SAMTA NAIDU & ANR.versusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.

                        [2020] 2 S.C.R. 1127                             1127


                     SAMTA NAIDU & ANR.                                  A
                                  v.
            STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
               (Criminal Appeal No. 367-368 of 2020)
                         MARCH 02, 2020                                  B
     [UDAY UMESH LALIT AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Second Complaint –
Maintainability of – The first complaint contained the basic
allegations that a vehicle belonging to the father of the parties,
                                                                         C
was sold after the death of their father with forged signature – It
was alleged that by the complainant that his brother and his brother’s
wife had forged the signatures of the father on Form 29 and 30 and
that on the basis of such forged documents the benefit of “sale
consideration of the vehicle” was derived by them – The Judicial
Magistrate after considering the evidence and documents produced         D
held that no prima facie case was found and the complaint was
rejected – After filing the revision, the complainant sought to
withdraw the revision with further liberty to file the fresh complaint
– Thereafter, another complaint was filed on same allegations but
with additional material in support of the basic allegation – The
                                                                         E
High court held the second complaint maintainable – On appeal,
held: The earlier complaint was dismissed after the Judicial
Magistrate found that no prima facie case was made out; the earlier
complaint was not disposed of on any technical ground, the material
adverted to in the second complaint was only in the nature of
supporting material and the material relied upon in the second           F
complaint was not such which could not have been procured earlier
– Pertinently, the core allegations in both the complaints were
identical – In the circumstances, the instant matter is covered by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Taluqdar as explained in Jatinder
Singh and Poonam Chand Jain – The High court was thus not
                                                                         G
justified in holding the second complaint to be maintainable – The
decision of the High Court set aside and the second complaint is
dismissed as not being maintainable.


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                                1127
1128            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A           Allowing the appeals, the Court
              Held: 1. The application of the principles laid down in
       Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar in Jatinder Singh
       & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur shows that “a second complaint is
       permissible depending upon how the complaint happened to be
 B     dismissed at the first instance”. It was further laid down that “if
       the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but on default of
       the complainant to be present there is no bar in the complainant
       moving the Magistrate again with a second complaint on the same
       facts. But if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of
       the Code was on merits the position could be different”.
 C
              To similar effect are the conclusions in Ranvir Singh and
       Poonam Chand Jain. Para 16 of the Poonam Chand Jain also
       considered the effect of para 50 of the majority judgment in
       Talukdar. These cases, therefore, show that if the earlier disposal
       of the complaint was on merits and in a manner known to law, the
 D     second complaint on “almost identical facts” which were raised
       in the first complaint would not be maintainable. What has been
       laid down is that “if the core of both the complaints is same”, the
       second complaint ought not to be entertained. [Para 14][1144-E-
       G; 1145-A]
 E            2. If the facts of the present matter are considered in the
       light of these principles, it is clear that paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 in
       the first complaint contained the basic allegations that the vehicle
       belonging to the father was sold after the death of the father; that
       signatures of the father on Form 29 and 30 were forged; that
 F     signatures on the affidavit annexed with Form 29 and 30 were
       also forged; and that on the basis of such forged documents the
       benefit of “sale consideration of the vehicle” was derived by the
       accused. The order dated 5.7.2013 passed by the Judicial
       Magistrate First Class, shows that after considering the evidence
       and documents produced on behalf of the complainant, no prima
 G     facie case was found and the complaint was rejected under Section
       203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The stand taken
       before the Revisional Court discloses that at that stage some
       new facts were said to be in possession of the complainant and as
       such liberty was sought to withdraw the Revision with further
 H
        SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                         1129
                  PRADESH & ANR.

liberty to file a fresh complaint. The liberty was not given and it   A
was observed that if there were new facts, the complainant, in
law would be entitled to present a new complaint and as such
there was no need of any permission from the Court. The
Revisional Court was definitely referring to the law laid down by
this Court on the basis of the principles in Taluqdar. Thereafter a
                                                                      B
complaint with new material in the form of a credit note and
Registration Certificate was filed. The core allegations, however,
remained the same. The only difference was that the second
complaint referred to additional material in support of the basic
allegations. Again, in terms of principle laid down in para 50 of
Taluqdar as amplified in para 16 in Poonam Chand Jain, nothing        C
was stated as to why said additional material could not be obtained
with reasonable diligence. [Para 15][1145 A-F]
       3. As against the facts in Shivshankar, the present case
stands on a different footing. There was no legal infirmity in the
first complaint filed in the present matter. The complaint was        D
filed more than a year after the sale of the vehicle which meant
the complainant had reasonable time at his disposal. The earlier
complaint was dismissed after the Judicial Magistrate found that
no prima facie case was made out; the earlier complaint was not
disposed of on any technical ground; the material adverted to in
the second complaint was only in the nature of supporting             E
material; and the material relied upon in the second complaint
was not such which could not have been procured earlier.
Pertinently, the core allegations in both the complaints were
identical. In the circumstances, the instant matter is completely
covered by the decision of this Court in Taluqdar as explained in     F
Jatinder Singh and Poonam Chand Jain. The High Court was thus
not justified in holding the second complaint to be maintainable.
[Para 17][1146 F-H; 1147 A-B]
      Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [1962]
      Suppl. SCR 297; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur            G
      (2001) 2 SCC 570 : [2001] 1 SCR 707; Poonam Chand
      Jain and Anr. v. Fazru (2010) 2 SCC 631 : [2010] 2
      SCR 109; Udai Shankar Awasthi v. State of Uttar
      Pradesh & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 435 : [2013] 3 SCR 935;

