SARTAJ SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.

                          [2021] 3 S.C.R. 87                              87


                          SARTAJ SINGH                                    A
                                  v.
               STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.
               (Criminal Appeal Nos. 298-299 of 2021)
                          MARCH 15, 2021                                  B
            [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD
                      AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Summoning of
additional accused – Appellant-original informant was attacked
by private respondents and other accused persons – On basis of            C
the statement of the appellant, FIR was lodged for offences u/ss.148,
149, 341, 323, 324, 307 and 506 IPC – Thereafter, charge-sheet
was filed by the Investigating Officer against the other accused,
but not against the private respondents – During the trial the
appellant was examined as P.W-1, he named the private respondents         D
in his evidence specifically and stood the test of cross-examination
– Appellant filed an application u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning of
the additional accused-private respondents – The trial Court allowed
the application u/s.319 Cr.P.C. – In the revision petitions, the High
Court quashed and set aside the order passed by the trial Court
summoning the additional accused-private respondents – On appeal,         E
held: The accused can be summoned on the basis of even
examination-in-chief of the witness and the Court need not wait till
his cross-examination – If on basis of the examination-in-chief of
the witness the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case
against the proposed accused, the Court may in exercise of powers         F
u/s.319 Cr.P.C. array such a person as accused and summon him to
face the trial – In the instant case, the appellant right from the
beginning disclosed the names of private respondents and
specifically named them in FIR – The reasons assigned by the High
Court were unsustainable in law and on facts – What is required to
be considered at this stage was whether there is any prima facie          G
case and not whether on the basis of such material the proposed
accused is likely to be convicted or not and/or whatever is stated
by the injured eye witness in his examination-in-chief is exaggeration
or not – Therefore, the trial Court was justified in directing to issue
summons against the private respondents to face trial.
                                                                          H
                                   87
88            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A          Allowing the appeals, the Court
            HELD: 1. In Hardeep Singh, this Court had an occasion to
     consider in detail the scope and ambit of the powers of the
     Magistrate under Section 319 CrPC, the object and purpose
     of Section 319 CrPC etc. It is observed in the said decision that
B    the entire effort is not to allow the real perpetrator of an offence
     to get away unpunished. It is observed that this is also a part of
     fair trial and in order to achieve this very end that the legislature
     thought of incorporating the provisions of Section 319 CrPC. It
     is further observed that for the empowerment of the courts to
     ensure that the criminal administration of justice works properly,
C    the law has been appropriately codified and modified by the
     legislature under the CrPC indicating as to how the Courts should
     proceed to ultimately find out the truth so that the innocent does
     not get punished but at the same time, the guilty are brought to
     book under the law. It is also observed that it is the duty of the
D    court to find out the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does
     not go unpunished. [Para 6.1.1][97-D-F]
            2. Considering the law laid down by this Court in
     Hardeep Singh, it emerges that (i) the Court can exercise the
     power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the
E    statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness
     concerned and the Court need not wait till the cross-examination
     of such a witness and the Court need not wait for the evidence
     against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested
     by crossexamination; and (ii) a person not named in the FIR or a
     person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted
F    or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under
     Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the
     basis of the evidence collected in the form of statement made
     in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears
     that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing
G    trial. [Para 6.2][110-C-E]
           3. Applying the law laid down by this Court in its various
     decisions to the case of the accused on hand, this Court is of the
     opinion that learned Trial Court was justified in summoning the
     private respondents herein to face the trial as accused on the
H
    SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                       89


basis of the deposition of the appellant – injured eye witness. As     A
held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the accused can be
summoned on the basis of even examination-in-chief of the witness
and the Court need not wait till his cross-examination. If on the
basis of the examination-in-chief of the witness the Court is
satisfied that there is a prima facie case against the proposed        B
accused, the Court may in exercise of powers under Section 319
CrPC array such a person as accused and summon him to face
the trial. At this stage, it is required to be noted that right from
the beginning the appellant herein – injured eye witness, who
was the first informant, disclosed the names of private
                                                                       C
respondents herein and specifically named them in the FIR. But
on the basis of some enquiry by the DSP they were not
charge-sheeted. What will be the evidentiary value of the enquiry
report submitted by the DSP is another question. It is not that
the investigating officer did not find the case against the
private respondents herein and therefore they were not                 D
chargesheeted. In any case, in the examination-in-chief of the
appellant injured eye witness, the names of the private
respondents herein are disclosed. It might be that whatever
is stated in the examination-in-chief is the same which was
stated in the FIR. The same is bound to be there and ultimately        E
the appellant herein – injured eye witness is the first informant
and he is bound to again state what was stated in the FIR, otherwise
he would be accused of contradictions in the FIR and the
statement before the Court. Therefore, as such, the Trial Court
was justified in directing to issue summons against the private        F
respondents herein to face the trial. [Para 7][111-C-H]
      4. The reasons assigned by the High Court for quashing
the order of the trial Court are unsustainable in law and on facts.
At this stage, the High Court was not required to appreciate the
deposition of the injured eye witness and what was required to         G
be considered at this stage was whether there is any prima facie
case and not whether on the basis of such material the proposed
accused is likely to be convicted or not and/or whatever is stated
by the injured eye witness in his examination-in-chief is
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90            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A    exaggeration or not. The aforesaid aspects are required to be
     considered during the trial and while appreciating the entire
     evidence on record. Therefore, the High Court has materially
     erred in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the
     learned Trial Court summoning the accused to face the trial in
     exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC, on the reasoning
B
     mentioned hereinabove. Even the observations made by the
     High Court referred are on probability. Therefore, the impugned
     judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable
     in law and on facts and is beyond the scope and ambit of Section
     319 CrPC. [Para 8.1][112-E-H; 113-A]
C          Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92
           : [2014] 2 SCR 1; S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra
           Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226: [2017] 10 SCR 29
           – relied on.
           Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab (2019) 6 SCC
D          638: Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC 368 :
           [2019] 8 SCR 187 – referred to.
                            Case Law Reference
     [2014] 2 SCR 1                 relied on                Para 3.6
E    (2019) 6 SCC 638               referred to              Para 3.6
     [2017] 10 SCR 29               relied on                Para 6.3
     [2019] 8 SCR 187               referred to              Para 6.4
          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
F    Nos.298-299 of 2021.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 28.08.2020 of the High Court
     of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRR No.3238/2018(O&M)
     and CRM-M No.55631/2018(O&M).
           R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Atul Kumar, Abhimanyu Sharma, Ms. Deepali,
G    Pulak Bagchi, Tarun Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
           Anil Kaushik, AAG, Haryana, Vivek Sood, Sr. Adv., Sanjay Kumar
     Visen, Sanjeev Prakash Upadhyaya, Shashi Pratap Singh, Ms. Monisha
     Handa, Mohit D. Ram, Advs. for the Respondents.

H
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                           91


      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                            A
      M. R. SHAH, J.
       1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 28.08.2020 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in revision application bearing CRR No. 3238 of
2018 and CRMM No. 55631 of 2018 by which the High Court has allowed         B
the said revision application and quashed and set aside the order dated
21.04.2018 passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the private
respondents herein, the original informant has preferred the present
appeals.
       2. As per the case of the appellant herein-original informant, the   C
appellant was attacked by the private respondents herein and other
accused persons on 27.07.2016. That the appellant got severely injured.
That a FIR was lodged by the appellant herein in which he stated that
besides Manjeet Singh, Narvair Singh and other persons namely
Palwinder Singh son of Ran Singh, Satkar Singh son of Rajwant Singh,        D
Rajwant Singh son of Gurcharan Singh and Sukhdeep Singh son of
Satnam Singh had inflicted injuries on his person. It was stated that
while he was going in his car – Mahendra XUV-500 for personal work
and stopped his car on the left side to answer the phone call, Manjeet
Singh son of Mahinder Singh, who was coming in his car from Assandh
side and a lady was sitting by his side, stopped his car next to him and    E
after rolling down his window threatened him for having ploughed his
barley crop in his capacity as the Sarpanch and while going back home
after finishing his work, he found that a car was parked diagonally on
the road. The same car was parked in which Manjeet Singh was traveling
and when he took out his head to look for the driver, Palwinder Singh       F
son of Ran Singh, Satkar Singh son of Rajwant Singh armed with lathies
and were hiding on the right side of road came and attached him and
gave lathi blows on the head. Thereafter, 10-12 persons came running
towards the car from both sides of the road. It was further stated in the
FIR that Manjeet Singh son of Mahinder Singh, Amarjit Singh son of
Ran Singh, Rajwant Singh son of Gurcharan Singh, Narvai Singh son of        G
Tarlok Singh, Sukhdev Singh son of Satnam Singh, residents of Bandrala
were holding lathies and Gandasis in their hands. Rajwant Singh came
running towards his side and switched off the engine of the car and also
opened the door lock of driver side of the car. Manjeet Singh opened the
door from outside. Manjeet Singh and Rajwant Singh both dragged him         H
92             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A    out of the car and Rajwant Singh raised a Lalkara that “today there is an
     opportunity to kill him”. On saying this, Amarjeet Singh, who was armed
     with Gandasi gave a blow on his head and Manjeet Singh, who was
     armed with Gandasi gave a blow on his left ear. Then Rajwant Singh
     who was armed with Gandasi gave blow from its front side. Thereafter,
     all these persons gave number of blows upon him and he started feeling
B
     unconscious and fell on the ground on his knees. He thought that they
     will kill him today and he was seeing his death in front of his eyes. They
     he took his revolver from the holster tied around his waist and fired with
     the same and he did not know to whom and where the shots hit. Those
     persons started running away upon his firing and while running away,
C    some persons gave blows on his right shoulder and due to which his
     revolver fell down and those assailants ran away and he also in order to
     save himself came back towards Adarsh School. He entered the Dera
     of Chhinna situated near the Adarsh School, where Bhupinder Singh
     and his father were present, whom he informed that some persons wanted
     to kill him and kindly take him to Police Station. Thereafter, Bhupinder
D
     Singh @ Pinda took him to Assandh on his motor cycle and after sometime
     he became unconscious, where the doctor gave him first aid and on
     seeing the seriousness of injuries referred him to General Hospital, Karnal.
     In the meantime, his family members also reached the Hospital, Assandh
     took him to General Hospital Karnal in the car and after considering the
E    number of injuries, the doctor referred him to PGI, Chandigarh. That, on
     the basis of the statement of the appellant, FIR no. 477 of 2016 was
     lodged for the offences under Sections 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307 and
     506 IPC. That, thereafter, the DSP, Assandh submitted a report wherein
     it was found that only four persons were involved in the dispute and the
     respondents herein who were named were found not to be involved.
F
     That, thereafter, the Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet against
     other accused, but not against the private respondents herein. That,
     thereafter, during the trial the appellant herein came to be examined by
     the prosecution as P.W.1, who was an injured witness. He named the
     private respondents herein in his evidence specifically and stood the test
G    of cross-examination. Dr. Mahinder, the Medical Officer, Civil Hospital
     was also examined as P.W.2. That, thereafter, one Bhupinder Singh who
     took the injured appellant to the hospital was also examined as P.W.7.
