Holding

The detention order is set aside as it is based on stale grounds and fails to meet the statutory requirement of a reasonable prognosis of future misconduct, rendering the authority's satisfaction unreasonable.

Summary

The appellant, Kalpana K. Tripathi, challenged the detention of her husband under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986, on the ground that the detention order dated 23‑11‑2016 was based on incidents that occurred between 2002 and 2007, i.e., nine to fourteen years earlier. The detaining authority relied on four old FIRs involving land‑grabbing, conspiracy, cheating, kidnapping and extortion, despite the fact that three of those cases had already resulted in bail. The Supreme Court examined whether such stale facts could satisfy the statutory requirement of a "reasonable prognosis" of future misconduct prejudicial to public order and whether the authority’s subjective satisfaction was reasonable. It held that preventive detention must be based on recent, proximate conduct that indicates a likelihood of future disturbance of public order, and that reliance on stale incidents renders the satisfaction unreasonable and the order mala fide. Consequently, the Court set aside the detention order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

The validity of a preventive detention order under the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986 when the grounds relied upon are stale and remote in time.
Whether the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction complies with the statutory requirement of a reasonable prognosis of future misconduct.
The scope and limits of judicial review of preventive detention orders, including the consideration of malice in law.

Legislation cited

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986s. 3(2), s. 3(3)

Subjects

preventive detentionstale groundsjudicial reviewsubjective satisfactionpublic ordermalice in lawTelangana Prevention Actconstitutional liberty

Judgment

[2017] 4 S.C.R. 52

A SAMAARUNA
v.
,.
STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 885 of2017)
B. MAY03,2017
[S. A. BOBDE AND L. NAGESWARA RAO, JJ.]
Preventive Detention:
Detention under s. 3 (2) of Telangana Prevention of
c Dangero·us Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders,
Goondas, Immoral Tl·affic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986
- Propriety of - Held: The essential concept of preventive detention
is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something
he has done, but to prevent him from doing it - The power to detain
under 1986 Act can be exercised only for preventing a person fiwn
D
engaging in, or pursuing or taking some action which adversely
affects or is likely to affectthe maintenance ofpublic order - Though
the conduct and activities of the detenu in the past must be taken
into account, but only those activities so far back can be considered
which furnish a cause for preventive detention in the present - Jn
E the present case, detention order was passed on the grounds which
are stale and which could not have been considered as relevant for
arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu must be detained
- Detention order is set aside.
Judicial Review:
F Review of detention order - Scope of - Held: While reviewing
detention order, Court does not substitute its judgment for the
decision of the executive - But the Court has a duty to enquire that
the decision of the executive is made upoi1 matters laid down by the
statute as relevant for reaching such decision.
G Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The detention order mentions six cases. Two
incidents are about three to two years before the detention order
dated 23.11.2016. The other incidents are about 9 to 14 years
before the detention order. Peculiarly, though the first two
H
52
SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 53

