Supreme Court of India
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGHversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 465
- Decided
- 3 July 2014
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- H L DATTU
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and all sentences except that it commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment, finding the trial fair and the death sentence disproportionate.
Summary
Santosh Kumar Singh, a 26‑year‑old tutor, entered the home of his employers, assaulted the mother, son and daughters with an iron hammer, and looted jewellery and cash, resulting in the deaths of the mother and son. He was convicted under IPC sections 302, 307, 394, 397 and 450 and sentenced to death, with additional life terms and fines. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial was fair, whether the evidence (injured witnesses, seizure records, and post‑mortem reports) supported the convictions, and whether the death penalty was justified. It held that the accused had been given adequate legal representation, the evidence was reliable, and the case did not fall within the "rarest of the rare" category warranting capital punishment. Consequently, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment while the conviction and other sentences were upheld.
Issues considered
- The accused was denied the opportunity to be defended by counsel of his choice.
- The trial court’s reliance on the statements of injured witnesses and the seizure of stolen articles was improper.
- The death sentence imposed was excessive and the case did not qualify as "rarest of the rare" under established jurisprudence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 354(3)
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 394, s. 397, s. 450
Subjects
murderhomicidedeath penaltyrarest of the rarecapital punishmentIPC sections 302 307 394 397 450criminal appealevidencefair trialsentencing
Judgment
[2014] 7 S.C.R. 928
A SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos.410-411 of 2012)
JULY 03, 2014
B
[H.L. DATTU, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
AND M.Y. EQBAL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302, 307, 394, 397 and 450 -
C Conviction and sentence under - Accused assaulting the
lady, her daughters and her son with iron hammer -
Thereafter, looting gold jewellery and cash - As a result qf
assault, the lady and f1er son succumbed to their injuries and
daughters grievously injured - Conviction and sentence u/ss.
o 302, 307, 394, 397 and 450 by courts below - Justification of
- Held: Death of the lady and her son homicidal in nature -
No contradiction in the statement of independent witnesses
to memorandum of seizure - Jewellery looted by accused
identified by family members - Daughters-injured witnesses
E clearly stated the incident - Prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that prior to the incident accused known to
deceased and injured witnesses and on the date of the
incident accused had come to their house - Statements made
by the injured witnesses corroborated by the postmortem
F report, seizure of jewellery, hammer, blood stained clothes -
Accused given an opportunity to defend by the counsel of his
choice - However, death sentence awarded to the accused
disproportionate on the facts and circumstances of the case
- Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment - Conviction
G and rest part of the sentence upheld.
According to the prosecution case, the accused was
known to the family of 'GM' including his wife 'N' and son
'JA' and daughters 'R'-PW3 and 'P'-PW4. On the fateful
H 928
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P 929
day, accused came to the house of 'N' and had a chat for A
half hour. Daughters of 'N' witnessed the same. After
some time accused came back and hit PW3 and PW4, 'N'
and 'JA' with iron hammer and thereafter, looted EfOld
jewellery and cash from the house of 'GM'. 'N' and ~JA'
succumbed to their injuries. PW3 and PW4 suffered B
injuries grievous in nature. FIR was registered. Accused
was arrested. Cash was recovered from the accused.
Thereafter, stolen articles, iron hammer and blood stained
clothes were recovered from the house of the accused.
The death of 'N' and 'JA' was homicidal in nature. Trial c
court held the accused guilty and convicted him for the
offences u/s 302, 307, 394, 397 and 450 IPC and
sentenced accordingly. The High Court upheld the order.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court D
HELD: 1.1. From the inquest memorandums and the
evidence of Sub-Inspector, PW-12 and constable PW-15,
who conducted inquest, it was established that 'N' and
'JA' died of homicidal injuries found on their bodies. E
[Para 11] [938-E-F]
1.2. PW.6 and PW-7 are the independent witnesses
of the memorandum of seizure. In their statement they
deposed that the police arrested the accused in their
presence and seized about Rs. 23,000/-from him and the F
accused was brought to the Police Station for inquiry. At
the Police Station the accused disclosed about the
jewellery, hammer an_d clothes, on the basis of which
jewellery, hammer and clothes were seized. Both the
witnesses ther.eby have corroborated the statement of G
PW-11. During the cross-examination both the witnesses,
PW-6 and PW-7 admitted that they visited the house of
'GM'. There is no infirmity or contradiction in the
statements of the two witnesses. [Para 13] [939-C-D]
H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 1.3. PW-9 stated that at the request of the Police he
conducted identification of the jewellery and prior to the
identification police had handed over other jewellery in
a sealed packet. He mixed it and then conducted the
identification and during the identification 'GM' and PW4
B had identified the original jewellery. After identification he
had handed over the jewellery in a packet to the Police
who were standing outside the stadium. (Para 14] (939-
E-F]
1.4. PW-3 and PW-4, daughters of deceased 'N' and
C sisters of deceased 'JA' are the injured eyewitnesses;
both of them received serious injuries at the incident.
