SANTOSH KUMARIversusSTATE OF J & K & OTHERS

                   (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1054

A                         SANTOSH KUMARI
                                   v.
                    STATE OF J & K & OTHERS
             (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1660-1662 of 2011)
                        SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
B
            [J.M. PANCHAL AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]

         CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1989 (1933 A.D.)
    (as applicable in the St;ite of Jammu and Kashmir):
c
       ss.267 to 269 - Framing of charge - Held: Every charge
  framed under the Code should state the offence with which
  the accused is charged and if the Jaw which creates the offence
  gives it pny specific name, the offence should also be
0 described in the charge by that name only - Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973.
        Bail - Interim bail - Accused charg~d for committing
   offence ulss.302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of the Ranbir Penal
   code - Trial court framed the charge which contained
E particulars as to the time, place, date of the offence of rioting
   and the place where the deceased succumbed to his injuries
  - High Court set aside the order of the trial court framing the
  charges against the accused observing that mere mention of
  the sections of the Jaw in the charge was likely to prejudice
F the accused in his trial and that he would be disabled to know
  the exact charge he had to face and remanded the case to
  the trial court to consider it in terms of ss.267 to" 269 and also
  directed release of all the accused except accused 'S' - On
  appeal, held: The order of the High Court was erroneous -
G The nature of charge was clearly understood by each accused
  - The cross-examination of eye. witnesses on behalf of the
  accused indicated that none of the accused was in fact
  misled by so.-ca/led error pointe"d out by High Court - The
  remand of case to trial court for fresh consideration on the
H                                 1054
   SANTOSH KUMAR! v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.                1055


point of charge was not warranted at all, as there was nothing A
to suggest even remotely that the accused had or would have
been misled by any error or omission in the charge - The
order admitting the accused except accused 'S' to interim bail
of Rs.25,0001- each to the satisfaction of the-..trial court
pending consideration of the prosecution case afresh on B
question of charge, was not warranted nor justified at all - The
fact that accused were involved in commission of murder
 which entails death or life imprisonment should have been
 taken into consideration before releasing them on interim bail
- Trial court after having considered the gravity of the offence  c
 and the apprehension on the part of the prosecution that the
 accused would tamper with the evidence in the event of their
 release on bail had rightly refused to enlarge the accused on
 bail - High Court while granting the relief of bail to the accused
 completely ignored and overlooked the relevant factors which
                                                                    0
  weighed heavily against the accused - Moreover, the fact that
 complainant and one of the witnesses were physically
 assaulted and threatened in the Court premises has to be
  given its due weight - The FIR was pending necessary
  investigation wherein the statement of the son of the appellant E
  was recorded uls. 164 - The contents of the FIR would indicate
  that the accused either themselves or through their relatives
  would try to tamper the evidence which is going to be led by
  the prosecution in the case - Under the circumstances,
  release of the accused on interim bail is set aside - Ranbir
  Penal code - ss.302, 109, 147, 148, 149.                          F
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

     Object of - Held: Like all procedural laws, the Code of
Cnminal Procedure is devised to subserve the ends of justice G
and not to frustrate them by mere technicalities - It regards
some of its provisions as vital but others not, and a breach of
the latter is a curable irregularity unless the accused is
prejudiced thereby.
                                                                   H
    1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A       Framing of charge - Object of - Held: The object of the
   charge is to give the accused notice of the matter he is
  charged with and does not touch jurisdiction - If, therefore, the
  necessary information is conveyed to him in other ways and
  there is no prejudice, the framing of the charge is not
B invalidated - The object of the statement of particulars to be
  mentioned in the charge is to enable the accused person to
  know the substantive charge, he will have to meet and to be
  ready for it before the evidence is given - The extent of the
  particulars necessary to be given in the charge depends upon
c the facts and the circumstances of each case - In drawing up
  a charge, all verbiage should be avoided - However, a charge
  should be precise in its scope and particular in its details -
  The charge has to contain such particulars as to the time and
  place of the alleged offence and the person against whom it
  was committed as are reasonably sufficient to give the
0
  accused notice of the matter with which he is charged - Code
  of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (1933 A.O.) (as applicable in the
  State of Jammu and Kashmir).

