Holding

Sub‑section 15(2) of the Bombay Rents Act validates a sub‑tenancy created by a lawful sub‑tenant when the sub‑tenancy was entered into before 21 May 1959 and the sub‑tenant remained in possession on that date, thus the appellant is a lawful tenant.

Summary

Gold Field Leather Works let a building to a partnership firm, which sub‑let a shop to Manek Chand, who in turn sub‑let it to Sardar Tota Singh in 1952. Gold Field sued Manek for unlawful sub‑letting and obtained a decree for possession; Tota Singh later sued for a declaration that he was a lawful tenant and for an injunction against execution of that decree. The issue was whether sub‑section 15(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which was introduced by the 1959 amendment ordinance, validated a sub‑tenancy created by a sub‑tenant when the original sub‑tenant was a lawful tenant under a contract. The Court of Small Causes and its appellate bench held the sub‑tenancy valid, but the High Court reversed, holding the provision did not extend to sub‑tenancies created by sub‑tenants. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that sub‑section 15(2) applies to sub‑tenancies not permitted by contract, but since Manek Chand was a lawful tenant, his sub‑tenancy to Tota Singh, entered into before 21 May 1959 and continuing on that date, is valid, making Tota Singh a lawful tenant. The decree against him was set aside and the appeal was allowed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether sub‑section 15(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 validates a sub‑tenancy created by a sub‑tenant when the original sub‑tenant is a lawful tenant under a contract.
Whether the prohibition against sub‑letting in section 15(1) applies to sub‑tenancies that are permitted by contract between landlord and tenant.
Whether the appellant can claim tenancy rights and be protected from execution of the decree obtained in the respondent's suit.

Legislation cited

Subjects

sub‑lettingBombay Rent Actsection 15tenancy rightssub‑tenancy validationamendment ordinancepossessionlandlord‑tenant law

Judgment

563
A

SARDAR TOTA SINGH
B
v.
)' ',
) M/S GOLD FIELD LEATHER WORKS, BOMBAY .
• January 15, 1985 c
(R.S. PATHAK, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND V.B. ERADJ, JJ.j .....,

' 1

Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
~ , Section 15 (2)-Scope of.
-~
D
Validation of sub-letting by the 1959 Ordinance-Whether sub-tenancies
permitted by contract between landlord and tenant are included.

A building was let out to the respondent partnership firm, who sublet
a portion of a shop on the ground floor to one Manek Chand which was further
sub-let by the latter to the appellant in 1952.
,I. .,

E
'> The respondent filed a suit in 1962 against the subtenant for possession
of the premises on the ground of unlawful subletting and carryin&'.out unauthori-
sed structurai alterations. The sub-tenant resisted the suit and filed a written
L statement. During the pendency of the suit the appeilant applied to the Court for
being added as a defendant but the application was opposed by the respondent and
was rejected. The respondent's suit was ultimately decreed for possession in accor-
dance with a compromise between the parties .
.... )
F
~ The appellant thereafter filed a suit in 1966 for a declaration that he was
a lawful tenant in possession of the pre1:llises and for an injunction the restraining
respondent from executing the decree he had obtained against the sub-tenant. It
• was pleaded that he was in occupation and exclusive possession as a lawful sub-
tenant for more than fifteen years to the knowledge of the respondent and that
the decree in the respondent's suit was a collusive one and that he had become
a direct tenant of the respondent under s. 14 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. G \

~). tenants The respondent filed a written statement and pleaded that ·they were
of the entire building and that they had sublet a portion of the premises
to a sub-tenant who could not sub-let the premises further to the arprllant and
therefore the appellant's subtenancy was invalid. H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 2 S.C.R.
A The Court of Smal1 Causes decreed the suit. The respondent filed an
appeal before the Appllate Bench of the Court of Small Causes which dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the trial judge's finding that the premises had been
iublet by Manekchand to the appellant, and that on May 21, 1959 when the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordi-
nance 1959 was promulgated and sub-s. (2) of s. 15 was introduced into the
Bornbay Rent Act the subtenant was not in possession. The Appellate Bench
B rdected the submission of the appellant that he had paid rent directly to the
respondent and therefore had been accepted as a tenant. It found that no rent
had been paid by the appellant to the respondent after Manek Chand statutory •
tenancy which followed the termination of his contractual tenancy by service of
notice had itself been tern1inated by the decree tor possession in the respondent's
suit. It further held that as the appellant was undisputably in possession on May •
21, 1959, the suh-tenancy in .his favour by Maneck Chand must be deemed to
c be a valid sub-tenancy and followed the vi.ew in Josephy Santa Vincent v. An1bico
I~dustries, 70 Bombay LR 224 while dismissing the respondent's appeal.