     That, thereafter, the appellant herein filed an application before the learned
     Trial Court under Section 319 CrPC for summoning of the additional
     accused – private respondents herein on the basis of the evidence
H
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                            93
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

recorded. That the learned Trial Court after considering the statements      A
of both – the appellant and other eye witnesses and the material on
record allowed the application under Section 319 CrPC vide order dated
21.04.2018. The private respondents herein thereafter filed two separate
revision petitions against the order passed by the learned Trial Court
summoning them, before the High Court. It appears that during the
                                                                             B
pendency of the aforesaid revision applications, as the order passed by
the learned Trial Court summoning the private respondents herein was
not stayed and therefore the learned Trial Court proceeded with the trial
and after summoning of the additional accused-private respondents herein,
18 witnesses came to have been examined by the learned Trial Court.
That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has allowed         C
the revision applications preferred by the private respondents herein and
has quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned Trial Court
summoning the additional accused-private respondents herein. Hence,
the present appeals.
       3. Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf        D
of the appellant has vehemently submitted that when the learned Trial
Court, considering the evidence on record, both documentary and oral,
allowed the application under Section 319 CrPC summoning the private
respondents herein to face the trial, the High Court is not justified in
quashing and setting aside the order summoning the private respondents
herein.                                                                      E

      3.1 It is further submitted that while quashing and setting aside
the order passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the private
respondents herein, which was in exercise of powers under Section 319
CrPC, the High Court has acted beyond the scope and ambit of Section
319 CrPC.                                                                    F

       3.2 It is submitted that the High Court has failed to appreciate
that in fact the private respondents herein were specifically named in
the FIR and thereafter even the names have been disclosed in the
evidence of the deposition of the appellant – injured eye witness. It is
submitted that therefore the learned Trial Court was justified in            G
summoning the private respondents herein in exercise of powers under
Section 319 CrPC.
      3.3 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the appellant that even the reasons assigned by the High
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94             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A    Court while reversing the order passed by the learned Trial Court are
     not sustainable in law and on facts.
             3.4 It is submitted that the High Court has erred in quashing and
     setting aside the order passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the
     private respondents herein by observing that there is no evidence except
B    the statement of the appellant herein. It is submitted that however even
     the accused can be convicted on the basis of the evidence of a single
     witness and in the present case the appellant is an injured eye witness. It
     is submitted that the appellant is subjected to cross-examination. It is
     submitted that therefore merely because there may be one witness and/
     or statement of only one person, is no ground not to summon the additional
C    accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC. It is further
     submitted that at this stage the High Court was not justified in appreciating
     the deposition/evidence of the appellant on merits. It is submitted that
     the things which are required to be done during the trial, have been done
     by the High Court at this stage of summoning the additional accused in
D    exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC. It is submitted that the
     aforesaid is wholly impermissible at the stage of considering an application
     under Section 319 CrPC.
             3.5 It is further submitted that, by the time, the High Court has
     passed the impugned judgment and order, as there was no stay in the
E    revision applications, the learned Trial Court proceeded further with the
     trial and 18 witnesses came to be examined and the trial wasat the near
     end. It is submitted that therefore also, the High Court is not justified in
     quashing and setting aside a well-reasoned order passed by the learned
     Trial Court summoning the private respondents herein in exercise of
     powers under Section 319 CrPC.
F
            3.6 Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
     of the appellant has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of
     Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 and the subsequent
     decision of this Court in Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab
     (2019) 6 SCC 638, in support of his submission that at the stage of
G    considering the application under Section 319 CrPC the High Court was
     not justified in entering into the merits and/or appreciation of the evidence
     on merits, which is required to be considered at that stage of trial. It is
     submitted that as held by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra), the
     word ‘evidence’ in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and
H    not literally as evidence brought during a trial. It is submitted that it is
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                              95
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

further held that the statement made in examination-in-chief constitutes       A
‘evidence’ and the court exercising powers under Section 319 CrPC
post commencement of trial,need not wait for evidence against person
proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination. It is
submitted that the degree of satisfaction for invoking Section 319 should
not be more than a prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing
                                                                               B
of charge but short of satisfaction to an extent that evidence, if not
rebutted, may lead to conviction of person sought to be added as accused.
      3.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeals.
       4. Shri Anil Kaushik, learned AAG, Haryana has supported the            C
present appeals and has submitted that the reasons given by the High
Court while quashing and setting aside a well-reasoned order passed by
the learned Trial Court summoning the private respondents herein in
exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC are not sustainable in law
and even on facts.
                                                                               D
      5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents
herein has vehemently opposed the present appeals.
       5.1 It is submitted that the power under Sections 319 CrPC is a
discretionary and an extra-ordinary power and has to be exercised
sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case          E
so warrant. It is submitted that it is not to be exercised because the Trial
Court is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of
committing that offence. It is submitted that where strong and cogent
evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court
that such powers should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier
manner.                                                                        F
       5.2 It is submitted that an order under Section 319 CrPC directing
summoning of additional accused cannot be passed because the first
informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other persons. It is
submitted that there must be sufficient and cogent reasons which are
required to be assigned by the Trial Court satisfying the ingredients of       G
the provisions under Section 319 CrPC. It is submitted that, in the present
case, the appellant herein reiterated the contents of his complaint in the
examination-in-chief and no new evidence was placed on record. It is
submitted that the said statement does not satisfy the test for adjudication
for an application under Section 319 CrPC, i.e. evidence on record is
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96             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A    such which would be more than what is required at the stage of framing
     of chares but less than if left unrebutted would lead to conviction.
            5.3 It is further submitted that in the examination in chief, the
     appellant has reiterated what was stated in the FIR. It is submitted that
     the allegations in the FIR were investigated/enquired into by the DSP
B    and as per his report no evidence was found against the private
     respondents herein. It is submitted that therefore the High Court is justified
     in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Trial Court.
