Holding

Section 5 of TADA creates a statutory presumption of terrorist intent that is rebuttable, and the indefeasible bail right under Section 20(4)(bb) subsists only until the challan is filed, while Section 20(8) is to be applied as per the Kartar Singh judgment.

Summary

The petitioners, accused in the 1993 Bombay blast case, were charged under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) for knowingly possessing an AK‑56 rifle and ammunition. They argued that the possession was for self‑defence, not for terrorist purposes, and sought bail. The Supreme Court was asked to interpret (1) the ingredients and defence available under Section 5 of TADA, (2) the scope of the bail right under clause (bb) of Section 20(4) when investigation exceeds the prescribed period, and (3) the ambit of Section 20(8). The Court held that Section 5 requires proof of conscious, unauthorized possession in a notified area, but the statutory presumption that the weapon is intended for terrorist use is rebuttable, allowing the accused to prove a non‑terrorist purpose. It further clarified that the indefeasible right to bail under Section 20(4)(bb) exists only until the filing of the challan and does not survive thereafter, and that Section 20(8) follows the earlier Kartar Singh decision. The petitions were dismissed, leaving the bail application to be decided by the designated court on its merits.

Issues considered

The proper construction of Section 5 of the TADA Act, including its essential ingredients and the ambit of the defence available to an accused.
The nature and enforceability of the bail right under clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of the TADA Act when investigation is not completed within the prescribed period.
The construction and scope of Section 20(8) of the TADA Act concerning bail.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 24A, s. 7
Code of Criminal Procedures. 167(1), s. 167(2)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 112
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 12, s. 20(4)(bb), s. 20(8), s. 21, s. 2(1)(f), s. 2(1)(t), s. 5

Subjects

TADASection 5notified areastatutory presumptionrebuttable presumptionbailSection 20(4)(bb)Section 20(8)terrorismarms possessioncriminal procedureconstitutional interpretation

Judgment

SANJAYDUTI A
v.
THE STATE THROUGH C.B.I. BOMBAY

SEPTEMBER 9, 1994
B
[AM. AHMADI, J.S. VERMA,'P.B. SAWANT, B.P. JEEVAN
REDDY AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.]

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987:

Section 5--Essential ingredients of and ambit of defence available to C
accused-First ingredient-Possession of specified Arms and Ammuni-
tion-Held possession means conscious possession and not mere cus-
todj-Second ingredient-Possession should be unauthorised i.e. without the
authority of law-Third ingredient-Possession of unauthorised arms and
. ammunition should be in a notified area-Essence of third ingredient is that D
a presumption arises that the weapons were meant for use in terrorist or
disruptive act-Held such a presumption is reason¢le and in consonance
with the scheme of the Statute but is rebuttable-The extent of burden ofproof
on the accused to rebut presumption is lighter burden of proving the great
probability--// the accused proves non-existing offacts necessary to prove the
third ingredient he cannot be prosecuted under section 5 but has to be dealt E
with under Section 12-But where prosecution proves the essential ingredients
it has to do nothing more and convictions under Section 5 would follow.

Expression 'arms and ammunition'-Held these words are not to be
read conjuctively. F

Section 2( l)(f)-State Government-Power t<;> declare 'notified
area'---Manner of exercise of powe,-/leld, must have relation to curb terrorist
and disruptive activities.

Section 20(4) (bb) and Proviso-Offence punishable under TADA- G
Failure to complete Investigation within the specified period-Right of ac-
cused to be released on bai1-Held that right accruing to the accused in such
a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challenge and does
not remain enforceable on challan being filed-After the filing of ch allan bail
has to be considered with reference to the merits of the case. H
263
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Offence under TADA-Extension of time for investigation of offence-
Requirement of notice to the accused-Held written notice is not necessary--
Production of accused at the time when prayer for extension of time is
considered by cowt is sufficient.

B Section 20(8}-TADA offences-Bail in respect of-£onditions for
grant of bail-field valid.

Interpretation of Statutes.

Penal Statutes-Rule of constntction of-TADA Acl-Constntction
C made of provision$ should be purposive so as to promote the obje.ct of the
Act.

The petitioner, one of the several accused persons in the Bombay
Blast case is being tried by the Designated Court, Greater Bombay, for
several offences including section 5 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Ac-
D tivities (Prevention) Act, 1987. The charge against him was tliat he know-
ingly and intentionally procured one AK-56 rifle with ammunition for the
purposes of committing terrorist acts. The petitioner's case was that his
possession of rifle and ammunition was for self defence on account of
·. various threats to the members of his family, unrelated to any terrorist
E activity and, therefore, mere unauthorised possession of the weapons and
ammunition by him does not constitute an offence under Section 5 and
consequently his case should be dealt with only under the Arms Act, 1959.
The petitioner's claim to be released on bail was-rejected by the Designated
Court against which special leave petitions were filed in this Court. Since
certain question involved in these petitions arose in respect of a large
F number of persons accused of offences punishable under the Act of 1987,
a Division Bench of this Court referred the following questions of law for
decisions by a Constitution Bench :

1. The proper construction of Section 5 of the TADA Act indicating
G the ingredients of the Offence punishable thereunder and the ambit of the
defence available to a persQn accused of that offence;·

2. The proper construction of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of
Section 20 of the TADA Act indicating the nature of right of an accused to
be released on bail thereunder, on the default to complete investigation
H within the time allowed therein; and
SANJAY DUTT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY 265

3. The proper construction and ambit of sub-section (8) of Section A
20 of the TADA Act indicating the scope for bail thereunder.

For the petitioner it was contended that (1) the unauthorised con-
scious possession of specified arms and ammunition etc. in a 'notified
area' may not necessarily be related to, or associated with, a terrorist or
disruptive activity and such an unauthorised possession may be for a B
different purpose e.g. self-defence. Therefore, the accused must have the
opportunity in law of raising such a defence and proving it; (ii) the
requirement of the 'notice' to the accused before granting the extension of
time for completing the investigation is mere production of the accused
before the court when the prayer for extension of time is considered by the c
Court and not written notice to the accused giving reasons for seeking the
extension requiring the accused to show cause against it; and (iii) that the
right available to the accused to be released on bail under section 20(4)
(bb) is enforceable only upto the filing of the challan and does n9t survive
for enforcement on the challan being fded; on fding of the challan the D
question of bail has to be considered only on merits.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that (i) in view of the
greater proneness of a notified area to the commission of terrorist and
disruptive activities mere unauthorised possession of the specified arms
etc. therein is made a statutory offence of strict liability. Therefore, there E
is no right available to the accused being tried for an offence punishable
under Section 5 of the TADA Act to prove that the possession was unre-
lated to terrorist or disruptive activities; (ii) the words 'arms and
ammunition' in Section 5 are not to be read conjunctively; (iii) the manner
in which the power to declare notified area under section 2(1) (f) is to be
exercised by the State Government has to be inferred by reading the F
enactment as a whole keeping in view its object and so read the State
Government's power to notify an area must have relation to curbing
terrorist and disruptive activities in the notified area; and (iv) in view of
the judgment of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 3 SCC
569, the meaning and scope of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA G
Act is clear and unambiguous and therefore, there is no occasion for a
fresh consideration of the matter.

Dismissing the petitions, this Court

HELD : 1. The ingredients of the offence punishable under Section H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 5 of the TADA Act are: (i) possession of any of the arms and ammunition
specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category I or Category IIl(a) of Schedule
I to the Arms Rules, 1962 or bombs, dynamite or other explosive substan-
ces; (ii) the possession of such arms should be unauthorised; and (iii) in
a notified area. If these ingredients of the offence are proved, then the ·
accused shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
B time being in force, be punishable with ·imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for
life and shall also be liable for fine. (287-G]

2. The meaning of the first ingredient of 'possession' of any such arms
c etc. is not disputed. Even though the word 'possession's is not preceded by
any adjective like 'knowingly' yet it is common ground that in the context
the word 'possession' must mean possession with the requisite mental
element that is, conscious possession and not mere custody without the
awareness of the nature of such possession. There is mental element in the
concept of possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of 'possession' in Sec-
D tion 5 of TADA Act means conscious possession. This is how the ingredient
of possession in similar· context of a statutory offence importing strict
liability on account of mere possession of an unauthorised substance has
been understood. Thus mere conscious possession of a forbidden sub-
stance is sufficient to constitute an offence and the offence created by
E Section 5 in a statute like the TADA Act is not extraordinary or concep-
tually impermissible. Moreover, that is also the position in the general law,
with difference only in the prescribed punishment. (290-H, 291-A-B, 298-F]

Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, (1969) A.C. 256; Sam-
basivam v.Public Prosecutor Federation of Malaya, (1950) AC 458 and Louis
F Beaver v. Her Majesty The Queen, [1957) S.C.R. 531, referred to.

3. The net ingredient is that the possession of such arms etc. should
be 'unauthorised'. The unauthorised possession in the context means
without the authority of law. (291-C]
G 4. The significance of the third ingredient i.e. of unauthorised pos-
session of any such arms and ammunition etc. in a notified area is that a
statutory presumption arises that the weapon was meant to be used for a
t~rrorist or disruptive act. This is so, because of the proneness of the area
to terrorists and disruptive activities, the lethal and hazardous nature of
H the weapon and its unauthorised possession with this awareness, within a
SANJAY DlJIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY 267

notified area. This statutory presumpti011 .s the essence of the tbrd A
ingredient of the offence created by Sectioa. 5 •li ihe TADA Act. [293-D-B]

5. The statutory presumption so read i11to Section 5 is in consonanct!
with the scheme of the o,tatute and Section 5 read in the context m•,h~
scheme statutory presumption implicit in it. l urtber, Section 5 is attrack1 1
only in case of unauthorised possession of sptufled arms and ammunition E
in a notified area. None of these weaJ>oni. is meant for, or kept, for ordina:·~
use. The statutory presumption is also, therefore, reasonable. [296-D-(;1

6. However, the accused has a right as a part of his defence to pr·.11 t'
the non-existence of a fact essential to constitute an ingredient of lht: C
offence under Section 5 of the TADA Act and for that purpose he can rt!but
the presumption against him. [290-G]

