Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary findings but set aside the life‑time ban for being disproportionate and ordered the BCCI Disciplinary Committee to reconsider the sanction in accordance with the Anti‑Corruption Code.

Summary

S. Sreesanth, a registered cricketer, was alleged to have participated in spot‑fixing during an IPL match on 9 May 2013, accepting Rs 10 lakh to concede 14 runs in an over. A one‑man BCCI commission prepared a preliminary report based on video and telephone recordings, and after Sreesanth’s release from police custody, a supplementary report was filed. The BCCI Disciplinary Committee, after a show‑cause notice, found him guilty of multiple offences under the Anti‑Corruption Code and imposed a life ban. Sreesanth challenged the ban on grounds of violation of natural justice, improper burden of proof, and improper constitution of the committee. The Supreme Court held that the transcripts were available to him, the procedural safeguards of natural justice were met, the burden of proof correctly shifted after the show‑cause notice, and the committee was properly constituted; however, the life ban was excessive as the Code required consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. The Court set aside the life‑ban portion of the order and remitted the matter to the BCCI Disciplinary Committee to determine an appropriate sanction.

Issues considered

Whether the BCCI Disciplinary Committee violated principles of natural justice by not providing the telephone transcripts to the appellant or confronting him with them.
Whether the disciplinary committee was justified in finding sufficient material to hold the appellant guilty of offences under the Anti‑Corruption Code.
Whether the burden of proof was wrongly placed on the appellant contrary to Article 3.1 of the Anti‑Corruption Code.
Whether the discharge order in the criminal case affects the disciplinary proceedings under the Anti‑Corruption Code.
Whether the composition of the Disciplinary Committee was vitiated by the inclusion of Shri Srinivasan as President after his resignation.
Whether the life‑time ban imposed under Article 6 of the Anti‑Corruption Code complied with the requirement to consider aggravating and mitigating factors.
Whether the High Court’s appellate review overstepped the scope of judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Societies Registration Act, 1860

Subjects

spot fixingnatural justiceburden of proofanti‑corruption codedisciplinary committeelife banBCCIsentencingaggravating factorsmitigating factorscriminal vs disciplinary standard of proof

Judgment

[2019] 4 S.C.R. 765 765

S. SREESANTH A
v.
THE BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2424 of 2019)
MARCH 15, 2019 B
[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Cricket: Spot fixing – Ban for life – Plea of violation of rules
of natural justice – In the instant case, appellant was registered
player and participated in IPL match – Allegation against the
C
appellant was that in the match played on 09.05.2013 between
Rajasthan Royals and Kings XI Punjab at Mohali, in exchange of
Rs.10 lakh, he agreed to concede 14 or more runs in the second
over of bowling spell – One-man Commission which was
constituted by BCCI on direction of Supreme Court submitted a
Preliminary report – The report relied on the video clipping and D
recordings of telephone conversation and opined that there was
sufficient evidence against the appellant to prove him guilty of
various Articles of Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI – The report also
stated that the Commissioner had no access to the appellant as he
was in police custody – After the appellant was released from
E
police custody, he appeared before the Commissioner and gave his
statement – Thereafter the Commissioner submitted Supplementary
report accusing the appellant of offences under the
Anti-Corruption Code – Disciplinary Committee heard the
appellant and communicated its decision of banning him from
playing or representing for life – Appellant raised plea that F
principles of natural justice was violated as the transcripts of
telephone conversation relied by the Disciplinary Committee of the
BCCI was not provided to him and further he was not confronted
with transcript of the telephone conversation relied on by it –
Held: The transcripts of telephone conversations were received by
G
the appellant from the Police much before issuance of the
show-cause notice by the Disciplinary Committee – The submission
of Preliminary Report without taking statement of the appellant
was in the circumstances that the appellant was in the Police
custody and under the order of Supreme Court, the Commissioner
H
765
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A had to submit report within 15 days – When the appellant was
released from the custody, his statement was duly taken and after
considering his statement further Supplementary Report was
submitted – In the show-cause notice with respect to the material
relied by the Disciplinary Committee, the appellant was given full
opportunity to have his say – Thus, there was no violation of
B
principles of natural justice by the Disciplinary Committee –
Doctrines/Principles – Natural Justice.
