SAJJAN KUMARversusCENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 624
- Decided
- 20 September 2010
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
A charge may be framed under Sections 227/228 when the court is satisfied that a prima facie case or grave suspicion exists, and delay alone does not invalidate the prosecution, so the framing of charges against Sajjan Kumar was lawful.
Summary
The case concerned the framing of charges against former MP Sajjan Kumar for alleged involvement in the 1984 anti‑Sikh riots. After the Delhi Police’s closure report, the CBI was tasked with re‑investigation and filed a charge‑sheet in 2010, relying on statements recorded many years after the incident. The appellant sought discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C., arguing that the delayed statements were unreliable and that the long lapse violated his Article 21 right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court held that at the stage of discharge or framing of charge the court need only ascertain whether a prima facie case or grave suspicion exists, not conduct a full evidentiary trial, and that delay, while relevant, does not by itself warrant quashing the proceedings. Consequently, the framing of charges was not an abuse of process and the appeal was dismissed. The Court also clarified that observations of the High Court would not prejudice the trial judge’s independent assessment.
Issues considered
- The proper scope and application of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in discharge and charge‑framing stages.
- Whether the 23‑year delay in filing charges infringes the appellant’s Article 21 right to speedy trial.
- Whether statements recorded after a long lapse can be relied upon to establish a prima facie case.
- Whether the High Court’s observations unduly influence the trial judge’s independent judgment.
- Whether the framing of charges constitutes an abuse of process of law.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 228
- Constitution of Indias. Article 21
Subjects
Judgment
[2010] 11 S.C.R. 669
SAJJAN KUMAR A
v.
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Criminal Appeal No. 1803 of 2010)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2010
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.J
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.227, 228' -
Discharge/Framing of charge - Held: While considering the
discharge petition filed u/s.227 or at the stage of framing of C
charge u/s. 228, it is not for the judge/magistrate to analysfJ
all the ma.terials including pros and cons, reliability or
acceptability - It is at the trial, that the judge has to appreciate
their evidentiary value, credibility or otherwise of the
statements, veracity of various documents and ifthere is "not o
sufficient ground" for proceeding against the accused, he· shall
discharge the accused by recording reasons - In exercising
jurisdiction u/s.227, magistrate should not make a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
evidence as if he was conducting a trial - At the time. of E
framing of the charges, the probative val.ue of the material on
record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the
court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on
record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence
.by the accused was possible - Principles as regards the
F
scope of ss.227 and 228 - Enumerated - The instant case
related to 1984. anti-sikh riots in respect of certain deaths -
The framing of charges on the basis of certain statements
made after a gap of 23 years was neither bad in law norabuse:
of process of law or without any material - High Court rightly
affirmed the same - Delay!laches. G
Delay/laches: Inordinate delay in framing of charges on
the basis of certain statements made after a gap of 23 years
- Held: Though delay is a relevant factor and every accused
669 H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A is entitled to speedy justice in view of Article 21 of the
Constitution, ultimately it depends upon various factors!
reasons and materials placed by the prosecution - In the
instant case, in the light of the materials which are available
before the court through CBI, without testing the same at the
8 trial, the proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the
ground of delay - Those materials have to be tested in the
context of prejudice to the accused only at the trial -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21.
In the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, FIRs were lodged in
C respect of certain deaths, which ended in acquittals. The
investigation pertaining to the death of family members
of PW-1 was re-opened by the anti-riot Cell of Delhi Police
in the year 2002 and after investigation, a closure report
was filed in the court on 15122.12.2005. After filing of the
D closure report, on 31.07 .2008, a Status Report was filed
by the Delhi Police. Meanwhile, pursuant to the
recommendation of Justice Nanavati Commission, the
Government of India had entrusted the investigation to
the CBI on 24.10.2005. On receipt of the said
E communication, the respondent-CBI had registered a
formal FIR on 22.11.2005. The closure report was filed by
Delhi Police on 15.12.2005/22.12.2005, when a case had
already been registered by the CBI on 22.11.2005 and the
documents had already transferred to the respondent-
F CBI.
After fresh investigation, CBI filed charge-sheet on
13.01.2010. After committal, charges were framed on
15.05.2010. The appellant filed a petition for discharge
before the Special Court, which was dismissed. He filed
G a revision before the High Court which was also
dismissed.
In the instant appeal, it was· contended for the
appellant that the statement of PW-1 was highly doubtful
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 671
INVESTIGATION
and, therefore, could not be relied upon to frame the A
charges against the appellant; that because of long
delay, the continuation of the prosecution and framing of
charges on the basis of certain statements made after a
gap of 23 years could not be accepted and it would go
against the protection provided under Article 21 of the B
Constitution; and that certain observations were made in
the order of the High Court which would affect the mind
of the trial judge to take independent conclusion and,
therefore, were unwarranted.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1. A perusal of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C.
makes it clear that the judge concerned has to consider
all the records of the case, the documents placed before
him, hear the submission of the accused and the D
prosecution and if there is "not sufficient ground" for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused by recording reasons. If after such consideration
and hearing, as mentioned in Section 227, the Judge is
of the opinion that "there is ground for presuming" that E
the accused has committed an offence, he is free to direct
the accused to appear and then try the offence in
accordance with the procedure after framing charge in
writing against the accused. [Para 7] [680-8-C]
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ and Another F
(1979) 3 SCC 4; Dilawar Batu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra
(2002) 2 sec 135 - relied on.
