Holding

Video conferencing cannot be ordered in transfer petitions and may be permitted only at the discretion of the Family Court after settlement fails and with joint consent, in accordance with Section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether video conferencing could be used in matrimonial disputes under the Family Courts Act, 1984, particularly in transfer petitions. It held that Section 11 of the Act obliges the court to hold proceedings in camera if either party desires, and that allowing video conferencing on the consent of only one party would contravene this provision. The Court clarified that discretion to permit video conferencing rests with the Family Court after settlement efforts fail and both parties file a joint application or consent memorandum. The earlier decision in Krishna Veni Nagam was partially overruled to the extent it mandated video conferencing in transfer petitions. Consequently, the Court directed that video conferencing cannot be ordered in transfer petitions and that any such direction must be prospective, leaving the matter to be considered by the appropriate bench.

Issues considered

The permissibility of video conferencing in matrimonial disputes under the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Whether Section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 mandates in‑camera proceedings and precludes video conferencing when only one party consents.
Whether the discretion to allow video conferencing lies with the Family Court after settlement fails.
The effect of the Krishna Veni Nagam decision on the use of video conferencing in transfer petitions.
Whether video conferencing infringes upon constitutional rights of women, including freedom of choice and dignity.
Whether a transfer petition under Article 139A(2) and Section 25 of the CPC can be directed to use video conferencing.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XLI Rule 2, s. Section 25
Constitution of Indias. Article 139A(2), s. Article 14, s. Article 15(3), s. Article 39A
Family Courts Act, 1984s. 10(3), s. 11, s. 12, s. 22, s. 9
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 22, s. 23(2), s. 26
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 65, s. 65A, s. 65B

Subjects

video conferencingfamily courtsmatrimonial disputein‑camera proceedingstransfer petitionconstitutional rightsgender equalitytechnologyaccess to justice

Judgment

[2017] 12 S.C.R. 557

SANTHINI A
v.
VIJAYA VENKETESH
(Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1278of2016)
OCTOBER 09, 2017 B
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Family Law - Matrimonial dispute - Video conferencing -
Permissibility - In view of the scheme of the 1984 Act and in
particular s. ll, the hearing of matrimonial disputes may have to be c
conducted in camera - Once a settlement fails and if both the parties
give consent that a witness can be examined in video conferencing,
that can be allowed - That apart, when they give consent that it is
necessary in a specific factual matrix having regard to the
convenience of the parties, the Family Court may allow ·the prayer D
for video coriferencing - That much of discretion can be conferred
on the Family Court - Such a limited discretion will not run counter
to the legislative intention that permeates the 1984 Act - However,
as a safeguard, a joint application should be filed before the F amity
Court Judge, who shall take a decision - However, in a transfer
petition, no direction can be issued for video conferencing - The E
discretion has to rest with the Family Court to be exercised after the
court arrives at a definite conclusion that the settlement is not possible
and both parties file a joint application or each party filing his/her
consent memorandum seeking hearing by video conferencing -
These directions shall apply prospectively- Fami(y Courts Act, 1984
F
- s.11 - Constitution of India - Art.139A(2) - Transfer Petition.
(Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself and for A.M Khanwilkm; .!.)
Family Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - Jn camera proceedings -
Importance of - Whether rights of woman would scuttle when
matrimonial disputes are conducted through video conferencing -
G
Held: The "constitutional identity", "freedom of choice", "dignity
of a woman" and "affirmative rights conferred on woman by the
Constitution" cannot be allowed to be abrogated even for a moment
- s.11 of 1984 Act mandates the proceedings to be held in camera if
one of the parties so desires - Equality_of choice has been conferred

557
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A by the statute - That apart, s.22 of the 1955 Act lays down the
proceedings to be held in camera and any matter in relation to any
such proceeding may not be printed or published except a judgment
of the High Court or of the Supreme Court with the previous
permission of the Court - The expression of desire by the wife or
the husband is whittled down and smothered if the Court directs
B
that the proceedings shall be conducted through the use of video
conferencing - To say that if one party makes the request, the
proceedings may be conducted by video conferencing mode, would
be contrary to the language employed under .d I of the 1984 Act -
The said provision is in consonance with the constitutional provision
c which confer affirmative rights on women that cannot be negatived
by the Court- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s.22. (Dipak Misra, CJ!
for himself and for A.M. Khanwilka1; J.)
Family Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - In camera proceedings -
Gender equality - s.11 provides that if one of the parties desires
D that the proceedings should be held in camera, the Family Court
has no option but to so direct - Such a sanctified right cannot be
taken away by courts which law recognizes either for the wife or
the husband.(Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself and for
A. M. Khanwilkm; J.)
E F amity Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - Role/duties of Family Court
Judge - The Family Court Judge is expected to be absolutely
sensitive and has to take stock of the situation and can suo motu
hold the proceedings in camera - The Family Court Judge is only
meant to deal with the controversies and disputes as provided under
the 1984 Act - He is not to be given any other assignment by the
F High Court - The in camera proceedings stand in contradistinction
to a proceeding which is tried in court - When a case is tried or
heard in court, there is absolute transparenGy - Having regard to
the nature of the controversy and the sensitivity of the matter, it is
desirable to hear in court various types of issues that crop up in
G these types of litigations - A Family Court Judge has to be very
sensitive to the cause before it and he/she should be conscious about
timely delineation and not procrastinate the matter as delay has the
potentiality to breed bitterness that eventually corrodes the emotions
- The Court has been extremely cautious while stating about patience
as a needed quality for ar~iving at a settlement and the need for
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 559

speedy settlement and, if not possible, proceeding with meaningful A
adjudication - There must be efforts for reconciliatidn - The
legislative intendment is for speedy settlement - The confidentiality
of the proceedings is imperative for these proceedings.
(Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself and for A.M Khanwilkar, J.)
Family Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - Video conferencing, when B
only one party gives consent, permissibility - Held: The procedure
of video conferencing which is to be adopted when one party gives
consent is contrary to s.11 of the 1984 Act - There is no provision
that the matter can be dealt with by the Fami~v Court Judge by
taking recourse to video conferencing - When a matter is not
transferred and settlement proceedings take place which is in the C
nature of reconciliation, it will be well nigh impossible to bridge the
gap - What one party can communicate with other, if they are left
alone for sometime, is not possible in video conferencing and if
possible, it is ve1y doubtful whether the emotional bond can be
established in a virtual meeting during video conferencing - Video D
conferencing may create a dent in the process of settlement - The
statuto1y right of a woman cannot be nullified by taking route to
technological advancement and destroying her right under a law,
more so, when it relates to family matters - Dignity of women is
sustained and put on a higher pedestal if her choice is respected -
That will be in consonance with Art.15(3) of the Constitution. E
(Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself and for A.M Khanwilkar, J.)
Family Courts Act, 1984 - Legislative purpose behind the
Family Courts Act- The Act aims to promote conciliation and secure
speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs
and for matters connected therewith. (Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself F
and for A.M Khanwilkm; J.)
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s.23(2) - Settlement or
reconciliation - Duty of Family Court to make efforts for settlement
- s.23(2) of the 1955 Act mandates for reconciliation - The language
used under s.23(2) makes it an obligato1y du~v on the part of the G
court at the first instance in every case where it is possible, to make
every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties
where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and
circumstances of the case. (Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself and for
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.) H

•
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s.23(2) - Reconciliation -
Presence of parties, necessity of - The reconciliation requires
presence of both the parties at the same place and the same time so
as to be effectively conducted - The spatial distance will distant the
possibility of reconciliation because the Family Court Judge would
not be in a position to interact with the parties in the manner as the
B
law commands - By virwe of the nature of the controversy, it has its
inherent sensitivity- The Judge is expected to deal with care, caution
and with immense sense of worldly experience absolutely being
conscious of social sensibility - This commands a sense of trust
and maintaining an atmosphere of co1?fidence and also requirement
c of assurance that the confidentiality is in no way averted or done
away with - There can be no denial of this fact - It is sanguinely
private. (Dipak Misra, CJ! for himself and for A.M. Khanwilkw; J)
DISSENTING VIEW:
Family Law - Matrimonial disputes - Access to justice - Use
D of video conferencing - Application of lechnology to facilitate the
judicial process - The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted at a
point in time when modern technology was not fully developed -
That would not be a reason for any court to exclude the application
of technology Jo facilitate the judicial process - Appropriate
deployment of technology facilitates access to justice - Litigation
E
under the Family Courts Act 1984 is not an exception to this
principle -- Whether video conferencing should be allowed in a
particular family dispute before the Family Court, the stage at which
it should be allowed and the safeguards which should be followed
should best be left to the High Co11rts while framing rules on the
F subject - Subject to such rnles, the use of video co1?ferencing must
he left to the careful exercise of discretion of the Family Court in
each case. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Family Law - Matrimonial disputes - Access to justice -
Prayer for video conferencing - Consent of parties, requirement -
G Held: To deprive parties of the benefit of video c01iferencing will
result in a denial ofaccess to justice- Nor can recourse to technology
be conditioned on the consent of both spo11ses f01; this will .only
enable one spouse to procrastinate or delay the proceeding -
Withholding consent to video conferencing will then become a tool
in the hands of one of the litigants to delay the proceedings.
H (D1: D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 561

Family Courts Act, 1984 - s)l - Video conferencing - An A
in-camera trial is contemplated under s.11 in two situations: first
where the Family Court so desires; and second if either of the parties
so desires - There is a fallacy in the hypothesis that an in-camera
trial is inconsistent with the usage of video conferencing techniques
- A trial in-camera postulates the exclusion of the public from the
B
courtroom and allows for restraints on public reporting - Video
conferencing does not have to be recorded nor is it accessible to
the press or the public - The proper adoption of video conferencing
does not negate the postulates of an in-camera trial even if such a
trial is required by the court or by one of the parties under s.11.
(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) c
Family Courts Act, 1984 - ss.10(3), II - Use of technology
in settlement process - Video conferencing - Family Courts Act
envisages an active role for the Family Court to foster settlements -
Under the provisions of s.11, the Family Court has to endeavour to
"assist and persuade" parties to arrive at a settlement - In the D
process of settlement, s.10(3) enables the Family Court to lay down
its own procedure - The Family Court is entitled to take the benefit
of counsellors, medical experts and persons professionally engaged
in promoting the welfare of the family - These provisions - far from
excluding the use of video conferencing - are sufficiently enabling
to allow the F amity Court to utilise technological advances to E
facilitate the purpose of achieving justice in resolvingfami(v conflicts
- There may arise a variety of situations ·where in today'.~ age and
time parties are unable to come face to face for counselling or can
do so only at such expense, delay or hard~hip which will defeat
justice - It would be inappropriate to deprive the Family Court F
which is vested with such wide powers and procedural flexibility to
adopt video conferencing as a fi1cilitative tool, where it is convenient
and readily available - Whether video conferencing should be
allowed mus/ be determined on a case to case analysis to best
effectuate the concern of providing just solutions - Far from such
a procedure being excluded by the law, it will sub serve the purpose G
of the law - Video conferencing allows things to be resolved from
the safety of a place which is not accessible to the other spouse
against whom there is a serious allegation of misbehaviour of a
psychiatric nature or in a case of substance abuse.
(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud. J.) H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Family Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - Video conferencing- Video
conferencing is gender neutral - In fact it ensures that one of the
spouses cannot procrastinate and delay the conclusion of the trial
- Delay generally defeats the cause of a party which is not the
dominant partner in a relationship - Imposing an unwavering
requirement of personal and physical presence (and exclusion of
B
facilitative technological tools such as video conferencing) will
result in a denial of justice - Constitution of India - Art.14 -
Administration of justice. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Family Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - Video conferencing -
Exclusion of video conferencing in the settlement process - The
C proposition that video conferencing can be permitted only after the
conclusion of settlement proceedings (resultantly excluding it in the
settlement process), and thereafter only when both parties agree to
it does not accord either with the purpose or the provisions of the
Family Co11rts Act 1984 - Exclusion of video conferencing in the
D settlement process is not mandated either expressly or by necessary
impl(cation by the legislation - On the contrary the legislation has
enabling provisions which are sufficiently broad to allow video
conferencing - Confining it to the stage after the settlement process
and in a situation where both parties have agreed will seriously
impede access to justice - It will render the Family Court helpless
E to deal with human sit11ations which merit flexible solutions.
(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Family Courts Act, 1984 - s.11 - Video conferencing -
Footage of Video conferencing, fear of misuse - The premise that
''the footage in video conferencing becomes part of the record'' is
F incorrect - It does not necessarily become a part of the record -
Discussions relayed through video confere11ci11g in the course of
settleme11t will of course 11ot be recorded - s. 10(3) of the 1984 Act
enables a Family Court to lay down its own procedure with a view
to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit
or proceedings - This provision gives the Family Court ample powers
G
to use video conferencing in matrimonial disputes, where
· appropriate. (D1: D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Famity Courts Act, 1984 - s. ll - Video conferencing - Misuse,
apprehension of - Video conferencing and in-camera proceedings
are not irreconciliable - Video conferencing. in itself, is a private
H interaction - It does not involve third perso11s or spectators apart
SANTHINI v. VDAYA VENKETESH 563

from the two participants between whom the video conferencing is A
taking place (judge or counsellor and one of the parties to the
dispute) - As long as it is not accessible to the public, privacy is
maintained - Therefore, it does not run contrary to the intent of
s.11, which is to maintain privacy - The same level of privacy that
is afforded to parties during in-camera proceedings which take
B
place in the same physical space, can be maintained over the virtual
space of video conferencing - Technology also allows to ensure
that there is 110 record of the conversation which took place through
video conferencing, once the conversation is over - Technology
provides flexibility - Discussions across an audio-visual link in the
course of counselling or conciliation will not be recorded so as to c
maintain privacy and intimate confidences - On the other hand,
where in the course of a trial, a judge requires that a record of the
deposition be maintained, technology will facilitate it - Even· if a
video conference is recorded for this purpose, the records can be
destroyed after the judgment is delivered or once the purpose of D
recording by the judge has been served.
(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Video conferencing - Importance of - Held: Video
conferencing must be in the interest ofjustice, - Video conferencing
facilities allow parties to communicate with each other in situations
where it would bl! expensive, inconvenient or otherwise not desirable E
for a person to attend the court procedure - Given the delays in
judicial proceedings, which are ojien due to the wilful
procrastination of one of the parties, video conferencing serves the
purpose of safeguarding the interests ofjustice by preventing undue
delay - The massive pendency of cases in India and issues related F
to access to justice will require a careful deployment of appropriate
technologies. (Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.)
Foreign jurisprudence - Video conferencing - With the
advancement of teclinology, many countries have applied video
conferencing in matrimonial proceedings.
(Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) G

In Krishna Veni Nigam case, a two-Judge Bench of Supreme
Court while dealing with. transfer petition seeking transfer of
divorce matter from Family Court Jabalpur to Family Court
Hyderabad took note of grounds of transfer and the approach of
the Courts to normally allow the transfer of proceedings keeping H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A in view convenience of the wife expressed concern for difficulties
faced by litigants travelling to Supreme Court and posed the
question whether there was possibility to avoid the same. The
question formulated therein was whether the court should
entertain such transfer petition only on the condition that the
husband makes appropriate deposit to bear the expenses of the
B
wife as may be determined by the Court so that the wife is not
handicapped to defend the proceedings. The pivotal concern of
the Court was whether an order could be passed so as to provide
a better alternative to each individual who is compelled to move
Supreme Court. The Court made certain references to the
c doctrine of 'forum non conveniens' and held that it can be applied
to matrimonial proceedings for advancing the interest of justice.
The Court further observed that if the proceedings are transferred
to place which is convenient to the woman, the problem which
are then faced by the husband cannot be ignored and thus, transfer
is not always a solution acceptable to both the parties. The Court
D
further noted that it may be appropriate that available technology
of video conferencing is used where both parties h.ave equal
difficulty and there is no place which is convenient to both the
parties.
The Krishna Veni Nigam case was brought to the notice of
E the two-Judge Bench in the instant case titled Santlti11i v. Vijaya
Venketesh. The two-Judge Bench held that to what an extent the
confidence and confidentiality will be safeguarded and protected
in video conferencing, particularly when efforts are taken by the
counsellors, welfare experts, and for that matter, the court itself
F
for reconciliation, restitution of conjugal rights or dissolution of
marriage, ascertainment of the wishes of the child in custody
matters, etc., is a serious issue to be considered; that it is certainly
difficult in video conferencing to maintain confidentiality; that
footage in video conferencing becomes part of the record whereas
the reconciliatory efforts taken by the duty-holders are not meant
G to be part of the record. The two-Judge Bench held that the
directions issued by the Court in Krishna Veni Nagam case needed
reconsideration on the aspect of video conferencing in
matrimonial disputes. The matter was referred to larger bench
and that is how matter was placed before this three-Judge Bench.
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 565

Answering the reference, the Court A
HELD:
Per Dipak Misra, CJI (For himself and Khanwilkar, J.)
1. The Supreme Court has been conferred with the power
by the Constitution under Article 139A(2) to transfer the cases B
and has also been conferred statutory jurisdiction to transfer the
cases. The Court has the power to allow the petition seeking
transfer. or to decline the prayer and indubitably, it is on
consideration of the merits of the case and satisfaction of the
Court on that score. [Para 10](591-F-G]
c
2.1 Legislative purpose behind Family Courts Act, 1984:
The preamble of the 1984 Act provides for the establishment of
Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure
speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family
affairs and for matters connected therewith. [Para 12][594-D]
D
2.2 Role of Family Court .Judge: A Family Court Judge has
to be very sensitive to the cause before it and he/she should be
conscious about timely delineation and not procrastinate the
matter as delay has the potentiality to breed bitterness that
eventually corrodes the emotions. The Court has been extremely
cautious while stating about patience as a needed quality for E
arriving at a settlement and the need for speedy settlement and,
if not possible, proceeding with meaningful adjudication. There
must be efforts for reconciliation, but the time spent in the said
process has to have its own limitation. The legislative intent, the
schematic purpose and the role attributed to the Family Court F
have to be perceived with a sense of sanctity. [Paras 14, 16](595-
E-F; 596-E-F]
Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6
SCC 353 : [2014) 8 SCR 858 - relied on.
K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida (2003) 4 SCC 166 : G
[2003] 3 SCR 498; Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan
(2015) 5 sec 705 - referred to.
2.3 Fundamental intent of scheme of the 1984 Act: The
1984 Act, to achieve its purpose, conceives of involvement of
institutions or organizations engaged in social welfare or their H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 12 S.C.R.