             5.4 It is submitted that as such the appellant herein is an accused
     in FIR NO. 477, regarding the death of one Amarjeet Singh and the
C    injuries having been suffered by Manjeet Singh. It is submitted that as
     per the said FIR, Amarjeet Singh died and Manjeet Singh suffered injuries
     at the hands of the appellant Sartaj Singh using his licensed revolver. It is
     submitted that only after the FIR No. 477 was registered against the
     appellant and his accomplices, belatedly a cross case in the same FIR
     was got registered by the police on the statement of the appellant herein,
D    wherein he made up a concocted story of firing bullets in self defence. It
     is submitted that the appellant herein stated that Palwinder Singh and
     Satkar Singh have given lathi blows on the head, whereas Manjeet Singh,
     Amarjeet Singh, Rajwant Singh, Narvair Singh and Sukdev Singh were
     holding Gandasis and gave him blows on the head and face, which seems
E    to be not at all possible as rightly observed by the High Court.
            5.5 It is further submitted that even otherwise the only evidence
     against the private respondents herein was the statement of the appellant
     herein, who in fact is an interested witness in entire matter. He himself
     stands accused of killing Amarjeet Singh and grievously hurting and
F    attempting to kill Manjeet Singh in the original and earlier FIR. It is
     submitted that therefore the High Court has rightly set aside the order
     passed by the learned Trial Court observing that there was no new
     evidence that had come forward against the private respondents herein,
     rather there was a detailed enquiry corroborating the innocence of the
     respondents and doubting the version of the appellant. It is submitted
G    that the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the learned
     Trial Court has erred in exercising its jurisdiction in summoning the
     answering respondents. It is further submitted that even the deposition
     of P.W.7 Bhupinder Singh relied upon by the appellant herein does not
     support the appellant. It is submitted that in the light of the cross-
H    examination of the witness Bhupinder Singh, it appears that the entire
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                                 97
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

story has been concocted by the appellant herein in his testimony. It is          A
submitted that it raises substantial doubt about the whole version of the
accused stated in the cross case in FIR No. 477 of 2016.
      5.6 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeals.
      6. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length. What         B
is under challenge in the present appeals is the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court allowing the revision applications filed
by the private respondents herein and quashing and setting aside the
order passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the accused in
exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC and to face the trial.                  C
      6.1 While considering the rival submissions, the law on the scope
and ambit of Section 319 CrPC is required to be considered and for that
few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to.
         6.1.1 In Hardeep Singh (supra), this Court had an occasion to
consider in detail the scope and ambit of the powers of the Magistrate            D
under Section 319 CrPC, the object and purpose of Section 319 CrPC
etc. It is observed in the said decision that the entire effort is not to allow
the real perpetrator of an offence to get away unpunished. It is observed
that this is also a part of fair trial and in order to achieve this very end
that the legislature thought of incorporating the provisions of Section 319       E
CrPC. It is further observed that for the empowerment of the courts to
ensure that the criminal administration of justice works properly, the law
has been appropriately codified and modified by the legislature under
the CrPC indicating as to how the Courts should proceed to ultimately
find out the truth so that the innocent does not get punished but at the
same time, the guilty are brought to book under the law. It is also observed      F
that it is the duty of the court to find out the real truth and to ensure that
the guilty does not go unpunished. In Paragraphs 8 and 9, this Court
observed and held as under:
              “8. The constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21 of
       the Constitution of India provides a protective umbrella for the           G
       smooth administration of justice making adequate provisions to
       ensure a fair and efficacious trial so that the accused does not get
       prejudiced after the law has been put into motion to try him for
       the offence but at the same time also gives equal protection to
       victims and to society at large to ensure that the guilty does not
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98            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A          get away from the clutches of law. For the empowerment of the
           courts to ensure that the criminal administration of justice works
           properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified by the
           legislature under CrPC indicating as to how the courts should
           proceed in order to ultimately find out the truth so that an innocent
           does not get punished but at the same time, the guilty are brought
B
           to book under the law. It is these ideals as enshrined under the
           Constitution and our laws that have led to several decisions,
           whereby innovating methods and progressive tools have been
           forged to find out the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does
           not go unpunished.
C                 9. The presumption of innocence is the general law of the
           land as every man is presumed to be innocent unless proven to be
           guilty. Alternatively, certain statutory presumptions in relation to
           certain class of offences have been raised against the accused
           whereby the presumption of guilt prevails till the accused
D          discharges his burden upon an onus being cast upon him under
           the law to prove himself to be innocent. These competing theories
           have been kept in mind by the legislature. The entire effort,
           therefore, is not to allow the real perpetrator of an offence to get
           away unpunished. This is also a part of fair trial and in our opinion,
           in order to achieve this very end that the legislature thought of
E          incorporating provisions of Section 319 CrPC. It is with the said
           object in mind that a constructive and purposive interpretation
           should be adopted that advances the cause of justice and does not
           dilute the intention of the statute conferring powers on the court
           to carry out the abovementioned avowed object and purpose to
F          try the person to the satisfaction of the court as an accomplice in
           the commission of the offence that is the subject-matter of trial.”
           6.1.2 In the said case, the following five questions fell for
     consideration before this Court.
           (i)   What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC
G                can be exercised?
           (ii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC
                could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or
                the court can exercise the power under the said provision
                even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-
H               in-chief of the witness concerned?
    SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                              99
                    [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      (iii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC           A
            has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the
            evidence collected during investigation or the word
            “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
      (iv)   What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the
             power under Section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused?              B
             Whether the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be
             exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused
             summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?
      (v)    Does the power under Section 319 CrPC extend to persons
             not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged         C
             or who have been discharged?”
     6.1.3 While considering the aforesaid questions, this Court in
Hardeep Singh (supra) observed and held as under:
             12. Section 319 CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex
      damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when                 D
      guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as a beacon
      light while explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the
      enactment of Section 319 CrPC.