The respondent filed a Special Civil Application in the High Court and the
High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Bench and dismissed the
appellant's suit, taking the view that having regard to' certain observations made
D in Jai Singh Morarj; & Ors. v. M/s Sarani Pvt. Ltd. & Or.1·, (1973} 2 SCR
603, an extended construction of sub-s. (2) of s.15 of the Bombay Rent Act so
as to include a sub-tenaney created by a sub-tenant was not justified.

In the appeal to this Court, on the question whether the appellant could
rightly claim tenancy rights in th premises and therefore nullify the enforcement
as against him of the decree in the respondent's suit. ~ l:

Allowing the Appeal, A:

HELD : 1. There can be no doubt that upon the amendment of sub-s. "-'
(1) of s.15 by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodiing House Rates Control
Amendment Ordinance 1959, which was brought into force on May 21, 1959 and
by its related Act, the prohibition against sub-letting did not operate in those
cases, where the sub-letting was permitted by contract between the landlord and
(
~
F tenant. In all such cases, if the landlord had permitted the tenant under a contract
between them to sub-let the premises, no question would arise of a need to ,..
validate those subtenancies The relevent amendment in sub-s. (I) of s.15 was
deemed to have always been-part of the sub-section. [569C-D]

2. Sub.s. (2) of s.15 raises the ban from all sub-letting effected before
May 21, 1959, the date of commencen1ent of the Ordinance, provided the
provisions of that sub-section are fulfilled. Any such sublease shall be
G deemed to be valid provided the sublessee has entered into possession before the
date of commencement of the Ordinance and has continued in possession on such
date. This is an special provision and marks a departure from the general law. ,.,..._.J
It does not refer to sub-tenanties which are permitted by contract between the
landlord and the tenant, but relates to sub-tenancies which are not so protected.
fl [569F-F)
TOTA SINGH v. G.F. LEATHER WORKS (Pathak, J.) 565

3. Sub-s. (2) of s.15 relates to sub-tenancies not permitted by contract
A
between the landlord and tenant and which would, but for the said sub-s. (2),
fall within the proh'bition enacted in the amended sub-section (1) of s. 15. [570C]

4. In the instant case, the respondent Goldfiled was a Tenant, Manek
Chand was a lawful sub-tenant and the latter had created a further sub-tenancy
in favour of the appellant. If regard be had to clause (a) of sub-section (ii) of B
section 5 it is apparent that in respect of the subseciuent sub-teriancy Manek
Chand could be described as a tenant and the apJ?ellant as his sub-tenant. And
if that is so, there is n-o reason why the appellant's sub-tenancy should not be
regarded as a valid sub-tenancy inasmuch as it was created before May 21, 1959
and he entered into possession of the premises before that date and was continu-
• ing in possession on that date. [571A-Bl
c
Jai Singh Morarji & Ors. v. M/s Sova11i Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [1973] 2
S.C.R. 603, referred to.

P.D. Awani v. Kavashah Dinshah Mu/la, (1953) 56 Bombay Law Repor-

.. ter 467 and Woman Shrinfras Kini v. Rat ital 1Jhagwa1,das & Co., [ 1959] Supp. 2
S.C.R. 217, held inapplicable. [572F] ))

In the instant case, having regard to the concession made on behalf of
the respondent in the Court below that Manekchand was a lawful tenant, which
necessarily implies a valid contract of tenancy between the respondent and Manek
Chand, the latter \Vas to be regarded as a .contractual tenant when he sub-Jet the
premises to the appellant. No question, therefore arises of a statutory tenant
purporting to sub· let his interest to a sub-tenant. [572F)

A1umd Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 892, referred to. E
> CIVIL APPELLATE JURISOICTION: Civil Appeal No. 682 of 1981.
L From the Judgment and Order dated the 21st June, 1980 of the
High Court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 2039 of
1975.

