Supreme Court of India
SATHEEDEVIversusPRASANNA AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 299
- Decided
- 7 May 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- G S SINGHVI
Holding
Under Section 40 of the Kerala Court‑Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, court fee is to be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed (i.e., the amount specified in the document), not on its market value.
Summary
Satheedevi owned a 9.98‑acre rubber plantation and had executed a power of attorney in favour of her daughter, who later sold the land to her husband by a registered sale deed. Satheedevi filed a suit for cancellation of that sale deed, stating the property value as Rs 7 lakhs and paying court fees accordingly. The trial court and the Kerala High Court directed her to pay court fees on the market value of the land, interpreting Section 40 of the Kerala Court‑Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 to require market‑value assessment. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, the special valuation rule in Section 40, and the phrase “value of the property for which the document was executed”. It held that Section 40 contains a special rule that mandates court fees be computed on the value specified in the document being cancelled, not on its market value, and set aside the lower courts' orders.
Issues considered
- Whether court fee under Section 40 of the Kerala Court‑Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 must be calculated on the value of the property as stated in the document being cancelled or on its market value.
- Whether Section 40 creates a special rule that overrides the general market‑value provisions of Section 7 of the same Act.
- How to interpret the expression “value of the property for which the document was executed” in Section 40(1).
- Whether precedents from other states interpreting similar provisions are applicable to the Kerala statute.
Legislation cited
- Court Fees Act, 1870s. 7(v)
- Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959s. 40, s. 7
Subjects
court feesvaluationSection 40Kerala Court‑Fees and Suits Valuation Actcancellation of sale deedstatutory interpretationmarket value
Judgment
[2010] 6 S.C.R. 657
SATHEEDEVI A
v.
PRASANNA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 4347 of 2010)
MAY 7, 2010
8
[G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
Kera/a Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 - s.40
- Interpretation of - Suits for cancellation of sale deed -
Computation of Court fees - Held: When there is a special C
rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of court
fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference
to any other method - Deeming clause in substantive part of
s.40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a
document which creates any right, title or interest in D
immovable property, the court fees is required to be
computed on the value of the property for which the document
was executed, and not on its market value - Since s.40
contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose
of court fee, there is no reason why the expression 'value of E
the property' used in s.40(1) should be substituted with the
expression 'market value of the property'.
Words and Phrases - Expression "value of the property"
- Meaning of- In the context to s.40 of the Kera/a Court-Fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1959. F
Interpretation of statutes - Two well recognised rules of
interpretation - Held: First and primary rule of construction is
that intention of the legislature must be found in the words
used by the legislature itself - The other important rule of G
interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe
the legislation because it has no power to do so.
The appellant owned 9.98 acres of rubber plantation.
She executed power of attorney in favour of her daughter
657 H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R
A (respondent no.1) in respect of the said property. After
sometime, respondent no.1 transferred the property to
her husband (respondent no.2) by a registered sale deed.
The appellant filed suit for cancellation of the sale
deed by respondent no.1 in favour of respondent no.2.
B In the plaint, the value of the property was shown as Rs.7
lakhs and accordingly, the court fees was paid. However,
the trial Court directed the appellant to pay court fee on
the market value of the plaint property.
The High Court upheld the trial court order holding
C that in terms of s.40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits
Valuation Act, 1959, the appellant was required to pay
court fees on market value of the property and not on the
value specified in the sale deed.
o Before this Court, the appellant contended that the
interpretation placed by the Courts below on s.40 of the
Act was ex facie erroneous and liable to be set aside
because that section does not provide for payment of
court fee on the market value of the property. The
E appellant contended that in terms of s.40(1 ), court fees
is required to be paid on the value of the property for
which the document was executed and the appellant had
correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the
property specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs.
F Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. There are two well recognised rules of
interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the legislature must
be found in the words used by the legislature itsolf. If the
G words used are capable of one construction, only then
it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such
hypothetical construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in
H the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 659
in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when A
such words are capable of two constructions that the
question of giving effect to the policy or object of.the Act
can legitimately arise. The other important rule of
interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or
reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. B
The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words
which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or an
omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the
defect or supply the omission. [Para 10] [674-H; 675-A-
D] C
Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1958 SCR 360;
Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC
323 and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation
(1966) 3 SCR 366, relied on.
2.1. Section 7 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits · D
Valuation Act, 1959 lays down different modes for
determination of the market value of the property for the
purpose of payment of court fee. Sub-section (1) of
Section 7 begins with the expression "Save as otherwise
provided" and lays down that where the fee payable E
under the Act depends on the market value of any
property, such value shall be determined as on the date
of presentation of the plaint. From the plain language of
Section 7(1), it is evident that it merely specifies the
methodology for determination of the market value of the F
property where the court fee payable under some other
provisions of the Act depends on the market value of the
property which is subject matter of the suit. Sections 25,
27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 deal with different kinds of
suit i.e., suits for declaration, suits for injunction, suits for G
possession under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, suits for
possession not otherwise provided f9r, partition suits,
suits for joint possession, suits under the Survey and
Boundaries Act and interpleader suits. These sections
provide for payment of court fee computed on the market H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A value of the property. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 lays
down that the market value of the agricultural land in suits
falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1),
37(3), 38, 45 and 48 shall be deemed to be ten times the
annual gross profits of such land where it is capable of
B yielding annual profits minus the assessment, if any, made
by the Government. In terms of sub-section (3), the
market value of a building in cases where its rental value
has been entered in the registers of any local authority,
shall be ten times such rental value and in other cases,
c the actual market value of the building as on the date of
the plaint. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) lays down that
market value of any property other than agricultural land
and building shall be the value it will fetch on the date of
institution of the suit. Sub-section (4) lays down that
0 where subject matter of the suit is only a restricted or
fractional interest in a property, the market value of the
property shall be deemed tp be the value of the restricted
or fractional interest. [Para 11] (675-E-H; 676-A-D] '~
2.2. Section 40 deals with suits for cancellation of
E decrees etc. which are not covered by other sections. It
this section is interpreted in the light of the expression
'save as otherwise provided' used in Section 7(1 ), it
becomes clear that the rule enshrined therein is a clear
departure from the one contained in Section 7 read with
F Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 which provide
for payment of court fee on the market value of the
property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special
rule. Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation
of a decree for money or other property having a money
G value, or other document which purports or operates to
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in
present or in future, any right, title or interest in money,
movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed
on the value of the subject matter of the suit and further
lays down that such value shall be deemed to be if the
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 661
whole decree or other document sought to be cancelled, A
the amount or value of the property for which the decree
was passed or other document was executed. If a part of
