Supreme Court of India
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGHversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 115
- Decided
- 23 February 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M PANCHAL
Holding
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's contempt convictions, holding that the contempt proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the mandatory procedural safeguards under the 1952 Rules and that the presumption of death under Section 108 was inapplicable.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined contempt proceedings initiated suo motu by the Allahabad High Court against police personnel accused of illegally detaining a man whose whereabouts were unknown. The High Court had presumed the detainee dead under Section 108 of the Evidence Act, despite only 4½ years having elapsed, and convicted the officers for contempt of its directions in D.K. Basu. The Court held that contempt proceedings are quasi‑criminal and must accord the accused all safeguards of criminal law, including precise charge‑framing, notice with supporting documents, and the opportunity to cross‑examine witnesses as mandated by the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (Rules 5 and 6). It found the High Court’s notice defective, misleading, and lacking the required charge, and that the presumption of death was erroneous. Consequently, the contempt convictions were set aside. The appeal was allowed and the High Court judgment reversed.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act to presume death after 4½ years.
- Whether contempt of court proceedings are quasi‑criminal and require criminal standards of proof and safeguards.
- Whether the Allahabad High Court complied with the mandatory procedural requirements of the 1952 Rules (Rules 5 and 6) in suo motu contempt proceedings.
- Whether the High Court’s show‑cause notice adequately informed the accused of the charges and provided necessary documents.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to order termination of the appellants' services.
Legislation cited
Subjects
contempt of courtquasi‑criminal proceedingsnatural justiceprocedural fairnesspresumption of deathhabeas corpusD.K. Basu directionsshow cause noticeAllahabad High Court Rules 1952summary procedure
Judgment
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 1086
A SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
·(Criminal Appeal No. 527 of 2002)
FEBRUARY 23, 2010
B
[J.M. PANCHAL AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Contempt of Court:
c Alleged illegal abduction and detention by police
personnel - Suo motu contempt proceedings initiated by
Division Bench of Allahabad High Court - Conviction of
appellants - Justification of - Held: On facts, not justified -
Contempt proceedings were concluded without ensuring
0 compliance of the mandatory provisions of the statutory Rules
framed for the purpose (i.e. the 1952 Rules) - The appe/lants
were never informed as what were the charges against them
- Relevant documents on the basis of which the High Court
had taken a prima facie view while initiating suo motu
E contempt proceedings, were not made available to them -
Notice itself was not only defective, but inaccurate and totalfy
mis-leading - Principles of natural justicfJ were not observed
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s.23 - Allahabad High
Court Rules, 1952 - rr. 5 and 6 of Chapter XXXV-E - Natural
justice.
F
Contempt proceedings - Nature of - Safeguards
provided to alleged contemnor - Held: Contempt proceedings
are quasi-criminal in nature - The alleged contemnor is
entitled to protection of all safeguards/rights provided in
G criminal jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt - Court
not to punish an alfeged contemnor merely on conjectures
and surmises.
Contempt proceedings - Requirement of expeditious
H 1086
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1087
ORS.
conclusion - Inapplicability of CrPC and Evidence Act - Held: A
lnspite of the contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in
nature, provisions of CrPC and Evidence Act are not attracted
thereto, since such proceedings have to be concluded
expeditiously.
B
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 108 - Presumption under, of a
person being dead - Held: On facts,. such presumption was
erroneously drawn by High Court since only 4!12 years had
elap~ed since the first informant's son went missing.
FIR was lodged alleging illegal abduction and C
detention of the first informant's son by police personnel
and thereafter Habeas Corpus petition was filed in the
Allahabad High Court. The High Court directed the
District Judge concerned to hold inquiry as regards the
allegations made in the Habeas Corpus petition and, upon D
receipt of the report from the District Judge, suo motu
initiated contempt proceedings against the alleged
contemnors under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
As the whereabouts of the first informant's son could E
not be traced, the High Court presumed that he had died
and disposed of the Habeas Corpus petition by /
transferring the investigation to the CBI. In the contempt
case, the High Court held that in taking the first informant'
son into custody, the appellants did not comply with the
directions issued by this Court to police authorities in F
D.K. Basu's case, and accordingly sentenced them to six
months imprisonment and further directed the State
Government to terminate the services of the appellants
after holding disciplinary proceedings.
