Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s interpretation of the rotation provision was erroneous and that the State’s reservation of the Mayor’s office for the Backward Class was valid, leading to the quashing of the High Court’s order.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a dispute over the reservation of the Mayor's office in Dhule Municipal Corporation. The State of Maharashtra had notified that the post would be reserved for the Backward Class (BC) for the term starting June 2021, despite earlier reservations for BC and no reservation for Scheduled Castes (SC) in the corporation. The original writ petitioner, an SC councillor, challenged the notification, arguing that the rotation policy under Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006 required that a category not be reserved again until all categories had been rotated. The High Court agreed and set aside the notification. On appeal, the Court held that the High Court mis‑interpreted clause (e) of sub‑rule (2) of Rule 3; when read with Article 243T of the Constitution, Section 19(1A) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act and the Rules, the scheme permits the State’s draw‑of‑lots procedure and does not violate the rotation principle. Consequently, the notification reserving the Mayor’s post for BC was upheld and the High Court order was quashed.

Issues considered

The correct interpretation of clause (e) of sub‑rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006 with respect to the rotation of reservation among categories.
Whether reserving the Mayor’s office for the Backward Class in Dhule Municipal Corporation, given prior BC reservations and no prior Scheduled Caste reservation, violates the rotation policy mandated by the Rules and Article 243T.
Whether the State’s draw‑of‑lots procedure for allocating reserved Mayor posts is consistent with the constitutional mandate and Section 19(1A) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act.
Whether the High Court’s order setting aside the notification was legally sustainable.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 243T
Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949s. Section 19, s. Section 19(1A)
Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006s. Rule 3, s. sub‑rule (1), s. sub‑rule (2)

Subjects

reservationmayormunicipal corporationrotation policyArticle 243TMaharashtra Municipal Corporations Actstatutory interpretationdraw of lotsBackward ClassScheduled Caste

Judgment

640 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 11 S.C.R. 640 [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL
v.
SANJAY AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 5060 of 2021)
B SEPTEMBER 01, 2021
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
Municipal Corporations:
Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation of Offices
C of Mayors) Rules, 2006 – r. 3(2) – Constitution of India – Art. 243T
– Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 – s. 19A –
Reservation of offices for the election of Mayor – Issuance of
Notification whereby Office of Mayor in Dhule Municipal
Corporation for the term commencing from June, 2021 reserved
D for Backward Class category – Writ petition by respondent no.1
challenging the said Notification and sought direction to reserve
the post of Mayor of the said Corporation for the next term for
Scheduled Caste category – Notification set aside by the High Court
holding that since already on two earlier occasions, the Office of
Mayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class,
E coupled with the fact that there has been no reservation for the
Scheduled Caste category, amounted to violation of rotation policy
– On appeal, held: Rules of 2006 are mechanism for giving effect
to the constitutional mandate u/Art. 243T of providing reservation
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the enabling
F provision for providing reservation for Backward Class of Citizens
in proportion to their population – Combined reading of the said
Rules along with the Art. 243T and s. 19(1A) would not permit the
interpretation as placed by the High Court – Taking into
consideration the fact that the number of seats reserved for
Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class are 7 i.e. more
G than twice, it is quite probable that the post of Mayor could be
reserved for two earlier terms for Backward Class and whereas no
reservation is provided for Scheduled Castes – Dominant purpose
and the legislative intent of r. 3 is to provide reservation in proportion
of the population of such categories in the Municipal areas and
H also to ensure that while all the eligible Corporations get reservation
640
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 641

at some point of time for the different categories, at the same time A
there would be no repetition of reservation until the rotation is
complete – Legislative intent is to exclude the Corporations which
were earlier reserved for a particular category until all the
categories are provided reservation – However, while doing so, the
Court will have to interpret r. 3 in such a manner that this scheme is
B
made workable and not frustrated.
Interpretation of statutes: Cardinal principle of construction
of a statute – Held: Duty of the Court is to construe the Statute as a
whole – One provision of the Act is to be construed with reference
to other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the
whole Statute – Provisions which appear to be in conflict with each C
other are to be constructed so as to harmonise them – While
interpreting a particular statutory provision, it should not result
into making the other provision a “dead letter” – Furthermore, the
court needs to ascertain the intention of the law-making authority
in the backdrop of dominant purpose and the intendment of the D
Statute – Court will have to prefer an interpretation which makes
the Statute workable and gives effect to the intention of the
legislature than the one which defeats the purpose of the enactment.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Section 19 of the Maharashtra Municipal E
Corporations Act, 1949 provides for election of Mayor and
Deputy Mayor from amongst the Councillors in the Corporation.
Sub-section (1A) of Section 19 of the Act provides that there
shall be reservation for the office of the Mayor in the Corporation,
by rotation, for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, F
Women and the Backward Class of Citizens, in the prescribed
manner. [Paras 13, 14][652-E, G-H]
1.2 Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Municipal
Corporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006
provides that the Government shall, by notification in the Official G
Gazette, specify the number of offices of Mayors in the Municipal
Corporations in the State to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens and Women
(including the women belonging to the category of Backward Class
of Citizens). [Para 16][654-F-G]
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642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 1.3 Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 thereof provides
that by notification in the Official Gazette, the State Government
shall allot by draw of lots, the offices of the Mayors to be reserved
for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the Backward
Class of Citizens and Women, on the principles specified in sub-
rule(1). Clause (b) thereof provides that the State Government
B
shall ensure that, at any given point of time, the number of offices
of Mayors, reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled
Tribes, the Backward Class of Citizens and Women shall not be
less than the number determined in accordance with the
provisions of sub-rule (1). Clause (c) provides that the lots in
C respect of women belonging to a particular category shall be
drawn only among the offices of Mayors reserved for such
category. Clause (d) provides that while drawing lots, the office
of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years shall
be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause
(e) provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be
D
rotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such
Corporation in which no reservation has been made in the
previous terms until such reservations are given by rotation to
each category. It is thus clear that the scheme of Rules which is
in tune with Section 19(1A) of the said Act and in turn with the
E constitutional provision under Article 243T of the Constitution,
is to provide reservation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes in proportion to the total population of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas.
Insofar as the Backward Class is concerned, the reservation
provided is fixed at 27% of the total number of offices of Mayors.
F
1/3rd of the total number of posts shall be reserved for women
category including the one belonging to Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Class of Citizens. Clause (a) of
sub-rule(2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State
Government to allot by draw of lots, the offices of Mayors for the
G Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens
and Women, on the principles specified in sub–rule (1). Clause
(b) of sub–rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State
Government to ensure that, at any given point of time, the number