the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled,
such part of the amount or value of the property
constitute the basis for fixation of court fee. Sub-section B
(2) lays down that if the decree or other document is such
that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief
claimed relates only to a particular item of the property
belonging to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's share in such
property, fee shall be computed on the value of such c
property, or share or on the amount of the decree,
whichever is less. The deeming clause contained in the
substantive part of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a
suit filed for cancellation of a document which creates
any right, title or interest in immovable property, the court
0
fees is required to be computed on the value of the
property for which the document was executed. To put it
differently, the value of the property for whic.h the
document was executed and not its market value is
relevant for the purpose of court fee. If the expression
'value of the subject matter of the suit' was not followed E
by the deeming clause, it could possibly be argued that
the word 'value' means the market value, but by
employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made
it clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the
amount of court fee shall be computed on the value of F
the property for which the document was executed and
not the market value of the property. The words "for
which" appearing between the words "property" and
"other documents" ciearly indicate that the court fee is
required to be paid on the value of the property· G
mentioned in the document, which is subject matter of
challenge. [Para 11] [676-E-H; 677-A-F]
2.3. If the legislature intended that fee should be
payable on the market value of the subject matter of the H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A suit filed for cancellation of a document which purports
or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish
any present or future right, title and interest, then it would
have, instead of incorporating the requirement of
payment of fees on value of subject matter, specifically
B provided for payment of court fee on the market value of
the subject matter of the suit as has been done in respect
of other types of suits mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29,
30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have also,
instead of using the expression "value of the property for
c which the document was executed", used the expression
"value of the property in respect of which the document
was executed". However, the fact of the matter is that in
Section 40(1) the legislature has designedly not used the
expression 'market value of the property'. [Para 12} [677-
D G-H; 678-A-BJ
2.4. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and
the High Court on the expression "value o~ the property
for which the document was executed" is accepted as
correct, then the word ·value' used in Section 40(1) of the
E Act will have to be read as 'market value' and there is no
compelling reason to add the word ·market' before the
word 'value' in Section 40(1) of the Act. [Para 13} [678-C-
DJ
2.5. When there is a special rule in the Act for valuing
F the property for the purpose of court fee, that method of
valuation must be adopted in preference to any other
method and, as Section 40 of the Act certainly contains
a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose of
court fee there is no reason why the expression •value
G of the property' used in Section 40(1) should be
substituted with the expression 'market value of the
property'. The legislature has designedly use·d different
language in Section 40 of the Act and the term 'market
value' has not been used therein. [Paras 30 and 31} [696-
H C-D; 697-CJ
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 663
2.6. The impugned ~rder of the High Court as also A
the order passed by the trial Court directing the appellant
to pay court fee on the market value of the property, in
respect of which the sale deed was executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.2, are set
aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the case B
and decid~ the same in accordance with law. [Para 32)
[697-D-E]
Balireddi v. Khatipula/ Sab AIR 1935 Madras 863 and
K.utumba Sastri v. Sundaramma AIR 1939 Madras 462,
· distinguished. C
Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya AIR 1927
Madras 825; Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (1967) 80
Madras Law Weekly 19 (SN); Arunachalathamma/ v.
Suda/aimuthu Pillai (1968) 83 Madras Law Weekly 789; 0
Andalammal v. B. Kanniah (1971) II Madras Law Journal
205 , and Allam Venkateswara Reddy v. Golla
Venkatanarayana and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 122,
approved.
Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others AIR E
1971 Madras 380; S. Krishna Nair and another v. N.
Rugmoni Amma AIR 1976 Madras 208; Krishnan
Damodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy (1972) Kerala Law
Times 774; P.K. Vasudeva Rao ·v. Hari Menon AIR 1982
Kerala 35; Pachayamma/ v. Dwaraswamy Pillai (2006) 3 F
Kerala Law Times 527; Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran
Pillai (1964) Kerala Law Times 895; Uma Antherjanam v.
Govindaru Namboodiripad and others (1966) Kerala Law
Times 1046; R. Rangiah v. Thimma Setty (1963) 1 Mysore
Law Journal 67 and Smt. Narbada v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 G
Rajasthan 162, overruled.
Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi AIR 1932
Madras 605; Narasamma v. Satyanarayana AIR 1951
Madras 793 and T. Tharamma v. T. Ramchandra Reddy and
others AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 333, referred to. H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference:
(1972) Kera la Law Times 774 overruled Para 5
AIR 1982 Kerala 35 overruled Para 5
(2006) 3 Kerala Law Times 527 overruled Para 5
B
(1971) II Madras Law
Journal 205 approved Para 6
AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 122 approved Para 6
c AIR 1939 Madras 462 distinguished Para 7
(1964) Kerala Law Times 895 overruled Para 7
(1966) Kera la Law Times 1046 overruled Para 7
AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 333 referred to Para 7
D
AIR 1971 Madras 380 overruled Para 7
AIR 1976 Madras 208 overruled Para 7
AIR 1987 Rajasthan 162 overruled Para 7
E
1958 SCR 360 relied on Para 10
1992 Supp (1) sec 323 relied on Para 10
(1966) 3 SCR 366 relied on Para 10
F AIR 1927 Madras 825 approved Para 15
AIR 1935 Madras 863 distinguished Para 16
AIR 1932 Madras 605 referred to Para 16
(1967) 80 Madras Law approved Para 18
G
Weekly 19 (SN)
(1968) 83 Madras Law approved Para 19
Weekly 789
H AIR 1951 Madras 793 referred to Para 20
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 665
(1963) 1 Mysore Law overruled Para 25 A
Journal 67
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
4347 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.07.2008 of the High B
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP {C) No. 21820 of 2008.
Bechu Kurian Thomes, R.Basant, Liz Mathew for the
Appellant.
T.L.V. Iyer, Subramonium Prasad for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted.
D
2. This appeal filed for setting aside order dated
21.7.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of Kerala High
Court in Writ Petition No.21820 of 2008 whereby he declined
to interfere with the direction given by Sub Judge, Palakkad
{hereinafter described. as 'the trial Court') to the appellant to E
pay court fee on the market value of the plaint schedule property
raises an important question of law relating to interpretation of
Section 40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act,
1959 (for short, 'the Act').
3. The appellant owned 9.98 acres rubber plantation. She F
executed power of attorney No.376/2006 in favour of her own
daughter (respondent No.1 herein). After sometime, respondent
No.1 transferred the property to her husband (respondent No.2
herein) by registered sale deed No.1784/2007. The appellant
filed O.S. No.231/2007 for cancellation of the power of attorney G
by alleging that respondent No.1 had misused the same and
sold the property to her husband. By an order dated 21.5.2008,
the trial Court directed the appellant to pay court fees on the
market value of the plaint schedule property. The appellant
H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A challenged that order in Writ Petition No.17032/2008 (C) which
was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of Kerala High
Court vide his order dated 26.6.2008, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:
"The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further
8
submitted that in view of the contentions raised in the
plaint, petitioner has to file an application for amendment
of the plaint modifying the relief sought for. In the nature of
the contentions raise.d in the plaint, an amendment of the
relief is definitely neqessary, as found by the learned Sub
c Judge. In such circumstances, Writ Petition is disposed
granting liberty to the petitioner to amend the plaint and to
pay the necessary court fee payable on such pleading. It
is made clear that the fact that a time limit is fixed by this
Court will not prevent the court from granting amendment,
D as it is necessary for an appropriate adjudication of the
dispute involved in the suit. It is made clear that the actual
court fee payable by the plaintiff is to be decided by the
trial Court afresh, taking into consideration the relief sought
for in the plaint, in the light of the amendment of the
E pleading."
-4. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court,
the appellant applied for and she was granted permission to
amend the plaint and to incorporate prayer for cancellation of
F the sale deed executed by respondent No.1 in favour of
respondent No.2. In the amended plaint, value of the property
was shown as Rs.7,00,000/- and accordingly, the court fees
was paid. However by an order dated 3.7.2008, the trial Court
directed the appellant to pay court fee on the market value of
G the plaint schedule property which was assessed at Rs.12 lakhs
per acre.