        The prosecution case was that the husband of the
E appellant-complainant was assaulted by respondent
   nos.3 to 8. The victim was rushed to hospital where he
   died after 2-3 days. On March 24, 2008, the trial court
 . framed charges against each accused for offences
   punishable under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of the
F Ranbir Penal Code. Respondent nos.3 to 7 filed revision
   petition before the High Court. The High Court called for
   the records of the case. Respondent no.8 filed a petition
   under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. for quashing the order
   passed by the trial court framing charges. During
G pendency of the petitions, the High Court sent back the
   records of the case and granted liberty to respondent
   nos. 3 to 8 to seek bail from the trial court. Meanwhile, the
   prosecution had examined three witnesses to the
   occurrence.
H
  SANTOSH KUMARI v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.           1057


    Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court, A
respondent nos. 3 to 8 applied for bail before the trial
court. The trial court rejected the bail applications.
Respondent nos.3 to 7 moved bail applications before
the High Court. On 10.8.2010, the High Court directed
production of evidence of witnesses. On 13.8.2010, the B
brother of respondent no.3 physically assaulted and
threatened the son of the appellant as well as other
witnesses to refrain them from deposing against the
accused.

     Respondent Nos. 3 to 8 argued before the High C
Court that the charge was invalid because there was no
mention in the order of the trial court indicating the
specific offence found to have been prima facie
committed by one or the other accused individually or
jointly nor there was any indication regarding the specific D
names of the offences sufficient for description in the
order of framing charge, but only sections of the law
against which the offences were found to have been
committed were mentioned. On 20.10.2010, the High
Court set aside the order of the trial court framing the E
::harges against respondent nos.3 to 8 and remanded the
case to the trial court to consider it in terms of Sections
267 to 269, Cr.P.C. By the said order, the High Court
:lirected release of all the accused persons except
·espondent no.3. The instant appeals were filed F
-::hallenging the order of the High Court.

    Disposing of the appeals, the Court

     HELD: 1. The provisions relating to framing of charge
lgainst the accused before the trial commences, are          G
.::ontained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1989 (1933
A.O.) which is applicable to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. The statute requires that every charge· framed
under the said code should state the offence with which
                                                             H
     1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

            '
A the accused is charged and if the law which creates the
    offence gives it any specific name, the offence should
    also be described in the charge by that name only. The
    statute further requires that the law and section of the law
    against which the offence is said to have been committed
B has to be mentioned in the charge. It is a fundamental
    principle of criminal law that the accused should be
   informed with certainty and accuracy the exact nature of
   the charge brought against him. The object of the
   statement of particulars to be mentioned in the charge is
c to enable the accused person to know the substantive
   charge, he will have to meet and to be ready for it before
   the evidence is given. The extent of the particulars
   necessary to be given in the charge depends upon the
   facts and the circumstances of each case. It is well
   settled law that in drawing up a charge, all verbiage
0
  should be avoided. However, a charge should be precise
   in its scope and particular in its details. The charge has
  to contain such particulars as to the time and place of the
  alleged offence and the person against whom it was
  committed as are reasonably sufficient to give the
E accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.
  One of the requirements of law is that when the nature
  of the ·case is such that the particulars mentioned in the
  charge do not give the accused sufficient notice of the
  matter with which he is charged, the charge should
F contain such particulars of the manner in which alleged
  offence was committed as would be sufficient for that
  purpose. If 'A' is accused of the murder of 'B' at a given
  time and place, the charge. need not state the manner in
  which 'A' murdered 'B'. [Para 6) [1067-G-H; 1068-A-E]
G
        2. Like all procedural laws, the Code of Criminal
    Procedure is devised to subserve the ends of justice and
    not to frustrate them by mere technicalities. It regards
    some of its provisions as vital but others not, and a
H
  SANTOSH KUMAR! v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.           1059


breach of the latter is a curable irregularity unless the A
accused is prejudiced thereby. It places errors in the
charge, or even a total absence of a charge in the curable
class. The object of the charge is to give the accused
notice of the matter he is charged with and does not touch
jurisdiction. If, therefore, the necessary information is B
conveyed to him in other ways and there is no prejudice,
the framing of the charge is not invalidated. The essential
 part of this part of law is not any technical formula of
 words but the reality, whether the matter was explained
 to the accused and whether he understood what he was c
 being tried for. Sections 34, 114 and 149 of the IPC
 provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles
 as regards actual participants, accessories and men
 actuated by a common object or a common intention.
 [Para 7] [1068-F-H; 1069-A-C]
                                                             D
     Willie Slavey v. The State of M.P. 1955 (2) SCR 140 -
followed.
     3~ A fair and reasonable reading of the order dated
March 24, 2008 made it abundantly clear that accused E
'RS' on June 28, 2007 at Sanoora about 9.30 pm with
criminal intention along with other accused, having
common object armed with lathies (sticks) committed
rioting. Thus, the charge contained particulars as to the
time, place and date of the offence of rioting. The law F
which creates the offence gives it specific name, i.e.,
"rioting" and, therefore, the offence is described in the
charge by that name, namely, "rioting". The charge
further proceeded to state that while committing rioting
accused 'RS' and other assaulted deceased 'SS' with an G
intention to murder him and injured him seriously. Thus
the name of person with reference to whom common
 criminal object was formed by the members of the
 unlawful assembly was stated. It was also stated in the
 Charge that during the treatment Injured 'SS' had H
    1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


