SAMPATH KUMARversusINSPECTOR OF POLICE, KRISHNAGIRI

                     [2012) 2 S.C.R. 289


                     SAMPATH KUMAR                                A
                              V.
         INSPECTOR OF POLICE, KRISHNAGIRI
           (Criminal Appeal No. 1950 of 2009)

                      MARCH 2, 2012
                                                                  8
     rr.s. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]
      Penal Code, 1860 - s 302 rlw s. 34 - Murder - Prosecution
for - No eye-witness - Conviction by courts below - Based on
ocular testimony of a witness and motive - Held: Conviction       C
not justified - Evidence of the witness being in contrast with
his police statement and not having independent
corroboration, not reliable - Motive by itself cannot be a
ground for conviction - However, in the facts of the case, even
motive did not suNive.                                            D

    Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Motive - Evidentiary
value - Held: Motive by itself cannot be basis for conviction.

    Criminal Trial - Discrepancies and contradictions in
evidence - Distinction between.                                   E

     The appellants-accused were prosecuted for having
caused death of one person. There was no eye-witness
to the incident. The prosecution case was that the
deceased had a love affair with the sister of one of the          F
accused which was not approved by two of the accused.
The trial court convicted all the three accused relying on
the testimony of PW7 who stated that on the night of the
occurrence, he was sleeping with the deceased, and on
hearing a sound, when he woke up, he saw the accused              G
persons there. Trial court also based the conviction on
motive. High Court upheld the conviction. Hence the
present appeals.

                              289                                 H
    290       SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A         Allowing the appeals, th.e Court

        HELD: 1. The prosecution has not proved its case
   against the appellants. They are entitled to acquittal
   giving them the benefit of doubt. The prosecution relies
   entirely upon the deposition of PWs.1, 2, 3 and 7. Of these
.B
   depositions PWs. 1, 2 and 3 are not admittedly eye-
   witnesses to the occurrence, nor have they stated
   anything against the appellants except that the deceased
   was fond of sister of one of the accused and wanted to
 C marry her, which was not to the liking of her brother.
   [Paras 16 and 8] [297-F-G; 302-E]

         2. The statement made by PW7 is in complete
    contrast with the statement made by him before the
    Police where the witness stated nothing about having
D seen the appellants standing near the deceased around
    the time of the incident. This omission is of very vital
    character. What affects the credibility of the witness is
    that he did not in his version to the police come out with
    what according him was the truth, but withheld it for a
E period of five years till he was examined as a prosecution
    witness in the court. Reliance upon the deposition of a
    witness who has made such a material improvement in
    his version is wholly unsafe unless it is corroborated by
    some other independent evidence that may probabilize
F . his version. PW 7 is not a chance witness who had no
    reason to be found near the deceased at the time of the
    occurrence. What makes it suspect is that the witness
    has, despite being a natural witness, made a substantial
    improvement in the version without there being any
G acceptable explanation for his silence in regard to the fact
    and matters which was in his knowledge and which
    would make all the difference in the case. The Court
    would, therefore, look for independent corroboration to
    his version, which corroboration is not forthcoming. All
    that is brought on record by the prosecution is the
H
  SAMPATH KUMAR v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                 291
              KRISHNAGIRI
presence of a strong motive but that by itself is n·ot          A
enough to support a conviction especially in a case
where the sentence can be capital punishment. [Paras 13,
8 and 14] [297-H; 298-A; 300-A-B; 301-A-C]

     Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116: 1985 (1) SCR 88; Aftab Ahmad Ansari
                                                                8
v. State of Uttaranchal (2010) 2 SCC 583: 2010 (1) SCR
1027; Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 2000 SC 3352:2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 104;
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj and Anr. AIR 1999
SC 3916 :1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 286; State of Haryana v.           C
Gurdial Singh and Pargat Singh AIR 1974 SC 1871: 1974
(3) SCR 6; Kehar Singh and Ors. v. State Delhi
Administration AIR 1988 SC 1883: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24
- relied on.
                                                                D
    3. Although, according to the appellants the question
of one the appellants having the motive to harm the
deceased for falling in love with his sister, did not survive
once the family had decided to offer her in matrimony to
the deceased. Yet even assuming that the appellant had          E
a motive for physically harming the deceased, that may
be an important circumstance in a case based on
circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place of
conclusive proof that the person concerned was the
author of the crime. One could even say that the presence
                                                                F
of motive in the facts and cir.cumstances of the case
creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but
suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute
for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Para 15] [302-A-D]
                                                                G
     N.J. Suraj v. State represented by Inspector of Police
(2004) 11 SCC346; Santosh Kumar Singh v. State through
CBI. (2010) 9 SCC 747: 2010 (13) SCR 901; Rukia Begum
v. State of Kamataka AIR 2011 SC 1585: 2011 (4 ) SCR 711;
Sunil Rai @ Paua and Ors. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh        H
    292      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A   AIR 2011 SC 2545- relied on.