H
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 643

of offices of Mayors, reserved for the said categories, shall not A
be less than the number determined in accordance with the
provisions of sub-rule(1). Clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of
the said Rules provides that the lots in respect of women
belonging to a particular category shall be drawn only among the
offices of Mayors reserved for such category. Clause (d) of sub-
B
rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that while drawing
lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the
earlier years shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those
categories. Clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules
requires that the offices of Mayors to be reserved, shall be rotated
in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation, C
in which no reservation has been made in the previous terms
until such reservations are given by rotation to each category.
[Paras 18, 19][655-E-H; 656-A-G]
1.4 The High Court, while interpreting clause (e) of sub-rule
(2) of Rule 3 held that until the reservations are given by rotation D
to each category, the reservation cannot be provided to a category
for which reservation was already provided. [Para 20][656-G-H]
M. Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka and Others Writ
Petition No. 38256 of 2013 decided on 06.01.2014 –
referred to. E
1.5 There is no hesitation in observing that sub-rule (2) of
Rule 3 of the said Rules has not been happily worded. On a plain
reading, various clauses in the sub–rule are capable of being
interpreted in a manner that there are inconsistencies and at times,
conflict amongst them. It is the duty of the Court to construe the F
Statute as a whole and that one provision of the Act has to be
construed with reference to other provisions so as to make a
consistent enactment of the whole Statute. It is the duty of the
Court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections and construe
the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in
such a manner so as to harmonise them. It is further equally G
settled that while interpreting a particular statutory provision, it
should not result into making the other provision a “useless
lumber” or a “dead letter”. While construing the provisions, the

H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Court will have to ascertain the intention of the law-making
authority in the backdrop of dominant purpose and the underlying
intendment of the Statute. [Paras 24, 31][660-F-G; 664-F-H]
Philips India Limited v. Labour Court, Madras and
Others (1985) 3 SCC 103 : [1985] 3 SCR 491;
B Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited v. Babubhai
Shankerlal Pandya and Others (1987) 1 SCC 606 :
1987 (1) JT 462; Mohan Kumar Singhania and Others
v. Union of India and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594;
Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC 373
: [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707; Jagdish Singh v. Lt.
C Governor, Delhi and Others (1997) 4 SCC 435 : [1997]
2 SCR 953; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan
Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR
387 – referred to.
1.6 The 2006 Rules are mechanism for giving effect to the
D constitutional mandate under Article 243T of the Constitution of
providing reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
and the enabling provision for providing reservation for Backward
Class of Citizens in proportion to their population. The said Rules
have been prescribed so as to provide a procedure for the
E reservation of the office of Mayor in the Corporation by rotation
for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, Women and the
Backward Class of Citizens as mandated under Section 19 (1A)
of the said Act. It could thus be seen that the intent and the
dominant purpose of Rule 3 of the said Rules is to provide
reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward
F Class of Citizens and Women and further to ensure that there is
no repetition of reservation of a particular category in a particular
Corporation. It could thus be seen that the dominant purpose
and the legislative intent of the said Rules is to provide reservation
in proportion of the population of such categories in the Municipal
G areas and also to ensure that while all the eligible Corporations
get reservation at some point of time for the different categories,
at the same time there would be no repetition of reservation until
the rotation is complete. However, while doing so, the number of
seats reserved for a particular category also cannot be ignored.

H
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 645

The total number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 A
whereas for Backward Class of citizens, they are 7. Sub-rule (2)
of Rule 3 prescribes the manner in which the seats are to be
allotted to be reserved for various categories including women.
[Para 32][665-A-F]
1.7 No doubt, that at the first blush, an isolated reading of B
clause (e) is capable of being interpreted in a manner that until
reservation is provided for each category by rotation, the said
office cannot be reserved for a category for which it was already
reserved. However, if the Rules along with Article 243T of the
Constitution and Section 19(1A) of the said Act are read as a
whole, then the dominant purpose behind the said Rules appears C
to be that the reservation as mandated in the Constitution, should
be provided for offices of Mayors in the Corporations. While doing
so, the reservation has to be provided by a draw of lots. It has to
be ensured that at any given point of time, the number of offices
of Mayors reserved for such categories should not be less than D
the number determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-
rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of
Rule 3 of the said Rules also provides that while drawing lots,
the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier
years, shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories.
The purpose appears to ensure that the reservation is not thrust E
upon a particular Corporation again and again and all the
Corporations, at some point of time, will have the office of Mayor
reserved for particular category in accordance with the said Rules.
The office of Mayor can be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in only
9 Corporations whereas all the Corporations are eligible for F
reservation for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens.
However, taking into consideration the fact that the number of
seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward
Class of Citizens, they are 7 i.e. more than twice, it is quite
probable that the post of Mayor could be reserved for two earlier
terms for Backward Class of Citizens and whereas no reservation G
is provided for Scheduled Castes. A harmonious construction of
the said Rules would not lead to a conclusion that the procedure
as followed by the State Government in allotting the reservation