7. Enactment of Section 21 also supports the view that the statutory
presumption arising of commission of an offence under presumption
arising of commission of an offence under Section 5, on proof of the D
requisite facts, is a rebuttable and not an irrebuttable presumption. The
presumption arising of the commission of an offence under Section 3 by
virtue of Section 21 is expressly made rebuttable and the accused can even
prove the non-existence of a fact essential to constitute an ingredient of
the offence under Section 3. On the same principle, the statutory presump- E
tion arising of the lesser offence under Section S on proof of the fact of
unauthorised possession in a notified area would be rebuttable presump-
tion enabling the accused to prove that the weapon was not meant for use
for any terrorist or disruptive act. Where its actual use in addition to the
possession has been proved, the presumption is of an offence under
!' Section 3 and burden on the accused is to prove the non-existence of any F
fact required for constituting an ingredient of the offence under Section 3.
The distinction that an offence under Section 3 can be committed anywhere
but that under Section 5 only within a notified area, is also significant. If
the presumption arising of an offence under Section 3 by virtue of Section
21 is expressly made rebuttable, there can be no reason why presumption G
of the offence under Section 5 would be irrebuttable and not rebuttable.
After all the offence under Section 5 is less serious than that under Section
3 of the Act. This construction is also preferable because the statute is
penal in nature. [295-E-H, 296-A-C]

8. The construction made of Section 5 of the TADA Act which gives H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
·-,
A an opportunity to the accused to rebut the presumption arising against
him of the commission of an offence by mere unauthorised possession of
any such arms etc. within a notified area is manifest from the Statement ,,
of object and Reasons. This is in consonance with the basic principle of :,

criminal jurisprudence and the basic rights of an accused generally recog-
nised. Court must attribute to the Parliament the legislative intent of not
B excluding the right of an accused to prove that he is not guilty of the graver
offence u~der Section 5 of the TADA Act and therefore, he is entitled to be
dealt with under the general law which provides a lesser punishment. But
on principle, there is no requirement of reading anything more than the
,..
rebuttable presumption into Section 5 of the TADA Act. [302-E-F]
c \'
•
l

R. v. Hunt, [1987] All. E.R. 1 and W.D. Manjev v. State of Georgi.a, 73
L.Ed. 575, referred to •. ~I
9. It is a settled rule of criminal jurisprudence that the burden on
an accused of proving a fact for rebutting a statutory presumption in his
D defence is not as heavy as on the prosecution to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt but the lighter burden of proving the greater prob-
ability. Thus, the burden on the accused of proving the rebutting the
statutory presumption which arises against him under Section 5 of the
TADA Act on proof by the prosecution that the accused was in un- ,,,
E authorised possession of any of the specified arms and ammunition etc. •
within a notified area is of greater probability. [30~-D-E]
.,

10. Thus for constituting the offence made punishable under section
5 of the TADA Act, the prosecution has to prove the aforesaid three
ingredients. When the prosecution has proved these facts, it has to do
F nothing more an conviction under Section 5 of the TADA Act must follow ";:-
unless the accused rebuts the statutory presumption by proving that any
such arms and ammunitfon etc. was neither used nor was meant to be used
for a terrorist or disruptive activity. No further nexus of his unauthorised
possession of the same with any specific terrorist or disruptive activity is
required to be proved by the prosecution for proving the offence. under
G
Section 5 of the TADA Act. The nexus is implicit, unless rebutted, from the
fact of unauthorised concious possession of any such weapon etc. within a
notified area and the inherent lethal and hazardous nature and potential ·
of the same. [300-F-G]
"
H Effect of observations of Sahai, Jin Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
SANJAY DlJIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY 269
(1994] 3 sec 569 on the burden of proof of the prosecution, explained. A

11. Undoubtedly, the accused can set up a defence of non-existence
of a fact which is an ingredient of the offence to be proved by the prosecu-
tion. For proving the non-existence. of facts constituting the third in-
gredient of the offence, the accused would be entitled to rebut the above
statutory presumption and prove that his unauthorised possession of any B
such arms and ammunition etc. was wholly unrelated to any terrorist or
disruptive activity and the same was neither used nor available in that
area for any such use and it~ ~vailability in a 'notified area' was innocuous.
Whatever be the extent of burden on the accused to prove the non-existence
of the third ingredient, as a matter of law he has such a right which flows c
from the basic right of the accused in every prosecution to prove the
non-existence of a fact essential to constitute an ingredient of the offence
for which he is being tried. If the accused succeeds in proving non-existence
of the facts necessary to constitute the third ingredient alone after his
unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition etc. in a D
notified area is proved by the prosecution, then he cannot be convicted
under Section 5 of the TADA Act and would be dealt with and punished
under the general law. It is obviously to meet situations of this kind that
Section 12 was incorporated in the TADA Act. (293-G, 294-A-D]

12. Though Section 2(1)(f) defines 'notified area' to mean such area E
as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify yet there is no express indication in the Act of the manner in which
the State Government is to exercise this power of issuing the notification.
The submission that the State Government's power to notify an area under
section 2(l)(f) must have relation to curbing terrorist and disruptive F
activities in the notified area is well founded for ptherwise the State
Government's power would be unfettered and unguided which would
render Section 5 vulnerable. (291-E, 292-C]

13. A specific area is declared to be a notified area by the State
Government under Section 2(1)(f) of the TADA Act. This is done with G
reference to the· fact that a notified area is treated to be more prone to
the commission and escalation of terrorist and disruptive activities. This
is the basis for classification of 'a notified area' differently from the non-
notified areas and it has a reasonable nexus with the object of classifica-
tion. Such activities must, therefore, have a bearing on the constitution of H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A any special offen'ce confined to that area. Declaration of a specified area
as a notified area by the State Government is based on its satisfaction,
subjective in nature that the area is prone to terrorist and disruptive
activities and its escalation. This opinion of the State Government has to
be formed necessarily with reference to facts relating to incidents of
terrorist and disruptive activities, for the prevention of which check on the
B influx of the specified arms ammunition etc. in that area is the object of
enacting Section 5. The existence of the factual basis for declaring a
specified area as notified area has to be presumed for the purposes of
section 5 for otherwise it would be put to proof in every case. This is the
true significance of the third ingredient of the offence under Section 5.
c [292-H, 293-A-D]
14. The settled rule of construction of penal provisions is, that 'if
there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any
particular case, Court must adopt that construction and if there are two
reasonable constructions. Court must give the more lenient one:; and i('two
D possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision,
the court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject
from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty'. [289-D-E]

London & North Eastern Railway v. Beniman, [1946) 1 All ER 255
E (BL); Tolaram Relumal andAnr. v. The State of Bombay, [1955] 1SCR158
and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mis. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and Anr.,
(1966) Supp. SCR 473, referred to.

Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya and
Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 76, relied on.
F
15. Schedule 1 to the Arms Rules specifies the categories of both
arms and ammunition mentioned therein. This is what has led to use of
the words 'arms and ammunition' in Section 5 while referring to them as
those specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category 1 or category m (a) of
G Schedule I. The word 'and' has been used because Schedule I specifies both
arms and ammunition in Columns 2 and 3 thereof. The word 'and' instead
of 'or' is used in the expression "any arms and ammunition specified.•."
because reference to both is made as specified in the Schedule. For this
reason, the words 'arms and ammunition' are not to be read conjunctively.
This is further evident from the fact that the disjunctive 'or' is used while
H describing other forbidden substances like bombs etc. It means the forbid·
SANJAYDUTI v. C.B.I. BOMBAY 271

den substances, the unauthorised possession of any of which in a notified A
area is an offence under Section 5, are any of the specified arms or its
ammunition or bombs or dynamite or other explosive substances. Unless
these words are read disjunctively instead of conjuctively in this manner,
the object of prohibiting unauthorised possession of the forbidden arms
and ammunition would be easily frustrated by the simple device of one B
person carrying the forbidden arms and his accomplice carrying its am-
munition so that neither is covered by Section 5 when any one of them
carrying both would be so liable. (301-E-H, 302-A-B]

Paras Ram v. State of Haryana, (1992) 2 S.C.C. 662, dissented from.

16. Section 20 of the TADA Act prescribes the modified application
c
of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicated therein. The effect of sub-sec- ·
tion (4) of section 20 is to apply Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under the
TADA Act subject to the modifications indicated therein. One of the
modifications made in Section 167 of the Code by Section 20(4) of the TADA D
Act is to require the investigation in any offence under the TADA Act to be
completed within a period of 180 days with the further proviso that the
Designated Court is empowered to extend that period upto one year if it is
satisfied that it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said
period of 180 days, on the report of the public prosecutor iqdicating the E
progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of
the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. This gives rise to the right
of the accused to be released on bail on expiry of the said period of 180 days
or the extended period on default to complete the investigation within the
time allowed. [303-D·F]
F
17. The 'indefeasible right' of the accused to be released on bail in
accordance with Section 20(4) (bb) of the TADA Act read with Section
167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the
investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, is a right
which ensures to and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of
default the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforce- G
able on the challan being filed. If the accused applies from bail under this
provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extend period, as the
case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so
released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [309-A-C] H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP .. 3 S.C.R.

A 18. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of the
challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed is
governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions ·
relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage. Once the challan has
been filed , the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided
B only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating
to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the challan. The custody
of the accused after the challan has been filed is not governed by Section
167 but different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that
right had accmed to the accused but it remained unenforced till the filing
of the Challan, then there is not question of its enforcement thereafter
C since it is extinguished the moment challan is filed because Section 167 Cr.
P.C.. ceases to apply. It is obvious that no bail can be given even in such a
case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In short, the
grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the prayer for
extension of time, if such a prayer is made. It is settled by Constitution
D Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the
ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused,
bas to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the mle, the custody or
detention is on the basis of a valid order. [306-D-H, 307-A-B]

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Mahrashtra and Ors.,
E (1994] 4 S.C.C. 602, explained.

Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. The State of Punjab, (1952) S.C.R. 395;
Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and Ors., (1953] S.C.R.652 and
A.K Gopalan v. The Government of India, (1966) 2 S.C.R. 427, referred to.
F
19. Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production, of
the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to the
accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180
days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section
G (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the judgment
of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. The requirement of such notice
to the accused before granting the extension for completing the investiga-
tion is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons therein. Produc-
tion of the accused at that time in the Court informing him that the
H question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being
SANJAY DUTI v. C.B.I. BOMBAY [VERMA,J.] 273

considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose. (308-F-HJ A
20. In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh
on the meaning and scope of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA
Act, the question as to proper construction and ambit of sub-section (8)
of Section 20 does not require any further elucidation by this Court. The
pronouncement of the Constitution Bench is clear and binding on this B
Court. (309-D]

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave peti-
tion (CRL.) Nos. 1834-35 of 1994.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.7.94 of the Designated Court
Bombay in M.A. No. 118/94 B.A. No. 31/94 B.B. C. No.l/93.

