SARABHAI M. CHEMICALSversusCOMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, VADODARA

A                            SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS
                                           V.

               COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, VADO DARA

                                 DECEMBER 16, 2004
B
                      (S.N. VARIA VA, DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN
                              AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

              Central Excise Act, 1944-Section 11A(J)-Central Excise Rules,
         1944-Rule 9(2)-Excise Duty-Exemption from-Of bulk drug-By Noti-
C       fication-Product certified ds bulk drug by Drugs Controller-Exemption
        granted-Classification List and monthly returns filed by manufacturer
        approved by the Revenue-Demand of Duty by Revenue at belated stage
        denying exemption on the ground that certain amount of the goods were
        sold to the non-pharma concerns-Appeal to Tribunal-Difference of
D       opinion on the point to /imitation between Judicial Member and Technical
        Member-Matter referred to Third Member-Matter dismissed on the point
        of limitation as well as merit-On appeal, held : Third Member rightly
        decided the question of limitation as well as merit-Demand rightly raised
         by Revenue as manufacturer last the benefit of exemption Notification
         because certain quantity of the goods was admittedly diverted to non-
E       pharma concern-However the demand was time barred-No case was
         made out for invoking proviso to Section 11A(J) for extended period of
         limitation-Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1979-Section 2(a).

             Appellant was manufacturer of bulk drugs. It used to manufacture
F       Ascorbic Acid and Salts ofl.P. (Vitamin 'C') as well as sorbitol Solution
        U.S.P. By a Notification, the bulk drugs ·as- d.eflned in the Notification
        were exempted from levy of excise duty. Appellant claimed exemption
        in respect of its products. It obtained certificates from Drugs Controller
        in respect of the claim. In the Classification List exemption was sought
        on the basis of the certificates. The Classification Lists were approved
G       by the Department. Appellant cleared the goods upon submission of the
        gate passes wherein they had disclosed the names of the consignees.
        Appellant also submitted its monthly returns on excisable goods manu-
        factured by it in the prescribed RT.12 Forms, giving the particulal's of
        the goods removed, gate passes under which the goods were removed
H       etc.
                                             1010

    ..,
    .
                   SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA                    1011

                Three show-cause notices were issued to the appellants after a          A
          period of one year on the ground that appellant had wrongly availed
          nil rate of duty in respect of its clearances by not bringing to the notice
          of the department the fact that certain qualities of sorbitol solution and
          Vitamin 'C' had been sold to non-pharma concerns. Knowing fully well
          that the commodities would not be normally used as drugs or medicines         B
          by its customers and demanded excise duty u/s. llA(l) of Central Excise
          Act, 1944. The demand was confirmed by the Department.

                In appeal before Custom, Excise, Gold (Control) Appellate Tribu-
          nal, Judicial Member was of the view that as the show cause notices were
          time barred and no case was rriade out for invoking extended period of        C
          limitation and hence set aside the show cause notices. Technical Member
          disagreed with the Judicial Member. In view of difference of opinion,
          the matter was referred to the Third Member to decide whether the
          demand was time barred. He agreed with the Technical Member and
          accordingly dismissed the appeals.                                            D
               In appeal to this Court appellant contended that the Third Member
          after concurring with the Technical Member on the question of limita-
          tion should have referred the matter back to Division Bench to decide
          on merits, and dismissal of appeal without going into the merits was
          erroneous; that since the Drugs Controller had issued the certificate in      E
          favour of the appellant certifying the product as a bulk drug, its product
          met the requirement laid down in the exemption Notification and no
          further requirement remained to be complied with; that the word !Nor-
          mally' used in the Notification means "under normal circumstances"
          and the same would rule out individual end use of the product; that the       p
          Notification did not require production of end use certificate by the
          assessee and in absence of such provision Department was not entitled
          to insist on production of end use certificate; that it was not open to the
          Department to raise the dispute at belated stage by invoking Rule 9(2)
          of Central Excise Rules; that the appellant had filed Classification List     G
          and monthly Returns in RT-12 Forms from time to time which were
          duly approved and the goods were cleared after approval of the Depart-
          Rtent; and that the appellant bonafide believed that the goods were
          covered by the exemption Notification.
'......

               Allowing the appeals, the Court                                          H
     1012                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         HELD : 1. Appellants had conceded before the Tribunal of having
     cleared 3.87% of the total clearances to non-pharmaceutical companies
     who could not have used the said solution as drugs or medicines. More-
     over, the department has not demanded the duty in respect of quantity
     sold to pharmaceutical concerns for pharmaceuticals or medical pur-
     poses. In the circumstances, the Third Member was right in holding that
B
     the appellant had failed to comply with the statutory requirement of the
     exemption Notification. [1023-F-G; 1024-A]

           2.1. The bulk drug is defined under Section 2(a) of the Drugs
     (Prices Control) Order, 1979 to mean any substance including pharma-
C    ceutical, chemical biological or plant product which is used as such or
     an ingredient in any formulation. A substance may have several uses
     other than in drugs/pharmaceuticals. The eligibility for exemption under
     the exemption Notification requires the substance (sorbitol solution) to
     be actually used in manufacture of drugs/medicines/pharmaceuticals. A
D    sorbitol solution could be called a drug for the purposes of exemption
     only when it is actually used as drug or as an ingredient in any formu-
     lation. The Notification gave exemption to only those substances, which
     are, in reality, drugs and not to the substances, which are not drugs even
     though they are capable of acting as drugs. Therefore, the exeipption
     was extendable to sorbitol solution, cleared by the appellant, wh'!° used
E    in the manufacture of drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals. By dh.1erting
     a specified quantity ofsorbitol solution etc., the appellant lost the ~nefit
     of exemption and in the circumstances, the department was right in
     raising the demand. [1025-G-H; 1026-A-B-C-D]