G
In appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf
of the appellants that the High Court committed an error
in observing that the first informant's son had died and
that therefore, no purpose would be served in continuing
with the Habeas Corpus petition; that there was not even H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A prima facie evidence against the appellants in contempt
proceedings; that the court did not adopt the fair
procedure; that even charges had not been framed; that
the enquiry conducted by the District Judge, at the most,
could be treated to be a preliminary enquiry; that the High
s Court erred in placing reliance on a preliminary enquiry
report and convicting the appellants without furnishing
the copy thereof to them and also that contempt
proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and the Court
while deciding the criminal case does not have
c ·competence to issue any direction affecting the civil rights
of the parties.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872
D provides for presumption of a person being dead in case
he has not been heard of for seven years. In the instant
case, only a period of 41h years had elapsed. Therefore,
such a presumption could not have been drawn by the
High Court. [Para 8] [1098-G-H; 1099-A]
E
2.1. The proceedings of contempt are quasi-criminal
in nature. In a case where the order passed by the court
is not complied with by mistake, inadvertence or by mis-
understanding of the meaning and purport of the order,
unless it is intentional, no charge of contempt can be
F brought home. There may possibly be a case where
disobedience is accidental. If that is so, there would be
no contempt. The Co~rt should not punish an alleged
contemnor without any foundation merely on
conjectures and surmises in criminal contempt. [Paras 9
G and 16] [1099-A; 1102-B]
2.2. The High Court has a power to initiate the
contempt proceedings suo motu for ensuring the
compliance of the orders passed by the Court. However,
H
•
'
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1089
ORS.
contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the A
same standard of proof is required in the same manner
as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is
entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which
are provided in the Criminal Jurisprudence, including the
benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of B
obstruction of administration of justice by a party
intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the
said provision. The alleged contemnor is to be informed
as what is the charge, he has to meet. Thus, specific
charge has to be framed in precision. The alleged C
contemnor may ask the Court to permit him to cross-
examine the witnesses i.e. deponents of affidavits, who
have deposed against him. lnspite of the fact that
contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature,
provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) D
and Evidence Act are not attracted for the reason that
proceedings have to be concluded expeditiously. Thus,
the trial has to be conclu~ed as early as possible. The
case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures.
There must be clear and reliable evidence to substantiate E
the allegations against the alleged contemnor. The
proceedings mui;t be concluded giving strict adherence
to the statutory Rules framed for the purpose. [Para 20]
[1103-F-H; 1104-A-C]
F
B.K. Kar v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and his companion
Justices of the Orissa High Court & Anr. AIR 1961 SC 136;
Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The Stote of West
Bengal & Anr. AIR 1969 SC 189; Aligarh Municipal Board &
Ors. v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union & Ors. AIR 1970 SC
1767; Dushyant Soma/ (Capt.) v. Smt Sushma Soma/ & brs. G
AIR 1981 SC 1026; Mis. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of
Bihar & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 127; Niaz Mohammed & Ors. v.
State of Haryana & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 332; Manish Gupta &
Ors. v. Gurudas Roy (1995) 3 SCC 559; Sukhdev Singh v. .
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A Hon'ble C.J.S. Teja Singh & the Hon'ble Judges of the Pepsu
High Court at Patiala AIR 1954 SC 186; S.Abdul Karim v.
M.K. Prakash & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 859; Chhotu Ram v.
Urvashi Gulati & Anr. (2001) 7 SCC 530; Anil Ratan Sarkar
& Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1405; Daroga
B Singh & Ors. v. B.K. Pandey (2004) 5 SCC 26; All India Anna
. Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. L.K. Tripathi & Ors. AIR 2009
SC 1314; Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman
& Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293; V. G. Nigam & Ors. v. Kedar Nath
Gupta. & Anr. AIR 1992 SC 215; Murray & Co. v. Ashok
C Kumar Newatia & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 833; Dr. L.P. Misra v.
State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 3337; Three Cheers Entertainment
Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C. Ltd. 'AIR 2009 SC 735; T.R. Dhananjaya
v. J. Vasudevan AIR 1996 SC 302; Afzal & Anr. v. State of
Haryana & Ors, AIR 1996 SC 2326; Contemnor: In re,
D Arundhati Roy, AIR 2002 SC 1375; Prem Surana v.
Additional M1Jnsif & Judicial Magistrate, AIR 2002 SC 2956;
Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court AIR 2003 SC
1467; S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC
3039; R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8
E SCC 106; Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemnor)
(1995) 2 sec 584, relied on.
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610;
The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961 SC 221
F and Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney-Genera/ of
Trinidad and Tabago AIR 1936 PC 141, referred to.
3.1. In the instant case, the contempt proceedings
had been initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. Section 23 9f the 1971 Act enables the High Court
G to frame rules providing for a procedure in contempt
cases. In view thereof, the Allahabad High Court framed
the rules by adding chapter XXXV-E in the Allahabad
High Court Rules, 1952. As per the said rules, a criminal
contempt is to be dealt with by the Division Bench and a
H detailed procedure to file the application etc. has been
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1091
ORS.
laid down therein. Once the Court is prima facie satisfied A
that there is a case to proceed with the contempt against
a person concerned, the Division Bench in such case has
to proceed giving strict adherence to the procedure
prescribed under the 1952 Rules. Rule 5 of the Chapter
XXXV-E provides for issuance of notice while Rule 6 B
provides mandatorily that the show cause notice issued
under Rule 5 must be accompanied with mate.rial
documents. Thus it is evident that while initiating
contempt proceedings the Court has to frame the charge
(s) and serv9 the same alongwith other relevant material c
upon the alleged contemnor. This is a mandatory
requirement under the 1952 Rules. [Para 21] (1104-D-F;
1105-F]
3.2. The notices had been served upon the
appellants and other alleged contemnor. There was no D
case filed by the State of U.P. before the High Court in
respect of abduction of the informant's son nor any
application for initiating contempt proceedings was ever
filed by any person yet show cause notice·s for suo motu
contempt had been issued in a case titled as "State of U.P. E
vs. Ramesh Chandra & Ors." Admittedly, the proceedings·
were initiated by the High Court suo motu. The notice
itself remains incomplete, inaccurate and mis-leading.