Cricket: BCCI – Anti-Corruption Code – Allegation of
betting, bringing disrepute to the game and failure to disclose to
the ACU BCCI full details of any approaches and invitations to
C engage in conduct that amounted to breach of the Code – Whether
Disciplinary Authority was right in holding that there were
sufficient materials to hold the appellant guilty of offences of
corruption under various articles of Anti-corruption Code – Held:
There being specific allegations made against the appellant in the
D show-cause notice, it was incumbent on the appellant to have
explained the evidence and circumstances which were sought to be
relied against the appellant – In the disciplinary proceedings a
delinquent has to explain circumstances and evidence relied against
him – It is true that the charges have to be proved by the BCCI for
taking any action under the Anti-Corruption Code – The
E Disciplinary Committee of the BCCI had jurisdiction to form its own
opinion after considering the evidence on record including the
telephonic conversation and other evidence on the record – The
conclusion drawn by the Disciplinary Committee on the basis of the
material cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity which
F may warrant judicial review by the constitutional courts – Judicial
Review.
Cricket: BCCI – Anti-Corruption Code – Article 3.1 – Whether
the Disciplinary Committee has rightly placed burden of proof on
the appellant whereas according to Anti-Corruption Code under
G Article 3.1, the burden of proof was on the designated
Anti-Corruption Official and whether by wrongly placing the
burden of proof the Disciplinary Committee has erred in recording
its conclusion – Held: Article 3.1 deals with burden of proof and
standard of proof – The initial burden of proof is on the Designated
Anti-Corruption Official i.e. Disciplinary Committee which has to
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form its opinion about the commission of designated offences by A
the delinquent – Before taking the decision when show-cause
notice is served on the appellant making allegations and referring
to relevant materials in support of the said allegation, it was
incumbent on the appellant to have satisfactorily explained each
and every circumstances or evidence referred to and relied – When
B
the explanation submitted by the appellant was not found
satisfactory, he having not been able to satisfactorily explain the
allegations which were noticed from the telephone conversation
between the appellant and the bookie, it cannot be said that the
burden of proof was wrongly placed on the appellant – Initial
burden as referred to in Article 3.1 stood discharged when the C
allegation referring to materials and evidence are communicated to
delinquent – Standard of proof as referred to in Article 3.1 is that
the BCCI Disciplinary Committee is to be comfortably satisfied,
bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation that is being made,
that the alleged offence has been committed – Of course, on mere
D
doubt the Disciplinary Committee cannot hold offences proved, there
has to be a positive evidence and finding regarding the proof of
offences – The burden of proof was not wrongly placed on the
appellant.
Cricket: BCCI – Anti-Corruption Code – Burden of proof,
standard – The standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry and in a E
trial of a criminal case are entirely different – In a criminal case it
is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt whereas
in disciplinary inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI the
preponderance of probability is to serve the purpose.
Cricket: BCCI – Anti-Corruption Code – Criminal case – F
Discharge of appellant from the criminal case – Whether the
discharge order has any effect on the disciplinary proceeding of
BCCI under Anti-Corruption Code – Held: There is a vast
distinction in the scope of inquiry between a criminal trial on one
hand and disciplinary inquiry against a public servant or G
disciplinary inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI on other
hand – The question before the Sessions Court was whether the
appellant was guilty of offences under the criminal statutes –
Sessions Court had not to deal with the question whether the
appellant was guilty of violating Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI –
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768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A The clauses which the appellant breached under the
Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI were entirely different from the
offences under which the appellant had been charged before the
Sessions Court – The ingredients required to establish a breach of
the BCCI Code are also distinct and separate from the ingredients
required to prove offences under the penal statutes – The
B
conclusions and observations as recorded in the disciplinary
proceedings under Anti-Corruption Code were entirely different from
proof of criminal charges which are on higher yardstick to prove –
Thus, the discharge order had no effect on the disciplinary
proceeding of BCCI under Anti-Corruption Code.