1.2. The principles as regards the scope of Section
227 and 228, Cr.P.C. are: G
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227, Cr.P.C. has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence
H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A for the limited purpqse of finding out whether or not
a prima facie case against the accused has been
made out. The test to determine prima facie case
would depend upon the facts of each case.
B
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion agc;linst the ciccused which
has not been properly explained, the Court will be
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with
the trial.
c (iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or
• a mquthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider
. the. broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of
the evidence and the documents produced before
the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this
D stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidenc.e as if
he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court
could form an opinion that the accused might have
E
committed offence, it can frame the charge, though
for conviction the conclusion is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
has committed the offence.
F (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into
but before framing a charge the Court. must apply its
judicial mind on the material placed on record and
must be satisfied that the commission of offence by
G the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court
is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 673
INVESTIGATION
therefrom taken at their face value discloies the A
existence of all the ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the.
evidence as it cannot be expected even at that_ initial
stage to accept all that the prosecution states as .
gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense B
or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is aot to
c
see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal. [Para 17] [685-0-H; 686-A-FJ
1.3. Keeping in view the principles regarding the;
scope of exercising jurisdiction under Sections 227 and D
. 228, Cr.P.C., from the statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-10
as well as of PW-8, it cannot be presumed that there was
no case at all to proceed. The cloS:ure. report was
prepared and filed before the magistrate on 31.07-.2008.
The magistrate, on going through the report and after E
hearing the submissions and after noting that the matter
under consideration was being further investigated by
the CBI and the investigation was pending and after
finding that no definite opinion could be given in respect
of the closure report, without passing any order closed. F
the matter, giving liberty to the prosecution to move
appropriate motion as and when required. In view of the
order dated 31.7.2008 of the magistrate, declining to give
definite opinion on the closure report since the same w:as
under further investigation by CBI, no further probe/ G
enquiry on that aspect is required. [Paras 18, 20, 21) [686-
G-H; 680-A-F]
Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC 355;
Abdul Rehman Antu/ay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr.; P.
Vijayan v. State of Kera/a and Another (2010) 2 SCC 398; H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 11 S.C.R.
A Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) 7 SCC 394
- referred to.
2. Though delay is a relevant factor and every
accused is entitled to speedy justice in view ofArticle 21
of the Constitution, ultimately, it depends upon various
8
factors/reasons and materials placed by the prosecution.
In the instant case, in the light of the materials which are
available before the court through CBI, without testing the
same at the trial, the proceedings cannot be quashed
merely on the ground of delay. Those materials have to
C be tested in the context of prejudice to the accused only
at the trial. [Paras 24, 25] [695-C-D; G-H; 696-A]
Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India
& Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 667 - referred to.
D
3. In the light of the fact that it is for the trial court to
evaluate all the materials including the evidentiary value
of the witnesses of the prosecution such as PW-1, PW-2,
PW-10 and PW-8, alleged contradictory statements, delay
E and the conduct of the Delhi Police in filing Status Report
and on the basis of further investigation by the CBI,
observations of the High Court would not affect the
ultimate analysis and final verdict of the trial Judge. It
cannot be concluded that framing of charges against the
F appellant by the trial court was either bad in law or abuse
of process of law or without any material. However, de
hors the comments, observations and explanations in the
judgment of the single Judge, the trial court is free to
analyse, appreciate, evaluate and arrive at a proper
conclusion based on the materials placed before it by
G prosecution as well as the defence. Inasmuch as the trial
relates to the incident of the year 1984, the trial court is
directed to take sincere efforts for completion of the case
as early as possible for which the prosecution and
accused must render all assistance. [Paras 26, 27] [697-
H C-E; 697-G-H; 698-A-B]
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 675
INVESTIGATION
Case Law Reference: A
(1979) 3 sec 4 relied on Para 13, 14,15
(2002) 2 sec 135 relied on Para 13, 15
{2009) 3 sec 355 relied on Para. 22, 24 B
(201 O) 2 sec 398 referred to Para 23
(2001) 1 sec 394 referred to Para 25
(1999) 6 sec 667 referred to Para 28
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1803 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 19.07 .2010 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No.
261 of 2010. D
H.P. Rawal. ASG, U.U. Lalit, Dushyant Dave, H.S. Phoolka,
S.A. Hashmi, A.K. Sharma, Anil Kumar Sharma, Parerna
Kumari, Sangram Saron, Amit Anand Tiwari, Yashvardhan,
Kamma Vohra, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Shweta Verma, D.P. E
Singh, Avneet Toor, Tarannum Cheema, A.K. Sharma, T.A.