F         2.2. In the explanation to the Notification, there are two expres-
     sions, namely "normally used" and "used as such". Both these expres-
     sions have to be read injuxta positions. If so read, it becomes clear that
     the expression "used as such" in the proviso qualifies the actual use and
     not the capability of use. These words are by way of emphasis. They are
     a condition to be actually satisfied before the exemption can be availed
G    and granted. Consequently, every manufa.cturer of a bulk drug cannot
     seek the benefit of exemption under the said Notification merely by
     reason of "normal use" of the drug. The words "normal use" indicate
     the possible use whereas the expression "used as such" indicates the
     actual use. The certificates issued by the Drugs Controller shows that         ......
,H   they did not deal with uses other than "normal uses" of such bulk drugs.
             SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA                   1013

    In the circumstances, the Tribunal was right in holding that the benefit     A
    of the exemption was available only to those drugs which went into the
    stream of diagnosis, treatment etc. and not to the use of any other profit
    making activity. [1026-G-H; 1027-A]

         3.1. Reopening of approvals/assessments is different from raising
                                                                                 B
    of demand in relation to the extended period of limitation. Under Sec-
    tion llA(l) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, a proper officer can reopen
    the approvals/assessments in cases of escapement of duty on account of
    non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, short-payment or erroneous refund,
    subject to it being done within one year from the relevant date. On the
    other hand, the demand for duty in relation to extended period is            C
    mentioned in the proviso to Section 1 lA(l). Under that proviso, in cases
    where excise duty has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied
    or short-paid or erroneously refunded on account of fraud, collusion or
    willful mis-statement or suppression of facts, or in contravention of any
    provision of the Act or Rules with intent to evade payment of duty,          D
    demand can be made within five years from the relevant date. In the
    present case, the Court is concerned with the proviso to Section llA(l).
                                                                [1027-D-E-F)

          3.2. There was no willful suppression of facts on the part of the
r   appellant as the appellant had filed the Gate Passes, Invoices and monthly   E
    returns, indicated the names of the consignees from which it was. possi-
    ble for the Department to infer sale of sorbitol solution to non-pharma-
                                                                    '
    ceuticals companies and yet no steps were taken by the department       to
    raise the demand in time and, therefore, there was no willful suppression
    of material facts for invoking the proviso to Section llA(l). In the
                                                                                 F
    present case, the demands raised by the department in the impugned
    three show-cause notices were time barred. The material placed,_ on
    record shows filing of Gate Passes, Invoices, Classification List. They
    indicated the names of the consignees. A mer~. reading of these names
    would indicate that Sorbitol Solution was sold to non-pharmaceutical
    companies. Despite such disclosure, the department approved the Clas-        G
    sification List as well as RT-12 returns. There was no reopening of the
    approvals and assessments within the stipulated period. In the circum-
    stances, the Judicial Member of the Tribunal was right in holding that
    no case was made out for invoking the extended period oflimitation. The
    end use was built in the exemption Notification. Therefore, the Depart-      H
    1014                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   ment could have demanded duty within one year from the relevant date
    under section llA(l). However, this was not done. In the absence of
    evidence of suppression of facts, the Judicial Member was right in
    setting aside the show-cause notices. [1029-D-E; 1028-E-FJ

B       3.3. Although on merits the Department succeeds, these appeals
    need to be allowed as the impugned show-cause notices-cum-demands
    were time barred and as no case is· made out by the. Department for
    invocation of the proviso to Section llA(l) of the Act. [1029-F]

        Cosmic Dye Chemical v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, (1995)
C   75 ELT 721 and Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of
    Central Excise, Bombay, (1995) 78 ELT 401, relied on.

         Jayant Vitamins Limited v. Union of India, (1991) 53 ELT 278,
    distinguished.
D
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2736-2738
    of 1999.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 11.1.98 of the Central Excise
    Customs and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in F.O. Nos.      p

E   41-43/99-C in A. Nos. E/736/91-C, E/738/91-C and E/747 of 1991-C.          '

         Ravindra Narain, Ms. Sonu Bhatnagar, Ajay Aggarwal and Rajan
    Narain for the Appellant.

F        R. Venkataramani V. Ramasubramanian, P. Parmeshwaran and B.
    Krishna Prasad for the Respondent.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           KAPADIA, J.: These appeals under section 35L(b) of Central Excise
G Act, 1944 are directed against a majority decision dated 11.1.1999 passed
    by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi,
    by which common order, the Appeal Nos.E-736/91-C, E-738/91-C and E/
    747/91-C filed by the appellant were dismissed.