C Cricket: BCCI – Anti-Corruption Code – Imposition of
maximum sanction of life time ban by Disciplinary Committee on
charges under Article 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 of the Anti-Corruption Code –
Propriety of – Held: Sanction under Article 6 of Anti-Corruption
Code of BCCI is nothing but punishment on commission of the
D offences and akin to sentencing in criminal jurisprudence – The
principles of sentencing as applicable in offence under the Indian
Penal Code may not be strictly applicable to one of punishment/
sanction under the Anti-Corruption Code but principles of sentencing
as applicable in the criminal jurisprudence may be relevant for
imposing sanction under the Anti-Corruption Code – In cases where
E offences under Article 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 are proved, the
Disciplinary Committee is not obliged to award a life time ban in all
cases where such offences are proved – When range of ineligibility
which is minimum five years, maximum life time ban is provided for,
the discretion to which, either minimum or maximum or in between
F has to be exercised on relevant facts and circumstances – No doubt,
Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI envisages zero tolerance to
corruption – However, zero tolerance approach cannot dilute
consideration of relevant factors while imposing sanction under
Article 6 – Disciplinary Committee’s order did not advert to the
aggravating and mitigating factors as enumerated in Articles 6.1.1
G and 6.1.2 – Without considering the relevant provisions of
Anti-Corruption Code, the Disciplinary Committee imposed a life
time ban on the appellant which sanction was not in accordance
with the Anti-Corruption Code itself – Sentence/Sentencing.

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Disciplinary Committee: Constitution of – Propriety chal- A
lenged – Whether the constitution of Disciplinary Committee was
vitiated by including Shri Srinivasan as President who had already
stepped down on 02.06.2013 resulting in vitiation of entire
proceedings – Held: There was no legal impediment in Shri
Srinivasan participating in the Disciplinary Committee in the
B
meeting of 13.09.2013 as President – The appellant having not taken
this ground even in the grounds of appeal is not allowed to
question the constitution of Disciplinary Committee at this stage.
Administrative Law: Disciplinary proceedings – Judicial
review, scope of interference – Constitutional court in exercise of
jurisdiction of judicial review of disciplinary proceedings conducted C
under the Code of Conduct framed by the BCCI to interfere only
when conclusions of the Disciplinary Committee are perverse or
based on no evidence – On appreciation of evidence, it is not open
for the High Court or Supreme Court to substitute its own opinion
based on the appreciation of material on record on the charges D
proved – Cricket.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The present is not a case where telephone con-
versations have been referred without they not being available
to the appellant. The transcripts of telephone conversations were E
received by the appellant from the Police much before issuance
of the show-cause notice issued by the disciplinary committee.
The appellant in his reply has not made any complaint of non-
receipt of transcripts. When the appellant was released from
the custody, his statement was taken and after considering his F
statement further Supplementary Report was submitted. There
was no violation of principles of natural justice by the disciplinary
committee of the BCCI. [Paras 23, 25] [788-E-F; 789-B-C]
2.1 The disciplinary inquiry conducted by disciplinary
committee of BCCI is akin to disciplinary inquiry conducted G
against a public servant. There being specific allegations made
against the appellant in the show-cause notice, it was incumbent
on the appellant to have explained the evidence and
circumstances which were sought to be relied against the
appellant. In the disciplinary proceedings a delinquent has to
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770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A explain circumstances and evidence relied against him. It is true
that the charges have to be proved by the BCCI for taking any
action under the Anti-Corruption Code. The disciplinary
committee of the BCCI had jurisdiction to form its own opinion
after considering the evidence on record including the telephone
conversation and other evidence on the record. The conclusion
B
drawn by the disciplinary committee on the basis of the material
cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity which may warrant
judicial review by the constitutional courts. Constitutional court
in exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review of disciplinary
proceedings conducted under the Code of Conduct framed by
C the BCCI will interfere only when conclusions of the disciplinary
committee are perverse or based on no evidence. It is not open
for the High Court or this Court to substitute its own opinion
based on the appreciation of material on record on the charges
proved. For the decision of the disciplinary committee holding
charges under Articles 2.1.1., 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.2.3 and Article
D
2.4.1. and 2.4.2 proved, there are no grounds for this Court to
take a different view. [Paras 30, 34, 35][790-F-G; [794-G-H;
795-A-B, D-E]
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975)
2 SCC 557 : [1976] 1 SCR 521; Union of India and
E Others v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610; Central
Industrial Security Force and Others v. Abrar Ali
(2017) 4 SCC 507 – relied on.