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1130            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A           Ranvir Singh v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2009) 9 SCC
             642; Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (2013) 9
             SCC 245 : [2013] 1 SCR 243 – relied on.
             Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh (1997) 1 SCC
             57 : [1986] 2 SCR 771; Maj. Genl. A.S. Gauraya &
 B           Anr. v. S.N. Thakur & Anr. (1986) 2 SCC 709;
             Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar (2012) 1 SCC 130
             : [2011] 13 SCR 247 – referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
       [1962] Suppl. SCR 297              relied on         Para 9
 C
       [1986] 2 SCR 771                   referred to       Para 13
       [2001] 1 SCR 707                   relied on         Para 13.1
       (2009) 9 SCC 642                   referred to       Para 13.2
       [2010] 2 SCR 109                   relied on         Para 13.3
 D
       [2013] 3 SCR 935                   relied on         Para 13.4
       [2013] 1 SCR 243                   relied on         Para 13.5
       [2011] 13 SCR 247                  referred to       Para 13.5

 E     (1982) 1 SCC 466                   referred to       Para 13.5
             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       367-368 of 2020.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2019 of the High Court
       of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur in Criminal Revision No. 2996 of 2015
 F     with Criminal Revision No. 2556 of 2016.
              Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Adv., Pai Amit and Rajesh Inamdar, Advs.
       for the Appellants.
            Ms. Pragati Neekhra, AAAG, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv.,
       Rahul Kaushik, Vivek Singh and Swastic Dalal, Advs. for the
 G     Respondents.




