Holding

Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC is clearly applicable, and the sentence is reduced to five years imprisonment with a fine.

Summary

The appellants were part of a group that assaulted three persons, pouring acid on their faces and bodies, causing severe burns. They were convicted by the trial court under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. The High Court altered the conviction to Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC, maintaining the sentence. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 34 IPC (joint liability) applied and whether the injuries satisfied the requirements of Section 307 IPC. It held that the joint intention and common participation established liability under Section 34, and that Section 307 was applicable even though the injuries did not cause death. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction but reduced the custodial sentence to five years and imposed a fine of Rs.25,000 on each appellant.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is applicable to the accused in the acid‑attack case.
Whether the facts satisfy the elements of Section 307 IPC despite the absence of fatal injury.
Whether the sentence of ten years' imprisonment is proportionate to the offence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 232
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307, s. 323, s. 324, s. 34

Subjects

Section 34 IPCSection 307 IPCjoint liabilitycommon intentionacid attacksentencingcriminal lawIndian Penal Code

Judgment

- -'(
'
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 14

+
A SACHIN JANA AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL

B
(Criminal Appeal No. 176 of 2008)
JANUARY 25, 2008 ....
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
...,
Penal Code, 1860:
s. 307 r w. s. 34 - Acid poured on victims resulting in face
c disfiguration - Conviction under s. 307 and s~ntence of 10
years imposed - High Court altering conviction to ss.307134
- On appeal, Held: s.307 r. w.s.34 clearly applicable -
Considering nature of dispute, sentence is reduced to 5 years.
s.34 - Distinctive features - Laid down.
D
s.307 - Conviction under - Essential requirement - .
Discussed.
The prosecution case was that informant PW-1 was
cultivating land when 20 persons including the appellants,
E
armed with various weapons assaulted PW-1 with blows,
kicks, iron rods and also poured acid on his face and
body. Appellants also poured acid on PW-2 and PW-3 and
assaulted another person who came forward to save PW-
1. Trial Court primarily relied on the evidence of PWs 1,2
F and 3 who were claimed to be the victims of acid pouring
and convicted 14 persons under s.307 IPC and sentenced "'
each person to 10 years imprisonment. On appeal, High
Court dismissed the appeal so far it related to the
appellants, but altered conviction to s.307134 IPC.
G
In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that
s.34 IPC has no application; that the offence under s.307
is not made out and that the sentence as imposed was
excessive.
H 14
)-- SACHIN JANA AND ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 15

Disposing of the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1.1. 5.34 IPC has been enacted on the principle
of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section
is only a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the section
is the element of participation in action. The liability of one 8
person for an offence committed by another in the course
of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises
under s.34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a
common intention of the persons who join in committing
the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom C
available and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred from the circumstances appearing from the
proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances.
In order to bring home the charge of common intention,
the prosecution has. to establish by evidence, whether D
direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of
minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence
for which they are charged with the aid of s.34, be it pre-
arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The E
true concept of the section is that if two or more persons
intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just
the same as if each of them has done it individually by ·
himself. [Para 1O] [19-D-H]
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (1977) 1 SCC 746 - F
,... relied on.
1.2. The section does not say "the common i
intentions of all", nor does it say "an intention common
to all". Under the provisions of s.34 the essence of the G
liability is to be found in the existence of a common
r intention animating the accused leading to the doing .of a
criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result
of the application of principles enunciated in s.34, when
an accused is convicted under s.302 read with s.34, in
H
-(
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A law it means that the accused is liable for the .act which + ,•
caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it
was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet
a case in which it may.be difficult to distinguish between t-
acts of individual members of a party who act in
B furtherance of the common intention of. all or to prove
exactly what part was taken by each of them. [Para 11]
[20-C-E] y