5. Writ Petition No.21820/2008 filed by the appellant
against the .above mentioned order was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge, who referred to the judgments of the
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 667
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Division Bench in Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan A
Parvathy (1972) Kerala Law Times 774, P.K. Vasudeva Rao
v. Hari Menon AIR 1982 Kerala 35 and Pachayamma/ v.
Dwaraswamy Pillai (2006) 3 Kerala Law Times 527 and held
that in terms of Section 40 of the Act, the writ petitioner is
required to pay court fees on market value of the property and B
not on the value specified in the sale deed.
6. Shri Bechu Kurian Thomas, learned counsel for the
appellant argued that the interpretation placed by the trial Court
and the High Court on Section 40 of the Act is ex facie
erroneous and impugned order is liable to be set aside C
because that section does not provide for payment of court fee
on the market value of the property for which the document,
which is subject matter of the suit, was executed. Learned
counsel emphasized that in terms of Section 40(1), court fees
is required to be paid on the value of the property for which the D
document was executed and submitted that the appellant had
correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the property
specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs. In support of his
arguments, the learned counsel relied upon the judgments of
the learned Single Judges of Madras High Court in E
Andalamma/ v. B. Kannaiah (1971) 2 Madras Law Journal 205
and of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara
Reddy v. Golla Venkatanarayana and others AIR 1975 Andhra
Pradesh 122.
F
7. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent argued that the expression 'value of the property'
for which the document was executed means market value of
the property and the same cannot be read as value specified
in the document. Learned senior counsel submitted that G
different High Courts have, following the judgment of the Full
Bench of Madras High Court in Kutumba Sastri v ..
Sundaramma AIR 1939 Madras 462, consistently held that the
market value of the property has to be taken into consideration
for the purpose of payment of the court fees. Learned senior
H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A counsel relied upon the judgments of different High Courts -
Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai (1964) Kerala Law
Times 895, Uma Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad
and others (1966) Kerala Law Times 1046, T. Tharamma v.
T. Ramchandra Reddy and others AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh
B 333, Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others AIR
1971 Madras 380, Allam Venkateswara Reddy v. Golla
Venkatanarayana and others (supra), S. Krishna Nair and
another v. N. Rugmoni Amma AIR 1976 Madras 208 and Smt.
Narbada v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 Rajasthan 162 and argued
C that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error by
refusing to interfere with the order of the trial Court.
8. We have considered the respective submissions.
Sections 7(1) (2) (3) (3A) (4), 25(a) (b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1)
(3), 38, 40, 45 and 48 of the Act which have bearing on the
D issue raised by the appellant, read as under:
"7. Determination of market value
(1) Save as otherwise provided, where the fee payable
under this Act depends on the market value of any
E
property, such value shall be determined as on the date
of presentation of the plaint.
(2) The market value of agricultural land in suits falling
under Section 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1 ), 37(3), 38,
F 45 or 48 shall be deemed to be ten times the annual gross
profits of such land where it is capable of yielding annual
profits minus the assessment if any made to the
Government.
G (3) The market value of a building shall in cases where
its rental value has been entered in the registers of any
local authority, be ten times such rental value and in other
cases the actual market value of the building as on the
date of the plaint.
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 669
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
(3A) The market value of any property other than A
agricultural land and building falling under sub-sections (2)
and (3) shall be the value it will fetch on the date of
institution of the suit.
(4) Where the subject-matter of the suit is only a restricted
8
or fractional interest in a property, the market value of the
property shall be deemed to be the value of the restricted
or fractional interest and the value of the restricted or
fractional interest shall bear the same proportion to the
market value of the absolute interest in such property as
the net income derived by the owner of the restricted or C
fractional interest bears to the total net income from the
property.
25. Suits for declaration.- In a suit for a declaratory decree
or order, whether with or without consequential relief, not o
falling under Section 26-
(a) where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession
of the property to which the declaration relates, fee shall
be computed on the market value of the property or on E
rupees one thousand whichever is higher;
'I, /
'
(b) where the prayer is for a declaration and for
consequential injunction and the relief sought is with
refer~nce to any immovable property, fee shall be
computed on one-half of the market value of the property F
or on rupees one thousand, whichever is higher;
27. Suits for injunction.- In a suit for injunction-
(a) Where the reliefs sought is with reference to any
immovable property, and G
(i) where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property is
denied, or
H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A (ii) where an issue is framed regarding the plaintiffs title
to the property,
fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of
the property or on rupees five hundred, whichever is higher;
B 29. Suits for possession under the Specific Relief Act,
1877.- In a suit for possession of immovable property
under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Central
Act 1 of 1877), fee shall be computed on one-third of the
market value of the property or on rupees one hundred and
c fifty, whichever is higher.
30. Suits for possession not otherwise provided for.- In a
suit for possession of immovable property not otherwise
provided for, fee shall be computed, on the market value
of the property or on rupees one thousand, whichever is
D
higher.
37. Partition suits
(1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a
E share of joint family property or of property owned, jointly
or in common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded from
possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the
market value of the plaintiff's share.
(2) xxx xxx xxx
F
(3) Where, in a suit falling under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), a defendant claims partition and separate
possession of his share of the property, fee shall be
payable on his written statement computed on half the
G market value of his share or at half the rates specified in
sub-section (2), according as such defendant has been
excluded from possession or is in joint possession.
38. Suits for joint possession.- In a suit for joint
possession of joint family property or of property owned,
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 671
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
'
jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded A
from possession, fee shall be computed on the market
value of the plaintiffs share.
40. Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc.-
(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other B
property having a money value, or other document which
purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title
or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee
shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the C
suit, and such value shall be deemed to be-
if the whole decree or other document is sought to be
cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the
decree was passed or other document was executed; o
if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be
cancelled; such part of the amount or value of the property.
(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability
under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates E
only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff
or to the plaintiffs share in any such property, fee shall be
computed on the value of such property, or share or on the
amount of the decree, whichever is less.
F
Explanation.- A suit to set aside an award shall be
deemed to be a suit to set aside a decree within the
meaning of this section.
45. Suits under the 'Survey and Boundaries Act.-ln a suit
under Section 14 of the Madra~\Survey and Boundaries G
Act, 1923, Section 13 of the Travancore Survey and
Boundaries Act of 1094, or Section 14 of the Cochin
Survey Act, II of 1074, fee shall be computed on one-half
of the market value of the property affected by the
determination of the boundary or on rupees one thousand, H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A whichever is higher.
48. lnterpleader suits.
(1) In an interpleader suit, fee shall be payable on the plaint
at the rates specified in Section 50.
B
(2) Where issues are framed as between the claimants,
fee shall be payable computed on the amount of the debt
or the money or the market value of other property,
movable or immovable, which forms the subject-matter of
c the suit. In levying such fee, credit shall be given for the
fee paid on the plaint; and the balance of the fee shall be
paid in equal shares by the claimants who claim the debt
or the sum of money or the property adversely to each
other.
D
(3) Value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of
Courts shall be the amount of the debt, or the sum .of
money or the market value of other property to which the
suit relates."