H          The facts, briefly, stated are as follows:
    SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.] 1015

     Mis Sarabhai M. Chemicals, the appellant herein, is a manufacturer of        A
bulk drugs in India. It manufactures Ascorbic Acid and Salts ofl.P. (Vitamin
'C') as well as Sorbitol Solution U.S.P. The said goods fall under chapter
heading 29 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

      By notification no. 234/86 dated 3.4.1986, the Central Government           B
exempted the bulk drugs as defined in the said notification from payment
of excise duty. The appellant submitted its classification list for approval
claiming exemption under the said notification. By letter dated 17.4.1986,
the Assistant Collector permitted the appellant to clear the bulk dru_gs under
the above notification subject to production of a certificate from the Drugs
Controller, Government of India. The appellant obtained certificates from         C
the Drugs Controller dated 17.4.1986, 15.5.1986, 21.5.1986 and 6.8.1990,
in respect of their claim for exemption under the aforestated notification.
In the classification list, exemption was sought by the appellant under
notification no. 234/86 on the basis of certificates received by the appellant
from the Drugs Controller, Government of India. The classification lists          D
were scrutinized, verified and approved by the Assistant Collector. The
appellant cleared the goods upon submission of the gate passes in which they
disclosed the names of the consignees. The appellant also submitted its
monthly returns on excisable goods manufactured by it in the prescribed RT-
 12 forms, which gave the particulars of the goods removed, gate passes
under which the goods were removed etc.                                           E
      Three show-cause notices were received by the appellant on 30.12.1987,
6.4.1988 and 20.6.1988 from Collector of Central Excise, Vadodara, deny-
ing the exemption under notification no. 234/86. All the three show-cause
notices alleged that the appellant has wrongly availed nil rate of duty in        p
respect of its clearances by not bringing to the notice of the department the
fact that certain quantities of sorbitol solution and vitamin "C" had been sold
to non-pharma concerns knowing fully well that the commodities would not
be normally used as drugs or medicines by its customers. By the said show-
cause notices, the appellant was asked to show-cause inter alia as to why
excise duty should not be recovered under section 11-A(l) of the said Act         G
read with rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The said three show-
cause notices related to the period, April 1986 to November 1986, March
1984 to February 1986, and April 1986 to 30th April, 1987. The grounds
for demand stated that on verification of the records of the appellant, it was
noticed by the department that the appellant had cleared sorbitol solution        H
    1016                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   to cigarette manufacturers, which fact was not brought to the notice of the
    department at the time of clearance.

          By its reply dated 2.3.1988, 18.7.1988 and 6.10.1988 respectively, the
    appellant submitted that the Drugs Controller to the Government of India
    had issued a certificate certifying sorbitol solution etc. as a Bulk Drug after
B   scrutinizing and examining the product; that the sorbitol solution manufac-
    tured by the appellant met the requirement of the said notification; and that
    the word "normally" used in the notification did not restrict the exemption
    based on individual end use. It was urged that ifthe intention was to restrict
    use of sorbitol solution by dr~g manufacturing units only for diagnosis,
c   treatment, mediCation or in prevention of diseases or as an ingredient in any
    formulation then the Legislature would have used the word "exclusively"
    instead of the word "normally"; that the notification did not require the
                                                                      a
    appellant to ascertain the end use at the time of clearance of bulk drug
    from the factory and that once the certificate from the Drugs Controller was
    issued in terms of the notification no. 234/86, no further requirement re-
D
    mained to be complied with in the matter of availing exemption under the
    notification. It was argued that the proviso to the notification did not leave
    any scope for further enquiry regarding the end use of the product on the
    part of the proper officer to grant exemption to the product which was
    certified as 'bulk drug' by the Drugs .Controller. It was submitted that the
E   Government did not intend to put the burden of production of end use
    certificate on the appellant; that had the Government intended to do so, some
    such provision would have been made in the notification. It was further
    submitted that the certificate granted by the Drugs Controller was final for
    all clearances of bulk drugs for exemption. It was submitted that the demand
    ()f duty by the department on sorbitol solution was without jurisdiction and
F
    without any authority of law; that it was based on misinterpretation of the
    word "normally" used in the notification and consequently, the demand
    notice was bad-in-law and a nullity. It was submitted that a conjoint reading
    of the proviso and the explanation given in the ~otification indicated that
    when the Drugs Controller issues a certificate under the notification to the
G   effect that the goods in question were hulk drugs as1jiven in the explanation,
    the goods were entitled to exemption. On the point of limitation, it was
    submitted that the appellant had filed their classification list to which the
    department had never objected. It had filed RT-12 assessments and the same
    were approved by the department from time to time. The appellant bonafide
H    believed that the goods in question fell under the said notification. The
    SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.] 1017

appellant was allowed to clear the goods by the department and conse-               A
quently, invocation of rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules by the depart-
ment was not warranted, as there was no violation of rule 9(1 ). It was argued
that the normal trade pattern of putting sorbitol solution in the market was
through distributors and consequently it was impossible to get an end use
certificate at the time of clearance of the consignments at the factory gate.       B

      By orders dated 23.11.1990, 22.11.1990 and 23.11.1990, the Collector
rejected the contentions of the appellant and confirmed the demands in all
the three notices.

      Being aggrieved by the three orders passed by the Collector, the              C
appellant filed three separate appeals, referred to above, before the Customs,
Excise Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter referred
to as "the Tribunal"). The appellant argued the matter before the Tribunal
on the point oflimitation as well as on merits. The Judicial Member (J.M.)
took the view that the above show-cause notices were time barred and no             D
case was made out for invoking the extended period of limitation as the
demands mentioned in the three show-cause notices have been worked out
from the gate passes without further investigation by the department with
the consignees mentioned in the gate passes. According to the J.M., the
matter was squarely covered by the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Union of India reported in ( 1991) 53 EL T         E
278. The J.M. observed that crucial point was-Whether the app'!llant has
suppressed any facts or had cleared the goods by misrepresentation, fraud
or collusion? According to the J.M., the appellant bonafide believed that
their product was covered by the exemption notification and on the strength
 of the certificate from the Drugs Controller and their classification list, duly   F
approved by the department, they had cleared the goods and, therefore, the
department was precluded from invoking the proviso to section 1 lA(l) of
the said Act, 1944. In the circumstances, the J.M. set aside the show-cause
notices-cum-demands as time barred and allowed all the three appeals filed
by the appellant. However, in his concluding paragraph, the J.M. clarified
that the appeals stood allowed only on the question of limitation and that          G
he was not recording any order on the merits of the case.

