Holding

The High Court exceeded both its review and contempt jurisdiction; the contempt petition was time‑barred and the review order is set aside.

Summary

The dispute arose from a civil suit concerning the partition of ancestral land, which led to a decree directing the Tahsildar to mutate the name of the first respondent in revenue records. The Tahsildar failed to comply, prompting a contempt petition that was initially allowed by a Single Judge but later set aside by a Division Bench on the ground of limitation. The first respondent filed review petitions, and the High Court, invoking Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, allowed the review and reinstated the contempt order, also finding the State had acted fraudulently. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction because the grounds did not satisfy the statutory criteria and that the contempt petition was barred by the one‑year limitation, not constituting a "continuing wrong". Consequently, the review order was set aside, the original contempt dismissal restored, and the appeals were allowed. The Court also noted that any alleged fraud on the court was not raised before it, leaving that issue unaddressed.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court exercised its review jurisdiction in accordance with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC.
Whether the contempt petition filed by the first respondent was barred by the limitation period under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and whether the alleged non‑compliance amounted to a "continuing wrong".

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 21, s. Order VII Rule 6, s. Order XLVII Rule 1, s. Section 114
Constitution of Indias. Article 129, s. Article 215
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. Section 20, s. Section 22, s. Section 23
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 79

Subjects

review jurisdictioncontempt of courtlimitation periodcontinuing wrongCivil Procedure CodeContempt of Courts Actfraud on courtmutation of revenue recordstitle of land

Judgment

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1077 : 2024 INSC 544

S. Tirupathi Rao
v.
M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7920-7921 of 2024)
22 July 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Dutta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
1. Whether the High Court has, in the impugned judgment, exercised
the jurisdiction of review in accordance with the parameters set
out in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure?
2. Whether the High Court has, in the impugned judgment,
erroneously entertained contempt petition which was barred by
limitation?

Headnotes†
Civil Procedure Code – Order XLVII Rule 1 – Power to review,
not an inherent power, it has to be specifically conferred by
law – Contours and extent of review jurisdiction – Explained:
Held: The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power
given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically
conferred by law – In civil proceedings, review jurisdiction is
governed by Section 114 read in conjunction with Order XLVII
of the CPC and the court has to be certain that the elements
prescribed therein are satisfied before exercising such power –
The provisions therein relating to review of an order or decree
are mandatory in nature and any petition for review not satisfying
the rigours therein cannot be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a
court of law. [Paras 11, 12]
Civil Procedure Code – Order XLVII Rule 1 – Order cannot be
reviewed merely because it is erroneous on merits – An error
apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident:
Held: A decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous
on merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a
court exercising appellate jurisdiction – To succeed in a motion for
review, viewed through the prism of ‘error apparent on the face
of the record’, it does neither require long-drawn arguments nor

* Author
1078 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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an elaborate process of reasoning as these may be required, in a
given case, when exercising the power of merit review – An error
apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident – Where,
conceivably, two opinions can be formed in a given set of facts
and circumstances and one opinion of the two has been formed,
there is no error apparent on the face of the record. [Paras 20, 25]
Constitution of India – Article 129 & 215 – Inherent power of
contempt – Explained:
Held: The purpose of the law of contempt is to secure public
respect and confidence in the judicial process – The power of the
Supreme Court and a High Court to punish for breach of its orders
is expressly recognised by Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution,
respectively – It is an inherent power, distinguishable from a power
derived from a statute. [Paras 28, 29]
Contempt of Courts Act – Bounden duty on the contemnor to
comply with the court’s order without any delay – Punishment
for proved contempt must be in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Contempt of Courts Act:
Held: There lies a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply
with the court’s order without any delay, in a case where legal
recourse has not been taken to set aside/review/vacate the order
which is alleged to have been breached – A public official against
whom an allegation of contempt is levelled, upon being noticed
either by issuance of a rule for contempt or by court notice, must
work out his remedy in accordance with law if he wishes not to
comply with the court’s direction – Not only any order imposing
punishment for proved contempt must be in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Act but initiation of the proceedings
too has to be in accordance with the three modes that the Act
envisages. [Paras 39, 40]
Contempt of Courts Act – Role of contempt petitioner is only as
an informer – The endeavour of the court in contempt petition
is to uphold the majesty, dignity and prestige of the courts:
Held: The role of a party, who brings a petition for contempt and
activates the court’s machinery, is merely that of an informer –
Whether or not to take the assistance of the petitioning informer is
a question which invariably must be left entirely to the discretion of
the court seized of the proceedings – In exercising its jurisdiction
to punish for contempt, the courts in India do keep in mind the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1079

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

benefit that could accrue to the petitioning informer (if he is a party
to the parent proceedings out of which the contempt arises) upon
implementation of the order alleged to have been wilfully disobeyed;
but more than anything else, the endeavour is to uphold the majesty,
dignity and prestige of the courts. [Paras 45, 46]
Contempt of Courts Act – Section 20 – Civil Procedure Code –
Order VII Rule 6 – Condonation of Delay in approaching the
High Court for contempt – The contempt petitioner cannot
choose a time convenient to him to approach the Court:
Held: Even in case of a petition disclosing facts constituting
contempt, which is civil in nature, the petitioner cannot choose a
time convenient to him to approach the Court – The statute refers to
a specific time limit of one year from the date of alleged contempt
for proceedings to be initiated; meaning thereby, that the action
should be brought within a year, and not beyond, irrespective of
when the proceedings to punish for contempt are actually initiated
by the High Court – In an appropriate case, it would be open to
the party who has not petitioned the court within the period of one
year, as stipulated in Section 20 of the Act, to seek exemption
from the law of limitation in line with the principle flowing from
Order VII Rule 6, CPC, by showing the ground upon which such
exemption is claimed – Applicability of the principle underlying
Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just
and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the
jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if,
of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption
ought to be extended in a given case. [Para 55]
Contempt of Courts Act – Section 20 – Limitation period for
filing contempt petition – Interpretation thereof – Explained:
Held: Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a “continuing
wrong/breach/offence” ought not to be entertained, having regard to
the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has
been noticed above – Contempt being a personal action directed
against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the
efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time – Even
if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one
year from such commission no action is brought before the court
on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing,
no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his
own time to approach the court. [Para 56]
1080 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Single & Continuing cause of action – Difference explained:
Held: When an act is final and complete and becomes a cause
of action for injury to the plaintiff, it is single, and the plaintiff is
entitled to sue, for the wrongful act – But if there is repetition of
a wrongful act or omission, it will comprise a continuing cause of
action – Neither do repeated breaches of continuing obligations
constitute a continuing wrong nor intermittent breaches of a
continuing obligation; rather there has to be present an element of
continuance in both, the breach and the obligation. [Paras 74,75]
Legal Maxim – Secundum allegata et probate – Court can arrive
at its decision only on the basis of the claims and proof led
by the parties – Even if a point of “continuing wrong/breach/
offence” is traceable in the pleadings, the court ought not to
accept it mechanically:
Held: The court cannot traverse beyond the pleadings and make out
a case which was never pleaded, such principle having originated
from the fundamental legal maxim secundum allegata et probate,
i.e., the court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims
and proof led by the parties – The assertion of the contumacious
conduct being in the nature of a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”
is factual and has to be borne from the pleadings on record – Law
is well-settled that when a point is not traceable in the pleas set out
either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered on such
point by the court would be unsustainable as that would amount
to an altogether new case being made out for the party – Even
if a point of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is traceable in the
pleadings, the court ought not to accept it mechanically; particularly,
in entertaining an action for contempt, which is quasi-criminal in
nature, the court should be slow and circumspect and be fully
satisfied that there has indeed been a “continuing wrong/breach/
offence”. [Paras 71, 72]

Case Law Cited
Pallav Seth v. Custodian [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 387 : (2001) 7 SCC
549; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8
SCC 320; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most
Rev. Mar Paulose Athanasius [1955] 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954
SC 526; State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. [2024] 5
SCR 949 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1090; State of West Bengal v.
Kamal Sengupta [2008] 10 SCR 4 : (2008) 8 SCC 612; Aribam
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1081

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389;
Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [1994] Supp. 5 SCR
503 : (1995) 1 SCC 170; R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu [1972]
3 SCR 417 : (1972) 1 SCC 651; Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka
Tonga Mazdoor Union (1970) 3 SCC 98; Jhareswar Prasad Paul
v. Tarak Nath Ganguly [2002] 3 SCR 913 : (2002) 5 SCC 352; In
Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [1995] 2 SCR 638 : (1995) 2 SCC 584;
L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 379; Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal v. Neeraj Kumar [2013] 12 SCR 457 : (2014) 3 SCC
602; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Supreme
Court & High Court Judges [2024] 1 SCR 211 : (2024) 3 SCC 1;
Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal [2000] 1 SCR 1064 : (2000) 3
SCC 171; Advocate General v. A.V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 Cri. LJ.
1171; High Court of Karnataka v. Y.K. Subanna, 1989 SCC OnLine
Kar 404; Arthur Branwell & Company Ltd. v. Indian Fibres Ltd.,
1993 (2) CLJ 182; Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C.
Muddaiah [2007] 9 SCR 784 : (2007) 7 SCC 689; Hadkinson v.
Hadkinson, 1952 (2) All ER 567; X Ltd. v. Morgan Grampian Ltd.,
1990 (2) All ER 1; In the Matter of Anil Panjwani [2003] 3 SCR
1179 : (2003) 7 SCC 375; High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
v. Raj Kishore Yadav [1997] 2 SCR 429 : (1997) 3 SCC 11; State
of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 373 :
(1996) 5 SCC 342; Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh,
AIR 1935 PC 85; National Coal Board v. Galley [1958] 1 All ER
9; Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj
Sansthan [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 476 : AIR 1959 SC 798; M. Siddiq
v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1; Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy
[2010] 10 SCR 47 : (2010) 8 SCC 383; K. Jayaram v. BDA (2022)
12 SCC 815 – referred to.
Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram [1989] Supp. 1 SCR
223 : (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 418 – distinguished.
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 422:
(1994) 1 SCC 1 – relied on.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Civil Procedure
Code, 1908.