E 9. Section 7 (iv), (iv-A) (as inserted by Madras Act of
1922) and (v) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for short, 'the
Court-fees Act'), which have been considered in various
judgments of Madras High Court relied upon by learned
counsel for the respondents reads as under:-
F
"7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits. - The
amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next
hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:- "
xxx xxx xxx
G
(iv) In suits-
for movable property of no market-va/ue.-(a) for moveable
property where the subject-matter has no market-value, as,
for instance, in the case of documents relating to title,
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 673
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
to enforce a right to share in joint family property.-(b) te A ·
enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that
it is joint family property,
for a declaratory decree and consequential relief-(c) to
obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential
8
relief is prayed,
for an injunction.-(d) to obtain an injunction,
for easements.-(e) for a right to some benefit (not herein
otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and c
for accounts.-(f) for accounts-
according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued
in the plaint or memorandum of appeal;
D
In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which
he values the relief sought ·
(iv-A) In.a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or
other property having a money value or other document
E
securing money or other property having such value, the
valuation should be according to the value of the subject-
matter of the suit and such value shall be if the whole
decree is sought to be cancelled', the amount or value of
the property for which the decree was passed, and if a
portion of the decree is sought to be cancelled, such part F
of the amount or value of the property.
(added by Madras Act of 1922)
for possession of land, houses and gardens.- (v) In suits G
for the possession of land, houses, and gardens -
according to the value of the subject-matter; and such
value shall be deemed to be-
where the subject-matter is land, and-
H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R
A (a) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite
share of an estate, paying annual revenue to
Government,
or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in
the Collector's register as separately assessed with
B
such revenue;
-
and such revenue is permanently settled - ten times
the revenue so payable;
c (b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite
share of an estate, paying annual revenue to
Government, or forms part of such estate and is
recorded as aforesaid;
and such revenue is settled, but not permanently-
D
five times the revenue so payable;
(c) where the land pays no such revenue, or has been
partially exempted from such payment, or is charged
with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue,
E
and net profits have arisen from the land during the
year next before the date of presenting the plaint -
fifteen times such net profits;
F but where no such net profits have arisen
therefrom - the amount at which the Court shall
estimate the land with reference to the value of
similar land in the neighbourhood; ,,
(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying
G
revenue to Government, but is not a definite share
of such estate and is not separately assessed as
above-mentioned - the market-value of the land:"
10. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well
H recognized rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 0
675
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature A
must be found in the words used by the legislature it~elf. If the
words used are capable of one construction, only then it would
not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical
9onstruction on the ground that such hypothetical construction
is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. B
The words used in the material provisions ;.qf the statute must
be interpreted in their plain grammatical m~a'ning and it is only
when such words are capable of two constructions that the
question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can
legitimately arise - Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan c
1958 SCR 360. The other important rule of interpretation is ~hat
the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation
because it has no power to do so. The Court cannot add words
to a statute or read words which are not therein.Even if there
is a defect or an omission in the statute, the Court cannot 0
correct the defect or supply the omission. - Union of India v.
Oeoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, Shyam
Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation (1966) 3 SCR
366.
11. Section 7 of the Act lays down different modes fQJ E
determination of the market value of the property for the purpose
of payment of court fee. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 begins
with the expression "Save as qtherwise provided" and lays down
that where the fee payable under the Act depends on the market
valu·e of any property, such value shall be determined as on the F
date of presentation of the plaint. Fro.m the plain language of
Section 7(1 ), it is evident that it merely specifies the
methodology for determination of the market value of the 0
property where the court fee payable under some other
provisions of the Act depends on the market value of the G
property which is subject matter of the suit. Sections 25, 27,
29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 deal with different kinds of suit i.e.,
·suits for declaration, suits for injunction, suits for possession
under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, suits for possession not
otherwise provided for, partition suits, suits for joint possession, H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A suits under the Survey and Boundaries Act and interpleader
suits. These sections provide for payment of court fee
computed on the market value of the property. Sub-section (2)
of Section 7 lays down that the market value of the agricultural
land in suits falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30,
B 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 and 48 shall be deemed to be ten times
the annual gross profits of such land where it is capable of
yi~lding annual profits minus the assessment, if any, made by
the Governrrient. In terms of sub-section (3), the market value
of a building in cases where its rental value has been entered
C in the registers of any local authority, shall be ten times such
rental value and in other cases, the actual market value of the
building as on the date of the plaint. Clause (a) of sub-section
(3) lays down that market value of any property other than
agricultural land and building shall be the value it will fetch on
the date of institution of the suit. Sub-section (4) lays down that
0
where subject matter of the suit is only a restricted or fractional
interest in a property, the market value of the property shall be
deemed to be the value of the restricted or fractional interest.
Section 40 deals with suits for canr.ellation of decrees etc.
which are not covered by other sections. If this section is
E interpreted in the light of the expression 'save as otherwise
provided' used in Section 7(1), it becomes clear that the rule
enshrined therein is a clear departure from the one contained
in Section 7 read with Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and
48 which provide for payment of court fee on the market value
F of the property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special rule.
Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation of a decree
for money or other property having a money value, or other
document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign,
limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title
G or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall
be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit and
further lays down that such value shall be deemed to be if the
whole decree or other document sought to be cancelled, the
amount or value of the property for which the decree was
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 677
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.)
passed or other document was executed. If a part of the decree A
or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the
amount or value of the property constitute the basis for fixation
of court fee. Sub-section (2) lays down that if the decree or other
document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up
and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of the B
property belonging to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs share in such
property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property,
or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less. The
deeming clause contained in the substantive part of Section
40(1) makes it clear thc:it in a suit filed for cancellation of a c
document which creates any right, title or interest in immovable
property, the court fees is required to be computed ori the value
of the property for which the document was executed. To put it
differently, the value of the property for which the document was
· executed and not its market value is relevant for the purpose
0
of court fee. If the expression 'value of the subject matter of the
suit' was not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly
be argued that the word 'value' means the market value, but
by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it
clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount E
of court fee shall be computed on the value of the property for
which the document was executed and not the market value of
the property. The words "for which" appearing between the
words "property" and "other documents" clearly indicate that the
court fee is required to be paid on the value of the property
mentioned in the document, which is subject matter of F
challenge.
12. If the legislature intended that fee should be payable
on the market value of the subject matter of the suit filed for
cancellation of a document which purports or operates to G
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any present or future
right, title and interest, then it would have, instead of
incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on value of
subject matter, specifically provided for payment of court fee
H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A on the market value of the subject matter of the suit as has been
done in respect of other types of suits mentioned in Sections
25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have
also, instead of using the expression "value of the property for
which the document was executed", used the expression "value
B of the property in respect of which the document was executed".
However, the fact of the matter is that in Section 40(1) the
legislature has designedly not used the expression 'market
value of the property'.
13. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and the
C High Court on the expression "value of the property for which
the document was executed" is accepted as correct then the
word ·value' used in Section 40(1) of the Act will have to be
read as ·market value' and we do not see any compelling
reason to add the word 'market' before the word 'value' in
D Section 40(1) of the Act.
14. We may now advert to the judgments relied upon by
the learned counsel for the parties and some other judgments
of different High Courts in which Section 40(1) of the Act and
E similar provisions of other State legislations have been
interpreted.
