Holding

The Explanation defines wilful default as a default that continues after the landlord’s two‑month notice; absent such notice, the Controller may assess wilfulness and may grant a reasonable 15‑day cure period, but where notice is given and rent remains unpaid, the default is presumed wilful unless the tenant proves unavoidable circumstances.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined several appeals concerning eviction petitions under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The central issue was the interpretation of "wilful default" in the proviso to section 10(2)(i) and its Explanation, which states that a default is wilful if it continues after a landlord’s two‑month notice. The Court held that the Explanation provides a definitive definition: where two‑month notice is given and rent remains unpaid, the default is presumed wilful unless the tenant shows sufficient cause; where no notice is given, the Controller may examine the facts and may grant a 15‑day period to cure the default. Accordingly, the Court upheld eviction where wilful default was proved and set aside eviction where arrears had been paid or the notice requirement was not satisfied. The appeals were disposed of in a mixed manner, with some allowed and others dismissed.

Issues considered

How should "wilful default" in the proviso to s.10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 be interpreted?
Does the Explanation to the proviso exhaust the definition of wilful default, or may courts consider other circumstances?
What is the effect of a landlord’s two‑month notice on the presumption of wilful default?
Does the Controller retain discretion to determine wilful default when no notice is given?

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967
Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(2)(i), s. 10(2) proviso, s. Explanation to proviso

Subjects

wilful defaultevictionrent controlTamil Nadu Buildings Actstatutory interpretationprovisoexplanationlandlord-tenantrent arrears

Judgment

643

A

S. SUNDARAM PILLAI, ETC.
B
v.

V.R. PATTABIRAMAN ETC.

January 24, 1985
c
[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VARADARAJAN AND SABYASACHI
MuKHARJI, JJ.J
Re1il Control-Tamil Nadu Buildif!CS (Lease and Rent Control) Act
1960, sec. 10(2J(i)-Proviso anJ Explanation-Scope of-Wilful default-Mean·

-~ D
Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
1960(for short, the Tamil Nadu Act) deals with the eviction of tenants and postu-
lates that a tenant shaJI not be evicted whether in acquisition of a decree or
otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of s.10 or ss. 14-16. Section
10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Act provides for the eviction of a tenant on the
ground of non-payment of rent. It lays· down that where the Controller is E
satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent within 15 days after
the expiry of the time fixed in the Agreement of tenancy or in the absence of
any such Agreement, by the last date of the month next following that for
which the rent is payable, he (tenant) undoubtedly commits a default lhe pro-
viso to sub·s.2 provides that in any case fa!Iing in clause (i), if the Controller is
satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may,
notwithstanding anything contained in s.IJ, give the tenant a reasonable time, F
not exceeding 15 days to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto
the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender the applica-
.. tion shall be rejected. The Explanation which was added by Act 23 of 1973 to
the said proviso stipulates that for the purpose cf sub-s.2 of s IO, default to
pay or tender rent shall be construed as wilful, if the default by the tenant in the
payment or tender of rent continues after the issue of two months notice by the
landlord claiming the rent. G

In Civil Appeals Nos. 1178 of 1984, 1992 of 1982, 2246 of 1982 and 1659
of 1982, the respondents·landlords issued notices to the appeilants-tenants
demanding the amount of rent in arrears and thereafter filed eviction petttions
against the appellants.tenants, inter alia, on the ground of 14 Wilful default".
All the appellants-tenants complied with the notices issued by their respective
\~ndlords except the appellant-tenant in Civil Appeal No. 1659 of 1982 where
he made part payment only. However in Civil Appeal 3668 of 1982 and 4012 of
1982 the respondents-landlords had filed eviction petitions against the appellants-
tenants without issuing such notices before filing of eviction petitions. In all the H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 2 S.C.R.

A appeals, the Madras High Court passed and/or confirmed, as the case may be,
the orders of eviction holding that the ground cf \,"iJful' default mentioned
'/"'
in section 10(2)(i) had been proved against the tenants. Hence these appeals by
special leave. The common question of Jaw involved in these appeals was as to
what is the interpretation of the term "wilful default" in the Explanation to the
Proviso of sub-s.2 of s. 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act.

Counsel for the appelants-tenants contender.I (i) that despite the explana-
B tion it is open to the court on an appraisement of the circurn~tances of each
case to determine whether or not the default was wilful and in doing so it can-
not be guided wholly and solely by the Explanation which is merely clarificatory
in nature and (ii) that mere non-payment of arrears of rent after issue of two
months' notice cannot in all circumstances auton1atically amount to a wilful
default if the non-payment does not fulfil the various ingredients of the term
0
wil fut defau't". On the other hand it was argued by counsel for the respondents-
landlords (i) that the very purpose of the Explanation is to bring about unifor-
c mity in court decisions by laying down a conclusive yardstick in the shape of the
Explanation and once it is proved that after issue of two months' notice if the
tenant does not pay the arrears within the stipulated period of two months, he
is Hable to be ejected straightaway.

On the question of interpretation of the terms 'wilful default' appearing
in the proviso to s.10(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act coupled with the Explanation,
the Court,
D
HELD : Per Fazal Ali and A. Varadarajan JJ. (majority)

1. Though the Court is concerned mainly with the Tamil Nadu Act, yet
in order to understand the contextual background of the words 'wilful default'
and its proper setting, it wiH be useful to refer to those Acts which contain
the term ·wilful default' either in a -negative or in positive form. These Acts
E are (1) AP. Buildings <Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act of 1960, the
Orissa House Rent Control Act 1967 and the Pondichery Buildings Lease and
Rerit Control Act 1969, (hereinafter referred to as the A.P. Act, Orissa Act
and Pondicherry Act respectively). Although the default contemplated by these
Acts is wilful yet it has been put in a negative. Form which undoubtenJy gives
suffieient leeway to the tenant to get out of the rigors of the statutory provision
F the relev~nt provisions of these Acts relating to eviction of tenants on the ground
of 'wilful default' in payment of rent contemplate that a default simpliciter would
not be sufficient to evict the tenant but it must further be shown that the default
was not wilful. These Acts are however, silent on the mode and the manner in
which a court may decide as to what is wilful aod what is wilful. Thus these
Acts bave left it to ti e courts to decide this question. So far as the Tamil Nadu
Act is concerned, it makes a marked in1provement by broadening the ambit of
G 'wilful default' in the proviso to s. 10(2) which is further clarified by an Explana-
tion added to it subsequently. Before coming to any conclusion it may be neces-
sary to examine the exact meanirg ·of the words 'wilful default' as also the
interpretation and the scope of the Proviso and the Explanation. [657H; 658A]

2. The words 'v.'ilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional
H default knowing fully well the legal consequences thereof. A consensus of the
I.
J

/
.. ···
S.S. PILLAI v; V.R.. PATTABiRAMAN • ... i 645 -~i
meaning of the words "wilrut derault' appears to indicate that default in order to, A'·~
ht wftFul must be inten:ional, deliberate; calculated anj cOnscious. with futl /
. l:,nowltd3e of leg•I coosequonccs flowing therefrom. [660B; 661A-B)

.. "A Dictionary of Law' by_ L.B. Co1z-~o, '.page 361 ; Wo~ditand Ph~a-ses;
, o'ume 11-A (Permanent Editiori) p.ige 268 ; Word$- and Phras~s'VOI. -
45, pages 296. Web'iter•s Third New International DiCtionarY· Vol. III
page 2617 and Volume I page. 590 and Black's Law Dictionary (4th B
Edn.) page 1773 referred to•.
The.
3. well. estabt:ished. ruiC' of int~ip'ret~tion of prOVis~ .is.that~- a
proviso fl'ay have three •e .. ~rate ·functions. Nt.rmally, _a prOviso iS mean_i to b-e.
an exc~ption to somfthin_g within the main enac1ment or to qualify somCthirig •
enacted the rt in which but for the proviso would be ·within the Purvie'w Of the ·
enactm~nt. In Otbe. words, a proviso canriot be tOn apart fro.Di the main ena.. t· c
ment nor can it be use J to nullify or set at naught the real ot-ject of the maia
eri<lc1.rllent .. While :D.tefpreting a prOv·so C3.re mu!.t be :taken that it is used to
.
'
remove SpeCi3.t ·ca Cs from 1he genera.I eri<ictmerit'and proVide 'for.theni separately
Jn short, gen rally speaking. a proviso is intCildCd to limit lhe eD.acied provision,
so as io except something which would have otherwise been within it or in some
a
mea~ure to modif)' the' ena~ting ct3Use.: Sofnetimes Proviso' miy be' e'ffibedded
in the main provision and becomes an integral' Pa'rf of it So as. to amount to a D
substant~ve provh.,ion i_t~elt To sum. up, a proyiso may serve four different
purposes : '. . '
;\ , 1. ciU~tifying or excePti~g Certain provisionS.from 'the m:iin enactment ;
• . - • - • j ' ' • ·,' • ·~, '

2. it 'may entirely change the very concept or the intendment the enact• or
ment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to
make the enactinent Workable ; · ·' · , · ·:' E
'· • , t ~ • ; '... • ? f, ,

3. it may be embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral pcirt of
the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and coJotir of the substantive enact·
ment itself : and

, . 4. it may be ·used inefeiy to 3:Ct _aS ~n ~-pt(o'Dai· a'~dencia ·to ~th~ enactment
"ith the sate object or eXPJaining the real intCndment 'of the statuiofy prOvision.·: .
[661J>.E; 664CD; 665H; 666A:cf ·F

Craie·s .in ~Statute Law' t7th Edri.) Page 218~. odgCrs in 'Construction of
Deeas 3.nd Statutes' (Fifth Edel.) 317, 3i8. Sa?athi i·n "Interpietation of Statutes'·.'
page 294-2951. refer~ to •.,', , .. • · .· . · · · , .. · .,
- · ' 1-'
Local GovernmtnJ. Board v. f south Stoitehiirri Uiiloii [1909) A.C. 57. ·
/shverlal.Thakorelal Almaulav-1\fotiobhai N;gjlbhal[l966) I SCR 367, Madras
and Souihe1n Maha1atta Railway CO. Ltd. v." Bezwada Municipa.fitY. AIR 1944 G
C11: weSt Derb·.~·v. Me1ropolitd11 Life A.rsu,:ance CO. [1897) AC 647. Rllodda -
Urban District Co11nc,il v Taff Vale. Railway Co. (1909) AC 253 and Jeil~ings· and·
Another v ·Kelly [1940] AC 2o6 referred to: · · · · ' · ·· · ·

Com.missiofter of lncO;tle- T~~~ Mys0Te, erC. 'v.", Inda Mercan11Ie'Ba11k'
Ltd. \i959) 2 Supp. 'SCR 256,:shah BhoJrO/. Kiiverfi Oil l\fil/s and Ginning
Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograf Sinha; [1962) 2 SCR 159, State of Rajasthan · H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R.
A v. Leela Jain [1965] l SCR 276, Sales Tax Officer, Circle I, Jabalpur v. Hanu-
man Prasad [1967] 1 SCR 831, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Ors.
v. R.S. !haver and Ors. [1968] l SCR 148, Dwarka Prasad v, Dwarka Das Saraf
[1976] 1 SCC 128 and Hirata/ Rattan/al etc. v. State of U.P. and Anr. etc.
[197311 sec 216 relied upon.