     The Technical Member (T.M.) disagreed with the J.M. holding that the
product cleared to a pharmaceutical factory alone became "bulk drugs"; that
"bulk drugs" cleared to a pharmaceutical factory alone could be manufac-            H
    1018                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   tured and sol.d for diagnosis or treatment or prevention of diseases in human
    beings and animals; that the appellant was well aware that if they sold their
    product to a non-pharmaceutical company (consumer), it was evidently
    intended for non-medicinal use and, therefore, would not be covered by the
    exemption notification. It was observed that mere obtaining a certificate
    from the Drugs Controller by itself would not absolve the appellant, when
B
    they knowingly sold a specified quantity to non-pharmaceutical concerns
    being fully aware that those customers are not going to use the product as
    drugs or medicines. The T.M. further observed that since the language of
    the notification was clear and since it did not admit any ambiguity, there
    was no merit in the plea of the appellant that they bonafide believed that
c   the items were covered by the exemption notification. It was further held
    that in the present case, the department did not demand duty from the
    appellant in respect of the quantity sold to pharmaceutical concerns, but the
    department had demanded duty only in respect of the quantity of sorbitol
    solution and vitamin 'C' sold to non-pharmaceutical concerns. On facts, the
D   T.M. came to the conclusion that the appellant had deliberately continued
    to take benefit of the exemption notification even in respect of the quantity
    about which they were aware would not constitute a drug or medicine in
    the normal course. That it was evidently done with the intention to sell to
    the non-pharmaceutical concerns, which fact was withheld from the depart-
    ment. It was further held that indication of names of the consignees on the
E   gate passes was by itself not sufficient to exclude the extended period of
    time available to the department. Accordingly, the T.M. dismissed the
    appeals.

         In view of difference of opinion, the matter was referred by the
F   President of the Tribunal to a Third Member to decide~Whether the de-
    mand was time barred? By the impugned judgment dated 11.1.1999, the
    Third Member, concurring with the T.M., came to the conclusion that the
    appellant had wrongly taken the benefit of exemption notification to the
    extent of sorbitol solution being removed to those, who were not the manu-
    facturers of medicines and who had nothing to do with the diagnosis,
G   treatment, mitigation or prevention of diseases. It was held that when the
    appellant diverted their consignments of bulk drugs to non-pharmaceutical
    concerns, they were not complying with the statutory requirements of the
    exemption notification. According to the Third Member, "bulk drugs" were
    products which were normally used for diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or
H   prevention of diseases in human beings or animals; that they were to be
    SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.] 1019

normally used for specified purposes and that they had to be actually used       A
as bulk drug or as an ingredient in any formulation. It was observed by the
Third Member that the appellant had admitted that certain quantity of
sorbitol solution, in respect of which duty has been demanded, was cleared
in favour of non-pharmaceutical concerns and in the circumstances, the
Third Member agreed with the T.M. and accordingly dismissed the appeals.         B

by drl?ging aggrieved by the majority decision, the assessee has come to this
Court by way of appeal under section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act,
1944.

     Two points arise for determination, one is on merits and other is on        C
limitation.

       Mr. Ravindra Narain, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the
appellant submitted, at the outset, that, the impugne~ majority decision was
patently erroneous. In this connection, it was urged that the J.M. had decided   D
the question of limitation in favour of the appellant holding the demands
to be time barred and, therefore, he did not decide the question of the
applicability of the exemption notification. It was urged that when the T.M.
disagreed with the J.M. on the question of limitation, the matter was referred
to the Third Member, who while concurring with the T.M., on the question
of limitation, erroneously dismissed the appeals instead of referring them       E
back to the Division Bench to decide the question on merits. In the circum-
stances, it was urged that the impugned majority decision dated 11.1.1999
dismissing the appeals, without going into merits, was patently erroneous.

      On the question of applicability of the exemption notification, Mr.        F
Ravindra Narain, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant,
submitted that the appellant had obtained a certificate from the Drugs
Controller to the effect that the sorbitol solution was a bulk drug within the
meaning of "bulk drug" given in the explanation to the notification as they
were normally used for diagnosis, treatment, medication or prevention of
diseases in human beings. They were normally usable as "bulk drug" or as         G
an ingredient in any formulation. Since the Drugs Controller had issued the
certificate in favour of the appellant certifying sorbitol solution as a bulk
drug, the appellant's product met the requirement laid down in the exemp-
tion notification. According to the learned advocate, the word "normally"
as used in the notification has to be assigned a dictionary meaning to mean      H
    1020                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   "under normal circumstances" or "ordinarily". The word "normal'', accord-
    ing to the learned advocate, is to be read as opposed to the word "excep-
    tional". According to the learned advocate, in using the word "normally",
    one is referring to something which is opposed to abnormal or exceptional.        ...
    Accordjng to the learned advocate, the word "normally" used in the noti-
B   fication cannot restrict the exemption. That the word "normally" would rule
    out individual end use of the product. According to the appellant, if it was
    the intention of the Legislature to restrict use of sorbitol
    manufacturing units only for diagnosis, treatment, medication etc., nothing
    prevented the Legislature from using the word "exclusively" instead of the
    word "normally". According to the appellant, the exemption notification did
c   not require the manufacturers to ascertain the end use at the time of clearance
    of bulk drug from the factory. It was urged that once the certificate from
    the Drugs Controller was issued in terms of the notification no. 234/86, no
    further requirement remained to be complied with in the matter of taking
    exemption in the notification. There was no requirement of production of
D   end use certificate by the assessee in the said exemption notification and in
    the absence of such provision, the department was not entitled to insist on
    production of the end use certificate. In the circumstances, it was submitted
    that the demand of duty made by the department on the bulk drug, manu-
    factured by the appellant, sorbitol solution was without jurisdiction and
    without authority of law. The authority had wrongly denied legitimate
E   exemption to the appellant and, therefore, the demand notices were bad-in-
    law and nullity.