 A succumbed to his injuries on July 2, 2007 at Medical
     College, Jammu. Thus, the date on which the deceased
     succumbed to this injuries and the place where the
     deceased succumbed to his injuries were mentioned with
     precision. Finally in the Charge, it was mentioned that
 B accused 'RS' had committed offences punishable under·
     Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of the Ranbir Penal code.
     After framing Charge immediately the plea of accused
     'RS' was recorded. The first question asked to him was
     whether he had understood the contents of the Charge
 C which was read and explained to him. In answer to the
     said question accused 'RS' had answered in affirmative.
    The record showed that thereafter two questions were
     put to accused 'RS' in answer to which he had claimed
    that he was innocent and had wished to be tried. This' is
    not a case of mere mention of the sections of the law in
0
    the charge or the order of framing charge. Therefore, the
    High Court was not justified in observing that mere
    mention ~f the sections of the law in the charge was likely
    to prejudice the accused in his trial and that he would be
   disabled to know the ·exact charge he had to face, nor the
E High court was justified in observing that the trial court
   was not alive to the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code
   of Criminal Procedure. It is necessary to reproduce part
   of the order passed by the trial court which is relied upon
   by the High Court for the purpose of coming to the
F conclusion that mere mention of the sections of the law
   in the charge or the order framing charge, wouJd not
   serve the purpose of the law. A glance at the order of the
   trial court would reveal that at the stage of framing charge
   the counsel for the accused had Pleaded for discharge
G of the accused under the relevant provjsions of the Code
   of Criminal Procedure 1989, Not only the counsel for the
   accused had advanced oral arguments, but he had also
   submitted written arguments and cited judgments as well
  as statements of the witnesses recorded by the police
H and relied upon other connected documents on ~._ti!e
    SANTOSH KUMAR! v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.             1061


fo emphasize that the accused should be discharged. A
The order of the trial court which was quoted by the High
Court in the impugned judgment was not the order
framing charge at all. It was a short order indicating that
no case was made out by the counsel for the accused
for discharging the accused at the stage of framing B
charge and that the accused should be tried for the
offences which were mentioned in the order of framing
charge separately against each accused. [Paras 9, 10, 11]
 [1071-E-H; 1072-A-E; 1073-C·F]

       4. The facts and in the circumstances of the case          C
  showed that a patent error of law apparent on the fact of
  the record was committed by the High Court in coming
  to the conclusion that in the order of framing charge there
. was mere mention of the sections of the law which was
  likely to prejudice the accused in his trial, as the accused    D
  would be disabled to know the exact charge he had to
  face. The High Court erred in law in holding that it was
  obligatory for the trial court to have indicated in its order
  and the charge sheet the description of the offences for
  which one or the other accused had to be tried because          E
  all necessary particulars which should be stated as
  required by law were already stated by the trial court while
  framing charge. Further the •fact that trial against the
  accused has/had made considerable progress in as
  much as material evidence of the eye witnesses to the           F
   occurrences was recorded by the trial court could not
   have been ignored while deciding the question whether
   proper charge against each accused was framed or not.
  The nature of charge to be faced was clearly understood
   by each accused which is evident from the plea recorded        G
   by the trial court after framing necessary charge that the
   nature of charge was very well understood by each
   accused. The fact was also evident from the averments
   made in the Revision Petition which was filed by the
   accused challenging order framing charge. The fact that        H
    1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


 A charge was clearly understood by each accused was
   also evident from the nature of cross-examination of the
   eye witnesses made on their behalf by their counsel. In
   view of the fact that all the eye witnesses were examined
   and cross-examined on behalf of the accused, the High
B Court should have resorted to the provisions of Section
   225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 as applicable
  to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The cross-
  examination of the eye witnesses on behalf of the
   accused would indicate that none of the accused was in
c fact misled by so-called error pointed out by the High
  Court nor it could be successfully pointed out by any of
  them that so-called error has occasioned failure of justice
  to him. The remand of the case to trial court for
  considering the case afresh on the point of charge was
D not warranted at all, as there is nothing to suggest or
  indicate even remotely that the accused had or would
  have been misled by any error or omission in the Charge.
  Therefore, the impugned orders of the High Court are set
  aside. [Para 12] [1073-G-H; 1074-A-F; 1075-A-C]