4. The next question is as to what is the impact of the Explanation on the
B Proviso which deals with the question of wilful default'. It is now well settled
that an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision
in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows, it is
merely meant to explain_or qualify certain ambiguities which may have crept in
the statutory provision. From a conspectus of the authorities, it is manifest that
the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is-
c (a) to explain the meaning and inte~dment of the Act itself;

(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to
clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant objeet
which it seems to subserve,

(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in
D order to make it meaningful and purposeful ;

(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enact-
ment or any part thereof but where gap is left which is relevant for
the purpose of the E~planation, in order to suppress the mischief and
advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the court in interpre-
t~ng the true purport and intendment of the enactment ; and

(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person
E under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an
Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.
[666F·G ; 668G·H; 669A-C]

SaratW in Interpretation of Statutes, p. 329 ; Swarnp in Legislation and
Interpretation' pages 297-298 and Bindra in 'Interpretation of Statutes' (5th Edn.)
page 67. referred to.
F
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of lndla Ltd. and Anr.
v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. (1961] l .SCR 902, Bihta Co:Jperative Deve-
lopment Cane Marketing Ualon Ltd. and Anr. y. The Bnnk of Bihar and Ors.
[1967] l SCR 848 and Dattatraya Govind Mahajan and Ors v. State of Mahara-
shira and Anr [1977) 2 SCR 790 relied upon.

5(1). Although almost every State has its own Rent Act, neither the
G Explanation nor the statutory clause concerning the term 'wilful default' is
mentioned therein. These Acts seem to proceed only on the simple word ·default'
and perhaps to buttress their intention they have laid down certain guidelines to
indicate the grounds of ejectment wherever a default takes place. Looking general-
ly at such Acts, they seem to ,have first provided statutorily a particular date or
time when the tenant on being inducted under the contract of tenancy, is to pay
H the rent. Such a provfSion may Qr may not be against the contract of the tenancy
S.S. PILLAI v. Y. R. PAITABIRAMAN 641

and if it is to that extent, it overrides the contract, This, therefore, gives suffi- A
cient notice to any tenant inducted in any premises that r.e must pay the rent
according to the yardst ck set out by the Act, failing which he runs the risk of
being evicted for default. Some Acts, however, have provided a particuJar num-
ber of defaults to enable the Rent Controller or Court to find out whether such
a default would entitle the landlord to get an order of eviction. There are some
other Acts which have made rather ingenious and, apt provisions for expedi·
ting the process of eviction in case of default by providing that wt.enevcr a suit B
for eviction i~ filed against a tenant on the ground of default, the tenant in order
to show his bona fides must first depo5it the entire rent, arrears and cost in the
court of the Rent Controller where the action is flied on the very first date of
hearing, failing which the court or the authority concerned would be fulJy justi~
fled in striking down the defence and passing an order of eviction then and
there. The dominant object of surh a procedure is to put the tenants On their
guard. It is true that such provisions are rather harsh but if a tenant goes on
defaulting then there can be no other remedy but to make him pay the rent
c
punctua1ly unless some drastic step is taken. These Acts, therefore, strike a just
balance between the rights of a landlord and those of a tenant. For deciding the
present cases, it is not necessary to go either into the ethics or philosophy of
such a provision because the Court is concerned with statutes having different
kinds of provisions. The relevent provisions of the A.P., Orissa and Pondichery
Acts are almost in pari materia the proviso to Section 10(2) of the Tamil Nadu
Act. The only difference between the Tamil Nadu Act and the other Acts is that D
whereas an Explanation is added to the proviso to s.10(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act,
no such Explanation has been added to the provisions of the other three Acts.
Hence the Court has to consider the combined effect of the proviso taken in
conjunction with the Explanation. From an analysis of the various concomitants
of the Explanation, the position seems to be that-

(a) there should be a default to pay or tender 1ent; E
~4 (b) the default should continue even afler the landlord has issued two
months• notice claiming the arrears of rent ; and

(c) if, despite notice, the arrears are not paid the tenant is said to have
committed a wilful default and consequently liable to be evicted forthwith.
[669E-H ; 670A·D, F-G)
F
,. 5 (ii) The Explanation, does not at all take away the mandatory duty cast
on the Controller in the Proviso to decide if a default is wilful or not. Indeed if
the landlord chooses to give two months notice to his tenant and he does not pay
the rent, then, in the absence of substantial and compeling reasons, the Controller
or the court can certainly presume that the default is wilful and order liis eviction
straightaway, There is no force in the view that whether two months notice for
payment of rent is given or not, it will always be open to the Controlier under the G
Proviso to determine the question of 'wilful default' because that would render
the very object of Explanation otiose and nugatory. (6730-E]

6. Two facto:r:s mentioned in s.10(2)(i) seem to give a clear notice to a
tenant as to the mode of payment as also the last date by which he is legally sup-
posed to pay the rent. This, however, does not put the matter beyond controversy
because before passing an order of eviction under the proviso, it must also be H
64S SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R.
A proved that the defaolt was wilful and if the Controller is of the opinion that the
default in the circumstances and facts of the case was not wilful, in the sense that
it did not contain any of the qualities or attributes of a wilful default as indicated,
he may give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding J 5 days, to pay the
entire· rent and if this is complied with, the application for eiec!ment would stand
rejected. The difficulty, however, is created by !he Explanation which says that
once a landlord gives a 'two months' notice to his tenant for paying the arrears of
B rent but the tenant continues in default even thereafter, then he is liable to be
evicted. There. is a good deal of force in this argument which has its own ad van~
tages. In the first place, it protects the court from going into the intricate question
as to what is a wilful default and whether or not the conditions of a wilful default
have been satisfied which, if permitted would differ from case to ca-e and court to
court. But the difficulty is that if uch a blanket ban is put on the court for not
c examining the question of wilful default once the conditions laid down in the
Explanation are satisfied then it would undoubtedly lead to serious injustice to
the tenant. -A subsidiary consequence of such an interpretation would be that
even though the tenant, after receipt of the notice, ma v be wanting to pay the
arrears of rent but is unable to do so because of unforeseen circumstances like,
death, accident, robbery, etc. which prevent him from paying the arrears, yet
under the Explanation he has to be evicted. Another difficulty in accepting the
D first view, viz., if two month's notice is not given, the tenant must not be
presumed to be a wilful defaulter, is that in such a case each landlord would has
to maintain a separate office so that after every default a two months' notice
should be give11,and if no notice is given no action can be taken against a tenant.
The correct view in the matter is in the following terms.

(i) Where no notice is given by the landlord in terms of the Explanation,
E the Controller, having regard to the four conditions spelt out in this judgment has
the undoubted discretion to examine the question as to whether or not the default
committed by the tenant is wilful, If he feels that any of the conditions mentioned
is lacking or that the default was due to son1e unforeseen circumstances, he may
give the tenant a chance of locus paenitentia ~by giving a reasonable time, which
the statute puts at 15 days, and if within that time the tenant pays the rent,
the application for eje·..:tment would have to be rejected.

F (ii} If the landlord chooses to g;ve two months' notice to th~ tenant to
c!e"at up the dues and the tenant does not pay the dues within the stipulated time
of the notice then the Controller would have no discretion to decide the question
of wilful default because such a conduct of the tenant would itself be presumed
to be wilful default unless he shows that he was prevented by sufficient cause or
circumstances beyond his control in honouring the notice sent by the landlord.
[671G-H ; 672A-D; F ; 673F-H ; 674A-B]

G N. Pamaswami Reddiar v. S.N. Per;anuuhu Nadar, 1980 LPW Weekly
(vol. 93) p. 577 and Khivaraj Chordia v. G. Manik/al Bhattad AIR 1966 Madras
67 approved,

Rajeswari v. Vasurnal Lalchand, AIR 1983 Madras 97, referred to.

7. In the light of the above principles and tests to be applied by courts-in
deciding the question of wilful default, the Court allowed Civil Appeals Nos. 1178
H of 1984, 1992 of 1982 and 2246 of 1982 and dismissed rest of the appeals. [678B]
S. S. PILLAi V. V. R; PATTABIRAMAN 649
Per ·Mukharji. J. (dissenting) A

t (i) Default has been constrlled in various ways depending upon the
context. 'Default' would seem to embrace every failure to perform part of one's
contract or bargain. It is a purely relative term like negligence. It means nothing
more, nothing less, than not doing what is reasonable uncler the circumstances; B
not doing something which you ought to do, having regard to the transaction.
Similarly, default in payment imports something wrongful, the omission to do
some act which, as between the parties, ought to have been done by one of them.
It simply means non-payment, fa lure or omission to pay_ Default happens in
payment of tents under various contingencies and situations. Whether the default
is wilful or not is also a question of fact to be proved from evidence, direct and
circumstantial drawing inferences from certain conduct. If the Courts are free to c
decide from varying circumstances whether defalt was wilful or not, then diver-
gence of conclusions are likely to arise 0ne judicial authority coming to the con-
clusion from certain circumstances that the default was wilful, another judicial
authority coming to a contrary conclusion from more or less same circumstances.
That creates ar,omalies. In order to obviate such anomalies and bring about a
unfform standard that Explanation explains the expression. "wilful" and accord-
D
ing to the Explanation added, a default to pay or tender rent "small be constru-
ed", as wilful if the default by the tenant nth~ payment of rent continues after
issue of twJ months' notice by the landlord claiming the rent. If that is the posi-
tion, in a case where the landlord has given notice to the tenant claiming the rent
and the tenant has not paid the same for two months, then the same must be
construed as wilful defau't, whatever may be the cause for non-payment. Whe ...
ther in a particular case default is wilful or not, must be considered in accordance
with the definit:on provided in the Explanation to Proviso to sub-section (2) of
section 10 of the Act. If it wa~ intended that the courts would be free to judg! E
whether in a particular set up of facts, the default was \\'ilful or not where no
notice has been given, then in such a case there was no necessity of adding this
Explanation to the Proviso which is a step to the making of the findings under
clause (1) of sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act. It is well-settled
that Legislature does not act without purpose or in futility.
[680E-G; 681Jl.E; 682E-F]

Stroud·s Judicial Dictionary Vol. 1. Third Edition. page 757, Prem's Judi-
F
.. cial Dictionary. Vol. 11964 page 483. The Dictionary of English law, page 597,
Fakir Chander Dat' and Other v. Rarn Kutnar Chauer1i, Indian Appeals. Vol.
XXXI. p. 19.'. referred to,

t(ii) If a definition is provided of an experssion, then the courts are not
free to construe the expression otherwise unless it is so warranted by.the use of
the expression such as "except otherwise provided or except if the context G
otherwise indicates." There is no such expression in the insttant case. There may
be in certain circumstances intrinsic evidence indicating otherwise. Here there is
none. [682C-D]