The appellants ought to have been told clearly as for what
offence they were being tried. The Registry of the High F
Court issued the "dotted lines notice" without any sense
of responsibility. The notice did not mention as what was
the allegation/ accusation against either of ttaem. [Paras
22, 23] [1107-8-D; 1106-A-B]
G
3.3. The· notice did not make any reference to the
judgment of this Court in O.K. Basu. Neither the report of
the District Judge nor any evidence collected by him
during that inquiry, nor any other document relevant to
the case was annexed with the said notice. Rather,
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A considering the reply of appellant no.1 and one other
person, the impugned judgment and order has been
passed. The aforesaid 1952 Rules provide for a specific
procedure to hold the trial in contempt cases. The Rules
mandatorily require the framing of charge(s) and
B furnishing the copy of the documents· to the alleged
contemnor on the basis of which, the charges have been
framed. In the instant cases, there has been no
compliance of these mandatory provisions contained in
the Rules. In absence of the charge(s), a delinquent/
c accused/alleged contemnor may not be able to furnish
any defence as he is not aware as to what charge(s) he
is required to meet. Every statutory provision requires
strict adherence, for the reason that the Statute creates
rights in favour of persons concerned. The impugned
judgment suffered from non-observance of the principles
0
of natural justice and not ensuring the compliance of
Statutory Rules, 1952. Thus, the trial itself suffered from
material procedural defect and stood vitiated. Also, it is
apparent from the order sheets itself that the matter
remained pending before the Court, so far as the
E contempt proceedings are concerned, for more than
three years which itself is in contravention of the true
spirit of the purpose of initiation of the contempt
proceedings. [Paras 24, 26] [1107-G-H; 1108-A-C; 1109-B-
C]
F
3.4. The contempt proceedings herein had been
concluded without ensuring the compliance of the
mandat~ry provisions of the 1952 Rules. The appellants
had never been informed as what were the charges
G against them. The relevant documents on the basis of
which the High Court had taken a prima facie view while
initiating the contempt proceedings suo motu, had not
been made available to them. The notice itself was not
only defective, but inaccurate and totally mis-leading.
H [Para 27] [1109-D-E]
SAHDEO@ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1093
ORS.
Case Law Reference: A
AIR 1997 SC 610 referred to Para 1
AIR 1961 SC 136 relied on Para 9
AIR 1969 SC 189 relied on Para 10 B
AIR 1970 SC 1767 relied on Para 10
AIR 1981 SC 1026 relied on Para 10
AIR 1988 SC 127 relied on Para 10
c
(1994) 6 sec 332 relied on Para 10
<1995) 3 sec 559 relied on Para 10
AIR 1961 SC 221 referred to Para 11
AIR 1954 SC 186 relied on Para 12 D
AIR 1936 PC 141 referred to Para 12
AIR 1976 SC 859 relied on Para 13
(2001) 1 sec 530 relied on Para 13 E
AIR 2002 SC 1405 relied on Para 13
(2004) 5 sec 26 relied on Para 13
AIR 2009 SC 1314 relied on Para 13
F
AIR 2001 SC 1293 relied on Para 13
AIR 1992 SC 215 relied on Para 13
AIR 2000 SC 833 relied on Para 13
F
AIR 1998 SC 3337 relied on Para 14
AIR 2009 SC 735 relied on Para 15
AIR 1996 SC 302 relied on Para 16
H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 2 S.C.R.
A AIR 1996 SC 2326 relied on Para 16
AIR 2002 SC 1375 relied on Para 16
AIR 2002 SC 2956 relied on Para 16
AIR 2003 SC 1467 relied on Para 16
B
AIR 2003 SC 3039 relied on Para 16
(2009) 8 sec 106 relied on Para 17
(1995) 2 sec 584 relied on Para 18
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 527 of 2002.
From the Judgment & Order dated 20.12.2001 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Contempt No. 69
D of 1997.
WITH
Crl. A. No. 531 of 2002.
E Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Sandeep Singh, Sanpreet Singh,
Seema Singh for the Appellant.