Kapil Sibal, C.B. Wadhwa, AK.Sahu, Manmohan, Ms. Rashmi D
Kathapalia and Ms. Lata Krishnamurti for the Petitioner.

K.T.S. Tulsi, Additional Solicitor General and N. Natarajan, Dr. V.K.
Agarwal, Additional Secretary, P. Parmeswaran and Krishan Mahajan for
the Respondent.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J.S. VERMA, J. By an order dated 18.8.1994 made in these special
leave petitions by the Division Bench (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and N.P. Singh,
JJ.), these matters relating to grant of bail to the petitioner, an accused in
the Bombay blasts' case being tried by the Designated Court for Greater F
Bombay, have been referred for decision by a Constitution Bench since
certain questions involved in these special leave petitions arise in respect
of a large number of persons accused of offences punishable under the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. 1987 (hereinafter
referred t(I) as 'the TADA Act'). This is }).ow these matters have come up
for decision by this Bench. At the commencement of hearing before us, we G
had indicated that this Bench would decide only the questions of law
involved in the case as indicated in the order of reference and then send
back these diatters to the appropriate Division Bench for decision on
merits in accordance with the answers we give to the questions of law.
Accordingly, only. those facts which are material for appreciating the H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A questions of law which are being decided by us require mention in this
order.

The questions of law indicated in the said order of reference, to be
decided by us, are three, namely -

B (1) The proper construction of Section 5 of the TADA Act
indicating the ingredients of the offence punishable thereunder and
the ambit of the defence available to a person accused of that
offence;

(2) The proper construction of clause (bb) of sub- section (4) of
c Section 20 of the TADA Act indicating the nature of right of an
accused to be released on bail thereunder, on the default to
complete investigation within the time allowed therein; and

(3) The proper construction and ambit of sub-section (8) of Section
D 20 of the TADA Act indicating the scope for bail thereunder.

The only material facts for answering the above question are these:
The petitioner is one of the several accused persons in case No. 1 of 1993
being trial in the Designated Court for Greater Bombay in connection with
the bomb blasts which took place in Bombay on 12.3.1993 killing a large
E number of person and causing huge destruction of property. The case of
the prosecution against the petitioner, set out in the charge-sheet, is that
on 16.1.1993 he "knowingly and intentionally procured from accused Anees
Ibrahim Kaskar through Sameer Ahmad Hingora, Hanif Kadawala, Baba
@ Ibrahim Musa Chouhan, Abu Salem Abdul, Qayoob Ansari and Man-
F zoor Ahmed Sayed Ahmed 3 AK-56 rifles, 25 hand grenades and one 9
mm. Pistol and cartridges for the purpose of committing terrorist acts. By
keeping the AK-56 rifles, hand grenades, pistol and cartridges' in his
possession willingly, accused Sanjay Dutt facilitated these objectives. Some
parts of the rifle, the 9 mm. pistol and 53 rounds of live cartridges were
G recovered during the course of investigation. Accused Yusuf Mohsin
Nullwaal, Kesri Bapuji Adenia, Rusi Framrose Mulla, Ajay Yashprakash
Marwah, caused wilful destruction of evidence namely 1 AK-56 rifle, one
9 mm. pistol, and cartridges by deliberately removing them from the house
of accused Sanjay Dutt, at his instance, with the intention to protect the
offender i.e. Sanjay Dutt from legal consequences ~d therefore, they are
H also guilty of the offence u/s 201 IPC".
SANJAYDUTf v. C.B.I.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 275

The charge against the petitioner is of several offence including those A
under the TADA Act, of which Section 5 thereof is one, Reliance is placed
by the prosecution on the testimony of certain witnesses, some incriminat-
ing circumstances and an unretracted confession by the petitioner himself.
In the said confession, which has remained unretracted, the petitioner
admitted receiving three AK-56 rifles on 16.1.1993 along with ammunition B
from the aforesaid persons adding that two days later he returned two of
them but retained only one for the purpose of self-defence. The petitioner
further stated that in view of the tense communal situation as a result of
the incident at Ayodhya on 5.12.1992 and the serious threats given to
petitioner's father Sunil D'ltta then a Member of Parliament, for his
active role in steps taken to restore communal harmony and serious threats C
to petitioners' sisters also, all of whom were residing together, the
petitioner agreed to obtain and keep one AK-56 rifle with ammunition for
protection of him family without the knowledge of his father. In short, the
petitioner's statement is that his possession of one AK-56 rifle with am-
munition was in these circumstances for self defence on account of the .D
serious threats to the members of his family, unrelated to any terrorist
activity and, therefore, mere unauthorised possession of the weapons and
ammunition by him in these circumstances cannot constitute an offence
under Section 5 of the TADA Act. and has to be dealt with only under the
Arms Act, 1959. The petitioner claims to be released on bail on this basis
and places reliance on certain other facts pertaining to his conduct to E
support his assertion that his action in unconnected with any terrorist or
disruptive activity. It is unnecessary here to refer to any other facts which
may be material only for the purpose of considering the case of petitioner
on the merits for grant of bail. The Designated C011rt has refused bail to
the petitioner. These special leave petitions are against the order of the F
Designated Court, in substance, for grant of bail to the petitioner.

On these facts, the aforesaid questions of law arise for determination
by us. These questions arise in a large number of cases of persons accused
of offences punishable under the TADA Act and detained for that reason.
It is the general importance of these questions, numerous cases in which G
they arise and the frequency of their occurrence during the life of the
TADA Act which has oCC<l;Sioned this reference.

The decision of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab, [1994] 3 S.C.C. 569, it is urged does not fully answer these H

T
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A questions. It is also urged that the principle enunciated by the Division
Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. v. State of Mahrashtra & Ors, IT
(4) SC 255 = (1994] 4 SCC 602, read in the context of the final order made
therein, raises some ambiguity about the true meaning and effect of Section
20(4) (bb) of the TADA Act which r:equires that controversy also to be
B settled. We shall now deal with these questions.

The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 is 'an
Act to make special provisions for the prevention of, and of coping with,
terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto'. The Statement of Objects and Reason indicates the
C historical background and the situation which led to enactment. It is useful
to refer to the material portion of the Statement of objects and Reasons
which is, as up.der : -

"The Terrorist and Disruptive activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, was
enacted in May, 1985, in the background of escalation of te"orist
D activities in many parts of the country at that time. It was expected
then that it would be possible to control the menace within a period
of two years and, therefore, the life of the said Act was restricted
to a period of two years from the. date of its commencement,
However, it was subsequently realised that on account of various
E factors, what were stray incidents in the begnning have now be-
come a continuing menace specially in States like Punjab. On the
basis of experience, it was felt that in order to combat and cope
with terrorist and disruptive activities effectively, it is not only
necessary to continue the said law but also to strength it further.
The aforesaid Act 1985 was due to expire on the 23rd May, 1987.
F Since both House of Parliament were not in session and it was
necessary to take immediate action, the President promulgated the
. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1987
(2 of 1987) on the 23rd May, 1987, which came into force with
effect from the 24th May, 1987.
G
:xxxx :xxxx xxxx

Subsequent to the promulgation of the Ordinance, it was felt
that the provisions need fu.rther strengthening in order to cope with
the menace of te"orism. It is, therefore, proposed that persons who
H are in possession of certain anns and ammunition specified in the
SANJAY DUTI v. C.B.l BOMBAY [VERMA, J.] 277

Anns Rules, 1962 of other explosive substances unauthorisedly in an A
area to be notified by the State Government, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a tenn which shall not be less than five years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and with fine. It is
further proposed to provide that confession made by a person
before a police officer not fower in rank than a Superintendent of
Police and recorded by such police officer either in writing or on B
any mechanical device shall be admissible in the trial of such
person for an offence under the proposed legislation or any rules
made thereunder. It is also proposed to provide that the Designated
Court shall presume, uniess the contrary is proved, that the accused
had committed an offence where amis or explosives or any other C
substances specified in Section 3 were recovered from his possession,
or where by the evidence of an expert the finger prints of the
accused were found at the site of offence or where a confession
has been made by a co-accused that the accused had committed
the offence or where the accused had made a confessio~ of the
offence to any other person except a police officer.......... " D
(emphasis supplied)

We have heard Shri Kapil Sibal on behalf of the petitioner and Shri
K.T.S. Tulsi, Additional Solicitor General on behalf of respondent C.B.I.
In view of the general importance of the questions for decision affecting a E
large number of persons accused of offences under the TADA Act, we
requested Shri Soli J, Sorabjee, a senior advocate of this Court to appear
as ambicus curiae to assist us in decision these questions, We have also
taken into account the written submission filed by the National Human
Rights Commission with our leave. We are grateful to the learned counsel
for the able assistance rendered by them at the hearing. F

Certain provisions of the TADA Act may now be referred. Section
1 provides for the extent, application, commencement and duration of the
Act, which says that it extends to the whole of India and was to remain in
force initially for a period of two years from May 1987 but has been 0
extended from time of time. The last extension by Act No. 43 of 1993 is
for eight years·from its commencement. Several clauses in sub-section (1)
of Section 2 contain the definitions. The definition of 'abet' in clause (a) is
much wider than that in the Indian Penal Code. Clauses (d) defines
'disruptive activity' to give it the meaning assigned to it in Section 4; and
'terrorist act' in clause (h) is defined to give the meaning assigned to it in· H
278 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A sub-section (1) of Section 3. Clause (t) defines 'notified area' to ~ean such
area as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette
specify. Apart from the aid given by the general scheme of the TADA Act
and the object of its enactment to guide the State Government in specifying
a 'notified area' for" the purpose of the TADA Act, there is no other
specific provision dealing with the manner of performance of that exercise.
B A notified area significant for the purpose of Section 5 of the TADA Act
which makes mere unauthorised possession of certain arms and ammuni-
tion etc. specified therein, a punishable offence. Part II of the TADA Act
relates to 'Punishments for, and measures for coping with, terrorist and
disruptive activities' containing Sections 3 to 8, Section 3 gives the meaning
C assigned to the expiession 'terrorist act' and also prescribes the punishment
for the same. Similarly, Section 4 gives the meaning assigned to the expres-
sion 'disruptive activity' and prescribes the punishment fer the same. Then
comes Section 5 which says that a person in mere unauthorised possession
of certain arms and ammunition etc. specified therein, in a 'notified area'
is punishable 'with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
D five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and. shall also be
liable to fine'. This offence is more grave and the punishment more severe
that the offence of· mere unauthorised possession of the same arm and
ammunition etc. provided in the Arms Act. Section 6 provides from en-
hanced penalties in certain cases. Section 8 provides for forfeiture of
property of persons convicted of any offence punishable under this Act in
E . addition to the punishment awarded for the offence. This Section also
provides for forfeiture of property of certain other persons accused of any
offence under this Act. Part III containing .Section 9 to 19 relates to
constitution of 'Designated Courts'. There place of sitting, jurisdiction and
power with respect to other offences, apart from the procedure to be
F followed by the Designated Courts and certain other matters relating to
trial. Section 15 deals with certain confessions made to police officers and
the admissibility thereof. Part IV contains miscellaneous provisions which
are in Sections 20-30. Section 20 provides for the modified application of
eertain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 21 deals
With presumption as to offences under Section 3 of this Act.
G
We may now quote for the sake of convenience the provisions of the
TADA Act which are particularly material for our purpose.