2(i)' The expression "shall be construed" would have the effect of provid·
ing a definition of wilful default in the proviso to sub-section (2) Of section 10.
According to the Explanation; a default to pay or tender rent ''shaH ·be construed",
H
6So SUPREME COURT REPORTS tJ98Sl ~ s.c.R..
A as wilful if the default by the tenant in the payment of rent continues after issue
of two months' notice by the landlord claiming the rent. If that is the position,
in a case where the landlord bas given notice to the tenant claiming the rent and
the tenant has not paid the same for two month::.s, then the same must be constru·
ed as wilful default, whatever may be the cause for non-payment. The Legislature
has chosen to use the expression "shall be construed as wilful" if after a notice
by the landlord for two months' failure to pay or tender rent on the part of the
B ten1nt continues, and if it is wilfu! then under sub-section(2) clause (I) read with
t'-e provi o as explained by the Explanation, the Controller must be satisfied and
give an order for eviction. The Legislature has provided an absolute and clear
definition of 'wilful default'. Other circu1nstances cannot be considered as wilful
default. It is true that Legislature has not chosen to use language to indicate that
in no other cases, the default could be consider.d to be wilful except one default
case which has been indicated in the Explanation. But it is not so necessary be-
c cause Legislature has defined 'wiJful default by the expression that ·default to pay
or tender rent shall be construed' meaning thereby that it will mean only this and
no other. Therefore, a default wiII be construed as wilful, only where the landlord
has Kiven notice and two months have expired without payment of such rent.
[682 B-R-C; H ; 681D-F ; 683A]

2(ii)Statutory provisions must be construed, if it is possible, that absuridity and
D mischief may be avoided. Where the plain and literal interpretation of astatutory
provision produces a manifestly ab~urd and unjust result, the court might modify
the language used by the Legislature or even c'o some violence to it so as to achi-
eve the obvious intention or the Legislature and produce rational construction and
just results. Ironing out the creases is possible but uot re-writing the language to
serve a notion of public policy held by the judges. [683C; 684B]

E
2(iii) Where two constructions are possible, one which avoids anomalies and
creates reasonable· results should be preferred but whe1 e the language is clear and
where there is a purpose that can be understood and appreciated for construing
in one particular manner, that is to say, avoidance of divergence of judicial
opinions in construing wilful default and thereby avoiding anomalies for d.fferent
tenants, it would not be proper in such a situation to say that this difinition of
wilful default was only illustrativeand not exhaustive. The
F Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 10 cannot be cons-
trued as illustrative when the Legislature has chosen to use the expression "shall
..
be construed". [683D-F]

In the aforesaid view of the matter, the individual appeals are disposed
of accordingly, that is to say, only those appeals of tenants are dismissed where
eviction orders were passed after two months' notice had been given and there
G was continuance of default, and the rest of the appeals are allowed. [685B·C]

Seaford Court E.1tates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 All E.R. 155 at pages 164
(CA), Regina v. Barnet London Borough Council Ex parte Nilish Saah, 1983 (2)
Weakly Law Reports p. 16 at p. 30., Carrington and others v. Therm-a-Star Ltd.,
H 1983 (I) Weakly Law Reports p. 138 at p. 142. referred to.
S. S. PILLAI v. . R. PATIABIRAMAN 651

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1178 of 1984 A
From the Judgment and Order dated the 15th July, 1982 of the
-"i High Court of Madras in Civil Revision Petition No. 3396 of 1981.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 6211 of 1983 B
From the Judgment and Order dated the 5th November, 1982
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Civil Revision Petition
No. 2477 of 1982. ·
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 1992 of 1982 c
From the Judgment and Order dated the 17th December, 1981
of the H!gh Court of Madras in Civil Revision Petition No. 152 of
1981.
WITH
D
Civil Appeal No. 1959 of 1982
From the Judgment and Order dated the 14th December, 1981
of the High Court of Madras in Civil Revision Petition No. 1630 of
1980.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 3668 of 1982 E

From the Judgment and Order dated the 20th October, 1982
of the High Court of Madras in Civil Revision Petition No. 4087 of
1982.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 2246 of 1982 F

-
Fr~m the Judgment and Order dated the 5th November, 1981
of the High Court of Madras in Civil Revision Petition No. 1397 of
198<'.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 4012 of 1982 G
From the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd November 1982
of the High Court of Madras in Civil Revision Petition No. 3983 of
1981.

Y. S., Chitale and P. N. Rama/ingam fot the Appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 1178 of 1984.
H
652 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.ll.
A P. G. Nair, K. K. Mani, V. Shekher and P.R. Setharaman for
the Respondents in Civil Appeal No. ll 78 of 1984
y-

A.K. Sen and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 6211of1983.
B
T. V.S. Narasimhachari for the Responcfent

K. Ramkumar for the Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1992 of
1982
A. T. M. Sampath for the Respondent.
c A. S. Nambiar for the Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1659 of
1982.
K. S. Ramamurthy, and A.T.M. Sampath, for the Appellant in
• Civil Appeal No. 3668 of 1982.
D C. S. Vaidianathan and K. K. Mani for the Respondents. •
M. G. Ramachandran, and A.V. Rangam for the Appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 2246 of 1982.

T. S. Krishnamurthy Iyer for the Respondent.
E
T. S. Krishnamurth Iyer. and S. Balakrishna for the Appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 4012 of 1984.

Padmanbhan and D.N. Gupta for the Respondent in Civil
Appeal No. 4012 of 1982.

F The following Judgments were delevered

FAZAL Au, J. These appeals invlove more or less an identical
point of law relating to the interpretation of the term 'wilful default'
appearing in the proviso to section JO (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buil-
dings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'Act') coupled with the Explanation which seeks to explain the
G intent of the proviso. We have heard counsel for the parties at great
length and a large number of authorities have been cited before us in
support of both the parties.

Before we take up the points of Jaw involved in these appeals
we would briefly narrate the bare facts of each of these cases in order
to test the correctness of the points argued before us.
H
s. s PILLAI v. v. ll. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 653

In Civil Appeal No. 1178 of 1984, the respondent-landlord let A
out the suit premises No. 3-B, New No 2· B, Davidson Street, Broad-
way Madras, to the appellant-tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 600 for
non-residential use. The appellant, despite repeated reminders, did
not pay the rent for the period from October 1978 to August 1979.
The respondent filed a suit on 2. 12. 79 for evicting the appellant on B
two grounds:(\) wilful default in payment of rent, and (2) material
acts of waste committed in the building.
It may be mentioned here that before filing a suit for eviction
of the appellant, the respondent on 17.9.79 sent a two months' notice
to the appel!,rnt. through his Advocate to clear up the dues. The c
appellant on receipt of the notice paid up the amount of the arrears,
amounting to Rs. 6,600 on 3.10.79, i.e., within the stipulated period
of two months. But, the respondent contended that in view
of the past conduct of the appellant be was gJi!ty of wilful default
within the meaning of proviso to s. I 0 (2) of the Act.
D
So far as this appeal is concerned, as the entire rent had been
paid up in pursuance of the notice dated 17 .9. 79 eveu prior to the
filing of the suit, it is manifest that on the date of filing
of the suit no cause of action in presenti having arisen, the suit
shpuld have been dismissed on this short ground alone as being not
maintainable. As indicated above, it was not open to the land-
lord after having received the entire amount of arrears before filing E
of the suit to have filed a suit for past conduct of the tenant. This
appeal, therefore, merits dismissal on this ground alone.
In Civil Appeal No. 6211of1983, the respondent-tenants were
given the suit premises No. 17/582, Ward B, Old corresponding No.
2, New No. 5/8/582 Abid Road, Hyderabad, on a monthly rent of
Rs. 225 which was, by mutual consent, increased to Rs. 275 per F
month in the year 1964. From l.7.66, the rent was again agreed to
be increased to Rs. 300 per month. The appellants-landlord filed a
suit under s. 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction Contrell Act, 1960 on 12.ll.71, against the respondents for
eviction on three grounds ; (I) wilful default by the tenants in pay-
ment of rent for the months of September, October and November G
1971 (total amount being Rs. 9bO, (2) the tenants sublet the premises
to one Hanumantha, and (3) that the premises were required bona
fide for their own use. However, during toe pendency of the matter,
the original landlords sold away their interest in the property in
favour of the present appellants before us and, therefore, the ques-
tion of bonafied requirement abated there itself.
H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1985] 2 s.c.R.
A The Rent Controller upheld both the grounds of wilful
default and subletting. Aggrieved by the said decision, the
respondents-tenant filed an appeal to the Chief Judge, City
Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and the learned Chief
Judge by his judgment held that wilful default in payment of rent
B for the month of September 1971 as also the question of sub-
letting was proved. Against this decision of the Chief Judge, City
Small Causes, the respondents filed a revision petition in the High
Court. It is not in dispute that the rent from September, 1971 on·
wards has not been paid and that by the time the eviction petition
was filed, the default was only for the month of September 1971. The
c High Court agreed with the lower courts with regard to wilful default
for the month of September, . 1971 and reversed the finding with
reagrd to subletting but on the ground of wilful default ordered evic-
tion of the respondents.
In civil Appeal No. 1992 of 1982, the respondent-landlord filed
an eviction petition against the appellant-tenant on the grounds of
D wilful default and the premises needing repairs. However, the second
ground was not pressed and the only point which survived for deter-
mination was whether there was any wilful default on the part of the
appellant. The brief facts are that the appellant became a tenant
under the father of the respondent in 1953 at a monthly rent of Rs.
15 which was subsequently mutually agreed to be increased to Rs. 49
per month. The respondent contended in his petition that the appel-
E lant became a defaulter in payment oi the rent as he did not pay the
rent for the months of June 1977 to January 1978. The respondent
also issued a notice on 16.1.78 demanding the dues amounting to Rs.
392. The appellant sent a detailed reply on 30.1. 78 alongwith a Bank
Draft for Rs. 392 which was, however, not enaashed by the respon-
dent and returned to the appellant subsequent to the filing of an evic-
F tion petition which was filed on 11. 8.1978.
The Rent Controller found the tenant to be a wilful defaulter
and consequently order his eviction. However, on appeal the Appel-
late Authority reversed the finding of the Rent Controller and accep-
ted the plea of the tenant· that as he was ill he was not able to pay the
rent. Jn revision, the High Court did not agree with the finding of
the Appellate Authority and restored the finding of the Rent Con-
G troller and ordered the eviction of the appellant, holding that the
explanation offered by the tenant could not be accepted as his sons
were carrying on the business in the same premises and nothing pre-
vented them from paying the rent to the landlord of the appellant was

H ill.
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 655

A
In Civil Appeal No. 1659 of 1982, the respondent-landlord filed
an eviction petition against the appellant-tenant in respect of a non-
residential premises on two grounds : (!) wilful default in payment
of rent from l.5.77 to 31.8.77, and (2) bona fide requirement for
personal use. The Rent Controller, after an equiry, ordered eviciion
of the tenant on both the grounds and the Appellate Authority con- B
firmed the findings of the Rent Controller. The landlord issued a
lawyer's notice on 1.9.77 to the tenant to clear up the dues. After
receipt of the notice the tenant paid the rent of two months' only and
for the remaining two months the tenant could not offer any satis-
factory explanation and, therefore, the High Court in revision agreed
with the findings of both the courts below in regard to wilful default
of payment of arrears of rent and ordered eviction of the tenant on c
this ground alone. The High Court, however, did not agree with the
findings of the courts below with regard to bona fide requirement of
the landlord and held that the landlord could not ask for a non-resi-
._, • dential portion for residential purposes having leased it out for a
non-residential purpose.
D
In Civil Appeal No. 3668 of 1982, the appellant took out the
premises from the respondent for non-residential use on a monthly
rent of Rs. 350. There was some misunderstanding between the
parties over payment of rent and as a result of which it was agreed
that the tenant would deposit the rent in the Bank. The respondent-
landlord filed an eviction petition on 1.4.1980 in the court of the
Rent Controller, after verifying from the Bank, that the tenant had E
not deposited th' rent for the months of January and February 1980,
thereby committing a wilful default. The authorities below found
against the arrangement of depositing the rent in the Bank and orde-
red the eviction of the appellant on the ground of wilful default. The
High Court upheld the decision of the courts below and held that

- the appellant bad wilfully defaulted in the payment of rent and orde-
red the eviction of the appellant.

