SANTOSH CHATURVEDIversusKAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.

76                       [2019]
              SUPREME COURT     17 S.C.R. 76
                             REPORTS                     [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A                        SANTOSH CHATURVEDI
                                      v.
                      KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6572 of 2010)
B
                            NOVEMBER 15, 2019
                    [R. BANUMATHI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
                        HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
            U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
C    Eviction) Act, 1972 – s.2(1)(a) – Eviction – Appellant initiated the
     petition u/s.2(1)(a) against the predecessor of the respondents
     seeking release of the suit property/premises – The prescribed
     authority dismissed the petition and held that appellant cannot
     claim ownership right over the coparcenary property and he was
     not the landlord of the respondents and also held that his bonafide
D
     requirement did not exist – The Appellate Authority on
     re-appreciating the entire aspect of the matter arrived at conclusion
     that the appellant had lawfully become the owner of the property
     and respondents were tenant under the appellant and held that
     case for release of property was made out – Thereafter, respondent
E    filed writ petition before the High Court – High Court took the
     similar view as arrived at by the prescribed authority and reversed
     the judgment passed by the Appellate Court – On appeal, held:
     The proceedings under the Rent Act is of summary nature wherein
     the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is to be taken note to
     the extent it is required for considering such eviction petition and
F    the rigour of examining the ownership ought not to be indulged
     in the manner as done in a title suit unless the respondent sets up
     title to the very rented property which is adverse to that of the
     landlord – In the instant case, the consideration made by the
     prescribed authority was in the nature of the title being examined
G    in the suit for partition or for seeking declaration of title – The
     detailed examination with regard to the nature of the right to the
     property was made, which was wholly unnecessary in a summary
     proceeding when tenant had not set up title to the premises in
     question – Father of the appellant admittedly was the owner of
     the property and he had made a settlement in favour of his
H
                                      76
  SANTOSH CHATURVEDI v. KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.                         77


son-appellant, the title thus acquired and cannot called in question   A
– Further, predecessor of the respondents earlier, had initiated a
proceeding before the Rent Control and Eviction officer and sought
alternate premises, that showed that respondents did not have any
issue with regard to the ownership – Insofar as a bonafide
requirement is concerned, there was no material available on
                                                                       B
record to indicate that the appellant had any other alternate
premises, the bonafide need of the appellant as claimed, accepted
– Therefore, the Judgment passed by the prescribed authority and
the High Court set aside – Consequently, the Judgment passed by
the Appellate Authority restored.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                   C

      HELD : 1. Though such detailed examination with regard
to the nature of the right to the property has been made in the
present case, this Court is of the opinion that the same was
wholly unnecessary in a summary proceeding of the present
nature when the tenant had not set up title to the premises in         D
question. Irrespective of the fact as to whether the property
was the coparcenary property or had become the absolute
property of father of the appellant, the fact remains that a family
settlement dated 15.11.1999 was entered into, to which father
of the appellant, who was the owner was himself a party and had        E
given a portion of his property to his son-appellant. Pursuant
to such oral family settlement dated 15.11.1999 a Memorandum
dated 02.02.2000 was also drawn up. Subsequent thereto the
appellant had also filed an Original Suit No.220/2001 seeking that
the family settlement be declared as valid. The said suit was
disposed of on 19.04.2001 based on the compromise. [Para 14]           F
[85-G-H; 86-A]
      2. Whether the share given by father of the appellant to
his son who is appellant is justified or as to whether the nature
of the document under which the settlement was recorded was
as per requirement of law and valid are all issues which can only      G
be raised by any other member of the family who would feel
deprived and could have claimed right over the such property.
But in a circumstance where father of appellant who admittedly
was the owner of the property had made a settlement in favour
of the appellant who is his son, the title thus acquired, in any       H
78           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A    event, cannot be called in question by the person who is in
     occupation of the premises as a tenant when father of appellant
     who admittedly was his landlord did not continue to claim to be
     the landlord. If that be the position as rightly noticed by the
     Appellate Authority, in view of the provision as contained in
     Section 8 and Section 109 of Transfer of Property Act, on transfer
B
     of the property by the owner the tenant would automatically
     become the tenant of the transferee. [Para 15] [86-B-E]
            3. The aspect which is also necessary to be taken note is
     that the predecessor of the respondents had initiated a
     proceeding in Suit No.113/2011 before the Rent Control and
C
     Eviction Officer wherein he had sought for allotment of alternate
     premises by indicating that the case bearing No.6/2010 had been
     initiated by the appellant herein against him. This would indicate
     that at the first instance, the predecessor of the respondents did
     not have any issue with regard to the ownership and was making
D    an attempt to secure an alternate premises but has only
     thereafter raised the contention despite the relationship being
     indisputable. Therefore, taking into consideration all these
     aspects this Court is of the opinion that the view expressed by
     the Appellate Court is appropriate in the present facts and
     circumstance. [Para 16] [86-G-H; 87-A-B]
E
           4. From the evidence as tendered, the appellant had
     contended that he is doing wholesale business of cloth for which
     he does not have premises due to which he, his wife and two
     children are experiencing hardship. In a circumstance where
     there is no material available on record to indicate that the
F
     appellant has any other alternate premises, the bonafide need
     of the appellant as claimed will have to be accepted and even
     though the respondents would face some hardship, as compared
     to the same the hardship to be faced by the appellant would be
     greater if the premises is not released to the appellant. [Para
G    17] [87-C-D]
          Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil
          (2010) 8 SCC 329 : [2010] 8 SCR 836 – referred to.
                          Case Law Reference
H    [2010] 8 SCR 836                referred to          Para 8
  SANTOSH CHATURVEDI v. KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.                              79


