Supreme Court of India
SAGARversusTHE STATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 692
- Decided
- 13 July 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARAVIND KUMAR
Holding
The conviction and sentence imposed by the Children’s Court are vitiated and cannot be sustained because the mandatory order under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act was not passed.
Summary
The appellant, a minor of 16½ years at the time, was charged with murder (IPC s.302) and related offences. The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) conducted a preliminary assessment under JJ Act 2015 s.15 and ordered that the case be transferred to the Children’s Court as an adult trial under s.18(3). The Children’s Court tried the appellant as an adult, convicted him and sentenced him to fourteen years’ rigorous imprisonment, a decision later affirmed by the High Court. The appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the Children’s Court failed to pass a reasoned order under JJ Act 2015 s.19(1), which the Supreme Court held to be a mandatory requirement. The Court declared that non‑compliance with s.19(1) vitiates the entire trial and set aside the conviction and sentence. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the appellant was acquitted and his bail discharged.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is a mandatory requirement for the Children’s Court after receipt of the JJB’s preliminary assessment.
- Whether a conviction and sentence imposed by the Children’s Court can be sustained in the absence of an order under Section 19(1).
- Whether the matter can be remitted for fresh assessment given the appellant is now an adult and has served part of the sentence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 323, s. 341
- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015s. 10, s. 14, s. 15, s. 18(3), s. 19(1), s. 21, s. 2(12), s. 2(13), s. 2(20), s. 2(33), s. 2(35), s. 24, s. 2(45), s. 8
- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016s. Rule 13
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the Children’s Court against the appellant-minor at the time of commission of offence, and affirmed by the High Court, can be sustained in the absence of an order u/s.19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and (Care and Protection Of Children) Act, 2015 – ss.19(1), 18(3), 15, 2(13), 2(20) – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 – Powers of Children’s Court – Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law – FIR against
Subjects
Conviction and sentence imposed by Children’s CourtAbsence of order under Section 19(1) of JJ Act 2015Powers of Children’s CourtChild in conflict with lawJuvenile Justice Board preliminary assessmentTried as adultMandatory compliance with Section 19(1)Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act
Judgment
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 254 : 2026 INSC 692
Sagar
v.
The State of Haryana
(Criminal Appeal No. 2059 of 2026)
13 July 2026
[Aravind Kumar* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the conviction and sentence imposed by
the Children’s Court against the appellant-minor at the time of
commission of offence, and affirmed by the High Court, can be
sustained in the absence of an order u/s.19(1) of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
Headnotes†
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection Of Children) Act,
2015 – ss.19(1), 18(3), 15, 2(13), 2(20) – Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 – Powers of
Children’s Court – Orders regarding child found to be in
conflict with law – FIR against appellant-minor at the time of
commission of offence, and others for assaulting the victim,
leading to his death – Appellant being child in conflict with
the law, the Juvenile Justice Board conducted preliminary
assessment u/s.15 and opined that the appellant was having
capability, mental as well as physical, to found involve
in the act against him and liable to be tried as an adult,
and committed the matter to the ‘Children’s Court’ as per
s.18(3), to be tried as adult – Thereafter, the Children’s Court
proceeded with the trial and convicted the appellant u/s.302
IPC and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment
for fourteen years and also ordered that the appellant should
be kept in the place of safety till he attains the age of 21
years and thereafter, would be transferred to the jail – Said
order upheld by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Under s.19, after the receipt of preliminary assessment from
the Board u/s.15, the Children’s Court may decide that there is a
need for trial of the child as an adult or there is no need for trial
of the child as an adult and may conduct an inquiry as a Board –
* Author
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 255
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
Expression ‘may’ occurring in Sub-section 19(1) and s.19(1)(ii)
will have to be necessarily read as ‘shall’ – Thus, passing of an
order u/s.19(1) is mandatory in nature and without passing an
order u/s.19(1), the Children’s Court cannot proceed with the
matter further – Furthermore, Rules, 2016, make it abundantly
clear that s.19(1) is mandatory in nature – Sub rule (6) of r.13,
by the use of the expression “shall”, mandates that the Children’s
Court must record reasons for its decision as to whether the
child in conflict with law is to be tried as a child or as an adult –
Thus, it is clear that s.19(1) is not merely procedural in nature,
but constitutes a substantive provision, obligating the Children’s
Court to pass a reasoned order upon due application of mind – In
the absence of compliance with s.19(1), which is determinative of
the procedure to be followed by the Court, whether a Sessions
trial or a summons case, the entire trial stands vitiated – On
facts, there was non-compliance with s.19(1) – After committal
of the case u/s.18(3), the Children’s Court took cognizance of
the matter, and what the Children’s Court at this stage ought to
have done is pass an order as contemplated u/s.19(1) on the
preliminary assessment, as to whether it will try the appellant as
a child or as an adult – However, without passing such order,
the appellant was tried as an adult and was convicted and
sentenced for the offence – Appellant is now 24 years old, at
this stage, it would not be feasible for the Children’s Court to
undertake a meaningful assessment of the mental capacity of the
appellant that was prevailing at the time when crime occurred –
Further, having regard to the fact that the trial has already been
concluded and the appellant has undergone incarceration for a
period exceeding six years, no useful purpose would be served
by remitting the matter to the Children’s Court – In view thereof,
the conviction recorded by the Children’s Court, having been
rendered in non-compliance with the mandate of s.19(1), cannot
be sustained – Judgment of conviction and the consequential
sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge and affirmed by the
High Court set aside – Issuance of direction to Children’s Courts
across the country that upon receipt of records pursuant to
transfer/committal u/s.18(3) by the Juvenile Justice Board, the
first duty of the Children’s Court, after taking cognizance of the
matter, to pass a reasoned order u/s.19(1) upon due assessment
of the ‘child in conflict with law’ before it proceeds further in the
matter. [Paras 10.2-10.4, 12-15]
256 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Thirumoorthy v. State represented by the Inspector of Police
[2024] 3 SCR 1228 : (2024) 12 SCC 307 – relied on.