          On the question of limitation, it was submitted on behalf of the appel-
    lant that they were manufacturing bulk drugs for which they have filed
F   classification list from time to time under Chapter 29 (Tariff Item 29.42).
    The department had approved the classification lists. On approval, the
    appellant had cleared the goods. The department had never objected to such
    clearances. The appellant was not asked to clear the goods under provisional
    assessment. The appellant has been filing RT-12 forms from time to time.
    These forms were approved by the department from time to time. According
G   to the appellant, as per the proviso to the exemption notification, the manu-
    facturer who sought to take exemption was required to furnish a certificate
    from the Drugs Controller, to the effect that the drug for which exemption
    was claimed was a bulk product within the meaning of "bulk drugs" given
    in the explanation to the notification. It was ·submitted that on conjoint
H    reading of the proviso and the explanation, once a certificate of the Drugs
    SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.]             1021

Controller was produced in connection with the goods in question, they were A
entitled to exemption. It was urged that where two interpretations of the
notification exist, the benefit should accrue to the assessee. It was urged that
in the present case, the appellant believed that sorbitol solution and vitamin
'C' stood covered under the exemption notification no. 234/86 and the
appellant was allowed to clear the said goods by the department. Therefore, B
it was not open to the department to raise the dispute at a belated stage, by
invoking rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, particularly, when.
there was no violation of rule 9(1). It was further contended that the normal
trade pattern of putting sorbitol solution LP. in the market was through the
distributors and, therefore, it was difficult for the appellant to obtain an end
use certificate at the time of clearance of the said goods at the factory gate.  c
 Lastly, it was urged that out of quantity, on which duty has been demanded,
only 29850 Kgs. have been cleared to non-pharmaceutical units, namely,
soaps, ceramics, rubber and cigarette units which represented 3.87% of the .
total clearances during the period in dispute and, therefore, 96% of the total
clearances was to the pharmaceutical concerns and in the circumstances, the D
 department was not right in invoking the extended period of limitation.

     Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of
the department submitted that the Third Member to whom the reference was
made has recorded a finding that the appellant has not contested the matter
on merits. He pointed out that the Third Member.to· whom the reference was       E
made concluded that the appellant had availed of the benefit of the exemp-
tion notification in respect of the µuantities of sorbitol solution cleared in
favour of non-pharmaceutical corvipanies. Learned senior advocate submit-
ted on behalf of the department th~t they were not demanding duty in respect
of the quantity sold to pharmaceutical concerns for pharmaceutical or            F
medicinal purposes. The department was demanding duty only in respect
of that quantity of sorbitol solution which admittedly has been sold to non-
pharmaceutical companies, knowing fully well that they would not be used
as drugs or medicines. In the circumstances, it was urged that both the
questions, of limitation and applicability of exemption notification, have
been decided by the impugned decision and in the circumstances, there was        G
no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Third
Member should have referred back the matter to the Division Bench for
deciding the question on merits.

     On the question of applicability of the notification, learned senior        H
    1022                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   advocate appearing on behalf of the department submitted that the word
    "bulk drug" is defined under section 2(a) of the Drugs (Prices Control)
    Ord_er, 1979, enacted in exercise of the powers conferred under section 3
    of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was urged that the explanation
    to the exemption notification no. 234/86 has borrowed the definition of
B   'bulk drug' from section 2(a) of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1979 to
    mean any substance including pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant
    product conforming to pharmacopoeia) standards accepted under the Drugs
    & Cosmetics Act, 1940, which is used as such or as an ingredient in any
    formulation. It was submitted that the certificate issued by the Drugs
    Controller, in the present case, was a reproduction of the explanation to the
c   notification. The said certificate did not deal with the uses other than the
    "normal uses" of such bulk drugs. It was urged that there are distinct
    categories of bulk drugs, namely, the class of drugs, which are normally
    used for diagnosis, prevention and mitigation of diseases and "used as such",
    as opposed to other classes which are not normally used but which are also
D   capable of being used for the diagnosis, treatment etc. In the circumstances,
    it was urged that there was no need for using the word "exclusive" as is
    canvassed on behalf of the appellant. It was submitted that the key expres-
    sion in the notification, namely, "normally used" and "used as such" should
    be given their purposive meaning in order to facilitate the taking of the
    benefit of exemption as also to prevent the abuse of the exemption. The
E   words "normally used" indicated 'bulk drugs' whose predominant use is for
    the diagnosis, treatment etc. and which were otherwise capable of being used
    for other purposes. These bulk drugs stood apart from drugs which may not
    be normally used in diagnosis, treatment, prevention or mitigation of dis-
    eases. The latter class of drugs did not fall within the scope of exemption
F   notification. Similarly, the first category of drugs referred to above, if and
    when diverted for other uses, would also get excluded. In the circumstances,
    the department was right in raising the demand on the appellant.