List of Keywords
Review; Review jurisdiction; Contempt of court; Contempt
jurisdiction; Continuing wrong.
1082 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7920-7921 of
2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.04.2022 of the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in RIA Nos. 1 and 3 of 2020
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 7922-7923 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
C. S. Vaidhyanathan, Sr. Adv., M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates,
Vinayak Goel, Gunnalan, Nitish Raj, Vineet George, Ms. Devina
Sehgal, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ranjit Kumar, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Vipin Singhi, C A Sundaram, R
Anand Padmanabhan, Sr. Advs., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Bina
Madhavan, Krishna Kumar Singh, Tushar Singh, Praseena Elizabeth
Joseph, Rajiv Kumar Choudhry , E Venkata Siddhartha, A.V.V.
Bhaskar, Ms. Ruchi Arya, Adith Memon, R. Sharath, Ms. Ruchi,
Shwetank Sailakwal, Mayank Suryan, Shashi Bhushan Kumar, G.
Seshagiri Rao, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Ms. Nisha Pandey, Maitreya
Mahaley, Yimyanger Longkumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19647-48 OF 2022]
Leave granted.
2. These appeals assail the common judgment and order dated 27th April,
20221 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad2
allowing Review I.A. No. 1/2020 in LPA 1/2018 and Review I.A. No.
3/2020 in CA 33/20173 preferred by the first respondent. The impugned

1 impugned order, hereafter
2 High Court, hereafter
3 review petitions, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1083

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

order of the High Court recalled the order under review and dismissed
a contempt appeal as well as a letters patent appeal of the appellant.
3. The present dispute emerges from a complex and interwoven set of
legal proceedings, involving myriad parties and decisions rendered
by both judicial and quasi-judicial authorities. The factual matrix, to
the extent relevant for adjudication of these civil appeals, is noticed
hereunder:
I. Ms. Sultana Jahan Begum, daughter of Nawab Moin-ud-Dowla
Bahadur, instituted Original Suit 130/19534 (since renumbered
as Civil Suit 07/1958 upon its transfer to the High Court) before
the City Civil Court, Andhra Pradesh, seeking partition of her
father’s properties known as ‘Asman Jahi Paigah’.
II. On 06th April, 1959, a preliminary decree was passed by the
High Court on the basis of a compromise entered into by and
between the parties to the civil suit. The schedule of properties
included within it Raidurg village.5
III. Notably, it is recorded therein that the plaintiff chose to withdraw
her claim against, inter alia, the defendant no. 48 in the suit,
i.e., the Secretary, Finance Department of the Government of
Andhra Pradesh. Resultantly, the suit stood dismissed against
the State unconditionally.
IV. During the pendency of the civil suit, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung,
son of Nawab Moin-ud-Dowla Bahadur, filed a claim petition
before the Nazim-e-Atiyat, claiming the subject land as jagir
land. This claim was negatived by the Nazim-e-Atiyat vide
an order dated 28th October, 1968 upon verification of sanad,
which revealed that there did not exist any document granting
paigah with respect to the subject land to the claimant’s father.
V. The order passed by the Nazim-e-Atiyat, upon appeal, was
confirmed by the Board of Revenue vide an order dated
29th December, 1976, which held that the subject land stood
escheated to the Government.

4 civil suit, hereafter
5 subject land, hereafter
1084 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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VI. Meanwhile, on 01st October, 2003, the decree holders in the
civil suit executed a deed of assignment in favour of the first
respondent herein in respect of land measuring more or less
Ac 143.00 guntas forming part of certain survey numbers of
the subject land.
VII. On 26th December, 2003, the High Court passed the final decree
and judgment in the civil suit in favour of the first respondent,
with respect to land measuring more or less acres 84.30 guntas6
forming part of Survey No. 46 of the subject land.
VIII. Pursuant thereto, the first respondent had approached the
Tahsildar with a prayer for mutation of his name in respect of the
decretal property in the revenue records which proved abortive.
Consequently, the first respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of
the High Court by preferring Writ Petition 1729/2009,7 seeking
direction for effecting mutation in terms of the final decree in
the civil suit. The respondent’s writ petition was heard with a
connected matter being Writ Petition 581/2009.
IX. On 05th March, 2009, a Single Judge of the High Court vide
a common order disposed of both the writ petitions at the
admission stage itself, with the following order:
“A partial final decree was passed by this Court on
26.12.2003 in Application No.1409 of 2003 in C.S. No.
7 of 1958, directing several steps. One of the steps
is that the names of the decree holders be mutated
in respect of the property mentioned in the decree.
It appears that the persons, who have purchased
part of the property from the parties to the decree,
have also approached the respondents for mutation
of their names. Having regard to the fact that there
was a specific direction in the decree, Acviving (sic,
requiring) authorities first to implement the decree
by effecting mutation in the only (sic) after the initial
step is complied with.

6 decretal property
7 writ petition, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1085

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

Hence, the writ petitions are disposed of, directing
that the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar, Serilingampally
Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, shall effect necessary
mutations in the revenue records strictly in accordance
with the decree, dated 26.12.2003, in Application
No.1409 of 2003 in C.S.No.7 of 1958 passed by this
Court, after issuing notices to the affected parties.
The subsequent purchasers, if any, shall be entitled
to pursue their remedies after this step. There shall
be no order as to costs.”
X. Thereafter, one Syed Azizulla Husaini challenged only the
decision in Writ Petition 581/2009. In exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, a Division Bench of the High Court, vide order
dated 18th August 2009, modified the order dated 05th March,
2009 as follows:
“Heard the learned advocates. The learned advocates
appearing for the respondents have no objection if
the objections which have been filed by the appellant
before the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar, Srilingampally
Mandal, Ranga Reddy District are also considered
along with the other objections which have been filed
by the affected parties.
In the circumstances, the order dated 05-03-2009
passed in Writ Petition No. 581 of 2009 is modified
to the effect that while considering the objections of
the affected parties, the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar,
Srilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District shall also
consider the objections which have already been filed
by the present appellant viz. Syed Azizullah Hussaini.”
XI. However, the appellant (the Tahsildar) did not carry the order
of disposal of the writ petition of the first respondent in appeal
and, thus, between the appellant and the first respondent, the
order dated 05th March, 2009 became final and binding.
XII. In view of the Tahsildar’s inaction in effecting mutation, as
ordered, the first respondent instituted Contempt Case 217/20148
before the High Court on 10th February, 2014.

8 contempt petition, hereafter
1086 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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XIII. The Single Judge, vide order dated 04th October, 2017, allowed
the contempt petition. The State’s contention that the petition
was barred by limitation was rejected on the ground that the
Tahsildar’s failure to obey the order of the Court, till mutation was
effected, would constitute a continuing wrong. Consequently, the
Tahsildar was directed to mutate the name of the first respondent
in terms of the final decree, and was also sentenced to simple
imprisonment for a term of two months, together with a fine of
Rs 1500/- (Rupees fifteen hundred only).
XIV. This decision of the Single Judge was challenged by the appellant
in two separate appeals – (i) Contempt Appeal 33/2017,9
presented against the punishment imposed on the appellant
and (ii) Letters Patent Appeal 01/2018,10 presented against the
direction for mutation of the name of the first respondent in the
revenue records qua the decretal property.
XV. A Division Bench of the High Court,11 vide a detailed judgment
and order dated 16th August, 2018, allowed both the appeals
and set aside the order under challenge for two primary
reasons – (i) the contempt petition was barred by limitation,
the failure of the Tahsildar to effect the mutation constituting a
single act and not a continuing wrong; and (ii) the preliminary
decree recorded that the civil suit was withdrawn as against the
State Government. Thus, there did not exist any decree which
could have been executed against the Government by the civil
court. Thus, as a legal and logical corollary, the State could not
be bound to effect mutation in the revenue records in terms of
a decree which was unenforceable against it. Consequently,
the first respondent’s attempt to seek a direction of mutation
against the State, on the strength of such a decree, was held
to be fraudulent in nature.
XVI. Challenge laid by the first respondent to the judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 by presenting special leave petitions12
before this Court was not entertained resulting in its dismissal

9 contempt appeal, hereafter
10 letters patent appeal, hereafter
11 Division Bench (original), hereafter
12 SLP (C) 24646-24647/2018
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1087

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

vide order dated 29th October, 2018. A petition seeking review13
of such order of dismissal was also dismissed by this Court vide
order dated 08th January, 2019.
XVII. This Court having spurned his aforesaid challenges, the first
respondent knocked the doors of the High Court once again by
filing review petitions against the common judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 (allowing the letters patent appeal and
the contempt appeal).
XVIII. As noted at the beginning of this judgment, vide the impugned
order, another Division Bench14 of the High Court allowed the
review petitions.
IMPUGNED ORDER
4. The Division Bench (review) noted at the outset that the merits of
the matter need not be looked into, and then went on to undertake
an exhaustive examination of precisely the same.
4.1 The High Court adversely observed that the State had not
yet obtained any decree against the first respondent or his
predecessors-in-interest to the effect that the subject land
belonged to it. The State was noted to have filed OSA (Sr) No.
2116/2011, challenging the final decree proceedings dated 26th
December, 2003 but the same stood dismissed vide order dated
24th August, 2011, with an observation that the State ought to
initiate separate proceedings in accordance with law. However,
no such proceedings were thereafter initiated by the State.
4.2 The High Court further observed that the State sought to set up
title to the subject land based on the concept of escheat without
invoking the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Escheats and
Bona Vacantia Act, 1974. This led to admonition of the State
authorities for taking mutually inconsistent pleas of ‘absolute
title’ and ‘right by escheat’.
4.3 The State was further held to have suppressed material
information and approached the Court with unclean hands
inasmuch as the stand taken by them was not supported by
any documentary evidence.

