Holding

Section 27's "may" is to be construed as "shall", making deposit of rent with the Controller mandatory; failure to do so amounts to a second default, justifying eviction under Section 14(1)(a) read with the proviso to Section 14(2).

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether a tenant who tendered rent by money order, which the landlord refused to accept, was required to deposit the rent with the Rent Controller under Section 27 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The Court held that the word "may" in Section 27 is to be read as mandatory, i.e., the tenant must deposit the rent with the Controller after such refusal. Because the tenant failed to do so, the Court concluded that a second default had occurred, invoking the proviso to Section 14(2) which bars protection after a second default. Consequently, the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller was proper and the High Court’s reversal was set aside. The appeal was allowed, restoring the eviction order.

Issues considered

Whether the tenant is obligated to deposit rent with the Rent Controller under Section 27 after the landlord's refusal to accept tendered rent.
Whether the term "may" in Section 27 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is mandatory (to be read as "shall").
Whether the tenant's failure to deposit rent constitutes a second default, disqualifying him from protection under the proviso to Section 14(2).
Whether the High Court erred in holding that tendering rent by money order sufficed to avoid eviction.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(a), s. 14(2), s. 15, s. 26, s. 27
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control Actevictionsecond defaultSection 27mandatory provisionlandlord-tenantrent depositstatutory construction"may" vs "shall"

Judgment

(2009] 10 S.C.R. 481
_.

- SARLA GOEL & ORS.
v.
KISHAN CHAND
A

(Civil Appeal No. 4162 of 2009)

JULY 8, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958- ss. 27, 14(1)(a) rw s. 14(2)
- Default in payment of rent - Tenant availing benefit of s.
14(2) rw s. 15 - Subsequently, committing second default in c
payment of rent - Refusal of landlord to accept the rent
tendered by tenant - Eviction on the ground of second default
uls. 14(1)(a) rlw proviso to s. 14(2) - Set aside by High Court
• - Sustainability - Held: Not sustainable - Tenant having once
availed the benefit uls. 14(2) is not entitled to such benefit in D
case if it is held to be a second default - Word 'may' occurring
in s. 27 shall be construed as 'shall', thus, tenant shall deposit
rent after refusal by landlord - Tenant did not deposit the rent
with Rent Controller in the manner required u/s.27 for the said
. period after refusal by landlord -It committed second default E
in payment of rent and is liable to be evicted - Order of High
Court set aside - Eviction order by Rent Controller restored.

The question which arose for consideration in this
appeal is whether the respondent-tenant had defaulted
in payment of rent inasmuch as he had not deposited the F
rent with the Rent Controller for the said period after the
refusal by the appellant-landlord in the manner required
under s.27 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

• Allowing the appeal, the Court G

HELD: 1.1. Section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 is a ground for eviction of a tenant for default
in payment of rent. lnspite of that, protection has been
*' 481 H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A given under section 15 of the Act to the tenant to avail of .j

the protection given by the Legislature by depositing rent
in the manner indicated in section 15 of the Act. However,
proviso to section 14(2) of the Act takes away the right
-
of a tenant of the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 14
B if the tenant having obtained such benefit once in respect
of any premises and makes a further default in payment
of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.
Therefore, it has been made clear that when the tenant
makes a second default, no protection can be given to
c the tenant from eviction. [Para 14) [495-E-G]
1.2. From a reading of sub-section (3) of section 26
of the Act, it is clear that the tenant has been given further
protection to get the rent receipt from the landlord and
in the event the landlord refuses to grant such receipt,
D the procedure has been clearly made by the Legislature
for the purpose of getting the receipt under the Act and
at the same time the landlord can be imposed to pay
damages not exceeding double the amount paid by the
tenant and the costs of the application and to obtain a
E certificate from the landlord in respect of the rent paid.
Section 27 deals with deposit of rent by the tenant. It
clearly says that where the landlord does not accept any
rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in
section 26 or refuses or neglects to deli\/er a receipt
F referred to therein or where there is a bona fide doubt as
the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the
tenant may deposit such rent with the Controller in the
prescribed manner. When the words " bona fide doubt"
has been added to section 27, the tenant may remit such
G rent to the Controller by postal money order. From a
conjoint reading of the provision and particularly section ~
27 of the Act, it cannot be doubted that the procedure
having been made by the Legislature how the rent can
be deposited if it was refused to have been received or
H
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 483

to grant receipt for the same. If that be the position, if such A
•·
protection has been given to the tenant, the said
-
'··
procedure has to be strictly followed in the matter of
taking steps in the event of refusal of the landlord to
receive the rent or to grant receipt to the tenant. Whether
the word "may" shall be used as "shall", would depend B
upon the intention of the Legislature. It is not to be taken
that once the word "may" is used by the Legislature in
section 27 of the Act, would not mean that the intention
"' of the Legislature was only to show that the provisions
under section 27 of the Act was directory but not c
mandatory. [Paras 15] [496-C-H; 497-A-C]