3. Article 3.1 deals with burden of proof and standard of
proof. The initial burden of proof shall be on the Designated Anti-
F Corruption Official i.e. disciplinary committee which has to form
its opinion about the commission of Designated Offences by the
delinquent. Before taking the decision when show-cause notice
is served on the appellant making allegations and referring to
relevant materials in support of the said allegation, it was
G incumbent on the appellant to have satisfactorily explained each
and every circumstances or evidence referred to and relied. When
the explanation submitted by the appellant was not found
satisfactory, he having not been able to satisfactorily explain the
allegations which were noticed from the telephone conversation
between the appellant and the bookie, it cannot be said that the
H
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 771
INDIA & ORS.

burden of proof has wrongly been placed on the appellant. Initial A
burden as referred to in Article 3.1 shall stand discharged when
the allegation referring to materials and evidence are
communicated to delinquent. The burden of proof was not
wrongly placed on the appellant. [Para 37] [796-B-F]
4.1 There is a vast distinction in the scope of inquiry B
between a criminal trial on one hand and disciplinary inquiry
against a public servant or disciplinary inquiry under Anti-
Corruption Code of BCCI on other hand. The ingredients
required to establish a breach of the BCCI Code are also distinct
and separate from the ingredients required to prove offences
under the penal statutes in question. The standard of proof in a C
disciplinary inquiry and in a trial of a criminal case are entirely
different. In a criminal case it is essential to prove a charge beyond
all reasonable doubt wherein in departmental inquiry
preponderance of probability is to serve the purpose.[Paras 38,
39] [796-G; 797-B-C] D
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh,
(2006) 4 SCC 265 : [2006] 3 SCR 872 – relied on.
4.2 The conclusions and observations as recorded in the
disciplinary proceedings under Anti-Corruption Code are entirely
different from proof of criminal charges which are on higher E
yardstick to prove. It is a well settled principle that criminal
charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt which is not
applicable in disciplinary proceedings initiated by the disciplinary
committee of the BCCI. [Para 40] [797-F-G]
5. There was no legal impediment in Shri Srinivasan F
participating in the disciplinary committee in the meeting of
13.09.2013 as President. The appellant having not taken this
ground even in the grounds of this appeal, he cannot be allowed
to question the constitution of disciplinary committee at this stage.
[Para 41] [798-D-E] G
6.1 The Anti-Corruption Code uses the word “offences”
and offences are enumerated under the Code for which sanction
is provided in Article 6. Sanction under Article 6 is nothing but
punishment on commission of the offences and akin to sentencing
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772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A in the criminal jurisprudence. The principles of sentencing as
applicable in offence under Indian Penal Code may not be strictly
applicable to one of punishment/sanction under the
Anti-Corruption Code but principles of sentencing as applicable
in the criminal jurisprudence may be relevant for imposing
sanction in Anti-Corruption Code. In the Criminal Procedure
B
Code, 1973, there are no structured sentencing guidelines. In
March, 2003, the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice
System (the Malimath Committee), a body established by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, issued a report that emphasized the
need to introduce sentencing guidelines in order to minimise
C uncertainty in awarding sentences. The Indian Penal Code
prescribe offences and punishments for the same. For many
offences only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some
offences the minimum punishment is also prescribed. Various
jurists and writers have tried to enumerate circumstances which
may mitigate the gravity of offences. [Para 43] [801-F-H;
D
802-A-B]
Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC
20 : [1973] 2 SCR 541; Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 – followed.
