Holding

A tenant in possession of a demised property by the vendor is not liable to ejectment except as provided in Section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, and therefore the appellate decree was unlawful.

Summary

Dalip Kaur sold her land to Jeet Kanwar in 1967. Zail Singh obtained a decree of pre-emption and attempted to take possession of the property, which was then occupied by the appellant who claimed to be a tenant of the vendor since before 1957. The trial court granted a perpetual injunction in favor of the appellant, but the appellate and high courts reversed, holding that the pre‑emptor's title, once acquired, entitled him to evict the tenant. The Supreme Court held that, under Section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, a tenant in possession of a demised property by the vendor cannot be ejected except in accordance with the specific grounds listed in that section. Consequently, the appellate and high court judgments were set aside and the trial court decree was restored.

Issues considered

Whether a tenant in possession of a demised property by the vendor can be evicted by a pre‑emptor without complying with Section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953.
Whether tenancy rights created by the vendee bind the pre‑emptor after the pre‑emptor acquires title.

Legislation cited

Subjects

pre-emptiontenant evictionPunjab Security of Land Tenures ActSection 9perpetual injunctionlandlord-tenant lawcivil procedure

Judgment

SANWAT SINGH A
v.
ZAIL SINGlf AND ORS.

'•'
DECEMBER 17, 1996
B
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Pu11jab Security of La11d Tenures Act, 1953 : Section 9.

Pre-emptio11-D, owner of prope~rop~rty sold to J-Z obtained a
decree of pre-emption and interfered with possession of appellant who was in c
possession of property-Suit filed by appellant for perpetual injunction
restraining Z from i11terfering with possessiorr-Trial Court found that appel-
Zant was in possessio11 prior to 1957 and granted decree accordingly-Appel-
late Court reversed the decree-Decree Affinned by High Court in second
appeal-Appeal before Supreme Court-Held a tena11t in possession of the
demised property by the vendor is not liable to ejectment except in accordance
D
with the provisions contained in Section 9-lt is 11ot the case of appella11t that
he has contravened any of the provisions and is liable to be ejected-Even
otherwise, if his case is that he has contravened any of the provisions, unless
appropriate action in accordance with law is taken and order passed, he is
entitled to resist unlawful interference with the possessiorr-Thereby, the E
decree gra11ted by the appellate Court a11d co11finned by the High Court is not
...- correct in law.

Hukam Singh v. Hakumat Raj, (1967) PLR 743, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 922 of F
1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.86 of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 848 of 1977.
G
Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.

-.)_
The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Punjab
& Haryana High Court, made on 16.11.1986 in RSA No. 848/77. H
275
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996) sup/10 S.C.R.

A The admitted and proved facts are that one Dalip Kaur daughter of
Inder Singh was the owner· of the property in question. She sold the
property oh April 14, 1967 to Smt~Jeth Kanwar. Zail Singh had filed a suit
for pre-emption of the sale and obtained a decree of pre-emption on
October 9, 1969. Thereafter, he sought to interfere with the possession of
B the appellant who was admittedly in possession of the said property.
Therefore, the appellant filed the suit in question for perpetual injunction
restraining Zail Singh and any other person from interfering with his
possession. He claimed to be a tenant prior to 1957 from Dalip Kaur and
was, therefore, entitled to remain in possession uninterruptedly as such.
The trial Court found that he was in possession as a tenant prior to 1957
C and accordingly granted the decree of perpetual injunction against the
respondents. On appeal, the appellant Court reversed the decree holding
that the appellant had come into possession of the suit property some time
in 1968 after the sale was made in favour of Jeet Kanwar. Since Dalip Kaur
had pre-empted the property sold by her mother, the tenancy right created
D by Jeet Singh in favour of the appellant did not bind Jeet Singh-defendant.
Having obtained the pre- emption, he had right to take physical possession
of the property dispossessing the appellant. As a consequence, the injunc-
tion was not correct in law. That was affirmed by the High Court in the
second appeal following the ratio of the judgment of th:e Full Bench of the
High Court in Hukam Singh v. Hakumat Rai, (1967) PLR 743.
E
Mr. Prem Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
contends that even accepting the finding of the appellate Court, without
conceding that he was not a tenant prior to 1957, the findings recorded by
the appellate Court are unsustainable in law and the application of the
F judgment of the Full Bench to the facts in this case is not warranted.
Therefore, the decree of the trial Court is correct in law. In support
thereof, he relied upon proposition Nos. (i), (ii) and (iv) laid in the
judgment of the Full Bench which read as under :