 H
            SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                 1131
                      PRADESH & ANR.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                              A
          UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.
          1. Leave granted.
      2. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order
dated 12.02.2019 passed by the High Court1 in Criminal Revision No.               B
2996 of 2015 and Criminal Revision No. 2556 of 2016.
      3. One G. S. Naidu, who owned a Maruti-800 vehicle of 1995
make, passed away on 12.12.2001 leaving behind his widow, three sons
and a daughter (who was unmarried and has since then passed away).
His second son (Complainant in the present matter) filed a complaint              C
against his brother (the third son of G. S. Naidu) and his wife, submitting
as under:-
          “3. It is submitted that the father of the complainant namely Late
          G.S. Naidu passed away on 12.12.2001. A copy of the death
          certificate in this regard is enclosed herewith as Annexure A/1         D
          with this complaint.
          4. It is submitted that on 2.11.2010, the aforesaid vehicle has been
          sold by the respondent by putting forged signatures of the
          complainant’s father on the Form 29 and 30 and also put forged
          signature on the affidavit annexed with Form No.29 and 30
                                                                                  E
          knowing fully well that Late G.S. Naidu has passed away on
          12.12.2001. A true copy of Form No.29 and 30 and the affidavit is
          being filed herewith as Annexure A/2. It is submitted that on the
          date when the vehicle was sold which was being owned by G. S.
          Naidu, the father of the complainant was no more.
                                                                                  F
          5. It is submitted that respondent Nos. 1 and 2, in order to sell the
          vehicle, has forged the signature of Late G.S. Naidu knowing fully
          well that he has passed away. It is also submitted that the
          documents which have been forged by the respondents have been
          subsequently used for getting the benefit in the form of sale
          consideration of the vehicle. The act of the respondents squarely       G
          covers the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468
          and 471 of the IPC and therefore, the respondents are liable to be
          punished accordingly. Hence, the present complaint is being filed
          before this Hon’ble Court.”
1
    High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Bench, Jabalpur                       H
1132            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A            4. The Complaint came up before the Judicial Magistrate First
       Class, Jabalpur, who, by his order dated 05.07.2013 concluded as under:-
             “On the basis of evidence and document produced on behalf of
             complainant it appears that no prima facie case is made out against
             accused Samta Naidu and Dilip Naidu.
 B           Hence complaint under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code is
             rejected and thereby dismissed.”
              5. The complainant being aggrieved, filed Revision before the VIII
       Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur. On 05.03.2014 the Counsel for the
       Complainant submitted that he wished to withdraw the Revision with
 C     liberty to file a fresh complaint on the basis of certain new facts, which
       request was opposed. After perusing the record and considering the
       submissions, the Revisional Court observed as under:-
             “This is well settled position that new complaint can be filed any
             time on the basis of new facts and for which purposes there is no
 D           need of permission of this Court or permission of any court.
             Because revisionist does not wish to press instant revision any
             more, hence instant revision is dismissed on this ground alone.
             Revision Petition is thus disposed of accordingly.”
              6. Thereafter, Complaint Case No. 9226 of 2014 was preferred
 E     by the Complainant on same allegations but relying on additional material
       adverted to in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of said Complaint, the material
       was:-
             a) The credit note in the sum of Rs.37,500/- issued upon request
             of the Appellants by the representatives of Standard Auto Agency,
 F           Jabalpur after valuing the vehicle.
             b) The fact that said amount of Rs.37,500/- was thereafter adjusted
             towards purchase of a new vehicle in the name of the first
             Appellant.
             c) The Registration Certificate of the new vehicle issued in the
 G           name of first Appellant.
             d) Certified copies of said documents received from the office of
             RTO, Jabalpur.
             Based on the aforesaid documents, it was submitted that
 H     cognizance be taken of the offences punishable under Sections 201,
            SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                 1133
             PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short,             A
“IPC”).
       7. On 02.08.2014, the Judicial Magistrate First Class Jabalpur
took cognizance in respect of offence punishable under Section 420 IPC
but rejected the Complaint with respect to other offences, which order
was challenged by the Complainant by preferring Criminal Revision                 B
No.288 of 2014. Said Revision was allowed by the 9th Additional Sessions
Judge, Jabalpur, by his order dated 02.11.2015 directing the Magistrate
to reconsider the documents available on record and to pass appropriate
order for taking cognizance in regard to appropriate offences. This
order was challenged by the Appellants by filing Criminal Revision
No.2996 of 2015 in the High Court.                                                C

      8. During the pendency of the aforesaid Revision in the High
Court, the matter was taken up and the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Jabalpur took cognizance of all offences alleged in the complaint.
Thereafter, the Additional Sessions Judge – X by his order dated
20.09.2016 framed charges against the Appellants in respect of offences           D
punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC.
This order led to the filing of Criminal Revision No.2556 of 2016 by the
Appellants in the High Court. Both the aforesaid Criminal Revisions
were heard together by the High Court.
       9. On the question, whether the second complaint was maintainable          E
or not, the High Court relied upon the decision of this Court in Pramatha
Nath Taluqdar vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar2 and observed:-
         “12. However, in the context of the instant case, when we compare
         the two complaints, it is obvious that at the time of filing the first
         complaint, the complainant seems to be aware only of the fact            F
         that accused persons Dilip and Samta had unilaterally sold a car
         belonging to G. Shankar Naidu and which, after his death, had
         become joint family property. The complainant seems to have
         acquired the knowledge of details of the transaction later.
         Therefore, subsequent complaint provides the particulars of the          G
         transaction in far greater details.”
      The High Court, thus, found no infirmity warranting interference
and dismissed both the Revision Petitions.