1.3. Taking into account the object of the Act and the
intention of the legislature, the word "may" occurring in
section 27 of the Act must be construed as a mandatory
provision and not a directory provision as the word D
"may" , was used by the Legislature to mean that the
procedure given in those provisions must be strictly
followed as the special protection has been given to the
tenant from eviction. Such a cannon of construction is
certainly warranted because otherwise intention of the E
Legislature would be defeated and the class of landlords,
for whom also, the beneficial provisions have been made
for recovery of possession from the tenants on certain
i'. grounds, ~ill stand deprived of them. [Para 16] (497-D-F]
F
1.4. The tenant/respondent had availed the benefit of
section 14(2) of the Act by its order passed by the
Additional Rent Controller. Since the tenant/respondent
has failed to deposit rent in compliance with section 27
of the Act because in the instant case, admittedly,
G
landlord/appellants had not accepted any rent tendered
• by the tenant/respondent within the time referred to in
section 26, it was the duty of the tenant to deposit such
rent before the Rent Controller as prescribed in section
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A 27 of the Act. Admittedly, this step was not taken by the
respondent which is mandatory in nature and, therefore,
the tenant/respondent had committed a second default
in payment of rent and is, therefore, liable to be evicted
-
from the suit premises. [Para 24) [503-G-H; 504-A]
B
1.5. The word "may" in the context of the Act, shall
be construed as "shall" and therefore, the tenant shall
deposit the rent after refusal by the landlord and,
accordingly, having not done so, he is liable to be evicted.
High Court was not correct in holding that the tenant/
C respondent had not failed to pay or tender arrears of rent
for the period mentioned earlier. The impugned order of
the High Court is not sustainable and is set aside and
since the tenant/respondent having committed second
default for which he is not entitled to be protected under
D the Act, the order of eviction passed by the Rent
Controller must be restored. [Paras 25, 26 and 27) [504-
B-E]

Atmaram Vs. Shakuntala Rani 2005 (7) SCC 211; E.
E Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123 - relied on.

Mohan Singh and Ors. vs. International Airport Authority
of India and Ors. 1997 (9) SCC 132, referred to.
Case Law Reference: ~

F
1997 (9) sec 132 Referred to. Para 17

2005 (7) sec 211 Relied on. Para 19,
20, 21
(2003) 1 sec 123 Relied on. Para 22
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. •
4162 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 12.12.2007 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM (Main) No. 1103 of 2007.
H
SAR LA GOEL & ORS. v. Kl SHAN. GHAND 485

Arvind Kumar Gupta and B.B. Singh for the Appellants. A

R.C. Gandhi and P.O. Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.1. Leave granted. B

2. This appeal is directed against an order dated 12th of
I
December, 2007 passed by a learned Judge of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Misc. (Main) No. 1103 of 2007,
reversing the order dated 11th of July, 2007 passed by the C
Additional Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi in RCA No. 33 of 2007
directing eviction of the respondent from premises being no.
18/15, Mandir Wali Gali, Yusuf Sarai, New Delhi - 110 016 (in
short, "the suit premises") under Section 14{1)(a) read with
Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter
0
referred to as the "Act").

3. Before we proceed further, it may be noted at the
threshold that this is a case of second default and the
respondent having once availed the benefit under Section 14(2)
of the Act is not entitled to such benefit in case if it is held to E
be a second default.