      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6572                   A
of 2010.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 54204
of 2007.
      Rajiv Dutta, Sr. Adv., Vikas Singh Jangra, Amit Kumar Pathak,         B
B. Vardhman Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Ms. Purnima Bhat, Adv. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      A. S. BOPANNA, J.                                                     C
      1. The appellant is before this Court assailing the order dated
28.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No.54204/2007. Through the said order the High
Court has allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondents herein and
has set aside the judgment and order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the         D
Special Judge, Mathura in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 whereby the order
dated 03.08.2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority/ Upper Civil Judge
(C.D.) is upheld. The appellant is, therefore, aggrieved and is before
this Court.
       2. The appellant herein instituted the petition under Section        E
21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rent Act” for short)
against the predecessor of the respondents herein seeking release of
the premises bearing No.83/72A, Tiwari Gali, Chhatta Bazar, Mathura.
The suit was registered as petition No.6/2000 before the Prescribed
                                                                            F
Authority. The Prescribed Authority having taken into consideration the
rival contentions, on holding that the appellant herein cannot claim
ownership right over the coparcenary property and in that light on
arriving at the conclusion that the appellant is not the landlord of the
respondents and also holding that the bonafide requirement does not
exist, had dismissed the petition declining the release of the shop/        G
premises in question.
      3. The appellant claiming to be aggrieved by the same had filed
the appeal in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 before the Appellate Authority,
namely, the Special Judge, Mathura. The learned Appellate Judge on
reappreciating the entire aspect of the matter had arrived at the           H
80            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A    conclusion that the appellant herein had lawfully become the owner of
     the property and in that circumstance considering the predecessor of
     the respondents herein to be the tenant under the appellant had further
     examined the matter with regard to the bonafide requirement.
     Accordingly, the learned Appellate Judge had arrived at the conclusion
     that the case for release of the property is made out and had accordingly
B
     allowed the appeal. While so considering the matter, the learned
     Appellate Judge had also taken into consideration that an alternative
     shop bearing No.83/9-C situated at Chhatta Bazar, Mathura measuring
     2.5 ft. x 26 ft. standing in the name of the father of the appellant which
     was vacant be allotted in favour of the respondents so as to mitigate
C    the hardship, if any. In that view, the respondents were directed to vacate
     the premises in question by taking possession of the said alternative
     shop No.83/9-C within one month.
            4. The respondents herein claiming to be aggrieved by the said
     order dated 09.10.2007 had filed the writ petition under Article 227 of
D    the Constitution of India before the High Court of Judicature at
     Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No.54204/2007. The learned Single Judge has
     in fact considered the matter in great detail, more particularly with
     regard to the claim of ownership made by the appellant herein and
     keeping in view the provisions contained in the Hindu Succession Act,
     1956 has arrived at the conclusion that the appellant cannot be considered
E    as a coparcener in respect of the premises in question. Hence the
     learned Single Judge has also taken a similar view as arrived at by the
     Prescribed Authority/learned Upper Civil Judge and in that light has
     reversed the judgment passed by the Appellate Court. The appellant,
     therefore, claiming to be aggrieved is before this Court in this appeal.
F          5. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Dutta, learned senior advocate along
     with Mr. Vikas Singh Jangra, learned advocate on behalf of the appellant,
     Ms. Purnima Bhat, learned advocate on behalf of the respondents and
     perused the appeal papers.
            6. The learned senior advocate for the appellant would contend
G    that the authorities prescribed under the Rent Act in issue had considered
     the matter and though divergent opinions were expressed, the Appellate
     Court had in fact appreciated the matter in its correct perspective since
     in a summary proceedings of the present nature the relationship of
     landlord and tenant was sufficient to be established which in fact had
H    been established and it ought not to have been considered like a title
  SANTOSH CHATURVEDI v. KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.                                   81
               [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