13 R.P. (C) 3973/2018
14 Division Bench (review), hereafter
1088 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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4.4 The State, on its part, had argued that the contempt action was
itself barred by limitation, as per section 20 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 197115 read with rule 21 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977.16 Such argument
was rejected by the Division Bench (review) by relying on the
decision in Pallav Seth v. Custodian,17 wherein it was held
that the period of limitation would only commence upon the
date from the discovery of fraud played by the party on the
Court/opposite party; the State having acted fraudulently by
suppressing information, the contempt petition would not be
barred by limitation.
4.5 With respect to the contempt alleged, the Division Bench (review)
examined the conduct of the State in remaining silent on the
matter of mutation and held that such silence could not be
interpreted to be a refusal on the part of the State to act upon
the representations. In view thereof, coupled with the State’s
periodic representations made before the Court that they would
implement the direction for mutation, it was held that such acts
constituted a continuing wrong so as to ensconce the contempt
petition within the ambit of the period of limitation.
4.6 In such review proceedings, the first respondent had brought on
record additional documents in the nature of sale deeds, orders by
revenue authorities and governmental memos, to which allegedly
access was obtained only after the disposal of the contempt
appeal, to argue that the subject land was the self-acquired
private property of the first respondent’s predecessor-in-interest.
The Division Bench (review) undertook a detailed examination
of the same to definitively conclude, with the aid of section 79
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that the property belonged to
the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent. The State’s
objection to such documents was overruled as the same were
held to come within the purview of “new and important matter
or evidence” as provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.18

15 the Act, hereafter
16 the Writ Rules, hereafter
17 [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 387 : (2001) 7 SCC 549
18 CPC, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1089

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

4.7 In summation, the Division Bench (review) reviewed and reversed
the judgment and order dated 16th August, 2018 and confirmed
the order dated 04th October, 2017 of the Single Judge passed
on the writ petition. The appellant’s sentence of imprisonment
was modified to four months, and a direction was issued to
implement the order passed in the writ petition within a period
of four weeks.
SUBMISSIONS
5. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, while
seeking our interference with the impugned order, submitted as under:
a) The Division Bench (review) of the High Court erred in allowing
the review petitions, without affording a hearing to the appellant
on merits.
b) The Division Bench (review) set aside the reasoned judgment
of the Division Bench (original) in the contempt appeal and
while substituting its own reasoning for that in the order under
review, did not disclose the error that was apparent on the
record; instead, it proceeded to decide the review as if it were
sitting in appeal over the earlier decision.
c) The Division Bench (review) placed undue reliance on the
additional documents produced by the first respondent, which
were accepted on face value, without giving an opportunity to
the appellant to rebut the same.
d) The Division Bench (review), in exercise of its review jurisdiction,
went beyond the order of the Single Judge passed in the writ
petition. It is settled law that a writ court cannot adjudicate on
title, since the same falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
civil court.
e) The Division Bench (original) had rightly set aside the order of
the Single Judge, as the order had been obtained by playing
fraud on the Court and the proceedings in the suit were itself
fraudulent in nature.
f) The civil suit was dismissed as against the State Government
and, thus, there could not have been an executable decree as
against the State.
g) The Division Bench (original) had rightly allowed the appellant’s
appeal on the ground that the failure to mutate the names of
1090 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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the first respondent was not a continuing wrong and, therefore,
the contempt petition was barred by limitation.
6. Mr. C. A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for an
intervenor, who disputed the title of the first respondent, adopted the
submissions of Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan. In addition, he contended that
there cannot be a more egregious mistake as the one committed by
the Division Bench (review) in exercise of its review jurisdiction. He
invited our attention to the grounds of review forming part of the review
petition and contended that none of the grounds can be said to be
within the parameters of section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of
the CPC; hence, the Division Bench (review) assumed a jurisdiction
which it could not have more particularly after the unsuccessful
misadventures of the first respondent before this Court.
7. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Mr. Vipin Sanghi and Mr.
R. Anand Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
various respondents, in support of upholding the impugned order,
submitted as under:
a) The appellant had not approached this Court with clean hands
since the Government Pleader, during the pendency of the
contempt proceedings, had avowed that the process of mutation
had already commenced, while the counter affidavit filed in the
same proceedings stated that the contempt petition itself was
barred by limitation.
b) The State had submitted in the contempt proceedings that there
was serious dispute with respect to the question of title which
could only be adjudicated in a civil suit; however, during the
course of the review proceedings, the senior counsel appearing
for the State categorically stated that no civil suit had been filed
till date.
c) During the period 1968 to 2022, the appellant had consistently
taken the plea of absolute title having been escheated to the
Government, but in course of consideration of the review petitions,
undertook a mutually inconsistent plea of the subject land being
Government land on the basis of revenue entries.
d) The appellant did not raise objections with respect to fraud and
fabrication when the additional documents were produced by the
first respondent before the High Court; having acquiesced to the
same, the appellant was now estopped from raising such pleas.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1091

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

e) The first respondent relied on a multitude of orders by both
judicial and administrative authorities to prove that the subject
land was privately purchased, and constituted self-acquired lands
of the first respondent’s predecessor in interest.
ANALYSIS
8. The present lis confronts us primarily with two inter-related legal
issues. The first one requires us to examine whether the parameters
set out in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC for exercising the power of
review, as interpreted by this Court in its numerous judgments, were
at all satisfied for the High Court to embark on an exercise of review.
The second issue requiring our consideration is the terminus a quo
for commencement of the point of limitation in matters of contempt,
in the light of provisions of section 20 of the Act read with Article
215 of the Constitution and rule 21 of the Writ Rules. This would, in
turn, require us to examine whether the contempt petition could have
been held to be maintainable by the High Court on the ground of the
appellant having continued to observe the order (directing mutation
to be effected) in the breach; in other words, whether there was a
continuing wilful breach of the order of the Single Judge dated 5th
March, 2009, amounting to civil contempt. These being preliminary
legal issues are proposed to be dealt with at the outset. Needless to
observe, hardly any other issue would survive for decision should any
of these issues be answered in favour of the appellant and against
the first respondent.
9. We are not too inclined to examine the contention raised on behalf
of the appellant that he was not extended reasonable and adequate
opportunity of hearing, once the Division Bench (review) allowed the
review petitions and proceeded to reverse the decision of the Division
Bench (original) on merits. There are other formidable grounds of
challenge, which would necessarily fall for our examination and
succeeding on one of such grounds would render the contention
raised redundant.
10. The Division Bench (review) extensively discussed the grounds
which need to exist so as to validate the invocation and exercise of
the Court’s power of review. In the impugned order, it held that the
State suppressed certain title documents, which were for the first
time produced before the Court by the first respondent as additional
documents. The additional documents constituted, inter alia, an order
of the Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh dated 19th November, 1959,
1092 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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which confirmed that the subject land is private land and not inam
or Government land. The first respondent justified the production of
these documents on the ground that access to such documents was
obtained only after the Division Bench (original) had rendered the
judgment and order dated 16th August, 2018. It was argued that if
the Division Bench (original) had the benefit of examination of such
additional documents, it would not have set aside the order dated 04th
October, 2017 passed on the contempt petition. The Division Bench
(review) held that since the first respondent had discovered new
evidence which was unavailable at the earlier stage of proceedings,
the threshold for maintainability of a review petition was satisfied.
11. While proceeding to determine the correctness of the impugned
order vis-à-vis the exercise of review jurisdiction, we ought to remind
ourselves of certain cardinal principles. The exercise of review
jurisdiction is not an inherent power given to the court; the power to
review has to be specifically conferred by law. In civil proceedings,
review jurisdiction is governed by section 114 read in conjunction
with order XLVII of the CPC and the court has to be certain that
the elements prescribed therein are satisfied before exercising such
power. This Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati 19 has succinctly
observed that:
“19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order
47 Rule 1 CPC.”
(emphasis ours)
12. That the provisions contained in section 114 and Order XLVII of the
CPC relating to review of an order or decree are mandatory in nature
and any petition for review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot
be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a court of law, is trite.
13. There is a plethora of decisions analysing the statutory provisions
governing the exercise of review jurisdiction; however, we would be
referring to a few of them for the purpose of the present exercise.
Suffice it to note that despite legal proceedings having commenced with
institution of the civil suit as far back as in 1953, the present controversy
has, as its source, a writ petition between the first respondent and
the Tahsildar preferred in 2009. Although the explanation to section

19 [2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1093

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

141 of the CPC makes it clear that provisions of the CPC would not
apply to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is
authority in abundance that the principles flowing from the CPC may
safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but to the extent
the same can be made applicable.
14. To put it plainly, Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC provides three
grounds for review:
1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant’s
knowledge or could not be produced by the applicant at the
time when the decree was passed, or order made; or
2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
3) for any other sufficient reason, which must be analogous to
either of the aforesaid grounds.
15. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar
Paulose Athanasius,20 this Court approved the view that the third
ground – “any other sufficient cause” must mean a reason sufficient
on grounds, at least analogous to the first two grounds. The same
view has been reiterated in a recent decision of this Court in State
(NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd.21 This Court affirmed that
the scope of the third ground had to be narrowly construed so as to
not traverse beyond the orbit of the first two grounds.
16. Since the Division Bench (review) invoked the first clause, we hasten
to emphasize that an applicant seeking review on the basis of
discovery of new evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has
been discovery of new evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge
or that it could not be produced at the time the decree was passed
or the order made despite due diligence; and secondly, that the new
evidence is material to the order/decree being reviewed in the sense
that if the evidence were produced in court when the decree was
passed or the order made, the decision of the court would have been
otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide whether a review
sought for by an applicant, if granted, would prevent abuse of the
process of law and/or miscarriage of justice.