4. The facts are not in dispute. The respondent is a tenant
.. in respect of the suit premises. As noted herein earlier, it is not
disputed that the respondent has already availed of the benefit
F
of Section 14(2) read with Section 15 of the Act pursuant to
an order dated 3rd of December, 2001 passed by the
Additional Rent Controller, Delhi in Eviction Case No. E-105
of 1999. At the present juncture, it may be mentioned that the
respondent is now facing the charge of committing second G
default in payment of rent to the appellants in respect of the suit
• premises. It is also not in dispute that a demand notice dated
31st of March, 2003 was served by the appellants upon the
respondent intimating that the respondent was in arrears of rent
for three consecutive months from January, 2003 onwards. It
H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A is also not in dispute that on receipt of the said demand notice
from the appellants, the respondent had sent the arrears of rent
for three months for the period from 1st of January, 2003 to 31st
of March, 2003 by a money order dated 22nd of April, 2003. It
is also not in dispute that the appellants had refused to accept
B the money order and consequently, the money was refunded
to the respondent. The case made out by the respondent was
that he had duly complied with the provisions of the Act which
was required to be done by him and therefore, it cannot be held
that it was a case of second default whereas the case of the
c appellants either before the Rent Controller or before the High
Court was that on refusal to receive the money order by the
appellants, the respondent ought to have taken the recourse of
Section 27 of the Act by depositing the aforesaid arrears of
rent with the Rent Controller and he not having admittedly done
so, was liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the
0
ground of second default under Section 14(1)(a) read with
proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act. Reliance was placed on
behalf of the appellants before the High Court on a decision of
this Court in,_Atmaram Vs. Shakuntala Rani [2005 (7) SCC
211]. The High Court, by the impugned order, however, held
E that in view of the admitted fact that as the rents were tendered
by the respondent to the appellants and the appellants having
refused to accept the same, the respondent had duly complied
with the provisions of the Act and, therefore, there was no
second default on the part of the respondent and accordingly,
F no order for eviction could be passed on the aforesaid ground.
So far as the decision in Atmaram's case (supra) is concerned,
the High Court explained that the said decision cannot be said
to have any application to the facts and circumstances of the
present case as that was a case where the tenant had
G deposited '~ part of the arrears of rent under the Punjab Relief
of Indebtedness Act, 1934 and his defence was that the amount
•
that was deposited ought to have been treated as having paid
to the landlord. It was also explained by the High Court in the
impugned order that in the aforesaid decision, this Court held
H
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 487
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
that the deposit made under the Punjab Act could be of no avail A
to the tenant and since the deposit was not made under Section
27 of the Act, the tenant could not claim the benefit sought by
him. The decision was also distinguished by the High Court in
the impugned order that in that decision, the Supreme Court
was only considering as to whether the deposits of arrears of B
rent under the Punjab Act could be treated as payment of rent
to the landlord. It was also observed that the tenant had not
made any deposit and it was not his case that the arrears stood
paid to the landlord. The High Court further held that in the
present case, the tenant/respondent had tendered the rent by c
money order, which the landlord admittedly had refused to
receive. So far as the interpretation of Section 27 read with
Section 14(1) (a) of the Act is concerned, the High Court said
that this Section clearly says that the tenant would be entitled
I
to protection if he either pays or tenders the arrears of rent D
within two months of the service of demand. That is to say, the
tenant was required to either tender or pay the rent to earn
protection. While interpreting the word "either" and "or", the High
Court observed that these words leave no manner of doubt that
if there was a valid tender of rent within two months of the notice
of demand, the tenant would be protected. E

5. In this way, the High Court had observed that it was not
the case of a second default and therefore reversed the order
of the Rent Control Tribunal and directed that no order of
eviction could be passed as this was not a case of second F
default.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We
have also examined the relevant provisions of the Act, namely,
Delhi Rent Control Act and also the materials on record. After G
having examined the provisions of the Act as well as the
impugned order and also the order of the Rent Control Tribunal,
the only question that has arisen before us to decide in this
appe'al is whether the tenant/respondent had defaulted in
payment of rent inasmuch as he had not deposited the rent with H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A the Rent Controller for the aforesaid period after the refusal by
the landlord/appellants in the manner required by law. In order
to decide this question, we, therefore, feel it appropriate at this
stage to reproduce Section 14(1) read with Section 14(2) of
the Act, Section 15 of the Act as well as Section 27 of the Act,
s which are required to be considered by us in this appeal.
Section 14 of the Act runs as under:-

Section 14 - Protection of tenant against eviction

c (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
any other law or contract, no order or decree for the
recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by
any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a
tenant:
D Provided that the Controller may, on an application made
to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on one or more
of the following grounds only, namely: -

E (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole
of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within
two months of the date on which a notice of demand for
the arrears of rent has been served of him by the landlord
in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of
F Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882);

(b) .............. .

(c) .............. .

G (d) ............. .

(e) .............. . •

(f) .............. .