E       5. The order admitting the accused except accused
   'S' to interim bail of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction
   of the trial court pending consideration of the
   prosecution case afresh on question of charge, was not
   warranted nor justified at all. Before granting interim bail
F to the accused the High Court could not have afforded
  to ignore· the testimony of eye witnesses including that
  of the ap'pellant who is wife of the deceased, merely
  because deceased had received only one injury nor the
  accused could have been accorded the benefit of
G temporary bail on the spacious plea that they were facing
  trial over a period of three years. The record of the case
  nowhere showed that the prosecution was responsible
  in any manner at all for so call~d delay in holding trial
  against the accused. The fact that accused were involved
H in commission of a heinous crime like murder which
  SANTOSH KUMARI v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.              1063


entails death or life imprisonment as punishment should A
have been taken into consideration befQre releasing the
accused on interim bail. The trial court after having
considered the gravity of the offence and the
apprehension on the part of the prosecution that the
accused would tamper with the evidence in the event of B
their release on bail had rightly refused to enlarge the
accused on bail. The High Court while granting the relief
of bail to the accused has completely ignored and over
looked the aforementioned relevant factors which weigh
heavily against the accused. Moreover, the complaint that c
complainant and one of the witnesses were physically
assaulted and threatened in the Court premises will have
to be given its due weight. The FIR was pending
 necessary investigation wherein the statement of the son ·
 of the appellant was recorded on August 20, 2010 under
 Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code. The contents of D
 the FIR would indicate that the accused either
 themselves or through their relatives would try to tamper
 the evidence which is going to be led by the prosecution
 in the case. Under the Circumstances, release of the
 accused except accused 'S' on interim bail deserves to E
 be set aside. [Paras 13 and 14) [1075-D-H; 1076-A-D]
                    Case Law Reference:
    1955 (2) SCR 140            Followed            Para 7
                                                                F
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1660-1662 of 2011.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 20.10.2010 of the High
Court of Jammu & Kashmir at Jammu in Criminal Revision No.      G
29 of 2008, 561-A Cr.P.C. No. 54 of 2009 and Bail Application
No. 26 of 2010.
    Nitin Sangra, Hemantika Wahi for the Appellant.

    R.P. Bhatt, Bimal Roy Jad, Vikram Rathore, Sunil            H
    1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   Fernandes, Suhaas Joshi, Astha Sharma, Yawar Masoodi for
    the Respondents. .

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. The appellant is the widow of late
B Mr. Surinder Singh, who was murdered at about 9:00PM on
   June 28, 2007. Criminal Appeal No. 1660/2011 is directed
   against judgment dated October 20, 2010 rendered by the
   learned Single Judge of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at
   Jammu in Criminal Revision No.29 of 2008 by which the order
C dated March 24, 2008 passed by the learned Additional
   Sessions Judge, Kathva framing charges under Sections 302,
   109, 147, 148 read with Section 149 of Ranbir Penal Code
  against respondent Nos. 3 to 7 is set aside and the matter is
  remanded to the learned Judge, Samba to consider the case
D in terms of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal
   Procedure, 1989 (1933 A.D.) (as applicable in the State -of
  Jammu and Kashmir). Criminal Appeal No. 1661 of 2011 is
  directed against order dated October 20, 2010 passed by the
  learned Single Judge of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at
E Jammu in 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 by which prayer made
  by the respondent of the present appeal to quash order dated
  March 24, 2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
  Judge, Kathua in a Criminal Challan being File No. 33 of 2007
  titled as State Vs. Subhash Singh and Others framing charge
F against him for commission of offences under Sections 302,
  109, 147, 148 read with 149 of Ranbir Penal Code, is allowed.
  Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 20·11 is directed against judgment
  dated October 20, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge
  of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Bail
  Application No.26 of 201 O by which the respondent Nos. 3 to
G 7 have been released on interim bail pending trial against the
  respondents for above mentioned offences. As the three
  appeals arise out of common judgment and order elated
  October 20, 2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge of
  High Court of.Jammu and Kashmir in Criminal Revision No.29
H
  SANTOSH KUMAR! v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.              1065
            [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
of 2008, petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of   A
2009 and Bail Application No.26 of 2010, this Court proposes
to dispose of them by this common judgment.