incidents are mentioned, the detaining authority has not relied A
on them as grounds of detention. The detaining alithority has
relied on the four other cases as grounds of detention. The report
in these cases was apparently lodged in tlte year 2016 for some
reason best known to the police. However, that is not of much
.consequence since the FIR is in respect of incidents which are
B
,. old, 9 to l4 years old. [Paras 7, 8) [58-B-C; 59-A-B]
1.2. The detaining authority has pointedly referred to only
four offences of criminal conspiracy, cheating, kidnapping and
extortion. In three out of these four cases he has. been gra1ited
bail. The State accepted these orders. Each of them are beyond
9~years, up to 14 years, before the detention orders. The detaining
c
__ J!llJJtoEity has then gone to consider those grounds, to arrive at
the sathfaction that the detenu needs to be detained in 2016.
These grounds are so stale al1d mildewed that the exe1·cise of
the power of detention based on them appears ma/a fide in law.
[Paras 9, 10 and 11) (59-C-F) D
1.3. The four cases which are old and therefore, stale, pertain
to the period frotn 2002 to '2007. They pertain, to land grabbing
and hence, the Court is not inclined to consider the impact of
those cases Oil Public order etc. They ought to have been
excluded from consideration on the ground that they are stale E
and could not have been used to detain the detenu in the year
2016 under the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous.Activities of
Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral traffic
.Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 which empowers the
detaining authority to do so with a view to prevent a person from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of-public order. F
[Para 12) [59-G-H)
1.4. Mere reference to two other cases which are 2-J years
old cannot be considered as relevant and proximate grounds of
detention. The detaining authority itself has not done so. Every ,
statement in the detention order must be taken to have been G
made responsibly. Where the detaining authority has detailed 4
cases and stated that these have been considered as the grounds
of detention, it must be considered as true-speaking. Moreover,
.those incidents appeared to be cases of ordinary criminal trespass
H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A which would not, in any way, be of much significance since they
do not deal with the disruption of any public order.which is relevant
under the law dealing with preventive detention. [Para 13)
[60-B-C)
1.5.. The power to detain, under the Act of 1986 can be
B exercised only for preventing a person from engaging in, or
pursuing or taking some action which adversely affects or is likely
to affect adversely the maintenance of public order; or for
preventing him from making preparations for engaging in such
activities. There is little doubt that the conduct or activities of
the detenu in the past must be taken into account for coming to
c the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make preparations
for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a
pattern of criminal activities. There is no doubt that only activities
so far back can be considered as. furnish a cause for preventive
detention in the present. · That is, only those activities so far
D back in the past which lead to the conclusion that he is likely to
engage in or prepare to engage in such activities in the immediate
future can be taken into account. In any case, incidents which are
said to have taken place nine to fourteen years earlier, cannot
form the basis for being satisfied in .the present that the detenu
is going to engage in, or make preparation for engaging in such
E activities. [Para 15] [61-C-D)
Go/am Hussain alias Gama v. Commissioner of Police,
Calcutta and Ors. [1974] 3 SCR 613.: 1974 (4) SCC
530 - relied on.

F 1.6. Therefore, detention order was passed on grounds
which are stale and whic'h could not have been considered as
relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu
must be detained. The detention order must be based on a
reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on
his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
G The live and proximate link that must exist between the past
conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him must
be taken to have been snapped in this case. A detention order
which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an order
of punishme.nt for a crime, passed without a trial, though
H purporting to be an order of preve~tive detention. The essential
SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 55

concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person A
is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent
him from doing it. [Para 16] [62-B-D]
G Reddeiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Am:
[2011] 12 SCR 454 : 2012 (2) SCC 389; and P. U. Iqbal
v. Union of India and Ors. [1991) 3 Suppl. SCR 515 : B
1992 (1) sec 434 - relied on.
2.1. While reviewing a detention order, a co.urt does not
substitute its judgment for the decision of the executive.
Nonetheless, the Court has a duty to enquire that the decision of
the e~ecutive is made upon matters laid down by the statute as c
relevant for reaching such a decision. For what is at stake, is the
personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed to him by the Constitution
and of which he cannot be deprived, except for reasons laid down
by the law and for a purpose sanctioned by law. [Para 17)[62-E-F)
Macflinder Shivaji v. The Kin[{ AIR 1950 FC 129; D
Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and Others
[1975] 2 SCR 832 : 1975 (2) sec 81 - relied on.
2.2. In the present case, the authority has come to a
conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could
ever reach. A detaining authority must be taken to k~ow both, E
the purpose and the procedure of law. It is no answer to say that
the authority was satisfied~ Whe1:e the authority takes into accou.nt .
stale incidents' which have gone by, to seed it' would be safe to
infer t~,at the satisfaction .of the authority is not a genuine one.
[Para 21] [65-H; 66-A-B) .
. . .
F
T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerela and Ors. [1989) 3
SCR 945 : 1989 (4) SCC 741 - relied on.
2.3. ·The extent ·Of staleness of grounds in the present case
compels the Court to examine the aspect of malice in law. It is
not necessary to say that there was an actuai malicious intent in
G
making .a· wrong detention order. [Para 21) [66-B-C)
Smt. S.R, Venkataraman v. Union of India and Anr.
[1979) 2 SCR 202 : 1979 (2) SCC 491- relied on.
Shearer v. Shields {1914) AC 808 - referred to ..
H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