V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh and R.N. Karanjawala for the F
Appellant.

Soli J. Sorabjee, V N. Ganpule and Mrs V.D. Khanna for the
•
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G

PATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit for a
declaration and injunction and aises questions concerning the inter-
pretation and application of certain provisions of the Bombay Rents,
Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R,
A
Peerbhoy Mansion is a building situated at Vithalbhai Patel
Road in the city of Bombay. It was let to a partnership firm, Gold
Field Leather Works. Gold Field sublet a portion of a shop on the
ground floor to Manekchand Bhikabhai. The sub-tenant Manekchand
sublet it further to Sardar Tota Singh in 1952.
B
Gold Field filed a suit in 1962 against Manekchand for posses-
sion of the premises on the ground of unlawful subletting and carry-
ing out unauthorised structural alterations. Manekchand resisted the
suit and filed a written statement During the pendency of the suit
Tota Singh applied to the Court for being added as a defendant, but ,
c the application was opposed by Gold Field and was rejected. Gold
Field's suit was ultimately decreed for possession in accordance with
a compromise between the parties.
)

Tota Singh then filed Suit No. 2454 of 1966 for a declaration
that he was a lawful tenant in possession of the premises and for an
D injunction restraining Gold Field from executing the decree which
that firm had obtained against Manekchand. It was pleaded that he
was in occupation and exclusive possession as a lawful sub-tenan~ for
more than fifteen years to the knowledge of Gold Field, that the
decree in Gold Field's suit was a collusive decree, that as the decree
had been passed against Manekchand he, Tota Singh, had become a
direct tenant of Gold Field under s. 14 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
E and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the "Bombay Rent
Act") and that therefore he was entitled to the declaration and injunc-
tion sought in the suit.

Gold Field filed a written statement in the suit and pleaded that
they were tenants of the entire building and had sublet the premises
to Manekchand, that Manekchand as sub-tenant could not sub-let the
F premises further to Tota Singh, and therefore Tota Singh's sub-tenancy
was invalid.

The Court of Small Causes tried the suit and decreed it on
April 17, 1973. Gold Field appealed. The Appellate Bench of the
Court of Small Causes dismissed the appeal on April 30, 1975. The
G Appellate Bench affirmed the trial Judge's finding that the premises
had been sublet by Manekchand to Tota Singh in 1952, and that on
May 21, 1959, when the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 was promulgated and
sub-s. (2) of s. 15 was introduced into the Bombay Act, Manekchand
H was not in possession. In the attempt to prove that he was a lawful
TOTA SINGH v. G.F. LEATHER WORKS (Pathak, J.) 567

sub-tenant, Tota Singh urged before the Appellate Bench that Gold A
Field had permitted Manekchand to sublet the premises 'to him, but
this contention was not entertained by the Appellate Bench as there
was neither any plea nor any evidence to support it. The Appellate
Bench also rejected the submissions of Tota Singh that he had paid
rent directly to Gold Field and therefore had been accepted as a
B
tenant by them. It found that no rent had paid by Tota Singh to
Gold Field after Manekchand's statutory tenancy, which followed
)
the termination of this contractual tenancy by service of notice
had itself been terminated by the decree for possession in Gold
Field's suit One road seemed still open to Tota Singh to establish the
'
validity of his tenancy. B~fore the Appellate Bench a concession had c
been made by counsel for Gold Field. It was conceded on behalf of
Gold Field that Manekchand was their lawful sub-tenant. On that
' Tota Singh urged that if Manekchand, although a sub-tenant, was
regarded as a "tenant" by reason of sub-s. (11) of s. 5 of the Bombay
Rent Act, then the benefit of sub-s. (21 of s. 15 should be extended to
him. He wa• in possession on May 21, 1959 as the sub-tenant ofa D
lawful tenant and, therefore, the submission proceeded, his subtena-
ncy would be deemed to be valid. This contention found favour
with the Appellate Bench. Tt held that as Tota Singh was undisputedly
in possession on May 21, 1959, the sub-tenancy in his favour by
Manekchand must be deemed to be a valid sub-tenancy. At this point
a debate was raised whether the benefit of sub-s. (2) of s. 15 had to
be confined to a sub-tenancy created by a tenant or could be extended ·
E
> to a sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant. Following the. view taken
by the Bomay High Court in Josephy Santa Vincent v Arnbico /ndus-
tries.\1) the Appellate Bench answered that question in favour of
Tota Singh and dismissed Gold Field's appeal.