20 [1955] 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954 SC 526
21 [2024] 5 SCR 949 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1090
1094 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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17. When the ground for review sought is that of discovery of new evidence,
this Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta 22 has clarified
that the same must be evidence which should be materially important
to the decision taken. The following passage is instructive:
“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a
review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter
or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and
must be of such a character that if the same had been
produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words,
mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is
not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only
this, the party seeking review has also to show that such
additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge
and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same
could not be produced before the court earlier.”
(emphasis ours)
18. In the light of the legal position crystalised by the above discussion,
we proceed to discern the rationale of the High Court in allowing the
review petition.
19. The proceedings of these civil appeals, as noted, have the writ
petition as its genesis and not the civil suit, which was decreed in
2003. It is of utmost importance to bear in mind that the Division
Bench (review) was called upon to review the judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 of the Division Bench (original), which
allowed the contempt appeal and the letters patent appeal and not
any other final decree or order. The Division Bench (review), in our
opinion, has fundamentally confused both its remit and the subject
matter of the review; whilst passing the impugned order, it has
merged the two proceedings (the civil suit and the writ petition) into
one to ostensibly create necessary grounds of review. The additional
documents discovered by the first respondent could have constituted
a ground to review any other decree/order but, most certainly, were
of no consequence for the purpose of the review petitions, which
were decided by the impugned order. This, we hold, for the reasons
that follow.

22 [2008] 10 SCR 4 : (2008) 8 SCC 612
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1095

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

20. This Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma 23
while clarifying the ambit of the review jurisdiction has categorically
held that a decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous
on merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a court
exercising appellate jurisdiction.
21. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury,24 this Court
affirmed the ratio in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra) and further
expounded that review proceedings were not by way of an appeal,
and would have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. It was further held that an error
apparent on the face of the record must be such an error which
must strike one on mere looking of the record, obviating the need
for long-drawn reasonings on two possible opinions. This Court in
Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik,25 while reiterating the decisions
in Meera Bhanja (supra) and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra),
drew out the narrow contours within which review jurisdiction of this
Court had to be exercised and held that Order XLVII, CPC does not
allow for the rehearing of a dispute merely because a party had not
highlighted all aspects of the case.
22. The Division Bench (original) had held that the decree was not
enforceable against the State; this, because the State, though a
party defendant originally, did not suffer any decree owing to the
dismissal of the civil suit against the State vide judgment and
preliminary decree dated 06th April, 1959. The said Division Bench in
its judgment and order dated 16th August, 2018 categorically noted
that the first respondent committed fraud on the Court by obtaining a
direction of mutation in the writ proceedings on the strength of a final
decree rendered in a suit which had been given up against the State
Government. The Division Bench (original) set aside the direction to
mutate the name of the first respondent in the revenue records on
three technical but fundamental grounds – first, that a non-party to a
suit could not be bound by the decree; secondly, the decision on the
title of the subject land not having been rendered upon hearing the
version of the State, no direction of the nature made by the Single
Judge could have validly been made; and thirdly, that the contempt
petition was barred by limitation.

23 (1979) 4 SCC 389
24 [1994] Supp. 5 SCR 503 : (1995) 1 SCC 170
25 (2006) 4 SCC 78
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23. In the light of the present controversy, the additional documents
purporting to validate the title of the subject land [even if obtained by
the first respondent belatedly and not in course of the proceedings
before the Division Bench (original) and howsoever clinching the
same might appear to be for the lis to be decided in his favour] can
neither be considered material nor relevant to the central issue, i.e.,
contempt, if any, of the direction contained in the order of disposal
of the writ proceedings.
24. As noted earlier, the Division Bench (original) inter alia proceeded to
dismiss the contempt petition as time-barred. We propose to consider
the averments made in the contempt petition in greater depth a little
later. However, what stands out is that a decision having been rendered
by the Division Bench (original) upon consideration of the pleadings in
the contempt petition vis-à-vis the law relating to limitation contained
in the Act, such decision was not open to a review on the basis of
alleged discovery of new evidence since the same did not have any
relation with the finding that the contempt petition was time-barred.
The first respondent failed to present any new evidence countering the
reasoning of the Division Bench (original) that a time-barred contempt
petition had been entertained by the Single Judge; furthermore, the
title documents or orders of the Board of Revenue had no bearing
on either the factum of the State not being a party to the civil suit,
or on the question of limitation. Quite apart the ground of discovery
of new evidence, the decision of the Division Bench (original) which
was rendered upon an exhaustive analysis of the materials on record
including the pleadings did not suffer from any error, much less any
error apparent on the face of the record, warranting a review. Even
if any error were present, such error could have been rectified only
in exercise of the court’s appellate jurisdiction and not the review
jurisdiction.
25. The grounds of review that the first respondent had urged in the review
petition have been meticulously looked into by us. They numbered in
excess of 90 (ninety). The general impression is that more the number
of grounds, less the likelihood of existence of a case for review. To
succeed in a motion for review, viewed through the prism of ‘error
apparent on the face of the record’, it does neither require long-drawn
arguments nor an elaborate process of reasoning as these may be
required, in a given case, when exercising the power of merit review. An
error apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident. Where,
conceivably, two opinions can be formed in a given set of facts and
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1097

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

circumstances and one opinion of the two has been formed, there is
no error apparent on the face of the record. However, disabusing our
mind of such an impression, we have looked into each of the grounds.
Not a single ground deserved consideration to embark on an exercise
to review the judgment and order dated 16th August, 2018 even on the
basis of discovery of new and important matter or evidence. We are
constrained to observe that there has been usurpation of the power
of review by the Division Bench (review) to overturn a well-considered
and well- crafted decision of the Division Bench (original).
26. No other legitimate cause for review having been made out in the
review petition before the High Court as well as before us by the first
respondent and bearing in mind the above, we unhesitatingly hold
that there was no valid, legal and/or proper ground for the Division
Bench (review) to reverse the judgment and order under review on
the basis of the additional documents brought on record by the first
respondent during the review proceedings.
27. The first legal issue is, thus, answered in favour of the appellant.
28. Having held that the review jurisdiction was not available to be
exercised by the Division Bench (review), reversal of the impugned
order is the solitary conceivable outcome. However, the importance
of the second legal issue cannot be over-emphasized. The purpose
of the law of contempt is to secure public respect and confidence
in the judicial process. We have found the law on the question of
applicability of the principle of “continuous wrong/breach/offence”
for the purpose of section 20 of the Act not too certain; hence, we
feel it expedient to give a brief overview of the law of contempt and
how such law has evolved and developed as well as chart out the
course of action to be followed by the high courts while exercising
contempt jurisdiction not only generally but also on the face of an
objection as to maintainability of a time-barred action initiated by a
party for civil contempt.
29. The power of the Supreme Court and a high court to punish for
breach of its orders is expressly recognised by Articles 129 and
215 of the Constitution, respectively. It is an inherent power,
distinguishable from a power derived from a statute. In R.L. Kapur v.
State of Tamil Nadu,26 this Court pointed out that the inherent power

26 [1972] 3 SCR 417 : (1972) 1 SCC 651
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or jurisdiction was neither derived from the statutory law relating
to contempt nor did such statutory law affect such inherent power
or confer a new power or jurisdiction. In view of the recognition of
such power by the Constitution itself, they partake the character of
constitutional power and consequentially no law made by legislature
could take away the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court
and the high courts.
30. In Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union,27 this
Court observed as follows:
“5. *** Contempt proceeding against a person who has
failed to comply with the Court’s order serves a dual
purpose: (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment
of contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the
contemner to do what the law requires of him. The sentence
imposed should effectuate both these purposes. ***”
31. This Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly,28
held that:
11.*** It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising
the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function
as an original or appellate court for determination of the
disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction
should be confined to the question whether there has
been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the
court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to
have committed such disobedience is contumacious.
The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled
to enter into questions which have not been dealt with
and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which
is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider
the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to
consider the question as to what the judgment or order
should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it
stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction
is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious
conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed

27 (1970) 3 SCC 98
28 [2002] 3 SCR 913 : (2002) 5 SCC 352
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1099

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order.
(emphasis ours)
32. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra 29 is a decision where, referring to Article
129, this Court observed that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
contempt as well as to award punishment for it being constitutional,
it cannot be controlled by any statute.
33. Despite such a power being conferred by the Constitution, what would
constitute contempt – civil and criminal – and also, what would be
the procedure for initiating action and how to punish for contempt
is provided by the Act. The source of power to enact the Act can
be traced to Items 77 and 14 of Lists I and III, respectively, of the
Seventh Schedule appended to the Constitution.
34. In L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State of U.P.,30 this Court set aside the order
under challenge (punishing the appellant for criminal contempt
committed on the face of the court but without extending to him
any opportunity to show cause). In the process, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court had the occasion to observe that it “is true
that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested
in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a
jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law”.
35. In Pallav Sheth (supra) too, a three-Judge Bench of this Court noticed
L.P. Misra (Dr.) (supra) and reiterated that “the power under Article
129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the
provisions of a validly enacted law”.
36. Yet again, this Court in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal v. Neeraj
Kumar31 overturned the decision of the high court under challenge
which passed an order in contempt proceedings solely on merits
disregarding the procedural objections (including that of limitation).
This Court reiterated that high courts were obliged to examine whether
procedure prescribed by law had been complied with when a petition
under Article 215 was presented before the court. Such examination