In Civil Appeal No. 2246 of 1982, the respondent-landladies let
F

out the premises to the tenant-appellant for non-residential use on a
monthly rent of Rs. 105. The respondents filed an eviction petition
G
on 2.11.76 against the tenant on the ground of wilful default for
non-payment of rent for the period from January 1976 to Septeme-
ber 1976, i.e., for a period of 9 months. But before filing the evic-
tion petition, the respondents on 6.7,1976 issued a notice to the tenant
to pay the dues and on 17.7.76 the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 630
which was accepted by the landladies without prejudice. The Rent H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R'
A
Controller found that the default in payment of rent was not wilful
and therefore dismissed the application of the landladies. On appeal,
the Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Rent Controller
and held that the default, was wilful. In revision, the High Court did
not agree with the contention of the appellant that be was not wilful
B defaulter as immediately after filing of the eviction petition be had paid
the entire arrears even before the serving of summons. The High Court
held that there was no satisfactory explanation by the tenant for non-
payment of rent for the period from January to June 1976 before the
issue of notice. Even after the payment of rent the tenant committed
further default till the petition for eviction was filed on 2.11.76. The
c High Court, therefore, upheld the finding of the Appellate Authority
and ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default.

In civil appeal No. 4012 of 1982, the appellant is in occupation
of the residential premises bearing No 17 (New No. 59), Burkit Road
T. Nagar, Madras on a monthly rent of Rs. 325 payable according
to English calendar month. The respondent filed an eviction petition
D
against the appellant on the ground of wilful default and bona fide
requirement for her own occupation. It was stated on behalf of the
respondent-landlady that the appellant committed wilful default in
payment of rent from June 1976 onwards and after repeated demands a
sum of Rs. 1000 was paid by him on 1.4.1977. He had paid rent for
five months to the Income Tax Department on behalf of the respondent
E but he did not produce any receipt evidencing payment to the Income
Tax Department. Assuming that the appellant had made the said
payment, the respondent further contended that from February 1977
to July 1978 the appellant was in arrears, thereby committing a wilful
default. The Rent Controller did not agree with the contentions of
the respondent and held that the default was not wilful and the
requirement for own Occupation of the landlay was not bona fide. On
F appeal, the Appellate Court came to the conclnsion that the tenant
had committed wilful default in payment of rent from May 1976
onwards as on 1.4.77 and from December 1976 as on 10.4.77. How-
ever, the appellate authority was of the view that the respondent had
not been able to prove her case for bona fide requirement. But, on
the ground of wilful default, the eviction of the appellant was ordered.
G ln reviston, the High Court agreed with the findings of the Appel-
late Court and confirmed the eviction of the appellant on the ground
of wilful default.

From a detailed survey of the provisions of the various Rent
Acts prevailing in the States and various Union Territories of our
H
s. s. PILLAI v. V. R. PATTADIRAMAN (Faza/ Ali, J.) 657

country, it appears that the provisions regarding eviction for default
A
in payment of rent are not uniform and differ from State to State.
Some Acts do not mention 'wilful default' at all, some mention it
in a negative form while some put it in an affirmative form. To cut
the matter short. from a review of the various Rent Acts the position
that emerges is that the provisions relating to eviction are couched IB
in three different types of default-
(!) Acts which expressly mention 'wilful default' without
defining the same,
(2) Acts which do not mention the words 'wilful default'
at all but confer a right on the landlord to evict the C
tenant on pure and simple default after a certain period
of time when the rent has become due, which is also
different in different States,
(3 J Acts which use the expression 'wilful default' but in a
negative form rather than in an affirmative form. D
These are the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act of 1960, The Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967
and the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1969
(hereinafter referred to as the 'A.P. Act, 'Orissa Act' and 'Pondi·
cherry Act' respectively). The last category of the Acts is the Tamil
Nadu Act, which is the Statute in question and which makes a mar- E
ked improvement by broadening the ambit of 'wilful default' in the
proviso to s. 10 (2) which is further clarified by virtue of the Expla-
nation added to the said proviso by Act No. 23 of 1973. There are
other Rent Acts which not only use the expression 'wilful default'
but which also give a sort of a facility to a tenant even for an ordi·

.. nary default to pay the entire rent together with interest, on payment
of which the suit for eviction is dismissed or, at any rate, they con-
F
tain provisions by which even if a suit for eviction is filed, the tenant
is required to pay the entire arrears of rent, costs and interest, failing
which his defence is struck out and the suit for eviction is decreed
automatically.

In these circumstanees, for the purpose of the present cases, it
is not necessary for us to make a roving enquiry into or carry on a G
detailed survey of the Acts which do not use the term 'wilful default'.
We might usefully refer only to those Acts which contain the term
'wilful default' either in a negative or in a positiv" form. These Acts
as already indicated, are the A.P., Orissa, Pondicherry and the Tamii
Nadu Acts. Though we are concerned mainly with the Tamil Nadu
II
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C R.
A
Act yet in order to understand the contextual background of the
words 'wilful default' and its proper setting, we might briefly examine
the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Acts. Section 10 (2) of the
A.P. Act is the only provision which confers protection to the tenant
from eviction under certain conditions. Proviso to that sub-section
B runs thus :

"Provided that in any case falling under clause (i), if
the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or
tender rent was not wilful, he may notwithstanding anything
in section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceed-
c ing fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the
landlord up to the date of such payment or tender and on
such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected."
It may be noticed that although the default contemplated by
the Act is wilful yet it has been put in a negative form which undoub-
tedly gives sufficient leeway to the tenant to get out of the rigours
•
D
of the statutory provision. The proviso to s.7 (2J of the Orissa Act
is similarly worded and the relevant portion of which runs thus:

"Provided that in any case falling under clause
(i) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to
pay or tender rent was not wilful."

Pondicherry Act is another statute which also contains the word
'wilful' in a negative form, the relevant portion of which runs
thus:

"Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if
the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay of
tender rent was not wilful..."
F
The aforesaid Acts undoubtedly contemplate that a default
simpliciter would not be sufficient to evict the tenant but it must
further be shown that the default was not wilful. The Act, however
is silent on the mode and the manner in which a court may decide
as to wh_. is wilful and what is not wilful. Thus, the Act has left
it to the courts to decide this question. So far as the Tamil Nadu
G Act is concerned, it clearly defines as to what is 'wilful default'.
Proviso to s. 10 (2) of the Act runs thus:

"Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if the
Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or
H tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding anything
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTARIRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J) 659
A
contained in section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time,
not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by
him to the landlord up to the date of such payment or tender
and on such payment or tender, the application shall be
rejected."
B
This proviso was clarified by an Explanation added to it by Act
No. 23 of 1973 which provides a clear criterion to determine as to
what is wilful default and what is not. In this connection, it was sub-
'> milted by counsel for the tenants that despite the Explanation it 1s
open to the Court on an appraisement of the circumstances of each
case to deremine whether or not the default was wilful and in doing C
so it cannot be guided wholly and solely by the Explanation which
is merely clarificatory in nature. If the Court in the circumstances of
each case finds that the default is not wilful then it can come to this
finding despite the Explanation. On the other hand, the argument of
the counsel for the landlords is that the very purpose of the Explana-
D
.'-' lion is to bring about uniformity in court decisions by laying down a
conclusive yardstick in the shape of the Explanation which says that
a default would be wilful only if the landlord gives two months'
notice to the tenant and the tenant does not pay the rent after the
( expiry of this period. In other words, the argument seems to be th1t
the Explanation is to be read into the proviso so that the word 'wilful'
will have to be defined and interprered in accordance with the crite- E
rion laid down by the said Explanation, i.e., 'issue of two months'
"'l notice.' The arguments merits consideration but before coming to any
conclusion it may be necessary for us to examine the exact mean!ng
of the words 'Wilful default' as also the interpretation and the scope
of the Proviso and the Explanation. Prima facie, there seems to be
some force in the argument of the counsel for the tenants that unless
the conditions of the Explanation are fulfilled, whatever may be the F
nature of the default, it cannot be a 'wilful default' as contemplated
...-J by the Proviso.

Before, however, going into this question further, let us find
out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words
'wilful default'. In the book 'A Dictionary of Law' by L.B. Curzon, G
at page 361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined
thus:

'Wilful'-deliberate conduct of a person who is a
free agent, knows what he is doing and intends to do what
he is doing.
H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.
A
'Wilful default'-Either a consciousness of negligence
or breach of duty ; or a recklessness in the performance of a
duty.

In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and
B intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof.
In Words and Phrases', Volume II A (Permanent Edition) at page
268 the word 'default' has been defined as the non-performance of a
duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do some-
thing required. In volume 45 of 'Words & Phrases', the word 'wilful'
has been very clearly defined thus :

c 'Wilful' -intentional ; not incidental or involuntary :
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without
justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done
carelessly ; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently :
in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of
intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involun-
D tary.
P. 296 - "Wilful" refers to act consciously and deliberately
done and signifies course of conduct marked by
exercise of volition rather than which is acciden-
tal, negligent or involuntary.
E In Volume Ill of Webster's Third New International Dictio-
nary at page 2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus: r
"governed by will without yielding to reason or with-
out regard to reason ; ob.stinately or perversely self-willed."