Sarla Goel and Others v. Kishan Chand [2009] 10 SCR 481 :
(2009) 7 SCC 658; Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2023) 15 SCC 678; Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu and
Another [2022] 10 SCR 595 : (2023) 12 SCC 401 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016.
List of Keywords
Conviction and sentence imposed by the Children’s Court;
Absence of an order u/s.19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Powers of Children’s Court;
Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law; Child in
conflict with the law; Juvenile Justice Board conducted preliminary
assessment; Tried as an adult; Committed the matter to the
‘Children’s Court’.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 2059 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2023 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRAD No. 649
of 2019
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Ranbir Singh Kundu, Ms. Kirti Aggarwal, Akash, Shitanshu
Saklani, Shubham Mavi, Ashish Pandey, Lakshya Singh,
Ali Mohammed Khan.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Keshav Mittal, Samar Vijay Singh, Ms. Sabarni Som, Gaj
Singh, Anuj Sehrawat, Sahil Gandass, Gaurav Dhull, Aman Dev
Sharma.
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 257
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Aravind Kumar, J.
1. Heard. Leave Granted.
I. BRIEF FACTS:
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the instant case are as
follows:
2.1. The prosecution alleges that on 21.10.2018, the police received
information from Civil Lines Police Station, Kaithal, regarding
the death of Mandeep Kumar, who had been admitted to
Cygnus Hospital with injuries sustained in a quarrel. Inspector
Rohtash Kumar and other police officials reached the hospital,
where they found that Mandeep had been brought dead and
recorded the statement of the complainant Mandeep Kumar
(PW11), who had stated that himself, Aman (PW12), and the
deceased Mandeep had gone to the Baba-Rajpuri fair on
a motorcycle and while returning around 1:30 p.m., seven
masked persons on two motorcycles intercepted them and
one of the assailants, identified as accused ‘S’- the Appellant
herein,1 struck the deceased on the left temporal region with
an iron pipe, after which the others attacked him with knives
and a rod. When the complainant and Aman intervened and
tried to stop, he was also attacked and suffered an injury to
his right little finger. As passersby approached on hearing their
cries, the accused fled towards village Garhi. The deceased
was taken first to Government Hospital, Kaithal, then referred
to PGI Chandigarh, and later admitted to Cygnus Hospital,
where he died due to the injuries.
2.2. The police carried out investigation following the incident by
registering an FIR under Sections 148, 323, 341, 302 read
with 149 Indian Penal Court (IPC for short), preserving the
body for postmortem, preparing the site plan, photographing
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Appellant’.
258 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the scene of crime, collecting blood samples, and recording
witness statements under Section 161 Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C for short). Postmortem was conducted
on 22.10.2018, and deceased’s clothes and shoes were seized.
On 23.10.2018, four co-accused namely Pawan alias Pammu,
Raman alias Kaka, Sandeep, and Vikash alias Babbu were
arrested, and on the next day their disclosure statements
were recorded, in which they confessed that they, along with
the appellant had conspired to assault the deceased using an
iron rod, knife, and danda. The conspiracy was hatched to
teach a lesson to the deceased for hurling abuses upon the
mother and sister of the appellant (child-in-conflict with law).
2.3. Pursuant to the disclosure statements, recoveries were made:
an iron pipe from accused Vikash, a danda from accused
Raman, a Honda Shine motorcycle from Sandeep, and a KTM
Duke motorcycle and a knife from the Appellant. The police also
prepared additional site plans, demarcation memos, collected
photographs, and verified call detail records, which disclosed
the Appellant and Vikash were in the vicinity of village Baba-
Ladana around the relevant time, thereby corroborating parts
of the prosecution case.
2.4. After investigation, the police filed chargesheet against the
Appellant, alleging that the Accused has committed offences
punishable under sections 302, 323 and 341 read with section
148, 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2.5. As the Appellant was a minor at the time of commission of
offence (16 and half years), he was produced before the
learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Kaithal2,
who carried a preliminary assessment as prescribed under
Section 15 of The Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of
Children) Act, 20153 and vide Order dated 24.01.2019 in
Criminal Case No. 04 of 2019 the JJ Board opined that the
Appellant ‘was having capability, mental as well as physical,
to found involve in the act against him and he is liable to be
tried as an adult.’ The JJ Board after recording its reasons,
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the JJ Board’.
3 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’.
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 259
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
committed the matter to the Court of Additional Sessions
Judge, Kaithal4 i.e., the ‘Children’s Court’ as per Section 18(3)
of the Act to conduct trial for the alleged offences and to try
the Appellant herein as an adult.
2.6. The Children’s Court proceeded with the Trial of the Case
and vide Judgment and Order dated 13/14.03.2019 in CIS
No. SC/11/2019 convicted the Appellant under Section 302 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and sentenced him
to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of fourteen
years and also ordered that the Appellant should be kept in
the Place of Safety till he attains the age of 21 years and
thereafter, he shall be transferred to the jail.
2.7. The Appellant filed a Criminal Appeal challenging his conviction
in Criminal Appeal-D-649-2019 (O&M) before the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh5. The High Court after
re-appreciation of evidence available on record dismissed
the Appeal filed by the Appellant. It is this order which is
impugned before us.
3. At the time of hearing the matter, the Counsel appearing for the
Appellant raised a plea that the Children’s Court on committal of the
case to it by the JJ Board has not passed any orders as prescribed
under Section 19(1) of the Act. To examine the issue this Court, vide
order dated: 22-04-2025 had passed the following order:
“During the course of hearing of this matter a question
has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that in this case there is an order by the Juvenile Justice
Board (for short “the JJB”) recommending the present
petitioner to be tried as a juvenile. We have also perused
the original school record as produced pursuant to our
previous order dated 04.11.2024, which shows that the
date of birth of the petitioner is 20.04.2002 and therefore,
at the time of commission of offence i.e. 21.10.2018,
he was a juvenile. On this aspect, there is no issue.