H (g) ............ .
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 489
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]

(h) ............. . A
(i) ............. ..

0) ............ .

(k) .......... . B

(I) ................ .

(2) Omitted as not required.

Section 14(2) runs as under:- c
No order for the recovery of possession of any premises
shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the
proviso to sub-section (1) if the tenant makes payment or
deposit as required by section 15:
D
Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under
this sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit once in
respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the
payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive
months. E

Section 15 of the Act runs as under :-

Section 15 - When a tenant can get the benefit of
protection against eviction
F
(1) In every proceeding of the recovery of possession of
any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the
proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, the Controller
shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard,
make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landlord G
or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date
of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at
which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears
of the rent were legally recoverable from the tenant
including the period.subsequent thereto up to the end of H
'
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 10 S.C.R.

A the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is
made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month.
by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum
equivalent to the rent at that rate.

(2) If, in any proceeding for the recovery of possession of
B
any premises on any ground other than that referred to in
sub-section (1 ), the tenant contests the claim for eviction,
the landlord may, at any stage of the proceeding, make
an application to the Controller for an order on the tenant
to pay to the landlord the amount of rent legally recoverable
c from the tenant and the Controller may, after giving the
parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order in
accordance with the provisions of the said subsection.

(3) If, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) or
D sub-section (2), there is any dispute as to the amount of
rent payable by the tenant, the Controller shall, within
fifteen days of the date of the first hearing of the
proceeding, fix an interim rent in relation to the premises
to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions
E of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be
until the standard rent in relation thereto is fixed having
regard to the provisions of this Act, and the amount of
arrears if any, calculated on the basis of the standard rent
shall be paid or deposited by the tenant within one month
F of the date on which the standard rent is fixed or such
further time as the Controller may allow in this behalf.

(4) If, in any proceeding referred to in sub<osection (1) or
sub-section (2), (here is any dispute as to the person or
persons to whom the rent is payable, me Controller may
G direct the tenant to deposit with the Controller the amount
payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
or sub-section (3), as the case may be, and in such a case,
no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in
deposit until the Controller decides the dispute and makes
H an order for payment of the same.
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 491
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
.._ (5) If the Controller is satisfied that any dispute referred to A
in sub-section (4) has been raised by a tenant for reasons
which are false or frivolous, the Controller may order the
defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with
the hearing of the application.
B
(6) If a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by
sub-section (1) or subsection (3), no order shall be made
for the recovery of possession on the ground of default in
the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Controller may
all()W such costs as he may deem fit to the landlord.
c
(7) If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required
by this section, the Controller may order the defence
against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the
hearing of the application.
D
7. Chapter IV of the Act deals with Deposit of Rent.

Section 26 of the Act clearly says that if rent is paid,
receipt of the same must be given by the landlord. Now,
the important Section is Section 27 of the Act, which runs
as under:- E

8. Section 27 - Deposit of rent by the tenant

(1) Where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered
by the tenant within the lime referred to in section 26 of
F
refuses or neglects to deliver a receipt referred to therein
or where there is a bona fide doubt as to the person or
persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant may
deposit such rent with the Controller in the prescribed
manner:
G
• [Provided that in cases where there is a bona fide doubt
as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable,
the tenant may remit such rent to the Controller by postal
money order.]
H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A (2) The deposit shall be accompanied by an application
by the tenant containing the following particulars, namely:

(a) the premises for which the rent is deposited with a
description sufficient for identifying the premises;
B
(b) the period for which the rent is deposited;

(c) the name and address of the landlord or the person or
persons claiming to be entitled to such rent;
c (d) the reasons and circumstances for which the
application for depositing the rent is made;

(e) such other particulars as may be prescribed.

D (3) On such deposit of the rent being made, the Controller
shall send in the prescribed manner a copy or copies of
the application to the landlord or persons claiming to be
entitled to the rent with an endorsement of the date of the
deposit.
E (4) If an application is made for the withdrawal of any
deposit of rent, the Controller shall, if satisfied that the
applicant is the person entitled to receive the rent
deposited, order the amount of the rent to be paid to him
in the manner prescribed:
F
Provided that no order for payment of any deposit of rent
shall be made by the Controller under this sub-section
without giving all persons named by the tenant in his
application under sub-section (2) as claiming to be entitled
G to payment of such rent an opportunity of being heard and
such order shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
persons to receive such rent being decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