A representatives and professionals engaged in promoting the
welfare of the family so that, if required, the Family Court can
take their assistance to exercise its jurisdiction in an effective
manner. (Para 17) [596-G-H; 597-A-B)
2.3 Jurisdiction of Family Court: The jurisdiction conferred
B on the Family Court is quite extensive. It confers power in a
Family Court to exercise jurisdiction exercisable by any district
court or any subordinate civil court under any law relating to a
suit or a proceeding between the parties to a marriage or a decree
of a nullity of marriage declaring the marriage to be null and void
or annulling the marriage, as the case may be, or restitution of
C conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage
and also the power to entertain a proceeding with respect to the
property of the parties to a marriage or either of them. The Family
Court has the jurisdiction to pass an order or injunction in
circumstances arising out of a marital relationship, declare
D legitimacy of any person and deal with proceedings for grant of
maintenance, guardianship of the person or the custody of or
access to any minor. That apart, it has also been conferred the
authority to deal with the applications for grant of maintenance
for wife and children and parents as provided under the CrPC.
Section 9 prescribes the duty of the Family Court to make efforts
E for settlement by rendering assistance and persuading the parties
for arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the
suit or proceeding. For the said purpose, it may follow the
procedure laid down by the High Court. If in any suit or
proceeding, at any stage, it appears to the Family Court that there
F is a reasonable opportunity of settlement between the parties, it
may adjourn the proceedings for such period as it thinks fit to
enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement. [Paras
18, 19)(597-C-H]
3.1 Section 11 provides for proceedings to be held in
G camera. A plain reading of Section 11 shows that if the Family
Court desires, the proceedings should be held in camera and it
shall be so held if either of the parties so desires. A reading of
the said provision indicates that, once one party makes a prayer
for holding the proceedings in camera, it is obligatory on the part
of the Family Court to do so. (Para 20)(598-A-C]
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 567

3.2 Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides A
for proceedings to be in camera and stipulates that the proceeding
may not be printed or published. Section 23(2) of the 1955 Act
enjoins that before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act,
it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case
where it is possible to do so consistently with the nature and B
circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring
about a reconciliation between the parties. The said provision is
not applicable to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any
of the grounds specified in clause (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) or (vii) of
sub-section (1) of Section 13. Sub-section (3) of Section 23 permits
the Court to take aid of a person named by the parties or of any C
person nominated by the Court to bring out a resolution. [Paras
22, 23J(598-D-H; 599-A]
3.3 Section 26 of the 1955 Act deals with custody of children.
It empowers the court, from time to time, to pass such interim
orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem D
just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and
education of minor children consistently with their wishes, ·
.wherever possible. In a matter relating to the custody of the child,
the welfare of the child is paramount and seminal. The interest
of the child in all circumstances remains vital and the Court has a
very affirmative role in that regard. [Paras 24-25] [599-B, E] E

Malthesh Gudda Pooja v. State of Karnataka (2011)
15 SCC 330 : [2011] 11 SCR 870 - distinguished
Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli (2008) 7
SCC 673 : [2008] 8 SCR 260; Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. F
Chakramakkal (1973) 1 SCC 840 : [1973] 3 SCR 918;
Vikram Vir Vohra v. Shalini Bhalla (2010) 4 SCC 409 :
[2010) 3 SCR 775 - referred to.
Halsbury's Laws of England (4 1h Edn., Vol. J 3) - ·
referred to. G
4.1 The "constitutional identity", "freedom of choice",
"dignity of a woman" and "affirmative rights conferred on her by
the Constitution" cannot be allowed to be abrogated even for a
moment. Section 11 of 1984 Act mandates the proceedings to. be
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A held in camera if one of the parties so desires. Equality of choice
has been conferred by the statute. That apart, Section 22 of the
1955 Act lays down the proceedings to be held in camera and any
matter in relation to any such proceeding may not be printed or
published except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme
B Court with the previous permission of the Court. The expression
of desire by the wife or the husband is whittled down and
smothered if the Court directs that the proceedings shall be
conducted through the use of video conferencing. To say that if
one party makes the request, the proceedings may be conducted
by video conferencing mode or system would be contrary to the
C language employed under Section 11 of the 1984 Act. The said
provision is in consonance with the constitutional provision which
confer affirmative rights on women that cannot be negatived by
the Court. [Paras 43-44)(607-F-G; 608-A-E]
State of Maharashtra v. Praful B. Desai (2003) 4 SCC
D 601 : (2003] 3 SCR 244; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan (2005) 3 SCC 284; Budhadev
Karmaskar (4) v. State of W.B. (2011) 10 SCC 283 :
[2011] 10 SCR 577; Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd
v. Audrey D'costa and another (1987) 2 SCC 469 :
(1987] 2 SCR 659; Vishaka and others v. State of
E Rajasthan and others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3
Suppl. SCR 404; Anin Kumar Agrawal and another v.
National Insurance Company Limited and others (2010)
9 'sec 218 : [2010] 9 SCR 303; Voluntary Health
Association of Punjab v. Union of India and others
F (2013) 4 SCC 1 : (2013] 5 SCR 111; State of H.P. v.
Nikku Ram (1995) 6 SCC 219 : (1995] 3 Suppl. SCR
177; MC. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 :
[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 726; Charu Khurana and others
v. Union ofIndia and others (2015) 1 SCC 192 : (2014]
12 SCR 259; Voluntary Health Association of Punjab
G v. Union of India .and Ors (2016) 10 SCC 265 : [2016]
8 SCR 192; Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others (2016) 9 SCC 541 : [2016] 8 SCR 872; Lata
Singh v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 475 : [2006) 3
Suppl. SCR 350; Maya Kaur Baldevsingh Sardar v.
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 569

State of Maharashtra (2007) 12 SCC 654 : [2007] 10 A
SCR 752 - referred to.
5.2 Section 11 of the 1984 Act provides that if one of the
parties desires that the proceedings should be held in camera,
the Family Court has no option but to so direct. This Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot take away such a sanctified B
right that law recognizes either for the wife or the husband. That
apart, the Family Court has the duty to make efforts for
settlement. Section 23(2) of the 1955 Act mandates for
reconciliation. The language used under Section 23(2) makes it
an obligatory duty on the part of the court at the first instance in
every case where it is possible, to make every endeavour to bring C
about reconciliation between the parties where it is possible to
do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case.
There arc certain exceptions carved out by the legislature as
has been enumerated in the proviso which pertain to incurably of
unsound mind or suffering from a virulent and incurable form of D
leprosy or suffering from venereal disease in a communicable
form or has renounced the world by entering any religious order
or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven
years, etc. The Court has to play a diligent and effective role in
this regard. [Para 45][608-F-H; 609-A-B]
E
5.3 The reconciliation rcq uircs presence of both the parties
at the same place and the same time so as to be effectively
conducted. The spatial distance will distant the possibility of
reconciliation because the Family Court Judge would not be in a
position t.o interact with the parties in the manner as the law
commands. By virtue of the nature of the controversy, it has its F
inherent sensitivity. The Judge is expected to deal with care,
caution and with immense sense of worldly experience absolutely
being conscious of social sensibility. This commands a sense of
trust and maintaining an atmosphere of confidence and also
requirement of assurance that the confidentiality is in no way G
averted or done away with. There can be no denial of this fact. It
is sanguinely private. [Para 46][609-B-D]
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Rtd) v. Union ofIndia & others
(2017) 10 SCALE 1 - referred to.
H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Schulte Co. v. Gangi 328 U.S. 108, 121-122 (1946);
Hopkins Savings Assn. v. Cleary 296 U.S. 315, 334
(1935) - referred to.
6.1 The procedure of video conferencing which is to be
adopted when one party gives consent is contrary to Section 11
B of the 1984 Act. There is no provision that the matter can be
dealt with by the Family Court Judge by taking recourse to video
conferencing. When a matter is not transferred and settlement
proceedings take place which is in the nature of reconciliation, it
will be well nigh impossible to bridge the gap. What one party
can communicate with other, if they are left alone for sometime,
C is not possible in video conferencing and if possible, it is very
doubtful whether the emotional bond can be established in a
virtual meeting during video conferencing. Video conferencing
may create a dent in the process of settlement. The statutory
right of a woman cannot be nullified by taking route to
D technological advancement and destroying her right under a law,
more so, when it relates to family matters; Dignity of women is
sustained and put on a higher pedestal if her choice is respected.
That will be in consonance with Article 15(3) of the Constitution.
[Paras 49, 50][610-E-G; 611-A]
6.2 The nine-Judge Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
E
case, after· enunciating the universally accepted pl"oposition in
favour of open trials expressed "the primary function of the
judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their
causes before it. On principle, it is difficult to accede to the
proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all
F causes must be tried in open court. If principle that all trial must
be held in public was treated as inflexible and universal and it is
held that it admits of no exceptions whatever, cases may arise
where by following the principle, justice itself may be defeated.
The principle of exception therein is founded on the centripodal
G necessity of doing justice to the cause and not to d_efeat it. In
matrimonial disputes that are covered under Section 7 of the 1984
Act where the Family Court exercises its jurisdiction, there is a
statutory protection to both the parties and conferment of power
on the court with a duty to persuade the parties to reconcile. If
the proceedings are directed to be conducted through video
H
SANTHJNI v. VDAYA VENKETESH 571

conferencing, the command of the Section as well as the spirit of A
the 1984 Act will be in peril and further the cause of justice would
be defeated". (Paras 51, 52][611-E-G; 6U-B-C]
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors v. State of
Maharashtra and Am: AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966) SCR
744 - followed B
6.3 The statement of law made in Krishna Veni Nagam that
if either of the parties gives consent, the case can be transferred,
is absolutely unacceptable. However, an exception can be carved
out to the same. Though the principle does not flow from statutory
silence, yet it is found from the scheme of the Act, the Family
Court has been given ample power to modulate its procedure.
c
The Evidence Act is not strictly applicable. Affidavits of formal
witnesses are acceptable. It will be permissible for the other
party to cross-examine the deponent. The enactment gives
emphasis on speedy settlement. A genuine endeavour has to be
made by the Family Court Judge, but in the name of efforts to D
bring in a settlement or to arrive at a solution of the lis, the Family
Court should not be chained by the tentacles by either parties.
Perhaps, one of the parties may be interested in procrastinating
the litigation. Therefore, once a settlement fails and if both the
parties give consent that a witness can be examined in video
E
conferencing, that can be allowed. That apart, when they give
consent that it is necessary in a specific·factual matrix having
regard to the convenience of the parties, the Family Court may
allow the prayer for video conferencing. That much of discretion
can be conferred on the Family Court. Such a limited discretion
will not run counter to the legislative intention that permeates F
the 1984 Act. However, as a safeguard, a joint application should
be filed before the Family Court Judge, who shall take a decision.
However, in a transfer petition, no direction can be issued for
video conferencing. The discretion has to rest with the Family
Court to be exercised after the court arrives at a definite G
conclusion that the settlement is not possible and both parties
file a joint application or each party filing his/her consent
memorandum seeking hearing by video conferencing.(Para
54)[612-E-H; 613-A-C]
Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam (2017) 4 SCC
150 - partly overruled. H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6
SCC 353 : (2014] 8 SCR 858; Anindita Das v. Srijit
Das (2006) 9 SCC 197; Mona Aresh Goel v. Aresh Satya
Goel (2000) 9 SCC 255; Lalita A. Ranga v. Ajay
Champa/al Ranga (2000) 9 SCC 355; Deepa v. Anil
Panicker (2000) 9 SCC 441; Archana Rastogi v. Rakesh
B
Rastogi (2000) 10 SCC 350; Leena Mukhe1jee v. Rabi
Shankar Mukhe~jee (2002) 10 SCC 480; Nee/am Bhatia
v. Satbir Singh Bhatia (2004) 13 SCC 436 : (2006) 1
sec (Cri) 323; Soma Choudhury V. Gourab
Choudhaury (2004) 13 SCC 462 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri)
c 341; Rajesh Rani v. Tej Pal (2007) 15 SCC 597;
Vandana Sharma v. Rakesh Kumar Sharma (2008) 11
SCC 768; Anju Ohri v. Varinder Ohri (2007) 15 SCC
556; Premlata Singh v. Rita Singh (2005) 12 SCC 277;
Gana Saraswathi v. H. Raghu Prasad (2000) 10 SCC
277; Ram Gu/am PandU v. Umesh J. Prasad (2002) 10
D
SCC 551; Rajwinder Kaur v. Ba/winder Singh (2003)
11 sec 726 - referred to.
Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.* (Dissenting view)
1.1. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted at a point in
E time when modern technology which enables persons separated
by spatial distances to communicate with each other face to face
was not the order of the day or, in any case, was not as fully
developed. That is no reason for any court - especially for this
court which sets precedent for the nation - to exclude the
application of technology to facilitate the judicial process.[Para
F 1] [617-B-C]
1.2 Appropriate deployment of technology facilitates access
to justice. Litigation under the Family Courts Act 1984 is not an
exception to this principle. This court must be averse to judicially
laying down a restraint on such use of technology which facilitates
G access to justice to persons in conflict, including those involved
in conflicts within the family. Modern technology is above all a
facilitator, enabler and leveler. [Para 2][617-B-C]

• Hon'ble Dr. Justice D. Y. Chandrachud has delivered one judgment recording his
conclusions and another judgment indicating the reasons.
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 573

1.3 Video conferencing is a technology which allows users A
in different locations to hold face to face meetings. Video
conferencing is being used extensively the world over (India being
no exception) in on line teaching, administration, meetings,
negotiation,mcdiation and telemedicine among a myriad other
uses. Video conferencing reduces cost,time, carbon footprint and
B
the like. [Para 1](617-E-.F]
1.4 An in-camera trial is contemplated under Section 11 in
two situations: the first where the Family Court so desires; and
the second if either of the parties so desires. There is a fallacy in
the hypothesis that an in-camera trial is inconsistent with the
usage of video conferencing techniques. A trial in-camera c
postulates the exclusion of the public from the courtroom and
allows for restraints on public reporting. Video conferencing does
not have to be recorded nor is it accessible to the press or the
public. The proper adoption of video conferencing does not negate
the postulates of an in-camera trial even if such a trial is required D
by the court or by one of the parties under Section 11. [Para
1)(617-GcH; 618-A)
1.5 The Family Courts Act 1984 envisages an active role
for the Family Court to foster settlements. Under the provisions
of Section 11, the Family Court has to endeavour to "assist and E
persuade" parties to arrive at a settlement. Section 9 clearly
recognises a discretion in the Family Court to determine how to
structure the process. It docs so by adopting the words "where
it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances
of the case". Moreover, the High Courts can frame rules under
Section 9(1) and the Family Court may, subject to those rules, F
"follow such procedure as it deems fit". In the process of
settlement, Section 10(3) enables the Family Court to lay down
its own procedure. The Family Court is entitled to take the benefit
of counsellors, medical experts and persons professionally
engaged in promoting the welfare of the family. [Para 1](618-B- G
D]
1.6 These provisions - far from excluding the use of video
conferencing - arc sufficiently enabling to allow the Family Court
to utilise technological advances to facilitate the purpose of
achieving justice in resolving family conflicts. There may arise a H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 12 S.C.R.

A variety of situations where in today's age and time, parties are
unable to come face to face for counselling or can do so only at
such expense, delay or hardship which will defeat justice. One or
both spouses may face genuine difficulties arising from the
compulsions of employment, family circumstances (including the
needs of young children), disability and social or economic
B
handicaps in accessing a court situated in a location distant from
where either or both parties reside or work. It would be
inappropriate to deprive the Family Court which is vested with
such wide powers and procedural flexibility to adopt video
conferencing as a facilitative tool, where it is convenient and
c readily available. Whether video conferencing should be allowed
must be determined on a case to case analysis to best effectuate
the concern of providing just solutions. Far from such a procedure
being excluded by the law, it will sub serve the purpose of the
law. [Para 1][618-E-G]
D 1.7 Conceivably there may be situations where parties (or
one of the spouses) do not want to be in the same room as the
other. This is especially true when there arc serious allegations
of marital abuse. Video conferencing allows things to be resolved
from the safety of a place which is not accessible to the other
spouse against whom there is a serious allegation of misbehaviour
E of a psychiatric nature or in a case of substance abuse. [Para
1][618-H; 619-A]
1.8 Video conferencing is gender neutral. In fact it ensures
that one of the spouses cannot procrastinate and delay the
conclusion of the trial. Delay generally defeats the cause of a
F party which is not the dominant partner in a relationship.
Asymmetries of power have a profound consequence in marital
ties. Imposing an unwavering requirement of personal and
physical presence (and exclusion of facilitative technological tools
such as video conferencing) will result in a denial of justice. [Para
G 1)(619-B-C]
1.9 The High Courts have allowed for video conferencing
in resolving family conflicts. A body of precedent has grown
around the subject in the Indian context. The judges of the High
Court should have a keen sense of awareness of prevailing social
H reality in their states and of the federal structure. Video
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 575

conferencing has been adopted internationally in resolving A
conflicts within the family. There is a robust body of authoritative
opinion on the subject which supports video conferencing, of
course with adequate safeguards. Whether video conferencing
should be allowed in a particular family dispute before the Family
Court, the stage at which it should be allowed and the safeguards
B
which should be followed should best be left to the High
Courts while framing rules on the subject. Subject to such rules,
the use of video conferencing must be left to the careful exercise
of discretion of the Family Court in each case. [Para 1)1619-D-El
1. 10 The proposition that video conferencing can be
permitted only after the conclusion of settlement proceedings c
(resultantly excluding it in the settlement process), and thereafter
only when both parties agree to it does not accord either with the
purpose or the provisions of the Family Courts Act 1984.
Exclusion of video conferencing in the settlement process is not
mandated either expressly or by necessary implication by the D
legislation. On the contrary the legislation has enabling provisions
which arc sufficiently broad to allow video conferencing. Confining
it to the stnge after the settlement process and in .a situation
where both parties have agreed will seriously impede access to
justice. It will render the Family Court helpless to deal with human
situations which merit flexible solutions. Worse still, it will enable E
one spouse to cause interminable delays thereby defeating the
purpose for which a specialised court has been set up. [Para
1][619-F-H; 620-A]
2. Plainly, Krishna Veni docs not embody an absolute or
invariable mandate that all transfer petitions should be disposed F
of by the court, by the application of a mechanical formula requiring
the contesting spouses to take recourse to the facility of video
conferencing. The language of the judgment is permissive and is
sufficiently flexible to accommodate an application of mind to the
interests of justice, the position and circumstances of parties as G
well as to the feasibility (both in technical and practical terms) of
adopting video conferencing as a solution to spatial distances.
Hence, it is fallacious to read Krishna Ve11i as a mandate to take
recourse to video conferencing in all transfer petitions filed before
this Court. That was not plainly the intent underlying the judgment
H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A nor indeed does such a consequence flow from the decision. [Para
6] [622-H; 623-A-B]
Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam (2017) 4 SCC
150 - referred to.
3.1 Section 9(1) of the Act casts a duty on the Family Court
B to make efforts for a settlement between parties to the
matrimonial dispute. A clear discretion is provided to the Family
Court to evolve the procedure which it will follow during the
hearing of a case. The Family Court, however, under Section 9(1)
would be subject to the "rules made by the High Court" in this
c regard. Similarly, the obligation under Section 23(2) of the Hindu
Marriage Act is to make every endeavour to bring about a
reconciliation between the parties, "where it is possible to do so
consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case". It
is a general belief that the process of reconciliation requires the
physical presence of both the parties at the same place and at the
D same time. The physical presence of both the parties together is
emphasized since it is perceived that when parties are alone
together they are able to strike an emotional bond, which will not
be possible in video conferencing. Intimate details are to be
discussed in an intimate environment. The point, however, is
E whether a hypothesis of desirability should be elevated to a
position of a legal principle which allows no interface of technology
in the course of settlement.[Paras 10-12)(626-F; 627-A-B]
K.A. Abdul la/eel v. T.A. Shahida (2003) 4 SCC 166:
[2003) 3 SCR 498; Koma/ S. Padukone v. Principal
F Judge, FamiZv Court, Bangalore City AIR 1999 Kant
427 - referred to.
3.2 Video conferencing and the statute: Video conferencing
transmits video, audio and data across a communications network
enabling geographically dispersed participants to meet
G synchronously. 'The general keyword associated with video
conferencing is interactivity. This allows real time visual and audio
contact between two or more persons at different geographical
locations.' The emotional attachment which people can develop
(or rekindle) wh~n are in the same physical space cannot be
undermined. However, the effect of video conferencing is that
H
SANTHINJ v. VUAYA VENKETESH 577