15. In Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya AIR 1927
Madras 825, the Division Bench of Madras High Court
F interpreted Section 7 (v) (a) of the Court-fees Act as amended
by Madras Act of 1922 and observed:
"One point raised is whether the market value of the
property should not be taken for the purpose of this
valuation, or whether the statutory value should be adopteo.
G We think the latter is the proper course as there is nothing
in the Act to show that the market value is the value
contemplated in S. 7 (iv) (a). When there is in the Act itself
a special rule as to valuing property in suits for Court-
fees, we think it is proper to take that method of valuation
H in preference to any other method to get the value where
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 679
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
there is no indication that any other method should be A
adopted."
(emphasis supplie9)
16. In Ba/ireddi v. Khatipulal Sab AIR 1935 Madras 863,
the learned Sirigle Judge of the High Court considered the B
question whether in a suit for setting aside mortgage deeds and
sale deeds, the plaintiff is required to pay court-fees on the
market value of the property and answered the same in
affirmative. The learned Judge referred to two earlier judgments
in Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya (supra) and ,C
Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi AIR 1932 Madras
605 but disagreed with the ratio of those judgments and held:
"The amount of court-fee payable depends upon "the value
of the subj~ct-matter of the suit," that is what the section D
says. Where a document securing money is sought to be
cancelled, the section goes on to say, that the value of the
subject-matter shall be deemed to be "the amount for which
the document is executed." In the case of a mortgage
instrument therefore the court-fee has to be computed on E
the amount for which the instrument is executed, in other
words, the principal amount secured by it. This is the plain
effect of the words of the section, and I fail to see how the
method of computation fixed in S.7(v) can possibly be
applied. Now as regards the sale-deed, the question
arises, is the value referred to in the section, the actual
F
value of the property, that is to say, its market value or the
artificial value prescribed by S.7 (v)? The last mentioned
section deals with suits for possession and the legislature
has expressly enacted that in such suits the value shall be
determined in a particular manner. CL (iv-A) refers simply G
to "the value of the property," which means "value" as
generally understood, whereas Cl. (v) prescribes an
artificial method of valuation. There is no reason to
construe Cl. (iv-A) in the light of Cl. (v) which deals with a
specific matter; indeed, when the legislature intends to H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A prescribe an artificial method, it says so in express terms,
as Cl. (iv-c) also shows. I am therefore of the opinion that
in the case of the sale-deeds, the amount of court-fee
payable must be computed on the market value of the
properties with which they deal."
B
17. In Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma (supra), the Full
Bench of Madras High Court interpreted paragraph (iv-A) of
Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. The Full Bench referred to the
earlier judgments in Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya
(supra), Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi (supra),
C Balireddi v. Khatipu/al Sab (supra) and approved the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge in Balireddi v.
Khatipu/a/ Sab (supra) by making the following observations:
"We consider that the view taken by Venkatasubba Rao
D J. in 59 Mad 240 is preferable to that taken in 53 MLJ 267.
Para (iv-A) deals with suits where it is necessary for the
plaintiff to seek the cancellation of a decree or of a deed.
Para (v) relates merely to suits for possession. In a suit
for possession it is not always necessary to set aside a
E decree or a document. Where a suit is merely for
possession the Act says how the value of the subject-
matter shall be arrived at. When adding para (iv-A) to S. 7
the Legislature did not say that in a suit falling within the
new paragraph the valuation of the subject-matter should
F be arrived at in accordance with the method indicated in
para (v). It said that a suit within para (iv-A) should be
valued according to the value of the property, and the value
of the property, unless there is an indication to the contrary,
must mean to its market value. By the Amending Act of
1922 para (iv-C) was also amended. Before the
G
amendment, this paragraph provided that in a suit to
obtain a declaratory decree or order where a
consequential relief was prayed, the value should be
according to the value of the relief sought by the plaintiff.
The Amending Act inserted the Proviso to the effect that
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 681
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
in a suit coming under this paragraph in a case where the A
relief sought is with reference to immovable property the
valuation shall not be less than half the value of the
immovable property calculated in the manner provided for
by paragraph (v). There the Legislature expressly
provided that the method of calculation was to be in B
accordance with para (v) but in adding para (iv-A) no such
direction was given. The court-fee is to be calculated on
the amount or the value of the property and to give the .
wording of para (iv-A) its plain meaning the valuation
must be the valuation based on the market value of the c
property at the date of the plaint."
(emphasis supplied)
18'. In Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (1967) 80 Madras
Law Weekly 19 (SN), the learned Single Judge noted that in D
the earlier suit, the properties were valued at Rs.4000/-,
referred to Section 40(1) of the Madras Court-fees and Suits
Valuation Act, 1955, which is pari materia to the Section 40 of
the Act and observed:
E
." ............ that as the decree itself specified the value of
the property it will fall within the language of Section 40(1),
namely, the amount or value ofthe property for which the
decree was passed and ordered that the court-fee has to
be paid calculated on the sum of Rs. 4000, which is the F
value given in the decree, and not the market value of
the properties on the date of the filing of the plaint."
(emphasis supplied)
19. In Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (1968) G
83 Madras Law Weekly 789, another learned Single Judge
examined the correctness of order passed by the Subordinate
Judge, Tirunelveli, who had allowed the plaintiff to pay the court-
fee for the cancellation of settlement deed on the value of the
document i.e. Rs.3500/-. While dismissing the revision filed by H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A the defendants, the learned Judge referred to Section 40(1) of
the Madras Act, distinguished the Full Bench judgment in_
Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma (supra) and observed:
"It will be seen that the section provides for suits (1) relating
to cancellation of a decree for money, (2) cancellation of
B
a decree for other property having a money value, and (3)
cancellation of other document which purports or operates
to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish rights in
moveable or immoveable property. The sub-section
provides that fee shall be computed on the value of the
c subject matter of the suit. Then it proceeds to state how
such value should be calculated. It provides that if the
whole decree is sought to be cancelled, the amount or
value of the property for which the decree was passed
should be taken into account. In the case of other
D document which purports or operates to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish rights in moveable or
immoveable property, the value shall be deemed to be the
value of the property. It is not clear as to whether the words
"the amount or value of the property for which the decree
E was passed" are applicable to the cancellation of a
document which creates or declares rights in .moveable or
immoveable property. In the case of suits for cancellation
of either documents, apart from suits for cancellation of
a decree for money or other property, the above clause
F would be certainly applicable. This would mean that in
the case of suits for cancellation of other documents, the
value of the subject matter of the suit shall be deemed
to be the amount for which the documents was executed.
It was submitted on behalf of the defendants that even in
G the case of a suit for cancellation of other documents, the
value shall be deemed to be the value of the property.
But this contention would ignore the effect of the words
"value of the property for which the decree was passed".
Even conceding that the value of the property should be
H taken into account in suits for cancellation of other
'·'
· SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 683
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.] ·
documents, there are two modes provided for to compute A
the value of the subject matter of the suit, (1) the value
of the property and (2) the amount for which the document
was executed.