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646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A by draw of lots, would be said to be inconsistent with the scheme
of the said Rules. As has been explained in the affidavit by the
Regional Deputy Director, after excluding 12 Corporations which
are already reserved for Scheduled Castes in the earlier years
and the one which was reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the first
draw of lots, there were 14 Corporations available including the
B
Dhule Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation was also
included in the draw of lots for Scheduled Castes. However, in
the draw of lots, it could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes.
However, insofar as Backward Class is concerned, out of 27
Corporations, 26 Corporations excluding newly created Panvel
C Corporation were already reserved for Backward Class in the
earlier years. As such, the State excluded the 7 Corporations
which were immediately reserved for the Backward Class and
also excluded the 4 Corporations which were reserved for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the present draw of
lots. Coincidentally, in the draw of lots, Dhule Municipal
D
Corporation was one of the 7 Corporations which got to be
reserved for the Backward Class. [Para 33][665-G-H; 666-A-H;
667-A]
1.8 Such a situation is bound to occur in view of the difference
in number of seats, reserved for Scheduled Castes and Backward
E Class of Citizens. If the interpretation as placed is to be accepted
then unless the post of Mayor is reserved for Scheduled Tribes
in all the Corporations to complete the rotation, it will not be
possible to provide reservation for the categories which were
already reserved earlier. However, it could be seen that as per
F the Rules, only 9 Corporations could be reserved for Scheduled
Tribes. Therefore, the combined reading of the said Rules along
with the constitutional mandate under Article 243T of the
Constitution and Section 19(1A) of the Act would not permit the
interpretation as placed by the High Court. [Para 34][667-B-D]
G 1.9 The Court will have to prefer an interpretation which
makes the Statute workable. The interpretation which gives effect
to the intention of the legislature, will have to be preferred. The
interpretation which brings about the effect of result, will have to
be preferred than the one which defeats the purpose of the
enactment. The dominant intent of the said Rules is to give effect
H
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 647

to the reservation policy while ensuring that reservations are A
not repeated in particular Corporations and at the same time in
all the Corporations, there shall be reservation, at some point of
time, for all the eligible categories by rotation. The legislative
intent is to exclude the Corporations which were earlier reserved
for a particular category until all the categories are provided
B
reservation. However, while doing so, the Court will have to
interpret Rule 3 of the said Rules in such a manner that this
scheme is made workable and not frustrated. Taking into
consideration the difference in number of seats for Scheduled
Castes and Backward Class of Citizens, the interpretation as
placed by the High Court, would not make the said Rules workable C
and give effect to the legislative intent. It would have been a
different matter that even after completion of the cycle, requisite
reservation as per the Rules is not provided to the Scheduled
Castes and excessive reservation is provided for Backward Class
of Citizens. Such is not the case. Unfortunately, for the writ
D
petitioner, even for the present term, Dhule Municipal
Corporation was also in the pool of eligible Corporations for draw
of lots for Scheduled Castes category. However, in the draw, it
could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes. Only thereafter,
Dhule Municipal Corporation was considered in the pool of draw
of lots for Backward Class of Citizens. This was so because in E
the immediate preceding elections, the office of Mayor was not
reserved for Backward Class of Citizens. Thus, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court is quashed and set
aside. [Para 38, 42][669-C-H; 671-B]
State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami and Others F
(1975) 4 SCC 745 : [1976] 1 SCR 38; Commissioner
of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC
57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balram Kumawat v.
Union of India and Others (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003]
3 Suppl. SCR 24; The Regional Manager and Another
v. Pawan Kumar Dubey (1976) 3 SCC 334 : [1976] 3 G
SCR 540 – referred to.

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648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[1985] 3 SCR 491 referred to Para 25
[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707 referred to Para 28
[1997] 2 SCR 953 referred to Para 29
B [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387 referred to Para 30, 36
[1976] 1 SCR 38 referred to Para 35
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 37
[1976] 3 SCR 540 referred to Para 41
C
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5060 of
2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.05.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No.14440
of 2019
D
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 5061, 5062 and 5063 of 2021
Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Braj Kishore Mishra, Vinod Kumar,
Abhishek Yadav, Amit Bhagat, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, N.L. Choudhari,
E Mahesh P. Shinde, Ms. Rucha A. Pande, Nishant Ramakantrao
Katneshwarkar, Prashant Katneshwarkar, Yogesh B. Bolkar, Sachin Patil,
Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, Makarand D. Adkar, Vijay
Kumar, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Suhas Kadam, M/s Black & White Solicitors,
Adv. for the appearing parties.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. All these appeals take exception to the judgment and order
G passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
Bench at Aurangabad dated 7th May 2021, thereby allowing the writ
petition being Writ Petition No.14440 of 2019, filed by respondent No.1-
Sanjay Sudhakar Jadhav and setting aside the Notification dated 27th
November 2019 in respect of Dhule Municipal Corporation, vide which
the Office of Mayor in Dhule Municipal Corporation for the term
H
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 649
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

commencing from June, 2021 was reserved for Backward Class category. A
The High Court further directed the State of Maharashtra to reconsider
the reservation process for the office of Mayor in Dhule Municipal
Corporation in accordance with the observations made by it in the
judgment.
3. Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 7556 of 2021, 7557 of B
2021 and 7558 of 2021 are filed by the Municipal Councillors who belong
to the Backward Class category whereas the appeal arising out of
SLP(C) No. 8870 of 2021 is filed by the State of Maharashtra.
4. Facts in brief giving rise to filing of these appeals are as under:-
We will refer to the facts in appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.7556 C
of 2021. The respondent No.1 though belongs to the Scheduled Caste
category, was elected as a Councillor to the Dhule Municipal Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as the “said Corporation”) from the General
category. By the Notification dated 27th November 2019, the Office of
Mayor in the said Corporation was earmarked for Backward Class of D
Citizens for the next term of two and half years commencing from June,
2021. Contending that from the year 2003 onwards, the Office of Mayor
in the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class category on
various occasions, but was not reserved for Scheduled Caste category,
a petition came to be filed by the respondent No.1, challenging the said
reservation with a prayer for direction to reserve the post of Mayor of E
the said Corporation for the next term of two and a half years for
Scheduled Caste category. The said petition came to be allowed as
aforesaid. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.
5. The Division Bench of the High Court while construing sub-
rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation F
of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the “said
Rules”) and relying on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Karnataka
High Court held that since already on two earlier occasions, the Office
of Mayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class,
reserving the same again for Backward Class coupled with the fact that G
there has been no reservation for the Scheduled Caste category, amounted
to violation of rotation policy. As such, it remanded the matter to
respondent No.2-State for consideration afresh in accordance with these
observations.