       2. The case of the prosecution is that respondent Nos. 3
to 8 in criminal appeal No. 1660 of 2011 formed an lawful 8
assembly on 29-06-2007, common object of which was to
murder Surinder Singh and in prosecution of the common object
of the said assembly, respondents Nos. 3 to 8 mounted a
murderous assault on Surinder Singh, husband of the appellant,
at village Sanoora, District Samba (J & K). The injured was
 immediately shifted to hospital for treatment. On the basis of C
the information given by the appellant, FIR No.113/2007 under
 Section 307 read with 109 of Ranbir Penal Code was
 registered at police station Hiranagar, in connection with the
 aforesaid incident on June 29, 2007. On July 2, 2007 injured
 Surinder Singh succumbed to his injuries in Military Hospital, D
 Satwari, Jammu and, therefore, offence punishable under
 Section 302 of Ranbir Penal Code was added. On the basis
 of FIR lodged by the appellant, investigation was undertaken.
 During the course of investigation statement of the appellant
 and other witnesses were recorded under Section 164 of the E
 Code of Criminal Procedure 1989. The dead body of the
 deceased was sent for postmortem examination. After
  completion of the investigation, the investigating agency had
 filed charge sheet in the Court of learned Magistrate for
 offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 F
  of the Ranbir Penal Code. As the offence punishable under
  Section 302 is triable exclusively by a Court of Sessions, the
  case was committed to Sessions Court for trial. The learned
  Additional Sessions Judge, after hearing the prosecution and
  !he accused on the question of framing charge, framed G
  necessary charge on March 24, 2008 against each accused
  forthe offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148,
  149 of Ranbir Penal Code.

     3. Feeling aggrieved by the framing of above mentioned    H
    1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A charges by the trial court on March 24, 2008, the respondent
   Nos. 3 lo 7 in Criminal Appeal No.1660 of 2011 preferred
   Criminal Revision No. 29 of 2008 before the High Court. The
   High Court by order dated June 6, 2008 issued notice and
  summoned the record of the case from the trial court. On March
B 20, 2009, the respondent No. 8, who is original accused No.6,
  preferred a petition No. 54 of 2009 under Section 561-A of the
  Code of Criminal Procedure to quash order dated March 24,
  2008 passed by the trial court framing charges against him for
  commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 109,
c 147, 148 read with 149 of the Ranbir Penal Code. During the
  pendency of above numbered petitions, the High Court by order
  dated August 13, 2009 sent back the record to the trial court
  and granted liberty to the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 to seek bail
  from the trial court. When the above numbered Revision and
D the petition filed under Section 561-A were pending disposal
  before the High Court, the prosecution examined three eye
  witnesses to the occurrence viz. (1) Santosh Kumari, i.e., the
  appellant herein, (2) Surishta Devi and (3) Shakti Devi. It may
  be stated that the appellant and the Shakti Devi have fully
E supported the case of the prosecution.

        Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court vide order
  dated August 13, 2009, the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 applied for
  bail before the trial court. The trial court rejected Bail Application
  filed by the accused vide order dated February 19, 2010. The
F record of the case indicates that except accused lqram, who
  is respondent No.8 in Criminal Appeal No. 1660 of 2011, all
  the other accused filed Bail Application No. 26 of 2010 before
  the High Court claiming bail. The High Court by order dated
  August 10, 2010 directed the learned counsel for the accused
G to place on record the deposition of the witnesses recorded
  by the trial court. On August 13, 2010, Raman Singh, brother
  of accused Subash Singh, who is respondent no.3 in the main
  appeal, physically assaulted and threatened the son of the
  appellant as well as one Kuljit Singh who is one of the
H witnesses in the case, allegedly in the court premises itself, to
   SANTOSH KUMARI v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.               1067
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

refrain them from deposing against the accused in the case. A
They were also warned that if they gave depositions against
the accused they would be killed. Because of the assault
mounted by brother of the accused, son of the appellant has
lodged FIR No.183/2010 under Sections 341, 195-A, 504, 506
of Ranbir Penal Code at Police Station Samba. With reference B
to above mentioned FIR statement of the son of the appellant
was rec.orded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on August 20, 2010.

    On September 8, 2010 and October 7, 2010 the
prosecution examined two more eye witnesses, i.e., (1) Raksha      C
Devi and (2) Kamlesh Devi who had supported the prosecution
case.

      4. The High Court by order dated October 20, 2010 has
set aside the order dated March 24, 2008 passed by the trial
court framing charge against the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 and D
has remanded the case to the trial court to consider it in terms
of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1989. By the said order the High Court has directed
release of all the accused persons except accused Subhash,
who is respondent No.3 in the main appeal, pending E
consideration of the prosecution case for framing charge by the
trial court. The above mentioned ord_er dated October 20, 2010
of the High Court has given rise to .the three instant appeals.
                                 '
    5. This Court has heard the. learned counsel for the parties
and have considered the documents fomiing part of the appeals.     F