Khan for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. Sathasivam, J. 1. Application for intervention is F
allowed.
2. Leave granted.
3. This appeal is directed against the order of the High G
Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 19.07.2010 whereby the
learned single Judge confirmed the order dated 15.05.201 O
passed by the District Judge-VII/NE-cum-Additional Sessions
Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in S.C. No. 26/10, RC Sil
2005 S0024. By the said order, the Additional Sessions Judge
H
67'6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010} 11 S.C.R.
A has ordered the framing of charges against the appellant for
offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections
153A, 295, 302, 395, 427, 436, 339 and 505 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and for the offence
under Section 109 read with Sections 147, 148, 149, 153A,
B 295, 302, 395, 427, 435, 339 and 505 IPC, besides framing
of a separate charge for offence punishable under Section
153A IPC and rejected the application for discharge filed by
the appellant.
4. Brief Facts:-
c
(a) The present case arises out of 1984 anti-Sikh Riot
cases in which thousands of Sikhs were killed. Delhi Police has
made this case. a part of Fl R No. 416 of 1984 registered at
Police Station Delhi Cantt. In this FIR, 24 complaints were
D investigated pertaining to more than 60 deaths in the area. As
many as 5 charge-sheets were filed by Delhi Police relating to
5 deaths which resulted in acquittals. One supplementary
charge-sheet about robbery, rioting etc. was also filed which
also ended in acquittal. The investigation pertaining to the death
E of family members of Smt. Jagdish Kaur PW-1, was reopened
by the anti-Riot Cell of Delhi Police in the year 2002 and after
investigation, a Closure Report was filed in the Court on 15/
22.12.2005.
(b) After filing of the Closure Report in the present case,
F on 31.07.2008, a Status Report was filed by the Delhi Police
before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Court, New
Delhi. Pursuant to the recommendation of Justice Nanavati
Commission, the Government of India entrusted the
investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
G referred to as "CBI") on 24.10.2005. On receipt of the said
communication, the respondent-CBI registered a formal FIR on
22.11.2005. The Closure Report was filed by Delhi Police on
15.12.2005/22.12.2005, when a case had already been
registered by the CBI on 22.11.2005 and the documents had
H already been transferred to the respondent-CBI.
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 677
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
(c) After fresh investigation, CBi filed charge-sheet bearing A
No. 1/2010 in the present case on 13.01.2010. After committal,
charges were framed on 15.05.2010. At the same time, the
appellant has also filed a petition for discharge raising various
grounds in support of his claim. Since he was not successful
before the Special Court, he filed a revision before the High B
Court and by the impugned order dated 19.07 .2010, after
finding no merit in the case of the appellant, the High Court
dismissed his criminal revision and directed the Trial Court for
early completion of the trial since the same is pending from
1984. c
5. Heard Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the
appellant, Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor General
for the respondent-CBI and Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior
counsel for the intervenor.
0
6. Submissions:
(a) After taking us through the charge-sheet dated
13.01.2010, statements of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-10, order
dated 15.05.201 O framing charges by the District Judge,
E
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi and the impugned order of the High
Court dated 19.07.2010, Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel for
the appellant submitted that i) ti''-"'! statement of Jagdish Kaur
is highly doubtful and later she made an improvement, hence
the same cannot be relied upon to frame charge against the
F
appellant; ii) reliance on the evidence of Jagsher Singh PW-2,
who gave a statement after a gap of 25 years cannot be
accepted; iii) the statement of Nirprit Kaur PW-10 is also not
acceptable since the same was also made after a gap of 25
years of the occurrence; iv) other witnesses who were examined
in support of the prosecution specifically admitted that they did G
not see the appellant at the time of alleged commission of
offence; v) inasmuch as the charge has been framed after 25
years of occurrence, proceeding against the appellant, at this
juncture, is violative of his constitutional right undet Article 21;
vi) after filing of the closure report by the Delhi Police, by H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A following the procedure, the present action of the CBI conducting
further re-investigation and filing charge-sheet based on fresh
and improved materials is impermissible in law; vii) follow-up
action based on the recommendation of Justice Nanavati
Commission is also impermissible at this juncture; viii) many
B remarks/observations made by the High Court are uncalled for
and based on conjectures and surmises and also without there
being any material on record. If those observations are not
deleted from the order of the High Court, it would amount to
directing the trial Judge to convict the appellant without proper
c proof and evidence.
(b) On the other hand, Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the CBI submitted that in view
of categorical statement by the victims before Justice Nanavati
Commission and its recommendation which was cjeliberated
D in the Parliament, the Government of India took a decision to
entrust further/re-investigation in respect of 1984 anti-Sikh riots
through CBL According to him, the present action by the CBI
and framing of charges against the appellant and others is in
consonance with Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal
E Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C."). He also
submitted that at the stage of framing of the charges, the
material on record has not to be examined meticulously; a
prima facie finding of sufficient material showing grave
suspicion is enough to frame a charge. He pointed out that there
F is nothing illegal with the order framing charge which was rightly
affirmed by the High Court. He further submitted that the High
Court has not exceeded in making observations and, in any
event, it would not affect the merits of the case.