        Vadive/u Thevar v. The State of Madras AIR 1957 SC
    614: 1957 SCR981; Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand AIR
    2003 SC 854: 2003 (1) SCR 1 - referred to.
B                        Case Law Reference:

      1985 (1) SCR 88                 Relied on         Para 6

      2010 (1) SCR 1027               Relied on         Para 7

c · 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 104           Relied on         Para 9

      1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 286      . Relied on          Para 10

      1974 (3) SCR 6                  Relied on         Para 10

      1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24          Relied on         Para 11
D
      1957 SCR 981                    Referred to       Para 12

      2003 (1) SCR 1                  Referred to       Para 13

      2004 (11) sec 346               Relied on         Para 14
E                                     Relied on         Para 14
      2010 (13) SCR 901

      2011 (4) SCR 711                Relied on         Para 14
                                                                    _,

      AIR 2011 SC 2545                Relied on         Para 14,,

F       CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1950 of 2009.

      From the -Judgment & Order dated 30.04.2009 of the High
  Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 1008 of
G 2007.

                               WITH

    Crl. A. Nos. 66 & 1205 of 2010.

H         K. Kanagaraj, P. Ramesh, Y. Arunagiri, Rakesh K.
   SAMPATH KUMAR v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                    293
               KRISHNAGIRI
Sharma, P. Vinay Kumar, V. Ramasubramaninan for the                 A
Appellant.

    M, Anbalagan (for B. Balaji) for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                    B
    T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. These appeals by special leave call
in question the correctness of an order dated 30th April 2009
passed by the High Court of Madras, whereby Criminal Appeal
No. 1008 of 2007 filed by the appellants against their conviction
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC has been                 c
dismissed and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded
to them by the trial Court upheld.

      2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is as under: The
appellants, namely, Shanmugam, Velu and Sampath Kumar
were close friends of the deceased-Senthil Kumar and Palani D
(PW7). Appellant-Velu has a younger sister, named, Us.ha who,
according to the prosecution story, had fallen in love with the
deceased-Senthil Kumar and wanted to marry him. Appellant-
Velu did not approve of the said relationship and had asked
appellant-Shanmugan to convey to the deceased-Senthil E
Kumar to keep off Usha or else he would break his hands and
legs. In July 2002, appellant-Velu appears to have come on
leave from his army services and during this period he and his
mother-Balammal are said to have informed Murugambal
(PW2)- mother of the deceased, sister-Lakshmi (PW3) and her F
husband-Selvam (PW1) that they had decided to give Usha in
marriage to the deceased-Senthil Kumar. Further discussion
regarding the marriage was, however, deferred till the passing
 of the Tamil month Adi, considered inauspicious for finalisation
 of matrimonial alliance. On 27th July, 2002 i.e. two days after G
the marriage proposal was made, Ramesh (PW9) was
 employed to paint the house of Lakshmi (PW3) when he saw
 the deceased-Senthil Kumar and Usha embracing one another
 in one of the rooms of the house. According to Ramesh (PW9),
 even the appellant-Shanmugam saw Usha and Senthil Kumar H
     294       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A in a .romantic embrace. The appellant-Shanmugam was also,
      according to the prosecution, one of the suitors of Usha and
      had a one-sided affection for her. On the following day, i.e. 28th
     July, 2002 PWs. 1 to 3, their neighbour and the appellant-
     Shanmugam went to a theatre to see a movie and retuned
B home around 9.30 p.m. While Selvam (PW1 ), Murugambal
     (PW2) and Lakshmi (PW3) retired to bed inside the house after
     dinner, the deceased-Senthil Kumar and Palani (PW?) slept as
     usual in the verandah of the house. The appellant-Shanmugam
     also used to sleep with them but for some reason he did not
c turn up to do so on that day. At about 2.45 a.m. on the night
     intervening 28th and 29th July, 2002, Palani (PW?) heard the
     sound of a stone being thrown. He woke up to see the appellant-
     Shanmugam standing near the head of the deceased and the
     remaining two appellants also standing close by. The
     prosecution case is that Palani (PW?) was threatened by the
0
     appellants not to disclose to anyone regarding anything for
     otherwise they would kill him also. At this, Palani (PW?) shouted
     and ran to hide himself on the rear side of the house. In the
     meantime, PWs 1 to 3 who were sleeping inside the house also
     awoke upon hearing the noise and started shouting for help.
E This woke up their neighbour (PW8) in the opposite house who
    went over to the house and opened the door to help them come
    out. PWs 1 and 8 then went to the rear side of the house to
    find the appellant-Shanmugam lying beside a plantain tree with
    his hands tied with a cloth. It was also noticed on removing the
F · blanket covering the deceased that someone had smashed his
    head with a stone which was lying at his side. When the
    appellant-Shanmugam was asked as to who had beaten him
    and thrown him behind the house, he stated that it was some
    stranger who had done so. Senthil was rushed to the hospital
G but died en-route. Selvam (PW1) went to the police station and
    lodged an oral complaint. The police registered a case under
    Sections 302 and 324 IPC.