E 6.2 A zero tolerance towards any wrong-doing alone can
satisfy the cry of clinching the Cricket. Anti-Corruption Code of
BCCI clearly envisaged zero tolerance to corruption. What was
meant by the zero tolerance is that any offence committed within
the meaning of Anti-Corruption Code cannot be ignored or to be
leniently dealt with. Zero tolerance emphasis taking cognizance
F of such offences and awarding suitable punishment. However,
zero tolerance approach cannot dilute consideration of relevant
factors while imposing sanction under Article 6. [Para 52]
[807-B-D]
6.3 Article 6 itself enumerates aggravating and mitigating
G circumstances. Article 6 contains a heading ‘Sanctions’. Para 6.1
provides that in order to determine the appropriate sanction that
is to be imposed in each case, the disciplinary committee must
first determine the relative seriousness of the offence, including
identifying all relevant factors that it deems to. Further, Article
6.1.2 enumerates the mitigating circumstances. The Anti-
H Corruption Code which has articles containing mitigating and
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 773
INDIA & ORS.

aggravating circumstances are necessarily to be taken into A
consideration while imposing punishment/sanction under
Article 6. [Paras 54, 55, 56] [808-C-D; 809-C; 810-C]
Shailesh Jasvantbhai and Another v. State of Gujarat
and Others (2006) 2 SCC 359 : [2006] 1 SCR 477 ;
Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 7 SCC 545 B
: [2013] 4 SCR 104 ; Mukesh and Another v. State
(NCT of Delhi) and Others (2017) 6 SCC 1 : [2017] 6
SCR 1 – relied on.
7.1 In the instant case, life ban was imposed on the appellant
on offences under Article 2.1.1., 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.14 (corruption), C
for which as per second column a minimum of five years and
maximum of life time ineligibility is provided for. Life ban cannot
be imposed in all cases where such offences are proved. When
range of ineligibility which is minimum five years, maximum life
ban is provided for, the discretion to choose either minimum or
maximum or in between has to be exercised on relevant factors D
and circumstances. [Para 57] [811-A-B]
7.2 The disciplinary committee’s order dated 13.09.2013
did not advert to the aggravating and mitigating factors as
enumerated in Article 6.1.1. and 6.1.2. Without considering the
relevant provisions of Anti-Corruption Code the disciplinary E
committee has imposed life time ban which sanction cannot be
held to be in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Code itself.
The disciplinary committee of the BCCI is empowered to impose
appropriate sanction in terms of Article 6 of the Code upon
consideration of relevant factors, without considering the relevant F
factors imposition of maximum punishment cannot be sustained.