The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner
4 Herein after referred to as ‘the Children’s Court’.
5 Hereinafter referred to as the High Court.
260 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
would be that the JJB has given an assessment report
regarding the juvenility of the petitioner and then the
matter went before the Children’s Court. There is no
order on record showing that there was an application
of mind by the Court concerned under Section 19(1) of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, inasmuch as there is no order saying that though the
accused is a juvenile, he is liable to be tried as an adult.
For abundant caution, we direct the District & Sessions
Judge, Kaithal, Haryana to submit a report on this and
if there is a specific order, apprise this Court on this
aspect, in relation to Sessions Case No.SC/11/2019
instituted on 18.01.2019/28.02.2019 by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Kaithal, Haryana. The concerned
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is hereby directed to
communicate this order to the concerned Court for
onward compliance.
List on 23.05.2025.”
4. Pursuant to the above order of this Court, the Learned District and
Session Court, Kaithal has sent a Report dated 19.05.2025 stating
that he is not in a position to verify the records and prepare a report
as the entire Trial Court records have been sent to this Court and
further, as per report of the concerned Ahlmad, the orders of the said
case file are inaccessible on CIS/online also, as the case being of
special category. Along with the report the Ld. Judge has enclosed
an order/report passed by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB in short)
dated: 24.01.2019. On perusal of the report it is clear that the JJB
had passed an order as per Section 15 after preliminary assessment
that the Appellant has to be tried as an adult and therefore committed
the matter to the Children’s Court as per Section 18(3) of the Act.
5. After committal of the case under Section 18(3) of the Act, the
Children’s Court took cognizance of the matter. What the Children’s
Court at this stage ought to have done is pass an order as
contemplated under Section 19(1) on the preliminary assessment,
as to whether it will try the Appellant herein as a child or as an adult.
Without passing such order, the Appellant was tried as an adult
and was convicted of the offence of Section 302 and was awarded
a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 14 years and
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 261
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
also ordered that he shall be kept in place of safety till he attains
the age of 21 years and thereafter he shall be transferred to jail.
II. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION:
6. We have perused the original Trial Court record. Upon such perusal,
the primary question that arises for our consideration, before
adverting to the merits of the case, is as follows:
I. Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by
the Children’s Court against the Appellant, and
subsequently affirmed by the High Court, can be
sustained in the absence of an order under Section
19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2015?
III. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT:
7. Before adverting to the question under consideration, we deem it
appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Act necessary
for adjudication of the dispute, which shall be referred to in the
course of this judgment. The said provisions are as follows:
“Section 2 (12): “child” means a person who has not
completed eighteen years of age;
Section 2(13):“child in conflict with law” means a child
who is alleged or found to have committed an offence
and who has not completed eighteen years of age on
the date of commission of such offence;
Section 2(20): “Children’s Court” means a court
established under the Commissions for Protection of
Child Rights Act, 2005 (4 of 2006) or a Special Court
under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), wherever existing and where such
courts have not been designated, the Court of Sessions
having jurisdiction to try offences under the Act;
Section 2 (33): “heinous offences” includes the
offences for which the minimum punishment under
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law
for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven
years or more;
262 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Section 2(35): “juvenile” means a child below the age
of eighteen years;
Section 2(45): “petty offences” includes the offences
for which the maximum punishment under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time
being in force is imprisonment up to three years;
Section 8: Powers, functions and responsibilities
of the Board.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force but save
as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Board
constituted for any district shall have the power to deal
exclusively with all the proceedings under this Act,
relating to children in conflict with law, in the area of
jurisdiction of such Board.
(2) The powers conferred on the Board by or under
this Act may also be exercised by the High Court
and the Children’s Court, when the proceedings
come before them under section 19 or in appeal,
revision or otherwise.
(3) The functions and responsibilities of the Board shall
include—
………………………
(f) adjudicate and dispose of cases of children in conflict
with law in accordance with the process of inquiry
specified in section 14;
……………………….
(i) conducting inquiry for declaring fit persons regarding
care of children in conflict with law;
Section 10. Apprehension of child alleged to be in
conflict with law.—(1) As soon as a child alleged to be
in conflict with law is apprehended by the police, such
child shall be placed under the charge of the special
juvenile police unit or the designated child welfare police
officer, who shall produce the child before the Board
without any loss of time but within a period of twenty-
four hours of apprehending the child excluding the time
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 263
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
necessary for the journey, from the place where such
child was apprehended:
Provided that in no case, a child alleged to be in conflict
with law shall be placed in a police lockup or lodged in
a jail.
(2) The State Government shall make rules consistent
with this Act,—
(i) to provide for persons through whom (including
registered voluntary or non-governmental organisations)
any child alleged to be in conflict with law may be
produced before the Board;
(ii) to provide for the manner in which the child alleged
to be in conflict with law may be sent to an observation
home or place of safety, as the case may be
Section 14. Inquiry by Board regarding child in
conflict with law.—(1) Where a child alleged to be in
conflict with law is produced before Board, the Board
shall hold an inquiry in accordance with the provisions
of this Act and may pass such orders in relation to such
child as it deems fit under sections 17 and 18 of this
Act.
………………..
(5) The Board shall take the following steps to ensure
fair and speedy inquiry, namely:—
(a) at the time of initiating the inquiry, the Board shall
satisfy itself that the child in conflict with law has not
been subjected to any ill-treatment by the police or by
any other person, including a lawyer or probation officer
and take corrective steps in case of such ill-treatment;
(b) in all cases under the Act, the proceedings shall be
conducted in simple manner as possible and care shall
be taken to ensure that the child, against whom the
proceedings have been instituted, is given child-friendly
atmosphere during the proceedings;
…………..
264 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(e) inquiry of serious offences shall be disposed of
by the Board, by following the procedure, for trial in
summons cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974);
(f) inquiry of heinous offences,— (i) for child below the
age of sixteen years as on the date of commission of an
offence shall be disposed of by the Board under clause (e);
(ii) for child above the age of sixteen years as on
the date of commission of an offence shall be dealt
with in the manner prescribed under section 15.