people who are not present at the same place and at the saine A
time are able to interact with each other as if they are present
together. The premise, in the referring judgment that "the footage
in video conferencing becomes part of the record" is incorrect.
It does not necessarily become a part of the record. Discussions
relayed through video conferencing in the course of settlement
B
will of course not be recorded. Technology answers our
commands. Section IO (3) of the Family Courts Act enables a
Family Court to lay down its own procedure with a view to arrive
at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or
proceedings; This provision gives the Family Court ample powers
to use video conferencing in matrimonial disputes, where c
appropriate. Section 11 of the Family Courts Act provides for "in
camera" proceedings in specified circumstances. Section 11 uses
both the expression "may" and "shall". The Family Court has
the discretion to order an in-camera trial. However, when a party
desires an in-camera trial, it is obligatory to do so. Hence, in-
D
camera trials are not mandated in every case in the Family Court.
Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for
proceedings to be in camera and stipulates that the proceeding
may not be printed or published.[Paras 13-15)(627-C-H; 627-A-
B) .
"The Technology and Pedagogy of Two-\vay E
communication over Geographical distance",
University of Malta (2013), available at https:I/
www.um.edu. mtlitservicesldocumen ts/guides!
videoconferencingguides/VC (ult guide.pd( - referred .
to. F
Black's Law Dictionary, West Publishing Co. (1979) -
referred to.
3.3 Technology ·ensures that there is no record of the
conversation which took place through video confereneing, once
the conversation is over. This is similar to a telephone call (unless G
the call was being recorded). Technology provides flexibility.
Discussions across an audio-visual link in the course of
counselling or conciliation will not be recorded so as to maintain
privacy and intimate confidences. On the other hand, where in
the course of a trial, a judge requires that a record of the deposition H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A be maintained, technology will facilitate it. In fact, one of the
advantages of adopting video conferencing technology in trials
of disputes, which has been acknowledged in various jurisdictions
where this is being practised, is the increased accuracy that results
from the judge having access to the recorded video. Even if a
video conference is recorded for this purpose, the records can
B
be destroyed after the judgment is delivered or once the purpose
of recording by the judge has been served. [Para 161 [628-D-GI
4.1 We arc living in an age of technology. Men and women
have access to and arc in possession of instruments which use
advanced technologies. The reality is that the world is not a closed
c space. People are constantly moving from one place to another
in the course of their personal and professional pursuits. In spite
of the distances that this movement entails, people are able to
interact with each other because of digital facilities. Most desktops
and mobile devices have cameras, thereby facilitating the case
D of onlinc communications in the audio-visual mode. Video
conferencing has made face-to-face interactions possible even in
the absence of physical proximity. Technological developments
have brought .a turning point in the history of human civilization
and have resulted in enhanced efficiency, productivity and quality
of output in every walk oflife. Technology has paved the way for
E an open and accessible world where physical barriers to
communication and connectivity have broken down. [Para 17-
18][629-B-DI
4.2 Technology must also be seen as a way of bringing
services into remote areas to deal with problems. associated with
F the justice delivery system. With the increasing cost of travelling
and other expenses, video conferencing can provide a cost-
cffcctive and efficient alternative. Solutions based on modern
technology allow the court to enhance the quality and
effectiveness of the administration of justice. The use of
G technology can maximize efficiency and develop innovative
methods for delivering legal services. Technology based solutions
must be adopted to facilitate access to justice. Family courts arc
overburdened with all too familiar problems : too few courts,
vacancies in judge strength and a creaking infrastructure. Men
and women in matrimonial distress have their woes compounded
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 579

in the justice delivery system. Repeated adjournments break the A
back of the litigant. The pervasive problem of pendency, the
barriers to access to justice in India, and the inability of the judicial
process to ensure timely and effective justice calls for a wide
range of reforms. There is a widespread concern that the manner
in which disputes are resolved in the judicial process is expensive
B
and causes hardships to litigants. Due to advances in technology
and tools for video conferencing, even when parties arc not in
proximity to each other, conflicts can be resolved effectively.
[Paras 19, 20)(629-E-H; 630-A]
5. High Court decisions: A line of judgments of various High
Courts which have allowed video conferencing in matrimonial c
disputes indicate a robust attempt to foster flexible, technology-
based solutions, in the context of matrimonial disputes. High
· Courts in each State are aware of the social and economic
circumstances prevailing there and the feasibility of adopting
technology. These decisions must be given credence because D
unless there is a manifest failure of justice under law or a cause
of public injury, the assessment by the High Courts of local
conditions ought to be respected. This is the mandate of a vibrant
federal structure. [Para 21)(630-C-D]
Mukesh Narayan Shinde v. Patak Mukesh Shinde Nee E
Patak D Patel 2012 (3) ALLMR 521; Blessy Varghese
Edattukaran v. Sonu 2015 (4) KLT 572; Finy Susan
Francis v. Binu Philip Paul 2015 (4) KLT 572;
Suvarana Rahul Musale v. Rahul Prabhakar Musale
(2015) 7 Born CR 608; Sirangai Shoba v. Sirangi
Muralidhar Rao AIR 2017 AP 88; International F
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) v. Madhu Bala
Nath AIR 2016 Delhi 71; V. Srivatsan v. SR Gayathri
C.R.P. (PD) No. 1012 of 2016 - referred to.
6. Foreign jurisprudence: Video conferencing has been
applied in matrimonial proceedings in various other jurisdictions. G
With the advancement of technology, many countries have laid
down detailed guidelines regulating the use of video conferencing
technology in Family Courts. In the absence of detailed statutory
guidelines, courts have been held to have wide powers to regulate
the procedure to be followed, including allowing video H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A conferencing. Guidelines have developed through case-law. [Para
22][636-G-H;. 637-A]
De Carvalho v Watson (2000) 83 Alta LR (3d) 354; P
v. C Between LV.P. Applicant and M.E.C Respondent
[2004] O;J. No.200 ONCJ IN ; Edmonton (City) v. Laval
B Tunnel Equipment Inc (2002) 260 AR 259 (QB) -
rcfcrre~ to.

"Technology and Family Law Hearings" by Ron S.
Foster and Lianne M. Cihlarment, Western Journal of
Legal Studies (2012) Vol. 5; Legal assistance by video
conferencing: what is known? by Suzie Fore/I, Meg
c Laufer and Ero! Diguisto; "Technology in Mediation"
by Anthony Syder; "The Australian Online Family
Dis.pute Resolution Service" by Wilson Evered
Zeleznikow andThomson; "The Use of Skype Ordered
fo Family Court" - referred to.
D 7. Video Conferencing must be in the interest of justice:
Video conferencing facilities allow parties to communicate with
each other in situations where it would be expensive, inconvenient
or otherwise not desirable for a person to attend the court
procedure. The overriding factor, as contemplated by the Delhi
E High Court in its video conferencing guidelines is that the use of
video conferencing in any particular case must be consistent with
fur_thering the interests of justice and should cause minimal
disadvantage to the parties. Given the delays in judicial
proceedings, which are often due to the wilful procrastination of
one of the parties, video conferencing will serve the purpose of
F safeguarding the interests of justice by preventing undue delay.
The massive pendency of cases in India and issues related to
· access to justice will require a careful deployment of appropriate
technologies. The guidelines prepared by Delhi High Court also
provide that the expenses of the video conferencing facility ought
G to be borne by such party as the Court may direct. It has also
been provided that the Court may, at the request of the person
to be examined, or on its own motion direct appropriate measures
to protect his/her privacy keeping in mind age, gender and
physical condition. It has further been provided that where a party
or a lawyer requests that in the course of video conferencing
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 581

some privileged communication may have to take place, the Court A
will pass appropriate directions. An encrypted master copy shall
be retained in the Court as part of the record. [Paras 23-25,
27)(641-B-D; 642-B-C]
Video Conferencing guidelines issued by the High
Court of Delhi" available at http://www.nja.in - B
referred to.
8.1 The ideal and the real: There is no basis either in the
Family Courts Act 1984 or in law to exclude recourse to video
conferencing at any stage of the proceedings. Whether video
conferencing should be permitted must be determined as part of C
the rational exercise of judgment by the Family Court. As in many
other areas of law and life, there is a gorge between the ideal and
the real. In an ideal world, spouses and partners live in everlasting
harmony but we know that life is not perfect. In marital
relationships, the spirit of dialogue and a faith in a plurality of
views leads to a synthesis between often conflicting ideas, D
opinions, aspirations and needs. Yet marital relationships do on
occasion run aground, increasingly so in recent times. Institutions
such as the Family Courts are intended to provide service to
families in distress. In doing so, there must be a synthesis between
the ideals of the law and the need to implement them in dealing
E
with practical problems of society today. The challenge is to build
a robust pathway that bridges the ideal and the real. In an ideal
sense, the physical presence of couples sharing the same physical
space before a judge or counsellor may foster a settlement. Yet
there arc genuine reasons why parties arc unable to remain
together in one physical space or do not desire to do so. A spouse F
may have been subject to grave marital abuse. Another may have
been repeatedly violated by a history of domestic abuse and
gender violence. One of the spouses may be involved in substance
abuse or may suffer from psychiatric disorder. Technology enables
the judicial forum to protect the legitimate concerns of privacy of
G
one or both spouses. Spouses, even without the above problems,
may live apart in distant cities because of reasons of employment.
Compulsions of employment, the needs of children, care of the
elderly and disability within the family may make it practically
impossible for parties to commute to another city to pursue or
H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A defend a proceeding. Besides, insistence on physical presence
is questionable in a situation where our. family courts are
overburdened and are unable to provide timely justice. To deprive
parties of the benefit of video conferencing will result in a denial
of access to justice. Nor can recourse to technology be
conditioned on the consent of both spouses for, this will only
B
enable one spouse to procrastinate or delay the proceeding.
Withholding consent to video conferencing will then become a
tool in the hands of one of the litigants to delay the proceedings.
I.Para 28-29][642-E-H; 643-A-D) ·
8.2 As a matter of principle, video conferencing cannot be
c excluded from any stage of the proceeding before the Family
Court. Whether it should be adopted in a particular case must be
left to the judicious view of the Family Court. The High Courts
will be well advised to formulate rules to guide the process. Family
Courts must encourage the use of technology to facilitate speedy
D and effective solutions. Above all, it must be acknowledged that
a whole-hearted acceptance of technology is necessary for courts
to meet societal demands for efficient and timely justice. [Para
30][643-E-F]
Case Law Reference
E Per Dipak Misra, CJI (For himself and Khanwilkar, J.)
(2017) 4 sec 150 partly overruled Pura 1
(2006) 9 sec 197 referred to Pura2
(2000) 9 sec 255 referred to Pura2
F (2000) 9 sec 355 referred to Para2
c2000) 9 sec 441 referred to Para2
c2000) 10 sec 350 referred to Para2
c2002) 10 sec 480 referred to Pura2
(2004) 13 sec 436 referred to Para2
G
c2004) 13 sec 462 referred to Para2
c2001) 15 sec 597 referred to Paru2
(2008) u sec 768 referred to Para 2
c2001) 15 sec 556 referred to Para2
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 583

(2005) 12 sec 211 referred to Para2 A
(2000) 10 sec 211 referred to Para2
[2003] 3 SCR 244 referred to Para3
(2005) 3 sec 284 referred to Para3
(2011] IO SCR 577 referred to Para3
B
(2011) 11 SCR 870 distinguished Para3
(2002) 10 sec 551 referred to Para 8
(2003) 11 sec 726 referred to Para 8
(2014] 8 SCR 858 relied on Para 13
[2003] 3 SCR 498 referred to Para 13 c
(20I5) 5 sec 105 referred to Para 15
(2008] 8 SCR 260 referred to Para 26
[1973] 3 SCR 918 referred to Para 28
[2010) 3 SCR 775 p;Jerred to Para 2~ D
[2003] 3 SCR 244 ~rred to Para 31
(2005) 3 sec 284 referred to Para 31
[2011) IO SCR 577 referred to Para 31
[2011] 1l SCR 870 referred to Para 32
E
(1987( 2 SCR 659 referred to Para 35
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 referred to Para 35
[2010] 9 SCR 303 referred to Para 36
[20I3] 5 SCR UI referred to Para 37
(1995) 3 Suppl. SCR 177 referred to Para 37 F
[I996] 9 Suppl. SCR 726 referred to Para 37
(2014] 12 SCR 259 referred to Para 38
(2016] 8 SCR 192 referred to Para 40
[2016] 8 SCR 872 referred to Para 42 G
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 350 referred to Para 42
[2007] IO SCR 752 referred to Para 42
(2017) 10 SCALE 1 referred to Para 46
[1966] SCR 744 followed Para 51
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A Per Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud 1 J.
c2017) 4 sec 150 referred to Para3
c2ot8l l sec 62 referred to Para3
c2006) 9 sec 197 referred to Para3
B [2003] 3 SCR 498 referred to Para9
AIR 1999 Kant 427 referred to Para 9
2012 (3) ALLMR 521 referred to Para 21
2015 (4) KLT 572 referred to Para 21
c 2015 (4) KLT 572 referred to Para 21
. (2015) 7 Born CR 608 referred to Para 21
AIR 2017 AP 88 referred to Para 21
AIR 2016 Delhi 71 referred to Para 21
D
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Petition (Civil) No.
1278of2016.
Under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908.
WITH
E T. P. (C) No. 422 of2017.
Ajit Kumar Sinha, Sr. Adv. (AC), V. K. Sidharthan, Shabu
Sreedharan, Ms. Sridevi V. S, R ishi Malhotra, Ad vs. for the appearing
parties.
F The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, CJI [For himself and Khanwilkar, J.]
1. A two-Judge Bench in Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harislt
Nagam 1, while dealing with transfer petition seeking transfer of a case
instituted under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, l 955 (for brevity,
G 'the 1955 Act') pending on the file of IInd Presiding Judge, Family
Com1, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh to the Family Court, Hyderabad,
Andhra Pradesh, took note of the grounds of transfer and keeping in
view the approach of the Court to normally allow the transfer of the
proceedings having regard to the convenience of the wife, felt disturbed .
H '(2017)4SCCl50
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 585
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

expressing its concern to the difficulties faced by the litigants travelling A
to this Court and, accordingly, posed the question whether there was
any possibility to avoid the same. It also took note of the fact that in the
process of hearing of the transfer petition, the matrimonial matters which
are required to be dealt with expeditiously are delayed. That impelled
the Court to pass an order on 09.01.2017 which enumerated the facts
B
including the plight asserted by the wife, the concept of territorial
jurisdiction under Section 19 of the 1955 Act, and reflected on the issues
whether transfer of a case could be avoided and alternative mode could
be thought of. Dwelling upon the said aspects, the Court articulated:-
"In thes~ circumstances, we are prima facie of the view that we
need to consider whether we could pass a general order to the c
effect that in case where husband files matrimonial proceedings
at place where wife does not reside, the court concerned should
ente1tain such petition only on the condition that the husband makes
appropriate deposit to bear the expenses of the wife as may be
determined by the Court. The Court may also pass orders from D
time to time for further deposit to ensure that the wife is not
handicapped to defend the proceedings. In other cases, the husband
may take proceedings before the Court in whose jurisdiction the
wife resides which may lessen inconvenience to the parties and
avoid delay. Any other option to remedy the situation can also be
considered." E

As the narration would exposit, the pivotal concern of the Court
was whether an order could be passed so as to provide a better alternative
to each individual who is compelled to move this Court.
2. The observation made in A11i11dita Das v. Srijit Das2 to the F
effect that on an average at least I 0 to 15 transfer petitions are on board
of each Court on each admission day was noticed. The learned Judges
apprised themselves about the observations made in Mona A resit Goel
v. Areslt Satya Goefl, Lalita A. Ranga v. Ajay Clu1111palal Ranga•,
Deepa v. Anil Panicker5, Ardtana Rastogi v. Rakeslt Rastogi6, Leena
Muklte1jee v. Rabi Sltankar Muklterjee 1, Nee/am Bltatia v. Satbir G
' c2006) 9 sec 191
, c2000) 9 sec 255
' c2000) 9 sec 355
'c2000J 9 sec 441
"c2000J 1o sec 350
1
c2002) 10 sec 480 H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A Singh Bltatia 8 , Soma Choudhury v. Gourab Cltoudhaury 9 , Rajeslt
Rani v. Tej Pa/10 , Vandana Sharma v. Rakeslt Kumar Sltarma" and
Anju Ohri v. Varittder Oltri' 2 which rest on the principle of"cxpedient
for ends of justice" to transfer the proceedings. It also adverted to
Premlata Singh v. Rita Singlt' 3 wherein this Court had not transferred
the proceedings but directed the husband to pay for travelling, lodging
B
and boarding expenses of the wife antVor person accompanying her for
each hearing. The said principle was also followed in Gana Sart1swathi
v. H. Raglt11 Prasad 14 •
3. The two-Judge Bench, after hearing the learned counsel for
the pmties, the learned Additional Solicitor General and the learned Senior
c Counsel who was requested to assist the Court, made certain references
to the doctrine of 'forum non conveniens" and held that it can be applied
to matrimonial proceedings for advancing the interest of justice. The
learned Additional Solicitor General assisting the Court suggested about
conducting the proceedings by videoconferencing. In that context, it has
D beenheld:-
" 14. One cannot ignore the problem faced by a husband if
proceedings are transferred on account of genuine difficulties
faced by the wife. The husband may find it difficult to contest
proceedings at a place which is convenient to the wife. Thus,
E transfer is not always a solution acceptable to both the parties. It
may be appropriate that available technology of videoconferencing
is used where both the parties have equal difficulty and there is
no place which is convenient to both the parties. We understand
that in every district in the country videoconferencing is now
available. In any case, wherever such facility is available, it ought
F to be fully utilised and all the High Courts ought to issue appropriate
administrative instructions to regulate the use ofvideoconfereneing
for certain category of cases. Matrimonial cases where one of
the parties resides outside court's jurisdiction is one of such
categories. Wherever one or both the parties make a request for
G 'c2004) u sec 436: c2006J 1 sec (Cri) 323
'(2004) 13 sec 462: (2006) 1 sec (Cri) 341
'" (2007) 15 sec 597
" (2008J 11 sec 768
"c2001J 15 sec 556
"c2005J 12 sec 211
H "' czoooi 1o sec 211
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 587
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

use of videoconferencing, proceedings may be conducted on A
videoconferencing, obviating the needs of the party to appear in
person. In several cases, this Court has directed recording of
evidence by video conferencing' 5 •
x x x x
16. The advancement of technology ought to be utilised also for B
service on parties or receiving communication from the parties.
Every District Court must have at least one e-mail ID.
Administrative instructions for directions can be issued to permit
the litigants to access the court, especially when litigant is located
outside the local jurisdiction of the Court. A designated officer/ c
manager of a District Court may suitably respond to such e-mail
in the manner permitted as per the administrative instructions.
Similarly, a manager/information officer in every District Court
may be accessible on a notified telephone during notified hours as
per the instructions. These steps may, to some extent, take care
of the problems of the litigants. These suggestions may need D
attention of the High Courts."
[Emphasis added]
4. After so stating, the two-Judge Bench felt the need to issue
directions which may provide alternative to seeking transfer of proceedings E
on account of inability of a party to contest proceedings at a place away
from their ordinary residence which will eventually result in denial of
justice. The safeguards laid down in the said judgment are:-
"(i) Availability of videoconferencing facility.
(ii) Availability oflegal aid service. F
(iii) Deposit of cost for travel, lodging and boarding in terms of
Order 25 CPC.
(iv) E-mail address/phone number, if any, at which litigant from
outstation may communicate."
G
Be it stated, the Court took note of the spirit behind the orders of
15
State of Maharashtra v. Praji1/ B. Desai. (2003) 4 SCC 601 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 815;
Ka/yan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 3 SCC 284 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 705;
Budhadev Karmaskar (4) v. StateoflV.B., (2011) IO SCC 283: (2012) I SCC (Cri)285;
Malthesh Gudda Pooja v. StateofKarnataka, (2011) 15 SCC 330: (2014) 2 SCC (Civ)
~3 H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A this Court allowing the transfer petitions filed by wives and opined that
the Court almost mechanically allows the petitions so that they arc not
denied justice on account of their inability to participate in proceedings
instituted at a different place. It laid stress on financial or physical
hardship. It referred to the authorities in the constitutional scheme that
provide for guaranteeing equal access to justice 16 , power of the State to
B
make special provisions for women and children 17 , duty to uphold the
dignity of womcn 18 and various steps that have been taken in the said
dircct:ion 19 •
5. In the said case, the Court transferred the case as prayed for
and further observed that it will be open to the transferee court to conduct
c the proceedings or record the evidence of the witnesses who arc unable
to appear in court by way of videoconferencing. The aforesaid decision
was brought to the notice of the two-Judge Bench in the instant case by
the learned counsel appearing for the respondent who advanced his
submission that there is no need to transfer the case and the parties can
D be directed to avail the facility of videoconferencing. The two-Judge
Bench, after referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Frunily Courts Act, 1984 (for brevity, 'the 1984 Act'), various provisions
of the said Act, Sections 22, 23 and 26 of the 1955 Act, Rules 2, 3 and
4 of Order XXXIIA which were inserted by the 1976 amendment to the
Code of Civil Procedure (for short, "the CPC"), the concept of
E reconciliation, the role of the counsellors in the Family Court and the
principle of confidence and confidentiality, held:- .
"I 9. To what extent the confidence and confidentiality will be
safeguarded and protected in video conferencing, particularly when
efforts arc takc1i by the counsellors, welfare experts, and for that
F matter, the court itself for reconciliation, restitution of conjugal
rights or dissolution of marriage, ascertainment of the wishes of
the child in custody matters, etc., is a serious issue to be considered.
lt is certainly difficult in video conferencing, ifnot impossible, to
maintain confidentiality. It has also to be noted that the footage in
G video conferencing becomes part of the record whereas the
reconciliatory efforts taken by the duty-holders referred to above
are not meant to be part of the record. All that apmt, in reconciliatory
16
Article 39-A of the Constitution of!ndia, 1950
17
Article 15(3) of the Constitution oflndia, 1950
" Article 51-A(e) of the Constitution of India, 1950
19
H Articles 243-D and 243-T of the Constitution
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 589
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