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650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 6. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel
and Mr. Braj Kishore Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the private appellants and Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the State of Maharashtra. We have heard Mr. Nishant
Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent-original writ petitioner.
B
7. It is the contention of the appellants that the judgment of the
High Court is rendered without considering the import of Clauses (d)
and (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. It is submitted that out
of the 27 total seats of Mayors available in the State, 1 is reserved for
C Scheduled Tribes, 3 are reserved for Scheduled Castes and 7 are reserved
for Backward Class of Citizens. Learned counsel for the appellant further
submitted that out of 27 seats, only 9 seats are eligible for reservation of
Scheduled Tribes category. It is stated that taking into consideration the
fact that the seats reserved for Backward Class of Citizens are 7 as
against 3 for Scheduled Castes, which is more than twice, it is quite
D possible that while applying the said Rules, the reservation may be
provided for Backward Class category on more than one occasion and
no reservation be provided for Scheduled Castes even on a single
occasion.
8. It is stated on behalf of the State that while earmarking the
E seats of Mayor, the State of Maharashtra had followed an appropriate
procedure so as to give effect to the said Rules. It is submitted that,
however, the same has not been taken into consideration by the High
Court.
9. As against this, Mr. Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearing
F
on behalf of the original writ petitioner would submit that the High Court
has correctly applied the principle of rotation and held that unless all the
categories got representation in a particular Municipal Corporation, the
reservation for a particular category cannot be repeated.

G 10. It is not in dispute that from 2003 to 2017, the Office of Mayor
of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class category for
two terms, out of the total 7 terms. It is also not in dispute that there was
no reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes category even once.
We will have to consider the rival submissions in the backdrop of this
factual scenario.
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SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 651
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

11. It will be relevant to refer to Article 243T of the Constitution A
of India which reads thus:-
“243T. Reservation of seats
(1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats B
so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion
to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that
Municipality as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the
Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area
bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be
allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. C

(2) Not less than one third of the total number of seats reserved
under clause (1) shall be reserved for women belonging to the
Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes.
(3) Not less than one third (including the number of seats reserved D
for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election
in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats
may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a
Municipality.
E
(4) The offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities shall be
reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and
women in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law,
provide.
(5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the F
reservation of offices of Chairpersons (other than the reservation
for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the
expiration of the period specified in Article 334.
(6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature of a State
G
from making any provision for reservation of seats in any
Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in
favour of backward class of citizens.”
12. Perusal of Clause (1) of Article 243T would reveal that it
mandates the State to reserve seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
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652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Tribes in every Municipality. It further mandates that the number of
seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to
the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in the Municipality
as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the Municipal area or of the
Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population of
that area. It further mandates that such seats may be allotted by rotation
B
to different constituencies in a Municipality. Clause (2) thereof provides
that not less than 1/3rd of the total number of seats reserved under Clause
(1) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or,
as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes. Clause (3) provides that not
less than 1/3rd (including the number of seats reserved for women
C belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total
number of seats to be filled by direct election shall be reserved for women
and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in
a Municipality. Clause (4) thereof provides that the offices of the
Chairpersons in the Municipalities shall be reserved for the Scheduled
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the
D
Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. Clause (6) thereof enables
the Legislature of the State to make provision for reservation of seats in
any Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favour
of Backward Class of Citizens.
13. Section 19 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act,
E
1949 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) provides for election of
Mayor and Deputy Mayor from amongst the Councillors in the
Corporation. It will be relevant to refer to Section 19 (1A) of the said
Act:-
“19. Mayor and Deputy Mayor
F
(1) …
(1A) There shall be reservation for the office of the Mayor in the
Corporation, by rotation, for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled
Tribes, women and the Backward Class of citizens, in the
G prescribed manner.”
14. It could thus be seen that sub-section (1A) of Section 19 of
the said Act provides that there shall be reservation for the office of the
Mayor in the Corporation, by rotation, for the Scheduled Castes, the
Scheduled Tribes, Women and the Backward Class of Citizens, in the
H prescribed manner.
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 653
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

15. The manner of reservation has been provided under Rule 3 of A
the said Rules which reads thus:-
“3. Reservation of offices for the election of Mayor- (1) The
State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify the number of offices of Mayors in the Municipal
Corporations in the State to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, B
Scheduled Tribes, the category of Backward Class of Citizens
and Women (including the women belonging to the category of
Backward Class of Citizens) on the following principles:-
(a) The number of offices of Mayors to be so reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall bear, as nearly as C
may be, the same proportion to the number of such offices in the
Corporations in the State as the population of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas bears
to the total population of all Municipal Corporation areas:
Provided that, such office of Mayor may not be so reserved, if D
the number of Councillors to be elected at ward elections from
the category of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes is less
than three:
Provided further that, while specifying such reservation one-
E
third of the total number of seats so reserved shall be reserved
for the women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case
may be, the Scheduled Tribes:
Provided also that, in a Municipal Corporation, where only one
office of the Councillor is reserved for the Scheduled Caste or, as F
the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes, then it shall not be necessary
to reserve the office for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes
or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes;
(b) As nearly as may be, twenty-seven per cent of the total
number of offices of Mayors in the State shall be reserved for the G
category of Backward Class of Citizens:
Provided that, one-third of the offices so reserved shall be
reserved for Women belonging to the category of Backward Class
of Citizens;
H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A (c) One-third of the total number of offices of Mayors in the
State (including the number of offices reserved for the Scheduled
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the category of Backward Class
of Citizens) shall be reserved for women.
(2) The State Government shall,-
B
(a) By notification in the Official Gazette, allot by draw of
lots, the offices of the Mayors to be reserved for the Scheduled
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the category of Backward Class of
Citizens and Women, on the principles specified in sub-rule (1).

C (b) Ensure that, at any given point of time, the number of offices
of Mayors, reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled
Tribes, the category of Backward Class of Citizens and Women
shall not be less than the number determined in accordance with
the provisions of sub-rule (1).