             13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by punishing the
      real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does        E
      not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not
      powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question
      remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the
      court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?
             14. The submissions that were raised before us covered a         F
      very wide canvas and the learned counsel have taken us through
      various provisions of CrPC and the judgments that have been
      relied on for the said purpose. The controversy centres around
      the stage at which such powers can be invoked by the court and
      the material on the basis whereof such powers can be exercised.
                                                                              G
             xxx         xxx      xxx
            17. Section 319 CrPC allows the court to proceed against
      any person who is not an accused in a case before it. Thus, the
      person against whom summons are issued in exercise of such
      powers, has to necessarily not be an accused already facing trial.      H
100      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A     He can either be a person named in Column 2 of the charge-
      sheet filed under Section 173 CrPC or a person whose name has
      been disclosed in any material before the court that is to be
      considered for the purpose of trying the offence, but not
      investigated. He has to be a person whose complicity may be
      indicated and connected with the commission of the offence.
B
             18. The legislature cannot be presumed to have imagined
      all the circumstances and, therefore, it is the duty of the court to
      give full effect to the words used by the legislature so as to
      encompass any situation which the court may have to tackle while
      proceeding to try an offence and not allow a person who deserves
C     to be tried to go scot-free by being not arraigned in the trial in
      spite of the possibility of his complicity which can be gathered
      from the documents presented by the prosecution.
             19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is
      cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be
D     inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts
      in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the
      real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating
      and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong
      that an accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved
E     even at the stage of investigation or inquiry even though he may
      be connected with the commission of the offence.
            xxx          xxx      xxx
             22. In our opinion, Section 319 CrPC is an enabling provision
      empowering the court to take appropriate steps for proceeding
F     against any person not being an accused for also having committed
      the offence under trial. It is this part which is under reference
      before this Court and therefore in our opinion, while answering
      the question referred to herein, we do not find any conflict so as
      to delve upon the situation that was dealt with by this Court
G     in Dharam Pal (CB) [Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014)
      3 SCC 306 : AIR 2013 SC 3018] .
            xxx          xxx      xxx
            47. Since after the filing of the charge-sheet, the court
      reaches the stage of inquiry and as soon as the court frames the
H     charges, the trial commences, and therefore, the power under
SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                               101
                [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised at any time after the charge-         A
sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment, except
during the stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC, committal, etc. which
is only a pre-trial stage, intended to put the process into motion.
This stage cannot be said to be a judicial step in the true sense for
it only requires an application of mind rather than a judicial
                                                                           B
application of mind. At this pre-trial stage, the Magistrate is required
to perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather than
judicial such as ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208
CrPC, and committing the matter if it is exclusively triable by the
Sessions Court. Therefore, it would be legitimate for us to conclude
that the Magistrate at the stage of Sections 207 to 209 CrPC is            C
forbidden, by express provision of Section 319 CrPC, to apply his
mind to the merits of the case and determine as to whether any
accused needs to be added or subtracted to face trial before the
Court of Session.
       xxx          xxx      xxx                                           D
       53. It is thus aptly clear that until and unless the case reaches
the stage of inquiry or trial by the court, the power under Section
319 CrPC cannot be exercised. In fact, this proposition does not
seem to have been disturbed by the Constitution Bench in Dharam
Pal (CB) [Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 306                 E
: AIR 2013 SC 3018] . The dispute therein was resolved visualising
a situation wherein the court was concerned with procedural delay
and was of the opinion that the Sessions Court should not
necessarily wait till the stage of Section 319 CrPC is reached to
direct a person, not facing trial, to appear and face trial as an
accused. We are in full agreement with the interpretation given            F
by the Constitution Bench that Section 193 CrPC confers power
of original jurisdiction upon the Sessions Court to add an accused
once the case has been committed to it.
      54. In our opinion, the stage of inquiry does not contemplate
any evidence in its strict legal sense, nor could the legislature          G
have contemplated this inasmuch as the stage for evidence has
not yet arrived. The only material that the court has before it is
the material collected by the prosecution and the court at this
stage prima facie can apply its mind to find out as to whether a
person, who can be an accused, has been erroneously omitted                H
102      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A     from being arraigned or has been deliberately excluded by the
      prosecuting agencies. This is all the more necessary in order to
      ensure that the investigating and the prosecuting agencies have
      acted fairly in bringing before the court those persons who deserve
      to be tried and to prevent any person from being deliberately
      shielded when they ought to have been tried. This is necessary to
B
      usher faith in the judicial system whereby the court should be
      empowered to exercise such powers even at the stage of inquiry
      and it is for this reason that the legislature has consciously used
      separate terms, namely, inquiry or trial in Section 319 CrPC.
            55. Accordingly, we hold that the court can exercise the
C     power under Section 319 CrPC only after the trial proceeds and
      commences with the recording of the evidence and also in
      exceptional circumstances as explained hereinabove.
              56. There is yet another set of provisions which form part
      of inquiry relevant for the purposes of Section 319 CrPC i.e.
