Holding

A Letters Patent Appeal filed against a Single Judge's order in a first appeal is not a second appeal; the Division Bench must exercise the same powers as a Single Judge and may consider both questions of fact and law.

Summary

The appellant, Sachioa Nano Lal (also known as Sachioa Nano Shah), challenged the compensation awarded in a land acquisition proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After a reference court fixed compensation, the appellant obtained a partial enhancement of the 'ka' category land from a Single Judge of the Patna High Court, but the 'kha' category remained unchanged. The appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench, which dismissed the appeal without addressing its merits. The Supreme Court examined whether such an intra‑court appeal, filed against a Single Judge's order in a first appeal, is limited to questions of law (as a second appeal) or may consider both fact and law. Relying on Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao and Gaudiya Mission v. Shobha Bose, the Court held that the Division Bench possesses the same powers as a Single Judge in a first appeal and must examine the merits. Consequently, the Division Bench's dismissal was declared an error of law, the order set aside, and the matter remanded for fresh disposal. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench, filed against a Single Judge's order in a first appeal, is limited to questions of law only or can consider both fact and law.
Whether the Division Bench erred in dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal without addressing the merits of the case.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100, s. 101, s. 110
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 18, s. 4, s. 54

Subjects

Letters Patent AppealDivision BenchHigh CourtFirst AppealLand AcquisitionCompensationScope of appellate jurisdictionCPC Sections 100 101Section 54 Land Acquisition Act

Judgment

[2008]· 1~ S.CR. 830 .

A SACHIOA
. . NAN.b.
.. . [AL @ SACHIDA NANO SHAH
:• . :

. : . v.
. STATE OF BiHAR,- (NOW .JHARKHAND)
... (Civli Appear Na'.· 6442 2000) of
• •.' •· t •

NOVEMBER 7, 2008
,. · [C·..K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

.. Appeal: U~tter Patent Appeal from order in first appeal
- Power of Division Bench of High Court hearing LPA -
C Held: Division Bench of High Court has same powers as
exereised by Single Judge of High Court in appeal from
original decree - Letters Patent before Division Bench is not
in the ·nature of appeal from an appellate decree i.e. second
appeal but it is continuation of appeal from original decree.
D
In land acquisition proceedings, the appellant-
claimant was aggrieved with the award of compensation. '
He sought reference for enhancement of. the
'
compensation amount. Reference Court partly allowed
E the reference. Still dissatisfied, appellant filed appeal in
the High Court.. Single Judge of High Court partly allowed
the appeal. Against the said order, a Letter Patent Appeal
. was filed before Division Bench of High Court. Division
Bench of High Court without entering into questions ·of
fact and law dis.missed the appeal. Hence the instant
F appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The appeal from original decree was
preferred by the claimant before the High Court, which
G was heard· bY' the Single Judge of the High Court. S.54
of the Land Acquisition Act provides for filing Appeals in
proceedings before the Court. In view of express
provision .as ·to filing of appeal under the Act as also the
H 830
SACHIOA NANO LAL @SACHIOA NANO SHAH v. STATE 831.
OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHANO)

provision relating to filing of Letters Patent as applicable 1 A
to the High Court of Patna, an order passed by a Single
Judge of the High Court can be challenged by filing an
intra-Court appeal before a Division Bench of the same
Court. The claimant was, therefore, justified in exercising
the right of filing Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, B
appeal was preferred before a Division Bench. [Paras 11
and 12] [834-F-G; 835-B-C]

1.2. Since the appeal before the Single Judge was
appeal from original decree, i.e. First Appeal, the Division C
Bench ought to have considered the correctness or
otherwise of the order passed by the Single Judge by
exercising same powers as exercised by the Single
J1.1dge in the appeal from original decree. The Letters
Patent before the Division Bench was not in. the nature
of appeal from an appellate decree, i.e. Second Appeal, D
but it was continuation of appeal from original decree, i.e.
First Appeal. In the circumstances, the Division Bench
committed an error of law in dismissing the appeal in
limine by a brief order without considering the merits.
[Para 13) [835-D-F] E

Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, AIR (1974) SC 2048 and
GaudiyaMission v. Shobha Bose &Anr. JT (2008) 1 SC 384,
relied on.

Case Law Reference: F

AIR (1974) SC 2048 relied on Para 15
JT (2008) 1 SC 384 relied on Para 17

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. G
6442 of 2000. ·

From the final Judgment and Order dated 1.3.2000 of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench, Ranchi in
L.P.A. No. 362 of 1999.(R). H
..
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15· S.C.R.

~,,
A Gopal Prasad for the Appellant. .. )-

B.S. Singh for the Respondent.