R.K. Gupta, S.K. Dwivedi, Rajeev K. Dubey, Vandana
Mishra, Kamlendra Mishra, K.C. Lamba, M.P. Shorawala,
F Praveen Swarup for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. The present appeals have been
filed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court
G dated 20.12.2001 passed in Criminal Contempt No. 69 of
1997, convicting the appellants for not complying with the
directions issued by this Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West
Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610, and sentencing them for six months'
imprisonment and also imposing a fine to the tune of Rs,;2000/
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1095 ·
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
- each. Further, direction has been issued to the State A
Government to terminate the services of the appellants after
holding disciplinary proceedings.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present
appeals are that one Ramwati lodged an FIR dated 01.06.1997
8
in the Police Station Kotwali Ghaziabad with an allegation that
her son Tej Veer Singh @ Pappu, a man of absolutely clear
antecedents, never involved in any criminal case, who was
running a sweet mart shop, was going to Allahabad by
Prayagraj Express on 29.05.1997. He was apprehended by
Deep Chand, Sub-Inspector of Police, posted at Police Station, C
Sector 24, Naida and Constable Ramesh Chandra, posted in
the office of Superintendent of Police (R.A.) Ghaziabad along
with some other policemen, from Shyamal Chauk, Sibbanpura,
Ghaziabad. Tej Veer Singh was carrying a briefcase containing
clothes and Rs. 40000/- in cash apart from the ticket. At-the D
time of apprehending, neither the reason for his arrest nor the
destination, where he was being taken to, was disclosed to him.
His family members ran from pillar to post to know his
whereabouts but in vain. On 30.05.1997, telegraphic
information regarding abduction of Tej Veer Singh @ Pappu E
by police was sent to the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Ghaziabad and Inspector General of Police, Meerut Zone.
3. No action was taken on the aforesaid FIR, thus Smt.
Ramwati, mother of Tej Veer Singh made complaint to the F
· Senior Suptd. of Police, Ghaziabad, Hon'ble the Chief Justi,ce
of India and the Chairman, National Human Rights
Commission, New Delhi. The case was registered only on
04.06.1997 under Section 364 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter called IPC). However, no progress was made in G
the investigation. Being aggrieved, a Habeas Corpus petition,
being numbered as Crl. Misc. (Habeas Corpus) Writ Petition
No. 20040 of 1997, was filed in June, 1997 by one M. C.
Verma, being next friend of the detenu Tej Veer Singh before
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A the Allahabad High Court. In the said petition, allegations had
been made that the respondent therein, Deep Chand, Sub-
Inspector of Police and Constable Ramesh Chandra had
detained Tej Veer Singh illegally since 29.5.1997 and his
whereabouts were not known.
B
4. As the High Court could not get any information from
the State regarding the whereabouts of Tej Veer Singh, the
Court, vide order dated 30.07.1997, directed the District Judge,
Ghaziabad to hold an inquiry regarding the allegations made
in the Habeas Corpus petition. The purpose of holding an
C inquiry was to find out as to whether the police was responsible
for his arrest and thereafter, his disappearance.
5. The District Judge submitted his report dated
03.12.1997 wherein it was mentioned that Yashpal, the elder
D brother of Tej Veer Singh, was a hardened criminal, and was
wanted in large number of criminal cases. The police had taken
away Tej Veer Singh alongwith one Jagdisti Kumar to know the
whereabouts of Yashpal to Murad Nagar Police Station, where
they were beaten up. However, no information could be
E gathered from either of them about Yashpal. It was found that
Jagdish Kumar was released by the police from its custody at
4.00 AM on 30.05.1997 but Tej Veer Singh remained under
detention and still remained untraceable. Sub-Inspector Deep
Chand was the mastermind in abducting Tej Veer Singh and
F Constable Ramesh Chandra had participated in illegal
detention. Sub-Inspectors R. P. Singh and Satya Veer Singh,
who were allegedly participated in abduction, were exonerated.
However, Sahdeo Singh, Lila Dhar (appellants) and one Sujan
Singh, Constable, were found to have participated in abduction.
Sub-Inspector Deep Chand, had died in a car accident \on
G 20.08.1997. After receiving the report from the District JUdge,
the High Court on 4.12.1997 issued notices to the four indicted
persons initiating proceedings for criminal contempt suo motu.
Sujan Singh -submitted an application before the High Court that
during the inquiry by the District Judge, no notice/opportunity
.H
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1097
ORS. [DR. RS. CHAUHAN, J.]
of hearing was given to him. The High Court asked the District A
Judge, Ghaziabad to provide an opportunity of hearing to the
said applicant-Sujan Singh and submit a supplementary report.
The said report was submitted on 10.07 .1998 exonerating
Sujan Singh from any criminal liability. Sahdeo Singh and
Ramesh Chandra submitted their replies to the said Show B
Cause Notices dated 4.12.1997. Lila Dhar did not submit any
reply.