D     provisions of Sections 200, 201, 202, etc. CrPC applicable in the
      case of complaint cases. As has been discussed herein, evidence
      means evidence adduced before the court. Complaint case is a
      distinct category of criminal trial where some sort of evidence in
      the strict legal sense of Section 3 of the Evidence Act 1872
E     (hereinafter referred to as “the Evidence Act”) comes before the
      court. There does not seem to be any restriction in the provisions
      of Section 319 CrPC so as to preclude such evidence as coming
      before the court in complaint cases even before charges have
      been framed or the process has been issued. But at that stage as
      there is no accused before the court, such evidence can be used
F     only to corroborate the evidence recorded during the trial (sic or)
      for the purpose of Section 319 CrPC, if so required. What is
      essential for the purpose of the section is that there should appear
      some evidence against a person not proceeded against and the
      stage of the proceedings is irrelevant. Where the complainant is
G     circumspect in proceeding against several persons, but the court
      is of the opinion that there appears to be some evidence pointing
      to the complicity of some other persons as well, Section 319 CrPC
      acts as an empowering provision enabling the court/Magistrate to
      initiate proceedings against such other persons. The purpose of
      Section 319 CrPC is to do complete justice and to ensure that
H
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                            103
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      persons who ought to have been tried as well are also tried.           A
      Therefore, there does not appear to be any difficulty in invoking
      powers of Section 319 CrPC at the stage of trial in a complaint
      case when the evidence of the complainant as well as his witnesses
      are being recorded.
       6.1.4 While answering Questions (iii), namely, whether the word       B
“evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC has been used in a
comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during
investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded
during trial, this Court, in the aforesaid decision has observed and held
as under:
                                                                             C
             “58. To answer the questions and to resolve the impediment
      that is being faced by the trial courts in exercising of powers
      under Section 319 CrPC, the issue has to be investigated by
      examining the circumstances which give rise to a situation for the
      court to invoke such powers. The circumstances that lead to such
      inference being drawn up by the court for summoning a person           D
      arise out of the availability of the facts and material that come up
      before the court and are made the basis for summoning such a
      person as an accomplice to the offence alleged to have been
      committed. The material should disclose the complicity of the
      person in the commission of the offence which has to be the            E
      material that appears from the evidence during the course of any
      inquiry into or trial of offence. The words as used in Section 319
      CrPC indicate that the material has to be “where … it appears
      from the evidence” before the court.
             59. Before we answer this issue, let us examine the meaning     F
      of the word “evidence”. According to Section 3 of the Evidence
      Act, “evidence” means and includes:
             “(1) all statements which the court permits or requires to
      be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under
      inquiry;                                                               G
             such statements are called oral evidence;
             (2) all documents including electronic records produced for
      the inspection of the court;
             such documents are called documentary evidence.”
                                                                             H
104      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A            xxx         xxx      xxx
             78. It is, therefore, clear that the word “evidence” in Section
      319 CrPC means only such evidence as is made before the court,
      in relation to statements, and as produced before the court, in
      relation to documents. It is only such evidence that can be taken
B     into account by the Magistrate or the court to decide whether the
      power under Section 319 CrPC is to be exercised and not on the
      basis of material collected during the investigation.
             xxx         xxx      xxx
             82. This pre-trial stage is a stage where no adjudication on
C     the evidence of the offences involved takes place and therefore,
      after the material along with the charge-sheet has been brought
      before the court, the same can be inquired into in order to
      effectively proceed with framing of charges. After the charges
      are framed, the prosecution is asked to lead evidence and till that
D     is done, there is no evidence available in the strict legal sense of
      Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The actual trial of the offence by
      bringing the accused before the court has still not begun. What is
      available is the material that has been submitted before the court
      along with the charge-sheet. In such situation, the court only has
      the preparatory material that has been placed before the court for
E     its consideration in order to proceed with the trial by framing of
      charges.
              83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be utilised,
      rather it is that material after cognizance is taken by a court, that
      is available to it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence,
F     that the court can utilise or take into consideration for supporting
      reasons to summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced
      before the court, who may be on the basis of such material, treated
      to be an accomplice in the commission of the offence. The
      inference that can be drawn is that material which is not exactly
G     evidence recorded before the court, but is a material collected by
      the court, can be utilised to corroborate evidence already recorded
      for the purpose of summoning any other person, other than the
      accused. This would harmonise such material with the word
      “evidence” as material that would be supportive in nature to
      facilitate the exposition of any other accomplice whose complicity
H
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                                105
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      in the offence may have either been suppressed or escaped the              A
      notice of the court.
              84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood
      in its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier,
      even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 CrPC.
      The court, therefore, should be understood to have the power to            B
      proceed against any person after summoning him on the basis of
      any such material as brought forth before it. The duty and obligation
      of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers
      cautiously on such material after evidence has been led during
      trial.
                                                                                 C
              85. In view of the discussion made and the conclusion drawn
      hereinabove, the answer to the aforesaid question posed is that
      apart from evidence recorded during trial, any material that has
      been received by the court after cognizance is taken and before
      the trial commences, can be utilised only for corroboration and to
      support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power             D
      under Section 319 CrPC. The “evidence” is thus, limited to the
      evidence recorded during trial.
       6.1.5 While answering Question (ii) namely, whether the word
“evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC means as arising in examination-
in-chief or also together with cross-examination, in the aforesaid decision,     E
this Court has observed and held as under:
             86. The second question referred to herein is in relation to
      the word “evidence” as used under Section 319 CrPC, which
      leaves no room for doubt that the evidence as understood under
      Section 3 of the Evidence Act is the statement of the witnesses            F
      that are recorded during trial and the documentary evidence in
      accordance with the Evidence Act, which also includes the
      document and material evidence in the Evidence Act. Such
      evidence begins with the statement of the prosecution witnesses,
      therefore, is evidence which includes the statement during                 G
      examination-in-chief. In Rakesh [(2001) 6 SCC 248 : 2001 SCC
      (Cri) 1090 : AIR 2001 SC 2521] , it was held that: (SCC p. 252,
      para 10)
                “10. … It is true that finally at the time of trial the
          accused is to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the
                                                                                 H
106      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A        witness to test its truthfulness. But that stage would not arise
         while exercising the court’s power under Section 319 CrPC.
         Once the deposition is recorded, no doubt there being no cross-
         examination, it would be a prima facie material which would
         enable the Sessions Court to decide whether powers under
         Section 319 should be exercised or not.”