      6. The provisions relating to framing of charge against the
 accused before the trial commences, are contained in the
 Code of Criminal Procedure 1989 (1933 A.D.) which is
 applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The statute G
 requires that every charge framed under the said code should
 state the offence with which the accused is charged and if the
 law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the
·offence should also be described in the charg·e by that name
 only. The statute further requires that the law and section of the H
     1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A law against which the offence is said to have been committed
    has to be mentioned in the charge. It is a fundamental principle
    of criminal law that the accused should be informed with
    certainty and accuracy the exact nature of the charge brought
    against him. The object of the statement of particulars to be
B mentioned in the charge is to enable the accused person to
   know the substantive charge, he will have to meet and to be
   ready for it before the evidence is given. The extent of the
   particulars necessary to be given in the charge depends upon
   the facts and the circumstances of each case. It is well settled
c law that in drawing up a charge, all verbiage should be avoided.
   However, a t:harge should be precise in its scope and particular
   in its details. The charge has to contain such particulars as to
  the time and place of the alleged offence and the person against
  whom it was committed as are reasonably sufficient to give the
  accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. One of
0
  the requirements of law is that when the nature of the case is
  such that the particulars mentioned in the charge do not give
  the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is
  charged, the charge should contain such particulars of the
  manner in which alleged offence was committed as would be
E sufficient for that purpose. If 'A' is accused of the murder of 'B'
  at a given time and place, the charge need not state the
  manner in which 'A' murdered 'B'.

        7. Like all procedural laws, the Code of Criminal
F Procedure is devised to subserve the ends of justice and not
  to frustrate them by mere technicalities. It regards some of its
  provisions as vital but others not, and a breach of the latter is
  a curable irregularity unless the accused is prejudiced thereby.
  It places errors in the charge, or even a total absence of a
G charge in the curable class. That is why we have provisions like
  Sections 215 and 464 in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  1973.
        The object of the charge is to !Jive the accused notice of
    the matter he is charged with and does not touch jurisdiction.
H
   SANTOSH KU MARI v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.                1069
              [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to him in A
other ways and there is no prejudice, the framing of the charge
is not invalidated. The essential part of this part of law is not
any technical formula of words but the reality, whether the matter
was explained to the accused and whether he understood what
he was being tried for. Sections 34, 114 and 149 of the IPC B
provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as
 regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by
                     a
 a common object or common intention; and as explained by
 five Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Willie S/avey Vs.
 The State of MP. 1955 (2) SCR 1140 at p. 1189, the charge c
 is a rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the
 constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable
 and who are sought to be made constructively liable.

    In the light of above principles, the question whether proper
charge was framed against the respondent Nos. 3 to 8, will           D
have to be viewed.

     8. In the present case, what was argued on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 3 to 8 before the High Court was that the
charge was invalid because there was no mention in the order         E
of the trial court indicating the specific offence found to have
been prima facie committed by one or the other accused
individually or jointly nor there was any indication regarding the
specific names of the offences sufficient for description in the
order of framing charge, but only sections of the law against        F
which the offences were found to have been committed were
mentioned.

       The High Court has held that mere mention of the sections
of the law in the order framing the charge would not, serve the
purpose of law, as it was likely to prejudice the accused in his G
trial, and that, the accused would be disabled to know the exact
Charge he had to face. In view of the above mentioned
conclusion, the High Court has set aside the order dated March
24, 2008 framing charge against the accused and has
remanded the matter to the trial court to consider the case in H
    1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A terms of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure 1989 which are pari materia to Sections 226, 227
  and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

       9. In order to ascertain whether the Charge framed against
B respondent was proper or not, this Court proposes to
  reproduce order dated March 24, 2008 framing charge against
  Rajesh Singh son of Jagdish Singh, resident of Sanoora, tehsil
  Hiranagar, which reads as under :-

              "IN THE COURT OF ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE
C                           KATHUA

        I, Vinod Chatterji Koul hereby charge you, Rajesh Singh
        S/o Jagdish Singh Rio Sanoora, tehsil Hiranagar as under

D        1.    That on 28.6.07 at Sanoora at about 9.30 pm with
               criminal intention along with other accused persons,
               having common criminal object armed with lathies
               (sticks) committed rioting and in that attacked
               deceased Surinder Singh with an intention to
E              murder him attacked and injured him seriously, who
               thereafter on 2nd July 2007 during treatment
               succumbed to his injuries at Medical College
               Jammu, and you thereby committed offence
               punishable u/s 302/109/147/148/149 of the Ranbir
F              Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.

        2.     And I hereby direct you be tried tzy this Court on the
               said charge.        '

               Dated 24.3.08Sd."
G
               "Statement of accused dated 24th March 2008

               Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh Rio Sanoora,
               tehsil Hiranagar Caste rajput, employee by
H              profession aged ...
   SANTOSH KUMARI v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.               1071
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
           Question: Whether you have understood the              A
           contents of the charge which has been read over
           and explained to you?

           Answer: Yes
            Question: Whether you have committed the              B
            offence?

            Answer: No.

            Question: Whether you want to say anything more?      C

            Answer: I am innocent and want trial of the case.

                                                           Sd."

    It may be mentioned that similar charge has been framed
                                                                  0
against each accused by order dated March 24, 2008.