Section 15. Preliminary assessment into heinous
offences by Board.—
(1) In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been
committed by a child, who has completed or is above
the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a
preliminary assessment with regard to his mental
and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability
to understand the consequences of the offence and
the circumstances in which he allegedly committed
the offence, and may pass an order in accordance
with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18:
Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may
take the assistance of experienced psychologists or
psycho-social workers or other experts.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it
is clarified that preliminary assessment is not a
trial, but is to assess the capacity of such child to
commit and understand the consequences of the
alleged offence.
(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary
assessment that the matter should be disposed of by
the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure,
as far as may be, for trial in summons case under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the
matter shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of
section 101:
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 265
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
Provided further that the assessment under this section
shall be completed within the period specified in section 14.
Section 18. Orders regarding child found to be in
conflict with law.—
(1) Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child
irrespective of age has committed a petty offence, or
a serious offence, or a child below the age of sixteen
years has committed a heinous offence, [or a child
above the age of sixteen years has committed a
heinous offence and the Board has, after preliminary
assessment under Section 15, disposed of the matter]
then, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in
any other law for the time being in force, and based on
the nature of offence, specific need for supervision or
intervention, circumstances as brought out in the social
investigation report and past conduct of the child, the
Board may, if it so thinks fit,—
(a) allow the child to go home after advice or admonition
by following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such
child and to his parents or the guardian
(b) direct the child to participate in group counselling
and similar activities
(c) order the child to perform community service under
the supervision of an organisation or institution, or a
specified person, persons or group of persons identified
by the Board
(d) order the child or parents or the guardian of the child
to pay fine: Provided that, in case the child is working,
it may be ensured that the provisions of any labour law
for the time being in force are not violated.
(e) direct the child to be released on probation of good
conduct and placed under the care of any parent,
guardian or fit person, on such parent, guardian or fit
person executing a bond, with or without surety, as the
Board may require, for the good behaviour and child’s
well-being for any period not exceeding three years
266 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(f) direct the child to be released on probation of good
conduct and placed under the care and supervision of
any fit facility for ensuring the good behaviour and child’s
well-being for any period not exceeding three years;
(g) direct the child to be sent to a special home, for
such period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit,
for providing reformative services including education,
skill development, counselling, behaviour modification
therapy, and psychiatric support during the period of
stay in the special home:
Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child
has been such that, it would not be in the child’s interest,
or in the interest of other children housed in a special
home, the Board may send such child to the place of
safety.
(2) If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-
section (1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to—
(i) attend school; or
(ii) attend a vocational training centre; or
(iii) attend a therapeutic centre; or
(iv) prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or
appearing at a specified place; or
(v) undergo a de-addiction programme.
(3) Where the Board after preliminary assessment under
section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial
of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order
transfer of the trial of the case to the Children’s Court
having jurisdiction to try such offences.
Section 19: Powers of Children’s Court.—
(1) After the receipt of preliminary assessment from
the Board under section 15, the Children’s Court may
decide that—
(i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as
per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 267
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate orders after
trial subject to the provisions of this section and
section 21, considering the special needs of the
child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a child
friendly atmosphere;
(ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult
and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions
of section 18.
(2) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the final order,
with regard to a child in conflict with law, shall include
an individual care plan for the rehabilitation of child,
including follow up by the probation officer or the District
Child Protection Unit or a social worker.
(3) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the child who
is found to be in conflict with law is sent to a place of
safety till he attains the age of twenty-one years and
thereafter, the person shall be transferred to a jail:
Provided that the reformative services including
educational services, skill development, alternative
therapy such as counselling, behaviour modification
therapy, and psychiatric support shall be provided to the
child during the period of his stay in the place of safety.
(4) The Children’s Court shall ensure that there is a
periodic follow up report every year by the probation
officer or the District Child Protection Unit or a social
worker, as required, to evaluate the progress of the
child in the place of safety and to ensure that there is
no ill-treatment to the child in any form.
(5) The reports under sub-section (4) shall be forwarded
to the Children’s Court for record and follow up, as may
be required.
Section 21. Order that may not be passed against
a child in conflict with law. —No child in conflict with
law shall be sentenced to death or for life imprisonment
without the possibility of release, for any such offence,
either under the provisions of this Act or under the
268 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
provisions of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any
other law for the time being in force.”
IV. ANALYSIS:
8. Before we go into the merits of the present case, it will have to be
examined as to whether Section 19 (1) of the Act is mandatory for
the Children’s Court to comply, and the consequence flowing if not
being followed and the need for passing order in compliance thereof.
9. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
mandates a calibrated and sequential procedure when a ‘child in
conflict with law’, aged between 16 and 18 years, is alleged to have
committed a heinous offence.
9.1. A person is said to be a child under Section 2 (1) of the Act,
who has not completed 18 years of age. Section 2 (13) would
also indicate that a child who has not completed 18 years
of age on the date of commission of such offence, who is
alleged or found to have committed an offence to be ‘a child
in conflict with law’. Section 2 (35) defines a child below
the age of 18 years as “juvenile”. Upon apprehension of a
‘child in conflict with law’ for the commission of an offence,
the procedure prescribed under Section 10 of the Act comes
into operation. Section 10 stipulates that, immediately upon
such apprehension, the ‘child in conflict with law’ has to be
placed under the charge of the Special Juvenile Police Unit
or a designated Child Welfare Police Officer. Thereafter, the
‘child in conflict with law’ shall be produced before the Board.
Section 2 (10) defines the “Board” means a Juvenile Justice
Board constituted under Section 4 of the Act. The composition
of such Juvenile Justice Board is defined under Section 4 of
the Act.