From the statements of both the witnesses, PW-3 and
PW-4 the facts of the accused coming to their house
before the incident, taking refreshment with deceased 'N'
D and talking with her are proved, which is also
corroborated from the FIR. Both these witnesses also
stated that in the past the accused used to come for
tuitions and their mother used to treat the accused like
her son and the phot~graph of the accused was also
E hanging in their house. From the evidence, it is clear that
the PW-3 and PW-4 were in a position to identify the
accused, the accused was well acquainted with both PW-
3 and PW-4 since long. The prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that even prior to the incident the
F accused was known to the deceased and the injured
witnesses PW-3 and PW-4 and on the date of incident
also, the accused had come to their house and had taken
refreshments and had talks. [Para 15] [939-G-H; 940-A-D]
G 1.5. PW-3 and PW-4-daughters of 'N' in their
statements clearly stated that initially the accused left their
house and after sometime the accused had come again
to their house. On opening the door he had hit the hammer
on the head of 'JA', who had come out after hearing
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P 931
screams of PW3 and then after ent~ring into the bedroom A
he hit deceased 'N' on her head. From the statement of
PW-4, it is also clear that the accused after entering the
store-room had hit on her head and then the accused had
taken out the money and jewellery from the almirah,
suitcase, box and attache, etc. PW-3 also stated that she s
had seen the accused hit 'JA' on his head but she could
not see as to who hit PW 4-'R and her mother. Such
statement cannot be stated to be contradictory and do~s
not adversely affect the case of the prosecution in view of
the deposition made by PW-4. [Para 16) (940-E-G] c
1.6. From the statement of PW-4, it is found that the
accused after hitting 'N' deceased and her daughters-
PW3, PW4 took away jewellery, cash amount and the
bangles of 'N' and then he ran away after bolting the door
from outside. PW-4 further deposed that thereafter she D
went into the balcony and stopped PW-1, who at that time
had taken out his vehicle and was going somewhere and
then the door got opened. The said statement was proved
by the statement of PW-1, who made similar statement.
[Para 17,18) [940-H; 941-A-C] E
1. 7. In view of the statements made by the injured
witnesses PW-3 and PW-4 as corroborated by the
postmortem report, seizure of jewellery, hammer, blood
stained clothes and statement of PW-11, as corroborated F
by PW-6 and PW-7, the trial court rightly held the accused
guilty for the offences u/s 302, 307, 394 r/w 397 and 450
IPC. [Para 19) (941-D, E]
1.8. As regards the ground taken by the counsel for
the appellant with respect to denial of opportunity to the G
accused to be defended by a· counsel of his choice, is
incorrect as from the record it is found that proper
opportunity was given to the accused. On perusal of
records it transpires that Advocate 'AS' had filed his ·
H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Vakalatnama for representing the appellant. When the
case was fixed for evidence though the advocate was
competent to cross-examine the witnesses but he"moved
the application to defer the cross-examination of the
witnesses on the ground that the accused wanted to
B engage senior advocate, 'RSC'. However, neither 'RSC'
was present nor any Vakalatnama was-filed on his behalf.
On that day, two witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were
exa,mined and 'AS', advocate had cross-examined those
witnesses. None of those witnesses were eyewitnesses;
C in fact PW-1 was declared hostile. Two days later,
advocate 'AS' refused to appear on behalf of the
lb:'
appellant, when the appellant on asking expressed his
inability to appoint any counsel. Since there was none to.
represent the accused, the trial court appointed advocate
'GP' to pursue the appeal. The appellant failed to show
0
that 'GP' was not competent or was incapable of handling
the case. On the contrary from the cross-examination of
the witnesses made by advocate 'GP', it is found that he
was competent to deal with the case. Even on the next
date neither 'RSC', advocate appeared nor he filed his
E Vakalatnama. [Para 20, 22] [941-E-F; 942-A-F]
1.9. In the instant case, the appellant is an educated
person, he was about 26 years old at the time of
committing the offence. The accused was a tutor in the
F family of the deceased. He was in acquaintance with the
deceased as well as PW-3 and PW-4. There is nothing
specific to suggest the motive for committing the crime
except the articles and cash taken away by the accused.
It is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant
G cannot be reformed or that the accused is a social
menace. Apart from the incident in question there is no
criminal antecedent of the appellant. It is true that the
accused has committed a heinous crime, but it cannot be
held with certainty that the instant case falls in the "rarest
H of the rare category". On appreciation of evidence on
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P 933
record and keeping jn mind the facts and circumstances A
of the case, sentence of death penalty would be
extensive and unduly harsh. The death sentence of
appellant is commuted to life imprisonment. The
conviction and rest part of the sentence are affirmed.
' [Para 29, 30] [955-B-F] B
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCC 684;
Machhi Singh and others vs. State of Punjab 1983 (3) SCR
413 :1983 (3) SCC 470; Ronny alias Ronald James Alwaris
and others vs. State of Maharashtra 1998 (2) SCR 162: 1998 C
(3) SCC 625; Al/auddin Mian & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar 1989
(2) SCR 498: (1989) 3 SCC 5; State of Maharashtra vs.
Goraksha Ambaji Adsul 2011 (9) SCR 41: 2011 (7) SCC 437;
Ramnaresh and others vs. State of Chattisgarh 2012 (3) SCR
630 : 2012 (4) SCC 257; Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs. State
of Maharashtra 2013 (6) SCR 949 :2013 (5) SCC 546 - D
referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1983 (3) SCR 413 Referred to Para 24
E
1998 (2) SCR 162 Referred to Para 25
1989 (2) SCR 498 Referred to Para 25
2011 (9) SCR 41 Referred to Para 25
F
2012 (3) SCR 630 Referred to Para 27
2013 (6) SCR 949 Referred to Para 28
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.410-411 of 2012. G
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.03.2011 in CRLR
No. 4/2010, CRLA No. 48/2011 of the High Court of M.P. at
Jabalpur.