           On the question of limitation, it was urged on behalf of the department
    that under the Self Removal Procedure, unlike the physical control proce-
G   dure, the gate passes -were not required to be endorsed at the time ofremoval.
    The gate passes used by the appellant were pre-authenticated by the proper
    officer. The gate passes were required to be supported by the RT-12 returns
    (monthly returns) to be submitted in terms of rule 1730 (3). It was submitted
    that rule l 73B required filing of classification list and rule l 73C required
H    filing of a price list. All that the proper officer was required to do, when
     SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.]                1023

RT-12 returns were filed, was to endorse, approve or disapprove the above            A
list. Therefore, the completion of assessment under the Self Removal Pro-
cedure did not relieve the assessee, where exemption was claimed, from
giving all details relevant for the purpose of endorsing the contents of the
gate passes. It was submitted that clearance to a non-pharmaceutical user
without giving further details, except the name of the consignee, would              B
amount to suppression of facts. In the alternative, it was submitted that even
assuming for the sake of arguments that the proper officer was either remiss,
negligent or in default in not asking for further information, at the time of
endorsing the RT-12 returns every month, the omission on the part of the
assessee in not disclosing the end use cannot be condoned. The law allows
a period of five years to trace the wrong in any manner. In this connection,         c
reliance was also placed on section 1 lA of the Act. In any event, the
satisfaction of the proper officer, even when there is no full disclosure,
cannot be said to be final and beyond review. It cannot debar the department
from reopening the approvals and assessments. The assessee cannot be
permitted to take advantage of its own illegal act. In the circumstances, it         D
was urged that no inference is called for in the present case.

      We do not find any merit in the preliminary submission made on behalf
of the appellant. In the present case, we are concerned with exemption
notification. It is well settled that an exemption notification has to be strict\y
interpreted. The conditions for taking the benefit of the exemption have to          E
be strictly interpreted. In the present case, the Third Member has rightly
rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that more than
one view was possible on interpretation of exemption notification no. 234/
86. The Third Member has recorded a finding that the appellant has not
disputed that a certain quantity of sorbitol solution and vitamin 'C' stood          F
cleared to non-pharmaceutical units, namely, soaps, ceramics, rubber and
cigarette units. The appellant had conceded before the Tribunal of having
cleared 3.87% of the total clearances to non-pharmaceutical companies who
could not have used the said solution as drugs or medicines. Moreover, in
the present case, the department has not demanded the duty in respect of
quantity sold to pharmaceutical concerns for pharmaceuticals or medicinal            G
purposes. In the present case, the dispute was not whether the appellant was
entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification in respect of the entirety
of goods manufactured and cleared during the period in question, but the
dispute was regarding the taking of exemption benefit under the notification
in respect of the quantum of bulk drugs cleared to consumers other than the          H
    1024                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   pharmaceutical concerns. In the circumstances, the Third Member was right
    in deciding the question oflimitation as well as the question of applicabiiity
    of exemption notification no. 234/86. In any event, the said two questions
    are interlinked and, therefore, we do not find any merit in the preliminary
    objection raised on behalf of the appellant.
B
          Before going into the question of applicability of the exemption no-
    tification and in order to understand the arguments advanced before us, we
    quote herein below the notification no. 234/86-CE dated 3.4.1986:

                   "G.S.R. 593(E):-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-
c            rule ( 1) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Ru Jes, 1944, the Central
             Government hereby exempts bulk drugs, falling under Chapter 28
             or Chapter 29 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985
             (5 of 1986), from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon
             under section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:
D
                  Provided that the manufacturer furnishes to the proper officer,
             a certificate from the Drugs Controller to the Government of India,
             within such period as the said officer may allow, to the effect that
             the drugs or chemicals which are claimed for exemption under this
             notification are the bulk drugs within the meaning of the bulk drugs
E            given in the Explanation to this notification, and are normally used
             for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or· prevention of diseases
             in human beings or animals, and used as such or as an ingredient
             in any formulation.


F            Explanation:- In this notification, "bulk drugs" means any chemi-
             cal or biological or plant product, conforming to pharmacopoeia)
             standards, normally used for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or
             prevention of diseases in human beings or animals, and used as
             such or as ingredient in any formulation."
                                                     (Emphasis supplied by us)
G
         To understand the controversy, we also quote hereinbelow the certifi-
    cate dated 17.4.1986 issued by the Drugs Controller:

             "This is to certify that the undermentioned Bulk Drugs manufac-
H            tured by Mis Sarabhai M. Chemicals, a Divn. of Ambalal Sarabhai
        SARABJ-IAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.] 1025

            Enterprises Ltd., Baroda, under the Drug Licence number as shown         A
            against each are the bulk drugs which can be used in the manufac-
            turer of formulation i.e. drugs which are used for the diagnosis,
            treatment, mitigation or prevention of diseases in human beings or
            animals, and used as such or as an ingredient in formulations.
                                                                                     B
            Sr. No.    Name of Bulk Drugs                  Licence No.

             l.        Ascorbic acid l.P.               Form 28 No. G/22
                       (Vitamin C)                       dated 17.3.1981

            2.         Vitamin C 'coated'                     - do -                 c
                       (Ascorbic acid 'coated')