.I I
A 2.4. The influe~ce of the stale incidents in the detention
order is too pernicious to be ignored, and the. order must
therefore go; hoth od account of being vitiated due to malice in
law and for taking into account matters which ought not to have
been taken into account. [Para 23) [67-C)
B 2.5. There is another reason why the detention order is
unjustified. It was passed when the accused was in jail. His
custody in jail for the said offence was converted into custody
under the impugned detention order. The incident involved in
this offence is sometime in the year 2002-2003. The detenu could
not have been detained preventively by taking this stale incident
c into account, more so when he was in jail. [Para 24) [67-D) ·
Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors.
(1985) 4 sec 232 - relied on.
. " Case .Law Reference
D
J1974J 3 SCR 613 relied on Para 15
120111 12 SCR 454 relied on Para 16 ·
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 515 relied on Para 16
AIR 1950 FC 129 relied on Para 17
E
J1975J 2 SCR 832 relied on Para 18
J1989J 3 SCR 945 relied on Para 21
Jl979J 2 SCR 202 relied on Para 21
F (1914) AC 808 referred to Para 2l·
(1985) 4 sec 232 · ,. " '
relied on Para 24
CRlMINALAPPELLATE JlJRlSDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
885 of2017.
G From the Judgment and Order dated 22.03.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of
Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 43671 of2016.
- Vikas Singh, Vedula Ve.nkata Ramana, Sr. Advs, Anupam Lal Das,
Anirudh Singh, Krishanu Barua, Ad vs. for the Appellant.
H
SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 57

Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv, H. Venugopal, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, A
Mrityunjai Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. A, BOBDE, J. I. The appellant - the wife of the detenu, has
preferred this appeal against the impugned judgmen~ and order dated
22.03.2017 passed by _the High Court of Hyderabad in Writ Petition B
,- No.43671 of2016, whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition
challenging the order of detention dated 23.11.2016, issued against the
detenu by Respondent No.2-Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda
Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana.
2. The detenu has been charged for various offences which he c
had allegedly committed during the years 2002-2007. Four FIR's were
registered forthe said offences. He was admitted to bail in thr~e FIR's ..
In the fourth FIR Crime No. 221 of2016, he was arrested on 05.09.2016 .
.To prevent him from seeking bail, while in judicial custody he was detained
under the Telangana Prevention ofD~ngerousActivities of Bootleggers,
Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land D
GrabbersAct, 1986 (for short, the 'Act of 1986').
3. The Respondent-No.2 - Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda
Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana, passed an .order of
detention against the detenu on 23.11.2016 under section 3(2) of the Act
of 1986, for a unspecified period, from the date of service of the order E
on the detenu, and further directed that the detenu be lodged in Central .
Prison, Chenchalguda, Hyderabad.
4. The aforesaid detention order was acco1npanied by grounds
for detention of the same date. The grom1ds in the detention order carried
a statement informing the detenu of his right td'represent against the
F
order of detention to (i) the detaini.ng authority i.e. Commissioner of
Police, Rachakonda, (ii) the Chief Secretary to Government ofTelailgana
State, Hyderabad, (iii) the Advisory Board. ,
· 5. The Respondent No. I - State approved the aforesaid detention
order on 0l.l~.2016 under section 3(3) of the Act of 1986. The Advisory ··
Board reviewed the case ~n 02.01.20 I7 _and opined that "there is sufficient G
cause for the detention of Sama Sanjeeva Reddy". After the report of
the Advisory Board, the respondent-State confirmed the detention order
on 15.02.2017. Being aggrieved, the appellant- the wife approachi::d the
High·Court by filing a writ petition which was dismissed. Hence, this
~.appeal. · ···, · · H .·
';·"'"'' .
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A 6. The main contention of Mr. Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellant, is that the grounds of detention are st~le .
.. They are based on the incidents which are said to hav.e occurred between
the period from 2002 to 2007 and are relied on by the detaining authority
. while forming its opinion and recording its satisfaction that the detenu.
needs to be detained on 23.11.2016.
B . . .
7. The aforesaid contention of Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant, may be examined with reference to the detention order.
The detention order mentions six cases as follows:
SI. Case No. Date of Date of 0 ffences under
c No.
Incident Reporting IPC
the incident .