Apart from these factors, the subsequent conduct of the appellant
also shows obedience to BCCI. Initially when the life time ban
was imposed on 13.09.2013, appellant has not even challenged
the said order, it was only after the appellant was discharged from
the criminal case on 25.07.2015 and when the appellant got G
opportunity to play and participate in the Scotland Premier League
on e-mail was sent through Kerala Cricket Association on
11.01.2017. It was only thereafter when No Objection Certificate
was not granted to the appellant and the BCCI refused to modify
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774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A the ban, writ petition was filed in the Kerala High Court. In so far
as charges proved under Article 2.2.3, 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, the
maximum sanction is of 5 years, the award of punishment of five
years shall also satisfy the requirement under Code, which need
no separate consideration for the purposes of this case. As per
Article 6.3.2 all sanction imposed on appellant shall run
B
concurrently. As on date the period of 5 years sanction has come
to an end. The order dated 13.09.2013 of the disciplinary
committee only to the extent of imposing sanction of life time
ban is set aside. The disciplinary committee of the BCCI may
reconsider the quantum of punishment/sanction which may be
C imposed on the appellant as per Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption
Code. The appellant may be given one opportunity to have his
say on the question of quantum of punishment/sanction. The
disciplinary committee may take decision on the quantum of
punishment/sanction at an early date. Appellant shall await the
decision of the disciplinary committee and future course of action
D
shall be in accordance with the decision of the disciplinary
committee so taken. [Paras 58, 59, 61] [811-C-H; 812-A;
813-G-H; 814-A-B]
Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket
Association of Bihar and Others (2015) 3 SCC 251 :
E [2015] 1 SCR 165 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2015] 1 SCR 165 relied on Para 3
[1976] 1 SCR 521 relied on Para 30
F
(2015) 2 SCC 610 relied on Para 32
(2017) 4 SCC 507 relied on Para 33
[2006] 3 SCR 872 relied on Para 39
[1973] 2 SCR 541 followed Para 43
G
(1980) 2 SCC 684 followed Para 44
[2006] 1 SCR 477 relied on Para 47
[2013] 4 SCR 104 relied on Para 48
[2017] 6 SCR 1 relied on Para 49
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S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 775
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2424 A
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2017 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in W.A. No. 1909 of 2017
Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv., Krishnamohan K. Menon,
Vikramaditya Singh, Zafar Khurshid, Ms. Dania Nayyar, Ms. Parul B
Sachdeva, Ms. Alisha Pande, Advs. for the Appellant.
Tushar Mehta, SG, Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Gauri Rasgotra,
Vikash Kumar Jha, Ms. Gathi Hari Prakash, Ms. Nikitha Shenoy, Rishabh
Kapur (for M/s Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas), Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh,
Ms. Alka Aggarwal, Raj Bahadur, Advs. for the Respondents. C

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. The sports occupy a prominent place
in life of a man/woman and also in the life of a nation. It not only gives
physical or moral strength to a personality but spread the message of D
goodwill and friendship. In the 21st Century the countries have come
closer and nearer to each other and sports have become a medium of
bonds. United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisation adopted in
the General Conference at the twentieth session, Paris, 21st November,
1978 an International Charter of physical education and sports. The
Charter contains following: E
“…….
Convinced that to preserve and develop the physical. intellectual
and moral powers of the human being improves the quality of life
at the national and the international levels,
F
Believing that physical education and sport should make a more
effective contribution to the inculcation of fundamental human
values underlying the full development of peoples,
Stressing accordingly that physical education and sport should seek
to promote closer communion between peoples and between G
individuals. together with disinterested emulation, solidarity and
fraternity, mutual respect and understanding, and full respect for
the integrity and dignity of human beings, ………”

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776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 2. Article 10 of the Charter recognizes the importance of National
institutions in sports. Article 10 states:
“Article 10. National institutions play a major role in
physical education and sport
10.1. It is essential that public authorities at all levels and specialized
B non-governmental bodies encourage those physical education and
sport activities whose educational value is most evident. Their
action shall consist in enforcing legislation and regulations, providing
material assistance and adopting all other measures of
encouragement. stimulation and control. The public authorities will
C also ensure that such fiscal measures are adopted as may
encourage these activities.
10.2. It is incumbent on all institutions responsible for physical
education .and sport to promote a consistent, overall and
decentralized plan of action in the framework of lifelong education
D so as to allow for continuity and co-ordination between compulsory
physical activities and those practised freely and spontaneously.”
3. Cricket, it is said, is a synonym for gentlemanliness which means
discipline, fair play, modest and high standard of morality. The ever
increasing interest in the game of Cricket in our country has raised issues
E of its regulation, control and management. In our country the Board of
Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), a registered Society under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860, exercises sufficient control on all aspects
of game of Cricket and has framed various Code of Conduct for all who
are associated with it. Highlighting the importance of BCCI, Justice T.S.
Thakur, as he then was, in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs.