As the whereabouts of Tej Veer Singh could not be known,
the High Court disposed of the Habeas Corpus petition vide C
judgment and order dated 20.12.2001 transferring the
investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
called, "CBI"). In contempt case, the Court came to the
conclusion that taking the said Tej Veer Singh into custody, was
in violation of the directions issued by this Court in D. K. Basu
(supra) and held all the three alleged contemnors guilty. D
Constable Ramesh Chandra was sentenced for six months'
imprisonment and a fine of rupees one lakh was imposed, In .
addition, Rs. 5000/- was imposed as costs. The appellants
were imposed the punishment of six months' imprisonment and
a fine of Rs. 2000/- each. Further direction was issued to the E
State to terminate their services after holding disciplinary
proceedings. Hence, these appeals.
6. Sh. Jitendra Mohan Sharma and Sh. P.K. Jain, learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, have submitted that the F
High Court had committed an error as while disposing of the
Habeas Corpus petition it observed that Tej Veer Singh had
died and, therefore, no purpose woulq be served in continuing
with the Habeas Corpus petition. There was not even prima
facie evidence against the appellants in contempt proceedings. G
The court d!d not adopt the fair procedure. Even charges had
not been framed. The enquiry conducted by the District Judge,
at the most, could be treated to be a preliminary enquiry. The
High Court erred in placing reliance on a preliminary enquiry
report and convicting the appellants without furnishing the copy
H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A thereof to them. More so, the contempt proceedings are quasi-
criminal in nature. The Court while deciding the criminal case
does not have competence to issue any direction affecting the
civil rights of the parties. Therefore, the judgment and order
impugned is liable to be set aside.
B
On the contrary, Sh. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel
appearing for the State of U.P. and Sh. K.C. Lamba, learned
counsel appearing for Smt. Ramwati, the mother of Tej Veer
Singh, defended the impugned judgment and order contending
C that a fair trial had been conducted. The appellant Lila Dhar did
not even submit the reply to the Show Cause Notice issued by
the High Court. Therefore, no fault could be found with the
impugned judgment and order. The appeals are liable to be
dismissed.
D We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The impugned judgment and the record of the case
reveal that as no progress was likely to be made in the Habeas
E Corpus petition, the District Judge, Ghaziabad, was directed
to conduct an inquiry in the allegations made in the petition and
also taking note of the contents of the FIR dated 4.6.1997
lodged by Smt. Ramwati, the mother of Tej Veer Singh. The
District Judge submitted his report after recording evidence of
F the witnesses, particularly, the family members and friends of
Tej Veer Singh, and also hearing the appellants and other
police officials. On the basis of the report submitted by the
District Judge, the Habeas Corpus petition was disposed of
vide Order dated 20.12.2001 presuming that Tej Veer Singh
was dead.
G
8. Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter
called 'Evidence .Act') provides for presumption of a person
being dead in case he has not been heard of for seven years.
In the instant case, only a period of 4Y2 years had elapsed.
H Therefore, we are not able to understand as under what
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND 1099
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
circL•mstances, such a presumption could be drawn by the High A
Court.
9. The proceedings of contempt are quasi-criminal in
nature. In a case where the order passed by the court is not
complied with by mistake, inadvertence or by mis-understanding -·
8
of the meaning and purport of the order, unless it is intentional,
no charge of contempt can be brought home. There may
. possibly be a case where disobedience is accidental. If that
is so, there would be no contempt. (Vide B.K. Kar vs. Hon'ble
the Chief Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa C
High Court & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1367).
10. Similarly, in Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. vs. The
State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189, this Court has
observed as under:-
D
"A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a
serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the
judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act with as
great circumspection as possible making all allowances
for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from E
inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when
a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable
otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be
punished ......... Punishment under the law of Contempt is
called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard
of one's duty and in defiance of authority. To take action F
in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty
for other measures and is not to be encouraged."
The same view has been re-iterated by this Court in
Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors. vs. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor G
Union & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1767; Dushyant Soma/ (Capt.)
vs. Smt Sushma Soma/ & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1026; Mis.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1988
SC 127; Niaz Mohammed & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors,
(1994) 6 SCC 332; and Manish Gupta & Ors. vs. Gurudas H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A Roy, (1995) 3 sec 559.
11. The Constitution Bench of this Court, in The State of
Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, Al R 1961 SC 221, held that
the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short 'the
Act, 1971 ') deal with the wilful defiance of the order passed by
8
the Court. Order of punishment be not passed if the Court is
satisfied that the party was, in fact, under a misapprehension
as to the scope of the order or there was an unintentional wrong
for the reason that the order was ambiguous and reasonably
C capable of more than one interpretation or the party never
intended to disobey the order but conducted himself in
accordance with the interpretation of the order.
12. In Sukhdev Singh vs. Hon'ble C.J.S. Teja Singh & the
Hon'ble Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954
D SC 186, this Court placing reliance upon the judgmer-tt of the
Privy Council in Andre Paul Terence Ambard vs. The Attorney
- General of Trinidad and Tabago, AIR 1936 PC 141, held that
the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasi-
criminal in nature and orders passed in those proceedings are
E to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases.