F The word 'default' has been defined in Vol. I of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary at page 590 thus ;

"to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a ~.
responsibility ; to fail to meet a financial obligation."
In Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edn.) at page 1773 the word
G 'wilful' has been defined thus :
"Wilfulness" implies an act done intentionally and
designedly ; a conscious failure to observe care ; Consci0:us;
knowing ; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice.
The word "reckless" as applied to negligence, is the
H legal equivalent of "willful" or "Wanton".
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 661
A
Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default'
appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be inten-
tional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of
legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case
where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or
reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, B
it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such
a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contem-
plated either by the Act or by other Acts referred· to above.
The next question that arises for consideration is as to what is
the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit of an Explanation c
either to a proviso or to any other statutory provision. We shall
first take up the question of the mture, scope and extent of a proviso.
The well established rule of interpretation of a proviso is
that a proviso may have three separate functions. Normally,
a proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main
enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the D
proviso would be within the purview of the enactment In other
words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor
can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main
enactment.
Craies in his book 'Statute Law' (7th Edn.) while explaining
the purpose and import of a proviso states at page 218 thus: E
"The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso,
according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to
except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or
to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the
proviso would be within it ... The natural presumption is
that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section F
would have included the subject-matter of the proviso.".
. Odgers in 'Construction of Deeds and Statutes' (Fifth Edn.)
while referring to the scope of a proviso mentioned the following
ingredients :

P. 31 '. "Provisos-These are clauses of exception or qualifica- G
~1on m an Act, excepting something . out of, or qualify.
mg ~omething in, the enactment which, but for the
proviso, would be within it."
31
P · 8 "Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may
exceptionally have the elfect of a substantive enact-
ment."
H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 2 S.C.R.
A Sarathi in 'Interpretation of Statutes' at pages 294-295 has
collected the following principles in regard to a proviso :-
(a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part
of the section would have included the subject-matter of
the proviso.
B
(b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preced-
ing parts of the clause to which it is appended.
(c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the
proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as
the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers.
c (d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a
guide to its interpretation ; but when it is clear, a proviso
cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no
trace in the section.
(e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section.
D (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for
compelling reasons.
(g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of
abundant caution.
(h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it
into general harmony with the terms of section should
E
prevail.
(i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the
proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later
Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one.
(j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provi-
F sion."
In the case of Local Government Board v. South Stoneham
Union,(') Lord Macnaghten made the following observation :
"I think the proviso is a qualification of the preced-
ing enactment, which is expressed in terms too general to
G be quite accurate."
In lshverlal Thakore/a/ Alma~/a v. Motibhai Nagjibhai( 2 ) it was
held that the main object of a proviso is merely to qualify the main
enactment. In Madras & Southern Maharatta Railway Co. Ltd. v.
Bezwada Municipality,( 3) Lord Macmillan observed thus:
(I) [1909] A.C. 57.
(2) [1966] 1SCR367.
(3) AIR 1944 P.C. 71.
11
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 663
A
"The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal
with Ii case .which would otherwise fall within the general
language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to
that case."
The above case was approved by this Court in Commissioner of B
Income Tax, Mysore, etc. v. lndo Mercantile Bank Ltd.,(') where
Kapur, J. held that the proper function of a proviso was merely to
qualify the generality of the main enactment by providing an excep-
tion and taking out, as it were, from the mnin enactment a portion
which, but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment.
In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash c
Chandra Yograj Sinha,( 2) Hidayatullah, J, as he then was, very aptly
and succinctly indicated the parametres of a proviso thus :
"As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment
to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enact-
ment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating
D
a general rule."
In West Derby v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co.(') while
guarding against the danger of interpretation of a proviso, Lord
Watson observed thus :
"a very Jangerous and certainly unusual course to
import legislation from a proviso wholesale into the body of
the statute." E

A very apt description and extent of a provio was given by Lord
Oreburn in Rhodda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale Railway Co.(')
where it was pointed out that insertion of a proviso by the drafts-
man is not always strictly adhered to its legitimate use and at times
a section worded as a proviso may wholly or partly be in substance F
, a fresh enactment adding to and not merely excepting something out
of or qualifying what goes before. To the same effect is a later
decision of the same Court in Jennings add Another v. Kelly( 0 ) where
it was observed :
"We must now come to the proviso, for there is, I G
think, no doubt that in the construction of the section the

(I) [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 256.
(2) [196212 SCR 159.
(3) [1897) AC 647.
(4) [1909] AC 253.
(5) [1940] AC 206.
664 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS (1985] 2. s.c.I!..
A
whole of it must be read and a consistent meaning if possi-
ble given to every part of it · The words are "provided that
such licence shall be granted . only for premises situate in
the ward or district electoral division in which such increase
in population has taken place". There seems to be no doubt
B that the words "such increase in population" refer to the
increase of not less than 25 per cent of the population men-
tioned in th~ opening words of the section."

While interpreting a proviso care must be taken that it is used
to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for
c them separately.

In short, generally speaking, a proviso is intended to limit the
enacted provision so as to except something which would have other-
wise been within it or in some measure to modify the enacting
clause. Sometimes a proviso may be embedded in the main provi-
D sion and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a subs-
tantive provision itself.
.,_..

Apart from the authorities referre4 to above, this Court has in
a long course of decisions explained and adumbrated the various
shades; aspects and elements of a proviso. In State of Rajasthan
v. Leela Jain,(') the following observations were made:
E
"So far as a general principle of con,truction of a
proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the
function of a proviso is to limit the main part of the section
and carve out something which but for the proviso would
have been within the operative part."
F
In the case of Sales Tax Officer, Circle I, Jabalpur v. Hanuman
Prasad(2), Bhargava, J. observed thus :
"It ·is well-recognised that a proviso is added to a
principle clause primarily with the object of taking out of
the scope of that principal clause what is included in it and
what the legislature desires should.be excluded."
G
In Commissioner of Commercial'Taxes and Ors. v. R.S. Jhaver
and Ors.,(3 ) this Court made the following observations :

(!) ]1965] I S.C.R. 276.
(2) [1967] I S.C.R. 831.
H (3) [1968] I S.C.R. 148.
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R.. PATTABillAMAN (Faza/, Ali J.) 665
A
"Generally speaking, it is true that the proviso is an
,exception to the main part of the section ; but it is recog-
nised that in exceptional cases a proviso may be a substan-
tive provision itself."
In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf,(1) Krishan Iyer, J.
. speaking for the Court observed thus : B

"There is some validity in submission but if, on a ·fair
construction, the principal provision is clear, a proviso can-
not· expand or limit it. Sometimes a proviso is engrafted
by an apprehensive draftsman to remove possible doubts,
to make matters plain, to light up ambiguous edges. Here, c
such is the case ...
If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso
should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of
the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To
expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins D
against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso
must be considered in relation to the principal matter to
which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a
proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole
section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they
mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmo- E
nious construction."

'' In Hiralal Rattan/al etc. v. Siaie of U.P. and Anr.(2 ) etc. this
Court made the following observations :
"Ordinarily, a proviso to a section is intended to take
F
out a part of the main section for special treatment. It is not
expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. But cases
have arisen in which this Court has held that despite the
fact that a provision is called proviso, it is really a separate
provision and the so-called proviso has substantially altered
the main section.''

We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this G
point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly
well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different
purposes:

(I)· [1976] 1S.C.R.128.
(2) [1973] l s.c.c: 216.
H
666 SUPREME COURT IlEPORfs [1985] 2 s.c.lt.
A
(I) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the
main enactment ;
(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intend-
ment of the enactment by insisting on certain manda-
tory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the
B enactment workable ;
(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become
an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the
tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; <""
and
c (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to
the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real
intendment of the statutory provision.

These seem to be by and large the main purport and para-
D meters of.a proviso.

So far as the Act in question is concerned, the matter does not
rest only on the question of wilful default, but by an amendment
(Act No. 23 of 197j) an Explanation, in the following terms, was
added to the proviso to section IO (2) of the Act :
E
"Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section,
default to pay or tender rent shall be construed as wilful, if
the default by the tenant in the payment or tender of
rent continues after the issue of two months' notice by the
landlord claiming the rent."
F We have now to consider as to what is the impact of the
Explanation on the proviso which deals with the question of wilful
default. Before, however, we embark on an enquiry into this
difficult and delicate question, we must appreciate the intent, purpose
and legal effect of an Explanation. It is now well settled that an
Explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive
provision in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the
G
word itself shows it is merely meant to explain or clarify certaie
ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision. Sarathi
in 'Interpretation of Statutes' while dwelling on the various aspects
of an Explanation observes as follows:

"(a) The object of an explanation is to understand the Act
H in the light of the explanation.
s. s. PILLAI v. v. tl. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal Ali J.) 661
A
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original
section which it explains, but only makes the meaning
clear beyond dispute."
(P. 329)
B
Swarup in 'Legislation and Interpretation' very aptly sums up
the scope and effect of an Explanation thus :

"Sometimes an explanation is appended to stress upon
a particular thing which ordinarily would not appear clearly
from the provisions of the section. The proper function of c
an explanation is to make plain or elucidate what is enacted
in the substantive provision and not to add or substract from
it. Thus an explanation does not either restrict or extend the
en1cting part ; it does not enlarge or narrow down the scope
of the original section that it is supposed to explain ..... The
D
Explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor ;
that it is meant to explain and not vice versa."
(P.P. 297-298.)

Bindra in 'Interpretation of Statutes' (5th Edn.) at page 67
states th us :

"An explanation does not enlarge the scope of the origi- E
nal section that it is supposed to explain. It is axiomatic that
an explanation only explains and does not expand or add to
the scope of the original section ...... The purpose of an expla-
nation is, however, not to limit the scope o the main
provision ...... The construction of the explanation must
depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose can be
entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. F
An 'explanation' must be interpreted according to its own
tenor."

The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are fully
supported by various authorities of this Court. To quote only a few,
in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. and
Anr. v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors.(1) a Constitution Bench G
decision, Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, observed thus :

"Now, the Explanation must be interpreted according to
its own tenor, and it is meant to explain cl. (I) (a) of tP,e

(l) [196111 S.C.R. 901.
H
668 SUPltEME COUllT ·REPORTS . (1985) 2 S.C.R.
A Article· and not vice versa. It is an error to explain the
Explanation with the aid of the Article, because this reverses
their roles."

In Bihta Cooperative Development Cane Marketing Union Ltd.
and Anr. v. The Bank of Bihar and Ors(')., this Court observed thus:

"The Explanation must be read so as to harmonise with
B
and clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should
not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section."

In Hiralal Rattan/al's case .(supra), this Court observed thus :

"On the basis of the language of the Explanation this
c Court held that it did not widen the scope of clause (c). But
from what has been said in the case, it is clear that if on a
true reading of an Explanation it appears that it has widened
the scope of the main section, effect be given to legislative
intent notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature nammed
that provision as an Explanation."