"2. Definitions. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise re-
H quires.
SANJAYDUTI v.C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.) 279

xxxx xxxx xxxx A
(d) "Disruptive activity'' has the meaning assigned to it in sectio~
4, and the expression "disruptionist shall be construed accordingly:

xxxx xxxx xxxx
B
(t) "notified area" means such area as the State Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, specify :

xxxx xxxx xxxx

(h) "terrorist act" has the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (1) C
of Section 3, and the expression "terrorist" shall be construed
accordingly;"

"PART-II

Punishments for, and measures for coping with, terrorist D
and disruptive activities.

3. Punishment for terrorist acts. -(1) Whoever with intent to
overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror
in the people of any section of the people or to alienate any section E
of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different
actions of the people does any act or thing by using bombs,
dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances
or fire arms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases
or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological
or other-wise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, F
or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or
persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or
disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the
community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure
such person in order to compel the Government or any other G
person to who are abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist
act.

(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall -

(i) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be
liable to fine ;

(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
B
(3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates,
abets, advises or incites or knowingly facilitates the commission of,
a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
c than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and
shall also be liable to fine.

(4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or
conceal, any terrorist shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend
D to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(5) Any person who is a member of a terrorists gang or a
terrorists organisation, which is involved in terrorist act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a terms which shall not be less·
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and
E
shall also liable to fine.

(6) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from
commission of any terrorist act or has been acquired through the
terrorist funds shall be punishable with imprisonment for a terms
F which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also liable to fine.

4. Punishment for dis1Uptive activities, - (1) Whoever commits
or conspires or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises,
or knowingly facilitates the commission of, any disruptive activity
G or any act preparatory to a disruptive activity shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a terms which shall not be less than five
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also
be liable to fine.

H xxxx xxxx xxxx
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY [VERMA, J.] 281

5. Possession of certain unauthorised arms, etc., in specified A
areas. - Where any person is in possession of any arms and
ammunition specified in Columns 2 and 3 of Category I or
Category III (a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, or bombs,
dynamite or other explosive substances unauthorisedly in a notified
area, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment B
for a terms which shall not be less than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

6. Enhanced Penalties, - (1) If any person with intent to aid any
terrorist or disruptionist, contravenes any provision of, or any rule C
made under, the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), the Explosives Act,
1884 (4 of 1884), the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908),
or the Inflammable Substances Act, 1952 (20 of 1952), he shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any of the aforesaid Acts or
the rules made thereunder, be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than five year but which may extend D
to imprisonment for life and shall also pe liable o fine.

(2) For the purpose of this section any person who attempts to
contravene or abets, or attempts to abet, or does any act
preparatory to the contravention of any provisions of any law, rule
or order, shall be deemed to have contravened that provision, and E
the provisions of sub-section (1) shall, in relation to such person,
have effect subject to the modification that the reference to "im-
prisonment for life" shall be construed as a reference to "imprison-
ment for ten years".

xxxx xxxx xxxx F

"PART-III
Designated Courts

xxxx xxxx xxxx G
12. Power of Designated Court with respect to other offences. (1)
When trying any offence, a Designated Court may also try any
other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be
charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such
other offence H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A . (2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any offence,
it is found that the accused person has committed any other offence
under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any other law, the
Designated Court may convict such person of such other offence
and pass any sentence authorised by this Act or such rule, as the
case may be, such other law, for the punishment thereof.
B
xxxx xxxx xxxx
15. Certain confession made to police officers to be taken into
consideration. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1of1872), but subject to the provisions
c of this section, a confession made by a person before a police
officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and
recorded by such police officer either in writing or on any mechani-
cal device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which
sounds or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in the
D trial of such person or co-accused, abettor or conspirator for an
offence under this Act or rules made thereunder :

Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and
tried in the same case together with the accused.
E (2) The police officer shall, before recording any confession
under sub-section (1), explain to the person making it that he js
not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may ~e
used us evidence against him and such police officer shall ntit
record any such confession unless upon questioning the person
F making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

xxxx xxxx xxxx
"PART-IV
Miscellaneous
G
20. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. -

xxxx xxxx xxxx

H (4) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.). 283

involving an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made A
thereunder subject to the modifications that -

(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof to "Judicial
Magistrate" shall be construed as a reference to "Judicial
Magistrate or Executive Magistrate or Special Executive
Magistrate."; B
(b) the references in sub-section (2) thereof to "fifteen days",
"ninety days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur, shall be con-
strued as references to "sixty days", and "one hundred and eighty
days" respectively: and
c
(bb) in sub-section (2), after the proviso, the following proviso
shall be inserted namely :

Provided further that, it is not possible to complete the inves-
tigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the
Designated Court shall extend the said period upto one year, on D
the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the
Investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days;
and ·

(c) sub-section (2-A) thereof shall be deemed to have been E
omitted.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

(7) Nothing in Section 43'8 of the Code shall apply in relation
to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of F
having committed an offence punishable under this Act or any rule
made thereunder.

(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made
thereunder shall, if in cust9dy, be released on bail or on his own G
bond unless -

(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to
oppose the application for such release, and

(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.

(9) The limitations on granting of bail specified in sub-section
(8) are in addition the limitations und~r the Code or any other law
B for the time being in force on granting of bail
.
21. Presumption as to offences under Section 3. - (1) In a
prosecution for an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 3, if it
is proved-

c (a) that the arms or explosive or any other substances specified
in Section 3 were recovered from the possession of the accused
there is reason to believe that such arms or explosive or other
substances of a similar nature, were used in the commission of
such offence : or

D (b) that by the evidence of an expert the finger prints of the
accused were found at the site of the offence or on anything
including arms and vehicles used in connec~ion with the commis-
sion of such offence;

the designated Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved,
E that the· accused had committed such offence.

(2) In a prosecution for an offence under sub-section (3) of
Section 8, if it is proved that the accused rendered any financial
assistance to a person accused of, or reasonably suspected of, an
F offence under that section, the Designated Court shall presume,
unless the contrary is proved, that such person has committed the
offence under that sub-section.

xxxx xxxx xxxx
G 25. Overriding effect. - The provisions of this Act or any rule
made thereunder or any order made under-any such rule shall have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any enactment ot~er than this Act or in any instrument having
effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.

H We would now consider the question referred for decision.
SANJAYDUTf v. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 285

SECTION 5 OF THE TADA ACT A

The true meaning and sweep of the Offence made punishable under
Section 5 of the TADA Act is the main controversy for decision by us. The
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh has upheld its constitutional validity

-- and, therefor, the question is one of proper construction of the provision B
keeping in view the object for which it was enacted, notwithstanding the
existenc~ of similar provision in the Arms Act, 1959. For the sake of
convenience, Section 5 of the TADA Act may be quoted:

"5. Possession of certain unauthorised arms, etc. in specified C
areas.- Where any person is possession of any arms and ammuni-
tion specified in Columns 2 and 3 of Category I or ~ategory III
(a) of Scheduled I to the Arms Rules, 1962, or bombs, dynamite
or other explosive substances unauthorisedly in a notified area, he
shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment for a term D
which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall be liable to fine. n

(emphasis supplied)
E
The relevant part of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962 incorporated
by reference in section 5 of the TADA Act is as under:

SCHEDULE-I F
Category Arms Ammunition
1 2 3
1. I(a) Prohibited arms as defined in Prohibited ammunition as
section 2(1) (i) and such other defined in 'section 2(1)(h)
arms as the Central Government and such other articles as G
may, by notification in the Official the Central Government
Gazette, specify to be prohibited may, by notification in the
arms. Official Gazette, specify
to be prohibited ammuni-
tion.
H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A I(b) Semi-automatic fire-arms, other Ammunition for arms of
than these included in categories I category I (b).
(c) and III(a); smooth bore guns
have barrel of less than 20" in
length.
B I(c) Bolt action or semi-automatic Ammunition for fire-arms
rifles of 303 or 7.62 mm. bore or of category l(c).
any other bore which can chamber
-
and fire service ammunition of
.303 or 7.62 mm. calibre: muskets
of .410 bore or any other bore
c which can fire .410 musket
ammunition; pistols, revolvers, or
carbines of any bore which can
chamber an fire .380 or .455
rimmed cartridges or ser~ce 9
D mm. or.45 rimless cartridges.
I(d) Accessories for any fire-arms
designed or adapted to diminish
the noise of flash caused by the
firing thereof.
E :xxx :xxx xxx:
III. Fire-arms other than those in Ammunition for fire-arms
categories I, II and IV, namely:- other than those in
categories I, II and IV
namely:-
F III(a) Revolvers and pistols Ammunition for fire-arms
of category III(a).

Note : Parts and accessories of any arms or ammunition and charges
G for fire-arms and accessories for charges belong to the same category as
the arms or ammunition."