13. In S. Abdul Karim vs. M.K. Prakash & Ors., AIR 1976
SC 859, Chhotu Ram vs. Urvashi Gulati & Anr., (2001) 7
sec 530; Anil Ratan Sarkar ·& Ors. VS. Hirak Ghosh & Ors.
AIR 2002 SC 1405; Daroga Singh & Ors. vs. B.K. Pandey,
F (2004) 5 SCC 26; and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam vs. L.K. Tripathi & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 1314, this
Court held that burden and standard of proof in contempt
1 .'lroceedings, being quasi-criminal in nature, is the standard of
.,roof required in criminal proceedings, for the reason that
G contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.
Similarly, in Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. vs. Sayed Hasibur
Rahaman & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293, this Court placing
reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments, including,
• 1 · V.G. Nigam & Ors. vs. Kedar Nath Gupta & Anr., AIR 1992
· SAHDEO@ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1101
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
SC 215i and Murray & Co. vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia & Ors., A
AIR 2000 SC. 833,· held that jurisdiction of the contempt has
been conferred on the Court .to punish an offender for his
contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, but
in the case of quasi-criminal in nature, charges have to be.
proved beyond reasonable doubt and alleged contemnor B
becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. It would be very
hazardous to impose sentence in contempt proceedings on
some probabilities.
14. In Dr. L.P. Misra vs. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 3337,
this Court dealt with an untoward incident i.e. ex-facie contempt C
in Allahabad High Court wherein, the High Court passed
certain orders without following the procedure prescribed in the
Rules applicable in such proceedings. This Court held that
power of the High Court even under Article 215 of the
Constitution has to be exercised in accordance with the D
procedure prescribed by law. The Court observed as under :
"12 .......... we are of the opinion that the Court while
passing the impugned order had not followed the
procedure prescribed by law. It is true that the High Court E
can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article
215 of the Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has
to be exercised in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. It is in these circumstances the
impugned order cannot be sustained." (Emphasis F
supplied)
15. In Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.E.S.C.
Ltd. AIR 2009 SC 735, this Court held that in contempt
proceedings the court must conclude the trial and complete the
proceedings "in accordance with the procedure prescribed by G
law". However, for enforcing the order passed by the Court "a
roving enquiry is not permissible". The proceedings had to be
completed most expeditiously and the court has to permit the
parties to cross-examine the witnesses to enable the court to
H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A reach a particular finding.
16. The Court should not punish an alleged contemnor
without any foundation merely on conjectures and surmises in
criminal contempt. (Vide T.R. Dhananjaya vs. J. Vasudevan,
AIR 1996 SC 302; Afzal & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors,
8
AIR 1996 SC 2326; Contemnor: In re, Arundhati Roy, AIR
2002 SC 1375; Prem Surana vs. Additional Munsif & Judicial
Magistrate, AIR 2002 SC 2956; Radha Mohan Lal vs.
Rajasthan High Court AIR 2003 SC 1467; and S.R. Ramaraj
C vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039).
17. In R.K. Anand vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009)
8 SCC 106, this Court while dealing with the same issue held
as under:
)o "140 .......... Now, it is one thing to say that the standard
of proof in a contempt proceeding is no Jess rigorous than
a criminal trial but it is something entirely different to insist
that the manner of proof for the two proceedings must also
be the same.
E 141. It is now well settled and so also the High Court has
held that the proceeding of contempt of court is sui
generis. In other words, it is not strictly controlled by the
provisions of CrPC and the Evidence Act. What, however,
appl 1e: ,; A proceeding of contempt of cnnrf are the
F principles of natural justice and those principles app:y to
the contempt proceeding with greater ;;guur than any
other proceeding. This means that the court must follow
a procedure that is fair and objective; that should cause
no pteiudice to the person facing the charge of contempt
of d'ourt and that should allow him/her the fullest
opportunity to defend himself/herself." (Emphasis added)
18. This Court In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged
contemnor) (1995) 2 sec 584, has observed that a contempt
amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence
iH
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1103
ORS. [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
I:'
"·
for such_ an offence, the procedure adopted both under the A
common law and the statute law has always been summary.
t \
The Court held that in spite of the fact that it is a summary
procedure, there must be an opportunity to the alleged
contemnor of meeting the charge. The degree of precision with
which the charge may be stated depends upon the B
circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegation is
made clear or otherwise the contemnor is aware of the specific '
allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge.
j
So long as the contemnor's interest is adequately safeguarded
~II
by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even c •'l;
summary procedure in the case of contempt cannot be found
fault with.
19. In Daroga Singh (supra), this Court observed that in
case, the alleged contemnor feels that there is a necessity to F\ "
cross-examine the witnesses Le. deponents of affidavits filed 0
against him, the alleged contemnor must be given an
opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses provided it is
so asked by him. This Court observed that in Contempt
proceedings, a summary procedure is to be adopted for the 11
reason that matter is to be disposed of most expeditiously and E
it is for this reason that in spite of the fact that proceedings are
quasi-criminal in nature, the procedure under Cr.P.C. or
Evidence Act is not made applicable.
20. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that F
the High Court has a power to initiate the contempt proceedings
suo motu for ensuring the compliance of the orders passed by
the Court. However, contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal
in nature, the same standard of proof is required in the same
manner as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is
G
entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are
provided in the Criminal Jurisprudence, including the benefit of
doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of
administration of justice by a party intentionally to bring the
matter within the ambit of the said provision. The alleged
H
·-. ~
·'' t''
·- ""'-~ ..
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
\.
A contemnor is to be informed as what is the charge, he has to
meet. Thus, specific charge has to be framed in precision. The
alleged contemnor may ask the Court to permit him to cross-
examine the witnesses i.e. deponents of affidavits, who have
deposed against him. In spite of the fact that contempt
B proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, provisions of Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called, "Cr.P.C.") and
Evidence Act are not attracted for the reason that proceedings
have to be concluded expeditiously. Thus, the trial has to be
concluded as early as possible. The case should not rest only
C on surmises and conjectures. There must be clear and reliable
evidence to substantiate the allegations against the alleged
contemnor. The proceedings must be concluded giving strict
adherence to the statutory Rules framed for the purpose.
,_
21. The instant cases are required to be exam.ined in view
D of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. The contempt
proceedings had been initiated under the Act, 1971. Section
23 of the Act 1971 enables the High Court to frame rules
providing for a procedure in contempt cases. In view thereof,
the Allahabad High Court framed the rules by adding chapter
E XXXV.:E in the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter
called the 'Rules 1952') vide amendment published in Uttar
Pradesh Gazette, Part II dated 12.2.1977. As per the said rules,
a criminal contempt is to be dealt with by the Division Bench
and a detailed procedure to file the application etc. has been
F laid down therein. Once the Court is primi:l facie satisfied that
there is a case to proceed with the conterflpt against a person
concerned, the Division Bench in such case has to proceed
giving strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under the
Rules 1952. Rule 5 of the Chapter XXXV-E reads as under:-
G "5. Issuance of notice. - Such allegations contained in the
petition as appears to the Court to make out a prima facie
case of contempt of Court against the person concerned,
shall be reduced into charge or charges by the Court
against such person, and notice shall be issued only with
H
SAHDEO @ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1105
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] .
respect to those charges. (Emphasis added). A
Rule 6 thereof provides mandatorily that the show caus~
notice issued under Rule 5 must be accompanied with
material documents. The Rule reads as under:-
"6. Documents accompanied notice. :. . . Where an. order 8
has been made directing that notice be issued to any
_person to show cause why he should not. be punished for
contempt of Court, a date shall be fixed for the hearing and
a notice thereof in the prescribed form given to the person
·.. concerned. The notice of a criminal contempt shall also be C
served on the Government Advocate. The notice shall be
accompanied by copies· of the application, motion and the
affidavit or a copy of the reference by a subordinate court
as the case may be, and a copy of the charge ~r charges
as fmmed by the Court, and shall require the person D
concerned to appear, unless otherwise ordered, in person
before the Court at the time and. on the date specified
therein to show cause why he should not be punished for
Contempt of Court. Notice of every proceeding under
Section 15 of the Act shall be served personally on the E
person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be
recorded directs otherwise." (Emphasis ad.ded)
Thus, it is evident that while initiating contempt
proceedings the Court has to frame the charge (s) and serve F
the same alongwith other relev~nt material upon the alleged
contemnor. This is a mandatory requirement under the Rules
1952.
22. The question does arise as to whether the contempt
proceedings had been concluded in conformity with the G
aforesaid Rules? The enquiry entrusted to the District Judge
was to find out as what was the truth in the allegations made in
the Habeas Corpus Petition about kidnapping of Tej Veer
Singh. After submission of both the reports by the District
Judge, Ghaziabad, the Court sue motu initiated the contempt H
1.106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A
Jroceedings. The appellants ought to have been told clearing
is for"what offence they were being tried. We have examined
he original record of the case and to our utter surprise, we find
hat show cause notices for suo motu contempt dated
8 ~0.2.1998 had been issued in a case, titled as "State of UP
'S. Ramesh Chandra & Ors.". The notice reads as under:
"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT
ALLAHABAD
c
QUASI CRIMINAL SIDE
N0.48- NOTICE
In the matter of Crl. Miscellaneous Contempt Case No.69/
D 97
Between
State of U.P. .. .. Applicant
And
E Ramesh Chandra & Ors. .. .. Opposite Party
Sri Lilidhar Constable Police Station
Muradnagar, District Ghaziabad.
To,
F
WHEREAS the above named applicant has
represented to this Court that you have committed
contempt of court.
AND WHEREAS the 31st day of March, 1998 has
G been fixed for the hearing of the said case:
NOTICE is hereby given to you calling upon you to
appear in person in this Court on the above mentioned
date at 10 O' clock in the forenoon to show cause why you
H should not be punished for contempt of court.