efforts, physical presence of the parties would make a significant A
difference. Having regard to the very object behind the
establishment of Family Courts Act, 1984, to Order XXXIIA of
the Code of Civil Procedure and to the special provisions introduced
in the Hindu Marriage Act under Sections 22, 23 and 26, we arc
of the view that the directions issued by this Court in Krishna B
Veni Nagam (supra) need reconsideration on the aspect of video
conferencing in 12 matrimonial disputes."
Being of this view, it has referred the matter to be considered by
a larger Bench. That is how the matter has been placed before us.
6. We have heard Mr. V.K. Sidharthan, learned counsel for the c
petitioner and Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel for the respondent.
We have also heard Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel who
has been requested to assist the Court.
7. Before we refer. to the scheme under the 1984 Act and the
1955 Act, we think it apt to refer to the decisions. that haye been noted in D
Krishna VeniNagam (supra). InMonaAreslt Goe/(supra), the three-
Judge Bench was dealing with the transfer ofthe matrimonial proceedings
for divorce that was instituted by the husband in Bombay. The prayer o.f
the wife was to transfer .the case from Bombay to Delhi. The averment
was made that the wife had no independent income and her parents
were not in a position to bear the expenses of her travel from Delhi to · E
Bombay to contest the divorce proceedings. That apart, various
inconveniences were set forth and the husband chose not to appear in
the Transfer Petition. The Court, considering the difficulties of the wife,
· transferred the case from Bombay to Delhi. In Lalita A. Ra11ga (supra),
the Court, taking note of the fact that the husband had not appeared and F
further appreciating the facts and circumstances of the ease, thought it
appropriate to transfer the petition so that the wife could contest the
proceedings. Be it noted, the wife had a small child and she was at
Jaipur and it was thought that it would be difficult for her to go to Bombay
to contest the proceedings from time to time. In Deepa :S case, the
stand of the wife was that she was unemployed and had no source of G
income and, on that basis, the prayer of transfer was allowed.' In 4rcl1a11a
Rastogi (supra), the Court entertained the plea of transfer and held that
the prayer for transfer of matrimonial proceedings taken by the husband
in the Court ofDistrictJudge, Chandigarh to the Court ofDistrictJudge,
Delhi deserved acceptance and, accordingly, transferred the case. H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Similarly, in Lee11a 11'/ukherjee (supra), the prayer for transfer was
allowed. In Nee/am Bhatia (supra), the Court declined to transfer the
ease and directed the husband to bear the to-and-fro travelling expenses
of the wife and one person accompanying her by train whenever she
actually appeared before the Court. In Soma Clto11dh11ry (supra),
taking into consideration the difficulties of the wife, the proceedings for
B
divorce were transferred from the Court of District Judge, South Tripura,
Udaipur (Tripura) to the Family Court at Ali pore (West Bengal). InA11ju
Olzri (supra), the Court, on the foundation of the convenience of the
parties and the interest ofjustice, allowed the transfer petition preferred
by the wife. In Vu11da11a Sharma (supra), the Court, taking note of the
c fact that the wife had two minor daughters and appreciating the difficulty
on the said bedrock, thought it appropriate to transfer the case and,
accordingly, so directed.
8. Presently, we think it condign to advert in detail as to what has
been stated inA11i11dita Das (supra). The stand of the wife in the transfer
D petition was that she had a small child of six years and had no source of
income and it was difficult to attend the court at Delhi where the
matrimonial proceedings were pending. The two-Judge Bench referred
to some of the decisions which we have already referred to and also
adverted to Ram Gu/am Pandit v. Umesh J. Prasad2° and Rajwi11der
Kaur v. Ba/111i11der Si11gh 21 and opined that all the authorities are based
E on the facts of the respective cases and they do not lay down any
particular law which 'operates as a precedent. Thereafter, it noted that
taking advantage of the leniency shown to the ladies by this Court, number
of transfer petitions arc filed by women and, therefore, it is required to
consider each petition on merit. Then, the Court dwclled upon the fact
F situation and directed that the husband shall pay all travel and stay
expenses to the wife and her companion for each and every occasion
whenever she was required to attend the Court at Delhi. From the
aforesaid decision, it is quite vivid that the Court felt that the transfer
petitions are to be considered on their own merits and not to be disposed
of in a routine manner.
G
9. Having noted the authorities relating to transfer of matrimonial
disputes, we may refer to Section 25 of the CPC which reads as follows:-
"Section 25. Power of Supreme Court to transfer suits, etc.-
"' (2002J 10 sec ss1
21
<2003) 11 sec 726
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 591
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

( 1) On the application of a party, and after notiC(' to the parties, A
and after heanng such of them as dcsm; to be heard, the Supreme
Court may, at any stage, if satisfied that an order under this section
is expedient for the ends of justice, direct that any suit, appeal or
other proceedings be transferred from a High Court or otherC'ivil
Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court in any
B
other State.
(2) Every application under this section shall be made by motion
which shall be supported by an affidavit. - .
(3) The court to which such suit, appeal or other proceeding is
transferred shall, subject to any special directions in the order of c
transfer, either rc-tly it or proceed from the stage at which it was
transferred to it.
(4) In dismissing aily application under this section, the Supreme
Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was fri)'olous or
vexatious, order the applicant to pay ·by way of compensation to D
any person who has opposed the application such sum, not
exceeding two thousand rupees, as it considers appropriate in the
circumstances of the case.
(5) The law applicable to any suit, appeal or other proceeding
transferred under this seetion shall be the law which the court in E
which the suit, appeal or other pron:cding was originally instituted
ought to have applied to such Suit, appeal or proceeding."
l 0. Order XLI Rule 2 of the Supreme Comt Rules, 2013 which
deals with the application for transfer under Article l 39A(2) of the
Constitution and Section 25 of the CPC is as follows:-
F
"!. Every petition under article 139A(2) of the Constitution or
Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be in writing.
It shall state succinctly and clearly alltclcvant facts and particulars
of the case, the name of the High Court or other Civil Comt in
which the case is pending and the grounds on which the transfer
_G
is sought. The petition shall be suppo1tcd by an affidavit.
2. The petition shall be posted before the Court for preliminary
hearing and orders as to issue of notice. Upon such hearing the
Court, if S:1tisfied that no prima facic case for transfer has been
made out, shall dismiss the petition and ifupori such hearing the
H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

Court is satisfied that a prima facie case for granting the petition
is made out, it shall direct that notice be issued to the parties in the
case concerned to show cause why the case be not transferred.
A copy of the Order shall be transmitted to the High Court
_concerned. ·
B 3. The notice shall be served not less than four weeks before the
date fixed for the final hearing ot the petition. Affidavits in
opposition shall be filed in the Registry not later than one week
before the date appointed for hearing and the affidavit in reply
shall be filed not later than two days preceding the day of the
hearing of the petition. Copies of affidavits in opposition and in
c reply shall be served on the opposite party or parties and the
affidavits shall not be accepted in the Registiy unless they contain
an endorsement of service signed by such party or parties.
4. The petition shall thereafter be listed for final hearing before
the Court.·
D
5. Save as otherwise provided by the rules contained in this Order
the provisions of other orders (including Order LI) shall; so far as
. may be, apply to petition under this Order."
The purpose of referring to the same is that this Court has been
E · conferred with the power by the Constitution under Article l 39A(2) to
transfer the cases and has also been conferred statutory jurisdiction to
transfer the cases. The Rules have been framed accordingly. The Court
has the power to allow the petition seeking transfer or to decline the
prayer and indu9itably, it is on consideration of the merits of the case
and satisfaction of the Court on that score.
F
Jl, Having stated thus, it is necessary to appreciate the legislative
purpose behind the 1984 Act.The Family Courts have been established
for speedy settlement of family disputes. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons reads thus:-
"Statement of Objects and Reasons
G
Several associations ofwomen, other organizations and individuals
have urged, from time to time, that Family Courts be set up for
the settlement of family disputes, where emphasis should be laid
on conciliation and achieving socially desirable results and
adherence to rigid rules of procedure and evidence should be
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 593
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI] ,

eliminated. The Law Commission in its 59•h report (1974) had A
also stressed that in dealing with disputes concerning the family
the court ought to adopt an approach radically different from that
adopted in ordinary civil proceedings and that it should make ,
reasonable efforts at settlement before the commencement of
the trial. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976 to
B
provide for a speCial family. However, not much use has been
made by the courts in adopting this conciliatory procedure and the
courts continue to deaf with family disputes in the same manner
as other civil matters and the same adversary approach prevails.
The need was, therefore, felt, in the public interest, to establish
Family Courts for speedy settlement of family disputes. c
2. The Bill inter alia, seeks to--
(a) provide for establishment of Family Courts by the State
Governments;
(b) make it obligatory on the State Governments to set up a Family D
Court in every city or town with a population exceeding one million;
(e),enable the State Governments to set up, such courts, in areas
other than those specified in (b) above:
(d) exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
the matters relating t6-- ·E
(i) matrimonial relief, including nullity ofmairiage,judicial separation,
divorce, restitution of conjugal rights, or declaration as to the validity
. of marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;
(ii) the property of the spouses or of either of them;
F
(iii) declaration as to the legitimacy of llny person;
(iv) guardianship of a person or the custody of ariy minor;
'
(v) maintenance, including proceedings under Chapter IX of the
Code of Criminal Procedure;
G
( e) Make it obligatory on the part of the Family Court to endeavour,
in the first instance to effect a reconciliation or a settlement
between the parties to a family dispute. During this stage, the
proceedings will be informal and rigid rules of procedure shall not
apply;
H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A (f) provide for the association of social welfare agencies,
counselors, etc., during conciliation stage and also to secure the
service of medical and welfare experts;
(g) provide that the parties to a dispute before a Family Court
shall not be entitled, as of right, to be r'epresented by legal
B practitioner. However, the court may, in the interest of justice,
seek assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae,
(h) simplify the rules of evidence and procedure so as to enable a
Family Court to deal effectively with a dispute;
(i) provide for only one tight of appeal which shall lie to the High
c Comi.
3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects."
12. The preamble of the 1984 Act provides for the establishment
of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure
D speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and
for matters connected therewith.
13. Presently, we may recapitulate how this Court has dealt with
the duty and responsibility of the Family Court or a Family Court Judge.
In B/111wa11 Mo/tan Singlt v. Meena and others22 , the three-Judge
Bench referred to the decision in K.A. Ahclul Jalee/ v. T.A. Shahiclct 23
E
and laid stress on securing speedy settlement of disputes relating to
marriage and family affairs. Emphasizing on the role of the Family Court
Judge, the Comi in Bhmvan Mohan Singh (supra) expressed its·anguish
as the proceedings before the family court had continued for a
considerable length of time in respect of application filed under Section
F I 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( CrPC). The Court observed:-
"It has come to the notice of the Court that on certain occasions
the Family Courts have been granting adjournments in a routine
manner as a consequence of which both the parties suffer or, on
certain occasions, the wife becomes the worst victim. When such
G a situation occurs, the purpose of the law gets totally atrophied.
The Family Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he
is dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive issues pe1iaining
to the marriage and issues ancillary thereto. When we say this,
"(2015) 6 sec 353
" <2003 >4 sec 166
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 595
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

we do not mean that the Family Courts should show undue haste A
or impatience, but there is a distinction between impatience and
to be wisely anxious and conscious about dealing with a situation.
A Family Court Judge should remember that the procrastination
is the greatest assassin of the !is before it. It not only gives rise to
more family problems but also gradually builds unthinkable and
B
Evercstine bitterness. It leads to the cold refrigeration of the hidden
feelings, if still left. The delineation of the !is by the Family Judge
must reveal the awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any
of the parties has to be sternly dealt with, for the Family Court
Judge has to be alive to the fact that the !is before him pertains to
emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it to grow." c
And again:
"We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges shall remain
alert to this and decide the matters as expeditiously as possible
keeping in view the Objects and Reasons of the Act and the
scheme of various provisions pertaining to grant of maintenance, D
divorce, custody of child, property disputes, etc."

14. The said passage makes it quite clear that a Family Court
Judge has to be very sensitive to the cause before it and he/she should E
be conscious about timely delineation and not procrastinate the matter
as delay has the potentiality to breed bitterness that eventually corrodes
the emotions. The Court has been extremely cautious while stating
about patience as a needed quality for arriving at a settlement and the
need for speedy settlement and, ifnot possible, proceeding with meaningful
adjudication. There must be efforts for reconciliation, but the time spent F
in the said process has to have its own limitation.
15. In Shamima Farooqui v. Sltaltid Kha11 24 , after referring to
the earlier decisions, especially the above quoted passages, the Court
expressed:- ·
G
"When the aforesaid anguish was expressed, the predicament
was not expected to be removed with any kind of magic. However,
the fact remains, these litigations can really corrode the human
relationship not only today but will also have the impact for years
21
(2015) s sec 10s
H
596 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A to come and has the potentiality to take a toll on the society. It
occurs either due to the uncontrolled design of the parties or the
. lethargy and apathy shown by the Judges who man the Family
Courts. As far as the first aspect is concerned, it is the duty of the
courts to curtail them. There need not be hurry but procrastination
should not be manifest, reflecting the attitude of the court. As
B
regards the second facet, it is the duty of the court to have the
complete control over the proceeding and not permit the !is to
swim the unpredictable grand river of time without knowing when
shall· it land on the shores or take shelter in a corner tree that
stands "still" on some unknown bank of the river. It cannot allow
c · it to sing th.e song of the brook. "Men may come and men may go,
but I go on forever." This would be the greatest tragedy that can
happen to the adjudicating system which is required to deal with
most sensitive matters between the man and wife or other family
members relating to matrimonial and domestic affairs. There has
to be a proactive approach in this regard and the said approach
D should be instilled in the Family Court Judges by the Judicial
Academies functioning under the High Courts. For the present,
we say no more."
[Underlining is ours]
E 16. The object of stating this is that the legislative intent, the
schematic purpose and the role attributed to the Family Court have to be
perceived with a sense of sanctity. The Family Court Judge should neither
be a slave to the co~cept of speedy settlement nor should he be a serf to
the proclivity ofhurried disposal abandoning the inherent purity ofjustice
dispensation system. The balanced perception is the warrant and that is
F . how the scheme. of the 1984 Act has to be understood and appreciated.
17. Let ,us now proceed to analyse the fundamental intent of the
scheme of the 1984 Act. Section 4 of the 1984 Act deals with the
appointment of the judges. Section 5 provides for association of social
welfare agencies, etc. It engrafts that the State Government may, in
G consultation with the High Court, provide, by rules, for the association in
such manner and for such purposes and subject to such conditions as
may be specified in the rules, with a Family Court of institutions or
organisations engaged in social welfare or the representatives
thereof; persons professionally engaged in promoting the welfare of the
H family; persons working in the field of social welfare;. and any other
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 597
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

person whose association with a Family Court would enable it to exercise A
its jurisdiction more effectively in accordance with the purposes of the
1984 Act.The aforesaid provision, as is evident, conceives involvement
of institutions or organizations engaged in social welfare or their
representatives and professionals engaged in promoting the welfare of
the family for the purpose of effective functioning of the Family Court to
8
sub-serve the purposes of the Act. Thus, the 1984 Act, to achieve its
purpose, conceives ofinvolvement of certain categories so that, if required,
the Family Court can take their assistance to exercise its jurisdiction in
an effective manner.
18. Section 6 provides for counselors, officers and other employees
of Family Courts. Section 7 deals with the jurisdiction of the Family c
Court. The jurisdiction conferred on the Family Court, as we perceive, is
quite extensive. It confers power in a Family Court to exercise jurisdiction
exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any
law relating to a suit or a proceeding between the parties to a marriage
or a decree of a nullity of marriage declaring the marriage to be null and D
void or annulling the marriage, as the case may be, or restitution of
conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage. It has
the authority to declare as to the validity of a marriage so as to annul the
matrimonial status of any person and also the power to entertain a
proceeding with respect to the property of the parties to a marriage or
either of them. The Family Court has the jurisdiction to pass an order or E
injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship, declare
legitimacy of any person and deal with proceedings for grant of
maintenance, guardianship of the person or the custody of or access to
any minor. That apart, it has also been conferred the authority to deal
with the applications for grant of maintenance for wife and children and F
parents as provided under the CrPC.
19. Section 9 prescribes the duty of the Family Court to make
efforts for settlement by rendering assistance and persuading the parties
for an;iving at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the suit or
proceeding. For the said purpose, it may follow the procedure laid down G
by the High Court. If in any suit or proceeding, at any stage, it appears
to the Family Court that there is a reasonable opportunity of settlement
between the parties, it may adjourn the proceedings for such period as it
thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement.

H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A 20. Section 11 provides for proceedings to be held in camera.
The provision, being significant, is reproduced below:-
"Scction 11. Proceedings to be held in camera.-in every
suit or proceedings to which this Act applies, the proceedings may
be held in camera if the Family Court so desires and shall be so
B held if either party so desires."
On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is limpid that ifthe
Family Court desires, the proceedings should be held in camera and it
shall be so held if either of the parties so desires. A ·reading of the said
provision, as it seems to us, indicates that, once one party makes a prayer
C for holding the proceedings in camera. it is obligatory on the part of the
Family Court to do so.
21. Section 12 stipuhltes for assistance of medical arid welfare
expe11s for assisting the Family Court in discharging the functions imposed
by the Act.
D 22. At this juncture, it is profitable to refer to certain provisions of
the 1955 Act. Section 22 oflhc said Act provides for proceedings to be
in camera and stipulates that the proceeding may not be printed or
published. Section 23(2) of the 1955 Act enjoins that before proceeding
to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the com1 in the
E first instance, in every case where it is possible to do so consistently
with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour
to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. The said provision is
not applicable to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the
grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause
(vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. Sub-section (3) of
F Section 23 permits the Court to take aid of a person named by the pmiics
or of any person nominated by the Court to bring out a resolution. It
enables the Court, if it so thinks; to adjourn the proceedings for a
reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any
person named by tl~c parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by
G. the court if the pa1iies fail to name any person, with directions to report
to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been effected
and the court shall, in disposing of the proceeding, have due regard to
the report.
23. It is worthy to note here. that the reconciliatory measures arc ·
to be taken at the first instance and emphasis is on efforts for
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 599
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

reconciliation failing which the court should proceed for adjudication A
and the command on the Family Court is to hold it in camera if either
party so desires.
24. Section 26 of the 1955 Act deals with custody of children. It
empowers the cowt, from time to tim.:, to pass such interim orders and
make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with B
respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children
consistently with their wishes, wherever possible, and the Government
may, after 1he decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make
from time to time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the
custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been
made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceedings for
c
obtaining such decree were still pending, and the cowt may also, from
time to time, revoke, suspend or vary any such orders and provisions
previously made. The proviso appended thereto postulates that the
application with respect to the maintenance and education of the minor
children, pending the proceeding for obtaining such decree, shall, as far D
as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of
notice on the respondent.
25. It is to be borne in mind that in a matter relating to the custody .
of the child. the welfare of the. child is paramount and seminal. It is
inconccivabk to ignore its importance and treat it as secondary. The E
interest cf the child in all circumstances remains vital and the Court has
a ve1y affirmative role in that regard. Having regard to the nature of the
interest of the child, the role of the Court is extremely sensitive and it is
expected of the Court to be pro-active and sensibly objective.
26. In Ma11sa111i Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ga11g11/i25 , it has .F
been held that the principles oflaw in relation to the custody ofa minor
child are well settled. While ddermining the question as to which parent
the care and control of a child should be committed, the first and the
paramount consideration is the welfare and interest of the child and not
the rights of the parents undern statute. The provisions contained in the
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship G
Act, 1956 hold out the welfare of the child as a predominant consideration
because no statute on the subject can ignore, eschew or obliterate the
vital factor of the welfare of the minor.