G (c) Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the
intervenor, while reiterating the stand taken by the learned
Additional Solicitor General supported the order of the District
Judge framing charges as well as the order of the High Court
dismissing the criminal revision filed by the appellant. He
pointed out that it is not a case for interference under Article
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 679
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
136 of the Constitution of India. No prejudice would be caused A
to the appellant and he has to face the trial. He further
contended that the delay cannot be a ground for interference.
Relevant Provisions:
7. Before considering the claim of the parties, it is useful B
to refer Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. which are
reproduced below: .
"227. Discharge.- If, upon consideration of the record of
the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after c
heari_ng the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there
is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused, he shall discharge the accused and recorc;I his _
rec:isons for so doing. o
228. Framing of charge- (1) If, after such consideration
and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there
is ground for presuming that the accused has committed
an offence which-
E
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he
may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order,
transfer the case for trial '.., the Chief Judicial Magistrate
or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct
the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial F
Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate
of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and
thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in
accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-
cases instituted on a police report; G
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in
writing a charge against the accused.
(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b)
of sub-section (1 ), the charge shall be read and explained to H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 11 S.C.R.
A the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads
guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried."
It is clear that the Judge concerned has to consider all the
records of the case, the documents placed, hear the
B submission of the accused and the prosecution and if there is
"not sufficient ground" (Emphasis supplied) for proceeding
against the accused, he shall discharge the accused by
recording reasons. If after such consideration and hearing, as
mentioned in Section 227, if the Judge is of the opinion that
"there is ground for presuming" (Emphasis supplied) that the
C accused has committed an offence, he is free to direct the
accused to appear and try the offence in accordance with the
procedure afte'r framing charge in writing against the accused.
Statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-8 and PW-10
D
8. Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the appellant pointed
out that the prosecution, for framing the impugned charges,
heavily relied on the statements of Jagdish Kaur, Jagsher
Singh and Nirprit Kaur. He also took us through their statements
E made at various stages which are available in the paper-book.
It is true that Jagdish Kaur PW-1, in her statement under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. dated 20.01.1985, did not mention the
name of the appellant. Even in the affidavit dated 07.09.1985,
filed before Justice Ranganath Misra Commission she has not
whispered a word about the role of the appellant. According to
F him, for the first time i.e. in the year 2000, after a gap of 15
years an affidavit was filed before Justice Nanavati
Commission, wherein she referred the name of the appellant
and his role along with certain local Congress workers.
According to Mr. Lalit, except the above statement in the form
G of an affidavit before Justice Nanavati Commission, she had
not attributed anything against the appellant in the categorical
statements made on 20.01.1985 as well as on 07 .09.1985
before Justice Ranganath Misra Commission.
H 9. He also pointed out that even after submission of
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 681
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Justice Nanavati Commission's report and entrusting the A
investigation to CBI, she made a statement before the CBI
officers at the initial stage by mentioning "that the mob was
being led by Congress leaders". Only in later part of her
statement, she mentioned that "she learnt that Sajjan Kumar,
the Member of Parliament was conducting meeting in the area". B
She confirmed the statement in the form of an affidavit dated
07.09.1985 filed before Justice Ranganath Misra Commission
as well as her deposition with regard to the appellant before
Justice Nanavati Commission on 08.01.2002. No doubt, in the
last part of her statement, it was stateg that in the year 1984- c
85, the atmosphere was totally against the Sikh community and
under pressure she did not mention the name of Sajjan Kumar.
She also informed that she could not mention his name for the
safety of her children.
10. The other witness Jagsher Singh, first cousin of D
Jagdish Kaur, in his statement recorded by the CBI on
07.11.2007 i.e. after a gap of 23 years, mentioned the name
of the appellant and his threat to Sikhs as well as to Hindus
who had given shelter to Sikhs. According to Mr. Lalit, this
witness mentioned the name of the appellant for the first time E
before the CBI nearly after 23 years of the incident which,
according to him, cannot be relied upon.
11. The other witness relied on by the prosecution in
support of framing of charges is Nirprit Kaur PW-10. It is F
pointed out that she also made certain statements to the CBI
after a gap of 23 years and she did not mention the name of
the appellant except stating that one Balwan Khokhar who is
alleged to be a nephew of Sajjan Kumar, came to her house
for discussing employment for her nephew as driver.
G
12. The,_other statement relied on by the prosecution in
support of framing of charges against the appellant is that of
Om Prakash PW-8. He narrated that during the relevant time
he had given shelter to a number of women and children of Sikh
community including Jagdish Kaur PW-1. Mr. Lalit pointed out H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A that in his statement, he did not even utter a word about the
appellant but at the end of his statement on being asked, stated
that he knew Shri Sajjan Kumar, Member of Parliament.