F Cricket Association of Bihar and others, (2015) 3 SCC 251, stated
following:
“103. BCCI is a very important institution that discharges
important public functions. Demands of institutional integrity are,
therefore, heavy and need to be met suitably in larger public
G interest. Individuals are birds of passage while institutions are
forever. The expectations of the millions of cricket lovers in
particular and public at large in general, have lowered considerably
the threshold of tolerance for any mischief, wrongdoing or corrupt
practices which ought to be weeded out of the system.”
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S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 777
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4. The present is an appeal filed by an acclaimed cricketer of A
India against whom proceedings were drawn by BCCI and a life ban
was imposed on the appellant by the BCCI which was unsuccessfully
challenged before the Kerala High Court and aggrieved by the Division
Bench judgment of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal.
5. Background facts giving rise to this appeal need to be noted B
now:
The appellant, a registered player with Kerala Cricket Association
affiliated to BCCI participated in an IPL match held at Mohali, Punjab
on 09.05.2013. The appellant represented Rajasthan Royals against Kings
XI Punjab. The case Crime No.20 of 2013 dated 09.05.2013 was C
registered in the Special Cell of Delhi Police on a suo moto information
provided by an Inspector of Special Cell. Information was received by
the Police regarding involvement of various persons in some sort of
fixing in the on going Cricket matches of IPL with active participation of
un-identified conduits based in Delhi. The appellant was arrested by
Delhi Police on allegation of spot fixing on 16.05.2013. By order dated D
17.05.2013 BCCI suspended the appellant. In the Writ Petition (C)
No.318 of 2013 Sulaxsha Awasthi vs. Union of India, this Court directed
the oneman Commission constituted by the BCCI to submit its report to
the Board within a period of 15 days indicated about the irregularities
that is noticed during the IPL matches. Oneman inquiry Commission E
submitted Preliminary Report dated 05.06.2013 on the basis of video
clipping and recordings of telephone conversation opining that there are
sufficient evidence against the appellant to prove him guilty of various
articles of Anti-corruption Code. Preliminary Report further stated that
the Commissioner had no access to the appellant who was in police
custody. It opined that there are sufficient evidence available to proceed F
with the disciplinary proceedings against the suspended players. The
appellant after being released from the custody appeared before oneman
Commission and gave his statement dated 24.06.2013. He denied any
spot fixing done by his friend Jiju, if at all, and he reiterated that he did
not under perform the game. In his statement he further stated that he G
confessed certain things before the Delhi Police which was due to
continuous torture and pressure. After receiving the statement dated
24.06.2013, Supplementary Report dated 08.07.2013 was submitted by
oneman Commission. The Supplementary Report relied on the audio
conversations between Sreesanth and Jiju Janardhan recorded on
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778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs. and on the basis of audio tapes
and transcripts oneman Commission concluded that the appellant was
part of the spot fixing and earlier findings given by the Preliminary Report
are confirmed. After receipt of the report disciplinary proceedings were
initiated by the disciplinary committee of BCCI against the appellant.
Show-cause notice dated 04.09.2013 was given to the appellant.
B
Following allegations in show-cause notice were made against the
appellant in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5:
“3. On the morning of 16th May, 2013, it came to be widely reported
in the media that the Delhi Police, Special Cell had arrested you
along with other fellow players on suspicion of having indulged in
C spot fixing during certain matches of Rajasthan Royals with whom
you are contracted to play for in the IPL. Reportedly at the time
of your arrest, you were allegedly in the company of one Mr. Jiju
Janardhan who according to Delhi Police is ad bookie.
4. It also came to be reported that the Delhi Police had also arrested
D a number of bookies on the same day, who were allegedly involved
in conspiring with you and the other players to fix spots for personal
financial gain.
5. Acting on the information that was provided by the police
authorities to the media which was in turn reported across the
E country, the BCCI on 17th May, 2013, suspended you from all
cricketing activities pending an inquiry into your actions by the
BCCI. The BCCI appointed a Commissioner, Mr. Ravi Sawani,
the head of the BCCI Anti-Corruption Unit, to conduct a preliminary
inquiry and submit a report to the BCCI as to his findings.”