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court,
SAHDEO@ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1107
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
This 20th day of February, 1998. A
Deputy Registrar
Allahabad"
23. The notices had been served upon the appellants and
other alleged contemnor. There was no case filed by the State B
of U.P. before the High Court in respect of abduction of Tej Veer
Singh nor any application for initiating contempt proceedings
was ever filed by any person. Admittedly, the proceedings were
initiated by the High Court suo motu. The notice itself remains
incomplete, inaccurate and mis-leading. The Registry of the c
High Court issued the "dotted lines notice" without any sense
of responsibility. The notice did not mention as what was the
allegation/accusation against either of them. It did not contain
any charge(s) against either of them. In D.K. Basu (supra) this __
Court has issued as many as eleven directions to the police D
authorities inter-alia, furnishing the information of the person
arrested to his relatives; the person should be arrested only by
the police officials with clear identification marks; a memo of
arrest is to be prepared at the time of arrest, which should be
attested at least by some person from the locality; the time, E
place of arrest and venue of custody must be disclosed etc.
etc. This Court further observed that non-observance of any of
the directions issued therein would make the Police personnel
liable for departmental action and render them liable to be
punished for Contempt of Court and proceedings for Contempt
of Court would be initiated in the High Court having territorial F
jurisdiction over the matter.
24. The notice did not make any reference to the judgment
of this Court in D.K.Basu (supra). Neither the report of the
District Judge nor any evidence collected by him during that G
inquiry, nor any other document relevant to the case was
annexed with the said notice. Rather, considering the reply of
Constable Ramesh Chandra and Sahdeo Singh, the impugned
judgment and order has been passed. The aforesaid Rules
1952 provide for a specific procedure to hold the trial in H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A contempt cases. The Rules 1952 mandatorily require the
framing,of charge(s) and furnishing the copy of the documents
to the alleged contemnor on the basis of which, the charges
have been framed. In the instant cases, there has been no
compliance of these mandatory provisions contained in the
s Rules. In absence
\
of the charge(s), a delinquent/accused/
.
alleged contemnor may not be able to furnish any defence as
he is not aware as to what charge(s) he is required to meet.
Every statutory provision ·requires strict adherence, for the
reason that the' Statute creates rights in favour of persons
c concerned. The impugned judgment suffered from non- ·
observance of the prinCiples of natural justice and not ensuring. '
the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952. Thus, the trial itself
suffered from material p~cedural defect and stood vitiated.
The impugned judgment and order, so far as the conviction
D of the appellants in Contempt proceedings are concerned, is
- liable to be set aside.
25. By the impugned judgment and order, Constable
Ramesh Chandra was convicted and punished with
E imprisonment for six months. Further, a fine of Rs. 1 lakh and
costs of Rs. 5000/- were also imposed on him. We are told that
during the pendency of his appeals, i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos.
530 & 532 of 2002, Constable Ramesh Chandra has died and
those appeals have been disposed of accordingly. Appellants
F were, however, convicted and imposed punishment as referred
to hereinabove. ··
?6. In the instant cases, the record reveals that the Habeas
Corpus petition was taken by the High Court on 30.07.1997
and directed the District Judge, Ghaziabad to hold the inquiry
G on the allegations made in the Habeas Corpus petition. Th~
District Judge submitted the report on 03.12.1997. The Court
considered the case on 4.12.1997 and initiated contempt
proceedings against appellants and others suo motu. Matter
was remanded to the District Judge for further inquiry in view
H of the fact that Sujan Singh was not heard in the earlier inquiry.
SAHDEO@ SAHDEO SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. AND1109
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
The District Judge, Ghaziabad, submitted the supplementary A
inquiry report on 12.07.1998. After hearing the parties the
judgment was reserved on 12.03.1999. Thereafter, it was listed
on ·14.12.2001 i.e. after 2 years and 9 months for fresh
arguments. However, the counsel for the parties stated that
nothing more was required to be submitted except what had B
been argued earlier. The judgment was pronounced on
20.12.2001. ·1t is apparent from the order sheets itself that the
matter remained pending before the Court, so far as the
contempt proceedings are concerned, for more than three years
which itself is in contravention of the true spirit of the purpose c
of initiation of the contempt proceedings.
27. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable
conclusion that contempt proceedings had been concluded
without ensuring the compliance of the mandatory provisions
of the Rules 1952. The appellants had never been informed as D
what were the charges against them. The relevant documents
on the basis of which the High Court had taken a prima facie
view while initiating the contempt proceedings suo motu, had
not been made available to them. The notice itself was not only
defective, but inaccurate and totally mis-leading. The facts and E
circumstances of the case warrant reversal of the aforesaid
judgment and order.
This Court, while entertaining these appeals, granted
interim relief to the appellants. Thus, State could not initiate F
disciplinary proceedings against either of them.
The appeals stand allowed. The judgment and order dated
20.12.2001 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal
Contempt No.69 of 1997 is hereby set aside.
G
B.B.B. Appeals allowed.
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