       A fair and reasonable reading of the above quoted order
  dated March 24, 2008 makes it abundantly clear that accused
  Rajesh Singh on June 28, 2007 at Sanoora about about 9.30
  pm with criminal intention along with other accused, havJng E
  common object armed with lathies (sticks) committed rioting.
  Thus, the charge contains particulars as to the time, place and
  date of the offence of rioting. The law which creates the offence
  gives it specific name, i.e., "rioting" and, therefore, the offence
  is described in the charge by that name, namely, "rioting'. The F
  charge further proceeds to state that while committing rioting
   accused Rajesh Singh and other assaulted deceased Surinder
  Singh with an intention to murder him and injured him seriously.
  Thus the name of person with reference to whom common
   criminal object was formed by the members of the unlawful G
   assembly was stated. It was also stated in the Charge that
   during the treatment injured Surinder Singh had succumbed to
I his injuries on July 2, 2007 at Medical College, Jammu. Thus
1



Ithe date on which the deceased succumbed to this injuries and
   the place where the deceased succumbed to his injuries were H
     1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A mentioned with precision. Finally in the Charge, it was
  . mentioned that accused Rajesh Singh had committed offences
    punishable under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of the
    Ranbir Penal code. After framing Charge immediately the plea
    of accused Rajesh was recorded. The first question which
B asked to him was whether he had understood the contents of
    the Charge which was read and explained to him. In answer to
   the said question accused Rajesh Singh had answered in
   affirmative. The record shows that thereafter two questions were
   put to accused Rajesh Singh in answer to which he had claimed
c that he was innocent and had wished to be tried.
        10. This is not a case of mere mention of the sections of
   the law in the charge or the order of framing charge. Therefore,
   the High Court was not justified in observing that mere mention
   of the sections of the law in the charge was likely to prejudice
D the accused in his trial and that he would be disabled to know
  the exact charge he had to face, nor the High court was justified
  in observing that the trial court was not alive to the provisions
  of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is
  necessary to reproduce part of the order passed by the trial
E court which is relied upon by the High Court for the purpose of
  coming to the conclusion that mere mention of the sections of
  the law in the charge or the order framing charge, would not
  serve the purpose of the law. The said order reads as under :-
        "Upon consideration of the arguments of the learned Public
F       Prosecutor, the learned counsel for the accused and the
        written arguments besides the judgments cited and also
        the statements of the witnesses recorded by the police and
       other connected documents on the file, I am of the
       considered opinion that there are reasonable grounds to
G      presume that accused Subash Singh S/o Krishen Singh,
       Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh, Vijay Singh S/o Krishen
       Singh, Ranjit Singh S/o Baldev Singh, Rakesh Singh S/o
       Jagdish Singh and lkram Singh S/o Neter Singh caste
       Rajput residents of Sonoora Tehsil Hiranagar have prima
H      facie committed offences punishable under Sections 302/
  SANTOSH KUMARI v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.              1073
            (J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
    109/147/148 and 149 RPC. Offence punishable under          A
    Section 302 RPC is exclusively triable by the court of
    sessions.
    Charges under Sections 302/109/147/148 and 149 RPC
    is framed against accused Subash Singh, Rajesh Singh,
    Vijay Singh, Ranjit Singh, Rakesh Singh and lkram Singh.   8
    The contents of the charges framed have been read over
    and explained to the accused persons who have pleaded
    not guilty to the said chages and have claimed to be
    tried ..... "
     11. A glance at the order quoted above would reveal that
                                                               c
at the stage of framing charge the learned counsel for the
accused had pleaded for discharge of the accused under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1989.
Not only the learned counsel for the accused had advanced oral
arguments, but he had also submitted written arguments and D
cited judgments as well as statements of the witnesses
recorded by the police and relied upon other connected
documents on the file to emphasize that the accused should
be discharged. The order of the trial court which is quoted by
the High Court in the impugned judgment is not the order E
framing charge at all. It is a short order indicating that no case
was made out by the learned counsel for the accused for
discharging the accused at the stage of framing charge and
that the accused should be tried for the offences which were
mentioned in the order of framing charge separately against F
each accused.
      12. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this
Court is of the opinion that a patent error of law apparent on
the fact of the record was committed by the High Court in G
coming to the conclusion that in the order of framing charge
there was mere mention of the sections of the law which was
likely to prejudice the accused in his trial, as the accused would
be disabled to know th.e exact charge he had to face. Having
noticed the charge which was separately framed against each
accused, the inevitable conclusion to be reached by this Court H
     1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A is that the High Court erred in law in holding that it was
  obligatory for the trial court to have indicated in its order and
  the charge sheet the description of the offences for which one
  or the other accused had to be tried because all necessary
  particulars which should be stated as required by law were
B already stated by the learned Judge of trial court while framing
  charge.
           Further the fact that trial against the accused has I had
     made considerable progress in as much as material evidence