However, he further stated that he did not see him in that mob
or even in their area during the said period. In the last sentence,
B he expressed that he had heard from the people in general that
Sajjan Kumar was also involved in the 1984 riots.
13. By pointing out the earlier statement of Jagdish Kaur
PW-1, recorded by the CBI, her affidavit before Justice
C Nanavati Commission and the statement of Jagsher Singh PW-
2, Nirpreet Kaur PW-10 and Om Prakash PW-8 before the
CBI, Mr. Lalit submitted that there was no assertion by anyone
about the specific role of the appellant except the bald
statement and that too after 23 years. In such circumstances,
according to him, the materials relied on by the prosecution are
D not sufficient to frame charges. According to him, mere
suspicion is not sufficient for which he relied on the judgments
of this Court in Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Sama/ and
Another, (1979) 3 SCC 4 and Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State
of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135.
E
14. In Prafulla Kumar Sama/ (supra), the scope of Section
227 of the Cr.P.C. was considered. After adverting to various
decisions, this Court has enumerated the following principles:
"(1) That the Judge while considering the tiuestion of
F framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out.
G (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing
a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 683
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is A
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and
large however if two views are equally possible and the
Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within hi's right to s
discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of
the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post C
Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. This however does not mean that the Judge should
make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter D
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
15. In Dilawar Batu Kurane (supra), the principles
enunciated in Prafulla Kumar Sama/ (supra) have been
reiterated and it was held: E
"12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case
has been made out against the appellant. In exercising
powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge
while considering the question of framing the charges F
under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and
weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has
been made out; where the materials placed before the
court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which G
has not been properly explained the court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial;
by and large if two views are equally possible and the
Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge
the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot
act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of
B the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the court but should not make a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
evidence as if he was conducting a trial (see Union of
India v. Prafulla Kumar Sama0.
c 14. We have perused the records and we agree with the
above views expressed by the High Court. We find that in
the alleged trap no police agency was involved; the FIR ..
was lodged after seven days; no incriminating articles were
found in the possession of the accused and statements of
D witnesses were recorded by the police after ten months
of the occurrence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
not to speak of grave suspicion against the accused, in
fact the prosecution has not been able to throw any
suspicion. We, therefore, hold that no prima facie case was
E made against the appellant."
16. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong
suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then
F it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the
guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is
only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court
should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the
G prosecution proposes to adduce prove the guilt of the accused
even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-
examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot
show that the accused committed the offence, then there will
be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. A
Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 of the
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 685
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Cr.P.C. is not to act as a mere Post Office and has to come to A
a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment
of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and
weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there
is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there
is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is r\o prima facie B
evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the
duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other·
hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may
reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear
that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of Cr.P.C .. the c
Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
17. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 & 228 of
~PC. D
On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:-
E
(i) The Judge while considering the question.of framing the
charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie
case would depend upon the facts of each case. F
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a
charge and proceeding with the trial. G
iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry
into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could
B form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence,
it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
C of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing
a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material
placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission
of offence by the accused was possible.
0 (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record with
a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their
face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift
E the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage
to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if
it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of
the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise
F to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the
trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and
at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in
conviction or acquittal.
G 18. With the above principles, if we discuss the statements
of PW-1, PW-2, PW-10 as well as of PW-8, it cannot be
presumed that there is no case at all to proceed. However, we
are conscious of the fact thi;it the very same witnesses did not
whisper a word about the involvement of the appellant at the
H earliest point of time. It is the grievance of the appellant that
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 687
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
the High Court did not take into account that the complainant A
Jagdish Kaur PW-1 had not named him in her first statement
filed by way of an affidavit dated 07.09.1985 before Justice
Ranganath Misra Commission nor did she named him in her
subsequent statements made before the Delhi Police (Riots
Cell) and in her deposition dated 08.01.2002 before Justice B
Nanavati Commission except certain hearsay statement. It is
the stand of Jagdish Kaur PW-1, the prime prosecution witness,
that apart from her statement dated 03.11.1984, she has not
made any statement to Delhi Police at any stage. However, it.
is also the claim of the C.B.I. that the alleged statements of c
Jagdish Kaur PW-1, dated 20.01.1985 and 31.12.1992 are
doubtful. Likewise, Nirprit Kaur PW-10, in her statement under
Section 161 Cr.P.C., has denied having made any statement.
before the Delhi Police. At the stage of framing of charge under
Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. or while considering the discharge D
petition filed under Section 227, it is not for the Magistrate or
a Judge concerned to analyse all the materials including pros
and cons, reliability or acceptability etc. It is at the trial, the
Judge concerned has to appreciate their evidentiary value,
credibility or othenNise of the statement, veracity of various
documents and free to take a decision one way or the other. E
Investigation by the C.B.I.