I. Crime No.554/2013 26.9.2013 21.11.2013 447,427,506

2 .. Crime No.8/2014 .21.11.2014 23.11.2015 447,427

D
J. bime No.361/2016 2007. 13.08.2016 363, 3 84, 420,
120B, Section 4 of
AP LG Act and 25
I (B) of the Arms
A ct.

E 4. :Crime No.362/2016 2007 13.08.2016 363, 3 84, 420,
120B,·Section 4 of
.
AP LG Act and 25
I (B) of the Arms
A ct.

F 5. :Crime No.367/2016 2005 17.08.2016 363, 384, 420,
120B, Section 4 of
AP LG Act and 25
I (B) of the Arms
A ct.

6 .. :Crime No.221/2016 2002-03 05.09.2016 419, 420, 468,
G 363' 452, 323,
342, 386, 505 r/w
-·;·
1208, Section 4 of
AP LG Act and 25
I (B) of the Arms
Act
H
/

SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 59
[S. A. BOBDE, J.]

8..The first two incidents are about three to two years before the A
detention order dated 23.11.2016. The other incidents are about 9 to 14
years before the detention order. Peculiarly, though the first two incidents
are mentioned, ti1e detaining authority has not relied on them as grounds ·
of detention. The detaining authority has relied on the four other cases ·
which are item nos.3 to 6 as grounds of detention. The report in these
B
cases was apparently lodged in-the year 2016 for some reason best
known to the police. However, that is not of much consequence since
the FIR is in respect of incidents which are old, 9 to 14 years old. It is
their relevance to a grossly belated order of detention which we have to
consider.
9. The detaining authority has pointedly referred to only four
c
offences of criminal conspiracy, cheating, kidnapping and extortion, in
the limits of Pahadishareef Police Station andAdibatla Police Station of
Rachakonda Commissionerate. In three out of these four cases he has
been granted bail. The State accepted these orders.
10. Each of them are beyond 9 years, up to 14 years, before the D
detention orders. They have been considered under a sub-heading which
is as follows:
"THE FOLLOWING FACTS OF THE (4) CASES
CONSIDERED AS GROUNDS FOR DETENTION WHICH
WERE COMMITTED BY YOU IN THE RECENT PAST, E
WOULD PROVE YOUR ACTIVITY PREJUDICIAL TO THE
MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER."
11. The detaining authority has then gone to consider those grounds,
to arrive at the satisfaction that the detenu needs to be detained in 2016.
These grounds are so stale and mildewed that the exercise of the power F
of detentio11 based on them appears mala fide in law.
12. The four cases which are old and therefore, stale, pertain to
the period from 2002 to 2007. They petiain to land grabbing and hence,
we are not inclined to consider the impact of those cases on public order
etc. We are satisfied that they ought to have been excluded from G
consideration on the ground that they are stale and could not have been
used to detain the detenu in the year 2016 under the Act of 1986 which
empowers the detaining authority to do so with a view to pi·event a
person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order.
H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A 13. We are not inclined to accept the justification offered by Mr.
Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents,'that the mere reference to two other cases which are 2-3
years old should be,considered as relevant and proximate grounds of
detention, though the detaining authority itselfhas not done so. Every
statement in the detention order must be taken to have been 'made
B
responsibly. Where the detaining authority has detailed 4 cases and stated
that these have been considered as the grounds of detention it must be
considered as true-speaking. Moreover, those incidents appeared to be
cases of ordinary criminal trespass which would not, in any way, be of
much significance since they do not deal with the disruption of any p_ublic
c order which is relevant under the law dealing with preventive detention.
14. Section 3( I) confers the power of detention in the following•
terms:-
."](]). The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any
boot-legger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral tra}jic
D offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order.directing
that such person be detained. " '- 1
..