9.2. The procedure to be followed by the Board is set out in Section
14 of the Act. In cases where the ‘child in conflict with law’ is
above the age of 16 years, and who is said to have committed
heinous offence, the manner in which the Board is required
to proceed is prescribed under Section 15 of the Act. Upon
production of such ‘child in conflict with law’ before it, the
Board is required to conduct a preliminary assessment with
regard to the child’s mental and physical capacity to commit
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 269
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
the alleged offence, the ability to understand the consequences
thereof, and the circumstances in which the offence is alleged
to have been committed. For undertaking the assessment, the
Board would be empowered to take assistance of experienced
psychologists or pyscho social worker or other experts. Such
preliminary assessment conducted by the Board is not in the
nature of a trial, but is only an assessment. Upon completion of
the said assessment, the Board has two options. If the Board
concludes that the ‘child in conflict with law’ ought to be tried
as an adult, it shall pass an order in terms of Section 18(3) of
the Act and commit/transfer the matter to the Children’s Court
having jurisdiction to try such offences. On the other hand, if
the Board concludes that the ‘child in conflict with law’ is to
be tried as a child and not as an adult, then the Board shall
proceed to try the matter in accordance with the procedure
prescribed for summons cases under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. Thereafter, the Board shall pass appropriate
orders in terms of Sections 18(1) and 18(2) of the Act.
10. Upon receipt of the preliminary assessment report under Section
15 transferred by the Board in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act,
the procedure to be followed by the Children’s Court is governed
by the provisions of the Act itself.
10.1. Upon receipt of the report from the Board, the procedure to be
followed by the Children’s Court is prescribed under the Act and
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model
Rules, 20166. The first step to be undertaken by the Children’s
Court, upon receipt of the report, is to take cognizance thereof.
After taking cognizance of the matter, the Children’s Court
is required to pass an order in terms of Section 19(1) of
the Act. The question that now arises for consideration is
whether the passing of an order under Section 19(1) of the Act
is mandatory in nature, and the consequence of non-passing
of such an order?
10.2. In our opinion, there is no doubt in our mind that passing
of an order under Section 19(1) of the Act is mandatory in
nature and without passing an order under Section 19(1), the
6 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ or ‘the Model Rules’
270 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
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Children’s Court cannot proceed with the matter further. We
say so for the reasons more than one.
10.3. Firstly, Upon a holistic reading of the Act, it furnishes several
indications that compliance with Section 19(1) is mandatory
for the Children’s Court. The first such indication is found in
Section 19(1)(i) and (ii) itself. Section 19(1) commences with the
expression, “After the receipt of preliminary assessment from
the Board under Section 15, the Children’s Court may decide
that…”. Although the expression used is “may”, a reading of
sub-clauses (i) and (ii) indicates that the same ought to be
construed as “shall”. The expression ‘may’ occurring in Sub-
section 19(1) and Section 19(1)(ii) will have to be necessarily
read as ‘shall’, since consequences flowing therefrom namely,
the trial of a child in conflict with law as an adult and trial as
a juvenile would be different. Ordinarily, the word ‘may’ would
indicate as a word not of compulsion. They are enabling words
and they only confer capacity, power or authority and imply
discretion. However, considering the nature of the statute as
a whole and the provision in particular, the word ‘may’ has to
be read as ‘shall’ in some circumstances to give the provision
its full value. The reason for the same has been propounded
in the case of Sarla Goel and Others Vs. Kishan Chand7,
wherein this Court held as follow:
In Crawford on the Construction of Statutes at
p.516, it is stated that:
“The question as to whether a statute is mandatory
or directory depends upon the intent of the
legislature and not upon the language in which
the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention
of the legislature must govern, and these are to
be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of
the provision, but also by considering its nature, its
design, and the consequences which would follow
from construing it the one way or the other”
The reasons for the interpretation of the word ‘may’ in Section
19 (1) as ‘shall’ are as under:
7 (2009) 7 SCC 658
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 271
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
10.3.1. Unless the Children’s Court arrives at a decision as to
whether the child in conflict with law is to be tried as an
adult or not, it cannot proceed further with the matter.
In a case where the Children’s Court decides that the
child in conflict with law is to be tried as an adult, it is
required to follow the procedure of a Sessions trial in
terms of Section 19(1)(i). This statutory obligation is
substantive in nature and not merely procedural, and
the Children’s Court assumes jurisdiction to try the child
in conflict with law as an adult only upon recording
satisfaction on the parameters laid down therein.
10.3.2. Conversely, where upon such evaluation the Children’s
Court concludes that the child in conflict with law ought
not to be tried as an adult, the legal consequence
is unequivocal. The Children’s Court is divested of
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial as a Children’s
Court and is required to deal with the matter as a
Board in terms of Section 19(1)(ii) of the Act and the
procedure to be followed is that of a of Summons Case
as per the Code of Criminal Procedure.
10.3.3. The Children’s Court cannot, in the above-mentioned
circumstances, undertake its own ‘child inquiry’ or
modify the procedure contemplated under the Act. The
statutory design draws a sharp distinction between an
adult criminal trial before the Children’s Court and a
child-centric inquiry before the Board. Consequently,
once the Children’s Court holds that the child should
not be subjected to an adult trial, it will try the matter
as a Board as contemplated under Section 19(1)(ii).
10.4. Secondly, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Model Rules, 2016, make it abundantly clear that
Section 19(1) is mandatory in nature. Rule 13 of the said
Rules elucidates the rationale behind such reasoning and
reinforces the mandatory character of Section 19(1). The
relevant provisions of the Rules are as follows:
“Rule 13. Procedure in relation to Children’s
Court and Monitoring Authorities. - (1) Upon
receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board
272 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
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the Children’s Court may decide whether there
is need for trial of the child as an adult or as a
child and pass appropriate orders.
(2 to 5) x x x x x x x x
(6) The Children’s Court shall record its reasons
while arriving at a conclusion whether the child
is to be treated as an adult or as a child.
(7) Where the Children’s Court decides that there
is no need for trial of the child as an adult, and
that it shall decide the matter itself:
(i) It may conduct the inquiry as if it were
functioning as a Board and dispose of the matter
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and
these rules.