19. Learned Additional Solicitor General has brought to
our notice the letter dated 24.10.2005 from Mr. K.P. Singh, . F
Special Secretary (H) to Mr. U.S. Mishra, Director, Central
Bureau of Investigation, North Block, New Delhi. A perusal of
the said letter shows that in reply to the discussion held in the
Lok Sabha on 10.08.2005 and the Rajya Sabha on 11.08.2005
on the report of Justice Nanavati Commission of Inquiry into
1984 anti-Sikh riots, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister G
had given an assurance that wherever the Commission has
named any specific individuals as needing further examination
or re-opening of case the Government will take all possible
steps to do so within the ambit of law. The letter further shows
H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A that based on the assurance on the floor of the Parliament, the
Government examined~
the report of Justice Nanavati
Commission, its recommendations regarding investigation/re-
investigation of the cases against (a) Shri Dharam Das Shastri,
{b) Shri Jagdish Tytler, and (c) Shri Sajjan Kumar. The letter
B further shows that the Government had decided that the work
of conducting further investigation/re-investigation against the
abovementioned persons as per the recommendations of
Justice Nanavati Commission should be entrusted to the CBI.
Pursuant to the sa_id decision, Home Department forwarded the
c relevant records connected with the cases against the
abovementioned persons. It also shows those additional
records/information required in connection with investigation
are to be obtained from the Delhi Police. The materials placed
by the CBI show that Justice Nanavati Commission submitted
D its report on 09.02.2005, its recommendations were discussed
by the Lok Sabha on 10.08.2005 and the Rajya Sabha on
11.08.2005, Government of India asked CBI to inquire those
recommendations on 24.10.2005 and the F.l.R. No. 416of1984
dated 04.11.1984 of Police Station, Delhi Cantt was re-
registered by the CBI as case RC-24(S)/2005-SCU.l/CBI/
E SCR.l/New Delhi. Pursuant to the same, on 22.11.2005,
investigation was taken up and it revealed that the accused
persons committed offences punishable under Section 109
read with Sections 147, 148, 149, 153A, 295, 302, 396, 427,
436, 449, 505 and 201 IPC and accordingly filed the charge-
F sheet. It is relevant to note that no one including the appellant
has not challenged appointment of CBI to inquire into the
recommendations made by Justice Nanavati Commission.
Status Report by Delhi Police
G 20. Mr. Lalit heavily relied on the status report of the Delhi
Police and consequential order of the Magistrate. By pointing
out the same, he contended that the CBI is not justified in re-
opening the case merely on the basis of observations made
by Justice Nanavati Commission. The following conclusion in
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 689
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
the status report dated 31.07.2008 filed by the Delhi Police was A
pressed into service.
"From the investigation and verification made so far it was
revealed that:-
(a) There is no eye-witness to support the version of the B
complaint of Smt. Jagdish Kaur.
(b) The complaints and affidavits made by Smt. Jagdish
Kaur are having huge contradictions.
(i) In her first statement recorded by local police
c
during the investigation, she did not name any
person specifically and also stated that she could
not identify any one among the mob.
(ii) She even did not name Shri Sajjan Kumar in her D
statement recorded by the 1.0. of the Spl. Riot Cell
after a gap of seven years.
(iii) She suspected the involvement of one
Congress Leader Balwan Khokhar in these riots but E
she had not seen him personally. She was told by
one Om Prakash who was colleague of her
husband, about the killing of her husband and son.
(iv) In the statement recorded on 22.01.1993 under
Section 161 Cr.P .C. during the course of further F
investigation, the witness Om Prakash stated that
he had seen nothing about the riots. Jagdish Kaur
stayed at his house from 01.11.1984 to 03.11.1984
but she did not mention the name of any person
who was indulged in the killing of her husband and G
son."
It is seen from the report that taking note of lot of contradictions
in the statement of Jagdish Kaur PW-1 before the
Commissions and before different investigating officers and H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 11 S.C.R.
A after getting legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor, closure
report was prepared and filed before the Metropolitan
Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi on 31.07.2008.
It is further seen that before accepting the closure report, the
Magistrate issued summons to the complainant i.e, Smt.
B Jagdish Kaur number of times and the same were duly served
upon her by the officers of the Special Riot Cell but she did not
appear before the Court. In view of the same, the Magistrate,
on going through the report and after hearing the submissions
and after noting that the matter under consideration is being
c further investigated by the CBI and the investigation is still
pending and after finding that no definite opinion can be given
in respect of the closure report, without passing any order
closed the matter giving liberty to the prosecution to move
appropriate motion as and when required.
D 21. Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel, by placing copy of
the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by Delhi Police as
well as endorsement therein including the date on which the
said report was filed before the Court, submitted that the action
taken by Delhi Police cannot be faulted with. In other words,
E according to him, till the entrustment of further investigation by
the CBI, Delhi Police was free to proceed further and there is
no error in the action taken by the Delhi Police. In view of the
order dated 31.07.2008 of the Magistrate, declining to give
definite opinion on the closure report since the same was under
F further investigation by CBI, we are of the view that no further
probe/enquiry on this aspect is required.
Delay
22. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
G further submitted that because of the long delay, the
continuation of the prosecution and framing of charges merely
on the basis of certain statements made after a gap of 23 years
cannot be accepted and according to him, it would go against
the protection provided under Article 21 of the Constitution. Mr.