D In Dattatraya Govind Mahajan and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra
and Anr(2)., Bhagwati, J, observed thus:

"It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation
is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to
E which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or am-
biguity in it ...... Therefore, even though the provision in
question has been called an Explanation, we must construe it
according to its plain language and not on any a priori consi-
derations."
F Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it
is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provi·
sion is-
(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,

(b) ·;vhere there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main
G enactment, to clarify the same so aa to make it consis-
tent with the dominant object which it seems to
subserve,

(1) [I 967] l S.C.R. 848.
H (2) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 790.
-
. s. s. PILLAI v. v. ll. PATTAnlRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 669
A
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object
of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purpose-
"-') fut,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or
change the enactment or any part thereof but where
B
some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the
Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and
advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the
Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment
of the enactment, and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with
which any person under a statute has been clothed or
set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an
hindrance in the interpretation of the same.

Having, therefore, fully discussed the main scope and ambit of
~_, , a proviso and an Explanation, we shall now proceed to elucidate the D
various provisions of the Act and other Acts. We have already discus-
sed that although almost every State has its own Rent Act, neither
the Explanation nor the statutory clause concerning the term 'wilful
default' is mcntained therein. These Acts seem to proceed only on the
simple word 'default' and perh"aps to buttress their intention they
have laid down certain guidelines to indicate the grounds of ejectment
wherever a default takes place. Looking generally at such Acts, they E
'• seem to have first provided statutorily a particular date or time when
the tenant on being inducted under the contract of tenancy, is to pay
the rent. Such a provision may or may not be against the contract of
the tenancy and if it is to that extent, it overrides the contract. This,
therefore, gives sufficient notice to any tenant inducted in any pre-
mises that he must pay the rent according to the yard-stick set out by F
the Act, failing which he runs the risk of being evicted for default.
r.< Some Acts, however, have provided a particular number of defaults
to enable the Rent Controller or Court to find out whether such a
default would entitle the landlord to get an order of eviction. There
are some other Acts which have made rather ingenious and, if we may
say so, apt provisions for expediting the process of eviction in case of
a
default by providing that whenever suit for eviction is filed against G
a tenant on the ground of default, the tenant in order to show his
bona fides must first deposit the entire rent, arrears and cost in the
,., court of the Rent Controller where the action is filed on the very
first date of hearing, failing which the court or the authority concern-
••
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll985j 2 S.C.R.
A
ed would be fully justified in striking down the defence and passing
an order of eviction then and there. The dominant object of such a
procedure is to put the tenants on their guard. It is true that such r--
provisions are rather harsh but if a tenant goes on defaulting then
there can be no other remedy but to make him pay the rent punc-
B tually unless some drastic step is taken. These Acts, therefore, strike
a just balance between the rights of a landlord and those of a tenant.
For deciding these cases, it is not necessary for us to go either into the
ethics or philosophy of such a provision because we are concerned
with statutes having different kinds of provisions. r
With this little preface we would now examine the working and
relevant provisions of the Act alongwith similar provisions contained
c in the other three Acts, viz., A.P., Orissa, and Pondicherry Acts,
which are almost in pari materia the proviso to s. 10 (2) of the Act.
The only difference between the Act and the other Acts is that where-
as an Explanation is added to the proviso to s. l 0 (2) of the Act, no
such Explanation has been added to the provisions of the other three •
Acts ; hence we have now to consider the combined effect of the Y
proviso taken in conjunction with tbe Explanation.
D
We may, therefore, extract the Explanation again to find out
what it really means and to what extent does it affect the provisions of
the Proviso :
Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section, de-
E fault to pay or tender rent shall be construed as wilful, if the
default by the tenant in the payment or tender of rent con-
tinues after the issue of two months' notice by the landlord
claimin~ the rent;"

If we analyse the various concomitants of the Explanation, the
position seems to be that-
F
(a) there should be a default to pay or tender rent,
(b) the default should continue even after the landlord has
issued two months' notice claiming the arrears of rent,
(c) if, despite notice, the arrears are not paid the tenant is
G said to have committed a wilful default and consequently
liable to be evicted forthwith.
The question is ; do these three conditions whittle down the
effect of the proviso or merely seeks to explain the intendment of a
wilful default? One view which may be possible and which form the ._.
H basis of the argument of the counsel for the tenants is that mere non-
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Faza/ Ali, J.) 671

payment of arrears of rent after issue of two months' notice cannot in A
all circumstances automatically amount to a wilful default if the non-
payment does not fulfil the various ingredients pointed out by us
while defining the term 'Wilful default'. The other view which has
been canvassed before us by the counsel for landlords is that in view
of the Explanation once it is proved that after issue of two months'
B
notice if the tenant does not pay the arrears within the stipulated
period of two months he is liable to be ejected straightaway. Another
view is that such an interpretation would be extremely harsb and
penal in nature because if, after receipt of the notice, the tenant is not
able to pay the arrears due to circumstances beyond his control, of
which the court is satisfied, it will be putting a serious premium or c
handicap on the right of the tenant. In the same token, it was argued
that if such an interpretation is put on the Explanation then the
entire provisions of the Proviso become otiose thus rendering the said
Proviso nugatory.
Another aspect that must be stressed at this stage is that where D
a tenant has committed default after default without any lawful or
reasonable cause and the said defaults contain all the qualities of a
wilful default, viz., deliberate, intentional, calculated and conscious,
should he be given a further chance of locus paenitentiae ? After
hearing counsel for the parties at great length, we feel that although
the question is difficult one yet it is not beyond solution. If we
keep the objects of the proviso and the Explanation separate, there E
would be no difficulty in deciding these cases.

To begin with, s. 13 (2) (i) of the Act lays down that where the
Controller is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the
rent within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the
F
Agreement of tenancy or in the absence of any such Agreement, by
the last date of the month next following that for which the
rent is payable, he (tenant) undoubtedly commits a default. Two
factors mentioned in s. 10 (2) (i) seem to give a clear notice to a
tenant as to the mode of payment as also the last date by which he
is legally supposed to pay the rent. This, however, does not put the G
matter beyond controversy because before passing an order of eviction
under the proviso, it must also be proved that the default was wilful
and if the Controller is of the opinion that the default in the circums-
tances and facts of the case was not wilful, in the sense that it did not
contain any of the qual!ties or attributes of a wilful default as indi-
cated by us above, he may give the tenant a reasonable time, not
exceeding 15 days, to pay the entire rent and if this is complied with, H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R

A
the application for ejectment would stand rejected. The difficulty,
however, is created by the Explanation which says that once a land- f--
lord gives a two months' notice to his tenant for paying the arrears
of rent but the tenant continues in default even thereafter, then he is
liable to be evicted. There is a good deal of force in this argument
B which has its own advantages. In the first place, it protects the court
from going into the intricate question as to what is a wilful default
and whether or not the conditions of a wilful default have been satis-
fied which, if permitted would differ from case to case and court to
court. But the difficulty is that if such a blanket ban is put on the
court for not exemining the question of wilful default once the con-
c ditions laid down in the Explanation are satisfied then it would un-
doubtedly lead to serious injustice to the tenant. A subsidiary conse-
quence of such an interpretation would be that even though the
tenant, after receipt of the notice, may be wanting to pay the arrears
of rent but is unable to do so because of unforseen circumstances
like, death, accident, robbery, etc., which prevent him from paying
D
the arrears, yet under the Explanntion he has to be evicted.

Another view which, in our opinion, is a more acceptable one
and flows from the actual words used by the proviso is that where
the Explanation does not apply in the sense that the landlord bas not
issued two months' notice, it will be for the Court to determine in
each case whether the default is wilful having regard to the tests laid
E down by us and if the Court finds that default is wilful then a decree
for eviction can be passed without any difficulty.

Another difficulty in accepting the first view, viz., if two months
notice is not given, the tenant must not be presumed to be a wilful
defaulter, is that in such a case each landlord would have to maintain
F a separate office so that after every default a two months' notice
should be given and if no notice is given no action can be taken
against a tenant. We are unable to place such an unreasanable res-
triction on the landlord to give two months' notice after every default
which may or may not be possible in every case. A correct interpre-
tation, in our opinion, would be that where-

G
(I) no notice, as required by the Explanation, is given to
the tenant, the Controller or the court can certainly
examine the question whether the default has been wil-
ful and to such a case the Explanation would have no
application,
H
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal Ali, J.) 673
A
(2) where the landlord chooses to issue two months' notice
and the rent is not paid then that would be a conclu-
sive proof of the default being wilful uuless the tenant
proves his incapability of paying the rent due to unavoi-
dable circumstances. B

The &rgument of the counsel for landlords was that even if
a notice under the Explanation is given that does not take away
the jurisdiction of the proviso to determine whether or not the default
has been wilful if it contains the qualities and attributes referred to
above because what the Explanation does is merely to incorporate
c
an instance of a wilful default and is not conclusive on the point and
would have to be construed by the court in conjunction with the con-
ditions mentioned in the proviso. We are, however unable to go to
this extreme extent because that will actually thwart the object of
the Explanation. As we read the Explanation, it does not at all take D
away the mandatory duty cast on the Controller in the proviso to
to decide if a default is wilful or not. Indeed, if the landlord choo-
ses to give two months' notice to his tenant and he does not pay the
rent, then, in the absence of substantial and compelling reasons, the
controller or the court can certainly presume that the default is wilful
E
and order his eviction straightaway. We are unable to accept the view
that whether two months' notice for payment of rent is given or not,
it will always be open to the Controller under the proviso to determine
the question of wilful default because that would render the very
object of Explanation otiose and nugatory. We express our view in
the matter in the following terms :
F
{I) Where no notice is given by the landlord in terms of
the Explanation, the Controller, having regard to the
four conditions spelt out by us has the undoubted dis-
cretion to examine the question as to whether or not
the default committed by the tenant is wilful. If be
feels that any of the conditions mentioned by us is
lacking or thatthe default was due to some unforeseen G
circumstances, he may give the tenant a chance of locus
paenitentiae by giving a reasonable time, which the
statute puts at 15 days, and if within that time the
tenant pays the rent, the application for ejectment
would have to be rejected.
(2) If the landlord chooses Jo give two months'· notice to
the tenant to clear up the dues arid the tenant, does not
H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R·
A
pay the dues within the stipulated time of the notice
then the Controller would have no discretion to decide
the question of wilful default because such a conduct of
the tenant would itself be presumed to be wilful default
unless he shows that he was prevented by sufficient
B cause or circumstances beyond his control in honouring
the notice sent by the landlord.