      3. After completion of the investigation the police filed a
H charge-sheet against the appellants accusing them of
   SAMPATH KUMAR v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                 295
         KRISHNAGIRI [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
committing the murder of Senthil Kumar. The appellants were A
then committed to the Sessions Judge, where they pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial. At the trial the prosecution examined
as many as 18 witnesses to prove its case. The Sessions
Judge eventually came to the conclusion that the prosecution
had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and accordingly B
convicted the appellants for the murder of the deceased-Senthil
Kumar and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. They were also
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each and in default of
payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for   c
two years. The Sessions Judge based his conviction primarily
on the strong motive which appellants _Shanmugam and Velu
had to do away with the deceased due to his love affair with
Usha. The Sessions Judge relied heavily upon the deposition
of Palani (PW7) and the letter Exh. P-22 allegedly written by 0
appellant-Shanmugam to the mother of the deceased,
 Murugambal (PW2) accusing appellant-Velu to be the person
 responsible for the death of the deceased.

     4. Aggrieved by· their conviction and sentence imposed
upon them, the accused person. preferred Criminal Appeal E
No.1008/2007 before the High Court of Madras which appeal
has been dismissed thereby confirming the conviction and
sentence recorded by the trial Court. The High Court held that
while the deposition of Palani (PW7) was reliable, letter Exh.
P-22 allegedly written by the appellant-Shanmugam to the F
mother of the deceased, Murugambal (PW2) was not. The
confessional statement was held to be inadmissible having
been produced after the statement of the accused persons had
been recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Independent of the
said document, the High Court felt that the evidence on record G
formed a complete chain of circumstances that unerringly
pointed to the guilt of the appellants. The present appeals assail
the correctness of the said judgment as noticed above.

    5. Mr. K. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel for the         H
    296       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A   appellant strenuously argued that the trial Court as also the High
    Court had fallen in error in holding that the charge against the
    appellants had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He
    urged that the entire case was based on circumstantial
    evidence and that the courts below had failed to keep in view
B   the legal requirements attracted to cases that are based on
    circumstantial evidence. He further argued that the deposition
    of Palani (PW7) was not reliable for reasons more than one ·
    and the trial Court as also the High Court had committed an I
    error in ignoring those reasons. The fact that there was a
c   motive, assuming that any such motive had been established
    in the present case, was also not sufficient by itself to justify
    the conclusion that the appellants were responsible for the
    murder of the deceased.

        6. The legal position regarding the standard of proof and
D the test which the circumstantial evidence must satisfy is well-
  settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. It is unnecessary
  to burden this judgment by making reference to all such
  decisions. We are content with reference to some of those
  decisions. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
E Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, this Court laid down the
  following five tests to be satisfied in a case based on
  circumstantial evidence:

          "(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
F         is to be drawn should be fully established.

          (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with
          the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
          they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
          except that the accused is guilty.
G
          (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
          and tendency.