(5) If at the time of filing the application under sub-section
H
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 493
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
(4), but not after the expiry of thirty days from receiving the A
notice of deposit, the landlord or the person or persons
claiming to be entitled to the rent complains or complain
to the Controller that the statements in the tenant's
application of the reasons and circumstances which led
him to deposit the rent are untrue, the Controller, after B
giving the tenant an opportunity of being heard, may levy
on the tenant a fine which may extend to an amount equal
to two months' rent, if the Controller is satisfied that the said
statements were materially untrue and may order that a
sum out of the fine realised be paid to the landlord as
. \ c
compensation. ·

(6) The Controller may, on the complaint of the tenant and
after giving an opportunity to the landlord of being heard,
levy on the landlord a fine which may' extend to an amount
equal to two months' rent, if the Controller is satisfied that D
the landlord, without any reasonable cause, refused to
accept rent though tendered to him within the time referred
to in section 26 and may further order that a sum out of
the fine realised be paid to the tenant as compensation."
E
9. Relying on the aforesaid decision, which has been
explained by the High Court in the impugned order namely
• Atmaram's Case (Supra), learned counsel Mr. Arvind Kumar
Gupta contended that in view of the mandatory provisions under
Section 27 of the Act, which clearly says that if the rent is F
refused to be accepted by the landlord and as the procedure
to be adopted by the tenant for payment of rent has been
specifically provided in Section 27 of the Act and that
procedure was not followed by the respondents after refusal by
the landlord to accept the rent for the aforesaid period, that is
G
' . . to say, after such refusal, the tenant had not deposited the rent
in compliance with Section 27 of the Act with the Rent
Controller, it must be held that the tenant had defaulted in
payment of rent by not depositing the rent, therefore it was a
case of second default which entails the tenant of eviction.
H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A Strong reliance once again was placed by the learned counsel
for the appellants on the decision in Atmaram's case (Supra).

10. Mr.Gandhi, le~rned counsel appearing on Jehalf of the
respondent, however, refuted the submission made by the
learned counsel for the appellants. He has drawn our attention
8
to Section 27 of the Act and submits that Section 27 cannot
be said to be mandatory in nature and only an obligation has
been created on the tenant either to pay the rent or tender or
to deposit the same with the Rent Controller. In the present
case, admittedly, tenant had tendered the rent to the landlord
C but he had refused to accept the same. After such refusal, it
would be open to the tenant to deposit the same in the office
of the Rent Controller but even if he does not do so, non
deposit of the rent after such refusal cannot be said to be
mandatory in nature which entails eviction of the tenant on the
D ground that he has committed second default and, therefore,
he is liable to be evicted. It was further argued by the learned
counsel for the respondent/tenant that in view of the word "may"
used in Section 27 of the Act and the Act being a beneficial
legislation for the tenant, it can never be said that the intention
E of the Legislature to use the word "may" was to mean that "may"
must be construed as "shall".

11. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned
counsel for the tenant/respondent for the following reasons :-
F It is true that in Section 27 of the Act, it has been provided
that tt.ie tenant may deposit rent when such rent was not
accepted or refused or no receipt was granted by the landlord
or there was bonafide doubt as to the person or the persons
to whom the rent was payable, the tenant may deposit such rent
G with the Rent Controller in the prescribed manner.

12. Chapter Ill deals with Control of Eviction of Tenants.
Section 14 gives a specific right to the tenants to resist
evictions. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act provides that
H no order for recovery of possession of any premises shall be
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 495
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
made on the grounds specified in Class A of the proviso to sub- A
'"·
section (1) if the tenant makes payment or deposit the rent as
""' ' required by Section 15.

13. An overall reading of Chapter Ill of the Act would clearly
show that an additional pr.Qtection has been given by the
B
Legislature to the tenant who has committed default in payment
of rent for which he is liable to be evicted under Section 14(1 )(a)
of the Act. Section 14(1 )(a) of the Act clearly provides that when
the tenant has neither paid nor tendered whole of the arrears
of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months from
the date of which a notice of payment of the arrears of rent has
c
been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in
'- Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A plain
reading of sub-section (2) of Section 14 makes it clear that a
, 1 tenant is _protected from eviction if he makes payment or
deposits the rent as required by Section 15. Section 15 deals D
with cases when a tenant can 1:1et the benefit of protection
against eviction.