2
    AIR 1962 SC 876 = (1962) Supp 2 SCR 297                                       H
1134            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A            10. While issuing notice in the present matters this Court directed
       the Appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.45,000/- (Rupees Forty Five
       Thousand Only) in the Registry of this Court within two weeks. Said
       sum stands deposited in the Registry. This direction was passed so that
       if any of the heirs of G. S. Naidu felt that his share in the property left
       behind by the deceased was not being given to him, the internal disputes/
 B
       difference between the members of the family could be sorted out. But
       such suggestions were not acceptable to the Complainant.
             11. The parties thereafter exchanged pleadings and the matter
       was heard. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate, appeared in
       support of the Appeal. Relying on the decision of this Court in Taluqdar2,
 C     he submitted that the High Court was in error in rejecting the Revision
       Applications. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Advocate for the
       respondent-complainant also relied upon the same decision and other
       decisions referred to by the High Court, to submit that as new material
       was found, the second Complaint was rightly considered and taken
 D     cognizance of.
              12. The principal decision relied upon by both sides is one rendered
       by a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Taluqdar2. Para 35 of the
       majority decision authored by Kapur, J. discloses that a Complaint under
       Sections 467 and 471 read with Section 109 of the IPC was preferred
 E     on the allegations that an unregistered deed of agreement purportedly
       executed on 19.01.1948, a transfer deed in respect of 1000 shares
       purportedly executed on 05.02.1951 and the minutes of proceedings of
       the Board meetings purporting to bear the signature of late Sri Nalini
       Ranjan Sarkar were stated to have been forged. The Chief Presidency
       Magistrate dismissed the complaint against which Revision was preferred
 F     before the High Court of Calcutta. Said Revision Petition was dismissed
       and the matter was carried before this Court but the Appeal was dismissed
       as withdrawn. Thereafter, another complaint was brought under very
       same Sections. The Chief Presidency Magistrate took cognizance of
       second Complaint against which order, Revision was preferred in the
 G     High Court of Calcutta. The matter came up before the Division Bench
       and the additional material projected in support of the submission that
       the second Complaint was maintainable was dealt with by the Division
       Bench. The matter in that behalf was adverted to this Court as under:-
             “In regard to the filing of a second complaint it held that a fresh
 H           complaint could be entertained after the dismissal of previous
           SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                1135
            PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

         complaint under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code when there         A
         was manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice or when
         fresh evidence was forthcoming. The Bench was of the opinion
         that the fact in regard to the City Telephone Exchange was a new
         matter and because Pramode Ranjan Sarkar was not permitted
         to take a photostat copy of the minutes-book, it was possible that
                                                                                B
         his attention was not drawn to the City Telephone Exchange which
         was not in existence at the relevant time and that there was
         sufficient reason for Pramode Ranjan Sarkar for not mentioning
         the matter of City Exchange in his complaint. It also held that the
         previous Chief Presidency Magistrate Mr Chakraborty had
         altogether ignored the evidence of a large number of witnesses         C
         who were competent to prove the handwriting and signature of
         N.R. Sarkar and he had no good reasons for not accepting their
         evidence. It could not be said therefore that there was a judicial
         enquiry of the matter before the previous Chief Presidency
         Magistrate; the decision was rather arbitrary and so resulted in
                                                                                D
         manifest miscarriage of justice. The Court was of the opinion
         therefore that there was no reason to differ from the finding of
         the Chief Presidency Magistrate Mr Bijoyesh Mukerjee and that
         there was a prima facie case against the appellants.”
      12.1 The issue was considered by the majority judgment of this
Court as under:-                                                                E

         “48. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the subject of
         “Complaints to Magistrates” is dealt with in Chapter 16 of the
         Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions relevant for the
         purpose of this case are Sections 200, 202 and 203. Section 200
         deals with examination of complainants and Sections 202, 203           F
         and 204 with the powers of the Magistrate in regard to the dismissal
         of complaint or the issuing of process. The scope and extent of
         Sections 202 and 203 were laid down in Vadilal Panchal v.
         Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker3. The scope of enquiry under
         Section 202 is limited to finding out the truth or otherwise of the    G
         complaint in order to determine whether process should issue or
         not and Section 203 lays down what materials are to be considered
         for the purpose. Under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code the
         judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the
3
    AIR 1960 SC 1113                                                            H
1136             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A            statements of the complainant and of his witnesses and the result
              of the investigation or enquiry if any. He must apply his mind to
              the materials and form his judgment whether or not there is
              sufficient ground for proceeding. Therefore if he has not
              misdirected himself as to the scope of the enquiry made under
              Section 202, of the Criminal Procedure Code, and has judicially
 B
              applied his mind to the material before him and then proceeds to
              make his order it cannot be said that he has acted erroneously. An
              order of dismissal under Section 203, of the Criminal Procedure
              Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint
              on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional
 C            circumstances, e.g., where the previous order was passed on an
              incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
              complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where
              new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
              brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been
              adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that
 D
              after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a
              full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be
              given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into. Allah
              Ditto v. Karam Baksh4; Ram Narain Chaubey v. Panachand
              Jain 5 ; Hansabai Sayaji Payagude v. Ananda Ganuji
 E            Payagude6 Doraisami v. Subramania7. In regard to the adducing
              of new facts for the bringing of a fresh complaint the Special
              Bench in the judgment under appeal did not accept the view of
              the Bombay High Court or the Patna High Court in the cases
              above quoted and adopted the opinion of Maclean, C.J. in Queen
              Empress v. Dolegobinda Das8 affirmed by a Full Bench in
 F
              Dwarka Nath Mandal v. Benimadhas Banerji9. It held therefore
              that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest
              error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or
              when fresh evidence is forthcoming.”
              12.2 It was observed in para 50 as under:-
 G
       4
         AIR 1930 Lah 879
       5
         AIR 1949 Pat 256
       6
         AIR 1949 Bom 384
       7
         AIR 1918 Mad 484
       8
         ILR 28 Cal 211
       9
 H       ILR 28 Cal 652 (FB)
         SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                  1137
          PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