"(2008J 1 sec 673
H
.600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A 27. In the said case, a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England
(4'h Edn., Vol. 13) was reproduced which reads thus:-
"809. Principles as to custody and upbringing of minors.-
Where in any proceedings before any court, the custody or
upbringing of a minor is in question, the court, in deciding that
B question, must regard the welfare of the minor as the first and
paramount consideration, and must not take into consideration
whether from any other point of view the claim of the father in
respect of such custody or upbringing is superior to that of the
mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father.
In relatiqn to the custody or upbringing of a minor, a mother has
c the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and
the rights and authority of mother and father are equal and are
exercisable by either without the other."
2.8. In Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakka/2 6 , the Court ruled
that the children are not mere chattels, nor are they mere playthings for
D their parents. Absolute right of parents over the destinies and the lives of
their children has, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded to
the considerations of their welfare as human beings so that they may
grow up in a normal balanced manner to be useful members of the
society and the guardian court in case of a dispute between the mother
E and the.father is expected to strike a just and proper balance between
the requirements of welfare of the minor children and the rights of their
respective parents over them.
29. In Vikram .Vir Vollra v. Sltali11i Bhal/a 27 , the Court took note
of the fact that the learned Judge of the High Court had personally
F interviewed the child who was seven years old to ascertain his wishes.
The two Judges of this Court also illteracted with the child in the chambers
in the absence of his parents to find out about his wish and took note of
the fact that the child was aged about 10 years and was at an informative
and impressionable stage and eventually opined that the order passed by
the High Court affirming the order of the trial Court pertaining to visitation
G rights of the father had been so structured that it was compatible with
the educational career of the child and the rights of the father and the
mother had been well balanced. It is common knowledge that in most of
the cases relating to guardianship and custody, the Courts interact with
'"(1973) 1 sec 840
21 <2010) 4 sec 409
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 601
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

. the child t~ know her/his desire keeping in view the concept that the A
welfare of the child is paramount.
30. It is essential to reflect on the reasoning ascribed iri Krishna
Veni Nagam (supra). As we understand, the two-Judge Bench has
taken into consideration the number of cases filed before this Court and
the different approaches adopted by this Court, the facet of territorial· B
jurisdiction, doctrine of forum non-conveniens which can be applicable
to matrimonial proceedings for advancing the interest of justice, the
problems faced by the husband, the recourse taken by this Court to
videoconferencing in certain cases and on certain occasions, the
advancement of technology, the role of the High Courts to issue
appropriate administrative instructions to regulate the use of C
videoconferencing for certain categories of cases and ruled that the
matrimonial cases where one of the parties resides outside the court's
jurisdiction do fall in one of such categories.
31. Before we proceed to analyse further, we would like.to cogitate
on the principles applied in the decisions rendered in the context of D
videoconferencing. In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai2 8,
the proceedings related to recording of evidence where the witness was
in a foreign country. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesll Ranja11
alias Pappu Yadav & Anr. 29 , the controversy pertained to a criminal
trial under Section 302 IPC wherein the Court, in exercise of power E
under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed shifting of the accused
from a jail in Patna to Tihar Jail at Delhi. In that context, the Court·
permitted conducting of the trial with the aid of videoconferencing. In
· Budhadev /(armaskar (4) v. State of West Benga/3-0, the issue of
videoconferencing had arisen as the /is related to rehabilitation of sex
workers keeping in view the interpretation of this Coµrt of' life' to mean F
life of dignity.
32. In Malthesh Gudda Pooja v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 31 ,
the question that fell for consideration was whether a Division Bench of
the High Court, while considering a memo for listing an appeal restored
for fresh hearing, on grant of application· for review by a co-ordinate G
Bench, could refuse to act upon the order of review on the ground that

" (2003J 4 sec 601
" (200S) 3 sec 284
'" (2011) 10 sec 2s3
" (2011) 1s sec 330 H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A the said order made by a Bench different from the Bench which passed
the original order gr;mting review is a nullity. We need not dilate upon
what ultimately the Court said. What is necessary to observe is what
arrangement should be made in case of a High Court ~vhere there are
Principal Scat and Circuit Benches and Judges moye from one Bench to
another for some time and decide the matters and review is filed. Jn
B
that context, the Court opined:-
" ... when two Judges heard the matter at a Circuit Bench, the
chances of both Judges sitting again at that place at the same
time, may not arise. But the question is in considering the
applications for review, whether the wholesome principle behind .
c Order 47 Rule 5 of the Code and Chapter 3 Rule 5 of the High
Coui1 Rules providing that the same Judges should hear it, should
be dispensed with merely because of the fact that the Judges in
question, though continue to be attached to the Court are sitting at
the main Bench, or temporarily at another Bench. In the interests
D ofjustice, in the interests of consistency in judicial pronouncements
and maintaining the good judicial traditions, an effort should always
be made for the. review application to be heard by the same Judges,
if they are in the same Court. Any attempt to too readily provide
for review applications to be heard by any available Judge or
Judges should be discouraged." .
E
And further:-
"With the technological innovations available now, we do not see
why the review petitions should not be heard by using the medium
of video conferencing."
F 33. The aforesaid pronouncements, as we find, arc absolutely
different from a controversy which is involved in matrimonial proceedings
which relate to various aspects, namely, declaration of marriage as a
nullity, dissolution of marriage, restitution of marriage, custody of children,
guardianship, maintenance, adjudication of claim of stridhan, etc. The
G decisions that have been rendered cannot be regarded as precedents for
the proposition that videoconferencing can be one of the modes to regulate
matrimonial proceedings.
34. The two-Judge Bench has also noted the constitutional scheme
that provides for guaranteeing equal access to justice and the power of
the State to make special provisions for women and children as enshrined
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 603
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

under Article 15(3) of the Constitution and the duty to uphold the dignity A
of women and the various steps taken in the said direction. The Court
has also referred to Articles 243-D and 243-T of the Constitution under
which provisions have been made for reservation for women in
Panchayats and Municipalities by the 1973 and 1974 amendments. It
has also taken note of the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of
B
Discrimination against Women (CED AW) that under! in es the awareness
of the international commitments on the subject. There is also reference
to various authorities of the Court that have referred to the international
conventions and affirmative facet enshrined under Article 15(3) of the
Constitution. We must immediately clarify that these provisions of the
Articles of the Constitution ai1d the decisions find place in the footnote C
of the judgment to highlight the factum that various steps have been
taken to uphold the dignity of women.
35. The two-Judge Hench has referred to certain judgments to
highlight the affirmative rights conferred on women under th.:
Constitution. We shall refer to them and explain how they are rendered D
in a different context and how conducting of matrimonial disputes through ·
videoconferencing would scuttle the rights of women and not expand
the rights. In Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd v. Audrey D'costa
and t111otlter3 2 , the Com1 dealt with the principle of applicability of equal
pay for equal work to lady stenographers in the same manner as male
stenographers. A contention was advanced by the employer that this · E
discrimination between the two categories had been brought out not
merely on the ground of sex but the Court found it difficult to agree with
the contention and referred to various aspects and, eventually, did not
interfere with the judgment of the High Comi that had granted equal
remuneration to both male and female stenographers. In Vislmka and F
otlters 11. Stt1te ofRajastlum and otlters33 , the three-Judge Bench, taking
note of Articles 14, 15, 19( l)(g), 21 and 51-Aand further highlighting the
concept of gender equality and the recommendations of CED AW and
· the absence of domestic law, laid down guidelines and norms for
observation at work places and other institutions for the pw]Jose of
effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and G
sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly, sexual harassment at
work places.

"< 1987) 2 sec 469
JJ (1997) 6 sec 241
H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A 36. InArun Kumar Agrawal and another v. National Insurance
Company Limited and others34, the /is arose pertaining to the criteria
for actermination of compensation payable to the dependants of a woman
who died in a road accident and who did not have regular source of
income.· Singhvi, J. opined that it is highly tmfair, unjust and inappropriate
to compute the compensation payable to the dependants ofa deceased
B
wife/mother who docs not have a regular income by comparing her
services with that of a, housekeeper or a servant or an employee who
works for a fixed period. The gratuitous services rendered by the.wife/
mother to the husband and children cannot be equated with the services
of an employee and no evidence or data can pos~ibly be produced for
c estimating the value of such services. Ganguly, J., in his concurring
opinion, said that women make a significant contribution at various levels.
He referred to numerous authorities and rulcd:-
"63. Houscho'!d work performed by women throughout India is
more than US $()12.8 billion per year (Evangelical Social Action
D Forum and Health Bridge, p. 17). We often forget that the time
spent by women in doing household work as homemakers is the
time which they can. devote to paid work or to their education.
This lack of sensitiveness and recognition of their work mainly
contributes to women's high rate of pove11y and their consequential
oppression in society, as well as various physical, social and
E psychological problems. The courts and tribunals should do well
to factor these considerations in assessing compensation for
housewives who arc victims of.road accidents and quantifying
the amount in the name of fixing "just compensation".
64. In this context the Australian Family Property Law has adopted
F a very gender sensitive approach. It provides that while distributing
propc11ies in matrimonial matters, for instance, one has to factor
in "the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare
of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any
children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the
G capacity of a homemaker or parent."
37. In Voluntary Hea/tliAssociation ofPunjab v. Union oflltdia
and otliers3S, the two-Judge Bench which was dealing with the sharp
decline in female sex ratio and mushrooming of various sonography
"(2010> 9 sec 21s
"(2013)4sec1
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 605
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

centers, issued certain directions keeping in view the provisions of the A
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and the Pre-Conception
and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules,
1996. The concurring opinion adverted to the direction contained in
point 9.8 of the-main judgment which related to the steps taken by the
State Government and the Union Territory to educate the people of the
B
necessity of implementing the provisions of the said Act by conducting
workshops as· well as awareness carrips at the State and district levels.
In the concurring opinion, reference was made to the authority in State
of H.P. v. Nikku Ram 36 and M.C. Melita v. State of T.N. 37 and it was
stated:-
"A woman has to be regarded as an equal partner in the life of a c
man. It has to be borne in mind that she has also the equal role in
the society i.e. thinking, participating and leadership. The legislature
has brought the present piece of legislation with an intention to
provide for prohibition of sex selection before or after conception
and for regulation of pre-natal diagnostic techniques for the D
purpos~s of detecting genetic abnormalities or metabolic disorders
or chromosomal abnormalities or certain congenital malformations
or sex-linked disorders and for the prevention of their misuse for
sex determination leading to female foeticide. The purpose of the
enactment can only be .actualised and its object fruitfully realised
when the authorities under the Act carry out their functions with E
devotion, dedication and commitment and further there is
awakened awareness with regard to the role of women in a
society."
38. In Cliaru Klmrcma and others v. Union of India and
others38 , the controversy arose about the prevalence of discrimination F
of gender equality in the film industry where women were not allowed
to become make-up artists and only allowed to work as hair-dressers.
Referring to various earlier judgments and Article S 1-A(c), the Court
observed:-
"On a condign understanding of clause (e), it is clear as a cloudless G
sky that all practices derogatory to the dignity of women arc to be
renounced. Be it stated, dignity is the quintessential quality of a
"' (1995J 6 sec 219
" <I 996J 6 sec 756
"(2015) 1sec192 H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A personality and a human frame always desires to live in the
mansion of dignity, for it is a highly cherished value."
And again:
" ... The sustenance of gender justice is the cultivated achievement
·of intrinsic human rights. Equality cannot be achieved unless there
B are equal oppo11unities and if a woman is debarred at the threshold
to enter into the sphere of profession for which she is eligible and
qualified, it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of equality. It also
clips her capacity to earn her livelihood which affects her individual
dignity."
c 39. Eventually, directions were issued that women were eligible
to become make-up artists. The aforesaid de.cisions unequivocally lay
stress and emphasis on gender equality and dignity of women.
40. In Volm~tary Health Association ofPunjab v. U11io11 ofllldia
and Ors 39, while dealing with female foeticide, it has been observ.cd:-
D
"It needs no special emphasis that a female child is ·entitled to
.enjoy equal right that a male chil_d is allowed to have. The
constitutional identity of a female child cannot be mortgaged to
any kind of social or other concept that has developed or is thought
of. It does not allow any room for any kind of compromise. It only
E permits affirmative steps that are constitutionally postulated. Be
it clearly stated that when rights are conferred by the Constitution,
it has to be understood that such rights arc recognised regard
being had to their naturalness and universalism. No one, l'et it be
repeated, no one, ef!dows any right to a female child or, for that
matter, to a woman. The question of any kind of condescension
F
or patronisation does not arise."
41. Emphasizing on the equality and dignity of women, it has been
stated:-
" ... let it be stated with cc11itude and without allowing any room
G for any kind of equivocation or ambiguity, the perception of any
individual or group or organisation or system treating a woman
with inequity, indignity, inequality or any kind of discrimination is
. constitutionally impermissible. The historical perception has to be
given a prompt burial. Female foeticide is conceived by the society·
"(~016) 10 sec 265
H
)

SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 607
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

that definitely includes the parents because of unethical perception A
of life and nonchalant attitude towards law. The society that treats
man and woman with equal dignity shows the reflections of a
progressive and civilised society. To think that a woman should
think what a man or a soi:iety wants her to think tantamounts to
slaughtering her choice, and definitely a humiliating act. When
B
'freedom of free choice is allowed within constitutional and statutory
parameters, others cannot dete1mine the norms as that wo.uld
amount to acting in derogation oflaw.".
42. In Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others40,
condemning honour killing, the Court after referring to Lala Singh v. C
State of U.P. 41 and Maya Kaur Baldevsingh Sardar v. State of
Mahamshtrti42 , has opined:-
".One may feel "My honour is my life" but that does not mean
sustaining one's honour at the cost of another. Freedom,
independence, constitutional identity, individual choice and thought
· of a woman, be a wife or sister or daughter or mother, cannot be · D
allowed to be curtailed definitely not by application of physical
force or threat or mental cruelty in the name of his self-assumed
honour. That apart, neither the family members nor the members
of the collective has any right to assault the boy chosen by the
girl. Her individual choice is her self-respect and creating dent in E
it is destroying her honour. And to impose so-called brotherly or
fatherly honour or class honour by eliminating her choice is a
crime of extreme brutality, more so, when it is done under a guise.·
It is a vice, condemnable and deplorable perception of"honour",
comparable to medieval obsessive asse11ions."
F
43. The aforesaid enunciation oflaw makes it graphically clear
that the "constitutional identity", "freedom of choice", "dignity of a
woman" and "affirmatjve rights conferred on her by the Constitution"
cannot be allowed to be abrogated even for a moment. Iri this context,
we have to scan tind appreciate the provision contained in Section 11 of
the 1984 Act. The provision, as has been stated earlier, mandates the G
proceedings to be held in camera if one of the parties so desires. Equality
of choice has been conferred by the statute. That apai1, Section 22 of

'° (2016) 9 sec 541
11
(2006) s sec 475
" (2007) 12 sec 654 H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A the 1955 Act lays down the proceedings to be held in camera and any
matter in relation to any such proceeding may not be printed or published
except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court with the
previous permission of the Court.
44. We, as advised at present, constrict our analysis to the provisions
B of the 1984 Act. First, as we notice, the expression of desire by the wife
or the husband is whittled down and smothered if the Court directs that
the proceedings shall be conducted through the use of videoconferencing.
As is demonstrable from the analysis of paragraph 14 of the decision,
the Court observed that wherever one or both the parties make a request
for the use of videoconferencing, the proceedings may be conducted by
c way of videoconferencing obviating the need of the parties to appear in
person. The cases where videoconferencing has been directed by this
Court arc distinguishable. They arc either in criminal cases or where the
Cou1i found it necessary that the witness should be examined through
videoconferencing. In a case where the wife docs not give consent for
D videoconferencing, it would be contrary to Section 11 of the I. 984 Act.
To say that if one party makes the request, the proceedings may be
conduc,ted by videoconferencing mode or system would be contrary to
the language employed under Section 11 of the 1984 Act. The said
provision, as is evincible to us, is in consonance with the constitutional
provision which confer affirmative rights on women that cannot be
E negatived by the Court. The Family Court also has the jurisdiction to
direct that the proceedings shall be held in camera if it so desires and,
needless to say, the desire has to be expressed keeping in view the
provisions of the 1984 Act.
45. The language employed in Section 11 of the 1984 Act is
F absolutely clear. It provides that if one of the parties desires that the
proceedings should be held in camera, the Family Court has no option
but to so direct. This Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot take
away such a sanctified right that law recognizes either for the wife or
the husband. That apart, the Family Court has the duty to make efforts
G for settlement. Section 23(2) of the 1955 Act mandates for reconciliation.
The language used under Section 23(2) makes it an obligatory duty on
the part of the court at the first instance in every case where it is possible, J

to make eve1y endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties
where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances
of the case. There are certain exceptions' as has been enumerated in the
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 609
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

proviso which pertain to incurably ofunsound mind or suffering from a A
virulent and incurable form ofleprosy or suffering from venereal disease
in a communicable form or has renounced the world by entering any
religious order or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of
seven years, etc. These are the exceptions carved out by the legislature.
The Court has to play a diligent and effective role in this regard.
B
46. The reconciliation requires presence of both the parties at the
same place and the same time so as to be effectively conducted. The
spatial distance will distant the possibility of reconciliation because the
Family Court Judge would not be in a position to interact with the parties
in the manner as the law commands. By virtue of the nature of the
controversy, it has its inherent sensitivity. The Judge is expected to deal
c
with care, caution and with immense sense of worldly experience
absolutely being conscious of social sensibility. Needless to emphasise,
this commands a sense of trust and maintaining an atmosphere of
confidence and also requirement of assurance that the confidentiality is
in no way averted or done away with. There can be no denial of this D
fact. It is sanguinely private. Recently, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy
(Retd) v. Union of India & others4 3, this Court, speaking through one
of us (Chandrachud, J.), has ruled thus:-
"The intersection between one's mental integrity and privacy
entitles the individual freedom of thought, the freedom to believe E
in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination. When
these guarantees intersect with gender, they create a private space
·which protects all those elements which are crucial to gender
identity. The family, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation
are all integral to the dignity of the individual." ·
F
And again:
"Privacy represents the core of the human personality and
recognizes the ability of each individual to make choices and to
take decisions governing matters intimate and personal."
47. Frankfurter Felix in Sclzulte Co. v. Gangi44 , has stated that G
the policy of a statute should be drawn out of its terms as nourished by
their proper environment and not like nitrogen out of the air. Benjamin