H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Vinay Kumar Garg, Neeraj Kr. Sharma, Namrata Singh,
Priyanka Dixft for the Appellant.
Vibha Datta Makhija, Archi Agnihotri for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. These
appeals are directed against the common impugned judgment
dated 24th March, 2011 passed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur, by which High Court upheld
c the judgment of conviction and sentence for the offences u/s
302, 307, 394, 397 and 450 IPC, as follows:
Section Sentence im12osed
For offence under Sentenced to death.
D Section 302 IPC
(on two counts);
For offence under Sentence for life on each
Section 307 IPC count with fine of Rs.10,000
E - (on two counts); each on
failure of payment RI for two years each.
For offence under RI for ten years on each coun
Section 394 read with with fine of Rs.5,000/- each
on Section 397 (on four failure
F of payment further RI for counts); one year each.
For offence under RI for ten years with fine of
Section 450 IPC. Rs.5,000/-. On failure of
payment, further RI for one
G year.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the
conviction, inter alia, on the following grounds:
(a) The trial was not fair as the appellant was not given an
H opportunity to defend by the counsel of his choice.
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 935
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
(b) The Trial Court gravely erred in placing implicit reliance A
on the statement of Razia Khatoon (PW-4) and Zeenat
Parveen (PW-3) and on the evidence of recovery of the
ornaments and other articles from the possession of the
appellant.
B
(c) The death sentence awarded by the Trial Court as
confirmed by the High Court is not justified, as no case of
rarest of the rare is made out.
3. Th(: case of the prosecution is that the accused-Santosh
Kumar Singh was known to the family of Gulam Mohd. including C
his wife, Noorjahan, son Javed Akhtar, and daughters viz. Rozi
@ Razia and Zeenat Parveen. On 7th May, 2010, accused
came to their house in Sector No.12, Quarter No.B-664, N.C.L.
Colony, Singrauli at about 2 p.m. He had a chat with Noorjahan
Begum (deceased) for about 30 minutes. In the same room D
besides her Rozi@ Razia Khatoon(PW-4) and Zeenat Parveen
(PW-3) were also present. Javed Akhtar (deceased}, son of
Noorjahan Begum was sleeping in the bedroom. After accused
left, Noorjahan Begum (deceased) started offering Namaz, Rozi
@ Razia went to bathroom to take bath and Zeenat Parveen E
was sitting in the outside room. After sometime, accused came
back and knocked the door; Zeenat Parveen opened the door
and the accused came inside. At that time Rozi @ Razia came
out of the bathroom and saw accused talking to Zeenat in the
outside room, at that moment, the accused suddenly pulled out F
an iron hammer from his T-shirt and hit on the head of Zeenat
Parween two-three times with hammer. Zeenat Parveen
screamed and became unconscious. The accused, thereafter,
with intention to kill Noorjahan Begum and Javed Akhtar also
hit them with hammer on their heads, because of which both
fell down and became unconscious. After that accused hit Rozi G
@ Razia by the hammer on her head with an intention to kill
her resultantly Razia's head got fractured. Thereafter, the
accused opened the almirah, suitcases and boxes and footed
two gold chains, one pair of tops, one pair of bali, one pair of
H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A jhala, three rings, one nose pin and four pairs of silver anklets,
artificial jewellery etc. and Rs. 23,000/- cash of Noorjahan
Begum. He also took out four brass bangles from the hands of
Noorjahan Begum. As a result of assault Noorjahan Begum ,
died on the spot. On hearing shrieks of Rozi @ Razia, Ramesh
B Satnami (PW-1 ), Ramawadh Pal (PW-5) and other people of
the colony came. At the time of incident, Gulam Mohd. (PW-2)
was on duty and on receiving the news he came to the place
of incident and took Rozi @ Razia, Zeenat Parveen and Javed
Akhtar to Nehru Hospital.
c 4. On the basis of the report, Ext.P-10, of Rozi @ Razia
Khatoon(PW-4), a case Crime No.0/10 was registered under
Section 302, 307, 450, 394 & 397 IPC at the Police Station
Vindhya Nagar. After receiving the news of the death of
Noorjahan and Javed Akhtar, Shiv Kumar Dubey (PW-13)
D recorded the marg intimation of Ext.P-24 & 25 in Police Chauki
Jayant, P.S. Vindhya Nagar and the marg intimation-Ext.P/10
was sent to the concerned Police Station, on the basis of which
Crime No.Ka-0-304/10 was registered at P.S. Baidhan and
investigation was started.
E
5. Sub-Inspector, J.S. Paraste (PW-12), on the same day,
went at the spot and prepared the inquest memo of the body
of Noorjahan Begum (Ext.P/12).The dead body of Noorjahan
Begum was sent for postmortem examination. After conducting
F inquest proceedings in respect of the dead body of Javed
Akhtar, the same was also sent for postmortem examination.
Dr. Vinod Sharma(PW.16) examined the injuries of Razia
Khatoon and Zeenat Parveen and found injuries on their heads.
The injuries, grievous in nature, were dangerous to life.