29 [1995] 2 SCR 638 : (1995) 2 SCC 584
30 (1998) 7 SCC 379
31 [2013] 12 SCR 457 : (2014) 3 SCC 602
1100 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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would also include a scrutiny of whether limitation, as prescribed by
section 20, was attracted to the facts of the case.
37. The ‘procedure prescribed by law’ or a ‘validly enacted law’ referred
to in the aforementioned decisions is the one the Act envisages.
Proceedings for contempt being quasi-criminal in nature, no
punishment can be ordered by any court without strictly adhering to
the stringent provisions therefor, however needless they may appear
to be when a contempt is committed on the face of a high court and
such court has no two opinions that following the course prescribed
by the Act to punish for contempt would eventually turn out to be a
useless formality.
38. Much water has flown under the bridge since the aforesaid decided
cases. Having regard to some extreme cases of exercise of contempt
power increasing over a period of time, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Supreme
Court & High Court Judges 32 speaking through the Hon’ble the Chief
Justice of India had to devise a Standard Operating Procedure33 for
being followed by the high courts while summoning public officials,
alleged to be in contempt, to be physically present in court. Deeply
concerned with the lack of self-restraint shown in the exercise of
contempt power in certain cases, the Bench directed framing of rules
by all the high courts in terms of the SoP, as devised. This Court
noted in such decision that mandating the physical presence of a
contemnor, specifically in the case of public officials, comes at a cost
to the public interest and efficiency of public administration, and thus
ought not to be resorted to at the drop of a hat.
39. We wish to add to this by way of clarification that concomitantly, there
lies a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply with the court’s order
without any delay, in a case where legal recourse has not been taken
to set aside/review/vacate the order which is alleged to have been
breached. A public official against whom an allegation of contempt is
levelled, upon being noticed either by issuance of a rule for contempt
or by court notice, must work out his remedy in accordance with law
if he wishes not to comply with the court’s direction. He must not
wait for compliance to be secured only upon all the phased steps
to be taken by the high courts in terms of paragraph 44 of State

32 [2024] 1 SCR 211 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
33 SoP, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1101

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

of Uttar Pradesh (supra), forming part of the SoP, are complete. A
public official who is arrayed as a contemnor is as much bound by an
unchallenged order of a high court as a private party is, and cannot
consider himself not bound by the law by virtue of the office he holds.
Being under a duty to comply with a final and binding order of a high
court, the contemnor ought not to drag his feet in doing the same until
the coercive measure of summoning the contemnor to be physically
present is resorted to by the high court. We are reminded at this
stage of what this Court in Aligarh Municipal Board (supra) said:
“5. *** It must also be clearly under stood in this connection
that to employ a subterfuge to avoid compliance of a court’s
order about which there could be no reasonable doubt
may in certain circumstances aggravate the contempt.***”
(emphasis ours)
Deliberate delay in effecting compliance with an order could be seen
as aggravating the contempt resulting in a degree of punishment higher
than what the court earlier thought of imposing. Be that as it may.
40. Axiomatically, not only any order imposing punishment for proved
contempt must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the
Act but initiation of the proceedings too has to be in accordance with
the three modes that the Act envisages. One of these is by presentation
of a petition for civil contempt before a high court complaining of
wilful and deliberate refusal by a person obliged to comply with its
final and binding order – a situation with which we are concerned.
41. In Pallav Sheth (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court had
the occasion to consider whether the view taken by a two-Judge
Bench in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal 34 was correct. In Om
Prakash Jaiswal (supra), the Bench had taken the view that filing
of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt
does not amount to initiation of proceedings by the court and initiation
under section 20 of the Act can only be said to have occurred when
the court forms the prima facie opinion that contempt has been
committed and issues notice to the contemner to show cause why
he should not be punished. Such view did not find favour with the
Bench in Pallav Sheth (supra). It was observed that a provision
like section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities

34 [2000] 1 SCR 1064 : (2000) 3 SCC 171
1102 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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of the situation, and that, too narrow a view of section 20 had been
taken in Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) which did not seem to be
warranted; the view taken would not only cause hardship but would
perpetrate injustice. Relevant passages from the decision in Pallav
Sheth (supra) read thus:
“39. … When the judicial procedure requires an application
being filed either before the court or consent being sought
by a person from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer,
it must logically follow that proceedings for contempt are
initiated when the applications are made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed
for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section
15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the
subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of
a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following
or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil
contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of
the court is necessary for further steps to be taken under
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation
is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its
rights. In this background such an interpretation should be
placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an
anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may
have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction
on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be made to
suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed
by Mr Venugopal would mean that the court would be
rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully
convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having
been committed and the same having been brought to the
notice of the court soon after the committal of the contempt
and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20,
therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would
avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the
litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part
of the court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation
of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant,
which would render the constitutional power of the courts
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1103

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nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of
gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one
year by practising fraud by the contemner would render
Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with
Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation
must therefore be avoided.
42. … if the filing of an application before the subordinate
court or the High Court, making of a reference by a
subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an
application before an Advocate-General for permission
to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation
by the court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an
interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power
of the High Court to punish for contempt which power,
dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in
Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of
Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers
of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised
by the Constitution.
43. ***
44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories,
namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that
instituted otherwise than on the court’s own motion. The
mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be
different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is
the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in
the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an
application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction
to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be
initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court
issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from
the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed.”
42. Interpretation of section 20 of the Act, which formed the crux of the
discussion in Pallav Sheth (supra), has the marginal note ‘limitation
for actions for contempt’. Section 20 ordains that:
“20. No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt,
either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of
1104 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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a period of one year from the date on which the contempt
is alleged to have been committed.”
43. The vires of section 20 of the Act has been upheld by Division Benches
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, High Court of Karnataka and
the High Court at Calcutta in Advocate General v. A.V. Koteswara
Rao,35 High Court of Karnataka v. Y.K. Subanna 36 and Arthur
Branwell & Company Ltd. v. Indian Fibres Ltd.,37 respectively.
44. In upholding the vires of section 20, the High Court of Karnataka in
Y.K. Subbanna (supra) traced the legislative history of section 20
of the Act. It is considered profitable to read the relevant passages
therefrom, which are as follows:
“79. The Act for the first time, by enacting Section 20,
introduced a period of limitation. The Sanyal Committee
examined the question as to whether any period of limitation
should be prescribed in respect of contempt proceedings
and observed in Paragraph 8 of Chapter X of its Report,
as under:
‘8. Limitation:— Contempt procedures are of a
summary nature and promptness is the essence of
such proceedings. Any delay should be fatal to such
proceedings, though there may be exceptional cases
when the delay may have to be over looked but such
cases should be very rare indeed. From this point of
view we considered whether it is either necessary or
desirable to specify a period of limitation in respect of
contempt proceedings. The period, if it is to be fixed
by statute, will necessarily have to be very short and
provision may also have to be made for condoning
delay in suitable cases. We feel that on the whole
instead of making any hard and fast rule on the
subject the matter may continue to be governed by
the discretion of the Courts as hithertofore.’
80. The Joint Select Committee of Parliament on Contempt
of Court (Bhargava Committee) after examining the Report

35 1984 Cri. LJ. 1171
36 1989 SCC OnLine Kar 404
37 1993 (2) CLJ 182
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1105

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of Sanyal Committee on the question of limitation, thought
that the contempt procedures by their very nature should be
initiated and dealt with as early as possible and considered
it necessary and desirable that period of limitation should be
specified in respect of actions for contempt and, therefore,
laid down in the new clause (Clause 20) a period of one
year at the expiration of which no proceedings for contempt
should be initiated. The reasons given by the Joint Select
Committee for introducing Clause 20 in the Bill, as reported
by it are these:
‘The Committee are of the opinion that contempt
procedures by their very nature should be initiated and
dealt with as early as possible. It was brought to the
notice of the Committee that in some cases contempt
proceedings have been initiated long after the alleged
contempt had taken place. The Committee therefore
consider it necessary and desirable that a period of
limitation should be specified in respect of actions for
contempt and have accordingly laid down in the new
clause a period of one year at the expiration of which
no proceedings for contempt should be initiated.’
81. This is the legislative history of Section 20.”
45. We can safely affirm, drawing from our joint experience on the Bench,
that in the vast majority of cases seeking invocation of the provisions
of the Act for an alleged civil contempt, institution of proceedings
is through a petition or an application containing information made
available by a party alleging that the facts disclosed by him do
constitute contempt of court and, thus, provide the court the premise
for initiating proceedings to commit for contempt. The role of such
a party, who brings a petition for contempt and activates the court’s
machinery, is merely that of an informer. Despite such a party
figuring in the memo of parties as a petitioner, the matter relating to
entertainment of his petition and the punishment to be imposed, in
case of a proved contempt, relate to the exclusive jurisdiction and
authority of the high courts to punish for contempt and is substantially
a matter between the court and the alleged contemnor. Whether or
not to take the assistance of the petitioning informer is a question
which invariably must be left entirely to the discretion of the court
seized of the proceedings.
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46. In exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the courts in
India do keep in mind the benefit that could accrue to the petitioning
informer (if he is a party to the parent proceedings out of which the
contempt arises) upon implementation of the order alleged to have
been wilfully disobeyed; but more than anything else, the endeavour
is to uphold the majesty, dignity and prestige of the courts. Indubitably,
the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised when the alleged
contemnor, by his action(s), shows extreme lack of solicitude in
complying with an order of court, which has attained finality and is
binding on him. So long a final order passed by a court is not set aside
in appeal/revision or recalled in exercise of review jurisdiction or an
interim order is vacated at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, it
continues to bind the parties to the proceedings and it would amount to
subversion of the rule of law if any party, in breach, were encouraged
to continue such breach. An order of a court has to be complied with
and it would not amount to a valid defence that in the contemnor’s
own understanding or because of legal opinion tendered to him, the
order did not warrant compliance being erroneous. This Court in
Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah 38 has
held that once a direction has been issued by a competent court, it
has to be obeyed and implemented without reservation; the order
of the court cannot be rendered ineffective on the specious plea
that no such direction could have been given by the court. A party,
though perceiving an order to be erroneous, allowing it to attain
finality by reason of acceptance thereof cannot escape the rigours
of compliance. He has to pursue his appellate or other remedy to
escape the consequences that can visit him, should the high court
hold him guilty of contempt. Such a compliance is insisted upon for
securing the majesty, dignity and prestige of the court.
47. Insofar as an interim order is concerned, despite an element of
contempt being involved, if a defence appearing to be valid in law
and having substance is raised before the high court by a party in
default which shakes the very foundation of the order alleged to have
been violated and upon the high court reaching a satisfaction of such
a defence being valid to the extent that the subject order ought not
to have been passed, it would always be open to the said court,
depending on the nature of order and the breach alleged, to first