In the Arms Act, 1959, Section 24A inserted by Act No. 25 of 1983
w.e.f. 22.6.1983 contains provision relating to the 'Prohibition as to posses-
H sion of notified arms in disturbed areas, etc' : and Section 25 prescribes
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 287

the 'punishment for certain offences' which includes punishment to a A
person who acquires, has in his possession or carries any prohibited arms
or prohibited ammunition in contravention of Section 7, in sub sections (1)
and (lA) inserted by Act No. 25 of 1983 w.e.f. 22.6.1983 and Act No. 42
of 1988 w.e.f. 27.5.1988 respectively. Section 7 prohibits acquisition or
possession etc. of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition unless spe- B
cially authorized by the Central Government in this behalf. Clauses (h) and
(i) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Arms Act define 'prohibited
ammunition' and prohibited arms' respectively. Section 11 of the Arms Act
empowers the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette
to prohibit import or export of arms etc. while Section 12 contains a similar
power to restrict or prohibit transport of arms. There is no dispute that C
the prohibition against unauthorised possession of the categories of arms
and ammunition etc. specified in Section 5 of the TADA Act could as well
be covered by the Arms Act and the rules framed thereunder, if necessary
by a further amendment thereof which would be governed by the general
law relating to investigation and trial of such offence without attracting the D
more stringent and drastic provisions of the TADA Act. However, the
parliament has chosen to adopt the course of enacting Section 5 in the
TADA Act which has the result of governing the investigation, trial and
punishment of the offence by the more stringent provisions in this behalf
in the TADA Act. In short, the offence prescribed by and made punishable
under Section 5 of the TADA Act is a graver offence governed by more E
stringent provisions for its investigation and trial while providing a more
severe maximum, with a minimum punishment of five years' imprisonment
for it. It is this difference which is .the reason for the controversy raised
about the true meaning and scope of the offence prescribed by Section 5
of the TADA Act and the rights of the accused in this context. F

The ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 5 of the
TADA Act are; {i) possession of any of the specified arms and ammunition
etc. {ii) unauthorisedly, {iii) in a notified area. If these ingredients of the
offence are proved, then the accused shall, notwithstanding anything con- G
tained in any other law for the time being in force, be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which
may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
Admittedly, this punishment prescribing a minimum sentence of five years
impris_gnment for unauthorised possession of any of the specified arms etc.
with the maximum extending to life imprisonment, is more severe as H
288 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A compared to the punishment for the corresponding offence under the
Arms Act. In addition to it, the other provisions of the TADA Act which
include admissibility of some evidence against the accused which is in
admissible under the general law coupled with a longer period available
for completing the investigation enabling longer custody of the accused and
the overall more stringent provisions of the TADA Act loads the prosecu-
B tion more heavily against the accused under the TADA Act.

The TADA Act was enacted to make special provisions for the
prevention of. and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto in the background of
C escalation of the terrorist and disruptive activities in the country. There is
also material available for a reasonable belief that such activities are
encouraged even by hostile foreign agencies which are assisting influx of
lethal and hazardous weapons and substances into the country to promote
escalation of these activities. The felt need of the times is, therefore, proper
D balancing of the interest of the vis-a-vis the rights of person accused of an
offence under this Act. The rights of a person found in unauthorised
possession of such a weapon or substance in this context, to prove his
innocence of involvement in a terrorist of disruptive, is to be determined.

The construction made of any provision of this Act must, therefore,
E be to promote the object of its enactment to enable machinery to deal
effectively with persons involved in, and associated with, terrorist and
disruptive activities while ensuring that any person not in that category
should not be subjected to the rigours of the stringent provisions of the
TADA Act. It must, therefore, be borne in mind that any person who is
F being dealt with and prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of the
TADA Act must ordinarily have the opportunity_to show that he does not
belong to the category of persons governed by the TADA Act. Such a
course would permit exclusion from its ambit of the persons not intended
to be covered by it while ensuring that any person meant to ~e governed
G by its provisions, will not escape the provisions of the TADA Act. which
is the true object of the enactment. Such a course while promoting the
object of the enactment would also prevent its misuse or abuse. Such a
danger is not hypothetical but real in view of serious allegations supported
-
by statistics of the misuse of provisions of the TADA Act and the con-
cerned to this effect voiced even by the National Human Rights Commis-
. H s1on.
SANJAY DUIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY [VERMA, J.] 289

It is the duty of courts to accept a construction which promotes the A
object of the legislation and also prevents its possible abuse even though
the mere possibility of abuse of a provision does nor effect it con-
stitutionality or constitution. Abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance
and monitoring of individual cases and this can be done by screening of
the cases by a suitable machinery at a high level. It is reported that in B
some States, after the decision of this Court in Kartar Singh, his powered
committees have been constituted for screening all such cases. It is hoped
that this actiou will be taken in all the States throughout the country.
Persons aware of instances of abuse, including the National Human Rights
Commission, can assist by reporting such instances with particulars to that
machinery for prompt and effective cure. However, that is no reason, in C
law, to doubt its constitutionality or to alter the proper construction when
there is a felt need by the Parliament for enacting such a law to scope with,
and prevent terrorist and disruptive activities threatening the unity and
integrity of the country.
D
The settled rule of construction of penal provisions is, that 'if there
is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular
case, we must adopt that construction and if there are two reasonable
constructions, we must give the more lenient one'; and if 'two possible and
reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court must
lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty E
rather than the one which imposes penalty. See London & North Eastern
Railway v. Berriman, [1946) 1 All ER 255 (HL). p. 270; Tolaram Relumal
and Anr. v. The State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 158 and State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Mis Azad Bharat Finance Co. and Anr., (1966] Supp. SCR 473.
F
Applying the settled rule of construction of penal statutes in Niranjan
Singh Karam Singh .funjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya and Ors., (1990] 4
SCC 76, a Division Bench of this Court speaking through one of us
(Ahmadi, j.) construing certain provisions of the TADA Act reiterated the
principle thus :
G
"The Act is. a penal statute. Its provisions are drastic in that
they provide minimum punishments and in certain cases enhanced
punishments also; make confessional statements made to a police
officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police admissible
in evidence and mandates raising of a rebuttable pr.esumption on H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A proof of facts stated in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of
Section 21. Provision is ali;o made in regard to the identification
of an accused who is not traced through photographs. There are
some of the special provisions introduced in the Act with a view
to controlling the menance of terrorism. These provisions are a
departure from the ordinary law since the said law was found to
B be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the special
class of offenders indulging in terrorist and disruptive activities.
There can, therefore, be no doubt that the legislature considered
such crimes to be of an aggravated nature which could not be
checked or controlled under the ordinary law and enact~d deter- !
c rent provisions to combat the same. The legislature, therefore,
made special provisions which can in certain respects be said to
be harsh, created a special forum for the speedy disposal of such
cases, provided for raising a presumption of guilt, placed extra
restrictions in regard to the release of the offender on bail; and
made suitable changes in the procedure with a view 'to achieving
D
its objects. It is well settled that statutes which impose a term of
imprisonment for what is a criminal offence under the law must
be strictly construed. .. .............. .

............Therefore, when law visits a person with serious penal
E consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom
the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language
of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the
law..........."

(at pages 85-86)
F
With respect, we fully concur with the above perception for construing the
provisions of the TADA Act.

It is with this perspective we must proceed to spell out the in-
G gredients of the offence created by section 5 of the TADA Act and the
extent of the right of the accused to defend himself of that charge. We have
already indicated the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section
5 of the TADA Act.

The meaning of the firstingredient of 'possession' of any such arms
H etc. is not disputed. Even though the word 'possession' is not preceded by .
SANJAY DlITT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY [VERMA, J.] 291

any adjective like 'knowingly', yet it is common ground that in the context A
the word 'possession' must mean possession with the requisite mental
element, that is, conscious possession and not mere custody without the
awareness of the nature of such possession. There is a mental element in
the concept of possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of 'possession' in
Section 5 of the TADA Act means conscious possession. This is how the B
ingredient of possession in similar context of a statutory offence importing
strict liability on account of mere possession of an unauthorised substance
has been understood. (See Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
(1%9) 2 AC. 256_ and Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of
Malaya, (1950) AC 458.
c
The next ingredient is that the possession of such an arm etc. should
be 'unauthorised. That also presents no difficulty. The unauthorised pos-
session in the context means without the authority of law. There is not
disputed even in this area. The difficulty arises only hereafter. The un-
authorised possession so understood of such an arm etc. 'in a notified area' D
constitutes the offence. The true import of this last ingredient is the area
of real controversy.

Section 2(1)(t) defines 'notified area' to mean such area as the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. There is
no express indication in the Act of the manner in which the State Govern- E
ment is to exercise this power of issuing the notification. It is rightly urged
by the learned Additional Solicitor General that the manner in which this
power is to be exercised by the State Government has to be inferred by
reading the enactment as a whole keeping in view its object, from which it
follows by necessary implication. He submits that the indication is, that the F~
State Government is to notify a specified area for this purpose with
reference to the extent of terrorist and disruptive activities herein with a
view to check the influx into. The availability without the notified area of
the specified arms and ammunition etc. which by their inherent nature are
lethal and hazardous and, therefore, facilitate commission of terrorist and
disruptive activities. He submits that the unauthorised possession of arms G
and ammunition etc. of the specified category facilitates the commission of
terrorist and disruptive activities and, therefore, an area which is more
prone to such activities is notified with a view to prevent the availability of
unauthorised weapons and substances of this kind in that area. Learned
Additional Solicitor General submitted that it is because of this fact of H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A greater proneness of a notified area to the commission oLterrorist and '.
•
disruptive activities that mere unauthorised possession of the specified
arms etc, therein is made a statutory offence of strict liability. This is the
basis of his contention that a conviction under Section 5 of the TADA Act
must follow on proof by the prosecution of conscious 'possession',
'unauthorisedly', of any of the specified arms and ammunition etc. in a
B 'notified area'. We think the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor
General that the State Government's power to notify an area under Section
2(1)(f) must have relation to curbing terrorist and disruptive activities in
the notified area is well founded for otherwise the State Government's
power would be unfettered and unguided which would render Section 5
C vulnerable.