The purpose for which a detention order may be passed is confined
E to 'preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order'.
The term "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order" is further defined as follows:-
"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
F
(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order" means when a bootlegger, a dacoit, a drug-
offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or a, land-
gfabber is engaged or is making"·preparations for engaging,
bl any of his activities as such, !Vhich affect adversely, or are
likely to affect adverselY, the maintenance of public order:
Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order
shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be'
, '--, -- deemed likely to be affe~ted adversely inter a/ia, if any of the
activities of any ?f the persons referred tq in this clause
H
SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 61
rs. A. BOBDE, J.l
directly, or indirectly, is causintI or calculated to cause any A
harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the
general public or any section thereof or a grave wide sprep__d
danger to life or public health: "
A person may be detained under the Act of 1986 with a view to
prevent him from engaging in, or making preparations for engaging, in B
any such activities.
15. Obviously, therefore; the power to detain, urider the Act of
1986 can be exercised only for preventing a person from engaging in, or
pursuing or taking some action which adversely affects or is likely to
affect advers~ly the maintenance of public order; or for preventing him c
from making preparations for engaging in such activities. There is little
doubt that the conduct or activities'1of the detenu in the past must be
taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage
·in or make preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such
persons follow a pattern of crimirtal activities. But the question is how
far back? There is 110 doubt that only activities so far back can be D
considered as furnish a cause for preventive detention in the present.
That is, only those activities so far back in the past which lead to the
conclusion that he is likely to engage in or prepare to engage in such
activities in the immediate future can be taken into account. In Golam
·Hussain alias Gama v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Ors, 1, this E
Court observed as follows:-
"No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied,
subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because
long ago· the ·detenu had done something evil. To rule
otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory F
requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months
of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the
·acts re/ted on, grave and determined or less serious and
corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the
reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like
information ofparticipation being available only in the cpurse G
of an investigation. We have to investigate whether the causal
. connection has been broken in the circumstaiids of each
case." ""'
ti

\
1
(1974)4 sec 530
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Suffice it to say that in any case, incidents which are said to have
taken place nine to fourteen years earlier, cannot form the basis for
being satisfied in the present that the detenu is going to engage in, or
make preparation for engaging in such activities.
16. We are, therefore, satisfied that the aforesaid detention order
B was passed on grounds which are stale and which could not have been
considered as relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the
detenu must be detained. The detention order must be based on a
reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his
past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The live and
proximate link that must exist between the past conduct of a person aud
c the imperative need to detain him must IJe taken to have been snapped in
this case. A detention order which is founded on stale incidents, must
be r(,':garded as an order of punislmient for a crime, passed without a
trial, though purporting to be an order of preventive detention. The essential
concept.of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to
D punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it.
See G Reddeiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.', and
P. U. Iqbal v. Union of India _and Ors. ·1
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
17. While reviewing a detention order, a court does not substitute
E its judgment for the decision of the executive. Nonetheless, the Court
has a duty to enquire .that the decision of the executive is made upon
matters laid down by the statute as relevant for reaching such a decision.
For what is at stake, is the personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed to him
by the Constitution and of which he cmmot be deprived, except for
reasons laid down by the law and for a purpose sanctioned by law. As
F early as in Machinder Shivaji v. The King\ this Court observed:-
" ...... and it would be a serious derogation from that
responsibility if the Court were lo substitute its judgment for
the satisfaction of the executive authority and, to that end,
undertake an investigation of the sufficiency of the materials
G on which such satisfaction was grounded.
The Court can, however, examine the grounds disclosed
by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object
2 (2012)'2sec 389
'(1992) 1 sec 434
H 'AIR 1950 FC 129
SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR . 63
. [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