Gold Field filed • Special Civil Application in the High Court
F
against the order of the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes
and on June 21, 1980 the High Court set aside the decree passed by
the Appellate Bench and dismissed Tota Singh's suit. The High Court
took the view that having regard to certain observations made by this
Court in Jai Singh Morarji and Ors. v. M/s Sovani Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.(')
an extended construction of sub·s. (2) of s. 15 of the Bombay Rent
Act so as to include a sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant was not G
justified.

(I) 70 Bombay Law Reporter 224.
(2) [1973] 2 S.C.R. 603.
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.
A Tota Singh died during the pendency of the appeal in the High
Court, and accordingly this appeal has been preferred by his legal
representatives.

The material question before us is whether Tota Singh could
rightly claim tenancy rights in the premises and therefore nullify the
B
enforcement as against him of the decree in Gold Field's suit.
,
It appears that sub-s. (I) of s. 15 of I.he Bombay Rent Act as
originally enacted prohibited the sub-letting by a tenant of premises
let to him, except in the particular cases notified by the State Govern-
c ment under the proviso to that sub-section. A sub letting by the
tenant constituted a ground for his eviction under clause (e) of sub-s.
(I) of s. I 3. The rigour of the provision was relaxed by the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amend-
ment) Ordinance 1959, which was brought into force on May 21,
1959. The Ordinance was replaced by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
D Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act 19 59. In conse-
quence, sub-s. (I) of s. 15 of the Act stood amended from the incep-
tion of the Bombay Rent Act so that the prohibition against sub-
letting incorporated in it operated 'subject to any contract to the
contrary". Simultaneously, sub:s- (2) was inserted ins. 15. That provi-
sion was subsequently substituted by Maharashtra Act 38 of 1962 by
E the following provision with effect from May 21, 1959 :

"15 (2) The prohibition against the sub-letting of the
whole or any part of the premises which have been let to
any tenant, and against the assignment or transfer in any
other manner of the interest of the tenant therein, contained
F in sub-section (!), shall, subject to the provisions of this sub-
section, be deemed to have had no effect before the
commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging
House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, in any
area in which this Act was in operation before such com-
mencement ; and accordingly, notwithstanding anything
contained in any contract or in the judgment, decree or
G
order of a court, any such sub-lease assignment or transfer
or any such purported sub-lease, assignment or transfer in
favour of any person who bas entered into possession despite
the prohibition in sub-section(!), as a purported sub-lease,
assignee or transferee and bas continued in possession at
the commencement of the said Ordinance, shall be deemed
H to be valid and effectual for all purposes, and any tenant
TOTA SINGH v. G.F. LEATHER WORKS (Pathak, J.) 569

who has •ub-let any premises or part thereof, assigned or A
transferred any interest therein, shall not be liable to evic-
tion under clause (e) of sub-section (l) of section 13".

It is contended for the appellant that as the respondent conce-
ded before the Court of Small Causes that Manekchand was a
B
lawful sub-tenant, the Hi:h Court should have held that a
sub-tenancy created by such sub-tenant must be deemed valid by
reason of sub-s. (21 of s. 15 of the Bombay Rent Act It is urged that
the High Court erred in construing Jai SinKh Morarji (supra) as
laying down the contrary. The case for the respondent is that sub-s,
(2i of s.15 benefits a sub-tenancy created by the original tenant on]~ c
and does not extend to a sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant.