B
            87. In Ranjit Singh [Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab,
      (1998) 7 SCC 149 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1554 : AIR 1998 SC 3148] ,
      this Court held that: (SCC p. 156, para 20)
                “20. … it is not necessary for the court to wait until the
C        entire evidence is collected for exercising the said powers.”
             88. In Mohd. Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007)
      14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC 1899] , it
      was held that the prerequisite for exercise of power under Section
      319 CrPC is the satisfaction of the court to proceed against a
D     person who is not an accused but against whom evidence occurs,
      for which the court can even wait till the cross-examination is
      over and that there would be no illegality in doing so. A similar
      view has been taken by a two-Judge Bench in Harbhajan
      Singh v. State of Punjab [(2009) 13 SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC
      (Cri) 1135] . This Court in Hardeep Singh [Hardeep
E     Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 16 SCC 785 : (2010) 2 SCC
      (Cri) 355] seems to have misread the judgment in Mohd.
      Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009)
      1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC 1899] , as it construed that the
      said judgment laid down that for the exercise of power under
F     Section 319 CrPC, the court has to necessarily wait till the witness
      is cross-examined and on complete appreciation of evidence, come
      to the conclusion whether there is a need to proceed under Section
      319 CrPC.
              89. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the diverse
G     views expressed in the aforementioned cases. Once examination-
      in-chief is conducted, the statement becomes part of the record.
      It is evidence as per law and in the true sense, for at best, it may
      be rebuttable. An evidence being rebutted or controverted
      becomes a matter of consideration, relevance and belief, which is
      the stage of judgment by the court. Yet it is evidence and it is
H
SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                            107
                [M. R. SHAH, J.]

material on the basis whereof the court can come to a prima facie       A
opinion as to complicity of some other person who may be
connected with the offence.
        90. As held in Mohd. Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq,
(2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC
1899] and Harbhajan Singh [(2009) 13 SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC             B
(Cri) 1135] , all that is required for the exercise of the power
under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that
some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have
been involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of
this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate
must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence.                C
Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with
respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion
and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of
evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the
power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such               D
other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses
the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried.
Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by
having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering
a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In
fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person   E
sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any
cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section
319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he
would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and                 F
advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the
basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can
proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that
the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima
facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact,
examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly         G
in itself, is an evidence.
       91. Further, in our opinion, there does not seem to be any
logic behind waiting till the cross-examination of the witness is
over. It is to be kept in mind that at the time of exercise of power
                                                                        H
108            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A           under Section 319 CrPC, the person sought to be arraigned as an
            accused, is in no way participating in the trial. Even if the cross-
            examination is to be taken into consideration, the person sought to
            be arraigned as an accused cannot cross-examine the witness(es)
            prior to passing of an order under Section 319 CrPC, as such a
            procedure is not contemplated by CrPC. Secondly, invariably the
B
            State would not oppose or object to naming of more persons as an
            accused as it would only help the prosecution in completing the
            chain of evidence, unless the witness(es) is obliterating the role of
            persons already facing trial. More so, Section 299 CrPC enables
            the court to record evidence in absence of the accused in the
C           circumstances mentioned therein.
                   92. Thus, in view of the above, we hold that power under
            Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the stage of completion of
            examination-in-chief and the court does not need to wait till the
            said evidence is tested on cross-examination for it is the satisfaction
D           of the court which can be gathered from the reasons recorded by
            the court, in respect of complicity of some other person(s), not
            facing the trial in the offence.
             6.1.6 While answering Question (iv), namely, what is the degree
      of satisfaction required for invoking the power under Section 319 CrPC,
E     this Court after considering various earlier decisions on this point, has
      observed and held as under:
                   105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and
            an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in
            those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is
F           not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge
            is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of
            committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence
            occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court
            that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier
            manner.
G
                  106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is
            to be established from the evidence led before the court, not
            necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires
            much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity.
            The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima
H
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                             109
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short     A
      of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted,
      would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the
      court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319
      CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if “it appears
      from the evidence that any person not being the accused has
                                                                              B
      committed any offence” is clear from the words “for which such
      person could be tried together with the accused”. The words
      used are not “for which such person could be convicted”. There
      is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC
      to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.
      6.1.7 While answering Question (v), namely, in what situations          C
can the power under Section 319 CrPC be exercised: named in the FIR,
but not charge-sheeted or has been discharged, this Court has observed
and held as under:
             112. However, there is a great difference with regard to a
      person who has been discharged. A person who has been                   D
      discharged stands on a different footing than a person who was
      never subjected to investigation or if subjected to, but not charge-
      sheeted. Such a person has stood the stage of inquiry before the
      court and upon judicial examination of the material collected during
      investigation, the court had come to the conclusion that there is       E
      not even a prima facie case to proceed against such person.
      Generally, the stage of evidence in trial is merely proving the
      material collected during investigation and therefore, there is not
      much change as regards the material existing against the person
      so discharged. Therefore, there must exist compelling
      circumstances to exercise such power. The court should keep in          F
      mind that the witness when giving evidence against the person so
      discharged, is not doing so merely to seek revenge or is naming
      him at the behest of someone or for such other extraneous
      considerations. The court has to be circumspect in treating such
      evidence and try to separate the chaff from the grain. If after         G
      such careful examination of the evidence, the court is of the opinion
      that there does exist evidence to proceed against the person so
      discharged, it may take steps but only in accordance with Section
      398 CrPC without resorting to the provision of Section 319 CrPC
      directly.
                                                                              H
110            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A                  xxx         xxx      xxx
                   116. Thus, it is evident that power under Section 319 CrPC
            can be exercised against a person not subjected to investigation,
            or a person placed in Column 2 of the charge-sheet and against
            whom cognizance had not been taken, or a person who has been
B           discharged. However, concerning a person who has been
            discharged, no proceedings can be commenced against him directly
            under Section 319 CrPC without taking recourse to provisions of
            Section 300(5) read with Section 398 CrPC.