"(2017) 10 SCALE I
"328 U.S. 108, 121-122(1946)
H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A N. Cardozo, in Hopkins Savings Assn. v. C/eary 45 , has opined that
when a statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, the Court
has to prefer the meaning that preserves to the meaning that destroys.
48. The command under Section 11 of the 1984 Act confers a
right on both the parties. It is statutory in nature. The Family Court
B Judge who is expected to be absolutely sensitive has to take stock of the
situation and can suo mot(1 hold the proceedings in camera. The Family
Court Judge is only meant to deal with the controversies and disputes as
provided under the 1984 Act. He is not to be given any other assignment
by the High Court. The in camera proceedings stand in contradistinction
to a proceeding which is tried in court .. When a case is tried or heard in
c c<;mrt, there is absolute transparency. Having regard to the nature of the
controversy and the sensitivity of the matter, it is desirable to hear in
court various types of issues that crop up in these types of litigations.
The Act commands that there has to be an effort for settlement. The
legislative intendment is for speedy settlement. The counsellors can be
D assigned the responsibility by the court to counsel the parties. That is
the schematic purpose of the law. The confidentiality of the proceedings
is imperative for these proceedings.
49. The procedure of videoconferencing which is to be adopted
when one party gives consent is contrary to Section 11 of the 1984 Act.
E There is no provision that the matter can be dealt with by the Family
Court Judge by taking recourse to videoconferencing. When a matter is
not transferred and settlement proceedings take place which is in the
nature ofreconciliation, it will be well nigh impossible to bridge the gap.
What one party can communicate with other, if they are left alone for
sometime, is not possible in videoconferencing and if possible, it is very
F doubtful whether the emotional bond can be established in a virtual
meeting during videoconferencing. Videoconferencing may create a dent
in the process of settlement.
50. The two-Judge Bench had referred to the decisions where
the affirmative rights meant for women have been highlighted in various
G judgments. We have adverted to some of them to show the dignity of
woman and her rights and the sanctity of her choice. When most of the
time, a case is filed for transfer relating to matrimonial disputes governed
by the 1984 Act, the statutory right of a woman cannot be nullified by
taking route to technological advancement and destroying her right under
H " 296 U.S. 315, 334 (1935)
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 611 .
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

a law, more so, when it relates to family matters. In our considered A
opinion, dignity of women is sustained and put on a higher pedestal if her
choice is respected. That will be in consonance with Article 15(3) of the
Constihltion.
51 '. In this context, we may refer to the fundamental principle of
necessity of doing justice and trial in camera. The nine-Judge Bench in B
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors v. State of Maharashtra and
Anr. 46 , after enunciating the universally accepted proposition in favour
of open trials, expressed:- · ·
"While emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot
overlook the fact that the primary function of the Judiciary is to c
do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If.
a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding
truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses
are required to give evidence subject to public gaze, is it or is it not
open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in
camera either partly or fully? If the primaryfunction of the court D
is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is
difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception
to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. Ifthe principle
that all trials before courts must be held in public was treated as
inflexible and universal and it is held ~hat it admits of no exceptions E
whatever, cases may arise where by following the principle, justice
. itself may be defeated. That is why we.feel no hesitation in holding
that the High Cow1 has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera
if the ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption
of such a course. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that this
inherent power must be exercised with greatcaution and it is only F
a
if the court is satisfied beypnd doubt that the ends of justice
themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court that
'it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera; but to deny the
existence of such inherent power to the court would be to ignore
the primary object of adjudication itself. The principle underlying G
the insistence on hearing causes in open court is to protect and
assist fair, impartial and objective administration ofjustice; but if
the requirement of justice itself sometimes dictates the necessity
of trying the case in camera, it cannot be said that the said
"'AIR 1967 SC I
H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A requirement should be sacrificed because of the principle that
every trial must be held in open court."
52. The principle of exception that the larger Bench enunciated is
founded on the centripodal necessity of doing justice to the cause and
not to defeat it. In matrimonial disputes that are covered under Section
B 7 of the 1984 Act where the Family Court exercises its jurisdiction, there
is a statutory protection to both the parties and conferment of power on
the court with it duty to persuade the parties to reconcile. If the
proceedings are directed to be conducted through videoconferencing,
the command of the Section as well as the spirit of the 1984 Ad will be
in peril and further the cause of justice would be defeated.
c
53. A cogent reflection is also needed as regards the perception
when both the parties concur to have the proceedings to be held through
videoconferencing. In this context, the thought and the perception are to
be viewed through the lens of the textual context, legislative intent and
schematic canvas. The principle may had to be tested on the bedrock
D that courts must have progressive outlook and broader interpretation
with the existing employed language in the statute so as to expand the
horizon and the connotative expanse and not adopt a pedantic approach.
54. We have already discussed at length with regard to the
complexity and the sensitive nature of the controversies. The statement
E oflaw made in Krishna Veni Nagam (supra) that if either of the parties
gives consent, the case can be transferred, is absolutely unacceptable.
However, an exception can be carved out to the same. We may repeat
at the cost of repetition that though the principle docs not flow from
statutory silence, yet as we find from the scheme of the Act, the Family
F Coui1 has been given ample power to modulate its procedure. The
Evidence Act is not strictly applicable. Affidavits of formal witnesses
.are acceptable. It will be permissible for the other party to cross-examine
the deponent. We are absolutely conscious that the enactment gives
emphasis on speedy settlement. As has been held in Bltuwan Mohan
Singlt (.mpra), the concept of speedy settlement does not allow room
G for lingering the proceedings; 1 A genuine endeavour has to be made by
the Family Couit Judge, but in the name of efforts to bring in a settlement
or to arri_ve at a solution of the !is, the Family Court should not be chained
by the tentacles by either parties. Perhaps, 1;me of the parties may be
interested in procrastinating the litigation. Therefore, we are disposed
H to think that once a settlement fails and if both the parties give consent
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 613
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

that a witness can be examined in video conferencing, that can be allowed. A
That apart, when they give consent that it is necessary in a specific
factual matrix having regard to the convenience of the parties, the Family
Court may allow the prayer for videoconferencing. That much of
discretion, we are inclined to think can be conferred on the Family Court.
Such a limited discretion will not run counter to the legislative intention B
that permeates the 1984 Act. However, we would like to add a safeguard.
A joint application should be filed before the Family Court Judge, who
shall take a decision. However, we make it clear that in a transfer
petition, no direction can be issued for video conferencing. We reiterate
that the discretion has to rest with the Family Court to be exercised after
the court arrives at a definite conclusion that the settlement is not possible C
and both parties file a joint application or each party filing his/her consent
memorandum seeking hearing by videoconferencing.
55. Be it noted, sometimes, transfer petitions are filed seeking
transfer of cases instituted under the Protection ofWomen from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 and cases registered under the IPC. As the cases D
under the said Act and the IPC have not been adverted to in Krishna
Veni Nagam (supra) or in the order of reference in these cases, we do
intend to advert to the same. ·
56. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we sum up our conclusion
as follows :- E
(i) In view of the scheme of the l 984Act and in particular Section
11, the hearing of matrimonial disputes may have to be conducted
in camera.
(ii) After the settlement fails and when a joint application is filed
or both the parties file their respective consent memorandum F
for hearing of the case through videoconferencing for examining
any witness before the concerned Family Court, it may exercise
the discretion to allow the said prayer.
(iii) After the settlement fails, ifthe Family Court feels it appropriate
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that G
videoconferencing will sub-serve the cause of justice, it may
so direct.
(iv) In a transfer petition, video conferencing cannot be directed.
(v) Our directions shall apply prospectively.
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A (vi) The decisionin Krishna ~ni Nagam (supra) is overruled to .
the aforesaid extent. ·
57. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance
'rendered by Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel.
58. The rnatters be placed before the appropriate Bench for
B ·consideration of the transfer petitions on their own merits.
. DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. I The judgment proposed by
the learned Chief Justice has been circulated and deliberated upon. The
reasons why I am unable to adopt the view propounded in the judgment
of the learned· Chief Justice will be delivered separately. I record below
c my conclusions:
I. The Family Courts Act, l 984 has been enacted at a point in
time when modern te.chnology { at least as we know it today ) which
enables peJsons separated by spatial distances to communicate with
each other face to face was not the order ofthe day or, in ilny case, was
D not as fully developed. That is no reason for any court - especially for
this court which sets precedent for the nation - to exclude the application
of technology to facilitate the judicial process.
2. Appropriate deployment of technology facilitates access to
justice. Litigation under the Family Courts Act 1984 is not an exception
E to this principle. This court must be averse tµ judicially laying down a
restraint on such use of technology which facilitates access to justice to
persons in conflict, including those involved in conflicts within the family.
Modern technology is above all a facilitator, enabler and leveler.
3. Video conferencing is a technology which allows users .in
F different locations to hold face to face meetings. Video conferencing is
being used extensively the world over (Inµia being no exception) in on
line teaching, administration, meetings, negotiation,mediation and
tclcmedicine among a myriad other uses. Video conferencing reduces
cost, time, carbon footprint and the like.
G 4. An in-carnera trial is contemplated under Section 11 in two
situations: the first where the Family Court so desires; and the second if
either of the parties so desires. There is a fallacy in the hypothesis that
an in-camera trial is inconsistent with the usage of video conferencing
techniques. A trial in-camera postulates the .exclusion of the public from
the courtroom and allows for.restraints on public reporting. Video
.H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 615
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

conferencing does not have to be recorded nor is it accessible to the A
press or the public. The proper adoption of video conferencing does not
negate the postulates of an in-camera trial even if such a trial is required
·by the court or by one of the parties under Section 11.
5. The Family Courts Act 1984 envisages an active role for the
Family Court to foster settlements.Under the provisions of Section 11, B
the Family Court has to endeavour to "assist and persuade" parties to
arrive at a settlement. Section 9 clearly recognises a discretion in the
Family Court to determine how to structure the process. It does so by
adopting the words "where it is possible to do so consistent with the
nature and circumstances of the case".' Moreover, the High Courts can
frame rules under Section 9(1) and the Family Court may, subject to· C
those rules, "follow such procedure as it deems fit". Jn the process of
settlement, Section 10(3) enables the.family Court to lay down its own
procedure. The Family Cowt is entitled to take the benefit of counsellors,
medical experts and persons professionally engaged in promoting the
welfare of the family.. D
6. The above provisions - far from excluding the use of video
conferencing - are sufficiently enabling to allow the Family Court to
utilise technological advances to facilitate the purpose of aehievingjustiee
in resolving family conflicts. There may arise a variety of situations where
in today's age and time parties arc unable to come face to face for E
counselling or can do so only at such expense,delay or hardship which
will defeat j usti'ce. One or both spouses may face genuine difficulties
arisjng from the compulsions of employment, family circumstances
(including the needs of young children), disability and social or economi<'.
handicaps in accessing a court situated in a location distant from where
either or both pa1ties reside or work. It would be inappropriate to deprive F
the Family Court which is vested with such wide powers and procedural
flexibility to adopt vidco·conferencing as a facilitative tool, where it is
convenient and readily available. Whether video conferencing should be
aBowed must be determined on a case to case analysis to best effectuate
the concern of providing Just solutioi).s. Far from such a procedure being -G
excluded by the law, it will sub serve the purpose of the law.·
7. Conceivably there may be situations 'Vhere parties ·(or one of
the spouses) do not want to be in the same room as the other. This is
especially true when there are serious allegations of marital abuse. Video
conferencing allows things to be resolved from the safety of a place
H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A which is not accessible to the other spouse against whom there is a
serious allegation of misbehaviour of a psychiatric nature or in a case of
substance abuse.
8. Video conferencing is gender neutral. In fact it ensures that
one of the spouses cannot procrastinate and delay the conclusion of the
B trial. Delay, it must be remembered, generally defeats the cause of a
party which is not the dominant partner in a relationship. Asymmetries
of power have a profound consequence in marital ties. Imposing an
unwavering requirement ofpersonal and physical presence (and exclusion
offacilitative technological tools such as video conferencing) will result
in a denial ofjustice.
c 9. The High Courts have allowed for video conferencing in
resolving family conflicts. A body of precedent has grown around the
subject in the Indian context. The judges of the High Court should have
a keen sense of awareness of prevailing social reality in their states and
of the federal structure. Video conferencing has been adopted
D internationally in resolving conflicts within the family. There is a robust
body of authoritative opinion on the subject which supports video
conferencing, of course with adequate safeguards. Whether video
conferencing should be allowed in a particular family dispute before the
Family Cow1, the stage at which it should be allowed and the safeguards
E which should be followed should best be left to the High Courts while
framing rules on the subject. Subject to such rules, the use of video
conferencing must be left to the careful exercise of discretion of the
Family Court in each case.
l 0. The proposition that video conferencing can be permitted only
after the conclusion of settlement proceedings (resultantly excluding it
F in the settlement process), and thereafter only when both parties agree
to it does not accord either with the purpose or the provisions of the
Family Courts Act 1984. Exclusion of video conferencing in the settlement
process is not mandated either expressly or by necessary implication by
the legislation. On the contrary the legislation has enabling provisions
o which are sufficiently broad to allow video conferencing. Confining it to
the stage after the settlement process and in a situation where both
parties have agreed will seriouslyimpede access to justice. It will render
the Family Court helpless to deal with human situations which merit
flexible solutions. Worse still, it will enable one spouse to cause
interminable delays thereby defeating the purpose for which a specialised
H court has been set up.
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 617
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] .

II The reference should in my opinion be answered in the above A
terms.
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. While setting down my
inability to adopt the view propounded in the judgment of the learned
Chief Justice, my conclusions have been formulated thus:
B
1. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted at a point in time when
modem technology (at least as we know it today) which enables
persons separated by spatial distances to communicate with each
other face to face was not the order of the day or, in any case,
was not as fully developed. That is no reason for any court -
especially for this court which sets precedent for the nation - to c
exclude the application of technology to facilitate the judicial
process.
2. Appropriate deployment of technology facilitates· access to justice.
Litigation under the Family Courts Act 1984 is not an exception to
this principle. This court must be averse to judicially laying down D
a restraint on such use of technology which facilitates access to
justice to persons in conflict, including those involved in conflicts
within the family. Modem technology is above all a facilitator,
enabler and leveler.
3. Video conferencing is a technology which allows users in different E
locations to hold face to face meetings. Video conferencing is
being used extensively the world over (India being no exception)
in online teaching, administration, meetings, negotiation, mediation
and telemedicine among a myriad other uses. Video conferencing
reduces cost, time, carbon footprint and the like.
F
4. An in-camera trial is contemplated under Section 11 in two
situations: the first where the Family Court so desires; and the
second if either of the parties so desires. There is a fallacy in the
hypothesis that an in-camera trial rs inconsistent with the usage of
video conferencing techniques. A trial in-camera postulates the
G
exclusion of the public from the courtroom and allows for restraints
on public reporting. Video conferencing does not have to be
recorded nor is it accessible to the press or the public. The p~oper
adoption of video conferencing does not negate the postulates of

H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A an in-camera trial even if such a trial is required by the court or by
one of the parties under Section 11.
5. The Family Courts Act 1984 envisages an active role for the Family
Court tci foster settlements. Under the provisions of Section 11,
the Family Court has to endeavour to "assist and persuade" parties
B to arrive at a settlement. Section 9 clearly recognises a discretion
in the Family Court to determine how to structure the process. It
does so by adopting the words "where it is possible to do so
consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case".
Moreover, the High Courts can frame rules under Section 9.(1)
and the Family Comt may, subject to those rules, "follow such
c procedure as it deems fit". In the process of settlement, Section
10(3) enables the Family Court to lay down its own procedure.
The Family Court is entitled to take the benefit of counsellors,
medical experts and persons professionally engaged in promoting
the welfare of the family. ·
D 6. The above provisions - far from excluding the use of video
conferencing- are sufficiently enabling to allow the Family Court
to utilise technological advances to facilitate the purpose of
achievingj ustice in resolving family conflicts. There may arise a
variety of situations where in today's age and time parties arc
E unable to come face to face for com1selling or can do so only at
such expense, delay or hardship which will defeat justice. One or
both spouses may face genuine difficulties arising from the
compulsions of employment, family circuntstances (including the
needs of yo~ng children), disability and social or economic
handicaps in accessing a court situated in a location distant from
F where either or both parties reside or work. It would be
Inappropriate to deprive the Family Court which is vested with
such wide powers and procedural flexibility to adopt video
conferencing as a facilitative tool, where it is convenient and readily
available. Whether video conferencing should be allowed must
G be determined on a case to case analysis to best effectuate the
concern of providing just solutions. Far from such a procedure
being excluded by the law, it will sub serve the purpose of the law.
7. Conceivably there may be situations where parties (or one of the
spouses) do not want to be in the same room as the other.This is
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 619
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

especially true when there are serious allegations of marital abuse. A
Video conferencing allows things, to be resolved from the safety
of a place which is not accessible to the other spouse against
whom there is a serious allegation of misbehaviour of a psychiatric
nature or in a case of substance abuse.
8. Video conferencing is gender neutral. In fact it ensures that one of B-
the spouses cannot procrastinate and delay the conclusion of the
trial. Delay, it must be remembered, generally defeats the cause
of a party whicli is not the dominant partner in a relationship.
Asymmetries of power have a profound consequence in marital
ties. Imposing an unwavering requirement ofpersonal and physical
presence (and exclusion of facilitative technological tools such as c
video conferencing) will result in a denial ofjustice.
9. The High Courts have allowed for video conferencing in resolving
family conflicts. A body of precedent has grown around the subject
in the Indian context. The judges of the High Courts should have
a keen sense of awareness of prevailing social reality in their D
states and of the federal structure. Video conferencing has been
adopted internationally in resolving conflicts within the family.
There is a robust body of authoritative opinion on the subject which
supports video conferencing, of cow·se with adequate safeguards.
Whether video conferencing should be allowed in a particular E
family dispute before the Family Court, the stage at which it should
be allowed and the safeguards which should be followed should
best be left to the High Courts while framing rules on the subject.
Subject to such rules, the use of video conferencing must be left
to the careful exercise of discretion of the Family Court in each
case. F

IO. The proposition that video conferencing can be permitted only
after the conclusion of settlement proceedings (resultantly ·
excluding it in tile settlement process), and thereafter only when
both pm1ies agree to it does not accord either with the purpose or
the provisions of the Family Courts Act 1984. Exclusion of video .G
conferencing in the settlement process is not mandated either
expressly or by necessary implication by the legislation. On the
contrary the legislation has enabling provisions which are
sufficiently broad to allow video conferencing. Confining it to the
stage after the settlement process and in a situation where both
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A parties have agreed will seriously impede access to justice. It will
render the Family Court helpless to deal with human situations
which merit flexible solutions. Worse still, it will enable one spouse
to cause interminable delays thereby defeating the purpose for
which a specialised court has been set up."
B 2. I now proceed to indicate my reasons.
3. The three Judge Bench was constituted to decide the correctness
of a judgment rendered by two Judges of this Court in Krishna Vcni
Nagam v Harish Nagam' ("Krishna Vcni"). This reference to a larger
bench was occasioned by an orderofa Bench of two Judges in Santhini
c v Vijaya Vcnkctcsh 2 {"Santhini"). The analysis of the issues which
arise in the present reference must be prefaced by determining, first and
foremost, the subject of the controversy in Krishna Veniand what the
decision laid down. In Krishna Veni, this Court dealt with a petition
filed under Article l 39A of the Constitution for the transfer of a
proceeding for divorce instituted by one spouse against the other under
D Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The spouse who sought
transfer of the proceedings instituted in the Family Court at Jabalpur to
its counterpaii at Hyderabad pleaded for a transfer of proceedings on
the ground that she would face serious hardship in defending a proceeding
in a distantly located court. In the course of its decision, the Bench of
E two Judges noted that a large number of transfer petitions are being
filed and are "mechanically allowed''. This position was noted over a
decade ago in Anindita Das v Srijit Das 3• Under Section 19 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition for divorce could be instituted at
the place where the marriage is solemnized or where the respondent
resides at the time when the petition is presented or where the parties
F last resided together. Evidently, though one of the spouses is entitled to
institute divorce proceedings at a place contemplated by Section 19, a
woman required to defend the proceeding at a place away from her
residence is subjected to hardship. In many cases, the court alleviates
the hardship involved by directing the payment of expenses incidental to
G attending hearings in the location where the divorce proceeding is
instituted.
4. Now, it is in this background that the two Judge Bench in
i (2017) 4 sec 150
'Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1278 of2016, dated 9 August 2017
' (2006) 9 sec 197
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 621
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Krishna Veni considered whether video conferencing could suitably be A
deployed. The court was conscious of the fact that both the spouses
may face genuine difficulties : the spouse against whom the proceeding
is instituted would face hardship and inconvenience by being required to
commute to a distant court, while the spouse who has instituted the
proceeding (in a forum which the law permits) may genuinely suffer
B
grave inconvenience if the proceeding is transferred to a distant court
within whose jurisdiction the other spouse resides. The exercise of the
jurisdiction of this Court to transfer matrimonial proceedings may not
always provide a satisfactory solution since one or the other spouse
would in any case suffer inconvenience as a result of the relief of transfer
being refused or, as the case may be, being allowed. This provided the c
backdrop to the following observations of the two Judge Bench:
"14. One cannot ignore the problem faced by a husband if
proceedings are transferred on account of genuine difficulties
faced by the wife. The husband may find it difficult to contest
proceedings at a place which is convenient to the wife. Thus, D
transfer is not always a solution acceptable to both the parties. It
may be appropriate that available technology of videoconferencing
is used where both the parties have equal difficulty and there is
no place which is convenient to both the parties. We understand
that in every district in the country videoconferencing is now
available. In any case, wherever such facility is available, it ought E
to be fully utilised and all the High Courts ought to issue appropriate
administrative instructions to regulate the use of videoconferencing
for certain category of cases. Matrimonial cases where one of
the parties resides outside court's jurisdiction is one of such
categories. Wherever one or both the parties make a request for F
use of videoconferencing, proceedings may be conducted on
videoconferencing, obviating the needs of the party to appear in
person. In several cases, this Court has directed recording of
evidence by video conferencing."
Eventually, the Court directed that while issuing summons in a G
matrimonial proceeding, the court where proceedings have been initiated,
may examine whether appropriate safeguards could be introduced to'
protect the interest of the spouse who resides outside the jurisdiction
and to whom the summons arc being issued. Among those safeguards,
is the availability of a video conferencing facility. The above directions
H
n