14. Accordingly, Section 14(1)(a) is a ground for eviction
of a tenant for default in payment of rent. In spite of that, E
protection has been given under Section 15 of the Act to the
tenant to avail of the protection given by the Legislature by
depositing rent in the manner indicated in Section 15 of the Act.
However, proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act takes away the
-- right of a tenant of the benefit of Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 F
if the tenant having obtained such benefit once in respect of
any premises and makes a further default in payment of rent
of those premises for three consecutive months. Therefore, it
has been made clear that when the tenant makes a second
default, no protection can be given to the tenant from eviction.
G
""-- • 15. Chapter IV, however, deals with Deposit of Rent.
Section 26 of the Act provides that if the rent is paid it is the
obligation of the landlord to grant receipt for the rent paid to
him. In default of payment of rent within the time specified\
therein, the tenant is also liable to pay simple interest at the H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A rate of 15% per annum from the date on which such payment
of rent is due to the date on which it is paid. The proviso to
Section 26(2) of the Act makes it clear that it shall be open to
the tenant to remit the rent to his landlord by postal money order.
Sub-section (3) of Section 26 also makes the provision that if
B the landlord or his authorized anent refuses or neglects to
deliver to the tenant a receipt referred to in sub-section (2), the
Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by
the tenant within two months from the date of payment and after
hearing the landlord or his authorized agent, by order direct the
c landlord or his authorized agent to pay to the tenant, by way of
damages, such sum not exceeding double the amount of rent
paid by the tenant and the costs of the application and shall
also grant a certificate to the tenant in respect of the rent paid.
From a reading of sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the Act, it
is clear that the tenant has been given further protection to get
0
the rent receipt from the landlord ard in the event the landlord
refuses to grant such receipt, the procedure has been clearly
made by the Legislature for the purpose of getting the receipt
under the Act and at the same time the landlord can be
imposed to pay damages not exceeding double the amount
E paid by the tenant and the costs of the application and to obtain
a certificate from the landlord in respect of the rent paid. Now
we come to the most important provision regarding the
procedure under the Act to pay or deposit or tender rent to the
landlord, if he refuses to grant any receipt in respect of the
F payment already made to him. As quoted herein earlier, Section
27 deals with deposit of rent by the tenant. It clearly says that
where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the
tenant within the time referred to in Section 26 or refuses or
neglects to deliver a receipt referred to therein or where there
G is a bona fide doubt as the person or persons to whom the rent
is payable, the tenant may deposit such rent with the Controller
in the prescribed manner. When the words " bona fide doubt"
has been added to Section 27, the tenant may remit such rent
to the Controller by postal money order. From a conjoint
H reading of this provision referred to herein above and
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 497
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

particularly Section 27 of the Act, in our view, it cannot be A
"'
doubted that the procedure having been made by the
Legislature how the rent can be deposited if it was refused to
have been received or to grant receipt for the same. If that be
the position, if such protection has been given to the tenant, the
said procedure has to be strictly followed in the matter of taking B
steps in the event of refusal of the landlord to receive the rent
or to grant receipt to the tenant. It is well settled that whether
the word "may" shall be used as "shall", would depend upon the
intention of the Legislature. It is not to be taken that once the
word "may" is used by the Legislature in Section 27 of the Act, c
would not mean that the intention of the Legislature was only
to show that the provisions under Section 27 of the Act was
directory but not mandatory.

16. In other words, taking into consideration the object of
the Act and the intention of the Legislature and in view of the D
discussions made herein earlier, we are of the view that the
word "may" occurring in Section 27 of the Act must be construed
as a mandatory provision and not a directory provision as the
word "may" , in our view, was used by the Legislature to mean
that the procedure given in those provisions must be strictly E
followed as the special protection has been given to the tenant
from eviction. Such a cannon of construction is certainly
warranted because otherwise intention of the Legislature would
be defeated and the class of landlords, for whom also, the
beneficial provisions have been made for recovery of F
possession from the tenants on certain grounds, will stand
deprived of them.