(ii) The Children’s Court, while conducting the
inquiry shall follow the procedure for trial in
summons case under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
(iii) The proceedings shall be conducted in
camera and in a child friendly atmosphere, and
there shall be no joint trial of a child alleged to
be in conflict with law, with a person who is not
a child.
(iv) When witnesses are produced for examination
the Children’s Court shall ensure that the inquiry
is not conducted in the spirit of strict adversarial
proceedings and it shall use the powers conferred
by section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(1 of 1872).
(v) While examining a child in conflict with law
and recording his statement, the Children’s Court
shall address the child in a child-friendly manner
in order to put the child at ease and to encourage
him to state the facts and circumstances without
any fear, not only in respect of the offence which is
alleged against the child, but also in respect of the
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 273
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
home and social surroundings and the influence
to which the child might have been subjected.
(vi) The dispositional order passed by the
Children’s Court shall necessarily include an
individual care plan in Form 7 for the child in
conflict with law concerned, prepared by a
Probation Officer or Child Welfare Officer or
recognized voluntary organisation on the basis
of interaction with the child and his family, where
possible.
(vii) The Children’s Court, in such cases, may
pass any orders as provided in sub-sections
(1) and (2) of section 18 of the Act.
(8) Where the Children’s Court decides that
there is a need for trial of the child as an adult:
(i) It shall follow the procedure prescribed by
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 of trial
by sessions and maintaining a child friendly
atmosphere.
(ii) The final order passed by the Children’s Court
shall necessarily include an individual care plan for
the child as per Form 7 prepared by a Probation
Officer or Child Welfare Officer or recognized
voluntary organisation on the basis of interaction
with the child and his family, where possible.
(iii) Where the child has been found to be involved
in the offence, the child may be sent to a place
of safety till the age of twenty-one years.
(iv) While the child remains at the place of safety,
there shall be yearly review by the Probation
Officer or the District Child Protection Unit or a
social worker in Form 13 to evaluate the progress
of the child and the reports shall be forwarded
to the Children’s Court.
(v) The Children’s Court may also direct the
child to be produced before it periodically and at
274 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
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least once every three months for the purpose
of assessing the progress made by the child
and the facilities provided by the institution for
the implementation of the individual care plan.”
10.4.1. Upon a perusal of Rule 13(1) and Rule 13(6) of the
Rules, it becomes evident that immediately upon
receipt of the report under Section 15, the Children’s
Court is required to pass an order under Section
19(1) of the Act. Further, sub-rule (6) of Rule 13, by
the use of the expression “shall”, mandates that the
Children’s Court must record reasons for its decision
as to whether the child in conflict with law is to be
tried as a child or as an adult. Thus, it is clear that
Section 19(1) is not merely procedural in nature, but
constitutes a substantive provision, obligating the
Children’s Court to pass a reasoned order upon due
application of mind.
10.4.2. If the Children’s Court concludes that the child in conflict
with law is to be tried as an adult, it is required to follow
the procedure of a Sessions case as prescribed under
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The procedure and
the manner in which such trial is to be conducted are
elaborately provided under the Act as well as Rule
13(8) of Model Rules. The scheme of the Act and the
Rules ensures that no child is subjected to an adult trial
without due compliance with the statutory safeguards.
It is in this context that Section 19(1) assumes critical
significance and must be regarded as mandatory in
nature. Conversely, if the Children’s Court determines
that the child in conflict with law is not to be tried
as an adult, it is required to follow the procedure
applicable to summons cases as given in Rule 13(7)
of the Model Rules. Therefore, in the absence of an
order under Section 19(1), the Children’s Court may
inadvertently bypass its jurisdiction akin to that of a
Board and assume the jurisdiction of a Sessions Court/
Children’s Court, which, in our considered opinion, is
impermissible.
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 275
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
10.4.3. Upon a perusal of Section 8 of the Act, which
respectively delineate the powers and functions of the
Board and the course to be adopted by the Children’s
Court, the statutory scheme becomes evident. Sub-
section (2) of Section 8 specifically provides that the
Children’s Court shall also exercise the jurisdiction of
the Board in situations contemplated under Section
19(1) of the Act. The Act and the Rules thus make
it clear that the Children’s Court is vested with the
jurisdiction of the Board including in terms of Section
19(1)(ii) which stands attracted when the Children’s
Court arrives at the conclusion that the child in conflict
with law is not to be tried as an adult.
10.4.4. The procedure to be followed by the Board and the
Children’s Court, while trying a ‘child in conflict with law’
as a child or as an adult pursuant to a determination
under Section 19(1) of the Act, is fundamentally distinct.
The Children’s Court can proceed to try a ‘child in conflict
with law’ as an adult only upon making a determination
to that effect in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act. In
such a case, the procedure to be adopted is that of
a Sessions trial, and not that of a summons case.
Conversely, where the determination is that the ‘child
in conflict with law’ is to be tried as a child and not as
an adult, the procedure applicable is that of a summons
case, to be followed by the Board or by the Children’s
Court exercising the jurisdiction of the Board. Thus,
the determination under Section 19(1) assumes crucial
significance. Non-compliance of the same, may result
in, firstly, Children’s Court not exercising the jurisdiction
vested upon to try the matter as a Children’s Court or
to conduct an inquiry as a ‘Board’ ; secondly, it would
lead such ‘child in conflict with law’ being tried as an
adult and being subjected in sessions trial though there
is no need of being tried as an adult, thirdly, the inquiry
to be conducted by such Court, in appropriate cases
as a Board would not take place.