suit. The Prescribed Authority has examined the ownership of the                 A
property as if being considered in a partition suit or title suit so as to
arrive at its conclusion. It is no doubt true that the father of the appellant
had earlier filed an eviction suit against the predecessor of the
respondents and had failed in the proceedings arising thereunder.
However, in a family settlement the property in question had fallen to
                                                                                 B
the share of the appellant herein and in that circumstance the need for
the premises was a fresh cause of action and in a circumstance where
at the first instance there was no dispute to the fact that the father of
the appellant, namely, Shri Dwarka Prasad Chaturvedi was the owner,
there could not have been dispute to the fact that the appellant, who is
his son had acquired ownership over the property in the family                   C
settlement. In that regard, it is contended by the learned senior advocate
that when the learned Appellate Judge which is a statutory authority
under the Act had arrived at the conclusion based on reappreciation of
the matter, the consideration as made by the High Court in a writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution, as if it was in the nature of an
                                                                                 D
appeal by reappreciating the entire aspect is not justified. Hence, he
contends that the ownership as well as the bonafide requirement being
established, the appellant is entitled to succeed and secure release of
the suit schedule premises.
       7. The learned advocate for the respondents, on the other hand,
would contend that the undisputed position is that Shri Dwarka Prasad,           E
the father of the appellant had filed the petition under Section 21(1)(a)
of the Rent Act for release of the shop but the suit was dismissed by
the Prescribed Authority through the judgment dated 07.12.1979. The
appeal against the same was dismissed and the writ petition was also
dismissed on 29.10.1999. The father of the appellant having failed to            F
succeed had thereafter instituted a fresh proceeding through the
appellant who is his son, on 10.02.2000 by creating certain rights in
favour of the appellant under an alleged settlement dated 15.11.1999.
The Memorandum of Settlement dated 02.02.2000 was created for the
said purpose. It is her contention that the father of the appellant had
secured his share in the property prior to the birth of the appellant and        G
as such the property cannot be considered as a coparcenary property
whereunder the appellant can claim any right as a coparcener and
secure a share. It is her contention that the Prescribed Authority as
also the High Court has considered this aspect and has arrived at the
conclusion in accordance with law which does not call for interference.          H
82             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A    It is further contended that the alternate shop indicated by the learned
     Appellate Judge is not suitable for business purpose and, therefore, even
     in that regard, apart from the bonafide of the appellant not being
     established the respondents would be exposed to greater hardship if
     the premises is ordered to be released. Hence it is contended that the
     order impugned does not call for interference.
B
            8. In the background of the rival contentions, at the outset, a
     perusal of the judgment in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr.
     vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 relied upon by the
     learned senior advocate for the appellant would be in order. This case
     refers to the scope of consideration that could be made by the High
C    Court in a writ petition of the present nature. However, keeping in
     view the fact that the High Court in the instant case while examining
     the matter had two views before it, one taken by the Prescribed
     Authority and the other by the Appellate Authority which were divergent,
     one of the views was required to be accepted by examining the matter
D    in that regard. Therefore, in the instant facts if that aspect of the matter
     is taken note, since the Prescribed Authority while examining the claim
     of the appellant herein had adverted to the manner in which the claim
     of ownership was made to the property and had held that the appellant
     cannot be considered as a coparcener to be accepted as the landlord,
     the High Court has also made a consideration in that regard to accept
E    such view. Hence in the present circumstance instead of examining
     the extent of jurisdiction, what is required to be noticed by this Court is
     as to whether the nature of consideration as made by the Prescribed
     Authority as also the High Court is justified as against the conclusion
     reached by the Appellate Authority and which among the divergent
     opinions is to be accepted.
F
            9. In order to examine that aspect of the matter a perusal of the
     papers would indicate that at the first instance the father of the appellant
     Shri Dwarka Prasad had become the owner of the property under a
     partition deed dated 09.07.1959. In that capacity, the predecessor of
     the respondents was the tenant under him and the said Shri Dwarka
G
     Prasad instituted an eviction petition against the predecessor of the
     respondents on 10.03.1979. In the said proceedings there was no dispute
     whatsoever with regard to the ownership of the property or the jural
     relationship of landlord and tenant between the father of the appellant
     and the predecessor of the respondents. It is no doubt true that the
H    father of the appellant had failed in the said proceedings and presently
  SANTOSH CHATURVEDI v. KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.                                  83
               [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