       “50. Taking first the question of fresh evidence, the view of some       A
       of the High Courts that it should be such that it could not with
       reasonable diligence have been adduced is, in our opinion, a correct
       view of the law. It cannot be the law that the complainant may
       first place before the Magistrate some of the facts and evidence
       in his possession and if he fails he can then adduce some more
                                                                                B
       evidence and so on. That in our opinion, is not a correct view of
       the law.”
      12.3 The majority judgment thus accepted the challenge, allowed
the Appeal and dismissed the Complaint with following observations:-
       “61. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the bringing     C
       of the fresh complaint is a gross abuse of the process of the Court
       and is not with the object of furthering the interests of justice.
                             …       …      …
       63. For these reasons we allow the appeals, set aside the order of
       the High Court and of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate            D
       and dismiss the complaint.”
       12.4 The dissenting opinion was expressed by S.K. Das, J.
      13. The law declared in Taluqdar2has consistently been followed,
for instance, in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. Kali Singh10 it was
                                                                                E
observed: “It is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only
on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is
made out”. The view taken in Bindeshwari10 was followed in Maj.
Genl. A.S. Gauraya and another vs. S.N. Thakur and another 11.
       13.1 In Jatinder Singh and Others vs. Ranjit Kaur12 the issue
                                                                                F
was whether the first complaint having been dismissed for default, could
the second complaint be maintained. The matter was considered as under:-
       “9. There is no provision in the Code or in any other statute which
       debars a complainant from preferring a second complaint on the
       same allegations if the first complaint did not result in a conviction
       or acquittal or even discharge. Section 300 of the Code, which           G
       debars a second trial, has taken care to explain that “the dismissal
       of a complaint, or the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal
10
   (1997) 1 SCC 57
11
   (1986) 2 SCC 709
12
   (2001) 2 SCC 570                                                             H
1138             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A           for the purposes of this section”. However, when a Magistrate
             conducts an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code and dismisses
             the complaint on merits, a second complaint on the same facts
             cannot be made unless there are very exceptional circumstances.
             Even so, a second complaint is permissible depending upon how
             the complaint happened to be dismissed at the first instance.
 B
                                       … ……
              12. If the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit but on default
       of the complainant to be present there is no bar in the complainant moving
       the Magistrate again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if
 C     the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on
       merits the position could be different. There appeared a difference of
       opinion earlier as to whether a second complaint could have been filed
       when the dismissal was under Section 203. The controversy was settled
       by this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar2. A
       majority of Judges of the three-Judge Bench held thus:
 D
             “An order of dismissal under Section 203, Criminal Procedure
             Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint
             on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional
             circumstances, e.g., where the previous order as passed on an
             incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
 E           complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where
             new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
             brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been
             adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after
             a decision has been given against the complaint upon a full
 F           consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given
             another opportunity to have his complaint inquired into.”
             S.K. Das, J. (as he then was) while dissenting from the said
             majority view had taken the stand that right of a complainant to
             file a second complaint would not be inhibited even by such
 G           considerations. But at any rate the majority view is that the second
             complaint would be maintainable if the dismissal of the first
             complaint was not on merits.”
                                                             (Emphasis supplied)

 H
            SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                 1139
             PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

      13.2. In Ranvir Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another13 the                A
issue was set out in para 23 of the decision and the discussion that
followed thereafter was as under:-
          “23. In the instant case, the question is narrowed down further as
          to whether such a second complaint would be maintainable when
          the earlier one had not been dismissed on merits, but for the failure   B
          of the complainant to put in the process fees for effecting service.
          24. The answer has been provided firstly in Pramatha Nath
          Talukdar case2 , wherein this Court had held that even if a
          complaint was dismissed under Section 203 CrPC, a second
          complaint would still lie under exceptional circumstances, indicated    C
          hereinbefore. The said view has been consistently upheld in
          subsequent decisions of this Court. Of course, the question of
          making a prayer for recalling the order of dismissal would not be
          maintainable before the learned Magistrate in view of Section
          362 CrPC, but such is not the case in these special leave petitions.
                                                                                  D
          25. In the present cases, neither have the complaints been dismissed
          on merit nor have they been dismissed at the stage of Section 203
          CrPC. On the other hand, only on being satisfied of a prima facie
          case, the learned Magistrate had issued process on the complaint.
          26. The said situation is mainly covered by the decision of this        E
          Court in Jatinder Singh case12, wherein the decision in Pramatha
          Nath Talukdar case2 was also taken into consideration and it
          was categorically observed that in the absence of any provision in
          the Code barring a second complaint being filed on the same
          allegation, there would be no bar to a second complaint being filed
          on the same facts if the first complaint did not result in the          F
          conviction or acquittal or even discharge of the accused, and if
          the dismissal was not on merit but on account of a default on the
          part of the complainant.”
      13.3. In Poonam Chand Jain and Another vs. Fazru14 the issue
whether after the dismissal of the earlier complaint had attained finality,       G
could a second complaint be maintained on identical facts was considered
as under:-