            3.         Sodium ascorbate U.S.P.                 - do -

            4.         Sorbitol Solution U.S.P.         Form 25 No. G-55
                                                                                     D
                                                          on 17.3.1981"

          A bare reading of the notification no. 234/86 indicates that the exemp-
    tion in favour of bulk drugs falling under chapter 28 or chapter 29 of the,
    schedule annexed to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 is not an uncon-
    ditional exemption. The said notification had a proviso. Under the proviso,      E
    the manufacturer was required to furnish to the Competent Authority a
    certificate from the Drugs Controller to the effect that the drug for which
    exemption was claimed was a ''bulk drug" within the meaning of the
    expression "bulk drug" given in the explanation to the notification and,


-   which was normally used for diagnosis, treatment etc. in human beings or
    animals and used as such or as an ingredient in any formulation. The
    explanation to the notification defines "bulk drugs" to mean any chemical,
    biological or plant product, normally used for diagnosis, treatment etc. in
                                                                                     F



    human beings or animals and used as such or as an ingredient in any
    formulation. The question is-Whether in the said exemption notification,
    end use of the bulk drug was made imperative. According to the appellant,        G
    mere production of the certificate from the Drugs Controller was sufficient.
    to attract the benefit of the exemption notification. We do not find any merit
    in this argument. The bulk drug is defined under section 2(a) of the Drugs
    (Prices Control) Order, 1979 to mean any substance including pharmaceu-
    tical, chemical, biological or plant product which is used as such or as an      H
    1026                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   ingredient in any formulation. A substance may have several uses other than
    in drugs/pharmaceuticals. The eligibility for exemption under notification
    no. 234/86-CE dated 3.4.1986 requires the substance (sorbitol solution) to
    be actually used in manufacture of drugs/medicines/pharmaceuticals. In
    other words, sorbitol solution may have different uses. However, sorbitol
B   solution got the benefit of exemption only when it was used actually in
    manufacture of drugs/medicines/pharmaceuticals. The exemption was given
    to a drug. It was not given to a sorbitol solution, which has uses other than
    in pharmaceuticals. A sorbitol solution could be called a drug for the
    purposes of exemption only when it was actually used as drug or as. an
    ingredient in any formulation. The notification no. 234/86 gave exemption
c   to only those substances, which are, in reality, drugs and not to the sub-
    stances, which are not drugs even though they are capable of acting_ as drugs.
    Therefore, the exemption was extendable to sorbitol solution, cleared by the
    appellant, when used in the manufacture of drugs, medicines, pharmaceu-
    ticals. By diverting a specified quantity of sorbitol solution etc. to liquor
D   units, cigarettes units, soap units etc., the appellant lost the benefit of
    exemption and in the circumstances, the department was right in raising the
    aforestated demand.

           Our interpretation is supported by the language of the notification.
E   Under the proviso read with the explanation to the said notification, there
    were three conditions required to be satisfied by way of certification by the
    Drugs Controller: Firstly, that the bulk drugs should have the same meaning
    as mentioned in the explanation to the notification. Secondly, that such bulk
    drugs should be normally used for the specified purposes; and, thirdly, that
    the "bulk drugs" are used as such or as an ingredient in any formulation.
F   Plainly read, the third condition has to mean that the goods, for which
    exemption was sought, were actually used as such or as an ingredient in any
    formulation. If the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant is ac-
    cepted then the second and third condition would have the same meaning
    and there would be no point in specifying them as separate conditions. In
G   the explanation to the notification, we have two expressions, namely, "nor-
    mally used" and "used as such". We have to read both these expressions
    in juxtaposition. If so read, it becomes clear that the expression "used as
    such" in the proviso qualifies the actual use and not _the capability of use.
     These words are by way of emphasis. They are a condition to be actually
H    satisfied before the exemption can be availed and granted. Consequently,
    SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.]             1027

every manufacturer of a bulk drug cannot seek the benefit of exemption           A
under the said notification merely by reason of "normal use" of the drug.
The words "normal use" indicate the possible use whereas the expression
"used as such" indicates the actual use. The certificates issued by the Drugs
Controller, quoted above, shows that they did not deal with uses other than
"normal uses" of such bulk drugs. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was         B
right in holding that the benefit of the exemption was available only to those
drugs which went into the stream of diagnosis, treatment etc. and not to the
use ofany other profit making activity. In the circumstances, on the question
of applicability of the notification, we do not find any infirmity in the
impugned decision of the Tribunal.
                                                                                 c
      Now coming to the question of limitation, at the outset, we wish to
clarify that there are two concepts which are required to be kept in mind
for the purposes of deciding this case. Reopening of approvals/assessments
is different from raising of demand in relation to the extended period of
limitation. Under section 11 A(l) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, a proper D
officer can reopen the approvals/assessments in cases of escapement of duty
on account of non-levy, non-payment, short-levy, short-payment or errone-
ous refund, subject to it being done within one year from the relevant date.
On the other hand, the demand for duty in relation to extended period is
mentioned in the proviso to section 11 A(l ). Under that proviso, in cases E
where excise duty has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or
short-paid or erroneously refunded on account of fraud, collusion or wilful ·
mis-statement or suppression of facts, or in contravention of any provision
of the Act or Rules with intent to evade payment of duty, demand can be
made within five years from the relevant date. In the present case, we are
concerned with the proviso t_o section I IA(l).                               F

      In the .case of Cosmic Dye Chemical v. Collector of Central Excise,
Bombay reported in (1995) 75 ELT 721, this Court held that intention to
evade duty must be proved for invoking the proviso to section l lA(l) for
extended period of limitation. It has been further held that intent to evade     G
duty is built into the expression "fraud and collusion" but mis-statement and
suppression is qualified by the preceding word "wilful". Therefore, it is not
correct to say that there can be suppression or misstatement of fact, which
is not wilful and yet constitutes a permissible ground for invoking the
proviso to section 11 A.
                                                                                 H
    1028                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A        In case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central
    Excise, Bombay reported in ( 1995) 78 EL T 40 I, this Court has held that the
    extended period of five years under the proviso to section 11 A( l) is not
    applicable just for any omission on the part of the assessee, unless it is a
    deliberate attempt to escape from payment of duty. Where facts are known
B   to both the parties, the omission by one to do what he might have done and
    not that he must have done does not constitute suppression of fact.