38 [2007] 9 SCR 784 : (2007) 7 SCC 689
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1107

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secure compliance of the order by allowing the contemnor to purge
the contempt without prejudice to his rights and contentions and, after
such compliance, to revisit the order as per law and the circumstances
present before it and then pass appropriate orders. There could be
exceptional situations where the consequences of complying with an
interim order, apparently erroneous or without jurisdiction and which
has attained finality, could bring about irretrievable consequences. In
such a case, where the high court is satisfied that securing compliance
of its order would cause more injustice than justice, notwithstanding
the finality attached to such order, the high court’s authority ought
to be conceded to pass such order as the justice of the case before
it demands.
48. Lord Denning in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson 39 had observed:
“The court would only refuse to hear a party to a cause
when the contempt impeded the course of justice by
making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth
or to enforce its orders and there was no other effective
means of securing his compliance. The court might then
in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment
was removed or good reason was shown why it should
not be removed.”
49. This decision was followed by the House of Lords in X Ltd. v.
Morgan-Grampian Ltd.40 which also observes that the court will
proceed with the contempt where a contemnor not only fails willfully
and contumaciously to comply with an order of the court, albeit makes
it clear that he will continue to defy court’s authority. The courts in
such circumstances may decline to entertain an appeal or hear a
party unless they purge themselves.
50. It will be appropriate here to also quote from Halsbury’s Laws of
England,41 which states:
“Thus a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt,
he may apply with a view to setting aside the order in
which his contempt is founded, and in some cases he
may be entitled to defend himself when some application

39 1952 (2) All ER 567
40 1990 (2) All ER 1
41 Volume 8, Third Edition
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is subsequently made against him. Even the plaintiff in
contempt has been allowed to prosecute his action, when
the defendant had not applied to stay the proceedings.
Probably the true rule is that the party in contempt will
not be heard only on those occasions when his contempt
impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective
way of enforcing his obedience.”
51. This Court In the Matter of Anil Panjwani 42 has observed that it is no
rule of law and certainly not a statutory rule that a contemnor cannot
be heard unless the contempt is purged. It has only developed as a
rule of practice for protecting the sanctity of the court proceedings
and the dignity of the court that a person who is prima facie guilty of
having attacked the court may be deprived of the right of participation
in the hearing lest he should misuse such an opportunity unless
he has agreed to disarm himself. The court would not be unjust in
denying hearing to one who has shown his lack of worth by attacking
the court unless he has agreed to beat a retreat and the court is
convinced of the genuineness of such retreating. It lies within the
discretion of the court to tell the contemner charged with having
committed contempt of court that he will not be heard and would not
be allowed participation in the court proceedings unless the contempt
is purged. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of
law. The discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Where the court may form an opinion
that the contemner is persisting in his behaviour and initiation of
proceedings in contempt has had no deterrent or reformatory effect
on him and/or if the disobedience by the contemner is such that so
long as it continues it impedes the course of justice and/or renders it
impossible for the court to enforce its orders in respect of him, the court
would be justified in withholding access to the court or participation
in the proceedings from the contemner. On the other hand, the court
may form an opinion that the contempt is not so gross as to invite
an extreme step as above, or where the interests of justice would be
better served by concluding the main proceedings instead of diverting
to and giving priority to hearing in contempt proceeding the court may
proceed to hear both the matters simultaneously or independently of
each other or in such as it may deem proper.

42 [2003] 3 SCR 1179 : (2003) 7 SCC 375
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1109

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52. Therefore, it would be correct to state that the court’s power when
dealing with the question of contempt, in a sense, is discretionary.
It cannot be gainsaid that even in cases where disobedience of the
order of the court is not disputed, the court may also accept a defence,
if raised, of impossibility to comply with an order and come to the
conclusion that since it is impossible to enforce its order, action to
punish may not be initiated. That apart, refusal may be justified by
grave concerns of public policy. Much would depend on the facts
and circumstances of the case, the nature of the contempt under
enquiry, etc., which would enable the court to exercise its discretion
either way. However, to demonstrate his bona fide, the contemnor
ought to bring any valid defence for his disability to comply with the
court’s direction to its notice without wasting any time. Whatever be
the position before it, nothing stands in the way of the high court
from passing an order to ensure that nothing impedes the course
of justice.
53. Reverting to the point of limitation, even in case of a petition disclosing
facts constituting contempt, which is civil in nature, the petitioner
cannot choose a time convenient to him to approach the Court. The
statute refers to a specific time limit of one year from the date of
alleged contempt for proceedings to be initiated; meaning thereby, as
laid down in Pallav Sheth (supra), that the action should be brought
within a year, and not beyond, irrespective of when the proceedings
to punish for contempt are actually initiated by the high court.
54. An action for contempt - though instituted through a petition or an
application – is essentially in the nature of original proceedings, as
held by this Court in High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v.
Raj Kishore Yadav;43 a fortiori, a prayer for condonation of delay in
presenting the petition/application alleging contempt would not be
maintainable. The express negative phraseology used in section 20 of
the Act, as a legislative injunction, places a fetter on the court’s power
to initiate proceedings for contempt unless the petition/application is
presented within the time-frame stipulated therein. However, since
section 20 also uses the expression “date on which the contempt is
alleged to be committed” as the starting point of the period of one
year to be counted for reckoning whether the petition/application has
been presented within the stipulated period, the high courts ought

43 [1997] 2 SCR 429 : (1997) 3 SCC 11
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to be wary of crafty and skilful drafting of petitions/applications to
overcome the delay in presentation thereof.
55. The Act, which is a special law on the subject of contempt, does
not expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability
of sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act. This Court, in State of West
Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das 44 has held that in terms of section
29(2) of the 1963 Act, provisions contained in section 5 of the
1963 Act can be called in aid by a party who seeks condonation of
delay in presentation of an appeal under section 19(1) of the Act.
Similarly, in exceptional cases, provisions like sections 12, 14, 17,
22, etc. of the 1963 Act could be invoked to seek exemption from
the law of limitation, which is distinct from condonation of delay.
In an appropriate case, it would be open to the party who has not
petitioned the court within the period of one year, as stipulated in
section 20 of the Act, to seek exemption from the law of limitation
in line with the principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6, CPC,45 by
showing the ground upon which such exemption is claimed. We
have no hesitation to hold that in a case where a civil contempt
is alleged by a party by referring to a “continuing wrong/breach/
offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the
action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on
the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year
as in section 20 of the Act. Applicability of the principle underlying
Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just
and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the
jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if,
of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption
ought to be extended in a given case. At the same time, it must be
remembered that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation
on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. Inspiration
in this regard may be drawn from the decision of the Privy Council
in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh.46 However,
as observed earlier, contempt proceedings being in the nature of

44 [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 373 : (1996) 5 SCC 342
45 Grounds of exemption from limitation law. - Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period
prescribed by the law limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is
claimed:
Provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any
ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint.
46 AIR 1935 PC 85
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original proceedings, akin to a suit, application of section 5 of the
1963 Act to seek condonation of delay is excluded.
56. A caveat needs to be added here. For a “continuing wrong/breach/
offence” to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an
action for contempt, the party petitioning the court not only has to
comprehend what the phrase actually means but would also be
required to show, from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he
seeks exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy the
court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also, the court has to
be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a “continuing
wrong/breach/offence” ought not to be entertained, having regard
to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which
has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed
against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the
efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even
if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one
year from such commission no action is brought before the court on
the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party
should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to
approach the court. If the bogey of “continuing wrong/breach/offence”
is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for
claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court
any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought
belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years
after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would
seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues.
Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by
non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate
proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate
against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a
provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering
the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the
court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence
of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is
suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction
as well is issued to bridge the breach.
57. Having thus held, we move on to examine the objection as to
maintainability of the contempt action initiated by the first respondent
upon the inaction of the appellant in effecting mutation of the decretal
property in his favour in the revenue records and also as to whether
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a case of “continuing wrong/breach/ offence” was at all shown by the
first respondent in the contempt petition.
58. To recapitulate, the Single Judge had allowed the writ petition of the
first respondent on 05th March, 2009 with a direction to the Tahsildar
to effect the necessary mutation in the revenue records in accordance
with the final decree dated 26th December, 2003. Pertinently, the
direction issued to the appellant vide the order of disposal of the
writ petition did not specifically mention a time-frame within which
the order was to be implemented.
59. In view of the absence of a time-frame in the order, much would
turn on rule 21 of the Writ Rules.47 Having read the relevant rule, we
presume that the learned Single Judge was aware of such a rule and,
hence, refrained from stipulating a time-frame for compliance of the
Court’s order. Irrespective of any time-frame fixed in an order, the
direction contained therein would require compliance within the period
stipulated in rule 21 if the person responsible for such compliance
has notice of it even aliunde.
60. The question of the contempt petition being barred by limitation has
to be decided keeping section 20 of the Act and rule 21 of the Writ
Rules in mind together with what constitutes a “continuing wrong/
breach/offence”. Undisputedly, the contempt petition was instituted on
04th October, 2014, more than 5 (five) years after the order (of which
contempt had been alleged) was passed, i.e., on 05th March, 2009.
Notably, the appellant had not carried the order dated 05th March,
2009 (disposing of the writ petition) in appeal. Therefore, question of
operation of the said order remaining suspended did not arise and the
principle embodied in section 15 of the 1963 Act was not attracted.
The said order required the appellant to effect mutation in terms of
the decree of the civil court. No time-frame for compliance of such
order having been stipulated by the Single Judge, it would stand to
reason that the same required compliance at least by the end of the
time-frame stipulated by rule 21.
61. The appellant has asserted before us that the contempt action was
time-barred in view of the fact that limitation for initiation of contempt
action commenced on 04th May, 2009, i.e., when the two-month period