13
     (2009) 9 SCC 642
14
     (2010) 2 SCC 631                                                             H
1140      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A     “14. In the background of these facts, the question which crops
       up for determination by this Court is whether after an order of
       dismissal of complaint attained finality, the complainant can file
       another complaint on almost identical facts without disclosing in
       the second complaint the fact of either filing of the first complaint
       or its dismissal.
 B
       15. Almost similar questions came up for consideration before
       this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar2.
       The majority judgment in Pramatha Nath2 was delivered by Kapur,
       J. His Lordship held that an order of dismissal under Section 203
       of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) is, however,
 C     no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same
       facts but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances.
       This Court explained the exceptional circumstances as:
          (a) where the previous order was passed on incomplete record,
          or
 D
          (b) on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint, or
          (c) the order which was passed was manifestly absurd, unjust
          or foolish, or
          (d) where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence,
 E        have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings.
       16. This Court in Pramatha Nath2 made it very clear that interest
       of justice cannot permit that after a decision has been given on a
       complaint upon full consideration of the case, the complainant
       should be given another opportunity to have the complaint enquired
 F     into again. In para 50 of the judgment the majority judgment of
       this Court opined that fresh evidence or fresh facts must be such
       which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought on
       record. This Court very clearly held that it cannot be settled law
       which permits the complainant to place some evidence before the
       Magistrate which are in his possession and then if the complaint
 G
       is dismissed adduce some more evidence. According to this Court,
       such a course is not permitted on a correct view of the law. (para
       50, p. 899)
       17. This question again came up for consideration before this Court
       in Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur12. There also this Court by
 H
            SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                 1141
             PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

         relying on the principle in Pramatha Nath2 held that there is no         A
         provision in the Code or in any other statute which debars a
         complainant from filing a second complaint on the same allegation
         as in the first complaint. But this Court added when a Magistrate
         conducts an enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and dismisses
         a complaint on merits a second complaint on the same facts could
                                                                                  B
         not be made unless there are “exceptional circumstances”. This
         Court held in para 12, if the dismissal of the first complaint is not
         on merit but the dismissal is for the default of the complainant
         then there is no bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts.
         However, if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of
         the Code was on merit the position will be different.                    C
         18. Saying so, the learned Judges in Ranjit Kaur12 held that the
         controversy has been settled by this Court in Pramatha Nath2
         and quoted the observation of Kapur, J. in para 48 of Pramatha
         Nath2: (AIR p. 899, para 48)
             “48. … An order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal       D
             Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a
             second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained
             only in exceptional circumstances e.g. where the previous order
             was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding
             of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd,          E
             unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with
             reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the
             previous proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to
             be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given
             against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case,
             he or any other person should be given another opportunity to        F
             have his complaint enquired into.”
         19. Again in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy15, a three-
         Judge Bench of this Court considered this question in para 19 at
         p. 740 of the Report. The learned Judges of this Court held that a
         second complaint is not completely barred nor is there any statutory     G
         bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts in a case where
         a previous complaint was dismissed without assigning any reason.
         The Magistrate under Section 204 of the Code can take cognizance
         of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for
15
     AIR 2003 SC 702                                                              H
1142             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A            proceeding. In Mahesh Chand15 this Court relied on the ratio in
              Pramatha Nath2 and held if the first complaint had been dismissed
              the second complaint can be entertained only in exceptional
              circumstances and thereafter the exceptional circumstances
              pointed out in Pramatha Nath2 were reiterated. Therefore, this
              Court holds that the ratio in Pramatha Nath2 is still holding the
 B
              field. The same principle has been reiterated once again by this
              Court in Hira Lal v. State of U.P.16 In para 14 of the judgment
              this Court expressly quoted the ratio in Mahesh Chand 15
              discussed hereinabove.
              20. Following the aforesaid principles which are more or less settled
 C            and are holding the field since 1962 and have been repeatedly
              followed by this Court, we are of the view that the second complaint
              in this case was on almost identical facts which was raised in the
              first complaint and which was dismissed on merits. So the second
              complaint is not maintainable. This Court finds that the core of
 D            both the complaints is the same. Nothing has been disclosed in the
              second complaint which is substantially new and not disclosed in
              first complaint. No case is made out that even after the exercise
              of due diligence the facts alleged in the second complaint were
              not within the of the first complainant. In fact, such a case could
              not be made out since the facts in both the complaints are almost
 E            identical. Therefore, the second complaint is not covered within
              exceptional circumstances explained in Pramatha Nath2. In that
              view of the matter the second complaint in the facts of this case,
              cannot be entertained.”
                                                             (Emphasised supplied)
 F
             13.4. In Udai Shankar Awasthi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
       and Another17, where the earlier complaint was dismissed after the
       examination of witnesses on behalf of complainant, the matter was dealt
       with as under:-