_"fhe Judgr:nent of the Court was delivered by
1

C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. The present appeal is filed against
B
judgment and order dated June 22, 1999 passed by a single
Judge of the High Court of Patna (Ranchi Bench) in Appeal
from Original Decree Nos. 228 and 229 of 1989 and confirmed ~'
\
by the Division Bench on March 01, 2000 in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 362 cif 1999. ·
c
2. Shortly stated the facts of the case are that on February
16, 1978, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued for
acquisition of land bearing Khata Nos. 277 and 107 situated
D in the town· of Lohardaga of Ranchi for construction of
agricultural market-yard. According to the appellant, the
Collector divided the land into two categories; (i) category 'ka'
-
,,.., .....
and (ii) category 'kha'. The land situated up to 150 feet from
the road was categorized as 'ka' whereas land situated beyond
E 150 feet from the road was categorized as 'kha'. The Collector
assessed the value of the land of category 'ka' at the rate of
Rs.48,500/- per acre and category 'kha' at the rate of
Rs.32,335/- per acre. It was, however, the allegation of the
appellant that the Deputy Secretary, Government of Bihar
illegally and without any reason or ground and without authority ~
F
of law reduced the rate to Rs.25,000/- and Rs. 16,000/- per acre
for category 'ka' and 'kha' respectively. Accordingly, an award
was passed on May 05, 1980 on that basis.
3. The appellant being aggrieved by the award sought
G reference for enhancement of compensation under Section 18
of the Act which was registered as Land Acquisition Case No.
498of1981. Similar referenc.:es were also sought by other land
owners. All the references came up for hearing before the Court }
of learned Subordinate Judge, Ranchi and the learned Judge
H by judgment and order dated July 06, 1987 partly allowed the
SACHIOA NANO LAL@ SACHIOA NANO SHAH v. STATE 833
OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHANO) [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
>-\ reference. For the land of category 'ka', the Reference Court .A
fixed compensation at the rate of Rs.48,000/- per acre and for
category 'kha', it was fixed at the rate of Rs.24,250/- per acre.
The Court also awarded solatium at the rate of 30% and interest
@ 6% with effect from June 01, 1979.
8
4. The appellant challenged the judgment and order
passed by Reference Court by filing First Appeal No. 229 of
f
1989 in the High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench. The learned
/ Singie Judge before whom the appeal came up for hearing
partly allowed it. So far as the land of category 'ka' is
concerned, he enhanced compensation from Rs.48,000/- per c
acre to Rs.66,000/- per acre. He, however, declined to interfere
with the rate of 'kha' category of land and no enhancement at
all was granted to the said land, though the Reference Court
had observed in the order that category 'kha' would get 50%
amount of compensation of the land of category 'ka'. D

5. In the circumstances, the appellant- claimant
approached the Division Bench of the High Court by filing
Letters Patent Appeal No.363 of 1999. The Division Bench of
the High Court disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal by a
E
cryptic order dated June 22, 1999 which read as under;
"Heard counsel for the appellant.

We do not find any merit in this Letters Patent
.A_
Appeal which is accordingly dismissed."
F
6. The above order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal is challenged by the
appellant in the present appeal. Initially when the matter was
placed for admission hearing, the following order was passed
by this Court on August 28, 2000; G

"Issue notice limited to the question, whether the High
{ Court is right while enhancing the rate of compensation of
category 'Ka' land to Rs. 66,000.00 per acre but
maintaining the category 'Kha' land at Rs. 24,250.00. The
H
834 SUPREME. COURT 'REPORTS [2008] 15'S.C.R.

,.. J..,_ .....
A case of the petitioner is that the rate of the land of 'Kha' l

should have been at least half of the rate of the 'Ka'
property as held by the referring Court."
(emphasis supplied)
··s 7. On November 13, 2000, the petition was called out for
hearing. Service of notice was complete, but none appeared
for the respondent and hence leave was granted. It was >c
thereafter placed for final hearing before the Court, but it was I,

brought to the notice of the Court that in the light of bifurcation
·c oftwostates of (i) Bihar and (ii) Jharkhand, the subject matter
in the appeal related to the State of Jharkhand. Fresh notices
were, therefore, issued and opportunity was given to the State
of Jharkhand to make submissions.

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
D
9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the ;r
Division Bench committed c;in error of law in dismissing the
Letters Patent Appeal without entering into the merits of the
matter. He also submitted that the Division Bench ought to have
E allowed the appeal by enhancing the amount of compensation.