H Lalit heavily relied on para 20 of the decision of this Court in
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 691
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355 A
which reads as under:
"20. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to
reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to
note the gist thereof. These are: (A.R. Antulay case, SCC
B
pp. 270-73, para 86)
(i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21
of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily;
c
(ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21
encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
(iii) in every case, where the speedy trial is alleged to have
been infringed, the first question to be put and answered D
is - who is responsible for the delay?;
(iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred
(resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have
regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature E
of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload
of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so
on-what is called, the systemic delays;
(v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice
the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his F
advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken
as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact
of incarceration of the accused will also be a relevant fact.
The prosecution should not be allowed to become a
persecution. But when does the prosecution become G
persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given
case;
(vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several
relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process'-, H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS , [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A and determine in each case whether the right to speedy
trial has been denied;
(vii) ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to a
conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been
infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may
B be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open
and having regard to the nature of offence and other
circumstances when the court feEils that quashing of .
proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open
to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing
c the period for completion of trial;
(viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any
outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings.
In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial,
D it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the
delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh
all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing
upon the complaint;
(ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial
E and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to
the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a
plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except
in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such
proceedings in the High Court must, however, be disposed
F of on a priority basis."
After adverting to various decisions including Abdul Rehman
Antulay and Ors. vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr., this Court further held:
"24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial
G in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an
inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This
right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in
court but also· includes within its sweep the preceding
police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial
H
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 693
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASWAM, J.]
extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not A
confined to any particular category of cases. In every case,
where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been
infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon
taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances,
enumerated above, and determine in each case whether B
the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
25. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right
to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the
charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be C
quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the
nature of offence and other relevant circumstances,
quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of
justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make
an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable
including fixation of time-frame for conclusion of trial." D
Considering the factual position therein, namely, alleged
demand of a sum of Rs.1,000/- as illegal gratification for
release of payment for the civil work executed by a contractor,
a charge was laid against Assistant Engineer in the Bihar State E
Electricity Board and taking note of considerable length of delay
and insufficient materials, based on the above principles,
ultimately the Court after findir · that further continuance of
criminal proceedings pending against the appellant therein is
unwarranted and quashed the same. Though the principles F
enunciated in the said decision have to be adhered to,
considering the factual position being an extraordinary one, the
ultimate decision quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be
applied straightaway.
23. In P. Vijayan vs. State of Kera/a and Another, (2010) G
2 sec 398, this Court while considering scope of Section 227
of Crl.P.C. upheld the order dismissing the petition filed for
discharge and permitted the prosecution to proceed further
even after 28 years. In that case, from 1970 till 1998, there was
no allegation that the encounter was a fake and only in the year H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 11 S.C.R.
A 1998 reports appeared in various newspapers in Kerala that
the killing of Varghese in the year 1970 was in a fake encounter
and that senior police officers were involved in the said fake
encounter. Pursuant to the said news reports, several writ
petitions were filed by various individuals and organisations
B before the High Court of Kerala with a prayer that the
investigation may be transferred to the Central. Bureau of
Investigation (CBI). In the said writ petition, Constable
Ramachandran Nair filed a counter affidavit dated 11.01.1999
in which he made a confession that he had shot Naxalite
c Varghese on the instruction of the then Deputy Superintendent
of Police (DSP), Lakshmana. He also stated that the appellant
was present when the incident occurred. By order dated
2r:ll1.1999, learned Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala
passed an order directing CBI to register an FIR on the facts
disclosed in the counter affidavit filed by Constable
0
Ramachandran Nair. Accordingly, CBI registered an FIR on 3-
3-1999 in which Constable Ramachandran Nair was named as
Accused 1, Mr Lakshmana was named as Accused 2 and Mr.
P. Vijayan, the appellant, was named as Accused 3 for an
offence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. After
E investigation, CBI filed a charge-sheet before the Special Judge
(CBI), Ernakulam on 11.12.2002 wherein all the
abovementioned persons were named as A-1 to A-3
respectively for an offence under Sections 302 and 34 IPC. The
appellant - P. Vijayan filed a petition under Section 227 of the
F Code on 17 .05.2007 for discharge on various grounds
including on the ground of delay. The trial Judge, by order dated
08.06.2007, dismissed the said petition and passed an order
for framing charge for offences under Sections 302 and 34 IPC.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant - Vijayan filed
G Criminal Revision Petition No. 2455 of 2007 before the High
Court of Kerala. By an order dated 04.07.2007, learned Single
Judge of the High Court dismissed his criminal revision petition.
The said order was challenged by Mr. P. Vijayan before this
Court. Taking note of all the ingredients in Section 227 of the
·H Criminal Procedure Code and the materials placed by the
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 695
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM, J.)
prosecution and the reasons assigned by the trial Judge for A
dismissing the discharge petition filed under Section 227, this
Court confirmed the order of the trial Judge as well as the order
of the High Court. Though, there was a considerable lapse of
time from the alleged occurrence and the further investigation
by CBI inasmuch as adequate material was shown, the Court B
permitted the prosecution to proceed further.