G 6. Dr. V.N. Satnami (PW-10) conducted autopsy of the
body of Noorjahan Begum. He found three injuries on her skull,
skull bones were fractured. He submitted his postmortem
report-Ext.P/19. In his opinion, death of the deceased was
homicidal in nature. Dr. V.N. Satnami (PW-10) also conducted
H autopsy of body of Javed Akhtar and found two injuries on his
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 937
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
head. There was depressed fracture of skull bone underneath A
the injuries. In his opinion, death of the deceased was homicidal
in nature. Postmortem report of Javed Akhtar is Ext.Pl20.
7. Anil Upadhyay (PW-11) was the Investigation Officer,
who on the same night apprehended the accused from Khariya 8
Chowk and recovered Rs.23,0201- from the pocket of his pants.
On the information given by the appellant under Section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act, he recovered stolen articles, iron
hammer and blood stained clothes from the house of the
accused situated in N.C.L. Colony. The recovered articles were C
identified by Gulam Mohd (PW.2) and Razia Khatoon (PWA).
8. After due investigation, the chargesheet was filed and
the case was commi!!ed for trial. The appellant denied the guilt
and pleaded false implication but he did not adduce any
evidence in his defence. D
9. Prosecution examined altogether 16 witnesses and
produced a number of documentary evidence to prove their
case. The Trial court on the appreciation of the evidence held
the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him for the E
offence as mentioned above, which was affirmed by the High
Court.
10. Dr. V.N. Satnami (PW-10), who performed the
postmortem examination of the body of Noorjahan Begum
found the following injuries on her body: F
"(1 )Reddish contusion 5 cm x 4 cm present on right side
of forehead. Red blood clot was deposited under the
skin.
G
(2)Lacerated wound 5 cm x 3 cm x bone deep on m.iddle
of the forehead posteriorly with depressed multiple
fractures of underlying bone.
(3) Lacerated wound 4 cm x 3 cm x bone deep on left
occipito parietal region of head with depressed multiple H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A fractures of underlying bones.
In his opinion, death of deceased Noorjahan .had
occurred as a result of coma due to head injury. Death
was homicidal in nature. The postmortem examination
report (P/19) was written and signed by him."
B
On the same day, Dr. Satnami (PW-10) performed
postmortem examination of the body of deceased Javed
Akhtar and found the following injuries:
c "(1) Lacerated wound on left parietal region of head 2 cm
x 1 cm x bone deep with peripheral.contusions in size of
6 cm x 5 cm. subcutaneous reddish blood clot with
multiple depressed fractures of underlying bone.
(2) Reddish contusion on occipital region of head 5 cm
D
x 4 cm in size with subcutaneous reddish blood clot with
depressed fracture of underlying bone.
In his opinion, death of Javed Akhtar had occurred as a
result of coma due to injury. Death was homicidal in
E n•ture."
11. From the inquest memorandums (Ext.P/6 and Pl12)
and the evidence of Sub-Inspector, J.S. Paraste (PW-12) and
constable Raj Bahadur Pandey (PW-15), who conducted
F inquest, it was established that Noorjahan and Javed Akhtar
died of homicidal injuries found on their bodies.
12. Anil Upadhyay (PW-11 ), Investigation Officer arrested
the accused from Khariya Chowk, Main Road, P.S. Shakti
Nagar in the presence of witnesses Mohd.Sadiq (PW-6) and
G Mohd. Yunus (PW-7) and seized money from him and prepared
seizure memo-Ext.P-15. After arrest the accused was brought
to the Police Station-Jayant and was interrogated in front of the
witnesses. During interrogation accused gave information
regarding jewellery and the hammer which was used in
H committing crime; the clothes, hammer and jewellery were
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 939
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
seized from the house of the accused vide memorandum-Ext.P- A
13, written by Anil Upadhyay (PW-11). Anil Upadhyay stated
that he went to the house of accused and seized the jewellery
article from articles-A1 to A 24; seizure memo-Ext.P-14 was
prepared. He had also stated that blood stained clothes and ·
iron hammer were seized in the presence of witnesses vide B
seizure memo-Ext.P-16.
13. Mohd. Sadiq (PW.6) and Mohd. Yunus (PW?!) are the
independent witnesses of the memorandum of seizure. In their
statement they deposed that the Police arre,Sted the accused C
at Khariya Chowk in their presence anc,l seized about Rs.
23,000/-from him' and the accused was brought to the Police
Station-Jayant /or inquiry. At the Police Station the accused
disclosed about the jewellery, hammer and clothes, on the basis
of whic1tjew.ellery, hammer and clothes were seized. Both the
witnesses thereby fl.aye corroborated the stafement of Anil D
Upadhyay(PW-11). During~ cro&S-examination both the
witnesses, PW-6 and PW-7 admitted that they visited the house
of Gul~m Mohd. There is no infirmity or contradiction in the
statements of the two witnesses.
E
14. Mohd. Ayaz Khan (PW-9) stated that on 8th July, 2010
at the request of the Police he conducted identification of the
jewellery at stadium Baidhan and prior to the identification
Police had handed over other jewellery in a sealed packet. He
mixed it and then conducted the identification and· during the F
identification Gulam Mohd .. and Razia had identified the original
jewellery. After identification he had handed over the jewellery
in a packet to the Police who were standing outside the
stadium.