We would, however, refer to some case law on the question of
wilful default as interpreted by the Madras High Court because there
appear to be three decisions of the Madras High Court taking some-
c what contrary views. In Rajeswari v. Vasumal Lalchand(1) it was held
that non-payment of rent amounted to such supine and callous in-

- ,
""
difference on the part of the tenant as to amount to a wilful default. ~-

However, the learned Judge does not appear to have noticed the
..r
effect of the Explanation to s. I 0 (2) introduced in 1973. This deci- &
sion undoubtedly supports the view that a wilful default is not merely
D
a pure and simple default but a default which is per se deliberate and
· intentional. In N. Ramaswami Reddiar v. S.N. Periamuthu Nadar,(2)
Explanation to the proviso to s. IO (2) of the Act was expressly con-
sidered and Ratnam, J. observed as follows :
)
"A reading of the Explanation indicates that it is not
exhaustive of all cases of wilful default, but it specifies !/:"'"
E ft'
only one instance where the default should be construed
as wilful. If a tenant does not pay the rents at all for a con-
siderable time and the landlord files a petition for an order
of eviction on the basis that the tenant had committed wil-
ful default without issuing any notice, then, in the absence
of any other explanation by the tenant, the default should
F be construed as wilful, in spite of the fact that the landlord
had not chosen to issue a notice to the tenant claiming the "'
rents. In this view, I hold that counsel for the petitioner
cannot be of any assistance to him."

We feel ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken
by the learned Judge on the interpretation of the proviso read with
G the Explanation. In the case of Khivraj Chordia v. G. Manik/al
Bhattad,(') Ramamurti, J. has drawn a very apt and clearcut distiction

(I) AIR 1983 Madras 97.
(2) [1980] Law Weekly (vol. 93) 577.
(3) AIR 1966 Madras 67.
H
s. s. PILLAI v, v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Faza/ Ali, J.) 675

between a simple default and a wilful default and has pointed out A
that in order to be a 'wilful default' it must be proved that the con-
duct of the tenant was such as would lead to the inference that his
omission was a conscious violation of his obligation to pay eht rent.
In this connection, the learned Judge observed thus :
B
"The decisions of this court have reportedly pointed
out that there is a clear difference in law between default
and wilful default and that non-payment of rent within the
time specified by the Act, though would amount to default,
cannot by itself be treated as wilful default, and that if the
rent was paid after the expiry of the time in the following c
month within a short time thereafter, the default cannot be
said to be wilful to warrant the punishment of eviction ...

Keeping in mind the main object of the enactment,
namely, prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants, the
principle that emerges from the several decisions is that for D
default to be regarded as wilful default, the conduct of the
tenant should be such as to lead to the inference that his
omission was a conscious violation of his obligation to pay
the rent or reckless indifference. If the default was due to
accident or inadvertence or erroneous or false sense of
security based upon the conduct of the landlord himself, E
the default cannot be said to be wilful default."

Having, therefore, enunciated the various principles and tests to
be applied by courts in deciding the question of wilful default we now
proceed to decide the various appeals filed before us. The brief facts
of each appeal have already been narrated in the opening part of
F
our judgment and we would like to sum up our conclusions flowing
from the facts found by the High Court in each case.

In civil appeal No. I 178 of 1984, it would appear that though
the tenant had committed a default but he had paid the entire rent
well before the filing of the suit by the landlord. In fact, the suit for
eviction was filed by the landlord not on the ground of pending G
arrears but to penalise the tenant for having defaulted in the past.
Such a suit cannot be entertained because once the entire dues are
paid to the landlord the cause of action for filing of a suit completely
vanishes. Hence, the suit arising o~t of civil appeal l'j'o. 1978 of 1984
must be dismissed as being not maintaintable and the order of
ejectment passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.
tt
A 676. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

Jn civil appeal No. 6211of1983, baving regard to the tests and
the criteria laid down by us there can be no doubt that wilful default
in the payment of arrears to the tune of Rs. 900 has been proved f .•
~
and as there is nothing to show that the arrears were not paid or
withheld due to circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, the
B order of eviction passed by the High Court is confirmed, and the
appeal is allowed.

In civil appeal No. 1992 ~f 1982, a somewhat peculiar position
seems to have arisen. It is true that, to begin with, the tenant did
not pay the rent for the months of June 1977 to January 1978 which
c led the landlord to issue a notice on 16.1.78 demanding payment of
arrears amounting to Rs. 392. The tenant within 15 days of receipt
of the notice (on 30.1.78) sent a detailed reply to the landlord
and enclosed a Bank Draft of Rs. 392 which was, however, not
encashed by the landlord and returned to the tenant after filing of
the eviction petition, for reasons best known to him. Therefore, since
D
the tenant had already complied with the notice within the stipulated
time envisaged by the Explanation to Pr0viso to s. 10 (2) of the Act,
by no stretch of imagmation could he he called guilty of wilful
default. On the other hand, the conduct of the landlord in filing a
suit and not encashing the Bank Draft was motivated with a view to
E get a decree for eviction on false excuse. Such a state of affairs could
not be countenanced by the court. In these circumstances, we are of
the opinion that the arrears having been paid through the Bank
Draft, the question of eviction of the tenant did not arise nor did
the question of default come into the picture merely because the •
landlord wanted to harass him by filing an eviction petition. The
High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in passing the decree of
F ejectment against the tenant. We, therefore, allow the appeal and
set aside the order of the High Court evicting the tenant.

In civil appeal No. 1659 of 1982, as it was clearly a case of
wilful default on the part of the tenant we affirm the order of the ~.
High Court evicting the tenant and dismiss the appeal.
G In civil appeal No. 3668 nf 1981, some dispute arose between
the parties as to whether the rent was to be deposited in Bank, resul-
ting in the filing of the present suit for eviction on 1.4.80 in the court
of the Rent Controller by the landlord after verifying from the Bank
that the tenant had not deposited the rent for the months of January
and February 1980. This default, in our opinion, was undoubtedly ~
deliberate, conscious and without any reasonable or rational basi&
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTABIRAMAN (Fazal, Ali J.) 677

and the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the tenant A
was guilty of wilful default and passing a decree for ejectments. As
no notice was given by the landlord, Explanation to Proviso to s. 10
(2) of the Act does not apply at all. The appeal is accordingly
dismissed.
B
In civil appeal No. 2246 of 1982, the respondent-landladies
had let out the premises to the tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 105.
A petition for eviction was filed by them on 2.1I.76 for non-payment
of rent by the tenant from January 1976 to September 1976, a period
of 9 months. But, we might state here that before filing the eviction
petition, the respondents had issued a notice on 6.7.76 asking the
c
tenant to pay the dues, which the tenant paid on 17 7.76, i.e., within
10 days of the receipt of the notice, which was accepted by the
landladies without any prejudice. The Rent Controller held that the
default was not wilful as in pursuance of the notice the payment had

.•
_,
already been made. The Appellate Authority reversed the finding of
the Rent Controller and held that the default was wilful. The High
Court in revision upheld the order of eviction on the ground that
D

there was no satisfactory explanation for non-payment of rent for the
period January to June 1976. In coming to this finding, the High
Court was clearly in error because the tenant had already deposited
the entire dues including the rent from January to June, on 17.7.76. E
Thus, the question of wilful default could not arise nor could it be
• said that the default was either conscious or deliberate or inter-
national. Moreover, in view of the Explanation since the tenant had
paid the amount within the time of the notice, there could be no
question of wilful default. This fact seems to have been completely
overlooked by the Gigh Court. We, therefore, allow the appeal and F
set aside the order of the High Court directing eviction of the tenant.
In civil appeal No. 4012 of 1982, the tenant occupied the pre-
mises at a monthly rent of Rs. 325. It appears that the tenant defaul-
ted in payment of tent from June 1976 onwards and after repeated
demands, only a sum of Rs. 1000 was paid by him on 1.4 77, leaving G
a substantial balance of arrears unpaid. The plea of the tenant that
be had made payments to the Income Tax Department has not been
proved, nor did the tenant have any right under the contract to pay
any amount to the Income Tax Department and if he did so on his
own, he must be held responsible for his conduct. Even so, the land-
lord contended that right from February 1977 to July 1978, the
appellant was in arrears without any lawful cause. This was, there-
fore, a clear case of wi!fol default where the tenant did not pay the
ff
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 2 S.C.R.O
A
rent deliberately, consciously and intentionally. In these circumstan-
ces, the High Court was fully justified in holding that the default
was wilful and affirming the decree passed by the Appellate court.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

The result is that all the appeals are disposed of as indicated
II
above but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs in
any of the appeals. Civil Appeal No. 5769 of 1983 already stands
disposed of in terms of our Order of September 12,1984.

SABYASACHI MuKHARJI, J. With great respect to my learned
c brothers, I regret I am unable to agree on the construction put on
the expression 'wilful default' in the Explanation to the Proviso of
sub-section (2) of section 10 of The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1960. It may be borne in mind that The Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter
called the 'Act' was an Act to amend and consolidate the law relating
D to the regulation of letting of residential and non-residential buildings
and the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of
unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil
Nadu. The Act was from time to time amended and was last amen-
ded by Act I of 1980. By Act 23 of 1973, an Explanation was added
to the Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act.
E Section 10 of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants. In •
order to appreciate the scheme of the section and the meaning of
the expression 'wilful' introduced by the Explanation to the
Proviso of sub-section (2) of section 10, we have to examine the
provisions of section 10 and the various sub-sections of the section.
As mentioned herein before section 10 deals with the eviction of
F tenants and postulates that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in
execution of a decree or otherwise except in acc0rdance with the
provisions of section 10 or sections 14 to 16. For these apprnls we
are not concerned with the provisions of sections 14 to 16. .->,

The first Proviso to sub-section (I) of section 10 stipulates that
G the said sections 14 to 16 would not apply to a tenant whose land-
lord is the Government. The second Proviso also provides that if
the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of perma-
nent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim
is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord
shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and j.j,
the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the ~rounds
s. s. PILLAI v. v. R. PATTAB!RAMAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 679
A
mentioned in the said sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds
that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the
claim is unfounded. Sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act deals
with the procedure which a landlord must follow in order to evict
his tenant. It provides that a landlord should apply to the
Controller for a direction for eviction if he wants it and, if the
Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of show- B
ing cause against the application, is satisfied with any of the various
conditions which are stipulated in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
and (vii) then he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not
satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application. The
Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 10 is as follows: c
"Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if the
Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or
tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding any-
•• thing contained in section 11, give the tenant a reasonable
time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent D
due by him to the landlord up to the date of such.payment
or tender and on such payment or tender, the application
shall be rejected."