17. In Mohan Singh and Ors. Vs. International Airport
Authority of India and Ors. 1997 (9) SCC 132, this Court while
G
dealing with the intention of the Legislature to use the word
• "may" or "shall" observed in paragraph 17 as follows :-

'The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect
of the language depends upon the language couched in
the statute under consideration and its object, purpose and H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A effect. The distinction reflected in the use of the word "shall"
or "may" depends on conferment of power. In the present
context, "may" does not always mean may. May is a must
for enabling compliance of provision but there are cases
in which, for various reasons, as soon as a person who is
B within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes
duty to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a
duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-
performance of the duty. In "Raise on Statute Law" (7th
Edn.) it is stated that the Court will, as a general rule
c presume that the appropriate remedy by common law or
mandamus for action was intended to apply. General rule
of law is that where a general obligation is created by
statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation,
statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and language
of the statute and consideration of policy at times may,
D
however, create exception showing that Legislature did not
intend a remedy (generality) to be exclusive. Words are
the skin of the language. The language is the medium of
expressing the intention and the object that particular
provision or the Act seeks the achieve. Therefore, it is
E necessary to ascertain the intention. The word "shall" is
not always decisive. Regard must be had to the context,
subject matter and object of the statutory provision in
question in determining whether the same is mandatory or
directory. No universal principle of law could be laid in that
F behalf as to whether a particular provision or enactment
shall be considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty
of Court to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature
by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or
section or a phrase under Consideration. As stated earlier,
G the question as to whether the statute is mandatory or
directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and
not always upon the language in which the intent is
couched. The meaning and intention of the Legislature
would govern design and purpose the Act seeks to
H achieve. In "Sutherland Statutory Construction" (3rd Edn)
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 499
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]

•·· Volume I at page 81 in paragraph 316, it is stated that A
although the problem of mandatory and directory legislation
is a hazard to all governmental activity, it is peculiarly
hazardous to administrative agencies because the validity
of their action depends upon exercise of authority in
accordance with their charter of existence the statute. If the B
directions of the statute are mandatory, then strict
compliance with the statutory terms is essential to the
validity of administrative action. But if the language of the
statute is directory only, the variation from its direction
does not invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, c
if the statutory direction is discretionary only, it may not
provide an adequate standard for legislative action and the
delegation. In "Crawford on the Construction of Statutes"
at page 516, it is stated that:

The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or D
directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and
ndt upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The
meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and
these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology
of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its E
design, and the consequences which would follow from
construing it the one way or the other... ."

18. It is not in dispute that in this case, according to the
landlord, this was a case of second default whereas the case F
of the tenant was that since he has already tendered the rent
to the landlord, who refused to receive the same, he had
complied with the provisions of the Act. The tenant/respondent
had already taken protection under the beneficial legislations
of the Rent Control Act once and, therefore, he ought to have G
strictly followed the procedure given in Section 27 of the Act.
•
19. In Atmaram's case (supra), this Court observed at
paragraph 19 as under :-

"It will thus appear that this Court has consistently H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A taken the views that in Rent Control Legislations if the
tenant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial
provisions of the Act, he must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Act. If any condition precedent is to
be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must
B strictly comply with that c0ndition. If he fails to do so he
cannot take advantage of the benefit conferred by such
a provision" (Emphasis supplied).

20. Again in paragraph 20 of the same decision, this
Court observed as follows :-
C
"Section 26 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
provides that every tenant shall pay rent within the time
fixed by contract, and in the absence of such contract, by
the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for
D which it is payable. Every tenant who makes a payment
of rent to his landlord shall be entitled to obtain forthwith
from the landlord or his authorized agent a written receipt
for the amount paid to him, signed by the landlord or his
authorized agent. It is also open to the tenant to remit the
E rent to his landlord by postal money order. The relevant part
of Section 27 of the Act reads as under:-

"27. Deposit of rent by the tenant- (1) Where the landlord
does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the
time referred to in Section 26 or refuses or neglects to
F deliver a receipt referred to therein or where there is a
bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the
rent is payable. the tenant may deposit such rent with the
Controller in the prescribed manner :

G Provided that in cases where there is a bona fide doubt
as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable,
the tenant may remit such rent to the Controller by postal
money order."
-
21. This Court in the aforesaid decision, after examining
H
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 501
(TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.)