There can be no doubt that upon the amendment of sub-s. (I)
of s. 15 by the Ordinance and by its related Act the prohibition
against sub-letting did not operate in those cases where the sub-letting
was permitted by contract between the landlord and tenant. In all D
such cases, if the landlord had permitted the tenant under a contract
between them to sublet the premises, no question would arise of a
need to validate those sub-tenancies. The relevant amendment in sub-
s. (I) of s. 15 was deemed to have always been part of the sub-section.
It is in this light that we must determine the scope of sub-s. (2) of
E
s. 15. Sub-s. (2) of s. 15 raises the ban from all sub-letting effected
before May 21, 1959, the date of commencement of the Ordinance,
provided the provisions of that sub-section are fulfilled. Any such
•ub-lease shall be deemed to be valid provided the sub-lessee has
entered into possession before the date of commencement of the Ordi-
nance and has continued in possession on such date. This is an espe-
cial provision and marks a departure from the general law. It does F
.' not refer to sub-tenancie• which are permitted by contract between
the landlord and the tenant, ·but relates to sub-tenancies which are
not so protected. It will be noted that the removal by sub-s. (2) of
s. 15 of the prohibition is limited only to those sub-tenancies which
were created before May 21, 1959. Such a limitation would be inap-
propriate to sub-tenancies permitted by contract which could be
created regardless of whether they were brought into existence before G
May 21, 1959 or after that date. Also, the sub-tenancies covered by
sub-s (2) of s. 15 would be regarded as valid only if the sub-tenant
had entered into possession before May 21, 1959 and was continued
in possession on that date. Such a requirement would be wholly
inconsistent in the case of sub-tenancies permitted by contract.
Inasmuch as sub-s.(2) of s. 15 specifically attaches the condition that the H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1985] 2 S.C.R.

A sub-tenant should have been in possession before the commencement
of the Ordinance and should have continued in possession on that
date, it is apparent that such a provision could be related only to
illegal sub-tenants, that is to say sub-tenants who were let in and
given possession without any contractual right conferred by the land-
lord on the tenant to do so. The protection conferred by sub-s. (I)
B of s. 15 is necessary for such-tenancies only, and not for a sub-
tenancy which is permitted by the terms of the contract and which
therefore falls altogether outside the prohibition embodied in sub-s.(l)
ofs. 15. The result, therefore,,is that sub-s. (2) ofs. 15 relates to sub-
tenancies not permitted by contract between the landlord and tenant
c end which would, but for the said sub-s. (2), fall within the prohibi-
tion enacted in the amended sub-section (I) of s. 15.

Jn the present case, it was conceded on behalf of Gold Field
before the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes that
Manekchand was a lawful sub-tenant. He could not have been a law-
p ful sub-tenent by virtue of sub-s. (2) of s. 15 because on May 21, 1959
he was not in possession of the premises, which in fact had already
passed as early as 1952 into the possession of Tota Singh. Manek-
chand could have been a lawful sub-tenant only on the assumption
that the sub-tenancy was permitted under the contract between Gold
Gold Field and their landlord. As the existence of such a term in the
E contract would be a question of fact, the· concession by counsel for
Gold Field must be regarded as binding in this case on Gold Field. It
is urged for the respondent that the concession made by counsel for
Field can be of no avail because any agreement by a tenant creating a
sub-tenancy, being directly opposed to sub-s. (I) of s. 15 as originally
enacted, would be void. The submission, it seems to us, is without
- force. It must be remembered that sub-s. (I) of s. 15 was amended by
F
inserting the words "but subject to any contract to the contrary" in
( ,
1959 retrospectively, the words being deemed always to have been
inserted in that sub-section. We must take it by reason of the legal °f"
fiction employed that those words were already part of the sub-section
when Gold Field agreed to sub-let the premises to Manekchand. The
cases, P.D. Aswani v. Kavashah Dinshah Mu/la( 1 ) and Waman Shrini-
G was Kini v. Ratila/ Bhagwandas and Co.,(') on which learned counsel
for the respondent relies, were decided before suh-s. (l) of s. IS was
amended and therefore did not take into account the effect of such
amendment.

(I) [!953] 56 Bombay Law Reporter 467.
H (2) [1969] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 217.
TOTA SINGH v. G.F. LEATHER WORKS (Pathak, J.) 571

Therefore, the present case is one where Gold Field is a tenant, A
Manekbhai is a lawful sub-tenant and the latter has created a further
sub-tenancy in favour of Tota Singh. The question is whether the
further sub-tenancy can fall within the scope of sub-s. (2) of s. 15.
Now, if regard be had to clause (I) of sub-s. (11) of s. 5, it is apparent
that in respect of the subsequent subtenancy Manekbhai could be
described ~s a tenant and Tota Singh as his sub-tenant And if that is B
so, there is no reason why Tota Singh's sub-tenancy should not be
regarded as a valid sub-tenancy inasmuc'i as it was created before
May 21, 1959 and he hid entered into possession of the premises
before that date and was continuing possession on that date.