 G            “47. The instant appeals are squarely covered by the observations
              made in Kishan Singh18 and thus, the proceedings must be labelled
              as nothing more than an abuse of the process of the court,

       16
          (2009) 11 SCC 89
       17
          (2013) 2 SCC 435
       18
 H        (2010) 8 SCC 775 (Kishan Singh vs. Gurpal Singh)
         SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                   1143
          PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

       particularly in view of the fact that, with respect to enact the          A
       same subject-matter, various complaint cases had already been
       filed by Respondent 2 and his brother, which were all dismissed
       on merits after the examination of witnesses. In such a fact
       situation, Complaint Case No. 628 of 2011 filed on 31-5-2001 was
       not maintainable. Thus, the Magistrate concerned committed a
                                                                                 B
       grave error by entertaining the said case, and wrongly took
       cognizance and issued summons to the appellants.”
      13.5. In Ravinder Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh and Others19 the
matter was considered from the standpoint whether a frustrated litigant
be permitted to give vent to his frustration and whether a person be
permitted to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. The               C
discussion was as under:-
       “26. While considering the issue at hand in Shivshankar Singh
       v. State of Bihar20 this Court, after considering its earlier judgments
       in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar2, Jatinder
       Singh v. Ranjit Kaur 12 , Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan                    D
       Reddy15 and Poonam Chand Jain v. Fazru21 held: (Shivshankar
       Singh case20, SCC p. 136, para 18)
          “18. … it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or
          entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts
          provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis           E
          of insufficient material or the order has been passed without
          understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts
          could not be placed before the court or where the complainant
          came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint
          which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However,            F
          second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier
          complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the
          case of the complainant on merit.”
       27. In Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh 22 this Court has
       held that it is equally true that chagrined and frustrated litigants      G
       should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by enabling
       them to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts in a cheap manner.
19
   (2013) 9 SCC 245
20
   (2012) 1 SCC 130
21
   (2004) 13 SCC 269
22
   (1982) 1 SCC 466                                                              H
1144            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A           In such a fact situation, the court must not hesitate to quash criminal
             proceedings.
                                       ………
             33. The High Court has dealt with the issue involved herein and
             the matter stood closed at the instance of Respondent 1 himself.
 B           Therefore, there can be no justification whatsoever to launch
             criminal prosecution on that basis afresh. The inherent power of
             the court in dealing with an extraordinary situation is in the larger
             interest of administration of justice and for preventing manifest
             injustice being done. Thus, it is a judicial obligation on the court to
 C           undo a wrong in course of administration of justice and to prevent
             continuation of unnecessary judicial process. It may be so
             necessary to curb the menace of criminal prosecution as an
             instrument of operation of needless harassment. A person cannot
             be permitted to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.
             Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in the inherent power of the court
 D           and the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice
             for which the courts exist. Thus, it becomes the paramount duty
             of the court to protect an apparently innocent person, not to be
             subjected to prosecution on the basis of wholly untenable
             complaint.”
 E            14. The application of the principles laid down in Taluqdar2 in
       Jatinder Singh 12 shows that “a second complaint is permissible
       depending upon how the complaint happened to be dismissed at
       the first instance”. It was further laid down that “if the dismissal of
       the complaint was not on merit but on default of the complainant to
 F     be present there is no bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate
       again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal
       of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code was on merits the
       position could be different”.
             To similar effect are the conclusions in Ranvir Singh13 and
 G     Poonam Chand Jain14. Para 16 of the Poonam Chand Jain14 also
       considered the effect of para 50 of the majority judgment in Talukdar2.
       These cases, therefore, show that if the earlier disposal of the complaint
       was on merits and in a manner known to law, the second complaint on
       “almost identical facts” which were raised in the first complaint would
       not be maintainable. What has been laid down is that “if the core of
 H
         SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                                    1145
          PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