          (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except
          the one to be proved, and
H
   SAMPATH KUMAR v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                      297
         KRISHNAGIRI [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
    (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not           A
    to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
    consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
    show that in all human probability the act must have been
    done by the accused."
                                                                       B
     7. The decision of this Court in Aftab Ahmad Ansari v.
State of Uttaranchal (2010) 2 SCC 583 is a timely reminder
of the abovementioned requlrements in the following words:

      "In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn C
should, in the first instance, be fully established. Each fact must
be proved individually and only thereafter the court hould
consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each
one of which reinforces the conclusion of the guilt. If the
combined effect of all the facts taken together is conclusive in D
establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be
justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts,
by itself/themselves, is/are not decisive. The circumstances
proved should be such as to exclude every hypothesis except
the one sought to be proved. But this does not mean that E
before the prosecution case succeeds in a case of
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every
hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever extravagant
and fanciful it might be."

     8. Coming to the facts of the present case, the prosecution       F
relies entirely upon the deposition of PWs. 1, 2, 3 and 7. Of
these depositions PWs. 1, 2 and 3 are not admittedly eye-
witnesses to the occurrence, nor have they stated anything
against the appellants except that the deceased was fond of
Usha and wanted to marry her which was not to the liking of            G
her brother-Velu, the appellant before us. It is only the deposition
of Palani (PW7) that holds the key to whether the appellants
are guilty or innocent. According to this witness who was
sleeping with the deceased in the verandah of the house of
PWs 1 to 3, at about 2.45 a.m. at night he heard a sound that          H
    298       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A woke him up. He also noticed the appellants standing near the
  deceased. According to the witness, the appellants threatened
  him not to disclose anything to anyone otherwise he would meet
  the same fate. The witness, however, made no disclosure to
  PWs. 1, 2 and 3 who were inside the house, even when they
B had been woken up because of the sound and wanted to come
  out but could not because the door was bolted from outside.
  He made no disclosure of what he had seen even after the
  police had arrived at the scene after the registration of the case.
  In his statement before the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,
c Palani (PW?) made no such accusations against the
  appellants nor did he disclose to anyone that he had seen the
  accused persons on the spot around the time of the
  commission of the offence. It was only five years after the
  occurrence that the witness for the first time disclosed in the
  Court the story about his having seen the appellants standing
0
  near the deceased when the former woke up on account of the
  noise of a stone falling hard on the ground. The witness did not
  offer any explanation, much less a cogent and acceptable one
  for his silence for such a long period. His assertion that he was
  scared by the appellants even after they had been taken into
E custody by the police and, therefore, did not reveal anything
  about the actual events till he had the courage to come to the
  Court to make a statement, is hard to believe. At any rate,
  reliance upon the deposition of a witness who has made such
  a material improvement in his version is wholly unsafe unless
F it is corroborated by some other independent evidence that may
  probabilize his version.

       9. In Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. v. State of
  Maharashtra (AIR 2000 SC 3352), this Court held that while
G discrepancies in the testimony of a witness which may be
  caused by memory lapses were acceptable, contradictions in
  the testimony were not. This Court observed:

          "Only such omissions which amount to contradiction in
          material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony
H
   SAMPATH KUMAR v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                    299
         KRISHNAGIRI [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
    of the witness. The omission in the police statement by A
    itself would not necessarily render the testimony of witness
    unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the
    Court is different in material particulars from that disclosed
    in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution
    become doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions
                                                                   8
    are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses
    as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of
    observation differ from person to person."

     10. The difference between discrepancies and
contradictions was explained by this Court in State of Himachal C
Pradesh v. Lekh Raj and Anr. (AIR 1999 SC 3916). Reference
may also be made to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Gurdial Singh & Pargat Singh (AIR 1974 SC
1871), where the prosecution witness had come out with two
inconsistent versions of the occurrence. One of these versions D
was given in the Court while the other was contained in the
statement made before the Police. This Court held that these
are contradictory versions on which the conclusion of fact could
not be safely based. This Court observed:
                                                                  E
     "The present is a case wherein the prosecution witnesses
     have come out with two inconsistent versions of the
     occurrence. One version of the occurrence is contained in
     the evidence of the witnesses in court, while the other
     version is contained in their statements made before the
     police ... ln view of these contradictory versions, the High F
     Court, in our opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that
     the conviction of the accused could not be sustained."

     11. Reference may also be made to the decision of this
Court in Kehar Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration)        G
AIR 1988 SC 1883. This Court held that if the discrepancies
between the first version and the evidence in Court were
material, it was safer to err in acquitting than in convicting the
accused.
                                                                     H
     300      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 2 S.C.R.