             6.2 Considering the law laid down by this Court in Hardeep
C     Singh(supra) and the observations and findings referred to and
      reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that (i) the Court can exercise the
      power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the statement made
      in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned and the Court need
      not wait till the cross-examination of such a witness and the Court need
      not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned
D     to be tested by cross-examination; and (ii) a person not named in the
      FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-
      sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under
      Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the basis of
      the evidence collected in the form of statement made in the examination-
E     in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears that such person can be
      tried along with the accused already facing trial.
           6.3 In S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak (2017)
      16 SCC 226, this Court has observed and held as under: (SCC p. 243)
            “35. It needs to be highlighted that when a person is named in the
F           FIR by the complainant, but police, after investigation, finds no
            role of that particular person and files the charge-sheet without
            implicating him, the Court is not powerless, and at the stage of
            summoning, if the trial court finds that a particular person should
            be summoned as accused, even though not named in the charge-
G           sheet, it can do so. At that stage, chance is given to the complainant
            also to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon
            other persons as well who were named in the FIR but not implicated
            in the charge-sheet. Once that stage has gone, the Court is still
            not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC. However, this section
            gets triggered when during the trial some evidence surfaces against
H           the proposed accused.”
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                                111
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       6.4 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC                A
368, after considering the observations made by this Court in Hardeep
Singh (supra) referred to hereinabove, this Court has further observed
and held that even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the
complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon
other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in the
                                                                                 B
charge-sheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless
by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in FIR but
not implicated in charge-sheet can be summoned to face the trial provided
during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.
        7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the case of the accused on hand, we are of the opinion that         C
learned Trial Court was justified in summoning the private respondents
herein to face the trial as accused on the basis of the deposition of the
appellant – injured eye witness. As held by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions, the accused can be summoned on the basis of even
examination-in-chief of the witness and the Court need not wait till his         D
cross-examination. If on the basis of the examination-in-chief of the
witness the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case against the
proposed accused, the Court may in exercise of powers under Section
319 CrPC array such a person as accused and summon him to face the
trial. At this stage, it is required to be noted that right from the beginning
the appellant herein – injured eye witness, who was the first informant,         E
disclosed the names of private respondents herein and specifically named
them in the FIR. But on the basis of some enquiry by the DSP they were
not charge-sheeted. What will be the evidentiary value of the enquiry
report submitted by the DSP is another question. It is not that the
investigating officer did not find the case against the private respondents      F
herein and therefore they were not charge-sheeted. In any case, in the
examination-in-chief of the appellant-injured eye witness, the names of
the private respondents herein are disclosed. It might be that whatever
is stated in the examination-in-chief is the same which was stated in the
FIR. The same is bound to be there and ultimately the appellant herein –
injured eye witness is the first informant and he is bound to again state        G
what was stated in the FIR, otherwise he would be accused of
contradictions in the FIR and the statement before the Court. Therefore,
as such, the learned Trial Court was justified in directing to issue summons
against the private respondents herein to face the trial.
                                                                                 H
112            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 3 S.C.R.


A            8. Now, so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by the
      High Court is concerned, it appears that while quashing and setting aside
      the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the High Court has considered/
      observed as under:
                   “No evidence except the statement of Sartaj Singh, which
B           has already been investigated into by the concerned DSPs was
            relied upon by the trial Court to summon, which was not sufficient
            for exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
                   As per statement of Sartaj Singh, Palwinder Singh and Satkar
            Singh gave him lathi blows on the head. Manjeet Singh, Amarjeet
C           Singh, Rajwant Singh, Narvair Singh and Sukhdev Singh were
            holding gandasi. Manjeet Singh, Amarjeet Singha and Rajwant
            Singh gave him gandasi blows on the head and face. All the injuries
            are stated to fall in the offence under Sections 323, 324, 326, 341
            read with Section 149 IPC. In case, so many people as mentioned
            above were giving gandasi and lathies blows on the head, Sartaj
D           Singh was bound to have suffered more injuries, which would not
            have left him alive and probably he would have been killed on the
            spot. He seems to have escaped with only such injuries as have
            invited offence only under Sections 323, 324, 326, 341 read with
            Section 149 of IPC. Therefore, the trial Court erred in exercising
E           his jurisdiction summoning the other accused where exaggeration
            and implication is evident on both sides.”
             8.1 The aforesaid reasons assigned by the High Court are
      unsustainable in law and on facts. At this stage, the High Court was not
      required to appreciate the deposition of the injured eye witness and what
F     was required to be considered at this stage was whether there is any
      prima facie case and not whether on the basis of such material the
      proposed accused is likely to be convicted or not and/or whatever is
      stated by the injured eye witness in his examination-in-chief is
      exaggeration or not. The aforesaid aspects are required to be considered
      during the trial and while appreciating the entire evidence on record.
G     Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in quashing and setting
      aside the order passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the accused
      to face the trial in exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC, on the
      reasoning mentioned hereinabove. Even the observations made by the
      High Court referred to hereinabove are on probability. Therefore, the
H     impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable
     SARTAJ SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. ETC.                               113
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

in law and on facts and is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 319            A
CrPC.
       8.2 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court dated 28.08.2020 in revision application bearing CRR
No. 3238 of 2018 and CRMM No. 55631 of 2018 is hereby quashed and               B
set aside and the order passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the
private respondents herein to face the trial is hereby restored. The private
respondents herein now to face the trial as summoned by the learned
Trial Court. The present appeals are allowed accordingly.
                                                                                C
Ankit Gyan                                                   Appeals allowed.




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