But it is urged on behalf of Gold Field that this Court has held c
in Jai Singh Morarji (supra) that sub-s (2) of s. J 5 does not validate a
sub-tenancy created by a sub-tenant. That was a case where the origi-
nal landlord filed a suit against the tenant Ochhavlal for possession
on the ground, inter alia, of illegal subletting by Ochhavlal. The suit
was decreed, and the plaintiff obtained possession. Ochhavlal had
sub-Lt the premises to Sovani and Sovani had sub-Jet them to a D
private limited company. On application by the Company against
dispossessi.on in the execution proceedings, the trial court upheld the
Company's claim to possession, but this Court ultimately rejected the
Company's claim and upheld the right of the original landlord to
possession. The facts of that case disclose that there were two prohi-
E
bited" sub-tenancies, the first was created by Ochhavlal in favour of
Sovani and the subsequent was created by Sovani in favour of the
Company. The benefit of sub-s. (2) of s. 15 could have been extended
to Sovani only if the conditions of the sub-section were satisfied If
they were satisfied in the case of Sovani, the benefit could not be
extended again in favour of the Company. That would obviously be
so because the condition as to possession on May 21, 1959 could not F
possibly be satisfied by the subsequent sub-tenant ifthe original sub-
\. ' tenant was in possession on that date. If, however, the subsequent
sub-tenant was in possession on May 21, 1959, then clearly neither
sub-tenancy can be regarded as valid. To be valid, the first sub-
tenancy bad to satisfy the condition of possession by that-sub-tenant
on May 21, 1959, which ex hypothesi was not possible. And if the
original sub-tenancy was invalid the subsequent sub-tenancy would G
also be invalid. The subsequent sub-tenancy ould be valid only
if the original sub-tenant had legal interest to transfer to the
subsequent sub-tenant. It is in the light of this analysis that the
decision of this Court in Jai Singh Morar}i (supra) needs to be appre-
ciated, in particular the passage on page 607 of the Report which
reads:
H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.
A
"The answer to the question is whether the respondent
Private Company was a sub-tenant prior to !959 and con-
tinued in possession at the commencement of the Ordinance
in 1959. Ochhavlal in the present case gave the sub-lease
to Sovani before the Ordinance. It is an indisputable feature
B in the present case that Sovani did not continue in possession
at the commencement of the Ordinance of 1959. Sovani
became a Director of the Private Company. It is the Private
Company which claims to be a sub-lessee. The Private
Company was in the first place not a sub-lessee of the tenant
but a subsequent ·assignee from the. sub-lessee. Secondly,
c Sovani who was the sub-lessee not in possession on the date
of the Ordinanc" on 21 May, 1959. It was the Private
Company whicli. was in possession. Therefore, the Private
Company is not within the protection of section 15 (2) of
the Act."

D The learned Judges were not unaware of the terms of sub-s. ( 1)
of s. 5, as is evident from the passage on page 608 of the Report.

It is then urged by learned counsel for the respondent that
clause (a) of sub·s. (ll) of s. 5 of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be
called in aid by the appellant as sub-s. (I) of s. 15 applies to
E contractual tenants only. We are referred to Anand Nivas (P) Ltd.
v. Anandji,(') where this Court laid down that the expression "tenant"
in sub-s. (l) of s. 15 of the Bombay Rent Act means a contractual
tenant and not a statutory tenant. The submission can be of no
assistance to the respondent. Having regard to the concession made
by counsel for Gold Field in the court below that Manekchand was
a lawful tenant, which position, as we have discussed earlier, neces-
F
sarily implies a valid contract of tenancy between Gold Field and
Manekchand the latter must be regarded as a contractual tenant when
he sublet the premises to Tota Singh. No question arises of a statu-
•
tory tenant purporting to sub-let his interest to a sub-tenant.

Upon the aforesaid considerations, in our judgment the appeal
G must succeed.
The appeal is allowed with costs.

·N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

H (!) (1964] 4 S.C.R. 892.