D (c) The lots in respect of women belonging to a particular
category shall be drawn only among the offices of Mayors reserved
for such category.
(d) While drawing lots, the office of Mayor reserved for such
category in the earlier years shall be excluded from the draw of
E lots for those categories;
(e) The offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be rotated in
the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation, in
which no reservation has been made in the previous terms until
such reservations are given by rotation to each category.”
F
16. It is clear that sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides
that the Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify
the number of offices of Mayors in the Municipal Corporations in the
State to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes,
Backward Class of Citizens and Women (including the women belonging
G to the category of Backward Class of Citizens). Clause (a) of sub-rule
(1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the number of offices of
Mayors to be so reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the number of
such offices in the Corporations in the State as the population of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation
H
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 655
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

areas bears to the total population of all Municipal Corporation areas. A
Obviously, the said provision is in tune with Clause (1) of Article 243T of
the Constitution of India. The first proviso thereof provides that such
office of Mayor may not be so reserved, if the number of Councillors to
be elected at ward elections from the category of the Scheduled Castes
or Scheduled Tribes is less than 3. The second proviso provides that
B
while specifying such reservation, 1/3rd of the total number of seats so
reserved shall be reserved for the women belonging to the Scheduled
Castes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes. It further provides
that in a Municipal Corporation, where only one office of the Councillor
is reserved for the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the
Scheduled Tribes, then it shall not be necessary to reserve the office for C
women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the
Scheduled Tribes.
17. Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides
that as nearly as may be, 27% of the total number of offices of Mayors
in the State shall be reserved for the category of Backward Class of D
Citizens. The proviso thereof provides that 1/3rd of the offices so reserved
shall be reserved for Women belonging to the category of Backward
Class of Citizens. Clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules
provides that 1/3rd of the total number of offices of Mayors in the State
(including the number of offices reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the
E
Scheduled Tribes and the category of Backward Class of Citizens) shall
be reserved for women.
18. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules would be the most
relevant one inasmuch as it is that provision which falls for consideration
in the present matter. Clause (a) thereof provides that by notification in F
the Official Gazette, the State Government shall allot by draw of lots,
the offices of the Mayors to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the
Scheduled Tribes, the Backward Class of Citizens and Women, on the
principles specified in sub-rule(1). Clause (b) thereof provides that the
State Government shall ensure that, at any given point of time, the number
of offices of Mayors, reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled G
Tribes, the Backward Class of Citizens and Women shall not be less
than the number determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-
rule (1). Clause (c) provides that the lots in respect of women belonging
to a particular category shall be drawn only among the offices of Mayors
reserved for such category. Clause (d) provides that while drawing lots,
H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A the office of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years
shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause (e)
provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be rotated in the
subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation in which no
reservation has been made in the previous terms until such reservations
are given by rotation to each category.
B
19. It is thus clear that the scheme of Rules which is in tune with
Section 19(1A) of the said Act and in turn with the constitutional provision
under Article 243T, is to provide reservation to the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to the total population of the Scheduled
C Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas. Insofar
as the Backward Class is concerned, the reservation provided is fixed at
27% of the total number of offices of Mayors. 1/3rd of the total number
of posts shall be reserved for women category including the one belonging
to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Class of Citizens.
Clause (a) of sub-rule(2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State
D Government to allot by draw of lots, the offices of Mayors for the
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens and
Women, on the principles specified in sub-rule (1). Clause (b) of sub-
rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State Government to
ensure that, at any given point of time, the number of offices of Mayors,
E reserved for the said categories, shall not be less than the number
determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule(1). Clause (c)
of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the lots in respect
of women belonging to a particular category shall be drawn only among
the offices of Mayors reserved for such category. Clause (d) of sub-
rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that while drawing lots, the
F offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years shall
be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause (e) of
sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules requires that the offices of
Mayors to be reserved, shall be rotated in the subsequent terms of office
of Mayor to such Corporation, in which no reservation has been made in
G the previous terms until such reservations are given by rotation to each
category.
20. The High Court, while interpreting clause (e) of sub-rule (2)
of Rule 3 of the said Rules, has held that until the reservations are given
by rotation to each category, the reservation cannot be provided to a
H category for which reservation was already provided. While doing so,
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 657
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

the High Court has relied on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court A
in M. Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka and Others1. We will have to
examine the correctness of the said view.
21. The procedure adopted for draw of lots followed by the State
was explained by filing an affidavit before the High Court by Smt. Alice
Sufi Pore, Regional Deputy Director, Municipal Administration, B
Aurangabad. It will be relevant to refer to paragraphs (5) to (8) of the
said affidavit:-
“5. The principles and manner for the reservation is mentioned in
the Rule 3 (1) and procedure to be followed by the State
Government is mentioned in Rule 3 (2) of Maharashtra Municipal C
Corporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayor) Rules 2006. As
per the provisions broadly the office of the Mayor of Corporations
are reserved in the proportion mentioned as follows:-
(a) The number of offices of the Mayor to be so reserved for
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall bear, as nearly D
as maybe the same proportion to the total number of such offices
in the Corporations in the State as the population of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas
bears to the total population of all the Municipal Corporation Areas.
E
(b) As nearly as may be, 27% of the total number of offices of
the Mayors in the State shall be reserved for the Backward class
of Citizen.
(c) One third of the total number of offices of Mayors (including
the number of offices reserved for women belonging to the F
category of backward Class of Citizen) in the Corporations in the
State shall be reserved for women.
6. While drawing the lots for the reservation of the office of the
Mayors of all 27 Corporations in the state on 13.11.2019 the above
proportion mentioned in the concern Rules is followed in totality G
and the offices of Mayors reserved for different classes is as
follows:-

1
Writ Petition No. 38256 of 2013 decided on 06.01.2014 H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A

B

C

7. As per Rule 3 (2) (d) while allotting the offices of the Mayor
for persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and the Backward Class of Citizens (including women belonging
D
to the said categories) the offices of the Mayor reserved for any
of the said categories in the earlier years shall be excluded Rule 3
(2) (e) indicates the policy of rotation has to be followed while
allotting the offices of Mayor.