Shri Kapil Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
unauthorised conscious possession of any such specified arms and ammuni-
tion etc. in a 'notified area' may not necessarily be related to, or associated ·
D with, a terrorist or disruptive activity and it may be possible for the accused
to show that the object even of the unauthorised possession was different,
for example, self-defence. He submits that the accused must have the
opportunity in law of raising such a defence and proving its. The construc-
tion of Section 5 suggested by Shri Soli J. Sorabjee as amicus curiae, as well
as by the National Human Rights Commission in its written submissions is
E the same. Shri Sibal further submitted that unless such an opportunity to
the accused to prove his innocence of the graver offence punishable under
Section 5 of the TADA Act is read into it, even though he may be punished
for mere unauthorised possession of such arm and ammunition etc. under
the Arms Act, the provisions would suffer from the vice of arbitrariness
being unrelated to the object of its enactment.
F
Several facets of the arguments of sides aim at supporting the rival
contentions. Learned Additional Solicitor General contends that there is
not such right available to the accused being tried for an offence punishable
under Section 5 of the TADA Act while the others canvass for accepting
G the other view. The clue for resolution of his controversy lies in the
significance and true import of the third ingredient of the offence, namely,
a 'notified area'.

We have already indicated the manner in, and the purpose for which,
H a specified area is declared to be a notified area by the State Government
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.l.BOMBAY(VERMA,J.) 293

under Section 2(1) (t) of the TADA Act. This is done with reference to A
the fact that a notified area is treated to be more prone to the commission
and escalation of terrorist and disruptive activities. This is the basis for
classification of 'a notified area' differently from the non-notified areas and
it has a reasonable nexus with the Qbject of classification. Such activities
must, therefore, have a bearing on the constitution of any special offence B
confined to that area. Declaration of a specified area as a notified by the
State Government is based on its satisfaction , subjective in nature that the
area is prone to terrorist and disruptive activities and its escalation. This
opinion of the State Government has to be formed necessarily with refer-
ence to facts relating to incidents of terrorist and disruptive activities, for
the prevention of which check on the influx of the specified arms and C
ammunition etc. in that area, is the object of enacting Section 5. The
existence of the factual basis for declaring a specified area as notified area
has to be presumed for the purposes of Section 5 for otherwise it would
be put to proof in every case. This is not true significaJ,1.'Ce of the third
ingredient of the offence under Section 5. J D

The significance of unauthorised possession of any such arms and
ammunition etc. in a notified area is that a statutory presumption arises
that the weapon was meant to be used for a terrorist or disruptive act. This
is so, because of the proneness of the area to terrorist and disruptive
activities, the lethal and hazardous nature of the weapon and its un- E
authorised possession with this awareness, within a notified area. This
statutory presumption is the essence of the third ingredient of the offence
created by Section 5 of the TADA Act. The question now is about the
nature of this statutory presumption.

F
The position which emerges is this. For constituting the offence made
punishable under Section 5 of the TADA Act, the prosecution has to prove
the aforesaid three ingredients. Once the prosecution has proved
'unauthorised' 'conscious possession' of any of the specified arms ammuni-
tion etc. in a 'notified area' by the accused, the conviction would follow on
the strength of the presumption unless the accused proved the non-exist- G
ence of a fact essential to constitute any of the ingredients of the offence.
Undoubtedly, the accused can set up a defence of non-existence of a fact
which is an ingredient of the offence to be proved by the prosecution.

There is no controversy about the facts necessary to comtitute the H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A fir1>t two ingredients. For proving the non-existence of facts constituting the
third ingredient of the offence, the accused would be entitled to rebut the
above statutory presumption and prove that his unauthorised possession of
any such arms and ammunition etc. was wholly unrelated to any terrorist
or disruptive activity and the same was neither used nor available in that
B area for any such use and its availability in a 'notified area' was innocuous.
Whatever be the extent of burden on the accused to prove the non-
existence of the third ingredient, as a matter of law he has such a right
which flows from basic right of the accused in every prosecution to prove
the non-existence of a fact essential to constitute an ingredient of the
offence .for which he is being tried. If the accused succeeds ~ proving
C non-existence of the facts necessary to oonstitute the third ingredient alone
after his unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition etc. in
a notified area is proved by the prosecution, then he cannot be convicted
under Section 5 of the TADA Act and would be dealt with and punished
under the general law. It is obviously to meet situations of this kind that
D Section 12 was incorporated in the TADA Act.

The non-obstante clause is Section 5 of the TADA Act shows that
within a notified area, the general law relating to unauthorised possession
of any of the specified arms and ammunition etc. is superseded by the
special enactment for that area, namely, the TADA Act. If however the
E ·third ingredient to constitute the offence under Section 5 of the TADA
Act is negatived by the accused while the first two ingredients are proved
to make out an offence punishable under the general law, namely, the Arms
Act, then the Designated Court is empowered to deal with situation in
accordance with Section 12 of the TADA Act. Section 12 itself shows that
F the Parliament envisaged a situation in which a person tried under the
TADA Act of any offence may ultimate be found to have committed any
other offence punishable under any other law and in that situation, the
Designated Court is empowered to punish the accused for the offence
under such other law. The offence under Section 5 of the TADA Act is
graver and visited with more servere punishment as compared to the
G corresponding offence under the general law. This is because of the greater
propensity of misuse of such arms and ammunition etc. for the terrorist of
disruptive act within notified area. If the assumed propensity of such use
is negatived by the accused, the offence gets reduced to one under the
general law and is punishable only thereunder. In such a situation, the
H accused is punished in the same manner as any other person found to be
SANJAYDlfIT v. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.) 295

in unauthorised possession of any such arms and ammunition etc. outside A
a notified area. The presumption in law is of the greater and natural danger
arising from its unauthorised possession within a notified area more prone
to terrorist or disruptive activities.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting the TADA Act
clearly states as under : B
".................. It is also proposed to provide that the Designated
Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused
had committed an offence where arms or explosives or any other
substances specified in Section 3 were recovered from his possession, C
or where by the evidence of an expert the finger prints of the
accused were found at the site of offence or where a confession
has been made by the co-accused that the accused had committed
the offence or where the accused had made a confession of the
offence to any other person except a police officer...............
D
(emphasis supplied )

The above extract gives a clear indication of the purpose for enacting
Section 21 in the TADA Act creating the statutory presumption as to
offences under Section 3 of the TADA Act, if it is proved that the arms
or explosive or any other substances specified in Section 3 were recovered E
from the Possession of the accused any where, and there is reason to
believe that such arms or explosives or other substances of a similar nature
were used in the commission of such offence. On proof of possession alone
and not also its use, the statutory presumption which arises is of the lesser
offence under Section 5 and that too when the possession is unauthorised F .
within a notified area, which is more prone to terrorist or disruptive
activities. The presumption arising of the commission of an offence under
Section 3 by virtue of Section 21 is expressly made rebuttable and the
accused can even then prove the non-existence of a fact essential to
constitute an ingredient of the offence under section 3. On the same
principle, the statutory presumption arising of the lesser offence under G
Section 5 on proof of the fact of unauthorised possession in notified area
would be rebuttable presumption enabling the accused to prove that the
weapon was not meant for use for any terrorist or disruptive act. Wb~re
its actual use in addition to the possession has been proved, the presfunp-
tion is of an offence under Section 3 and burden on the accused is to prove H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the non-existence of any fact required for constituting an ingredient of the
offence under Section 3. The distinction that an offence under section 3
can be committed anywhere but that under Section 5 only within a notified
area, is also significant. Enactment of Section 21 also supports the view
that the statutory presumption arising of commission of an offence under
section 5, on proof of the requisite facts, is a rebuttable and not an
B irrebuttable presumption. If the presumption arising of an offence under
Section 3 by virtue of section 21 is expressly made rebuttable, there can be
no reason why presumption of the offence under Section 5 would be
irrebuttable and no rebuttable. After all the offence under Section 5 is less
serious that than under Section 3 of the Act. This construction is also
C preferable because the statute is penal in nature. The nature and extent of
burden on the accused to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 5
is the same as in case of the presumption arising by virtue of Section 21 of
an offence under Section 3 of the Act.

D It is clear that the statutory presumption so read into Section 5 is in
consonance with the scheme of the statute and section 5 read in the context
makes the statutory presumption implicit in it. The clear words in Section
21 that the 'Designated Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved'
is an unambiguous expression that the presumption thereunder is a rebut-
table presumption. The language in Section 21 of the TADA Act has to be
E contrasted with the Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 which
shows that the presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act
is irrebuttable whereas the presumption under Section 21 of the TADA
Act is rebuttable. It may here be noticed that Section 5 is attracted only in
case of unauthorised possession in a notified area, of arms and ammunition
F specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category I or Category III(a) of Schedule
I to the Arms Rules, 1962 which are prohibited arms, semi-automatic fire
ares, smooth bore guns, bolt action or semi-automatic rifles of certain
.categories, revolvers and pistols, and their ammunition, or bombs, dynamite
or other explosive substances, which are all inherently more dangerous
weapons. None of these weapon is meant for, or kept, for ordinary use.
G Th~ statutory presumption is also, therefore, reasonable.

In Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, (1950) AC
458, the accused was c,:harged with carrying a fire-arm and being in posses-
sion of 10 rounds of ammunition for which he was convicted under reg. 4,
H sub-reg. 1, of the Emergency Regulations, 1948, which was as under :
SANJAYDUTiv. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 297

"4. - (I.) Any person who carries or who has in his possession A
or under his control -

(a} any fire-arm, not being a fire-arm which he is duly licenced
to carry or possess under any other written law for the time being
in force; or
B
(b) any ammunition or explosives without lawful authority
therefor,

shall be guilty of an offence against these Regulations and shall on
conviction be punished with death." C
The Privy Council while dismissing the appeal of the accused held as
under:-

"Another submission on behalf of the appellant, which may be
conveniently considered now, was directed to the nature of the D
offence of carrying a firearm of which the appellant was convicted.
It was contended that an intent to use the fireanns in question as an
offensive weapon, or to have it so used, was an essential ingredient
of this offence and that the evidence fell short of establishing such
intent. Several decisions of India courts were cited in support of
this argument, but they relate to different enactment and their E
Lordships do not find them of assistance in determining the
present point, which must depend on the true construction of reg.
4, sub-reg. I, of the Emergency Regulations, The material words
are : "Any person who carries ...... any firm-arm, not being a firearm
which he is duly licenced to carry .......... shall be guilty of an F
offence........ " It was conceded on behalf of the Crown - and rightly,
in their Lordship' opinion - that '"carries" here means "carries to his
knowledge", and that the carrying of a firearm by a person who did
not know what he carried would not constitute an offence under
this provision. But the regu1':tion says nothing of any special intent, G
and their Lordships are unable to find any ground on which such an
intent should, as a matter of implication, be regarded as an claimant
of the offence. The Emergency Regulations form a drastic code
designated to meet a state of grave disorder and their Lordships see
no reason to suppose that reg.4, sub-reg. I, was not intended to strike
at the carrying of firearms simpliciter, if engaged in knowingly and H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 s.c,~.