ChintaPulla Reddy v. State of A.P. (1993) Supp. 3 134;
Girija Shankar vs. State of U.P. (2004) 4 sec 793 - relied on.
c
2.1. Three persons suffered injuries on account of
acid poured on them. The doctor had indicated that each
of the injured persons suffered more than 50% burn injury
which was caused due to acid and the same was sufficient
to cause death if not attended by medical ai.d at
D
appropriate time. [Para 9] [19-C]
2.2. To justify conviction under s.307 IPC, it is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death
should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury
E actually caused may often give considerable assistance
in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused,
such intention may also be deduced from other
circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
\
ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds.
F The section makes a distinction between an act of the
accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be
attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is
concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit
·. would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that
the injury actually caused 'to the victim of the assault
G
should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to
-..(
cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court '
has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, "'
was done with the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in
H
'r SACHIN JANA AND ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 17
[PASAYAT, J.]
1- order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is A
sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with
some overt act in execution thereof. [Para 13] [21-A-E]
State of Maharashtra v. Bairam Bama Patil (1983) 2
sec 28 - relied on.
B
2.3. When the evidence on record is analysed, it is
clear that s.307 read with s. 34 IPC has clear application.
,.,.
The acid burns caused disfigurement. Considering the
nature of dispute the custodial sentence is reduced to 5
years. However, each of the appellants is directed to pay
a fine of Rs.25,000/-. [Paras 15,16] [21-F-G]
c
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 176 of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 15.5.2007 of
the High Court of Calcutta at Calcutta in C.R.A. No. 17/1995 D
R.S. Suri, S. Bhowmick and K.S. Prasad for the Appellants.
..... Avijit Bhattacharjee for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court which confirmed
conviction of the appellants while directing acquittal of twelve
co-accused persons. Originally, 20 persons including the F
·:-- present appellants faced trial for offence punishable under
Sections 148, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). After recording
evidence the Trial Court acquitted six persons under Section
232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.') G
and the rest 14 were convicted.
r
3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
First information report was lodged by one Hrishikesh Jana
--t on 17.1.1992, stating that on 17.1.1992 in the morning when
H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A said Hrishikesh Jana was busy in the field for cultivation of his
land, the appellants under the leadership of appellant Sachin
Jana forming an unlawful assembly and being armed with
different weapons like bombs, sticks, knives, iron rods and
bottle of acid threatened Hrishikesh Jana with dire
B consequences and when Hrishikesh Jana did not oblige them
by leaving the work of cultivation, the accused persons started
assaulting him with blows, kicks, iron rods etc. and acid was
also poured on his face and body. Hrishikesh Jana alleged in
his written complaint that the appellants also poured acid on
C one Amulya Giri and Kartick Maity and also assaulted one
Sabitri Giri who came forward to save Hrishikesh Jana. After
completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. Accused
persons pleaded false implication.
4. In order to further its version the prosecution examined ·
o 11 witnesses including the informant Hrishikesh Jana and
injured persons Amulya Giri, Kalipada Maity. The accused
persons examined three persons to contend that the prosecution
was not projecting the correct scenario. The Trial Court after
considering the evidence came to the conclusion that on 17th
E January, 1992 Sachin Jana and remaining appellants, after
forming an unlawful assembly assaulted him when Amulya
(PW2), Kartick (PW3) and Sachin came to rescue Hrishikesh.
The accused persons shared common intention and also poured
acid on the person of Amulya and assaulted.
F 5. Fourteen persons were found guilty of offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC and each was sentenced to
ten years imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/- with default ~
stipulation. Different sentences were also imposed for the other
offences.
G 6. The Trial Court primarily relied on the evidence of PWs.
1, 2 and 3 who were claimed to be victims of acid pouring. The
High Court in appeal found that the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3 -..(
clearly established the guilt of the appellants, but was not
sufficient to convict the ·12 co-accused persons. Accordingly1
H the appeal so far it relates to the present appellants. was
)'- . SACHIN JANA AND ANR v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 19
[PASAYAT, J.]

dismissed. But the conviction was altered to Section 307/34 A
IPC.
·7. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the case was one of false implication.
In any event, offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out
8
and the sentence as imposed is clearly excessive.
8. It is also submitted that Section 34 IPC has no
application.
9. It is to be noted that three persons suffered injuries on
account of acid poured on them. The doctor had indicated that C
each of the injured persons suffered more than 50% burn injury
which was caused due to acid and the same was sufficient to
cause death if not attended by medical aid at appropriate time.
10. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint
0
liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of
evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The
distinctive·feature of the section is the element of participation
in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed
by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in E
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in
committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is
seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts ·
of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home F
the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish
by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was
plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit
the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section
34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must G
)- necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true
concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally
do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of
them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok
Kumarv. State of Punjab (1977 1 SCC 746) the existence of a H
- -i
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R.

A common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the
essential element for application of this section; It is not
necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with
commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically
similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have
B been actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision.
11. The section does not say "the common intentions of
all", nor does it say "an intention common to all". Under the
provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be
C found in the existence of a common intention animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of
such intention. As a result of the application of principles
enunciated· in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under
Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the
D accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased -
in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision
is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to
distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who
act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove
E exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed
in Chinta Pu/la Reddy v. State of A.P (1993 Supp. (3) 134)
Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by
the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not
necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.
F 12. The above position was highlighted in Girija Shankar
vs. State of U.P (2004 (4) sec 793).
13. Section 307 IPC reads:
"307. Whoever does any act with such intention or
G knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by
that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such
H act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for
I

)- - SACHIN JANA AND ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 21
[PASAYAT, J.]

life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned." A
To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential
that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been
inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often
give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the
intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced B
from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The
section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and
its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result
so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may C
be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section.
It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of
the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances
to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has
to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done D
with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances
mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need
not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present
an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
14. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra E
v. Bairam Bama Patil (1983 (2) SCC 28).
15. When the evidence on record is analysed, it is clear
that Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC has clear application.
The acid burns caused disfigurement.
F
16. Considering the nature of dispute the custodial
sentence is reduced to 5 years. However, each of the appellants
is directed to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-. If the amount is deposited
by the appellants within six weeks from to<'.iay, out of each
deposit, Rs.10,000/- shall be paid to each of the victims PWs. G
1, 2 and 3. In case the amount of fine imposed is not deposited,
the default custodial sentence of one year each.
17. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
D.G. Appeal disposed of. H