Mr. Venugopalachari, learned counsel for the B
petitioners, submitted that this view is opposed to the one
taken in the decision in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma
where the Full Bench held that in a suit for cancellation of
a deed of conveyance the valuation must be the valuation
based on the market value of the property at the date of
the plaint. The Full Bench was considering the question as C
to the Court fee payable in a suit for cancellation of a deed
of conveyance and for possession of the property covered
by the deed. The court held that the plaintiff should value
his relief in accordance with the provisions of S.7(4)(A),
and not according to S.7(V) of the old Court fees Act, D
1870. After referring to the difference of opinion between
the various dedsions, the Full Bench preferred the view
taken in Bali Reddi v. Khatifulal Sab 59 Mad. 240, followed
in Venkatakrishniah v. All Sahib 48 L.W. 277. S. 7(4-A),
of the old Act is slightly differently worded and it runs as E
follows:-
"In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or
other property having a money value, or other
document securing money or other property having F
such value, according to the value of the subject
matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed
to be-
if the whole decree or other document is sought to
be cancelled, the amount or the value of the G
property for which the decree was passed or the
other document executed,
if a part of the decree or other document is sought
\ H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value
of the property".
It will be seen that the above section relates to a suit for
cancellation of a decree for money or other property having
a money value, or other document securing money or other
B
property having such value. There was some doubt
whether the third part of the section relating to either
document securing money would include sales. In
Balireddy v. Badul Sabar, Venkatasubba Rao, J. referring
to his earlier decision in Doraiswami v. Thangavelu held
c that sale deeds would come within the meaning of this
section. Whether this sub-section includes sale deeds or
need not detain us, as S. 40(1) of Madras Act XIV of 1955
is differently worded and there can be no doubt that it
brings within its purview sale deeds as it relates to other
D documents which purports or operates to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish any right in moveable or
immoveable property, S. 7(iv-A) of the old Act states that
the value be deemed to be "if the whole decree or other
document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the
E value of the property for which the decree was passed or
the other document executed". The same words are used
in S. 40(1) of the new Act. In construing this sub-clause in
S. 7(iv-A) of the old Act, the Full Bench pointed out in the
decision cited above that the suit within the meaning of the
F above section should be valued according to the value of
the property, unless there is an indication to the contrary,
must mean its market value. It may be noted that the court
was considering the value of the property and does not
appear to have taken note of the words "the other
G document executed".
As already pointed out, S. ?(iv-A) of the Old Act as
well as S. 40(1) of the present Act deal with suits for
cancellation of a decree for money, cancellation of a
decree for other property having a money value and suit
H
SATHEEDEVJ v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 685
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
for cancellation other document. In the case of other A
documents, the clause "the amount or the value of the
property for which the decree was passed" cannot be held
to be applicable and the only clause that can be properly
applied is only the value for which·the documelilt was
executed. In the third category in S. 40(1 ), to the! words s
'other document, the words 'which purports or operates to
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish' rights in
moveable or immoveable property are included. Obviously
in suits for cancellation of other documents referred to in
S. 40( 1) of the new Act the valuation should be the value c
of the other document executed. In Balireddy v. Abdul
Satar the court refers to the section which says that the
value of the subject matter shall be deemed to be the
amount for which the document is executed. But it
confined its discussion to the actual value of the property
0
and held that it referred only to the market value. This
decision also does not refer to the valuation of the
document on the basis of the amount for which the
document is executed."
(emphasis supplied) E
20. In Appikunju Mee:-asayu v. Meeran Pillai (supra), the
learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court relied on the
judgment of Madras High Court in N.arasamma v.
Satyanarayana AIR 1951 Madras 793 and observed: F
"As I have pointed out earlier, the emphasis in S.40(1) of
the Court Fees Act is regarding the subject matter of this
suit and in respect of that subject matter which admittedly
is immovable property it will have to be valued on the
amount or valued as the property which was no doubt G
covered by the decree in O.S. 21/1125~ But the value or
amount must certainly be the market value as on the date
of the filing of the suit."
The same view was reiterated by another learned Single H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A Judge of the Kerala High Court in Uma Antherjanam v.
Govindaru Namboodiripad and others (supra).
21. In Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Got/nd.er and others
(supra), the learned SinW,e Judge of Madras High Court referred
to earlier judgments ~ut i;f isagreed with the view expressed by
8
the other learned Single Judges in Navaraja v. Kaliappa
Gounder (supra) and Arunachalathammal v. Suda/aimuthu
Pillai (supra) and followed the ratio of Full Bench judgment by
recording the following observations:
c "With respect, I need hardly add that this is not the correct
reading of the Full Bench decision. He has concluded by
stating that obviously in suits for cancellation of "other
documents" referred to in Section 40 (1) of the present Act,
the valuation should be the value of the other document
D executed. I have already pointed out that in the documents
just as in the case of decrees, the distinction is between
those that dealt with money and those that dealt with
property. The amount mentioned in the decree or the
document is relevant only when the question is with regard
E to the decree for money or document securing money. But
in the case of decrees or documents dealing with property
of money value, the value of the subject-matter of the suit
should be computed on the value of the property for which
the decree was passed or the document was executed. I
F need not repeat that the valuation in respect of the property
dealt with by the decree or document should be the market
value and such a market value should be as on the date
of suit."
22. In S. Krishna Nair and another v. N. Rugmoni Amma
G (supra), another learned Single Judge followed the ratio of
Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others (supra)
and held that in a suit for cancellation of decree, the property
is to be valued under Section 40(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court
Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and the court fee is
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. -687
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
required to be paid on the market value of the property as on A
the date of the plaint.
23. In Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy
{supra), the Division Bench of Kerala High Court reiterated the
views expressed in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma {supra), B
Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai {supra) and Sengoda
Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others {supra) and held that
court fee is payable on the market value of the property covered
by the document and not on the basis of the valuation given in
the document.
c
24. In P.K. Vasudeva Rao v. Hari Menon {supra), the
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held as under:
"True, as contended for on ~alf of the plaintiff-revision
petitioner, S.40 nowhere µses the expression 'market D
value'. But it is clear therefrom that the legislative intent is
to levy court-fee on the just equivalent in money of the
'other property' comprised in the decree or portion thereof
sought to be set aside; or dealt with in the 'other document'
· or part thereof s'ought to be cancelled. The section opens E
by saying that 'in a suit for cancellation of a decree for
money or other property having a money value' {emphasis
supplied) 'fee shall be computed on the value of the subject
matter of the suit'. 'Money value' of a property is its worth
in terms of the currency of the land or in other words, is
such money-equivalent thereof in open market; and not any
F
amount less than that as where it is overvalued at a fancy-
price. It cannot be that when, what is soughUo be cancelled
is a decree or part thereof for 'other properfy', f,e, property
other than money, the value 'of such ,prop•rtY for
computation of court-fees is its 'money-valoe'; and when, G
what is sought to be cancelled is a document or part
thereof in respect of 'other property', the value of such
property for such computation is not its 'money-value'.
Value of the subject matter, namely, value of the 'other
property' in both cases is its money-value. H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A The object of the second and the third paras in sub-section
(1) of S.40 is not to introduce any fiction but to provide for
two situations, namely, (i) where the decree or the
document as a whole is sought to be cancelled and (ii)
where only part thereof is sought to be cancelled. In the
B first situation, the value of the subject matter is t'he amount
for which the decree was passed or the document was
executed; or the value of the property concerning which the
decree was passed or the document was executed. In the
second class of cases, the value of the subject matter of
c the suit is such part of the amount for which the decree was
passed or the document was executed, in respect of which
part, the decree or the document is sought to be cancelled;
or the value of such part of the property concerning which
the decree was passed or the document was executed,
in respect of which part, the decree or the document is
D
sought to be cancelled.