A without lawful authority."

(at pages 469-70)

(emphasis supplied)

B The mental element of knowledge as requirement of the ingredient
'carry or possess' was read into this provision but the requirement of any
special intent as a matter of implication as an element of the offence was
negatived. That was the construction made of a provision similar to_ Section
5 of the TADA Act where death penalty was provided for the offence in
C similar legislation. On principle, there is no requirement of reading any-
thing more than the rebuttable presumption into Section 5 of the TADA
Act indicated by us.

A decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Louis Beaver v. Her
Majesty The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531 is also useful in this context. The
D offence there related to possession of the forbidden narcotic substance. It
was held that the element of knowledge formed part of the ingredient of
possession when mere possession of the substance amounted to an offence.
However, it was clearly stated that it would be within the power of
Parliament to enact that mere physical possession without any guilty
knowledge constituted the crime but such an intention would not be
E imputed to the Parliament 1inless the words of the statute were clear and
admitted of no other interpretation. We have construed in Section 5 of the
TADA Act, the ingredient of 'possession' to mean 'conscious possession'.
This decision also supports the principle that mere conscious possession
of .a forbidden substance is sufficient to constitute an offence and the
F offence created by Section 5 in a statute like the TADA Act is not
extraordinary or conceptually impermissible. Moreover, that is also the
position in the general law, with difference only in the prescribed punish-
ment.

The construction we have made of Section 5 of the TADA Act shows
G th~t it creates a statutory offence with strict liability and no statutory
exception therein. However, we have also taken view that the accused has
a right as a part of his defence to prove the non-existence of a fact essential
to constitute an ingredient of the offence wider Section 5 of the TADA
Act and for that purpose he can rebut the presumption against him, as
H indicate above. The question whether the defence set up by an accused is
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 299

really a defence of an exception or is a defence to assert the non-existence A
of a fact, which is an ingredient of an offence to be proved by the
prosecution, depends upon the construction of the particular statute. If the
language of the statute does not clearly reveal the parliamentary intent, it
has then to be inferred with reference to the mischief to be checked and
the 'practical considerations affecting the burden of proof and the com- B
parative ease or difficult which the respective parties would encounter in
discharging the burden. In R. v. Hunt, [1987] 1 All ER 1, the rule of
construction in such a situatipn was indicated as under :

"I would summarise the position thus by saying the Wool-
mington v. DPP did not lay down a rule that the burden of proving C
a statutory defence only lay on the defendant if the statute specifi-
cally so provided, that a statute can, on its true construction, place
a burden of proof on the defendant although it does not do so
expressly and that if a burden of proof is placed on the defendant
it is the same burden whether the case be tried summarily or on D
indictment. namely a burden that has to be discharged on the
balance of probabilities.

• The real difficulty in these i;ase lies in determining on whom
Parliament intended to place the burden of proof when the statute
has not expressly so provided. It presents particularly difficult E
problems of construction when what might be regarded as a matter
of defence appears in a clause creating the offence rather than in
some subsequent proviso from which it may more readily be
inferred that it was intended to provide fqr a separate defence
which a defendant must set up and prove if he wishes to avail
himself of it. F

xxxx xxxx xxxx

......... However, their Lordships were in agreement that if the
linguistic construction of the State did not clearly indicate on whom
the burden should lie the court should look to other considerations G'
to determine the intention of Parliament, such as the mischief at
which the Act was aimed and practical considerations affecting the
burden of proof and, in particular, the ease or difficulty that the
respective parties would encounter in discharging the burden. I
regard this last consideration as one of great importance, for surely H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Parliament can n~ver lightly be taken to have intended to impose
an onerous duty on a defendant to prove his innocence in a
criminal case, and a court should be very slow to draw any such
inference from the language of a statute.

When all the cases are analysed, those in which the courts have
B held that the burden lies mi the defendant are cases in which the
burden can be easily discharged ........ "

(at pages 10 and 11)

C The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in W.D.Manly v. State of
Georgia, 73 L.Ed. 575 also supports the view that ordinarily in such a
statute, the statutory presumption is to be treated as rebuttable.

It is a settled rule of criminal jurisprudence that the burden on an
accused of proving a fact for rebutting a statutory presumption in his
D defence is not as heavy as on the prosecution to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt but the lighter burden of proving the greater probability.
Thus, the burden on the accused of rebutting the statutory presumption
which arises against him under Section 5 of the TADA Act on prO!lf by
the prosecution that the accused was in unauthorised possession of any of
the specified arms and ammunition etc. within a notified area, is of greater
E probability. When the prosecution has proved these facts, it has to do
nothing more and conviction under Section 5 of the TADA Act must follow
unless the accused rebuts the statutory presumption by proving that any
such arms and ammunition etc, was neither us~d nor used meant to be used
for a terrorist or disruptive activity. No further nexus of his unauthorised
F possession of the same with any specific terrorist or disruptive activity is
required to be proved by the prosecution for proving the offence under
Section 5 of the TADA Act. The nexus is implicit, unless rebutted, from
the fact of unauthorised conscious possession on any such weapon etc.
within a notified area and the inherent lethal and hazardous nature and
G potential of the same. The observations of Sahai, J. alone in Kartar Singh
cannot be read to enlarge the burden on the prosecution to prove the
implicit nexus by evidence aliunde, or to require the prosecution to prove
anything more than what we have indicated.

We may deal with one more aspect pertaining to the construction of
H Section 5 of the TADA Act to which reference was made placing reliance
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 301

on the decision in Paras Ram v. State of Haryana, [1992) 2 SCC 662, to A
which one of us (J.S. Verma, J) was a party. Correctness of that decision
has been doubted by the learned Additional Solicitor General. That
decision holds that the words 'arms ammwi.ition' in Section 5 should be
read conjunctively and so read, the COI\clusion is that a person in posses-
sion of only both, a fire-~m and the ammunition therefore, is punishable B
under Section 5 and not one who has either the firm-arm or the ammuni-
tion alone.

Section 5 applies where 'any person is in possession of any arms and
ammunition specified in column 2 and 3 of Category I or Category III (a)
of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, or ..........unauthorisedly in a C
notified area'. After specifying tlie forbidden arms and ammunition, Sec-
tion 5 proceeds to include in that category other substances by using the
expression ' or bombs, dynamite or the explosive substances'. It is clear that
unauthorised possession in a notified area is forbidden of 'any arms and
ammunition' which is specified 'or bombs or dynamite or other explosive D
substance'. The other forbidden substances being r.ead disjunctively, the
only questions being read disjunctively, the only question is : Whether in
this context the words 'arms and ammunition' in Section 5 should be read
conjunctively? We do not think so.

Schedule I to the Arms Rules specifies the categories of both arms E
and ammunition mentioned therein. This is what has led to use of the words
'arms and ammunition' in section 5 while referring to them as those
specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category I or Category III( a) of Schedule
I. 'The word 'and' has been used because Schedule I specified both arms
and ammunition in columns 2 and 3 thereof. The words 'any arms and F
ammunition' in Section 5 mean any of the arms and ammunition so
specified or in other any arms or any ammunition specified in columns 2
and 3 of Category I or Category III (a) of the Schedule. The word 'and'
instead of 'or' is used in the expression 'any arms and ammunition
specified.......... .' because reference to both is made a specified in the G
Schedule. For this reasons, the words, 'arms and ammunition' are not to
be read conjunctively. This is further evidence from the fact that the
disjunctive 'or' is used while describing other forbidden substances like
bombs etc. It means the forbidden substances, the unauthorised possession
of any of which in a notified area is an offence under Section 5, are any of
the specified arms or its ammunition or bombs or dynamite or othei H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A explosive substances. Unless these words are read disjunctively instead of
conjunctively in this manner, the object of prohibiting unauthorised pos-
session of the forbidden arms and ammunition would be easily frustrated
by the simple device of one person carrying- the forbidden arms and his
accomplice carrying its ammunition so that neither is covered by Section 5
when any one of them carrying both would be so liable. We must, therefore,
B correct the view taken in Paras Ram. This part of section 5 has to be read
in the manner indicated herein by us. With respect, the decision in Paras
Ram does not lay down the correct law.

The Parliament envisages that enactment of the TADA Act is .neces-
C sary to deal terrorists, disruptionists and their associates or even those
reasonably suspected of such association. A purposive construction
promoting the object of the enactment but not extending its sweep beyond
the frontiers within which it was intended to operate must be adopted
keeping in view that a construction which exempts a persol,i from· its
D operation must be preferred to the one includes him in it, in view of the
penal nature of the statute. The construction we have made of Section 5
of the TADA Act which give an opportunity to the accused to rebut the
presumption arising against him of the commission of an offence by mere
unauthorised possession of any such arms etc. within a notified area is
E manifest from the Statement of Objects and Reasons. This is in consonance
with the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence and the basic right of an
accused generally recognised, We must attribut~ to the Parliament the
legislative intent of not excluding the right of an accused to prove that he
is not guilty of the graver offence under section 5 of the TADA Act and,
therefore, he. is entitled to be dealt with under the general law which
F provides a lesser punishment. The provision of a minimum sentence of five
years' imprisonment for unauthorised possession of any of the specified
arms etc. \vith the maximum punishment of life imprisonment under Sec-
tion 5 of the TADA Act is by itself sufficient to infer such a legislative
intent, more so, when such intent is also more reasonable. The practical
G considerations in prosecution for an offence punishable under Section 5 of
the TADA Act affecting the burden of proof indicate that the intended use
by the accused of such a weapon etc. of which he is in unauthorised
possession within a notified area is known only to him and the prosecution
would be unable most often to prove the same while. the accused can easily
H prove his intention in this behalf. The practical considerations also support
SANJAY DUIT v. C.B.I. BOMBAY [VERMA, J.) 303
the view we have taken. A
In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary to consider the several
arguments advanced at the hearing relating to the requirement of mens rea
as an ingredient of this offence, the nature of the statutory offence, whether
it is one of-strict liability, whether any exception can be read into the
provision and if so, how. These aspects do not require any further con- B
sideration on the construction we have made of Section 5 and the manner
in which we have read into it the right and extent of defence available to
the accused tried of an offence punishable under Section 5 of the TADA
Act. This purpose is achieved by a route which is free of most of the
debated area in the controversy. For this reason we need not refer to the C
details of the other argument apd the decisions cited at the Bar to support
the rival contentions.