the Petition bearing No.6/2000 was instituted by the appellant, who is          A
his son, claiming to be the owner of the property. The entire case as
put forth by the respondents to oppose the eviction suit is with regard
to the status of the property by contending that the joint family property
had lost its character when the partition had taken place between the
father of the appellant and the other members of the Hindu undivided
                                                                                B
family on 09.07.1959. It is, therefore, contended that the appellant being
born in the year 1977 cannot be considered as a coparcener. In that
light it is contended that in a circumstance where the appellant was
not a coparcener, he could not have taken a share in the property in
the alleged family settlement dated 15.11.1999 to claim as the owner
of the property. Such contention as urged by the respondents herein             C
has been accepted by the Prescribed Authority as well as the learned
Single Judge in the High Court.
       10. While referring to the said contentions it is necessary to
emphasise that the proceedings under the Rent Act is of summary nature
wherein the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is to be taken note       D
to the extent it is required for considering such eviction petition and
the rigour of examining the ownership ought not to be indulged in the
manner as done in a title suit unless the respondent sets up title to the
very rented property which is adverse to that of the landlord. The
Prescribed Authority at the initiation of the proceedings appears to have
been mindful of the same and the said aspect would be clear if the              E
very nature of the issues that were framed for consideration by the
Prescribed Authority is taken note of, which read as hereunder:
             1. Whether the petitioner is having a just, dire and bonafide
                need of the disputed shop for running his business?
             2. Whether the difficulties arising to the petitioner is more      F
                compared to the difficulties arising to the respondent if
                the disputed shop is being released to the respondent.
      However, the consideration has extended beyond the same and
therefore the question is as to whether it is justified in the instant facts.
                                                                                G
       11. It is to be noticed that the ownership of the property was
not raised by the Prescribed Authority as an issue for consideration but
appropriately the issues that were required under the Rent Act had been
framed. Though that was the position the requirement of proof noted
and the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority with regard to
the nature and status of the property reads as hereunder:                       H
84            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A          “In the present case, the petitioner had to prove that the disputed
           property was a coparcenary property of the Joint Hindu Family.
           In this context, the petitioner had not presented any record in
           which the disputed property has been shown to be a coparcenary
           property. The petitioner’s father himself had filed the petition
           against the respondent in the year 1979 for the release of the
B
           disputed shop, in that also, he had declared himself to be owner
           and landlord of the disputed property and he has not given any
           such statement that he himself in the capacity of the Karta of
           the family was the owner of the coparcenary property of the
           Hindu Joint Family, is the owner and the landlord. Apart from
C          this, the perusal of the paper No.33g/22 (Colly) (Lagayat) 26,
           which is filed on behalf of the respondent and is a copy of the
           Assessment of Municipal Corporation, that the disputed property
           was registered in the name of Dwarka Prasad as the owner and
           in this, Shyam Bihari has been shown as a tenant in one shop
           and in the above record, there is no such mention that Dwarka
D
           Prasad had been the owner of the disputed property, in the
           capacity of Karta of the family. Besides this, the electricity bill
           paper No.33g/27 is in the name of Dwarka Prasad. After going
           through all the circumstance, I am of the opinion that the
           petitioner has failed to prove that the aforesaid disputed shop to
E          be a coparcenary property of the Joint Hindu Family.”
            12. The very consideration made by the Prescribed Authority as
     noticed above is in the nature of the title being examined in a suit for
     partition or for seeking declaration of title. In fact the Prescribed
     Authority apart from the above conclusion has gone to the extent of
F    indicating as if the family settlement dated 15.11.1999 was not an
     equitable partition and that the right claimed under the same cannot be
     accepted as in the earlier round of litigation when Shri Dwarka Prasad
     instituted the suit for eviction he had not referred to the property as a
     coparcenary property but had claimed absolute right over the same.