24. Though delay is also a relevant factor and every
accused is entitled to speedy justice in view of Article 21 of the
Constitution, ultimately it depends upon various factors/reasons C
and materials placed by the prosecution. Though Mr. Lalit
heavily relied on paragraph 20 of the deeision of this Court in
Vakil Prasad Singh's case (supra), the learned Additional
Solicitor General, by drawing our attention to the subsequent
paragraphs i.e., 21, 23, 24, 27 and 29 pointed out that the
principles enunciated in A.R.Antulay's case (supra) are only D
illustrative and merely because of long delay the case of the
prosecution cannot be closed.
25. Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the
intervenor has pointed out that in criminal justice "a crime never E
dies" for which he relied on the decision of this Court in Japani
Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394. In
para-14, C.K. Thakker, J. speak: .. J for the Bench has observed:
"It is settled law that a criminal offence is considered as a
wrong against the State and the society even though it has F
been committed against an individual. Normally, in serious
offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a court
of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on
the ground of delay."
G
In the case on hand, though delay may be a relevant ground, in
the light of the materials which are available before the Court
through CBI, without testing the same at the trial, the
proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the ground of delay.
H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R
A As stated earlier, those materials have to be tested in the
context of prejudice to the accused only at the trial.
Observations by the High co·urt
26. Coming to the last submission about the various
B observations made by the High Court, Mr. Lalit pointed out that
the observations/reference/conclusion in paragraphs 64, 65, 69,
70, 72, 73 and 50 are not warranted. According to him, to arrive
such conclusion the prosecution has not placed relevant
material. Even otherwise, according to him, if the same are
C allowed to stand, the trial Judge has no other option but to
convict the appellant which would be against all canons of
justice. He further submitted that even if it is clarified that those
observations are to be confined for the disposal of the appeal
filed against framing of charges and dismissal of discharge
D petition and need not be relied on at the time of the trial,
undoubtedly, it would affect the mind of the trial Judge to take
independent conclusion for which he relied on a judgment of
this Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union
of India & Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 667. He pressed into service
E paragraph 177 which reads as under:
"177. Mr Gopal Subramaniam contended that the Court
has itself taken care to say that CBI in the matter of
investigation, would not be influenced by any observation
made in the judgment and that it would independently hold
F the investigation into the offence of criminal breach of trust
or any other offence. To this, there is a vehement reply from
Mr Parasaran and we think he is right. It is contended by
him that this Court having recorded a finding that the
petitioner on being appointed as a Minister in the Central
G Cabinet, held a trust on behalf of the people and further
that he cannot be permitted to commit breach of the trust
reposed in him by the people and still further that the
petitioner had deliberately acted in a wholly arbitrary and
unjust manner and that the allotments made by him were
H wholly mala fide and for extraneous consideration, the
SAJJAN KUMAR v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF 697
INVESTIGATION [P. SATHASIVAM. J.]
direction to CBI not to be influenced by any observations A
made by this Court in the judgment. is in the nature of
palliative. CBI has been directed to register a case against
the petitioner in respe~t of the allegations dealt with and
findings reached by this Court in the judgment under
review. Once the findings are directed to be treated as part B
of the first information report, the further direction that CBI
shall not be influenced by any observations made by this
Court or the findings recorded by it, is a mere lullaby."
On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General C
highlighted that these observations by the High Court are based
on the materials placed and, in any event, it would not affect
the interest of the appellant in the ultimate trial. In view of the
apprehension raised by the learned senior counsel for the
appellant, we also verified the relevant paragraphs. In the light
of the fact that it is for the trial Judge to evaluate all the materials D
including the evidentiary value of the witnesses of the
prosecution such as Jagdish Kaur PW-1, Jagsher Singh PW-
2, Nirpit Kaur PW-10 and Om Prakash PW-8, alleged
contradictory statements, delay and the conduct of the Delhi
Police in filing Status Report and on the basis of further E
investigation by the CBI, we clarify that all those observations
of the High Court would not affect the ultimate analysis and final
verdict of the trial Judge.
Conclusion: F
27. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view
that it cannot be concluded that framing of charges against the
appellant by the trial Judge is either bad in law or abuse of
process of law or without any material. However, we clarify that
de hors to those comments, observations and explanations G
emanating from the judgment of the learned single Judge, which
we referred in para 26, the trial Judge is free to analyse,
appreciate, evaluate and arrive at a proper conclusion based
on the materials being placed by prosecution as well as the
defence. Inasmuch as the trial relates to the incident of the year H
698 sliPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A 1984, we direct the trial Judge to take sincere efforts for
completion of the case as early as possible for which the
prosecution and accused must render all assistance. Interim
order granted c:i 13.08.201 O is vacated. With the above
observation and direction, the appeal is disposed of.
B
D.G. Appeal disposed of.
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