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A are contained in the following extract from the decision:
"18. We, therefore, direct that in matrimonial or custody matters
or in proceedings between parties to a marriage or arising out of
disputes between parties to a marriage, wherever the defendants/
respondents are located outside the jurisdiction of the court, the
B court v.:here proceedings are instituted, may examine whether it
is in the interest of justice to incorporate any safeguards for
ensuring that summoning of defendant/respondent does not result
in denial of justice. Order incorporating such safeguards may be
sent along with the summons. The safeguards can be:
c (i)Availability of videoconferencing facility.
(ii) Availability oflegal aid service.
(iii) Deposit of cost for travel, lodging and boarding in terms of
Order 25 CPC.
(iv) E-mail address/phone number, ifany, at which litigant from
D
outstation may communicate."
5. Since the decision in Krishna Vcni forms the focus of the
present reference, it is necessary to emphasise what the two Judge
Bench hel!l and what it did not. Krishna Vcni notes that a transfer of.
proceedings (from one state to another) is not always a solution
E
acceptable to the contesting spouses since one of them would suffer
hardship as a result of the transfer of proceedings. It was in this context
that the court observed that "it may be appropriate" to use video
conferencing facilities "where both the patties have equal difficulty and
there is no place which is convenient to both the parties". The decision
F does not stipulate a mechanical direction that in every transfer petition
parties should be directed to take recourse to video conferencing facilities.
Evidently, the Court was eoncemed with the fact that an order of transfer
would work to the prejudice of the spouse against whom the transfer is
ordered. Similarly, it is necessary to emphasise that the two Judge Bench
G requires the court issuing summons to a spouse who resides outside its
jurisdiction to examine the feasibility of safeguards that would obviate a
denial ofjustice. One of those safeguards which the comt "may examine"
is the availability of a video conferencing facility.
6. Plainly, Krishna Veni does not embody an absolute or invariable
mandate that all transfer petitions should be disposed of by the court, by
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 623
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the application of a mechanical formula requiring the contesting spouses A
to take recourse to the facility of video conferencing. The language of
the judgment is permissive and is sufficiently flexible to accommodate
an application of mind to the interests of justice, the position and
circumstances of parties as well as to the feasibility {both in technical
and practical terms) of adopting video conferencing as a solution to spatial
.B
distances. Hence, it is fallacious to read Krishna Veni as a mandate to
take recourse to video conferencing in all transfer petitions filed before
this Court. That was not plainly the intent underlying the judgment nor
indeed does such a consequence flow from the decision.
7. While referring the correctness of the view in Krishna Veni
to a larger Bench, a coordinate Bench in Santhini has differed on the c
use of video conferencing in matrimonial disputes. The referring order
records that while placing reliance on the two Judge Bench decision in
Krishna Veni, orders are being passed by this Court, the High Comis
· and by District Courts relegating parties to video conferencing even
where such facilities are not available. The Bench opined that this has D
made the "situation" not only of inter-state or intra-state appeal but also
of intra-district appeal. As regards this aspect, it needs really no detailed
reasoning to hold that a misconstruction of a judgment ofa court either
by coordinate courts or by courts from whose decision an appeal lies is
no justification to overrule the former. It is the misconstruction which
has to be set at rest. E

8. Relying upon Section 9 of the Family Courts Act 1984, the
court in Santhini was of the view that it is the mandatory duty of the
Family Court to make efforts for settlement between parties. Invoking
the provisions of Sections 22, 23 and 26 of the HindLL Marriage Act
195 5, the court focused on the duty of the court to "make every endeavor" F
to make the parties arrive at a reconciliation "in every case where it is
possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the
case". The Bench also referred to Order XXXUA of the Code of Civil
Procedure introduced in 197 6 to emphasize the duty cast on the Comt to
make every effort for settlement in family matters. It concluded that G
Krishna Veni had not considered the above-mentioned provisions. In
doing so, the Bench highlighted the importance of reconciliation in family
matters and observed as follows:
"The principal thrust of ~he law in family matters is to make an
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A attempt for reconciliation before processing the disputes in the
legal framework ... [I]n reconciliation, the duty-holders have to
take a proactive role to assist the parties to reach an amicable
solution... In reconciliation, as already noted above, the duty-holders
remind the parties of the essential family values, the need to
mainJain a cordial relationship, both in the interest of the husband
B
and wife or the children, as the case may be, and also make a
persuasive effort to make the parties reconcile to the reality and
restore the relationship, if possible. The Family Courts Act expects
the duty-holders like the court, counsellors, welfare experts and
any other collaborators to make efforts for reconciliation ... The
c role of a counsellor in Family Court is basically to find out what is
the area ofincompatibility between the spouses, whether the parties
are under the influence of anybody or for that matter addicted to
anything which affects the normal family life, whether they are
taking free and independent decisions, whether the incompatibility
can be rectified by any psychological or psychiatric assistance
D
etc. The counsellor also assists the parties to resume free
communication. In custody matters also the counsellor assists the
child, ifhe/she is of such age, to accept the reality ofincompatibility
between the parents and yet make the child understand that the
child is of both parents and the child has a right to get the love and
E affection ofboth the parents and also has a duty to love and respect
both the parents etc. Essentially, the counsellor assists the parents
to shed their ego and take a decision in the best interest of the
child."
Expressing it.s reservations on the use of video conferencing in
F family matters, the Bench held that:
"To what extent the confidence and confidentiality will be
safeguarded and protected in video-conferencing, particularly when
efforts are taken by the counsellors, welfare experts, and for that
matter, the court itself for reconciliation, restitution of conjugal
G rights or dissolution of marriage, ascertainm.cnt of the wishes of
the child in custodymatters, etc., is a serious issue to be considered.
"It is certainly difficult in video conferencing, if not impossible, to
maintain confidentiality. It has also to be noted that the fc;mtage in
video-conferencing becomes part of the record whereas the
reconciliatory efforts taken by the duty-holders ... arc not meant
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 625
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

to be part of the record. All that apart, in reconciliatory efforts, A
· physical presence of the parties would make a· significant
difference. Having regard to the very object behind the
establishment of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Code of Civ'il
Procedure and to the special provisions introduced in the Hindu
Marriage Act under Sections 22, 23 and 26, we are of the view B
that the directions issued by this Court in Krishna Veni Nagam
need reconsideration oh the aspect of video•conferencing in
matrimonial disputes".
These observations make it necessary to consider the scheme of
the Family Courts Act, 1984 and to determine whether the use of video
conferencing stands excluded by its provisions. C
Statutory Scheme of the Family Courts Act
9. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted to provide for the
establishment of family courts with a view to promote conciliation in and
secure .speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family D
affairs "and for.matters connected therewith".
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Family Courts Act,
1984 provides that:
" ... emphasis should be laid down on conciliation and achieving
socially desirable results and adherence to rigid rules of E
procedure and evidence should be eliminated."
In KA Abdul Jaleel v TA Shahida4 , this Court held that "the
reason for enactment of the said Act was to set up a court which would
deal with disputes concerning the family by adopting an approach
radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings". F.
Section 9 (1) of the Act casts a duty on the Family Court to make
efforts for a settlement between parties to the matrimonial dispute :
"In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be made by the
Family Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so
consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, G
to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in
respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this
purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made by the
High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit."
• 2003 (4) sec 166 H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A A similar duty is cast upon the Family Court under Section 23 (2)
of the Hindu MarriagcAct, 1955, which states that:
" ... it shall be the duty of the Court in the first insta,nce, in every
case where it is possible so to c\o consistently with the nature
and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring
B about a reconciliation between the parties"
The phrase in these provisions "where it is possible to do so
consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case'', acknowledges -
that it may not be possible to do so in every case.
In Komal S Padukone v Principal Judge, Family Court,
c Bangalore City\ the Kamataka High Court held that:
"Section 9 makes it clear that the duty of Family Court to make
efforts for settlement in the first instance is "where it is possible
to do, consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case".
Where one of the parties is abroad or is disabled, it may not be
D possible to attempt settlement in the first instance. But, that does
not mean that the party who is unable to appear, should be denied
the right to prosecute or defend the proceedings. All that it means
is that the effort to make settlement, gets postponed to a later
date when parties are able to appear. In some cases, it may not
E be possible to attempt settlement at all due to the peculiar
facts and circumstances."
10. A clear discretion is provided to the Family Court to evolve
the procedure which it will follow during the hearing of a case. The
Family Court, however, tmder Section 9( 1) would be subject to the "rules
made by the High Court" in this regard. Similarly, the obligation under
F
Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is to make every endeavour to
bring about a reconciliation between the parties, "where it is possible to
do so consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case" .
11. While dealing with the above provisions, one aspect needs to
G be discussed. It is a general belief that the process of reconciliation
requires the physical presence of both the parties at the same place and
at the same time. The physical presence of both the parties together is
emphasized since it is perceived that when pai1ies are alone together
they are able to strike an emotional bond, which will not be possible in
'Am t 999 Kant 427
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 627
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

video conferencing. Intimate details are to be discussed in an intimate A
environment.
12. The point, however, is whether a hypothesis of desirability
should be elevated to a position of a legal principle which allows no
interface of technology in the course of settlement. To appreciate the
issue, it is necessary to understand and demystify technology. · B
Video conferencing and the statute
13. Video conferencing transmits video, audio and data across a
communications network enabling geographically dispersed participants
to meet synchronously. 'The general keyword associated with video
conferencing is interactivity. This allows real time visual and audio contact c
between two or more persons at different geographical locations. ' 6 The
emotional attachment which people can develop (or rekindle) when are
in the same physical space cannot be undermined. However, it must be
noted that the effect of video-conferencing is that people who are not
present at the same place and at the same time are able to interact with D .
each other as if they are present together. The premise, in the referring
judgment that "the footage in video conferencing becomes part of the
record" is incorrect. It does not necessarily become a part of the record.
Discussions relayed through video conferencing in the course of settlement
will of course not be recorded. Technology answers our commands.
E
14. Section I 0 (3) of the Family Courts Act enables a Family
Court to lay down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement
in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings. Far from
embodying a specific bar or prohibition to the use of video conferencing,
this provision gives the Family Court ample powers to use video
conferencing in matrimonial disputes, where appropriate. F
15. Section 11 of the Family Courts Act provides for "in camera"
proceedings in specified circumstances. It states:
"In every suit or proceedings to which this Act applies, the
proceedings may be held in camera if the Family Court so desires
G
and shall be so held if either party so desires."
Section 11 uses both the expression "may" and "shall". The Family
Court has the discretion to order an in-camera trial. However, when a
' "The Technology and Pedagogy of·Two-way communication over Geographical
distance .. , University ofMalta (2013), available at https://www.um.cdu.mt/itscrvices/
documcnts/guidcs/vidcoconfcrencingguides/VC foll guidc.pdf H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C..R.

A party desires an in-camera trial, it is obligatory to do so. Hence, in-
camera trials are not mandated in every case in the Family Court.
Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage ACt, 1955 provides for
proceedings to be in camera and stipulates that the proceeding may not
be printed or published.
B
While analyzing whether video conferencing would be contrary
to Section 11 of the Family Courts Act and Section 22 of the f!:indu
Marriage Act, it would be necessary to understand the meaning of the
phrase "in-camera".
Black's Law Dictionary defines "in~camera" as follows 7 :
c
· "In chambers; in private. A cause is said to be heard in camera
either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private
chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom." ,
16. Video conferencing and in-camera proceedings are not
D irreconciliablc. Video conferencing, in itself, is a private interaction. It
docs not involve third persons or spectators apart from the two participants
between whom the video conferencing is taking place (judge or counsellor.
and one of the parties to the dispute). As long as it is not accessible to
the public, privacy is maintained. Therefore, it docs not run contrary to
the intent of Section 11, which is to maintain privacy. The same level of
E privacy that is afforded to parties during in-camera proceedings which
take place in the same physical space, can be maintained over the virtual
space of video conferencing. Technology also allows us to ensure that
there is no record of the conversation which took place through video
conferencing, once the conversatiorr is over. This is similar to a telephone
call (unless the call was being recorded). Technology provides flexibility.
F
Discussions .across an audio-visual link in the course of counselling or .
conciliation will not be recorded so as to maintain privacy and intimate
confidences. On the other hand, where in the course' of a trial, a judge
requires that a record of the deposition be maintained, technology will
facilitate it. ·
'G
Jn fact, one of the advantages of adopting video conferencing
technology in trials of disputes, which has been acknowledged in various
jurisdictions where this is being practised, is the increased accuracy that
results from the judge having access to the recorded video. Even if a
7 Black's Law Dictionary, West Publishing Co. ( 1979), at page 681.
H
SANTHINI v. VIJAYA VENKETESH 629
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

video conference is recorded for this purpose, the records can be A
destroyed after the judgment is delivered or once the purpose of recording
· by the judge has been served.
17. This Court must also take a robust view of today's conditions.
We are living in an age of technology. Men and women have access to
and are in possession of instruments which use advanced technologies. B
The reality is that the world is not a closed space. It has never been, and
is becoming increasingly interconnected. People are constantly moving
from one place to another in the course of their personal and professional
pursuits. In spite of the distances that this movement entails, people are ·
able to interact with each other because of digital facilities. Most desktops
and mobile devices have cameras, thereby facilitating the ease of online
c
communications in the audio-visual mode. ·
18. Video conferencing has made face-to-face interactions
possible even in the absence of physical proximity. Technological
developments have brought a turning point in the history of human
civilization and have resulted in enhanced efficiency, productivity and D
quality of output in every walk oflife. Technology has paved the way for
an open and accessible world where physical barriers to communication
and connectivity have broken down.
19. Technology must also be seen as a way of bringing services
into remote areas to deal with problems associated with the justice E
delivery system. With the increasing cost of travelling and other expenses,
video conferencing can provide a cost-effective and efficient alternative.
Solutions based on modern technology allow the court to enhance the
quality and cffyctivencss of the administration of justice. The use of
technology can maximize efficiency and develop innovative methods for F
delivering legal services. Technology based solutions must be adopted to
facilitate access to justice. Family courts are overburdened with all too
familiar problems : too few courts, vacancies in judge strength and a
creaking infrastructure. Men and women in matrimonial distress have
their woes compounded in the justice delivery system. Repeated
adjournments break the.back of the litigant. We must embrace technology G
and not retard its application to make the administration ofjustiee efficient.
20. The pervasive problem of pendency, the ban-icrs to access to
justice in India, and the inability of the judicial process to ensure timely
and effective justice calls for a wide range of reforms. There is a
H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 12 S.C.R.

A widespread concern that the manner in which disputes are resolved in
the judicial process is expensive and causes hardships to litigants. Due
to advances in technology and tools for video conferencing, even when
parties are not in proximity to each other, conflicts can be resolved
effectively.
B AH the statutory provisions noted above apply to 'parties'. Since
these provisions are applicable to parties equally, regardless of gender,
they are gender~neutral.
High Court decisions
21. Even prior to Krishna Veni there has been a line ofjudgments
c of various High Courts which have allowed video conferencing in
matrimonial disputes. These decisions are important because they indicate
a robust attempt to foster flexible, technology-based solutions, in the
context of matrimonial disputes. High Courts in each state are aware of
the social and economic circumstances prevailing there and the feasibility
D ofadopting technology. These decisions must be given credence because
unless there is a manifest_ failure of justice under· law or a cause of
public injury, the assessment by the High Courts oflocal conditions ought
to be respected. This to my mind is the mandate of a vibrant federal
\ structure.

E In Mukcsh Narayan Shinde v Palak Mukcsh Shindc Nee
Palak D Patc1 8 (2012), the petitioner husband and respondent wife had
decided to convert a Petition filed under Section 13( 1)(ia) to a Petition
for divorce by mutual consent under Section l 3B of the Hiridu Marriage
Act, 1955. The husband was residing in Mumbai, while the wife was
residing in the US. The request was rejected by the Family Court holding
F that the respondent wife was absent throughout and coup.selling had not
taken place in that matter. The Bombay High Court set aside the order
of the Family Court and held that:
"The physical presence ofboth the pmiies is generally asked and
necessary to verify the authenticity of the identity of the parties
G and consent of the parties. However, there arc peculiar
circumstances like the case in hand where either of the
parties cannot remain present before the Court due to
certain practical difficulties i.e. Job, leave, visa etc. Due to
. globalization noticeable educated young persons arc
8
2012 (3) ALLMR 521
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 631
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

crossing the borders of India and they are taking up jobs A
outside the country. So some of them can not remain present
before the Family Court to give consent in matrimonial
matters. There is no illegality to solve such difficulty by
adopting novel and available ways. This hurdle can be
crossed with the help of advanced technology of B
communication and new scientific methods. Though the
physical presence is not possible, the Court can accept and rely
on the virtual presence of the parties for verification and
confirmation of the mutual consent. Even though,the
counselling with the Marriage Counsellor can be facilitated
by virtual presence." (emphasis supplied) C
The High Court directed the Family Court to arrange a video
conference of the Marriage Counsellor with a respondent wife in the
Court with the help of a computer/laptop or by using a webcam and also
to verify and record online consent. Parties were directed to appear
before the Family Court so as to enable it to give directions to make D
arrangements for counselling and verification by video conference.
In Blessy Varghese Edattukaran v Sonu 9 (2015), a Division
Bench of the Kerala High Court, while dealing with the issue of divorce
by mutual consent held that:
"[T]his Court is of the considered opinion that, the intention of the E
legislature contained in S. 9( 1) of the Family Courts Act does not
insist upon the Family Court to direct the parties to undergo the
process of counselling invariably in all the cases as a mandatory
requirement ... the endeavour by the Court to assist and to
persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement is required F
only if it is possible to do so and is consistent with the nature
and circumstances of the case.•• Butin cases where any one
of the parties or both the parties makes an application to
the court to dispense with the procedure of counselling due
to their non-availability in the country or due to any other
valid reasons incapacitating their personal appearance, then G
it will be left open to the Family Courts to consider such
applications and to allow the exemption from undergoing
counselling with respect to either one of the parties or to
9
2015 (4) KLT 572
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

"A both the parties, as the case may be. In such situation it is
also not necessary in all the cases to insist upon both the
parties to have counselling 'together' ... Possibility for
conducting the counselling through "video conferencing"
using computer/laptop or mobile phones having requisite
facility also can be explored and permitted.''
B
(emphasis supplied)
In Finy Susan Francis v Binn Philip Paul 10 (2015), parties jointly
requested the Family Court to direct the Counsellor to conduct counselling
. through a video conference. the Family Court declined the request,
while holding that counselling is mandatory and finding that no facilities
C were available in the court for conducting counselling through video
conference. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that the
Family Court ought to have considered the feasibility of counselling being
done through video conferencing with the help of a computer/laptop or
through a cell phone having facilities for the said purpose. The court
D therefore quashed the order of the Family Court and granted liberty to
the parties to approach the Family Court seeking to dispense with the
process of counselling or else to seek permission for arranging counselling
through video conferencing by offering to provide necessary facilities.
In Suvarna Rahul Musale v Rahul Prabhakar Musale 11
(2014), the Bombay High Court allowed the Petitioner,wife who was
E
staying in the US to recoi"d evidence by way of video recording. It was
held that:
"The petitioner/wife has moved an Application for recording of
evidence through yidco conferencing because she is working in
U.S. She has a minor daughter aged about 6 years and stays with
F her. It is a different and distant country. Travelling to and fro from
U.S. to India is undoubtedly financially expensive so also it is
difficult for a mother of 6 years old girl to arrange the logistics.
Though in the Application only financial difficulty and inconvenience
is mentioned, it is necessary to understand what kind of
G inconvenience a mother of 6 years old child can face if she has to
travel from U.S. to India to give evidence. Moreover she is a
working lady and may face difficulty in getting leave and may be
some hurdles in VISA. Hence, the Application for video
conferencing is justified on all counts ...
"O.P. (FC). No. 401 of2015 (R)
H "(2015) 7 Bom CR 608
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 633
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

It is to be noted that our legislature has wisely taken note ofthis A
fact and accordingly has made the changes in the Evidence Act
by amending Section 65 and thereby section 65A, 65B are inserted
on the point of recording of evidence relating to electronic record
and admissibility of electronic 'record. When the legislature has
expanded the scope of term 'Evidence' acknowledging advance
B
technology and scientific methods used by people in their day-to-
day activities, it is the duty of the Judicial officers to put life to
those letters oflaw by interpreting them effectively...
An attitudinal chm1ge in Judges is required. We need to train
ourselves to understand the pulse of the new generation who is
avidly techno savvy. Though it is difficult for the Judges, especially c
who are in their middle age, to accept and digest the entry of new
language and methods of evidence in the established judicial
· system, it is high time forus to change our mindset and see whether
this new technology can help us to increase the speed and also
we have to take into account the convenience of the parties as D
our judicial system is necessarily litigant centric ...
The presence of the person can be obtained physically so also
virtually. What is important is that a person should be..~een and be
heard and vice versa. These are the methods of distant
communication, which is possible by virtual measures and E
microspeakers. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Judge to
insist for the physical presence of the witness when it is not possible
especially in the circumstances of this case, a virtual presence
can be secured which is very much legal and for this purpose, it is
not necessary for the Judge himself to give time but such evidence
can be recorded by appointing Commissioner." F

Sirangai Shoba v Sirangi Muralidhar Rao 12 (2017) concerned
the legality and correctness of an order allowing examination on Skype
technology for recording evidence in a divorce petition. Allowing the use
of Skype technology for witness testimony, the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh held: G

"[T]here is no foundation to say the request to record evidence
through Skype technology is a device to avoid facing the criminal

12 AIR 2017 AP 88

H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 12 S.C.R.