both the complaints is same”, the second complaint ought not to be                A
entertained.
       15. If the facts of the present matter are considered in the light of
these principles, it is clear that paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 in the first complaint
contained the basic allegations that the vehicle belonging to the father
was sold after the death of the father; that signatures of the father on          B
Form 29 and 30 were forged; that signatures on the affidavit annexed
with Form 29 and 30 were also forged; and that on the basis of such
forged documents the benefit of “sale consideration of the vehicle”
was derived by the accused. The order dated 5.7.2013 passed by the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, shows that after considering the evidence
and documents produced on behalf of the complainant, no primafacie                C
case was found and the complaint was rejected under Section 203 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The stand taken before the
Revisional Court discloses that at that stage some new facts were said
to be in possession of the complainant and as such liberty was sought to
withdraw the Revision with further liberty to file a fresh complaint. The         D
liberty was not given and it was observed that if there were new facts,
the complainant, in law would be entitled to present a new complaint and
as such there was no need of any permission from the Court. The
Revisional Court was definitely referring to the law laid down by this
Court on the basis of the principles in Taluqdar2. Thereafter a complaint
with new material in the form of a credit note and Registration Certificate       E
was filed. The core allegations, however, remained the same. The only
difference was that the second complaint referred to additional material
in support of the basic allegations. Again, in terms of principle laid down
in para 50 of Taluqdar2 as amplified in para 16 in Poonam Chand
Jain14, nothing was stated as to why said additional material could not           F
be obtained with reasonable diligence.
       16. Reliance was, however, placed by Ms. Meenakshi Arora,
learned Senior Advocate, on para 18 of the decision of this Court in
Shivshankar Singh20.In that case a Protest Petition was filed by the
complainant even before a final report was filed by the police. While             G
said Protest Petition was pending consideration, the final report was
filed, whereafter second Protest Petition was filed. Challenge raised by
the accused that the second Protest Petition was not maintainable, was
accepted by the High Court. In the light of these facts the matter came
to be considered by this Court as under:-
                                                                                  H
1146             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 2 S.C.R.


 A           “7. Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the
             appellant has submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate
             that the so-called first protest petition having been filed prior to
             the filing of the final report was not maintainable and just has to
             be ignored. The learned Magistrate rightly did not proceed on the
             basis of the said protest petition and it remained merely a document
 B
             in the file. The second petition was the only protest petition which
             could be entertained as it had been filed subsequent to the filing of
             the final report…......
             18. Thus, it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or
             entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts
 C           provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of
             insufficient material or the order has been passed without
             understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts
             could not be placed before the court or where the complainant
             came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint
 D           which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, the
             second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier
             complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case
             of the complainant on merit.
             19. The protest petition can always be treated as a complaint and
 E           proceeded with in terms of Chapter XV CrPC. Therefore, in case
             there is no bar to entertain a second complaint on the same facts,
             in exceptional circumstances, the second protest petition can also
             similarly be entertained only under exceptional circumstances. In
             case the first protest petition has been filed without furnishing the
             full facts/particulars necessary to decide the case, and prior to its
 F           entertainment by the court, a fresh protest petition is filed giving
             full details, we fail to understand as to why it should not be
             maintainable.”                                  (Emphasis supplied)
               17. As against the facts in Shivshankar20, the present case stands
       on a different footing. There was no legal infirmity in the first complaint
 G     filed in the present matter. The complaint was filed more than a year
       after the sale of the vehicle which meant the complainant had reasonable
       time at his disposal. The earlier complaint was dismissed after the Judicial
       Magistrate found that no prima facie case was made out; the earlier
       complaint was not disposed of on any technical ground; the material
 H     adverted to in the second complaint was only in the nature of supporting
         SAMTA NAIDU & ANR. v. STATE OF MADHYA                               1147
          PRADESH & ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

material; and the material relied upon in the second complaint was not       A
such which could not have been procured earlier. Pertinently, the core
allegations in both the complaints were identical. In the circumstances,
the instant matter is completely covered by the decision of this Court in
Taluqdar 2 as explained in Jatinder Singh 12 and Poonam Chand
Jain14. The High Court was thus not justified in holding the second
                                                                             B
complaint to be maintainable.
       18. In the aforesaid premises, we allow these appeals, set aside
the decision of the High Court and dismiss Complaint Case No.9226 of
2014 as not being maintainable. The amount deposited by the appellants
shall now be returned to them along with any interest accrued thereon.
                                                                             C

Ankit Gyan                                                 Appeals allowed




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