G           13. As against such conclusion, the learned Appellate Judge has
     taken note that Shri Dwarka Prasad, the father of the appellant had
     received the property under a registered partition dated 09.07.1959 and
     in that light has kept in view the legal position that a share received in
     the coparcenary property would remain to be so for three generations.
     Having observed so the learned Appellate Judge has concluded in the
H    following manner:
  SANTOSH CHATURVEDI v. KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.                                  85
               [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

      “On the basis of the above discussions, it is very much clear and         A
      evident that the shop in question was a coparcenary property in
      the hands of Dwarka Prasad and the applicant Santosh
      Chaturvedi being his son has got a right, interest and share in
      the said coparcenary property. Evidence available on the record
      reveals that again family settlement occurred in between Dwarka
                                                                                B
      Prasad, his sons and mother on 15.11.1999 and due to this family
      settlement, family claims and dispute arose and due to that cause
      there was repartition of the said property on 09.04.1997 between
      Santosh Chaturvedi and his mother, father and brother which was
      written memorandum on 02.02.2000. The written memorandum
      was also filed on the records and one original suit No.220/01             C
      Santosh Chaturvedi vs. Dwarka Prasad and Others was filed in
      context with the partition of the property which was decided on
      19.04.2001 on the basis of the compromise.
      It is the argument of the learned counsel for Shyam Bihari that
      all the averments are concocted and have been framed just to              D
      give colours to the matter, I am not satisfied with this argument.
      Because, the evidence has been filed on record that oral partition
      occurred on 15.11.1999 amongst Dwarka Prasad and his sons
      Vijay and Santosh Chaturvedi and his mother which was reduced
      in writing by a memorandum of family settlement dated
      02.02.2000 which was confirmed by the decree of the original              E
      suit No.220/01. It is well settled law on this point that the partition
      can be oral and even written amongst the members of Hindu
      families. The Hindu Law is very much clear that if one
      coparcener expresses his desire for the partition then legally the
      partition/severance of the coparcenary property takes its effect          F
      from the same day i.e. from the day, coparcener had expressed
      his desire for the partition.”
       14. Though such detailed examination with regard to the nature
of the right to the property has been made in the present case, we are
of the opinion that the same was wholly unnecessary in a summary
                                                                                G
proceeding of the present nature when the tenant had not set up title
to the premises in question. Irrespective of the fact as to whether the
property was the coparcenary property or had become the absolute
property of Shri Dwarka Prasad, the fact remains that a family
settlement dated 15.11.1999 was entered into, to which Shri Dwarka
Prasad who was the owner was himself a party and had given a portion            H
86            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A    of his property to his son. Pursuant to such oral family settlement dated
     15.11.1999 a Memorandum dated 02.02.2000 was also drawn up.
     Subsequent thereto the appellant had also filed an Original Suit No.220/
     2001 seeking that the family settlement be declared as valid. The said
     suit was disposed of on 19.04.2001 based on the compromise.
B            15. Whether the share given by Shri Dwarka Prasad to the
     appellant who is his son is justified or as to whether the nature of the
     document under which the settlement was recorded was as per
     requirement of law and valid are all issues which can only be raised
     by any other member of the family who would feel deprived and could
     have claimed right over the such property. But in a circumstance where
C    Shri Dwarka Prasad who admittedly was the owner of the property
     had made a settlement in favour of the appellant who is his son, the
     title thus acquired, in any event, cannot be called in question by the
     person who is in occupation of the premises as a tenant when Shri
     Dwarka Prasad who admittedly was his landlord did not continue to
D    claim to be the landlord. If that be the position as rightly noticed by
     the Appellate Authority, in view of the provision as contained in Section
     8 and Section 109 of Transfer of Property Act, on transfer of the
     property by the owner the tenant would automatically become the tenant
     of the transferee. The further observation of the Appellate Authority
     contained in its order to notice the relationship of landlord and tenant is
E    as hereunder;
             “………………Even if, Shyam Bihari Lal has denied himself
           to be the tenant of the applicant, but here it is more important
           that another suit was pending amongst the parties for the eviction
           of tenant Shyam Bihari Lal where Shyam Bihari Lal had
F          accepted himself to be the tenant of Santosh Chaturvedi and had
           deposited the rent on the first date of hearing of the suit and
           has also requested for extending the benefit of Section 20(4) of
           Act No.13 of 72, to him in that case.”
           It will indicate that the respondents at this juncture cannot dispute
G    the ownership of the appellant over the property or the jural relationship.
           16. The aspect which is also necessary to be taken note is that
     the predecessor of the respondents late Shyam Bihari had initiated a
     proceeding in Suit No.113/2011 (Annexure R-12) before the Rent
     Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura wherein he had sought for
H    allotment of alternate premises by indicating that the case bearing No.6/
  SANTOSH CHATURVEDI v. KAILASH CHANDRA & ANR.                               87
               [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