10. In our opinion, however, the matter deserves to be
allowed on the first ground and it would not be appropriate for
this Court fo express any opinion on the second question on
merits of the matter. ~
F
11. As already observed earlier, after the Reference Court
decided the Reference, Appeal from Original Decree was
preferred by the claimant before the High Court. It was heard
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Section 54 of
the Act provides for filing Appeals in proceedings before the
G
Col'.lrt. It reads as under;

Appeals in proceedings before Court.-Subject to
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
J
1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and
H notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment
SACHIOA NANO LAL@ SACHIOA NANO SHAH v. STATE 835
OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHANO) [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
.>-- ~
for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any A
proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the
award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from
any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as
aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject
to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of B
Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof.
,t
12. In view of express provision as to filing of appeal under
/
the Act as also the provision relating to filing of Letters Patent
as applicable to the High Court of Patna, an order passed by
a single Judge of the High Court can be challenged by filing c
an intra-Court appeal before a Division Bench of the same
Court. The claimant was, therefore, justified in exercising the
right of filing Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, appeal was
preferred before a Division Bench.
D
~ 13. Since the appeal before the learned Single Judge was
Appeal from Original Decree, i.e. First Appeal, the Division
Bench ought to have considered the correctness or otherwise
of the order passed by the learned Single Judge by exercising
same powers as exercised by the learned single Judge in the
E
appeal from original decree. The Letters Patent before the
Division Bench was not in the nature of appeal from an
appellate decree, i.e. Second Appeal, but it was continuation
of appeal from original decree, i.e. First Appeal. In the
circumstances, in our opinion, the Division Bench committed
F
an error of law in dismissing the appeal in limine by a brief
order quoted hereinabove without considering the merits.

14. The law on the point is well-settled as regards the
power of the Division Bench while dealing with and deciding
Letters Patent Appeal from an order passed by a single Judge G.
in exercise of power as a Court of Appeal.

15. In Asha Devi v. Oukhi Sao, AIR 1974 SC 2048, a
similar question came up for consideration before this Court.
There, a First Appeal came up for hearing before a Single
H
836 · SUPREMi=: COURT REPORTS. r2008J 15 s.c.R:
..

A Judge of the High Court and was disposed of. Against the said ;"°'- 1
order, a Letters Patent Appeals was filed. A preliminary
objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that since it
was an appeal from a decree passed by a Single Judge of the
High Court in First Appeal, the appeal before the Division
B Bench was in substance and in reality in the nature of Second
Appeal and questions of law only could be agitated in such
Letters Patent Appeal. ....
16. N·egativing the contention and holding that the scope . '
of appeal before the Division Bench was similar to one before
c a Single Judge. this Court stated;

"There is no dispute that an appeal lies to a Division Bench
of the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of
that Court in appeal from a judgment and decree of a court
D subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The only
question is whether the power of a Division Bench hearing
a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters
Patent of Patna High Court or under the analogous
provisions in the Letters Patent of other High Courts is
limited only to a question of law under Section 100 of the
E
CPC or has it the same power which the Single Judge has
as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of
fact and of law. The limitations on the power of the Court
imposed by Sections 100 and 101 of the CPC cannot be
made applicable to an Appellate Court hearing a Letters
F Patent appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge of that
High Court in a first appeal from the judgment and decree
of the court subordinate to the High Court, for the simple
reason that a Single Judge to the High Court is not a Court
subordinate, to the High Court".
G
17. The above observations in Asha Devi make it explicitly
clear that an intra-Court appeal is required to be considered
and decided by the Division Bench of the High Court on the
same footing as an appeal considered and decided by a single
H Judge of the Court.
SACHIOA NANO LAL@ SACHIOA NANO SHAH v. STATE 837
OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHANO) [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

18. A similar question again arose before this Court A
)..1 recently in Gaudiya Mission v. Shobha Bose & Anr., JT 2008
r
(1) SC 384. There also, a single Judge of the High Court of
Allahabad decided the First Appeal against which Letters
Patent Appeal was filed before a Di.vision Bench. There also,
the Division Bench without entering into questions of fact and B
law, dismissed the appeal as if it was in the nature of Second
Appeal. Setting aside the order passed by the Single Judge,
following the law laid down by this Court in Asha Devi and
-~
remitting the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court for
--..)
fresh disposal in accordance with law, this Court held that the c
order passed by the Division Bench was liable to be set aside
and the matter was required to be decided on all questions,
i.e. on questions of fact as also on questions of law.

19. The same principle applies in the present case also.
The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court D
dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal cannot be said to be in
'T accordance with law and the said order deserves to be set
"' aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed
by the Division Bench is set aside. The appeal stands allowed
and the matter is remanded to Division Bench which will now E
hear the parties on merits and decide the case in accordance
with law by a reasoned judgment. On the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as
to costs.
F
__.I..., 20. Before parting with the matter, we may clarify that we
have not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter one way
or the other. All the observations made by us hereinabove have
been made only for the purpose of deciding the present appeal.
As and when the matter will be placed for hearing before the
Division Bench, the same will be decided strictly on its own G
merits without being influenced by the above observations.

21. The ~ppeai is accordingly. allowed.

D.G. Appeal allowed.
H