Section 40\1) has to be read as a whole. So read: (A) when
the suit is for cancellation of a decree or other document
for money, then the value of the subject-matter of the suit
E will be:- (i) the whole amount for which the decree was
passed or the document was executed, if what is sought
to be cancelled is the whole of the decree or the whole of
the document; and (ii) such part of the amount for which
the decree was passed or the document was executed, if
F only part of the decree or part of the document is sought
to be cancelled; (8) when the suit is for cancellation of a
decree or other document for a property having money-
value, then, the value of the subject-matter of the suit will
be:- (i) if the whole of the decree or the document is sought
G to be cancelled - the value of the property covered by the
decree or the document; and (ii) if only part of the decree
or of the document is to be cancelled; value of such part
of the property in respect of which the decree was passed
or the document was executed and to which extent such
H decree or such document is to be cancelled. We are not
..
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 689
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
impressed with the submission that there is a distinction A
between the expressions 'the value of the property for
which the decree was passed or other document was
executed' and 'the value of the property in respect of which
the decree was passed or other document was executed'
for the purpose of computation of court-fees. The scheme B
of S.40 is to make court-fees leviable on the sum of money
or portion thereof, when what the plaintiff seeks is to get
rid of his obligation and liability therefor or part thereof
under a decree passed or a document executed by
cancellation thereof, and on the money-equivalent of the c
property or portion thereof, when what he seeks to get rid
of is his obligation and liability in relation to that property
or portion thereof under a decree passed or a document
executed in respect of it by cancellation thereof."
25. In R. Rangiah v. Thimma Setty (1963) 1 Mysore Law D
Journal 67, the Division Bench of Mysore High Court interpreted
Section 4(iv)(A) of Mysore Court Fees Act, which is
substantially similar to Section 40 of the Act and held that:
"Now, one thing which is very clear from the paragraphs 1 E
& 2 of S.4 (iv) A is that in a suit brought for the cancellation
of a document executed for the purpose of securing
property, the Court Fee payable is on the value of such
property. Although those paragraphs do not refer in terms
to the market value of the property, as some of the other F
parts of the Act do, I have no doubt in my mind that the
word 'value' occurring in those paragraphs has reference
to no other value than the market value. The word 'value'.
when it occurs in an enactment like the Court Fees Act,
has to my mind, particularly known and definite meaning. G
That word has reference to the price which the property
will fetch when exposed to the test of competition.
Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar had to admit that the word
'value' occurring in the first paragraph would have to be
understood as the market value if paragraphs 2 and 3 did H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A not exist in S.4(iv) A. If, therefore, the word 'value' occurring
in the first paragraph means market value, I see nothing
in paragraphs 2 and 3 on which Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar
strongly relied which can persuade me to take the view that
the word 'value' occurring in the first paragraph which, as
B ordinarily understood, is the market value, should be
understood differently.
Paragraph 2 does no more than to merely provide
that, if a document is sought to be cancelled in its entirety,
the Court Fee is payable on the value of the whole of the
c property in respect of which the document is executed.
Likewise paragraph 3 merely provides that where the
cancellation sought is a partial cancellation, Court Fee is
payable only on the value of the property in respect of
which cancellation is sought. It is for that purpose that the
D words "value shall be deemed to be" are used by the
Legislature in the first paragraph of the clause and not for
the purpose of assigning to the word 'value' occurring in
the first paragraph a meaning different from that which has
to be ordinarily given to it.
E
It is no doubt true that the second paragraph of
S.4(iv) A directs that the Court Fee payable in a suit
brought for the cancellation of a document is the Court Fee
on the value of the property 'for which' the document was
F executed. Ordinarily the expression 'for which' occurring
in that paragraph might have justified the interpretation that
the amount on which the Curt Fee has to be paid is the
amount specified in the document. But, that, that would not
be correct way of understanding those words occurring in
paragraph 2 of that clause is clear from the fact that S.4(iv)
G
A does not provide merely for cancellation of a document
executed for a specified consideration such as a sale
deed, but also provides for the payment of Court Fee even
in suits brought for cancellation of other documents such
as a deed of settlement, a gift deed or a trust deed. In the
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 691
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
latter category of cases it would not be appropriate to A
regard those documents as executed for a consideration
or a specified amount and those cases would not be
cases in which there would be any value 'for which the
document is executed.
8
The second paragraph which requires the payment
of Court Fee on the value of the property 'for which' the
document was executed, does not, when properly
understood, direct the payment of such Court Fee on the
value for which the document was executed, but on the
value of the property for which it was executed. In other C
words, the words 'for which' occurring in that paragraph
do not refer to the value but to the property to which the
document relates. The words 'for which occurring in that
paragraph, in my opinion, mean 'for securing which', so
that what that paragraph directs is the payment qf Court -D
Fee on the value of the property for securing which the
document is executed.
That, that is the correct interpretation is indicated by
the word 'securing' occurring in the first paragraph of the E
clause in the context of a document of which cancellation
is sought.
It therefore follows that what is relevant for the
purpose of S.4(iv) A is not the value of the property
specified in the document but its real and actual value F
when the suit is brought. It is on th.at value that the Court
fee has to be paid if the suit is for the cancellation of a
document recording a transaction involving such property."
26. In Pachay~mmal v. Dwaraswamy Pillai (supra), G
another Division B~nch of Kerala High Court interpreted
Sections 7 and 40 of\the Act and held:
"Section 7 of the Act though deals with determination of
market value, it starts with a saving clause. A reading of
H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A Section 7(1) makes it clear that if there is a specific
provision in the Act for valuing the suit, the Sub-sections
(2) to (4) of Section 7 can have no application. According
to the counsel for the petitioners, Section 40 is an
independent provision for valuation of suits for cancellation
B of decrees and documents and in view of Section 7(1 ),
market value of the property is not a criteria at all.
Whenever market value of the property is to be taken into
account, it is specifically stated in the statute. Sections 24,
25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 & 48 etc, specifically provide
that market value of the property involved in the suit is to
c be taken as basis for valuation. But, the word 'market' is
conspicuously absent in Section 40. When the section is
plain and unambiguous, courts should not venture to add
words to it to give an entirely different scope to the said
provisions never intended by the legislature. Therefore, it
D was argued that concept of "market value of the property'
cannot be brought into Section 40. Learned Counsel
invited our attention to the decisions of the Apex Court in
Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors (2001) 4 SCC 534 (Paragraph 26)
E and Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N.
and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 (Paragraphs 14 and 15). It is
true that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only
one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that
F meaning irrespective of consequences. The rule stated by
TINDAL, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl & F
85, p. 143) is in the following form: "If the words of the
statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then
no more can be necessary than to expound those words
G in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves
do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the
lawgiver".