15. Zeenat Parween(PW-3) and Razia Khatoon (PW-4), G
daughters of deceased Noorjahan and sisters of deceased
Javed Akhtar are the injured eyewitnesses; both of them
received serious injuries at the incident. Both the witness PW-
3 and PW-4 clearly stated that sometime before the incident,
the accused had come to their house and he being a prior H·
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A acquaintance, the accused had taken refreshment sitting with
their mother and also was talking with her. From the statements
of both the witnesses the facts of the accused coming to their
house before the incident, taking refreshment with deceased
Noorjahan and talking with her are proved, which is also
B corroborated from the FIR-Ext.P-10. Both these witnesses have,
also stated that in the past the accused used to come for tuitions 1
and their mother used to treat the accused like her son and the
photograph of the accused was also hanging in their house.
From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that the PW-3 and PW-
C 4 were in a position to identify the accused, the accused was
well acquainted with both PW-3 and PW-4 since long. The
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that even prior
to the incident the accused was known to the deceased and
the injured witnesses PW-3 and PW-4 and on the date of
incident also, the accused had come to their house and had
0
taken refreshments and had talks.
16. Zeenat Parveen (PW-3) and Razia Khatoon (PW-4) in
their statements clearly stated that initially the accused left their
house and after sometime the accused had come again to their
E house. On opening the door he had hit the hammer on the head
of Javed Akhtar, who had come out after hearing screams of
Zeenat Parveen and then after entering into the bedroom he
hit deceased Noorjahan on her head. From the statement of
Razia Khatoon (PW-4), it is also clear that the accused after
F entering the store-room had hit on her head and then the
accused had taken out the money and jewellery from the
almirah, suitcase, box and attache, etc. In paragraph 7 Zeenat
Parveen (PW-3), has also stated that she had seen the
accused hit Javed Akhtar on his head but she could not see
G as to who hit Razia and her mother. Such statement cannot be
stated to be contradiction and does not adversely affect the
case of the prosecution in view of the deposition made by Razia
Khatoon(PW-4).
17. Similarly, from the statement of Razia Khatoon (PW-
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 941
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
4), we find that the accused after hitting Zeenat Parveen, Javed A
Akhtar and Noorjahan took away jewellery, cash amount and
the bangles of Noorjahan and then he ran away after bolting
the door from outside.
, 18. PW-4 further deposed that after the accused n.in away 8
: by bolting the door from outside she went into the balcony and
stop Satnami (PW-1), who at that time had taken out his
vehicle and was going somewhere. Then, the door was got
open. Statements of Razia Khatoon (PW-4) about shouting from
the balcony stopping Satnami (PW-1) and then opening of the C
door by Satnami are also proved by the statement of Ramesh
Satnafrii (PW-1), who made similar statement.
. . 19. In view of the statements made by the injured witnesses
· ··zeenat Parveen (PW-3) and Razia Khatoon (PW-4) as
corroborated by the postmortem report, seizure of jewellery, D
hammer, blood stained clothes (Ex. P-13)and statement of Anil
Upadhyay (PW-11 ), as corroborated by Sadiq (PW-6) and
Yunus (PW-7), the Trial Court rightly held the accused guilty for
the offences u/s 302, 307, 394 r/w 397 and 450 IPC.
E
20. First ground taken by the learned counsel for the
appellant with respect to denial of opportunity to the accused
to be defended by a counsel of his choice is incorrect as from
the record we find that proper opportunity was given to the
accused.
F
21. The order sheets of the Trial Court dated 25th
September, 2010 shows that the appellant made an application
that appellant wanted to get the witnesses cross-examined by
senior Advocate, Mr. Rajendra Singh Chauhan, therefore, he
requested to defer the cross-examination of the witnesses. The G
Trial court rejected the application. On 27th September, 2010,
counsel of the accused, Mr. Amrendra Singh, who was
defending the accused, refused to defend him. The Trial Court
then appointed one Mr. G.P. Dwivedi, Advocate, as defence
counsel on State expenses. H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 22. dn perusal of records it transpires that Shri Amrendra
Singh, Advocate had filed his Vakalatnama for representing the
appellant. On 25th September, 2010, when the case was fixed
for evidence though he was competent to cross-examine the
witnesses but he moved the application to defer the cross-
B examination of the witnesses on the ground that the accused
wanted to engage senior Advocate, Mr. Rajendra Singh
Chauhan. However, neither Rajendra Sin!;lh Chauhan was
present nor any Vakalatnama was filed on his behalf. On that
day, two witnesses, namely Ramesh Satnami (PW-1) and
c Gulam Mohd. (PW-2) were examined and Mr. Amrendra Singh,
Advocate had cross-examined those witnesses. None of those
witnesses were eyewitnesses; in fact one of them, Ramesh
Satnami (PW-1) was declared hostile. On 27th September,
2010, Mr. Amrendra Singh refused to appear on behalf of the
appellant, when the appellant on asking expressed his inability
0
to appoint any counsel. Since there was none to represent the
accused, lhe Trial Court appointed Mr. G.P. Dwivedi, Advocate,
to pursue the appeal. The appellant has failed to show that Mr.
G.P. Dwivedi was not competent or was incapable of handling
the case. On the contrary from the cross-examination of the
E witnesses made by Mr. G.P. Dwivedi we find that he was
competent to deal with the case. Even on the next date neither
Mr. Rajendra Singh Chauhan, Advocate appeared nor he filed
his Vakalatnama.