SECTION 20(4)(bb) OF THE TADA ACT

Section 20 of the TADA Act prescribes the modified application of D
the Code of Criminal Procedure indicated therein. The effect of sub-sec-
tion (4) of Section 20 is to apply Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under the
TADA Act subject to the modifications indicated therein. One of the
modifications made in Section 167 of Code by Section 20(4) of the TADA
Act is to require the investigation in any offence under the TADA Act to E
be completed within a period of 180 days with the further proviso that the
Designated Court is empowered to extend that period upto one year if it
is satisfied that it is not possible to complete the investigation within the
said period of 180 days, on the report of the public prosecutor indicating
the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention
of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. This gives rise to the F
right of the accused to be released on bail on expiry of the said period of
180 days or the extended period on default complete the investigation
within the time allowed.

In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors, JT G
(1994) 4 SC 255 = (1994) 4 SCC 602, the conclusion was summarised, as
under:-

"In conclusion, we may (even at the cost of repetition) say that
an accused person seeking bail under section 20(4) has to make
an application to the court for grant of bail on grounds of the H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 'default' of the prosecution and the court shall release the accused
on bail after notice to the public prosecutor uninfluenced by the
gravity of the offence or the merits of the prosecution case since
Section 20(8) does not control the grant of bail under Section 20(4)
of TADA and both the provisions operate in separate and inde-
pendent field. It is, however, permissible for the public prosecutor
B to resist the grant of bail by seeking an extension under clause (bb)
by filing a report for the purpose before the court. However, no
extension shall be granted by the court without notice to an accused
to have his say regarding the prayer for grant of extension under ·-
clause (bb).In this view of the matter, it is immaterial whether the
application for bail on ground of 'default' under Section 20(4) is
c filed first or the report as envisaged by clause (bb) is filed by the
public prosecutor first so long as both are considered while grant-
ing or refusing bail. If the period prescribed by clause (b) of
Section 20(4) has expired and the court does not grant an extension
on the report of the public prosecutor made under clause (bb), the
D rourt shall release the accused on bail as it would be an in-
defeasible right of the accused to be so released. Even where the
court grants an extension under clause (bb) but the charge sheet
is not filed within the extended period, the court shall have no \
option but to release the accused on bail, if he seeks it and is .'\

prepared to furnish the bail as directed by the court. Moreover,
E. no extension under clause (bb) can be granted by the Designated
Court except on a report of the public prosecutor nor can extension
be granted for reasons other than those specially contained in
Jclause (bb), which must be strictly construed."

(Para 28 at page 280 of JT)
F
In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, it was held that the Designated Court
would have 'no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his indefeasible right to
be released on bail on account of the default of the prosecution to file the
challan within the prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to
G furnish the bail bond as directed by the court'; and that a 'notice' to the
accused is required to be given by the Designated Court before it grants
any extension under the further proviso beyond the prescribed period of
180 days for completing the investigation. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned counsel
for the petitioner contended that the requirement of the 'notice' con-
H templated by the decision in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur before granting, the
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 305

extension for completing the investigation is mere production of the ac- A
cused before the court and not a written notice to the accused giving
reasons for seeking the extension requiring the accused to show cause
against it. Learned counsel submitted that mere production of the accused
at that time when the prayer for extension of time is made by the Public
Prosecutor and, considered by the court, to enable such a decision being B
made in accordance with the requirements of Section 167 Cr. P.C., is the
only requirement of notice to be read in the decision of the Division Bench
in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. The Grievance of the learned counsel was, that
quite often the accused was not even produced before the court at the time
of consideration by the court of the prayer of the public prosecutor for
extension of the period. C

On the other aspect, Shri Kapil Sibal conceded that the indefeasible
right for grant of bail on expiry of the initial period of 180 days for
completing the investigation or the extended period prescribed by Section
20(4) {bb) as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right of the accused which D
is enforceable only upto the filing of the challan and does not survive for
enforcement on the challan being filed in the court against him. Shri Sibal
submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur cannot be read to confer on the accused an indefeasible right to
be released on bail under this provision once the challan has been filed if.
the accused continues in custody. He stated unequivocally that on filing of E
the challan, such a right which accrued prior to filing of the -challan has no
significance and the question of grant of bail to an accused in custody on
filing of the challan has to be considered and decided only with reference
to the provisions relating to grant of bail applicable after filing of the
challan, since Section 167 Cr. P.C. has relevance only to the period of p
investigation.

Learned Additional Solicitor general, in reply, agreed entirely with
the above submission of Shri Sibal and submitted that principle enunciated
by then Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur must be so read.
However, the grievance of the learned Additional Solicitor General is that G
the direction for grant of bail by the Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur,on the facts of that case, is not in consonance with such reading of
that decision and indicates that the indefeasible right of the accused to be
released on bail on expiry of the time allowed for completing the investiga-
tion survives and is enforceable even after the challan has been filed, H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A · without reference to the merits of the case or the material produced in the
court with the challan. He further submitted that it should be clarified that
the direction to grant bail under this provision on this ground alone in
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur after the challan had been filed was incorrect. Such
a clarification, he urged, is -necessary because the decision in Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur is being construed by the Designated Courts to mean that
B the right of the accused to be released on bail in such a situation is
indefeasible in the sense that it survives and remains enforceable, without
reference to the facts of the case, even after the challan has been filed and
the court has no jurisdiction to deny the bail to the accused at any time if
there has been a default in completing the investigation within the time
c allowed. Bail is being claimed by every accused under the TADA Act for
this reason alone in all such cases. This is the occasion for seeking a fresh
decision of this question by a larger Bench.

We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature
D of indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail by virtue of
Section 20(4) (bb) is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated
in that decision. The indefeasible right accruing to ·the accused in such a
situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does
not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not
availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of bail
E has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the
case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the
filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the challan has been
filed is not governed by Section 167 but clifferent provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrud to the accused but it
F remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no question
of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment challan is
filled because Section 167 Cr. P.C. ceases to apply. The Division Bench
also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused for release
on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation
according to the proviso in section 20(4) (bb), both of them should be
G coruiidered together. It is obvious that no bail can be given of the even in
such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In
short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the
prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused applies
for bail under this provisions on expiry of the period of 180 days or the
H extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail
SANJAYDUITv. C.B.l.BOMBAY[VERMA,J.) 307

forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed A
to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ
of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or
detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of
the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order. (See B
Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. The State of Punjab, [1952] SCR 395; Ram
Narayan Singh v. The State of Delhi and Others, [1953] SCR 652 and A.K
Gopalan v. The Government of India, [1966] 2 SCR 427).

This is the nature and extent of the right of the accused to be
released on bail under Section 20(4) (bb) of the TADA Act read with C
Section 167 Cr. P.C. in such a situation. We clarify the decision of the
Division Bench in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, accordingly, and if it gives a
different indication because of the final order made therein, we regret our
inability to subscribes to that view.

SUB-SECTION (8) OF SECTION 20 OF THE TADA ACT D

Shri Kapil Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
meaning and scope of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA Act is
indicated by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh (supra) as under : -
E
"The conditions imposed under Section 20(8)(b), as rightly
pointed out by the Additional Solicitor General, are in consonance
with the conditions prescribed under clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-
section (1) of Section 437 and clause (b) of sub; section (3) of that
section .............. Therefore, the co'ndition that "there are grounds
for believing that he is not guilty of an offence. " which condition F
in different form is incorporated in other Acts such as clause (i)
of Section 437(1) of the Code............. cannot be_ said to be an
unreasonable condition infringing the principle of Article 21 of the
Constitution."
G
(page 707 of sec)

In reply, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the
pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh is clear and
unambiguous and, therefore, there is no occasion for a fresh consideration
of that matter. H
308 SUPREME COURT RproRTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The pronouncement of the Constitution Bench as extracted above is
clear and does not require any further elucidation by us, beside it being
binding on us. ·

CONCLUSIONS

B As a result of the above discussion. our answers to the three question
of law referred for our decision are as under : -

(1) In the prosecution for an offense punishable under Section 5 of
the TADA Act, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused was
....
C in conscious 'possession', 'unauthorisedly', in a 'a notified area' of any '
arms and ammunition specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category I or
Category III (a) of Schedule l to the Arms Rules, 1962 or bombs, dynamite
or other explosive substances. No further nexus with terrorist or disruptive
activity is required to be proved by the prosecution in view of the statutory
presumption indicated earlier. The accused in his defence is entitled to
D prove the rion existence of a fact constituting any of these ingredients. As
apart of his defence, he can prove by adducing evidence, the non-existence
of facts constituting the third ingredient as indicated earlier to rebut the
statutory presumption. The accused is entitled to prove by adducing
evidence, that the purpose of his unauthorised possession of any such arms
E and ammunition etc.· was wholly unrelated to any terrorist or disruptive
activity. If the accused succeeds in proving the absence of the said third
ingredient, then his mere unauthorised possession of any such arms and
ammunition etc. is punishable only under the general law by virtue of
Section 12 of the TADA Act and not under Section 5 of the TADA Act.

F (2)(a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production
of the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to
the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180
days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section
(4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the Judgment
G of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thalau. The
requirem~nt of such notice to the accused before granting the extension
for completing the investigation is not. a written notice to the accused giving
reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court
informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing
H the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose.
SANJAYDUIT v. C.B.L BOMBAY[VERMA,J.] 309

(2)(b) The 'inaefeasible right' of the accused to be released on bail A
in accordance with Section 20(4){bb) of the TADA Act read with Section
167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the
investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which ensures to, and is enforceable by
the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and B
it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the
accused applies for bail under this provision on eicpiry of the period of 180
days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released
on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and
committed to custody according te> the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing on C
the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed,
as governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions
relating to the grant of bail applicable at the stage.

(3) In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh
on the meaning and scope of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA D
Act as extracted earlier, this question does not require any further elucida-
tion by us.

The question referred are answered in the above manner. This case,
for decision of the petitioner's claim for grant of bail on merits, like any E
other bail matter, has now to be considered and decided by the appropriate
Divisions Bench. We direct, accordingly.

T.N.A. Petitions dismissed.