     of the eye witnesses to the occurrences was recorded by the
C    trial court could not have been ignored while deciding the
     question whether proper charge against each accused was
     framed or not. The nature of charge to be faced was clearly
     understood by each accused which is evident from the plea
     recorded by the trial court after framing necessary charge that
.D   the nature of charge was very well understood by each accused.
     The fact is also evident from the averments made in the Revision
     Petition which was filed by the accused challenging order
     framing charge. The fact that charge was clearly understood by
     each accused is also evident from the nature of cross-
E    examination of the eye witnesses made on their behalf by their
     learned counsel. In view of the fact that all the eye witnesses
     have been examined and cross-examined on behalf of the
     accused, the High Court should have resorted to the provisions
     of Section 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 as
F    applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir which reads as
     under:-
         "225. Effect of errors :- No error in stating either the offence
         or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and
         no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall
G        be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless
         the accused was in fact misled by swch error or omission,
         and it has occasioned failure of justice."
       The cross-examination of the eye witnesses on behalf of
  the accused would indicate that none of the accused was in
H fact misled by so-called error pointed out by the High Court nor
   SANTOSH KUMAR! v. STATE OF J & K & ORS.                1075
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
it could be successfully pointed out by any of them that so-called A
error has occasioned failure of justice to him. The remand of
the case to trial court for considering the case afresh on the
point of charge was not warranted at all, as there is nothing to
suggest or indicate even remotely that the accused had or
would have been misled by any error or omission in the Charge. 8
Therefore, the order dated October 20, 2010 rendered in
Criminal Revision No.29 of 2008 deserves to be set aside. For
the similar reasons the order dated October 20, 2010 passed
by the High Court in petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C.
No.54 of 2009 allowing the prayer made by the respondent No. C
8 to quash the order dated March 24, 2008 will have to be set
aside.
      13. It may be mentioned that the order admitting the
accused except accused Subhash Singh to interim bail of
Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the trial court pending o
consideration of the prosecution case afresh on question of
charge, was not warranted nor justified at all. Before granting
interim bail to the accused the High Court could not have
afforded to ignore the testimony of eye witnesses including that
of the appellant who is wife of the deceased, merely because E
deceased had received only one injury nor the accused could
have been accorded the benefit of temporary bail on the
spacious plea that they were facing trial over a period of three
years. The record of the case nowhere shows that the
prosecution was responsible in any manner at all for so called
                                                                   F
delay in holding trial against the accused. The fact that accused
are involved in commission of a heinous crime like murder
which entails death or life imprisonment as punishment should
have been taken into consideration before releasing the
accused on interim bail. The trial court after having considered
the gravity of the offence and the apprehension on the part of G
the prosecution that the accused would tamper with the
evidence in the event of their release on bail had rightly refused
to enlarge the accused on bail. The High Court while granting
the relief of bail to the accused has completely ignored and over
                                                                   H
    1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A looked the aforementioned relevant factors which weigh heavily
  against the accused. Moreover, the complaint filed by Vijinder
  Singh that he and Kuljit singh, who is one of the witnesses in
  the present case, were physically assaulted and threatened in
  the Court premises will have to be given its due weight. The
8 FIR registered on August 13, 2010 is pending necessary
  investigation wherein the statement of Vijinder Singh who is son
  of the appellant was recorded on August 20, 2010 under
  Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code. The contents of the FIR
  would indicate that the accused either themselves or through
C their relatives would try to tamper the evidence which is going
  to be led by the prosecution in the case.
        14. Under the Circumstances, this Court is of the opinion
  that release of the accused except accused Subhash Singh on
  interim bail deserves to be set aside. The net result of the
o above discussion is that all the three appeals will have to be
  allowed.
       For the foregoing reasons the three appeals succeed.
   Order dated October 20, 2010 rendered by the High Court of
   Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Criminal Revision No.29 of
E 2008 is hereby set aside. Similarly the order dated October 20,
   2010 passed by the High Court in petition filed under Section
   561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 is also·set aside. The order
   dated October 20, 2010 passed in Bail Application No.26 of
  .2010 by which the accused except accused Subhash Singh are
F enlarged on interim bail is also set aside. Accused Subhash
   Singh is already in custody. Therefore, it is directed that the
   other accused shall be taken in custody immediately.
       Having regard to the facts of the case and more particularly
  the fact that the trial has already commenced, the trial court is
G directed to complete the trial as early as possible .and
  preferably within 9 months from the date of receipt of writ from
  this Court. Subject to above mentioned directions, all the three
  appeals stand disposed of.
H D.G.                                      Appeals disposed of.