.. Section 27 of the Act observed at paragraph 21 as follows :- A

"The Act, therefore, prescribes what must be done
by a tenant if the landlord does not accept rent tendered
by him within the specified period. He is required to
deposit the rent in the Court of the Rent Controller giving
B
the necessary particulars as required by Sub-section (2)
of Section 27, There is, therefore, a specific provision
which provides the procedure to be followed in such a
contingency. In view of the specific provisions of the Act it
\
would not be open to a tenant to resort to any other
procedure. If the rent is not deposited in the Court of the
c
Rent Controller as required by Section 27 of the Act. and
4
is deposited somewhere else, it shall not be treated as a
valid payment/tender of the arrears of rent within the
meaning of the Act and consequently the tenant must be
held to be in default. n D

22. In E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC, 123,
this Court while considering the provisions of the Tamil Nadu
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which is similar
to the Delhi Rent Control Act, observed at paragraph 4, 5 & 8 E
as follows :-

"4. It would be seen from the above provisions that
while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default,
on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required
F
to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify th~
name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the
tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify
the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an
obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of
arrears of rent in the account of landlord. However, if the G

-<'"
' . landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of
being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant
is required to send the amount of arrears through a money
order to the landlord after deducting the commission
payable on the money order. lfthe landlord still refuses to H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application ..
before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit
the arrears of rent under Sub-section (5) of Section 8 of
the Act.

5. Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellants
B
argued that since the appellants-tenant had deposited the
arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance
with Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no
default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and
therefore, no eviction order could have been passed
c against the appellants on that ground. According to the

-
learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view
of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account
of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way
of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the
D Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since
there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 in as much
as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or
technical view ought not to have been taken by the High
Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced
E on behalf of the appellants by the learned counsel. The rent
legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the
tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits
conferred on the tenants through the relevant statues can
be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the
F statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place
in such matters. The statute contains express provisions.
It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to
take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed
by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a
G pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe
the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict ~

compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant ......
cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. to deposit
rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier
H steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in
.. ·-
SARLA GOEL & ORS. v. KISHAN CHAND 503 '
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
this view by the decisions of this Court in Ku/deep Singh A
v. Ganpat Lal and Anr. 1996 (1) SCC 243 and M.
Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu 1996 (6) SCC 228 ..

8. Admittedly the tenant did not follow the procedure
prescribed under Section 8. The only submission that was
8
advanced on behalf of the appellants was that since the
deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought to be
taken. We are unable to agree with this. The appellants
failed to satisfy the conditions contained in Section8. Mere
refusal of the landlord to receive rent cannot justify the C
action of the tenant in straightaway invoking Section 8(5)
of the Act without following the procedure contained in the
earlier sub-sections i.e. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of
Section8. Therefore, we are of the considered view that;
the eviction order passed against appellants with respect
.. of the suit premises on the ground of default in payment D
of arrears of rent need no interference."

23. Applying the principles laid down in Atmaram's case
(Supra), as noted herein earlier, and the decision in E.
Palanisamy (Supra) and in view of our discussions made E
herein earlier and considering the object of the Act and the
intention of the Legislature, we are in respectful agreement with
the observations made, by this Court in the aforesaid two
decisions. In our view, similar facts had arisen in the present
case.
F
24. It is not in dispute that the tenant/respondent had
availed the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act by its order dated
3rd of December, 2001 passed by the Additional Rent
Controller, Delhi. Since we have already come to the conclusion
that since the tenant/respondent has failed to deposit rent in G
~ compliance with Section 27 of the Act because in the present
case, admittedly, landlord/appellants had not accepted any rent
tendered by the tenant/respondent within the time referred to
in Section 26, it was the duty of the tenant to deposit such rent
before the Rent Controller as prescribed i;1 Section 27 of the H
' 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A Act. Admittedly, this step was not taken by the respondent which
is mandatory in nature and, therefore, we must hold that the
tenant/respondent had committed a second default in payment
of rent and is, therefore, liable to be evicted from the suit
premises.
B 25. In view of our discussions made hereinabove and
considering the scope and object of the Act and the provisions
of the same, we are of the view that the word "may" in the
context of the Act, shall be construed as "shall" and therefore,
the tenant shall deposit the rent after refusal by the landlord and,
C accordingly, having not done so, he is liable to be evicted.

26. That being the position, we are unable to sustain the
order of the High Court and are of the view that the High Court
was not correct in holding that the tenant/respondent had not
o failed to pay or tender arrears of rent for the period mentioned
herein earlier.

27. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the
High Court is set aside and since the tenant/respondent having
committed second default for which he is not entitled to be
E protected under the Act, the order of eviction passed by the
Rent Controller must be restored.

28. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Additional
F Rent Control Tribunal is restored. There will be no order as to
costs.

29. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case,
we grant six months time to the respondent to deliver peaceful
G actual physical possession of the suit premises subject to filing
of a usual undertaking in this Court within a month from this
date.

N.J. Appeal allowed.