which the legislation has in view, namely, the prevention of A
acts prejudicial to public safety and tranquility, for
"satisfaction" in this connection must be grounded on material
which is of rationally probative value. "
Later, in the case of Khudiram Das vs. The State of West Bengal
and Others5 , while considering the judicial reviewability of the subjective 8
satisfaction of the detaining authority, the Court surveyed the area withii1
which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can be subjected to judicial
scrutiny in the following paragraphs:-
" 9. .. ..... There are several grounds evolved by judicial
decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is arrived c
at by the authority as required under the statute. The simplest
case is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all;
in such a case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as .
regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be
satisfied. Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji is a case in point. Then
there may be a case where the power is exercised dishonestly D
or for an improper purpose: such a case would also negative
the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The
existence of 'Improper purpose', that is, a purpose not
contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an
independent ground of control in several decided cases. The E
satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority
itself, and therefore, if in exercising the powe1; the authority
has acted under the dictation of another body as the
Commissioner of Police did in Commissioner of Police v.
Gordhandas Bharl}i and the officer of the Ministry of Labour
and National Service did in Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister F
of Labour and National Service, the exercise of the power
would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be
vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from applying
its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created
rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction said G
to have been arrived at by the authority would also be bad
where it is based on the application of a wrong test or the
misconstruction of a statute. Where this happens, the
satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect of the
'(1975)2SCC81
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201.7] 4 S.C.R.

A thing in regard to which it Js required to be satisfied. Then
again the .satisfaction must be grounded. 'on materials which .
are of rationally probative:._value'. Machinder v. King ..The
grounds on ., . which the satisfaction is based must be such as a
rationaThuman being can consider connected with the fact
in respect of w/:lich the satisfaction is to be reached: They
B
must be relevant to the subject-mailer of the inquiry and must
not be extraneous to _the scope and purpose of the statute. If
the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the
best of intention: as a relevant factor something which it could
not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to
c . exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should
be exercised, the exercise of the power. would be bad. "
18. This Court then dealt with the review of administrative findings
which are not supported with substantial eviden~e in the following
paragraphs ofKhudiram Das"(supra):- ·
D "JO. ... :.. But in England and in India, the courts stop-short
at merely iliquiring whether the grounds on which the
authority has reached its subjective satisfaction are such that
any reasonable person could possibly arrive at such
satisfaction. "If'', to use the words of Lord Greene, M R., in
E Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v, Wed,nesbury
Corporation words which have found approval ofthe House
of Lords in Sii1ith v. Rest Eller Rural District Counciland
Fawce(t Proper,ties Ltd. l< Buckingham Cowity Council - 'the
authority has come to a ·conclusion so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the
F courts c'an interfere". Jn such a case, a legitimate inference
may fairly be drawn either that the authority "did not honestly
form that' view or that in forming it, he could not have applied
his mind to the relevant facts' ... ....
11. This discussion is sufficient to show that" there is nothing
G like unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability.
The truth is that in a Government under law, there can be no
such thing as unreviewable discretion. "Law has reached its
finest moments", said Justice Douglas, "when it has freed
man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler,. some... official,
H
SAMA ARUNA v, STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 65
[S. A. BOBDE, J.]