Here, the question is what is clearly stated in Section 40
as the criteria for valuation of suit filed for cancellation of
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 693
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
a document. Section 40 of the Act mandates that if a suit A
is filed for cancelling a document which creates, assigns
or extinguishes the right, title or interest in an immovable
property, if the whole document is to be cancelled, the
value of the property for which the document was executed
and if plaint is only to cancel part of the document, such B
part of the value of property for which document was
executed is the basis for suit valuation. Therefore, value
depends on the value of property for which document was
executed and sought to be cancelled and not the value
mentioned in the document. Here, a gift deed is sought to c
be cancelled. Then on a plain meaning of Section 40, suit
should be valued at the value of the property for which gift
deed was executed and not the value of the document or
value mentioned in the document. If a gift deed is executed
out of love and affection, which is a valid consideration,
0
suit valuation depends upon not on estimation of value of
love and affection or null value, but, on the value of the
property covered by the gift deed. Then the question is what
is the value of property at the time of filing the suit. In legal
terms value of property means market value of property
and when valuation is considered with regard to suit E
valuation, it can only be market value of property at the time
of filing the suit and nothing else. Section 7(1) clearly states
that except otherwise provided, court fee payable under
the Act depends on the market value determined on the
date of presentation of plaint. No contrary indication is F
made in Section 40."
27. In Smt. Narbada v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 Rajasthan
162, the learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court followed
the ratio of the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in P.K. G
Vasudeva Rao v. Hari Menon (supra) and held that in a suit
for cancellation of decree, the court fee is required to be paid
on the market value of the property.
28. In Andalammal v. B. Kanniah (1971) II Madras Law H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Journal 205, the learned Single Judge considered the question
relating to court fee in the context of a suit filed for cancellation
of a settlement deed on the ground that the same had been
procured by fraudulent misrepresentation. In the settlement
deed, the property was valued at Rs.10,000/-. The learned trial
B Court held that the suit should be valued on the market value
of the property as on the date of plaint and not on the basis of
the value of suit in the settlement deed and accordingly directed
the plaintiff to pay deficit court fee after furnishing the market
value of the property. The learned Single Judge referred to
c Section 40 of the Madras Act and held:
"It is important to mark the words "the amount or value of
the property for which the document was executed". If the
Legislature had said "the amount or value of the property
in respect of which the document was executed", it would
D be reasonable to hold that the basis shall be the market
value of the property, regardless of what the document
says it is. But as the section refers to "the amount or value
of the property for which the document was executed", the
legislative intent is clear that the basis for the purpose of
E valuation shall be the amount or value mentioned in the
document itself. Evidently, the intention of the Legislature
is that when a person seeks to cancel a document
executed by himself, he shall pay Court-fee upon the value
which he has chosen to put upon the property in the
F document he seeks to cancel. The word "value" ordinarily
connotes the price set on a thing, and when the Legislature
directs that the value of the subject-matter shall be deemed
to be the amount or value of the property for which the
document was executed, I see no warrant for ignoring the
G plain language or the section and holding that the value
shall be the market value of the property. In fact, the
Legislature has expressly used the words "market value"
in twelve other sections of the Act in contra distinctil\)n to
the word "value" used in section 40(1) of the Act. I,
H therefore, hold that the Court-fee paid by the petitioner
'SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 695
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
upon the basis of the value of the property as given in the · A
settlement deed is correct."
29. In Allam Venkateswara Reddy v. Golla
Venkatanarayana AIR 1975 A.P. 122, a learned Single Judge
of Andhra Pradesh High Court construed Section 37 of the
8
Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, which is
pari materia to Section 40 of the Act, and held:
"Section 37(1) contemplated two kinds of suits, viz. suits
for cancellation of decrees, whether they are for money or
for property having a money value and suits for cancellation C
of documents creating or extinguishing rights whether in
money, movable or immovable property. It is stated therein
that for the purpose of payment of court-fee in the suit the
fee shall be computed on the basis of the value of the
subject-matter of the suit and that such value shall be D
deemed to be the one indicated in clause (a) of Section
37(1) wherein it is mentioned that if the whole decree or
other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or
value of the property for which the decree was passed or
other document was executed shall be deemed to be the E
value for computation of court-fee . From this it is very clear
that for cancellation of a document regarding a property
the value shall be deemed to be the amount for which the
document regarding a property the value shall be deemed
to be the amount for which the document sought to be F
cancelled was executed with regard to the property. In the
present case, the two sale deeds in question were
executed for a sum of Rs.18,000/-. Therefore, the court-
fee has to be paid on that amount and not on the present
market value of the properties which are the subject-matter G
of the two sale deeds. A reading of Section 37 does not
show that the court-fee has to be computed on the basis
of the present market value of the document sought to be
cancelled."
30. In view of our analysis of the relevant statutory H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A provisions, it must be held that the judgments of the Division
Bench of Madras High Court and of the learned Single Judges
in Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya (supra), Navaraja
v. Kaliappa Gounder (supra), Arunachalathammal v.
Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra) and Andalammal v. B. Kanniah
B (supra) as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge of
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara Reddy v.
Golla Venkatanarayana (supra) lay down correct law. In the first
of these cases, the Division Bench of Madras High Court rightly
observed that when there is a special rule in the Act for valuing
c the property for the purpose of court fee, that method of
valuation must be adopted in preference to any other method
and, as mentioned above, Section 40 of the Act certainly
contains a special r_ule for valuing the property for the purpose
of court fee and we do not see any reason why the expression
'value of the property' used in Section 40(1) should be
0
substituted with the expression 'market value of the property'.
31. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of Madras
High Court in Balireddi v. Khatipu/al Sab (supra), which was
approved by the Full Bench of that Court in Kutumba Sastri v.
E Sundaramma (supra) turned primarily on the interpretation of
Section ?(iv-A) of the Court Fee Act as amended by Madras
Act which refers to the value of the property simpliciter and the
Court interpreted the same as market value. Neither the learned
Single Judge nor the Full Bench were called upon to interpret
F a provision like Section 40 of the Act. Therefore, the ratio of
those judgments cannot be relied upon for the purpose of
interpreting Section 40 of the Act. In Arunachalathammal v.
Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra), the learned Single Judge rightly
distinguished the judgment of the Full Bench by making a
G pointed reference to the language employed in Section 40(1)
of the Madras Act No.XIV of 1955~ which is identical to Section
40 of the Act. In Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and
others (supra) and S. Krishna Nair and another v. N. Rugmoni
Amma (supra), the other learned Single Judges did not
H correctly appreciate the ratio of the judgment of the coordinate
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR. 697
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Bench in Arunachalathamma/ v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra) A
and distinguished the same without assigning cogent reasons.
We may also observe that if the learned Single Judges felt that
the view expressed by the co-ordinate Bench was not correct,
they ought to have referred the matter to the larger Bench. The
judgments of the Division Benches of Kerala High Court in B
Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy (supra), P.K.
Vasudeva Rao v. Hari Menon (supra) and Pachayamma/ v.
Dwaraswamy Pillai (supra) and of the learned Single Judges
in Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai (supra) and Uma
Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad and others (supra) c
also do not lay down correct law because the High Court did
not appreciate that the legislature has designedly used differen(
language in Section 40 of the Act and the term 'market value'
has not been used therein. The same is tiue of the judgments
of the learned Single Judges of Mysore and Rajasthan High D
Courts noticed hereinabove.
32. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order
of the learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court as also the
order passed by the trial Court directing the appellant to pay
court fee on the market value of the property, in respect of which E
the sale deed was executed by respondent No.1 in favour of
respondent No.2, are set· aside. The trial Court shall now
proceed with the case and decide the same in accordance with
law. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
B.B.B. · Appeal allowed.
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