A case allegedly filed against him and so far as the apprehensions
as to demeanor and possibility of prompting or tutoring can be
taken care of with necessary precautions, the reconciliation also
can be done if need be by use of Skype technology, there are no
grounds to interfere with the impugned order of the lower Court
permitting the recording of evidence of the party-witness abroad
B
through Advocate Commissioner and by use of Skype technology,
but for to give necessary directions of the precautions required to
be taken to ease out the apprehensions of the other side in giving
disposal of the revision petition."
ThcAndhra Pradesh High Court relied upon a decision of a Division
c Bench of the Delhi High Court in International Planned Parenthood
Federation (IPPF) v Madlrn Bala Nath 13, where it was observed
that Courts must be liberal to record evidence through video conferencing
in order to save time or avoid inconvenience:
"Procedures have been laid down to facilitate dispensation of
D justice. Dispensation of justice entails speedy justice and justice
rendered with least inconvenience to the parties as well as to the
witnesses. If a facility is available for recording evidence through
video conferencing, which avoids any delay or inconvenience to
the parties as well as to the witnesses, such facilities should be
E resorted to. Merely because a witness is travelling and is in a
position to travel does not necessary imply that the witness must
be required to come to Court and depose in the physical presence
of the court."
In International Planned ParenthoodFederation (IPPF)v
F Madhu Bala Nath 14 (2016), the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
noted that : ·
" ... Video-conferencing is an advancement in science and
technology which permits one to see, hear and talk with someone
far away, with same facility and ease as if he is present. In fact
G he/she is present before one on a screen. Except for touching,
one can see, hear and observe as if the party is in the same room.
In video-conferencing both parties arc in the presence of each
other ... "

13
AIR 2016 Delhi 71
H 14
FAO (OS) ~16/2015 & CM no 13475/2015, decided on 07.01.2016
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH' 635
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

In V Srivatsan v SR Gayathri 15 (2017), the husband had initiated A
a matrimonial proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights, whereas the
wife had filed for divorce. The petitioner-husband made an application
before the Court for examination through video conferencing. It was
pleaded by him that since he was residing in the US and was employed
in Los Angeles, he had to remain at the place of posting and it would be
B
extremely difficult and prejudicial for him to come to India to depose in
the case. According to him, it also involved an unnecessary amount of
delay, expenditure and inconvenience, which, on the facts and
circumstances of the case would be patently unreasonable and extremely
harsh on him. The application was allowed. It was held that:
"Section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 suggests and c
provides for in camera proceedings, so that there will not
be any ambiguity in understanding the parties. But many of
the Family Courts arc not adopting the unique path-breaking
initiatives ...
So far as the matrimonial matter is concerned, excepting D
the fact of the touch of the person concerned, video
conferencing is an advancement of Science and Technology,
which permits one to see, hear and talk with someone, who is far
away with the same facility and ease as if he is present herein.
The application of any technique through advancement of E
technology, is only to make things easier and flexible ... Video
conferencing is one such facility even under Section 65-A and B
of the Evidence Act and a special provision as to evidence relating
to electronic record and admissibility of the same, has been
introduced in the amended Act. There should not be any bar of
examination of witness by way of video conferencing ... F

In fact the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding Process Re-
engineering is suggesting rule for JCT enablement of the Court
processes. As a first step for process re-engineering, electronic
filing, recording ofevidence through video conferencing, electronic
evidence, service of summons etc arc suggested. On the utilization G
of video conferencing facilities, there are more than lakh of cases
across the country have been conducted which resulted in
expediting trials apart from tremendous financial savings ...
"C.R.P.(PD) No. 1012 of 2016 and C.M.P. No. 5676 of 2016, judgment dated
23.01.2011 H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A Admittedly, electronic video conferencing is cheaper and
facilitate to avoid delay of justice. Wherever there is a
linkage facility available, then the attendance of the witness
may be dispensed with and examination may be done
through video conferencing. Order 18 Rule 4 (3) of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides for recording evidence either
B
by writing or mechanically in the presence of the
Judge ...The mechanical process also includes electronic
process for both the C-0urt and the Commissioner. If the
law Courts do not permit the technology development in
the Court proceedings, it would be lagging behind compared
c to the other sectors. The technology is only a tool and
necessary safeguards have to be taken for the purpose of
recording evidence through audio-video link. ..
Therefore, without going into other questions, the trial Court is
only directed to follow the necessary safeguards for taking
D evidence through video conferencing by giving a day-today hearing,
preferably, within three months from the date of communication
of the order. The petitioner is directed to bear any incidental
expenses in this regard. It is made clear that .such expenses is
directed to be paid by the petitioner-husband without prejudice to
the rights and contention of the parties. The court may accordingly
E fix time for video conferencing considering different time zone of
the land, in which, the husband is living and intimation be given to
him through electronic mail with respect to the time and date to
be fixed for Video conferencing well in advance." (emphasis
supplied)
F These are words of wisdom and perspicacity across the spectrum.
Voices from within the judiciary in a federal structw·e should merit close
listening by the Supreme Court.
Foreign jurisprudence
G 22. Video conferencing has been applied in m·atrimonial
proceedings in various other jw·isdictions. With the advancement of
technology, many countries have laid down detailed guidelines regulating
the use of video conferencing technology in Family Courts. In the absence
of detailed statutory guidelines, courts have been held to have wide powers
to regulate the procedure to be followed, including allowing video
H conferencing. Guidelines have developed through case-Jaw.
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 637
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Nearly seventeen years ago, in De Carvalho v Watson 16, the A
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in Canada had this perspective on
video conferencing technology:
"It is not the suggestion of this Court that because video
conferencing is an available form of technology suitable for
examination and cross-examination of witnesses or potential B
witnesses that such use of technology should be used generally
as a substitute for personal appearances ... But it seems to me
that where there are circumstances such as the present where an
individual is a long way away from the jurisdiction where the
examination would normally take place, where the costs for the .
personal attendance of that individual would be extremely
c
substantjal, where the examination can be carried out with a
minimum of difficulty by the use of such video conferencing
technology, and where there has already been a (sic) opportunity
for counsel to engage in personal cross-examination of an extensive
nature of the particular witness or potential witness, that this is an D
appropriate type of case for a Court to look positively upon a
request made on behalf ofsuch witness that the witness be allowed
in a civil action such as this to provide continued evidence on
examination for discovery by way of video conference. This would
be inappropriate only where there is some other circumstance · E
which would cause a meaningful risk of causing prejudice to the
party seeking to require the witness to appear in person."
It also rejected the arguments of the defendant opposing an
examination by video conference:
"The only submission of substance alleged on behalf ot the F
Defendants is that it would be easiedo assess credibility of the
witness if the witness appeared in pertmn ... [T]he state of
technology is now such that when video conferencing is properly
carried out, in my opinion, a good view can be had of the witness
for the purposes of assisting in assessing credibility through that G
medium."

"De Carvalho v Watson (2000), 83 Alta LR (3d) 354
17 Ron S. Foster and Lianne M. Cihlar, "Technology and Family Law Hearings",

Western Journal ofLega/ Studies (2012), Vol. 5, Issue I
H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A An article titled "Technology and Family Law Hearings" 17 (2012)
speaks about the usage of 'Skype' (a video-conferencing software) in
the context of family law arbitrations:
"The witnesses were located in different countries and in different
time zones. Despite this, the use of Skype facilitated a mutually
B convenient schedule for the witnesses and counsel. The witnesses
had access to the agreed exhibits, took the oath over video, and
were cross-examined. The corollary is that there is less opportunity
to observe ifwitnesses arc testifying under any form ofimpairment,
if they are being coached off-screen, or if they arc reading from
notes that are not part of the record. There was some concern
c about the delay ofa witness's facial expression when a damaging
document or picture was unveiled mid-testimony. However, the
advantages to video conferencing technologies and the costs saved
outweighed the disadvantages of a face-to-face cross-
cxamination." 18
D In P v C 19 , the Ontario Court of Justice in Canada allowed
testimony by the internet-based video conferencing program Skype,
despite the lack of clarity in the Ontario Family Law Rules on this issue,
in situations where a judge secs it fit. It was held:
"36. It is clear to me that the balance of convenience on this
E motion favours the Applicant. With the conditions which I set out...
the Respondent should suffer little or no prejudice in his counsel's
ability to cross-examine. The cross-examination will be conducted
in.real time, and the "lag" which counsel fears in the transmission
of questions and answers should not exist. Requiring the Applicant
F and her spouse to travel to T.O. would have a negative impact on
their already financially -stretched household, and would be
damaging to the children's best interests.
37. Cross-examination of the Applicant and Mr. B.M. by Skype
will be permitted. The Applicant shall bear any of the costs
G incidental to facilitating this video conference. Applicant's counsel
shall contact court administration well in advance of the trial to
ensure that the connection between the facilities to be used in D.
and Courtroom IE in T.0. is effective."
" Ibid, at page 16
19 P. 11. C. Between L.VP, Applicant, and M.E.C. Respondent (2004] O.J. No. 200

H ONCJN
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 639
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

In Edmonton (City) v Lovat Tunnel Equipment Inc 20 , the A
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench set out guidelines for information to be
stated in applications for allowing hearings through video conferencing:
"l. the relevance of the evidence which it is anticipated that the
witness wilf give and why that evidence is necessary to their case;
2. the reasons why they suggest that video conferencing should B
be employed, bearing in mind that rule 216. l requires that there
be a "good reason" for the court. to allow the admission of such·
evidence. If the applicant intends to argue that cost and
inconvenience are factors which should be taken into consideration,
... some evidence would be presented as to the anticipated time c
and costs associated with video conferencing as opposed to
alternate means of procuring the evidence;
3. the logistical and technical arrangements that they have made
both here and in the place from which they propose that the witness
give their evidence ... Counsel must ensure that the witness will D
have access at the appropriate time to a clear copy of any exhibit .
to which their attention may be directed during the course of their
testimony which presumably can be done via a fax machine at
both ends of the video conference .... [S]ome efforts would be
made by the person administering the oath to ensure that there is
no scripting of the evidence. Also, a tape ofthevideo conference E
should be made."
In a study titled "Legal assistance by video conferencing: what is
known?"21 (2011 ), it was observed:
"While further research is required to identify the relative impact
F
of any or all of the following factors, the uptake and use of video
conferencing for legal assistance appears to be affected by:
- the convenience, privacy and confidentiality of video
conferencing compared to other available modes of assistance
- whether video conferencing offers services or benefits that are G
not already available through existing legal services, including
20
Edmonton( City) v Lovat Tunnel Equipment Inc (2000), 260 AR 259 (QB)
" Suzie Forcll, Meg La'l!fcr and Erol Digiusto, "Legal assistance by video conferencing:
what is known?'', Justice Issues (Nov. 2011 ). at page 2, available at
http: 11 w w w. I aw foundation . net. au 11 j f Is it e I art i c I e IDs I
BOA936D88AF64726CA25796600008A3A/$file/JI 15 Videoconferenc.ing web.pdf H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A services available by telephone, such as access to specialist
services or more timely assistance
- the quality and reliability of the video conferencing (e.g. drop
outs, picture quality)
- the willingness of clients, lawyers and the host service at the
B client end to use this form of technology for legal assistance."
'Specific situations where video conferencing may assist the
parties in reaching agreement outside of court regarding their families
include: families in different geographic locations; and families that have
a history of or current concern with regarCls to family violence. '22 This
c view has been supported in a paper titled "The Australian Online Family
Dispute Resolution Service"23 written by Wilson Evered, Zeleznikow
and Thomson, according to which:
"While the focus of ADR has largely been on face-to-face
processes, incorporating technology into ADR processes has
D quietly been commonplace for a long time. Primarily, this has taken
the form of using the telephone as a simple measure to convene
people who cannot or should not be together in the same room,
whether owing to geographical situations or to extremely vitriolic
situations, or those where violence has occurred."
E An article on the use of Skype in family courts 24 has stated that:
"The use of Skype and similar services in visitation is just one
example of the ways in which technology is changing law.
Technology has also changed the way attorneys work; some
lawyers carry the iPad tablet in lieu of a briefcase, and there are
F now several niche biogs .dedicated solely to advising legal
professionals on how to get the most out of their iPads. And,
beyond affecting day-to-day responsibilities, technology has raised
a number of issues in the courts ...
Xxx xxx xxx
G 22 Anthony Sydcr, "Technology in Mediation'', Fair Way, available at http://

www.fairwayresolution.com/resources/whats-ncw/te<'hnology-in-mediation
" Elisabeth Wilson Evered, John Zelcznikow and Mark Thomson, "The Australian
Online Family Dispute Resolution Service.. , available at https://www2.iceaustralia.com/
ei/imagcs/nrnc2014/abstracts/nmc 14abstract00068.pdf
24 "The Use of Skype Ordered.in Family Court"', available at https://fornandezlauby.com/

Articles/The-Use-of-Skype-Ordered-in-Family-Court.html
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 641
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

As many commentators note, technological change in general will A
correspond to change in divorce and family law cases. Technology
can be used to better meet the needs of families ... "
International precedent- both of a judicial and academic nature
- is testimony to the use and acceptance of video conferencing..
Video Conferencing must be in the interest of justice B

23. Video-conferencing facilities allow parties to communicate
with each other in situations where it would be expensive, inconvenient
or otherwise not desirable for a person to attend the court procedure.
24. The overriding factor, as contemplated by the Delhi High Court c
in its video conferencing guidelines25 ' is that the use of video conferencing
in any particular case must be consistent with furthering the interests of
justice and should cause minimal disadvantage to the parties.
25. Given the delays injudicial proceedings, which are often due
to the wilful procrastination ofone of the parties, video conferencing will D
serve the purpose of safeguarding the interests ·of justice by preventing
undue delay. The massive pendency of cases in India and issues related
to access to justice will require a careful deployment of appropriate
technologies.
26. The High Courts, under Section 9(1) of the Family Courts
E
Act, should lay down guidelines in regard to video conferencing in
matrimonial matters. The Delhi High Court has provided for certain
minimum requisites for the application of video conferencing in all cases.
They are follows:
(a) A desktop or laptop with internet connectivity and printer
F
(b) Device ensuring uninterrupted power supply
(c) Video camera
(d) Microphones and speakers
(e) Display unit G
( t) Document visualizer
(g) Comfortable sitting arrangements ensuring privacy
" "Video Conferencing Guidelines issued by the High Court of Delhi", available at
http://www.nja.nic.in/CJ-CM Resolution/Delhi HC/
Video%20Conferencing%20Guidelines%20issued%20by'Y.20DHC.PDF H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A (h) Adequate lighting
(i) Proper acoustics
(j) Digital signatures from licensed certifying authorities for the
co-ordinators at the court point and at the remote point

B 27. The guidelines prepared by Delhi High Court also provide that
the expenses of the video conferencing facility ought to be borne by
such party as the Court may direct. It has also been provided that the
Co mt may; at the request of the person to be examined, or on its own
motion direct appropriate measures to protect his/her privacy keeping in
mind age, gender and physical condition. It has further been provided
c that where a party or a lawyer requests that in the course of video
conferencing some privileged communication may have to take place,
the Court will pass appropriate directions. An encrypted master copy
shall be retained in the Court as part of the record. These guidelines are
being adverted to since they indicate that the High Courts are sufficiently
D enabled to formulate and evolve a procedure to facilit<1te video
conferencing.
The ideal and the real
28. There is, in my view, no basis either in the Family Courts Act
1984 or in law to exclude recourse to video conferencing at any stage of
E the proceedings. Whether video conferencing should be permitted must
be determined as part of the rational exercise ofjudgment by the Family
Court.
29. As in many other areas oflaw and life, there is a gorge between
the ideal and the real. In an ideal world, spouses and partners live in
F everlasting harmony. Fai1y tales are built along the lore of couples "who
Ii vcd happily ever after. .. ",but we know that life is not perfect. Indeed,
some would believe that the perfection oflifc lies in its imperfections. In
marital relationships, the spirit of dialogue and a faith in a plurality of
views leads to a synthesis between often conflicting ideas, opinions,
aspirations and needs. Yet marital relationships do on occasion run
G
aground, increasingly so in recent times. Institutions such as the Family
Courts are intended to provide service to families in distress. In doing so,
there must be a synthesis between the ideals of the law and the need to
implement them in dealing with practical problems of society today. The
challenge is to build a robust pathway that bridges the ideal and the real.
H
SANTHINI v. VUAYA VENKETESH 643
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

In an ideal sense, the physical presence of couples sharing the same A
a
physical space before a judge or counsellor may foster settlement. Yet
there are genuine reasons why parties are unable to remain together in
one physical space or do not desire to do so. A spouse may have been
subject to grave marital abuse. Another may have been repeatedly violated
by a history of domestic abuse and gender violence. One of the spouses B
may be involved in substance abuse or may suffer from psychiatric
disorder. Technology enables the judicial forum to protect the legitimate
concerns of privacy of one or both spouses. Spouses, even without the
above problems, may live apa11 in distant cities because of reasons of
employment. Compulsions of employment, the needs of children, care
of the elderly and disability within the family may make it practically C
impossible for parties to commute to another city to pursue or defend a
proceeding. Besides, insistence on physical presence is questionable in
a situation where our family courts are overburdened and are unable to
provide timely justice. To deprive parties of the benefit of video
conferencing will result in a denial of access to justice. Nor can recourse
D
to technology be conditioned on the consent ofboth spouses for, this will
only enable one spouse to procrastinate or delay the proceeding.
Withholding consent to video conferencing will then become a tool in the
hands of one of the litigants to delay the proceedings. ·
30. As a matter ofprinciple, video conferencing cannot be excluded
from any stage of the proceeding before the Family Com1. Whether it E
should be adopted in a particular case must be left to the judicious view
of the Family Court. The High Courts will be well advised to formulate
rules to guide the process. Family Courts must encourage the use of
technology to facilitate speedy and effective solutions. Above all, it must
be acknowledged that a whole-hearted acceptance of technology is F
necessary for courts to meet societal demands for efficient and timely
justice.
Should this court even attempt to put a lid on the inexorable
movement towards incorporating technology? If we do so, we risk
ourselves being left behind as an anachronism in a digital age. G

Devika Gujral Reference answered.