 A       12. In the present case the statement made by Palani
   (PW?) is in complete contrast with the statement made by him
   before the Police where the witness stated nothing about
   having seen the appellants standing near the deceased around
   the time of the incident. This omission is of very vital character.
 8 What affects the credibility of the witness is that he did not in
   his version to the police come out with what according him is
   the truth, but withheld it for a period of five years till he was
   examined as a prosecution witness in the Court. This Court in
   Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)
 C classified witnesses into three categories, namely, (i) those that
   are wholly reliable, (ii) those that are wholly unreliable and (iii)
   who are neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the case
   of the first category the Courts have no difficulty in coming to
   the conclusion either way. It can convict or acquit the accused
   on the deposition of a single witness if it is found to be fully
 D reliable. In the second category also there is no difficulty in
   arriving at an appropriate conclusion for there is no question
   of placing any reliance upon the deposition of a wholly unreliable
   witness. It is only in the case of witnesses who are neither wholly
   reliable nor wholly unreliable that the Courts have to be
 E circumspect and have to look for corroboration in material
   particulars by reliable testimony direct or circumstantial.

         13. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Lallu
    Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, (AIR 2003 SC 854) where this
  F Court felt that the testimony of the witness Man nu (PW9) could
    neither be totally discarded nor implicitly accepted. Mannu was
    a witness who could have been naturally present with his
    brother while ploughing the field. However, his testimony was
    found to have been improved substantially at the trial. He was
. G considered neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

          14. In the present case the testimony cannot be wholly
     reliable or wholly unreliable. He is not a chance witness who
     had no reason to be found near the deceased at the time of
     the occurrence. There is evidence to show that Palani (PW?)
 H
     SAMPATH KUMAR v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,                     301
           KRISHNAGIRI [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
  used to sleep with the deceased-Senthil in the verandah of the       A
. house. What makes it suspect is that the witness has, despite
  being a natural witness, made a substantial improvement in the
  version without their being· any acceptable explanation for his
  silence in regard to the fact and matters which was in his
  knowledge and which would make all the difference in the case.       8
  The Court would, therefore, look for independent corroboration
  to his version, which corroboration is not forthcoming. All that
  is brought on record by the prosecution is the presence of a
  strong motive but that by itself is not enough to support a
  conviction especially in a case where the sentence can be            C
  capital punishment. In N.J. Suraj v. State represented by
  Inspector of Police (2004) 11 SCC 346, the prosecution case
  was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence and a motive.
  Having discussed the circumstances relied upon by the
  prosecution, this Court rejected motive which was the only
  remaining circumstance relied upon by the prosecution stating        D
  that the presence of a motive was not enough for supporting a
  conviction, for it is well-settled that the chain of circumstances
  should be such as to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is
  incompatible with the innocence of the accused. To the same
  effect is the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v.       E
   State through CBI. (2010) 9 SCC 747 and Rukia Begum v.
  State of Karnataka AIR 2011 SC 1585 where this Court held
  that motive alone in the absence of any other circumstantial
  evidence would not be sufficient to convict the appellant.
  Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in          F
  Sunil Rai @ Paua and Ors. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh
  (AIR 2011 SC 2545). This Court explained the legal position
  as follows:

      "In any event, motive alone can hardly be a ground for           G
      conviction. On the materials on record, there ll)ay be some
      suspicion against the accused but as is often said
      suspicion, howsoever, strong cannot take the place of
      proof."
                                                                       H
    302      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 2 S.C.R.


A      15. Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants
  the question of the appellant-Velu having the motive to harm
  the deceased-Senthil for falling in love with his sister, Usha did
  not survive once the family had cfecided to offer Usha in
  matrimony to the deceased-Senthil. Yet even assuming that the
8 appellant-Velu had not reconciled to the idea of Usha getting
  married to the deceased-Senthil, all that can be said was that
  the appellant-Velu had a motive for physically harming the
  deceased. That may be an important circumstance in a case
  based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place of
C conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of
  the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in
  the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong
  suspicion against the appellant but suspicion, howsoever
  strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the
   accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
0
       16. In the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view
  that the prosecution has not proved its case against the
  appellants who are, in our opinion, entitled to acquittal giving
  them the benefit of doubt. In the result, these appeals succeed
E and are hereby allowed. The appellants shall stand acquitted
  of the charges framed against them giving them the benefit of
  doubt.

    K.K.T.                                       Appeals allowed.