F 23. The next question is whether death sentence awarded
to the appellant is excessive, disproportionate on the facts and
circumstance of the case, i.e. whether the present case can be
termed to be a rarest of the rare case.
G 24. Guidelines emerged from Bachan Singh vs. State of
Punjab, 1980 (2) SCC 684 were noticed by this Court in
Machhi Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, 1983 (3) SCC
470. In the said case the Court observed:
38. In this background the guidelines indicated in Bachan
H Singh case- 1980 (2) sec 684 will have to be culled out
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 943
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
and applied to the facts of each individual case where the A
question of imposing of death sentence arises. The
following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh
case<supra):
"(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted 8
except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances
of the 'offender' also require to be taken into
consideration along with the circumstances of the 'crime'.
c
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is
an exception. In other words death sentence must be
imposed only when fife irrprisonment appears to be an
altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the
relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and D
only provided, the option to impose sentence of
imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously
exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances
of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating E
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the
mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
weightage and a just balance has to be struck between
the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before
the option is exercised. F
39. In order to apply these guidelines inter a/ia the
following questions may be asked and answered:
(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which
renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate G
and calls for a death sentence?
(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is
no alternative but to impose death sentence even after
H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A according maximum weightage to the mitigating
circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?
40. If upon taking an overall global view of all the
circumstances in the light of the aforesaid proposition and
taking into account the answers to the questions posed
, B
hereinabove, the circumstances of the case are such that
death sentence is warranted, •the court would proceed to
do so."
25. In Ronny alias Ronald James Alwaris and others vs.
C State of Maharashtra, 1998 (3) SCC 625, this Court held:
"45. These principles have been applied in various .
judgments of this Court thereafter and it is unnecessary to
multiply the cases here. Whether the case is one of the
D rarest of the rare cases is a question which has to be
determined on the facts of each case. Suffice it to mention
that the choice of the death sentence has to be made only
in the ra~est of the rare cases and that where culpability
of the accused has assumed depravity or where the
accused is found to be an ardent criminal and menace to
E
the society and; where the crime is committed in an
organised manner and is gruesome, cold-blooded,
heinous and atrocious; where innocent and unarmed
persons are attacked and murdered without any
provocation, the case would present special reason for
F purposes of sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the Criminal
Procedure Code."
In Rony alias Ronald James Alwaris (supra) this Court
noted the law laid-down by this Court in Allauddin Mian & Ors.
G Vs. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5, that unless the nature of
the crime and circumstances of the offender reveal that criminal
is a menace to the society and the sentence of life
imprisonment would be altogether inadequate, the Court should
ordinarily pass a lesser punishment and not punishment of
H death which should be reserved for exceptional case only.
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 945
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
Considering the cumulative effect of all the factors, like the A
offences committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, the young age of the accused, the
possibility of reform and rehabilitation, etc. the Court may
convert the sentence into life imprisonment.
B
26. In State of Maharashtra vs. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul,
2011 (7) SCC 437, this Court made the following observation:
"30. The principles governing the sentencing policy in
our criminal jurisprudence have more or less been
consistent, right from the pronouncement of the C
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab,(2010) 8 SCC 775. Awarding
punishment is certainly an onerous function in the
dispensation of criminal justice. The court is expected to
keep in mind the facts and circumstances of a case, the D
principles of law governing award of sentence, the
legislative intent of special or general statute raised in
the case and the impact of awarding punishment. These
are the nuances which need to be examined by the court
with discernment and in depth. E
31. The legislative intent behind enacting Section 354(3)
CrPC clearly demonstrates the concern of the legislature
for taking away a human life and imposing death penalty
upon the accused. Concern for the dignity of the human
life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's
F
instrumentalities and that ought not to be done, save in
the rarest of rare cases, unless the alternative option is
unquestionably foreclosed. In exercise of its discretion,
the court would also take into consideration the mitigating
circumstances and their resultant effects. G
32. The language of Section 354(3) demonstrates the
legislative concern and the conditions which need to be
satisfied prior to imposition of death penalty. The words,
"in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A such sentence" unambiguously demonstrate the
command of the legislature that such reasons have to be
recorded for imposing the punishment of death sentence.
This is how the concept of the rarest of rare cases has
emerged in law. Viewed from that angle, both the
B legislative provisions and judicial pronouncements are
at ad idem in law. The death penalty should be imposed
in the rarest of rare cases and that too for special reasons
to be recorded. To put it simply, a death sentence is not
a rule but an exception. Even the exception must satisfy
c the prerequisites contemplated under Section 354(3)
CrPC in light of the dictum of the Court in Bachan
SinghfsupraJ.
33. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
Bachan Singh (supra) has been summarised in para 38
D in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab· <1998! 1 sec 149• and the
following guidelines have been stated while considering
the possibility of awarding sentence of death: (Machhi
Singh case(supra), SCC p. 489)
E "(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted
except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances
of the 'offender' also requires to be taken into
consideration along with the circumstances of the 'crime'.
F
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is
an exception. . .. death sentence must be imposed only
when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether
inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant
G circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only
provided the option to impose sentence of imprisonment
for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard
to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the
relevant circumstances.