10.5. Thirdly, the aspect of punishment also assumes significance.
Where a child in conflict with law is tried as a child and not
276 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
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an adult and after completion of the inquiry, the Board is
empowered to pass orders in terms of Sections 18(1) and 18(2)
of the Act, including measures relating to the care, protection
and rehabilitation of the child and it may also direct the child
to be sent to a Special Home for a period not exceeding three
years. In contrast, where a ‘child in conflict with law’ is tried
as an adult, the Children’s Court, subject to the prohibitions
contained in Sections 19 and 21 of the Act (including the bar
on death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of
release), is empowered to impose other punishments. It is for
this reason that a determination under Section 19(1) assumes
critical importance. In the absence of such determination, if
a child in conflict with law who ought to be tried as a child is
instead tried as an adult, there exists a real possibility of the
child being subjected to a sentence exceeding three years,
which, in our considered view is contrary to the law, and
therefore impermissible. While it may be argued that, in certain
cases, even in the absence of a formal determination under
Section 19(1), the punishment imposed may ultimately align
with what would have been awarded had the child been tried
as an adult, such instances cannot justify non-compliance with
the statutory mandate. Even a remote possibility that a child in
conflict with law, who ought to be tried as a child, is subjected
to an adult trial, such adult trial is wholly impermissible and it
strikes at the very root of the protective framework envisaged
under the Act.
10.6. The above view expressed by us has also been briefly
summarized in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya
Pradesh8 wherein it was held as follows:
“9. There are two parts to sub-section 1 of Section
19. The first part requires the children’s Court to
decide whether there is a need for trial of the child
as an adult as per the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. If the Court is satisfied
that the child needs to be tried as an adult as
per the provisions of Cr.P.C., the Children’s Court
8 (2023) 15 SCC 678
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 277
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
can proceed with the trial and thereafter pass
an appropriate order subject to the provisions of
sections 19 and 21 of the JJ Act.
10. Clause (ii) of sub-section 1 of Section 19 is
very crucial which indicates that though the word
‘may’ have been used in the opening part of sub-
section 1 of Section 19, the same will have to
be read as ‘shall’. Clause (ii) provides that after
examining whether there is a need for a trial of the
child as an adult, if the children’s Court comes to
the conclusion that there is no need for the trial of
the child as an adult, instead of sending back the
matter to the Board, the Court itself is empowered
to conduct an inquiry and pass appropriate orders
in accordance with provisions of Section 18 of the
JJ Act. The trial of a child as an adult and his trial
as a juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board has
different consequences.
11. Therefore, holding an inquiry in terms of clause
(i) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 is not an empty
formality. The reason is that if the Children’s Court
comes to the conclusion that there is no need to
try the child as an adult, he will be entitled to be
treated differently in the sense that action can be
taken against him only in terms of Section 18 of
the JJ Act.”
10.7. This Court in the case of Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master
Bholu and Another9 has also discussed the nature of Section
15 and 19 of the Act, which might be some relevance for the
discussion. This Court has held:
“47. The order of preliminary assessment decides
whether the child in conflict with law, falling in the
age bracket of 16-18 years and having committed
heinous offence, is to be tried as an adult by the
Children’s Court or by the Board itself, treating him
9 (2023) 12 SCC 401
278 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to be a child. There are two major consequences
provided in the Act, 2015, if the child is tried as an
adult by the Children’s Court. First, that the sentence
or the punishment can go up to life imprisonment
if the child is tried as an adult by the Children’s
Court, whereas if the child is tried by the Board as a
child, the maximum sentence that can be awarded
is 3 years. The second major consequence is that
where the child is tried as a child by the Board,
then under section 24(1), he would not suffer any
disqualification attached to the conviction of an
offence, whereas the said removal of disqualification
would not be available to a child who is tried
as an adult by the Children’s Court, as per the
proviso to section 24(1). Another consequence,
which may also have serious repercussions, is
that as per section 24(2), where the Board or the
Children’s Court, after the case is over, may direct
the police or the registry that relevant records of
such conviction may be destroyed after the period
of expiry of appeal or a reasonable period as may
be prescribed. Whereas, when a child is tried as an
adult, the relevant records shall be retained by the
relevant Court, as per the proviso to section 24(2).
48. These consequences are serious in nature
and have a lasting effect for the entire life of the
child. It is well settled that any order that has
serious civil consequences, reasonable opportunity
must be afforded. The question is of what would
be a reasonable opportunity in a case where a
preliminary assessment is to be made by the Board
under section 15.
……………….
85. We are conscious of the fact that the power
to make the preliminary assessment is vested in
the Board and also the Children’s Court under
sections 15 and 19 respectively. The Children’s
Court, on its own, upon a matter being referred to
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 279
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
under section 18(3), would still examine whether
the child is to be tried as an adult or not, and if it
would come to the conclusion that the child was not
to be tried as an adult then it would itself conduct
an inquiry as a Board and pass appropriate orders
under section 18. Thus, the power to carry out the
preliminary assessment rests with the Board and
the Children’s Court. This Court cannot delve upon
the exercise of preliminary assessment. This Court
will only examine as to whether the preliminary
assessment has been carried out as required
under law or not. Even the High Court, exercising
revisionary power under section 102, would test
the decision of the Board or the Children’s Court
with respect to its legality or propriety only. In the
present case, the High Court has, after considering
limited material on record, arrived at a conclusion
that the matter required reconsideration and for
which, it has remanded the matter to the Board
with further directions to take additional evidence
and also to afford adequate opportunity to the child
before taking a fresh decision.”
10.8. From the above discussion it becomes abundantly clear and
evident that the intention of the Act is to have Section 19(1)
as mandatory.
11. Now adverting to the consequence of non-compliance with Section
19 of the Act, the same has already been considered by this Court in
Thirumoorthy v. State represented by the Inspector of Police10.
In the said case, the ‘child in conflict with law’ was apprehended
and subsequently tried by the Children’s Court without adhering to
the mandatory requirements of Sections 9, 15, 18 and 19 of the Act,
and was convicted and sentenced to a maximum term of ten years
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, along with sentences
under other provisions. This Court, upon a detailed analysis of the
scheme and provisions of the Act, held that non-compliance with the
mandatory provisions thereof vitiates the entire trial, and accordingly
10 (2024) 12 SCC 307
280 [2026] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
proceeded to quash and set aside the judgment of conviction and
sentence. This Court held as follows:
“33. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after
preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there
is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then
the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the
Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try such offences.
34. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children’s Court,
upon receiving such report of preliminary assessment
undertaken by the Board under Section 15 may further
decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child
as an adult or not.