E 8. It is humbly submitted that the provisions and the essence of
the rules of reservation is followed totally considering the total
number of Corporations and the reservations in earlier years in 27
Corporations in the State. The approved procedure to follow the
above rules is adopted in the draw of lots dated 13.11.2019. The
approved minutes of the draw of lots dated 13.11.2019 is annexed
F herewith and marked as Exhibit ‘A’. A copy of the factual position
of earlier Reservation in Annexed here with and marked as Exhibit
‘B’. As per the factual position of earlier reservation and the
number of posts mandatorily needs to be reserved for various
class the following approved principle is followed:-
G a) For Schedule Tribes 1 posts of Mayor needs to be mandatorily
reserved and out of 27 Corporations there are 9 Corporations
where the number of Concillors to be elected at ward election
from the said category is not less than 3. Out of those 9 corporation
4 Corporations were reserved for schedule tribes in earlier years.
H And those 4 corporations are excluded as their are 5 corporations
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 659
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

available for draw of lots, which were not previously reserved for A
scheduled tribes. And in the draw of lots dated 163.11.2019 by
following the laid procedure out of those 5 Corporations 1
corporation is reserved for schedule Tribe [sic].
b) For Schedule Castes 3 posts of Mayor needs to be
mandatorily reserved and out of 27 Corporation 12 corporations B
were reserved for schedule Castes in earlier years. Those 12
Corporations and 1 corporation (vasi-Virar Corporation) which
was reserved for schedule tribes in the first draw of this draw of
lots dated 13.11.2019 are excluded, So there are 14 Corporations
available, which were not previously reserved for schedule caste. C
In para no.4 of this minutes the details of draw of lots for scheduled
caste is mentioned. And it is clear that Dhule Corporation was
also considered among those 14 corporations in the draw for
schedule caste. Though it is a draw of lots out of those 14
corporations 3 corporations (Mira- Bhayender, Ahmednagar and
Parbhani Corporation) got reserved for Schedule caste [sic]. D

c) For backward Class of Citizens 7 posts of Mayor needs to
be mandatorily reserved and it is clearly mentioned that out of 27
Corporations 26 Corporations excluding newly created Panvel
Corporation were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in
earlier years. As 26 Corporations were reserved for backward E
Class of Citizens in earlier years, for the draw of lots dated
13.11.2019 even the minimum required 7 Corporations were not
available. Which were not previously reserved for backward Class
of Citizens. And considering this fact and the provisions in the Act
and Rules the 7 Corporations which were reserved for backward F
Class of Citizens in the earlier years, i.e. immediately preceding
term were excluded in the draw of lots dated 13.11.2019.
By following the laid procedure the 4 Corporations which are
reserved in the 1 st and 2 nd draws for Scheduled Tribes (1
Corporation) and scheduled castes (3 Corporations) in the current G
draw of lots and 7 corporations which were reserved for backward
Class of Citizens in the immediately preceding term are excluded
and the remaining corporations including Dhule Corporation are
considered for this draw and in the draw the 7 Corporations are
reserved for backward class of Citizens.”
H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 22. It could thus be seen from paragraph (8) of the said affidavit
that insofar as Scheduled Castes are concerned, 3 posts of Mayor need
to be mandatorily reserved. It could further be seen that out of 27
Corporations, 12 Corporations were reserved for Scheduled Castes in
earlier years. It further states that those 12 Corporations and 1
Corporation (Vasai-Virar Corporation) which was reserved for Scheduled
B
Tribes in the first draw of lots dated 13th November 2019 were excluded.
As such, there are 14 Corporations available, which were not previously
reserved for Scheduled Castes. It is further clear that when draw of lots
was done for the Scheduled Castes category, amongst the other eligible
Corporations, Dhule Municipal Corporation was also considered.
C However, in the said draw of lots, 3 Corporations i.e. Mira-Bhayandar,
Ahmednagar and Parbhani Municipal Corporation got reserved for
Scheduled Castes.
23. Insofar as Backward Class is concerned, it is stated that 7
posts of Mayor need to be mandatorily reserved. Out of 27 Corporations,
D 26 Corporations excluding the newly created Panvel Corporation were
reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the earlier years. It is stated
that since 26 Corporations were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens,
even the minimum required 7 Corporations were not available in the
draw in question. As such, 7 Corporations which were reserved for
Backward Class of Citizens in the earlier years i.e. immediately preceding
E term, were excluded in the draw of lots. So also, 4 Corporations which
got reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the first and
second draw, were excluded. As such, the draw of lots was done from
the pool of 16 Corporations after excluding the 7 Corporations which
were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the immediately
F preceding term and the 4 Corporations which were reserved for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
24. We have no hesitation in observing that sub-rule (2) of Rule 3
of the said Rules has not been happily worded. On a plain reading, various
clauses in the sub-rule are capable of being interpreted in a manner that
G there are inconsistencies and at times, conflict amongst them. We will
have to therefore examine the legal position with the aid of principles of
interpretation as laid down by this Court in such situations.
25. In Philips India Limited v. Labour Court, Madras and
Others2, this Court observed thus:-
2
H (1985) 3 SCC 103
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 661
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

“15. No canon of statutory construction is more firmly established A
than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general
rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken
of as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutory
construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as
“elementary rule” (see Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All
B
ER 497] ) and as a “settled rule” (see Poppatlal Shah v. State
of Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274 : 1953 SCR 667] ). The only
recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be
called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and
explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: “it is the most natural and
genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute C
by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth
meaning of the makers” (Quoted with approval in Punjab
Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978
SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370]).”
26. In Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited v. Babubhai D
Shankerlal Pandya and Others3, this Court observed thus:-
“4. …..It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to
be made of all parts together. It is not permissible to omit any part
of it. For, the principle that the statute must be read as a whole is
equally applicable to different parts of the same section……” E
27. Again in the case of Mohan Kumar Singhania and Others
v. Union of India and Others4, this Court observed thus:-
“67. We think, it is not necessary to proliferate this judgment by
citing all the judgments and extracting the textual passages from
the various textbooks on the principles of Interpretation of Statutes. F
However, it will suffice to say that while interpreting a statute the
consideration of inconvenience and hardships should be avoided
and that when the language is clear and explicit and the words
used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them
in their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Act G
or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes/rules/
regulations relating to the subject matter, Added to this, in construing
3
(1987) 1 SCC 606
4
1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A a statute, the Court has to ascertain the intention of the law making
authority in the backdrop of the dominant purpose and the
underlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute is
to be interpreted without any violence to its language and applied
as far as its explicit language admits consistent with the established
rule of interpretation.”
B
28. In Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain5, this Court observed
thus:-
“15. On a conspectus of the case-law indicated above, the
following principles are clearly discernible:
C (1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash
between two sections of the Act and to construe the
provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other
in such a manner as to harmonise them.
(2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be
D used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in
spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time
that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act,
E which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should
be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given
to both. This is the essence of the rule of “harmonious
construction”.
(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation
F which reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter”
or “useless lumber” is not harmonious construction.
(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision
or to render it otiose.”
29. In Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Others6, this
G Court observed thus:-
“7. ….It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute or the
statutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the different
5
(1997) 1 SCC 373
6
H (1997) 4 SCC 435
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 663
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