47 Unless the court otherwise directs, the direction or order made or the rule absolute issued by the High
Court shall be implemented within two months of the receipt of the order.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1113

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stipulated by rule 21 expired and ended on 03rd May, 2010, i.e., in
accordance with section 20 of the Act. However, the first respondent
has contended that the contempt petition was not barred by limitation
since the act of the appellant in not implementing the direction for
effecting mutation was in the nature of a continuing wrong.
62. The date on which service of the order dated 05th March, 2009
disposing of the writ petition was effected on the appellant is not stated
anywhere in the contempt petition by the first respondent. No such
date is also reflected in the representations that the first respondent
claims to have made on 11th May, 2009, 12th September, 2009, 22nd
October, 2010, 16th August, 2012 and 05th February, 2014. It is also not
seen from the appellant’s counter affidavit that he pleaded non-service
of such order. We are, thus, inclined to the view that the appellant
had notice aliunde of the order dated 05th March, 2009. Proceeding
on the premise that the order must have been served immediately
after the same was passed by the Single Judge and in the light of
rule 21 of the Writ Rules, the appellant had 2 (two) months’ time from
receipt of the order dated 05th March, 2009, i.e., say till the end of
May, 2009 to implement the direction. The appellant failed to effect
mutation, as directed, within the aforesaid time-frame and was, thus,
in breach of the said order dated 05th March, 2009, say from June,
2009. There does not appear to be any explanation proffered in the
contempt petition worthy of consideration as to why the contempt
petition was delayed and not presented within the period of a year
of commission of the breach when it first occurred, i.e., at least by
the end of May, 2010.
63. The learned Single Judge deciding the contempt petition, vide order
dated 04th October, 2017, was impressed by the arguments advanced
by the first respondent and while holding that there has been a
continuing wrong and also that the appellant is in contempt, allowed
the contempt petition.
64. The Division Bench (review) held in favour of the first respondent
observing that the inaction of the Government officials was a continuing
wrong since they did not outrightly refuse to implement the order,
rather, till as late as 2017, assured that they would implement it but
failed to do so. Furthermore, what weighed with the High Court was
the alleged misrepresentation with respect to the title of the subject
land; such misrepresentation being in the nature of fraud, would
entitle the High Court to recall the primary order on merits. The State
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authorities were held to have misrepresented the title of the suit land
inasmuch as they took mutually contradictory stands, i.e., on the one
hand it was argued that the subject land was escheated land, and on
the other, it was argued, on the strength of revenue entries, that the
subject land always belonged to the State. The High Court then went
on to examine and interpret documents produced by the respondents
for the first time and accorded title in favour of the respondents.
65. For reasons more than one, the impugned order allowing the contempt
petition is indefensible.
66. First, having read the impugned order, we are quite convinced
that submissions that were advanced before the Division Bench
(review) of the order dated 05th March, 2009 being in the process of
implementation had the undesirable effect of shifting the focus of the
High Court from adjudging the maintainability of the contempt petition
as on date the same was presented, i.e., 04th October, 2014, to the
unacceptable fact of actual non-compliance of the order of 05th March,
2009 despite indication of compliance. No doubt, compliance of an
order of the court has to be insisted upon but within the four corners
of the contempt petition. Non-compliance coupled with an assurance
in court to comply, after the court has issued notice on the contempt
petition, is not sufficient to attract the principle of “continuing wrong/
breach/offence”. A contemnor on pain of suffering consequences for
contempt may well give up available defences before the court and
proceed to obey the order/direction, of which he is alleged to be in
contempt; but if the jurisdiction to punish is otherwise barred, there
is no law that prohibits the court from first proceeding to ascertain
whether the jurisdiction is at all available to be exercised; and, when
an objection of maintainability based on limitation is raised, it becomes
all the more essential for the court to decide the objection leaving
aside other considerations. The Division Bench (review), unfortunately,
missed the woods for the tree.
67. Proceeding ahead, we find that as complex as the issues surrounding
the title of the subject land are, the impugned order of the Division
Bench (review) is unsustainable in law, for, it has exceeded its contempt
jurisdiction, which indubitably is limited and finite in the sense that
every court exercising power to punish for contempt ought to keep
itself within the boundaries specified by the Act and the judicial
pronouncements in this behalf. The laborious exercise undertaken
to unravel the web of deeds and documents so as to determine the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1115

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question of title was akin to an exercise undertaken by a court of
first instance or first appeal and, thus, wholly unwarranted. It is of the
utmost importance to remember that none of the documents produced
by the first respondent answered the question as to whether the
contempt petition was barred by limitation, which is the question the
Division Bench (review) ought to have confined itself to, since it was
only tasked with exercising review, and not appellate, jurisdiction.
68. In our considered view, it further becomes imperative to undertake
an examination of the contempt petition itself. This exercise reveals
that the primary grounds taken for the contempt petition being filed
belatedly, inter alia, were the pendency of collateral proceedings
and the continuous filing of representations before the Tahsildar by
the applicants. Law is well-settled that the issue of limitation has to
be considered with reference to the original cause of action. The
period of limitation does not stand extended to the last of repeated
representations made by a party, if filing of representation is not
statutorily provided. The contempt petition is, however, entirely bereft
of any pleading to the effect that the breach committed by the Tahsildar
is in the nature of a continuing wrong or breach or offence, so as to
overcome the bar of limitation set by section 20 of the Act read with
rule 21 of the Writ Rules.
69. Despite the absence of any pleading as to “continuing wrong/breach/
offence”, the Single Judge by placing reliance on the decision in Firm
Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram 48 proceeded to hold that the
Tahsildar’s inaction constituted a continuing wrong, thereby saving the
petition from being barred by limitation. The Division Bench (review)
approached the matter in a similar manner, and concluded that the
contumacious conduct alleged was in the nature of a continuing wrong.
70. While we are not in disagreement with the view expressed in Firm
Ganpat Ram Rajkumar (supra) because of the special facts and
circumstances obtaining therein, the decision of the Division Bench
(review) affirming that of the Single Judge is wholly unsustainable in
law for a few other reasons.
71. First, it is trite that the court cannot traverse beyond the pleadings
and make out a case which was never pleaded, such principle
having originated from the fundamental legal maxim secundum

48 [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 223 : (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 418
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allegata et probate, i.e., the court will arrive at its decision on the
basis of the claims and proof led by the parties. The assertion of
the contumacious conduct being in the nature of a “continuing
wrong/breach/offence” is factual and has to be borne from the
pleadings on record. Law is, again, well-settled that when a point
is not traceable in the pleas set out either in a plaint or a written
statement, findings rendered on such point by the court would be
unsustainable as that would amount to an altogether new case
being made out for the party. Absent such pleading of there being
a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”, the finding returned by the
Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division Bench (review), cannot
be sustained in law.
72. Even if a point of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is traceable in the
pleadings, the court ought not to accept it mechanically; particularly, in
entertaining an action for contempt, which is quasi-criminal in nature,
the court should be slow and circumspect and be fully satisfied that
there has indeed been a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”.
73. This takes us to the other infirmity in the decision of the High Court
inasmuch as it held that the disobedience of the mutation order by
the appellant was in the nature of a continuing wrong. A reference to
section 22 of the 1963 Act would be prudent at this stage. It reads:
“22. Continuing breaches and torts - In the case of a
continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing
tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every
moment of the time during which the breach or the tort,
as the case may be, continues.”
74. While proceeding to examine the nature of the contumacious conduct
in question, it is considered apposite to commence the discussion
with a reference to Halsbury’s Laws of India (Damages; Deeds
and Other Instruments) 49 reading thus:
“[115.032] When cause of action is single and continuing - A
cause of action may be either single or continuing. When
an act is final and complete and becomes a cause of action
for injury to the plaintiff, it is single, arises once and for all
and the plaintiff is entitled to sue for compensation at one
time, for all past, present and future consequences of the

49 Volume 9, First Edition
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1117

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wrongful act. But if there is repetition of a wrongful act or
omission, it will comprise a continuing cause of action, and
if an action is brought by the plaintiff, it will be restricted to
recovery of damages which have accrued up to the date
of suit. In such cases the cause of action is said to arise
‘de die in diem’ (from day to day). It is inaccurate strictly
to speak of a ‘continuing cause of action’, but the phrase
refers to a cause of action which arises from the repetition
of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the
action was brought.”
75. The English Court of Appeals in National Coal Board v. Galley 50
distinguished between the two scenarios by observing that neither do
repeated breaches of continuing obligations constitute a continuing
wrong nor intermittent breaches of a continuing obligation; rather there
has to be present an element of continuance in both, the breach and
the obligation.
76. This Court too, as far back as in 1958, with reference to the
Limitation Act of 1908, discussed in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v.
Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan 51 what would constitute a
continuing wrong. The relevant passage reads thus:
“20. *** s. 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a
continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing
wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of
injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable
for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act
causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing
wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character
that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act
constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is
necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused
by the wrongful act and what may be described as the
effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which
can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that
s. 23 can be invoked.***