The Explanation which was added by Act 23 of 1973 to the
said Proviso stipulates that for the purpose of this sub-section, default
to pay or tender rent shall be construed as wilful, if the default by E
• the tenant in the payment or tender of rent continues after the issue
of two months' notice by the landlord claiming the rent. It is this
Explanation that falls for consideration in these appeals. Clause (i)
of sub-section (2) of section IO of the Act requires the Controller to
be satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered rent due by him
in respect of the buiJ ding within fifteen days after the expiry of the
F
time fixed in the agreement of the tenancy with his landlord or in the
absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next
following that for which the rent is payable. For the purpose of
these appeals, it is not necessary to consider the grounds of eviction
mentioned in other clauses of sub-section (2) of section IO of the
G
Act. If the Controller is satisfied of any of the grounds mentioned
in clause (i) to clause (vii) of sub-section (2) of section 10, then the
shall, so the section stipulates, make an order directing the tenant to
put the landlord in possessioo of the building and if he is not so
satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application ; the Proviso
prvides that in any case falling under clause (i) which we have noted
H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R.

herein before, if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to
pay or tender rent was not wilful, he may, notwithstanding anything
contained in section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time, not
exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to
the landlord upto the date such payment or tender and on such
payment or tender, the application shall be rejected. The Explana-
tion which is the subject matter of interpretation before us and which
was added, as noted before, by Act 23 of 1973 by section JO, J
stipulates that for the purpose of the said sub-section, namely sub- '•
section (2) of section 10, default to pay or tender rent shall be const- '
rued as wilful, if the default by the tenant in the payment or tender
c of rent continues after the issue of two months' notice by the
landlord claiming the rent. The question, therefore, is-can the
default be construed as wilful under any other circumstances apart
from default continuing after the issue of two months' notice by the
landlord claiming the rent ? In other words, for the purpose of this
section, wiU the wilful default be only when notice has been given by
D
the landlord and two months have expired and the tenant has not
paid the rent ? My learned brethren say that there may be other
--·
circumstances constituting wilful default. With respect, I differ. I
will briefly note the reasons.

As I read the provision, it appears to.me that there must be
satisfaction of the Controller whether default was wilful and a default
will be construed as wilful, in my opinion, only where the landlord
has given notice and two months have expired without payment of
such rent. Default has been construed in various ways depending
npon the context. 'Default' would seem to embrace every failureto
perform part of one's contract or bargain. It is a purely relative
term like negligence. (See in this ccnnection Stroud's Judicial.
F Dictionary Vol. I, Third Edition, page 757). It means nothing more,
nothing less, than not doing what is reasonable under the circum-
stances ; not doing something which yon ought to do, having regard
to the transaction. Similarly, default in payment imports some·
thing wrongful, the omission to do some act which, as between the
parties, ought to have been done by one of them. It simply means
non-payment, failure or omission to pay. (See Prem's Judicial
G Dictionary, Vol. I, 1964 page 483). Earl Jowitt defines 'default' as
omission of that which a man ought to do. (See The Dictionary of
English Law. page 597).

'. The Privy Council in the case of Fakir Chander Dutt and Others
"H
S.S. PILLAI v. V. R. PATrABIR,Vf'.N (S. M"kha,ji, J.) 681

v. Ram Kumar Chatteiji(') observed that 'Default' did not necessarily A
mean breach of contractual obligation, but simply non-payment of
rent by a person capable of protecting his tenure by doing so.

Default happens in payment of rents under various contingen-
cies and situations. Default is a fact which can be proved by
B
evidence. Whether the default is wilful or not is also a question of
fact to be proved from evidence, direct and circumstantial, drawing
inferences from certain conduct. If the Courts are free to decide
from varying circumstances ·whether default was wilful or not,
then divergence of conclusions are likely to arise, one judicial autho-
rity coming to the conclusion from certain circumstances that the
default was wilful, another judicial authority coming to a contrary C
conclusion from more or less ·same circumstances. That creates
anomalies. In order to obviate such anomalies and bring about a

... uniform standard, the explanation as I read, explains the expression
'wilful' and according to the Explanation added, a default to pay or
ten~er rent "shall be construed", as wilful if the default by the tenant
in the payment of rent continues after issue of two months' notice
D
by the landlord claiming the rent If that is the position, in a case
where the landlord has given nollce to the tenant claiming the
rent and the tenant has not paid the same for two months, then
the same must be construed as wilful default, whatever may
be the cause for non-payment,-bereavement on the date of
payment in the family of near or dear ones or serious heart E
attack or other ailment of the tenant or of any person sent by the
tenant to pay the rent cannot be excused and cannot be considered to
be not wilful because the legislature has chosen to use the expression
"shall be construed as wilful" if after a notice by the landlord for
two months, failure to pay or tender rent on the part of the tenant
continues, and if it is wilful then under sub-section (2) clause (i) read
F
with the proviso as explained by the Explanation, the Controller must
be satisfied and give an order for eviction. The question is whether in
other cases, that is to say, in cases where admittedly or by other facts or
aliunde the Court comes to the conclusion that the default is wilful,
for instance, in a case where there is chronic default, regular defaults
or habitual defaults, the two months' notice is necessary or not. It
was the argument on behalf of the respondents that in those circum- G
. stances such notice was not necessary and this is the view which has
found acceptance by my learned Brethren: I am unable to agree,

(I) Indian Appeals, Vol. xxxr, p. 195.
H
682 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [ 1985] 2 s.c.R..
A
with respect. If in c1~es where there are genuine and bona fide
reasons for failure or non-payment of rent which cannot be excused
after two months' notice to pay rent, then other causes which lead
to inference of wilful default cannot also be construed as 'wilful
default' in the context of the Explanation. The legislature has
B provided an absolute and clear definition of 'wilful default'. Other
circumstances cannot be considered as wilful default.

[n my opinion, the expression "shall be construed" would
have the effect of providing a definition of wilful default in the
c proviso to sub-section (2) of section 10.

If a definition is provided of an expression, then the Courts are
not free to construe the expression otherwise unless it is so warranted
by the use of the expression such as "except otherwise provided or
except if the context otherwise indicates". There is no such expression
D in the instant case. There may be in certain circumstances intrinsic
evidence indicating otherwise. Here there is none.

The whole scheme of section 10 is that in order to be entitled
to eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, the ingredients of which
the Controller must be satisfied are ; (a) default; (b) default was
wilful. Whether in a particular case default is wilful or not, must be
E
considered in accordance with the definition provided in the Explana-
tion to Proviso to sub-section (2) of section I 0 of the Act. If it was
intended that the Courts would be free to judge whether in a particu-
lar set up of facts, the default was wilful or not where no notice has
been given, then in such a case there was no necessity of adding this
Explanation to the Proviso which is a step to the making of the
F findings under clause (I of sub-section (2) of section 10 ofthe Act.
It is well-settled that the Legislature does not act without purpose or
in futility.

It was contended on behalf of the landlords that the Legislature
has not used the expression default to pay or tender rent shall be
construed as wilful only if the defauit by the tenant in the payment
G or tender of rent continues after the issue of two months' notice by the
landlord claiming the rent. It is true that legislature has not chosen
to use language to indicate that in no other cases, the default could
be considered to be wilful except one case which has been indicated
in the Explanation.
,H
s. s. PILLAI v. V, R. PATfABIR~\IA'I cs. Mu'cha,ji, J.) 683
As I read the E~plan1tion it is not 30 necessary because Legis- A
lature has defined 'wilful default' by the expression that 'default to
pay or tender rent shall be construed' meaning thereby that it will
mean only this and no other. My learned brethren have given
instances of difficulties and hardships, if the other defaults, that is
to say, default apart from tenant not paying after the expiry
of notice by the landlord are not considered as wilful default. B
ft is true that there may be hardships and many problems
might arise. I share the apprehension of these problems and hard-
ships but I find no justification to read that these hardships of which
Legislature must have been aware, were also intended to be covered
by the Explanation. It appears to me that the meaning is clear about
the purpose of introduction of the Explanation, i.e., to obviate the c
difficulties and divergence of judicial opinions depending upon vary-
ing circumstances, the legislature has provided a uniform definition
to the concept of 'wilful default'. It is true that where two construc-
tions are possible, one which avoids anomalies and creates reasonable
results should be preferred but where the language is clear and where
there is a purpose that can be understood and appreciated for
construing in one particular manner, that is to say, avoidance of D
divergence of judicial opinions in construing wilful default and
thereby avoiding anomalies for different tenants, one judge taking a
particular view on the same set of facts, another judge taking a
different view on the same set of facts, in my opinion, it would not
be proper in such a situation to say that this definition of wilful
default was only illustrative and not exhaustive. I cannot construe
the expression used in the Explanation to the Proviso to sub-section
(2) of section 10 as illustrative when the Legislature has chosen to
use the expression "shall be construed".
It has been observed that statutory provisions must be so
construed, if it is possible, that absurdity and mischief may be
avoided. Where the plain and literal interpretation of a statutory
provision provisio produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result, F
the Court might modify the language used by the legislature or even
do some violence to it so as to achieve the obvious intention of the
legislature and produce rational construction and just results. (See v.
in this connection the observations in the case of Bhag Mal Vs.
G
Ch. Prabhu Ram and Others (Civil Appeal No. :451 (NCE) of 1984).
Lord Denning in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher(')
has observed :
"If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this

1. [1949] 2 All E.R. 155 a 164 (CA).
H
684 si:JPREME COURT REPORTS [19851 2 s.c.R..
A
ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened i
out ? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must
.•
not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases."

B
Ironing out the creases is possible but not re-writing the langu-
age to serve a notion of public policy held by the judges. Legislature .i
must have legislated for a purpose by Act 23 of 1973 and used the {'
expression "shall be construed" in Explanation in the manner it did.

c
The fact that in interpreting the statntory language, judges
should avoid policy as an approach was emphasised by Lord Scarman
in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Regina v.
Barnet London Borough Council Exparte Ni/ish Shah.(') User of policy
in interpretation of statutory language, Lord Scarman observed, was
D
an impermissible approach to the i.nterpretation of statutory language.
Judges should not interpret statutes in the light of their own views
as to policy. They may, of course, adopt a purposive interpretation
if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which
they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an
expression of Parliament's purpose or policy.

E
In the case of Carrington and Others v. Therm-a-Stor-Ltd,(') the
Master of the Rolls observed that "If regard is had solely to the
apparent mischief and the need for a remedy, it is only too easy for a
judge to persuade himself that Parliament must have intended to
provide the remedy which he would himself have decreed if he bad
F legislative power. In fact Parliament may not have taken the same
view of what is a mischief, may have decided as a matter of policy
not to legislate for a legal remedy or may simply have failed to
realise that the situation could ever arise. This is not to say that
statutes are to be construed in blinkers or with narrow and legalistic
literalness, but only that effect should given to the intentions of
Parliament as expressed in the statute, applying the normal canons of
G construction for resolving ambiguities or any lack or clarity."

I. 1983 (2) Weekly Law Reports, 16 at 30.
2. 1983 (I) Weekly Law Reports 138 at 14l.
s. s. PILLAI V, v. R. PATTABIRAMAN cs. Mukharji J.) 685
'A
Tn the aforesaid view of the matter, I would construe the
• ->, expression 'wilful defavlt' in the Explanation to Proviso to sub-
"" section (2) of section IO of the Act in the manner I have indicated.
In that view of the matter, I would decide the appeals accordingly,
that is to say, I would agree with my learned brethren in the order
passed in those cases where eviction orders have been passed after B
two months' notice had been given and there was continuance of
default by the tenant thereof. Appeals which have been disposed of
on the basis of wilful default as understood in the m1nner indicated
in the aforesaid observations of mine, l respectfully agree. Appeals
which have been disposed of on wilful default other than in the
manner l have indicated hereinbefore, I respectfully differ. The
individual appeals are diiposed of accordingly. There will be no order
as to costs.
c

M.L.A. Appeals dfrmissed.