provisions, so that, each provision will have its play and in the A
event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given.
Further a statute or a rule made thereunder should be read as a
whole and one provision should be construed with reference to
the other provision so as to make the rule consistent and any
construction which would bring any inconsistency or repugnancy
B
between one provision and the other should be avoided. One rule
cannot be used to defeat another rule in the same rules unless it is
impossible to effect harmonisation between them. The well-known
principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given
to all the provisions, and therefore, this Court has held in several
cases that a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a C
“dead letter” is not a harmonious construction as one part is being
destroyed and consequently court should avoid such a
construction…..”
30. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk
Carriers7, this Court observed thus:- D
“16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will
defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may
be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v.
Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)]
AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB E
174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR
1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .)
17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of
which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation,
we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation
to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based F
on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose
of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940 AC 1014 :
109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister
for Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410 G
(PC)] .) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated
by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of
India [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1992) 19
ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1] .
7
(2003) 3 SCC 57 H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the
Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the
same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole
statute.
19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by
B directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed
but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other
parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted
occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1
SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992
SC 81] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any
C
inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between
two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the
duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections
of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand
Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006] .)
D
20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe
the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It
should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one
hand what it took away with the other.
21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to
E
defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect
reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces
one of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead letter” is not
a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.”

F 31. It could thus be seen that it is more than well settled that it is
the duty of the Court to construe the Statute as a whole and that one
provision of the Act has to be construed with reference to other provisions
so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole Statute. It is the duty
of the Court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections and construe
the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a
G manner so as to harmonise them. It is further equally settled that while
interpreting a particular statutory provision, it should not result into making
the other provision a “useless lumber” or a “dead letter”. While construing
the provisions, the Court will have to ascertain the intention of the law-
making authority in the backdrop of dominant purpose and the underlying
intendment of the Statute.
H
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 665
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

32. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to construe A
the provisions that fall for consideration. Undisputedly, the said Rules
are mechanism for giving effect to the constitutional mandate under
Article 243T of the Constitution of providing reservation for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the enabling provision for providing
reservation for Backward Class of Citizens in proportion to their
B
population. As already discussed hereinabove, the said Rules have been
prescribed so as to provide a procedure for the reservation of the office
of Mayor in the Corporation by rotation for the Scheduled Castes, the
Scheduled Tribes, Women and the Backward Class of Citizens as
mandated under Section 19 (1A) of the said Act. It could thus be seen
that the intent and the dominant purpose of Rule 3 of the said Rules is to C
provide reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward
Class of Citizens and Women and further to ensure that there is no
repetition of reservation of a particular category in a particular
Corporation. It could thus be seen that the dominant purpose and the
legislative intent of the said Rules is to provide reservation in proportion
D
of the population of such categories in the Municipal areas and also to
ensure that while all the eligible Corporations get reservation at some
point of time for the different categories, at the same time there would
be no repetition of reservation until the rotation is complete. However,
while doing so, the number of seats reserved for a particular category
also cannot be ignored. As already pointed out hereinabove, the total E
number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for
Backward Class of citizens, they are 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the
said Rules prescribes the manner in which the seats are to be allotted to
be reserved for various categories including women. Clause (a) thereof
provides that it shall be done by notification in the Official Gazette by
F
allotment of draw of lots. Clause (d) thereof provides that while drawing
lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier
years shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause
(e) thereof provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be
rotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation,
in which no reservation has been made in the previous terms until such G
reservations are given by rotation to each category.
33. No doubt, that at the first blush, an isolated reading of clause
(e) is capable of being interpreted in a manner that until reservation is
provided for each category by rotation, the said office cannot be reserved
for a category for which it was already reserved. However, if the Rules H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A along with Article 243T of the Constitution and Section 19(1A) of the
said Act are read as a whole, then the dominant purpose behind the said
Rules appears to be that the reservation as mandated in the Constitution,
should be provided for offices of Mayors in the Corporations. While
doing so, the reservation has to be provided by a draw of lots. It has to
be ensured that at any given point of time, the number of offices of
B
Mayors reserved for such categories should not be less than the number
determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3
of the said Rules. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules
also provides that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for
such category in the earlier years, shall be excluded from the draw of
C lots for those categories. The purpose appears to ensure that the
reservation is not thrust upon a particular Corporation again and again
and all the Corporations, at some point of time, will have the office of
Mayor reserved for particular category in accordance with the said Rules.
The office of Mayor can be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in only 9
Corporations whereas all the Corporations are eligible for reservation
D
for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens. However, taking
into consideration the fact that the number of seats reserved for
Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class of Citizens, they
are 7 i.e. more than twice, it is quite probable that the post of Mayor
could be reserved for two earlier terms for Backward Class of Citizens
E and whereas no reservation is provided for Scheduled Castes. We find
that a harmonious construction of the said Rules would not lead to a
conclusion that the procedure as followed by the State Government in
allotting the reservation by draw of lots, would be said to be inconsistent
with the scheme of the said Rules. As has been explained in the affidavit
F filed before the High Court by Smt. Alice Sufi Pore, after excluding 12
Corporations which are already reserved for Scheduled Castes in the
earlier years and the one which was reserved for Scheduled Tribes in
the first draw of lots, there were 14 Corporations available including the
Dhule Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation was also included in
the draw of lots for Scheduled Castes. However, in the draw of lots, it
G could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes. However, insofar as
Backward Class is concerned, out of 27 Corporations, 26 Corporations
excluding newly created Panvel Corporation were already reserved for
Backward Class in the earlier years. As such, the State excluded the 7
Corporations which were immediately reserved for the Backward Class
H and also excluded the 4 Corporations which were reserved for Scheduled
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 667
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the present draw of lots. Coincidentally, A
in the draw of lots, Dhule Municipal Corporation was one of the 7
Corporations which got to be reserved for the Backward Class.
34. We find that such a situation is bound to occur in view of the
difference in number of seats, reserved for Scheduled Castes and
Backward Class of Citizens. If the interpretation as placed is to be B
accepted then unless the post of Mayor is reserved for Scheduled Tribes
in all the Corporations to complete the rotation, it will not be possible to
provide reservation for the categories which were already reserved
earlier. However, it could be seen that as per the Rules, only 9
Corporations could be reserved for Scheduled Tribes. We therefore find
that the combined reading of the said Rules along with the constitutional C
mandate under Article 243T of the Constitution and Section 19(1A) of
the said Act would not permit the interpretation as placed by the High
Court.
35. Apart from that, we find that another rule of interpretation will
also come into play. It will be relevant to refer to the observations of this D
Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami and Others8:-
“26. ….If more than one construction is possible, that which
preserves its workability, and efficacy is to be preferred to the
one which would render it otiose or sterile…..”
E
36. This Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan
Bulk Carriers(supra) has observed thus:-
“15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation
thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial
omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. F
(See Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas 88 : 95 LJKB
165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja
Singh [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] and Gursahai
Saigal v. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR 1] .)”
37. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India and Others9, this
G
Court observed thus:-
“25. A statute must be construed as a workable instrument. Ut
res magis valeat quam pereat is a well-known principle of law.
8
(1975) 4 SCC 745
9
(2003) 7 SCC 628 H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [(1989)
3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123] this Court stated the law thus:
(SCC p. 754, paras 118-120)
“118. The courts strongly lean against any construction which
tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statute
B must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on
the principle ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’. It is, no doubt,
true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly
intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be
declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review by
testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under
C
Article 14; but what a court of construction, dealing with the
language of a statute, does in order to ascertain from, and
accord to, the statute the meaning and purpose which the
legislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal
Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co. [(1900) 2 Ch 352 : 69
D LJCh 850 : 83 LT 274 (CA)] Farwell, J. said: (pp. 360-61)
‘Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could
do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some
meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty.’
119. In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County
E
Council [(1960) 3 All ER 503 : (1960) 3 WLR 831 (HL)] Lord
Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said: (All ER p. 516)
‘But when a statute has some meaning, even though it is
obscure, or several meanings, even though there is little to
F choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning
the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.’
120. It is, therefore, the court’s duty to make what it can of the
statute, knowing that the statutes are meant to be operative and
not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a
G court to declare a statute unworkable. In Whitney v. IRC [1926
AC 37 : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] Lord Dunedin said: (AC
p. 52)
‘A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation
thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial
H omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.’ “
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 669
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