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 947
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
(iv) A lialance sheet of aggravating and mitigating A
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the
mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
weightage and a just balance has to be struck between
the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before
the option is exercised." B
(emphasis supplied)
34. The judgment in Bachan Sing(supra), did not only
state the above guidelines in some elaboration, but also
specified the mitigating circumstances which could be C
considered by the Court while determining such serious
issues and they are as follows: (SCC p. 750, para 206)
"206. ... 'Mitigating circumstances.-ln the exercise of its
discretion in the above cases, the court shall take into 0
account the following circumstances:
(1) That the offence was committed under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or E
old, he shall not be sentenced to death.
'
(3) The probability that the accused would not commit
criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing
threat to society.
F
(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and,
rehabilitated.
The State shall by evidence prove that the accused does
. not satisfy Conditions (3) and (4) above. G
1 (5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the
accused believed that he was morally justified in
committing the offence.
H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A (6) That the accused acted under the duress or
domination of another person.
(7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was
mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct."'
B
35. Now, we may fJxamine certain illustrations arising
from the judicial pronouncements of this Court.
36. In D.K. Basu v. State of WB.,(2002) 1 SCC 351, this
c Court took the view that custodial torture and
consequential death in custody was an offence which fell
in the category of the rarest of rare cases. While
specifying the reasons in support of such decision, the
Court awarded death penalty in that case.
D 37. In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra, (1972) 2 SCC 640, this Court also spelt out
in paras 56 to 58 that nature, motive, impact of a crime,
culpability, quality of evidence, socio-economic
circumstances, impossibility of rehabilitation are the
E factors which the court may take into consideration while
dealing with such cases. In that case the friends of the
victim had called him to see a movie and after seeing
the movie, a ransom call was made, but with the fear of
being caught, they murdered the victim. The Court felt
F that there was no evidence to show that the criminals were
incapable of reforming themselves, that it was not a
rarest of the rare case, and therefore, declined to award
death sentence to the accused.
G
38. Interpersonal circumstances prevailing between the
deceased and the accused was a/so held to be a relevant
consideration in Vashram Narshibhai Rajpara v. State of
Gujarat, (1996) 8 sec 167, where constant nagging by
family was treated as the mitigating factor, if the accused
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 949
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
is mentally unbalanced 1and as a result murders the A
family members. Similarly, the intensity of bitterness
which prevailed and the escalation of simmering
thoughts into a thirst for revenge and retaliation were also
considered to be a relevant factor by this Court in different
cases. B
39. This Court in Satishbhushan Bariya (supra) also
considered various doctrines, principles and factors which
would be considered by the Courts while dealing with
such cases. The Court discussed in some elaboration
the applicability of the doctrine of rehabilitation and the C
doctrine of prudence. While considering the application
of the doctrine of rehabilitation and the extent of
weightage to be given to the mitigating circumstances, it
noticed the nature of the evidence and the background
of the accused. The conviction in that case was entirely D
based upon the statement of the approver and was a
case purely of circumstantial evidence. Thus, applying
the doctrine of prudence, it noticed the fact that the
accused were unemployed, young men in search of job
and they were not criminals. In execution of a plan E
proposed by the appellant and accepted by others, they
kidnapped a friend of theirs. The kidnapping was done
with the motive of procuring ransom from his family but
later they murdered him because of the fear of getting
caught, and later cut the body into pieces and disposed F
it off at different places. One of the accused had turned
approver and as already noticed, the conviction was
primarily based upon the statement of the approver."
"41. The above principle, as supported by case
illustrations, clearly depicts the various precepts which G
would govern the exercise of judicial discretion by the
courts within the parameters spelt out under Section
354(3) CrPC. Awarding of death sentence amounts to
taking away the life of an individual, which is the most
H
\
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) ~ S.C.R.
A valuable right available, whether viewed from the
constitutional point of view or from the human rights point
of view. The condition of providing special reasons for
awarding death penalty is not to be construed
linguistically but it is to satisfy the basic features of a
B reasoning supporting and making award of death penalty
unquestionable. The circumstances and the manner of
committing the crime should be such that it pricks the
judicial conscience of the court to the extent that the only
and inevitable conclusion should be awarding of death
penalty."
c
27. This Court in Ramnaresh and others vs. State of
Chattisgarh, 2012 (4) SCC 257, noticed the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances with respect to a crime and held as
follows:
D
"76. The law enunciated by this Court in its recent
;udgments, as already noticed, adds and elaborates the
principles that were stated in Bachan Singh<19eoJ 2 sec 684,
and thereafter, in Machhi Singh,(1983) 3 SCC 470. The
E aforesaid judgments, primarily dissect these principles
into two different compartments-one being the
"aggravating circumstances" while the other being the
"mitigating circumsf'ances". The court would consider the
cumulative effect of both these aspects and normally, it
may not be very appropriate for the court to decide the
F most significant aspect of sentencing policy with
reference to one of the classes under any of the following
heads while completely ignoring other classes under
other heads. To balance the two is the primary duty of
the court. It will be appropriate for the court to come to a
G final conclusion upon balancing the exercise that would
help to administer the criminal justice system better and
provide an effective and meaningful reasoning by the
court as contemplated under Section 354(3) CrPC.
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 951
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
Aggravating circumstances A
(1). The offences relating to the commission of heinous
crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping, etc.
by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital
felony or offences committed by the person having a 8
substantial history of serious assaults and criminal
convictions.
(2) The offence was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of another serious offence.
c
(3) The offence was committed with the intention to create
a fear psychosis in the public at large and was committed
in a public place by a weapon or device which clearly
could be hazardous to the life of more than one person.