         Applying the tests in the aforestated judgments to the facts of the
    present case, we find that the demands raised by the department in the
    impugned three show-cause notices were time-barred. The first show-cause
c   notice was dated 30.12.1987. It was in respect of period 1.4.1986 to
    30.11.1986. The second show-cause notice was dated 6.4.1988. Under the
    said notice, the department has demanded duty for the period 1.3 .1984 to
    28.2.1986. The last show-cause notice was dated 20.6.1988, for the period
    1.4.1986 to 30.4.1987. Therefore, section l lA(l) was not applicable.
D
          The question is, whether in the present case, there was any wilful
    suppression of facts. On facts, as stated above, we find that the appellant
    had filed a classification list indicating notification no. 234/86 dated 3.4.1986
    as well as the chapter under which the goods fell. We have gone through
    the classification list. It indicates the claim for exemption. The classification
E   list was duly approved by the department. So also monthly returns were filed
    by the appellant in the form of RT-12, in which there was a complete
    disclosure regarding the nature of the goods. These returns were regularly
    assessed by the department. The material placed on record shows filing of
    gate passes, invoices, classification list. They indicated the names of the
p   consignees. A mere reading of these names would indicate that sorbitol
    solution was sold to non-pharmaceutical companies like, M/s Golden To-
    bacco Co. Ltd. Despite such disclosure, the department approved the clas-
    sification list as well as RT-12 returns. There was no reopening of the
    approvals and assessments within the stipulated period. In the circum-
    stances, the Judicial Member of the Tribunal was right in holding that no
G   case was made out for invoking the extended period of limitation. As stated
    above, the end use was built in the exemption notification. Therefore, the
    department could have demanded duty within one year from the relevant
    date under section l lA(l). However, this was not done. In the absence of
    evidence of suppression of facts, the J.M. was right in setting aside the show-
H   cause notices.
     SARABHAI M. CHEMICALS v. C.C.E., VADODARA [KAPADIA, J.]               1029

      In the case of Jayant Vitamins Limited v. Union of India reported in          A
(1991) 53 ELT 278, show-cause notice-cum-demand was issued by the
department alleging pon-user of bulk drugs for specified purpose. In that
matter, goods were cleared without payment of duty, as in the present case,
on the basis of certificate from Drugs Controller. In that case, same noti-
fication no. 234/86 was relied upon by the assessee. However, on facts, the         B
High Court found that the assessee had disclosed the relevant facts in the
gate passes and, therefore, it was held that the department was not entitled
to invoke the proviso to section l IA(l). In our view, the judgment of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jayant Vitamins Ltd. (supra), is not on the
applicability of the notification no. 234/86, as it is sought to be urged on
behalf of the appellant. The said judgment is only on the point of limitation.
                                                                                    c
It only states that the department was not entitled to invoke the proviso to
section 11 A(l) as the assessee had indicated in the gate passes the material
facts. On this point, before concluding, we may mention that in the present
case, we have come to the conclusion that there was no wilful suppression
of facts on the part of the appellant as the appellant had filed the gate passes,   D
invoices and monthly returns, which were all duly approved by the depart-
ment from time to time. The invoices, gate passes and the monthly returns
indicated the names of the consignees from which it was possible for the
department to infer sale of sorbitol solution to non-~harmaceutical compa-
nies and yet no steps were taken by the department to raise the demand in           E
time and, therefore, we hold that there was no wilful suppression of material
facts for invoking the proviso to section 1 IA(l). The facts of the present
case are not confined only to gate passes clearances. In such cases, it would
not be proper to Courts to rely on the evidence furnished only by gate passes.

      In the circumstances, although on merits the department succeeds,             F
these appeals need to be allowed as the impugned show-cause notices-cum-
demands were time barred and as no case is made out by the department
for invocation of the proviso to section l IA(l) of the said Act.

      Before concluding, we may point out that numerous judgme;its were
cited on behalf of the appellant under the Food Adulteration Act, the
Essential Commodities Act and the matters concerning classification dis-
pute. It is not necessary for us to burden this judgment with those cases,
particularly, in view of the fact that in the present case, we are concerned
with interpretation of an exemption notification.                                   H
    1030                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A        Subject to above, these civil appeals stand allowed. The majority
    decision dated 11.1.1999 passed in Appeal Nos.E-736/91-C, E-738/91-C
    and E/74 7/91-C by the Customs, Excise and Go id (Control) Appellate
    Tribunal, New Delhi is hereby set aside. Consequently, the three show-
    cause-cum-demand notice.> dated 30.12.1987, 6.4.1988 and 20.6.1988 are
B   hereby set aside as time barred. In the facts and circumstances of the case,
    there will be no order as to costs.

    K.K.T.                                                    Appeals allowed.




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