35. The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19
has been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case
of Ajeet Gujar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In the said
case, this Court considered the import of Section 19(1) of
the JJ Act and held that the word ‘may’ used in the said
provision be read as ‘shall’. It was also held that holding
of an inquiry under 19(1)(i) is not an empty formality.
Section 19)(1)(ii) provides that after examining the matter,
if the Children’s Court comes to the conclusion that there
is no need for trial of the child as an adult, instead of
sending back 2023 SCC Online SC 1255 the matter to
the Board, the Court itself is empowered to conduct an
inquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with
provisions of Section 18 of the JJ Act. The trial of a child
as an adult and his trial as a juvenile by the Children’s
Court have different consequences.
36. It was further held that the Children’s Court cannot
brush aside the requirement of holding an inquiry
under Section 19(1)(i) of the JJ Act. Thus, all actions
provided under Section 19 are mandatorily required to
be undertaken by the Children’s Court.
37. As can be seen from the facts of the present case,
there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory
requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither
was the charge sheet against the accused appellant filed
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 281
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
before the Board nor was any preliminary assessment
conducted under Section 15, so as to find out whether the
accused appellant was required to be tried as an adult.
38. In absence of a preliminary assessment being
conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without
an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1)
read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial
Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have
proceeded with the trial of the accused.
39. Thus, it is evident that the procedure adopted by the
Sessions Court in conducting the trial of the accused
appellant is de hors the mandatory requirements of JJ Act.
40. Thus, on the face of the record, the proceedings
undertaken by the Sessions Court in conducting trial of
the CICL, convicting and sentencing him as above are
in gross violation of the mandate of the Act and thus,
the entire proceedings stand vitiated.
41. It seems that pursuant to the trial being concluded, the
trial Court realized the gross illegality in the proceedings
and thus, in an attempt to give a vestige of validity to the
grossly illegal proceedings conducted earlier, an exercise
was undertaken to deal with the accused appellant as per
the provisions of the JJ Act on the aspect of sentencing.
However, ex facie, the said action which seems to be
taken by way of providing an ex post facto imprimatur
to the grossly illegal trial does not stand to scrutiny
because the very foundation of the prosecution case is
illegal to the core.
……………………………
46. In the case of Ajeet Gurjar(supra), this Court remitted
back the matter to the Sessions Court for complying with
the requirements of Section 19(1) of the JJ Act. However,
in the present case, there is yet another hurdle which
convinces us that it is not a fit case warranting de novo
proceedings against the accused appellant by taking
recourse to the provisions of the JJ Act. At the cost of
repetition, it may be reiterated that the charge sheet
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was filed against the accused appellant directly before
the Sessions Court (statedly designated as a Children’s
Court) and he was never presented before the Juvenile
Justice Board as per the mandate of the JJ Act.
47. The accused appellant being a CICL was never
subjected to preliminary assessment by the Board so
as to find out whether he should be tried as an adult.
Directing such an exercise at this stage would be sheer
futility because now the appellant is nearly 23 years of age.
48. At this stage, there remains no realistic possibility
of finding out the mental and physical capacity of the
accused appellant to commit the offence or to assess his
ability to understand the consequences of the offence
and circumstances in which he committed the offence
in the year 2016.
49. Since we have held that the entire proceedings
taken against the appellant right from the stage of
investigation and the completion of trial stand vitiated
as having been undertaken in gross violation of the
mandatory requirements of the JJ Act, we need not
dwell into the merits of the matter or to reappreciate
the evidence available on record for finding out whether
the prosecution has been able to prove the guilt of the
appellant by reliable circumstantial evidence.
50. Thus, we are left with no option but to quash and
set aside the impugned judgment and direct that the
appellant who is presently lodged in jail shall be released
forthwith, if not required in any other case.”
IV. CONCLUSION:
12. Though in Thirumoorthy (supra) there was non-compliance with
both Sections 15 and 19 of the Act, in the present case there is
compliance with Section 15, but there is non-compliance with Section
19(1) of the Act. We had, for some time, considered the possibility
of reducing the sentence to the period already undergone, or of
limiting the sentence to a maximum of three years. However, we
are unable to adopt such a course. In the absence of compliance
with Section 19(1), which is determinative of the procedure to be
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 283
Sagar v. The State of Haryana
followed by the Court, whether a Sessions trial or a summons case,
the entire trial stands vitiated. We are, therefore, left with no option
but to follow the course adopted in Thirumoorthy.
13. In Thirumoorthy (supra), the appellant was about 23 years of age
at the time of the judgment. In the present case, the appellant is
now 24 years old. At this stage, it would not be feasible for the
Children’s Court to undertake a meaningful assessment of the mental
capacity of the appellant that was prevailing at the time when crime
occurred. Further, having regard to the fact that the trial has already
been concluded and the appellant has undergone incarceration for
a period exceeding six years, we are of the considered view that
no useful purpose would be served by remitting the matter to the
Children’s Court.
14. In view of the foregoing, the conviction recorded by the Children’s
Court, having been rendered in non-compliance with the mandate
of Section 19(1) of the Act, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the
judgment of conviction and the consequential sentence imposed
in CIS No. SC/11/2019 passed by the Court of Additional Sessions
Judge, Kaithal dated 13/14.03.2019 and affirmed by the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana in CRA-D-649-2019(O&M) dated 16.12.2023
are hereby set aside for non-compliance with Section 19(1) of the Act.
15. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to issue a word of caution and
a direction to Children’s Courts across the country that upon receipt
of records pursuant to transfer/committal under Section 18(3) of the
Act by the Juvenile Justice Board, the first duty of the Children’s
Court, after taking cognizance of the matter, is to pass a reasoned
order under Section 19(1) of the Act upon due assessment of the
‘child in conflict with law’ before it proceeds further in the matter.
16. Consequently, the Appeal is allowed. The Appellant is acquitted.
The Appellant is on bail, the bail bonds executed by the Appellants
stands discharged. Pending applications, if any stands disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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