26. The courts will therefore reject that construction which will A
defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may
be some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v.
Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)]
(AC at p. 634).] Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided
and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be
B
given effect to, the courts would accept the bolder construction
for the purpose of bringing about an effective result…….”
38. It could thus be seen that the Court will have to prefer an
interpretation which makes the Statute workable. The interpretation which
gives effect to the intention of the legislature, will have to be preferred. C
The interpretation which brings about the effect of result, will have to be
preferred than the one which defeats the purpose of the enactment. As
already discussed hereinabove, the dominant intent of the said Rules is
to give effect to the reservation policy while ensuring that reservations
are not repeated in particular Corporations and at the same time in all
the Corporations, there shall be reservation, at some point of time, for all D
the eligible categories by rotation. The legislative intent is to exclude the
Corporations which were earlier reserved for a particular category until
all the categories are provided reservation. However, while doing so, the
Court will have to interpret Rule 3 of the said Rules in such a manner
that this scheme is made workable and not frustrated. At the cost of E
repetition and particularly taking into consideration the difference in
number of seats for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens,
we find that the interpretation as placed by the High Court, would not
make the said Rules workable and give effect to the legislative intent. It
would have been a different matter that even after completion of the
F
cycle, requisite reservation as per the Rules is not provided to the
Scheduled Castes and excessive reservation is provided for Backward
Class of Citizens. Such is not the case. Unfortunately, for the writ petitioner,
even for the present term, Dhule Municipal Corporation was also in the
pool of eligible Corporations for draw of lots for Scheduled Castes
category. However, in the draw, it could not be reserved for Scheduled G
Castes. Only thereafter, Dhule Municipal Corporation was considered
in the pool of draw of lots for Backward Class of Citizens. This was so
because in the immediate preceding elections, the office of Mayor was
not reserved for Backward Class of Citizens.
H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 39. The High Court has strongly relied on the following observations
of the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in M. Abdul Azeez v.
State of Karnataka and Others (supra):-
“27.1. An elementary test to find out as to whether the principle
of rotation is violated or not, is to examine as to whether any
B allotment to a reserved category is repeated in any Municipality
before commencement of a fresh cycle of rotation for that
category. If there is any allotment to any reserved category for
the second time in a Municipality before completion of a cycle of
rotation or before commencement of a fresh cycle of rotation
for that category, it would be a clear violation of the principle of
C rotation.”
40. However, it is to be noted that the Rules that fell for
consideration before the Karnataka High Court, provided that the offices
of the President and Vice-President shall be rotated for the different
categories from term-to-term. The Rules provided that the cycle of the
D reservation will begin from the Municipal Council which had the highest
population of a particular category. The rotation will go to the other
Municipal Councils in the descending manner on the basis of the population
of a particular category in the concerned Municipal Council area. The
scheme is that the Municipal Council which has the highest number of
E population of a particular category, will be the first to be reserved for
that category and the Council with the least population of that category,
would be the last one to be reserved for that category. Only after
completion of the said cycle, the reservation can come back for a
particular category which was reserved for it at the first instance. It
could thus be seen that the Rules that fell for consideration before the
F Karnataka High Court, were totally different than the ones which fell
for consideration before the Bombay High Court.
41. Though the Division Bench of the High Court was not bound
by the judgment of the Single Judge and it had only a persuasive value,
we may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in The Regional
G Manager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey10:-
“7. …..Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would,
we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly
understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to

H 10
(1976) 3 SCC 334
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL v. SANJAY AND OTHERS 671
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio A
decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may
appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a
world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when
the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts…..”
42. We are therefore of the considered view that the view taken B
by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court needs to be interfered.
The appeals are therefore allowed and the judgment and order passed
by the Bombay High Court dated 7th May 2021, is quashed and set
aside.
C
Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.

D

E

F

G

H