(i) The title of a pre-emptor in respect of the pre- empted property
G accrues from the date on which payment of the purchase money
and costs (if any) is made by him in accordance with the provisions
of Order XX, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure;

(ii) On such title accruing to him the pre-emptor is entitled to
H deli".ery of possession of the property in question from the vendee
SANWATSINGHv. ZAILSINGH m
including any person who has happened to possess the property A
through the vendee after the original sale;

(iv) a tenant inducted into pre-emptible property by a vendee after
its sale in his favour does not become the tenant of the pre-emptor
after title to the property passes to the latter by devolution of B
interest; as the vendee is not the predecessor-in-interest of the
pre-emptor;"

Though notice has been served on the respondent, they are not
appearing either in person or through counsel. Having considered the
contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that C
there is force in the same. It is seen that Proposition No. (i) lays that the
title of the pre-emptor in respect of the pre-empted property accrues from
the date on which payment of the purchase money and the costs, if any, is
made by him in accordance with the provisions of Order XX Rule 14, CPC.
In other words, he acquires the title only from the date of the deposit of D
the pre-emption money and the ~osts, if any, into the Court. Proposition
No. (ii) envisages that the pre-emptor is entitled to delivery of possession
of the property in question from the vendee including any person who
happened to 1mssess the property through the vendee after the original
sale. Proposition No. (iv) provides that a tenant inducted into pre-emptible
property by a vendee after its sale in his favour does not become the tenant E
of the pre,emptor, after the title to the property passes to the latter by
devolution of interest, as.the vendee is not the predecessor-in-interest, of
the pre-emptor. It is seen that since he acquired the title to the property
only after the purchase money was deposited into the Court, the natural
consequence would be that any tenancy rights of any person created by the p
predecessor vendee or possessory right given by the vendor binds the
vendee and to the .... or person in lawful possession. It is seen that the
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 defines a tenant to mean a person who holds
the land under another person and is, or but for a special contract, would
be, liable to pay rent for that land to that other person. In other words, a
tenant who is holding a land under the vendor is a tenant within the G
- ..(_
meaning of Punjab Tenancy Act. Section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land
Tenures Act, 1953 specifically bars ejectment of a tenant except under
certain conditions. Conditions enumerated are as under :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A being in force, no land owner shall be competent to eject a tenant
except when such tenant -

(i) is a tenant on the area reserved under this Act or is a tenant
of a small landlord; or

B (ii) fails to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause; or

(iii) is in arrears of rent at the commencement of this Act; or

(iv) has failed, or fails without sufficient cause, to cultivate the land
comprised in his tenancy in the manner or to the extent customary
c in the locality in which the land is situated; or

(v) has used or use the land comprised in his tenancv in a manner
' ,
which has rendered, or renders it unfit for the purpose of which
he holds it; or
D
(vi) has sublet the tenancy or a part thereof provided that where
only a part of the tenancy has been sublet;

the tenant shall be liable to be ejected only from such part".

E In other words, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force, including the law relating to prescription, a
tenant in possession of a demised property by the vendor is not liable to
ejectment except in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 9
of the Punjab Security of Land. Tenures Act, 1953. It is not his case that
F he has contravened any of the provisions and is liable to be ejected. Even
otherwise, if his case is that he has contravened any of the provisions, unless
appropriate action in accordance with law is taken and order passed, he is
entitled to resist unlawful interference with the possession. Thereby, the
decree granted by the appellate Court and confirmed by the High Court
G is not correct in law.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The Judgement and decree of the
High Court and of the appellate Court stand set aside and that of the trial
Court stands restored. No costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.