with her matrimonial life
    and she had expressed so on earlier occasions as well. This
    fact has•now surfaced in her statement. It is also pertinent to
F point out that she has primarily blamed her mother"in-law and
    sister-in-law. There is no accusation against her husband to the
    effect that he was also demanding dowry. She is forthright in
    stating that whatever her husband did was under the influence
    of her mother-in-law, and he was even beating her occasionally.
G Otherwise, she has categorically stated that her husband is
    innocent. Had there been any tutoring, it would not have come
    in such a form which appears to be more natural and voluntary.
     For all these reasons we do not agree with the contention of
     Mr. Jain that Sunita was tutored before she made the statement.
H
          SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                      45
                   [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

       30. Simply because the statement is not recorded in the A
 form of questions and answers, is no reason to discard it once.
 It is otherwise found to be trustworthy and can be treated as·
 the dying declaration admissible under Section 32 of the
 Evidence Act. No doubt, it is emphasised by this Court that
 recording of such a statement in the form of question and B
 answer is more appropriate method which should g~nerally be
 resorted to. However, that would not mean that if such a
 statement otherwise meets all the requirements of Section 32
 and is found to be worthy of credence, it is to be rejected only
 on the ground that it was not recorded in the form of questions     c
 and answers. As pointed out above, all the requisite
 precautions were taken before recording the statement by the
 Executive Magistrate (P.W.2). It has come on record that Sunita
 remained conscious even after concluding her statement and
 during the period when her statement was being recorded, 0
                                                             1
 C.ertificate to this effect was also obtained by P.W.2.

       31. Having held that tl'le aforesaid statement of the
  deceased was rightly accepted as admissible under Section
  32 of the Evidence Act treating the same as the dying
  declaration, we proceed further to find out as to whether          E
  conviction of the appellants under Section 498A and 3048 of
  IPC is rightly recorded by the Courts below. From the tenor of
  the letters, reference to which have been made above, there
  may be a possibility that deceased was not happy with her
  matrimonial life also because of the reason that her husband       F
  was not well off and settled in life. Possibility also cannot be
  ruled out that she was not happy with the small business of
  Namkeen which was being carried on by Appellant No. 1 in a
. small shop and her aspirations were much higher. She made
  him wind up that business and both of them viz. the husband        G
  and the deceased had started joined service as teachers in a
  private school. Later she even lost that job of hers. But the
  question is as to whether this was the reason for her to commit
  suicide? This question has to be answered in the negative
  having regard to her statement made in the dying declaration.      H
    46        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A   She has very categorically stated that her mother-in-law used
    to fight with her regularly on account of demand of gold chain
    which her parents could not fulfill. She had fight on that day also
    and being tired of such regular fights she poured kerosene oil
    on her and set herself on fire. It is thus, clear that immediate
B   cause of committing suicide was regular fights with mother-in-
    law on account of dowry demand. It, thus, stands established
    that there was continuous dowry demand by Appellant No. 2,
    mother-in-law of the deceased and Appellant No. 2 was even
    treating her with cruelty for not fulfilling this demand.
c        32. Section 498A IPC reads as under:-

         "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
         subjecting her to cruelty. -

D        Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband
         of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
         punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
         to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

         Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section, 'cruelty'
E        means -

         (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
         to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
         injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
F        physical) of the woman; or

         (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
         with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
         meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
         security or is on account of failure by her or any person
G
         related to her to meet demand."

         We find that ingredients of the aforesaid Section stand
    satisfied qua Appellant No. 2 as deceased was subject to
    cruelty on account of unlawful demand for property viz. gold
H
          SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                        47
                   [A.K. SIKRI, J]
 chain in the instant case and failure on her part to meet that A
 demand. So much so, it ultimately had driven Sunita to commit
 suicide.

        33. In so far as Appellant No. 1 is concerned it is difficult
  to sustain his conviction under Section 498A. The deceased
                                                                        8
  in her statement has accused only her mother-in-law and sister-
  in-law for this demand. She has not blamed her husband at all.
  On the contrary, she has categorically stated that her husband
  is innocent. May be at times Appellant No. 1 had beaten h:s
  wife on the saying of her mother-in-law but the deceased had
  not connected this with demand of dowry. Therefore, it is not         C
  conclusively proved that there was any "cruelty" on his part .
. Here, reading the statement of the deceased along with various
  letters becomes somewhat important. Tenor of those letters, in
  so far as they relate to Appellant No. 1, indicates that as far as
  Appellant No. 1 is concerned, he is not to be blamed. In fact,        D
  in order to please and satisfy his wife, Appellant No. 1 was
  making all efforts to become something in life and was
  struggling for that. We thus, are persuaded to give benefit of
  doubt to Appellant No. 1 for change under Section 498A. As a
  consequence while upholding the conviction of Appellant No.           E
  2 under Section 498A of IPC, we acquit Appellant No. 1 from
  this charge.

      34. With this, we come to the question of conviction under
!'Section 3048 of IPC. It is couched in the following language:- F

      "304B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman
      is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
      than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
      marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
      was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or G
      any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
      demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry
      death' and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
      have caused her death.
                                                                  H
    48       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 6 S.C.R.


A        Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, 'dowry' "
         shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
         Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)

         (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
         imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
8
         years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.

          35. Undoubtedly, death of Sunita is caused by burns and
    has occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. It has
    happened within 7 years of her marriage. Further, the trigger
C   point"for committing suicide was the quarrel between her and
    her mother-in-law on the fateful day. At the same time it is also
    to be borne in mind that it is not a case where appellants have
    poured kerosene and put her on fire. That is the act of
    deceased herself and thus it is a case of suicide. The question
D   is whether the quarrel between the deceased and her mother-
    in-law can be treated as satisfying the condition that "soon
    before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment
    for, or in connection with, in demand for dowry". On the reading
    the statement in totality, it becomes clear that cause/ reason
E   for regular fights was dowry. One can clearly find out from the
    statement that on that day also Appellant No. 2 fought with her
    for that reason. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
    commission of offence under Section 3048 against Appellant
    No. 2 stands conclusively proved in view of iron clad dying
F   declaration. Here again, for the reason stated by us while
    discussing the accusation against Appellant No. 1 under
    Section 498A of IPC, it cannot be said that he had committed
    any act of "cruelty" soon before her death which forced the
    deceased to take such a step. She has nowhere stated .that
G   on that date when her mother-in-law had quarreled with ·her,
    Appellant No. 1 was associated or even responsible for that.
    We thus acquit Appellant No. 1 of charge under Section 3048
    as well.

         36. Coming to the sentence of Appellant No. 2 in respect
H   of the aforesaid offences, we maintain the sentence of one year
         SATISH CHANDRA v. STATE OF M.P.                         49
•.                [AK. SIKRI, J.]
rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for offence under Section 498A            A
of IPC. However, in so far as Section 3048 of IPC is
concerned we are of the opinion that there are certain
extenuating and mitigating circumstances which persuade us
to reduce the sentence of 10 years R.I. as awarded to Appellant
No. 2. First of all, even when the immediate cause to commit           B
suicide was the fight, at the same time it has to be kept in mind
that deceased was not happy with her matrimonial life for other
reasons as well. In fact, she was not happy with this marriage
at all which she stated in some of the letters to her mausi or
mausa. We are of the view that ends of justice would be sub            c
served by reducing the sentence from 10 years to 7 years
Rigorous Imprisonment. The appeals are partly allowed in the
aforesaid terms. The Appellant no.2 shall be taken into custody
to serve remaining sentence.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                         Appeals partly allowed.   D