D
(4) The offence of murder was committed for ransom or
like offenqes to receive money or monetary benefits.
(5) Hired killings.
(6) The offence was committed outrageously for want only E
while involving inhumane treatment and torture to the
victim.
(7) The offence was committed by a person while in lawful
custody.
F
(8) The murder or the offence was committed to prevent
a person lawfully carrying out his duty like arrest or
custody in a place of lawful confinement of himself or
another. For instance, murder is of a person who had
acted in lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 G
CrPC. .
·,,
(9) When the crime is enormous in proportion like making
an attempt of murder of the entire family or members of
a particular community.
H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A (10) When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person
relies upon the trust of relationship and social norms, like
a child, helpless woman, a daughter or a niece staying
with a father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime by such
a trusted person.
B
(11) When murder is committed for a motive which
evidences total depravity and meanness.
(12) When there is a cold-blooded murder without
provocation.
c
(13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or
shoqks not only the judicial conscience but even the
conscience of the society.
Mitigating circumstances
D
(1) The manner and circumstances in and under which
the offence was committed, for example, extreme mental
or emotional disturbance or. extreme provocation in
contradistinction to all these situations in normal course.
E
(2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration
but not a determinative factor by itself.
(3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in
commission of the crime again and the probability of the
F accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
(4) The condition of the accused shows that he was
mentally defective and the· defect impaired his capacity
to appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct.
G
(5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life,
would render such a behaviour possible and could have
the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given
situation like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading to
such a peak of human behaviour that, in the facts and
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 953.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
circumstances of the case, ,the accused believed that he A
was morally justified in committing the offence.
;
(6) Where the court upon proper appreciation of evidence
is of the view that the crime was not committed in a
preordained manner and that the death resulted in the 8
course of commission of another crime and that there
was a possibility of it being construed as consequences
to the commission of the primary crime.
'
(7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the
testimony of a sole eyewitness though the prosecution C
has brought home the guilt of the accused.
· While determining the questions relating to sentencing
policy, the Court laid down the Principle·s at paragraph 77
which reads as follows: D
"77. While determining the questions re/atable to
sentencing policy, the court has 'to follow certain
principles and those principles are the /oadstar besides
the above considerations in imposition or otherwise of the
death sentence. E
Principles
(1) The court has to apply the test to determine, if it was
the "rarest of rare" ,9ase for imposition of a death F
sentence.
(2) In the opinion of the court, imposition of any other
punishment i.e. life imprisonment would be completely
inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice.
G
(3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is
an exception.
(4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for
life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the
H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant
considerations.
(5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner
(extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the
crime was committed and the circumstances leading to
B
commission of such heinous crime."
28. Recently, this Court in Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs.
State of Maharashtra, 2013 (5) SCC 546, dealing with a case
of death sentence, observed:
c
"52. Aggravating circumstances as pointed out above,
of course, are not exhaustive so a/so the mitigating
circumstances. In my considered view, the tests that we
h_ave to apply, while awarding death sentence are "crime
D test", "criminal test" and the "R-R test" and not the
"balancing test". To award death sentence, the "crime
test" has to be fully satisfied, that is, 100% and "criminal
test" 0%, that is, no mitigating circumstance favouring the
accused. If there is any circumstance favouring the
accused, like lack of intention to commit the crime,
E
possibility of reformation, young age of the accused, not
a menace to the society, no previous track record, etc.
the "criminal test" may favour the accused to avoid the
capital punishment. Even if both the tests are satisfied,
that is, the aggravating circumstances to the fullest extent
F and no mitigating circumstances favouring the accused,
still we have to apply finally the rarest of the rare case
test (R-R test). R-R test depends upon the perception of
the society that is "society-centric" and not "Judge-centric''.
that is, whether the society will approve the awarding of
G death sentence to certain types of crimes or not. While
applying that test, the court has to look into variety of
factors like society's abhorrence, extreme indignation
and antipathy to certain types of crimes like sexual
assault and murder of intellectually challenged minor
H
SANTOSH KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF M.P. 955
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
girls, suffering from physical disabili.ty, old and infirm A
women with those disabilities, etc. Examples are only
iliustrative and no( exhaustive. The courts award death
/sentence sinc;e situation demands so, due to
constitutional compulsion, reflected by the will of the
people and not the will of the Judges." B
29. In the present case the appellant fs an educated
person, he was about 26 years old at the time of committing
the offence. The accused was a tutor in the family of the
deceased-Noorjahan. He was in acquaintance with the C
deceased as well as Zeenat Parveen (PW-3) and Razia
Khatoon (PW-4). There is nothing specific to-suggest the
motive for committing the crime except the articles and cash
taken away by the accused. It is not the case of the prosecution
that the app~llant cannot be reformed or that the accused is a
social menace. Apart from the incident in question there is no D
criminal antecedent of the appellant. It is true that' the accused
has committed a heinous crime, but it cannot be held with
certainty that this case falls in the "rarest of the rare category".
·On appreciation of evidence on record and keeping in mind
the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that E
sentence of death penalty would be extensive and unduly harsh.
30. Accordingly, we commute the death sentence of
appellant to life imprisonment. The conviction and rest part of
the sentence are affirmed. Appeals are partly allowed. F
Nidhi Jain Appeals partly allowed.
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