2010 had been initiated by the appellant herein against him. This would      A
indicate that at the first instance, the predecessor of the respondents
did not have any issue with regard to the ownership and was making
an attempt to secure an alternate premises but has only thereafter raised
the contention despite the relationship being indisputable. Therefore,
taking into consideration all these aspects we are of the opinion that
                                                                             B
the view expressed by the Appellate Court is appropriate in the present
facts and circumstance.
        17. Having arrived at the above conclusion we have taken into
consideration the nature of the claim made by the appellant for release
of the property. From the evidence as tendered, the appellant had
contended that he is doing wholesale business of cloth for which he          C
does not have premises due to which he, his wife and two children are
experiencing hardship. In a circumstance where there is no material
available on record to indicate that the appellant has any other alternate
premises, the bonafide need of the appellant as claimed will have to be
accepted and even though the respondents would face some hardship,           D
as compared to the same the hardship to be faced by the appellant
would be greater if the premises is not released to the appellant. Though
at this juncture the learned counsel for the respondents would submit
that the alternate premises bearing No.83/9-C Chhatta Bazar, Mathura
ordered to be made available to the respondents is not suitable, it is in
fact an order made by the Appellate Court only in order to minimize          E
the hardship. In that circumstance, if the said premises is not suitable,
it is open to the respondents to not opt for the same. However, when
the appellant has established that he is the owner of the property and
the same is required for his bonafide occupation, the release of the
premises in any event, is required to be made.
                                                                             F
       18. In that view, for all the reasons stated above we are of the
opinion that the Prescribed Authority as well as the learned Single Judge
of the High Court were not justified in their conclusion. Accordingly,
the judgment dated 03.08.2001 passed in Petition No. 6/2000 and the
judgment dated 28.11.2007 passed in C.M.W.P. No.54204/2007 are set
                                                                             G
aside. Consequently, the judgment dated 09.10.2007 passed in P.A.
Appeal No.1/2002 is restored. The respondents are granted three
months’ time to vacate and handover the vacant possession of the
petition subject premises bearing No.83/72-A situate in Tiwari Gali,
Chhatta Bazar, Mathura to the appellant subject to an undertaking being
filed before this Court within a period of three weeks. It is made clear     H
88                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A    that if such undertaking is not filed the benefit of the time granted to
     vacate will not be available to the respondents. Further, the release of
     the premises in question shall be made irrespective of opting for the
     alternate premises as ordered by the Appellate Court.
            19. The appeal is allowed accordingly. There shall be no order
B    as to costs. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.


     Ankit Gyan                                                 Appeal allowed.



C




D




E




F




G




H