some bureaucrat.... Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It A
is more destructlve of freedom thel].any of man :S other
·inventions". United States v. Wunderlich and this is much more .
so in a case where personal liberty is involved. That is why
the courts have· devised various 1i1ethods of judicial COIJtrol
· So .that power i11 the hands of an individual officer or authority · B
. is .not misused or abused or exercised ar"bitrarily or without
any justifiable _grounds. "
19. Incidents which are old and stale and in wh.ich the detenu has
been granted bail, cannot be said to have·any relevance for detaining.a
citizen and depriving him ofhis liberty without a trial. This Court observed
the following in the case of Khudiram Das (Supra): c
"The grounds on which..the satisfaction is based must be
such as a rational human being can e<1nsider connected with
the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached.
They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and .
must not be extraneous to the scope andpurposeofthestatute. D
· If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with
the best of intenti~n. as a relevant factor something which it
· could not properly take into acco11nt in dec,iding whether or
not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it
should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad E
Partap Singh v. State of Punjab. If there are to be found in
the statute expressly or by implication matters which the .
authority ought to have regard to them; in exercising the power,
. the 'authority must hGYe regard to those matters. The authority
· must call .its attention to the matters which it is .boun.d to
consider: " . F
20. We are of the yiew, that the detention order in this case is
vitiated by taking into account incidents so fa~ back in the past as would
have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial.
The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to
which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to · G
have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and tnust be treated ·
as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statut~. · · ·
21. In this case, we find the authority has come to a conclusion so
uilreasona.~Je that no reasonable authority could ever reach. A detaining
H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A authority must be taken to know both, the purpose and the procedure of
law. It is no answer to say that the authority was satisfied. Jn TA.
Abdul Rahman v. State ofKerela and Ors. 6 , this Court observed, where
the authority takes into account stale incidents which have gone by to
seed it would be safe to infer that the satisfaction of the authority is not
a genuine one.
B
· The extent of staleness of grounds in this case compel us to
examine the aspect of malice in law. It is not necessary to say that
there was an actual malicious intent in making a wrong detention order.
In Smt. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India and Am:-, this Court
cited Shearer v. Shields 8 , where Viscount Haldane observed as follows:-
c "A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in
contravention of law is not allowed to say that he did so with
an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must
act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in
lali\ although, so far the state of his mind is concerned, he
D acts ignorantly and in ihat sense innocent~y. "
22. This Court then went on to observe in Smt. S.R. Venkataraman
(supra) as follows:-
"6. It is however not necesswy to examine the question of
malice in law in this case, for it is trite law that if a
E discretionary power has been exercised for an unauthorised
purpose, it is generally immaterial whether its reposit01y was
acting in good faith or in bad faith. As was stated by Lord
Goddard. C.J. in Pilling v. Abergele. Urban District Council
where a duty to determine a question is conferred on an
authority which state their reasons for the decision,
F
and the reasons which they state show that they have taken
into account matters which they ought not to have taken
into account, or that they have failed to take matters into
account -H1l1ich they ought to have taken ii1to account, the
court to which an appeal lies can and ought to adjudicate
G on the matter. ·
7. The principle which is applicable in such cases has thus

'(1989) 4 sec 741
1
(1979) 2 sec 491
'(1914)AC 808
H
SAMA ARUNA v. STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. 67
[S. A. BOBDE, J.]

been stated. by Lord Esher, M.R. in The Quee~ on. the A
. P~osecution of Richard Westbro~k v. The Vestry ofSt. Pancras:
"If people who have to.exercise a public duty by exercising
. their discretion take into account matters which the Courts
consider.not to be proper for the.guidance of their discretion,
then in the eye of the law they have not exercised their B
discretion. "
··This view has been followed in Sadler v. Sheffield
Corporation:"
23. The influence of the stale incidents in the detention order is
too pernicious tobe ignored, and the order must therefore go; both on c
account ofbeing vitiated due to malice in law and for taking into account
matters which ought not to have been taken into account.
24. There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified.
It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of2016.
His custody in jail forthe said offence was converted into custody under D
the impugned detention order. The incident involved in this offence is
sometime in the year 2002-2003. The detenu could not have been detained
preventively by taking this stale incident into account, more so when he
wa~ in jail. In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors. 9,
this Court observed a's follows:- · E
"6. On a reading of the groi;nds, particularly the
paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that
the order of detention was passed as the detaining authority
was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on
bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the F
area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true,
the /Jail .application had to be opposed and in case bail was
granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum
had to be raised Merely on the ground that an accused in
detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an
order of detention under the National Security Act should G
l}Ot 01:dinarily be passed. "
25. Therefore, ·in the facts and circumstances of this case, we
allow this appeal, and set aside the aforesaid detention order dated

• (1985) 4 sec 232 · · H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A 23.11.2016 passed by the Respondent No.2 - Commissioner of Police,
Rachakonda Commissionerate, Rangareddy District, Telangana, as also
the impugnedjudgment and order dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in W!it Petition No.43671 of2016.

B Kalpana K. Tripath_r· Appeal allowed.