50 [1958] 1 All ER 9
51 [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 476 : AIR 1959 SC 798
1118 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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As soon as the decree was passed and the appellants were
dispossessed in execution proceedings, their rights had
been completely injured, and though their dispossession
continued, it cannot be said that the trustees were
committing wrongful acts or acts of tort from moment to
moment so as to give the appellants a cause of action de
die in diem. We think there can be no doubt that where
the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the
resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the
ouster and so there would be no scope for the application
of s. 23 in such a case.***”
(emphasis ours)
77. The decision of this Court in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari (supra) was
endorsed by this Court in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5
J.) v. Suresh Das 52 wherein, while concluding that the ouster of
shebaitship was a single incident and did not constitute a continuing
wrong, this Court further observed as follows:
“343. The submission of *** is based on the principle of
continuing wrong as a defence to the plea of limitation.
In assessing the submission, a distinction must be made
between the source of a legal injury and the effect of the
injury. The source of a legal injury is founded in a breach
of an obligation. A continuing wrong arises where there
is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise
to continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular
manner. The breach of such an obligation extends beyond
a single completed act or omission. The breach is of a
continuing nature, giving rise to a legal injury which assumes
the nature of a continuing wrong. For a continuing wrong
to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong which is
actionable because in the absence of a wrong, there can be
no continuing wrong. It is when there is a wrong that a further
line of enquiry of whether there is a continuing wrong would
arise. Without a wrong there cannot be a continuing wrong.
A wrong postulates a breach of an obligation imposed on
an individual, where positive or negative, to act or desist

52 (2020) 1 SCC 1
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1119

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

from acting in a particular manner. The obligation on one
individual finds a corresponding reflection of a right which
inheres in another. A continuing wrong postulates a breach
of a continuing duty or a breach of an obligation which is
of a continuing nature. …
…
Hence, in evaluating whether there is a continuing wrong
within the meaning of Section 23, the mere fact that the
effect of the injury caused has continued, is not sufficient
to constitute it as a continuing wrong. For instance, when
the wrong is complete as a result of the act or omission
which is complained of, no continuing wrong arises even
though the effect or damage that is sustained may enure in
the future. What makes a wrong, a wrong of a continuing
nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but
which continues to subsist. The breach of such a duty
creates a continuing wrong and hence a defence to a plea
of limitation.”
(emphasis ours)
78. The order on the writ petition directed the appellant to effect
mutation in the revenue records in favour of the first respondent, in
accordance with the final decree. The direction for mutation having
been issued on 05th March, 2009, the appellant had a period of
2 (two) months therefrom to effect such mutation, as stipulated
by the Writ Rules, which we shall assume the appellant failed or
neglected to comply without just reason. From 04th May, 2009, i.e.,
the starting point for the limitation period for initiation of contempt
action to commence, till 10th February, 2014, i.e., the date of the
filing of the contempt petition, the appellant failed to effect mutation,
as ordered by the Single Judge. Could it be said that every day
thereafter that the appellant did not effect mutation gave rise to a
fresh cause of action so as to constitute a “continuing wrong/breach/
offence”? To our minds, the answer is a clear and unequivocal ‘NO’.
Upon application of the test laid down by this Court in Balkrishna
Savalram Pujari (supra) and M. Siddiq (supra), it is evident that
when, by 04th May, 2009, the appellant failed to implement the
direction of the High Court, the act of disobedience was complete
as on that date itself. Every day thenceforth, the name of the first
respondent continued to be absent from the revenue records but
1120 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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such absence could not be characterised as the injury or wrongful act
itself; it was merely the damage which flowed from the standalone
act of breach committed by the appellant – that of not effecting the
mutation. The injury was not repetitive or in other words, did not
arise de die in diem, but rather, it was the effect of the injury which
continued till the date the first respondent presented the contempt
petition on 10th February, 2014.
79. Having held that the nature of breach or offence committed by the
appellant was not in the nature of a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”,
the bar of limitation was rightly pressed by the Division Bench (original)
to halt the claim of the first respondent at the threshold itself, since
the period of limitation to initiate the contempt action ended at least
by May end of 2010. The decision of the Division Bench (original)
in dismissing the first respondent’s contempt petition as time-barred
was unexceptionable and the Division Bench (review) acted illegally
in reversing the same assuming the jurisdiction to review which, on
facts and in the circumstances, was not available to be exercised.
80. The contempt petition was, thus, barred by limitation and no case for
claiming exemption having been set up, the same deserved outright
dismissal.
EPILOGUE
81. Having answered the two legal issues and before recording our
conclusion, we cannot resist reflecting on the point of fraud having
vitiated the proceedings. This point, in turn, emerges because the
Division Bench (review) erroneously held the State to have practised
fraud; and this discussion is necessitated since, to the contrary, there
seems to be sufficient reason to hold the first respondent responsible
therefor. The writ petition, in the form the same had been presented
by the first respondent, does evince clear suppression of a material
fact bordering on fraud on court and having the potential to render
it not maintainable. But to this too, there is a caveat. This question,
though quite fundamental in nature, does not appear to have been
argued by the appellant before the High Court and also before us.
Thus, argument on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition
not having been advanced before us by the parties, whatever we
observe and record hereafter is merely an indication of the direction
our decision would have taken, if such point were raised or argued.
We may not be misunderstood of having decided a point without
calling upon the parties to address on it.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1121

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

82. The effect of suppression of a material fact on maintainability of
a writ petition is too well known. But what is important is, whether
suppression of a material fact in a writ petition amounts to fraud on
court and whether an issue of maintainability based on suppression
can be examined if the judgment and/or order of disposal of the writ
petition has attained finality by reason of no appeal being carried
therefrom.
83. This Court in Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy 53 observed that
suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the
court and every court has an inherent power to recall its own order
obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est.
84. Quite recently, in K. Jayaram v. BDA,54 this Court held:
“10. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction exercised by
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and
it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ
court must come with clean hands and put forward all
facts before the court without concealing or suppressing
anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are
relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or
relevant material in order to gain advantage over the
other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with
the court as well as with the opposite parties which cannot
be countenanced.”
(emphasis ours)
85. It is also settled law that fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which
vitiates the most solemn of proceedings including judicial acts and
that a plea of fraud can be set up even in a collateral proceeding.
We are reminded of what this Court said in S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu v. Jagannath: 55
“The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be pressed to
the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine
of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants.”

53 [2010] 10 SCR 47 : (2010) 8 SCC 383
54 (2022) 12 SCC 815
55 (1994) 1 SCC 1
1122 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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86. The Division Bench (original) noted that the civil suit having been
withdrawn against the State, the first respondent could not have
validly attempted to obtain a direction, through the medium of the writ
petition, on the strength of a decree passed in such a suit where the
State was no longer a party, yet, the Division Bench (review) held
the State to have practised fraud.
87. A perusal of the averments in the writ petition do not reveal any mention
of the civil suit having been withdrawn against the State Government.
Suppression of a material fact on the part of the first respondent is
indeed discernible which, if pleaded, could have altered the outcome
of the writ petition. A very innocuous prayer was, however, made
for effecting mutation in terms of the final decree, without disclosing
that mutation was being asked for in respect of a piece of land over
which the State itself had been claiming title and that the civil suit was
withdrawn faced with such a claim of the State. A writ court being a
court of equity, it is needless to observe that the parties are bound to
approach the court with clean hands. Inasmuch as the aforesaid fact
of withdrawal was not brought to the writ court’s notice, an egregious
breach of such principle is noticed. Suppression of such a material
fact, as in the present case, could legitimately be argued to amount to
a fraud on court. There can hardly be two opinions that such breach
would strike at the very root of the matter and since a point of fraud
can be raised even collaterally, if the point of fraud had been raised,
the writ petition itself could have been held non-maintainable.
88. However, since our decision is premised on the reasons assigned
while answering the issues formulated in paragraph 8 (supra), we
wish to say no more.
CONCLUSION
89. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the High Court exceeded
both its review and contempt jurisdiction. The impugned order is, thus,
set aside, and the judgment and order of the Division Bench (original)
in the contempt appeal and the letters patent appeal is restored.
90. The appeals succeed and are allowed. All pending applications stand
disposed of. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
91. Determination of the title to the subject land, adjudication on the
validity of the decrees in favour of the respondents, or decision on
any other contentious issue are left open for a forum of competent
jurisdiction to embark upon, if approached by any of the parties. None
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1123

S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.

of the observations of this Court, or of the High Court in the impugned
order should be treated as an expression of opinion in any particular
matter or on any factual aspect whatsoever.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19748-19749 OF 2022]
92. Leave granted.
93. These appeals assail the common judgment and order dated 26th
September, 2022 of the High Court dismissing petitions56 preferred
by the appellant, seeking recall of the judgment and order dated
27th April, 2022 of the Division Bench (review). The High Court held
that the recall petitions were review petitions in disguise; thus, the
impugned judgment and order was upheld in view of the specific
statutory bar of Order XLVII Rule 9, CPC.
94. The judgment and order 27th April, 2022 having been set aside for
the reasons assigned above while allowing the civil appeals arising
out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 19748-19749 of 2022, the order of the High
Court dated 26th September, 2022 assailed in these appeals upholding
the same can no longer stand. Resultantly, the impugned order is set
aside. The present appeals succeed and are allowed on the same
terms as the appeals decided hereinabove.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Mukund P Unny, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Shadan Farasat)

56 I.A. No. 3/2022 in Review I.A. No. 1/2020 in LPA 1/2018 and I.A. No. 10/2022 in Review I.A. No. 3/2020
in CA No. 33/2017