F 6. The appellant was accused of offences under Articles 2.1.1,
2.1.2 and 2.1.3, 2.2.3, 2.4.1. and 2.4.2 of Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI.
The appellant was asked to show-cause as to why action should not be
taken against him under the Rules. Date, 13.09.2013 was fixed for hearing
and appellant was asked to submit his written statement within a week.
G Reply to show-cause notice was submitted by the appellant on 11.09.2013.
In his reply the appellant denied his involvement in spot fixing. In his
reply apart from stating other facts following was stated:
i) Fixing – There is absolutely no reliable material even to find out
a charge of fixing against me. What is relied upon is the alleged
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conversation between my friend Shri Jiju Janardhan a follow A
cricketer and some others. Shri Jiju Janardhan is very much
familiar with my mannerism and habit in the cricket field as he
knows me from the age of 18. It is not uncommon to use a
towel in afternoon matches particularly in a place like Mohali in
the month of April-May. Enough photographs are there to show
B
that in many of the earlier matches I played, white colour towel
had been used by me. In fact even other well known cricketers
use white towel as a matter of habit. Even in the very same
match towels were used by other players. Apart from a sheer
coincidence nothing culpable can be attributed to me by reason
of using a towel. The allegation that in the first over no towel C
was used cannot be correct.
ii) What is alleged as warming up against me is not really warming
up but a manner of play which I did in other plays also.
iii) As regards conceding of 14 runs I may respectfully point out
there was no guarantee that the Captain will ask me to bowl in D
a particular over and if so, depending on the field, the pitch,
batsman etc. the bowler will have to bowl. It may be stated
here that my bowling is considered pace bowling estimated at
an average of 135 kms. per hour and there is no guarantee for
a bowler regarding the runs he is likely to concede unless delib- E
erately either a no ball or wide is bowled. Conceding runs there-
fore, cannot be manipulated as alleged. There is no allegation
that in the concerned second over any wide or no ball was
bowled.
iv) As regards seeking, accepting, offering or agreeing to accept F
any bribe there is no trace of evidence pointing out to any such
incident at all.
v) There had been no failure or refusal on my part to perform my
abilities in the Matches as all the balls bowled by me will show
that I have done my best in bowling on that day also.” G
7. The appellant appeared on 13.09.2013 and was heard, the
disciplinary committee communicated its decision dated 13.09.2013 vide
letter dated 03.10.2013, with regard to appellant in paragraph 9 to 14
following was held:
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780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A “9. We have considered the inquiry Report of the Commissioner,
his written statement before the Inquiry Commissioner, his
written reply to the Show Cause Notice and his oral defence
before us.
10. The evidence against Sreesanth in relation to the charge
B comprises to two audio recordings which are recorded by the
Delhi Police. The first of these audio recordings is a conversation
between Jiju Janardhan, his close friend, and a bookie called
CP (Chandresh Patel). Both have been arrested by the Delhi
Police. In the said conversation Jiju Janardhan is said to be
promising that in the second over to be bowled by Sreesanth 14
C or more runs would be conceded by him. The consideration to
be paid for such fixing would be Rs.10 Lacs.
11. In his written reply before us Sreesanth has admitted the factum
of the alleged conversation with Jiju Janardhan. The Delhi
Police along with the charge sheet has given him a copy of the
D recorded transcripts. He states that he is a superstitious person
and the use of the towel is due to the same. He, however, could
not officer and explanation with regard to the content of the
conversation which deals with conceding of 14 runs for a
consideration. On the contrary, he argues that how many runs
E would be conceded would depend upon a large number of
variable factors and not merely on the desire or the will of the
bowler.
12. Even if Sreesanth wants to distance himself from the said
audio recording which he was not privy, there is a cross
F reference to this conversation on record at 17.40 hours on
6.5.2013 between Jiju Janardhan and Sreesanth. In the said
conversation, Jiju Janardhan admits being in possession of
Sreesanth’s money Jiju Janardhan is head referring to receipt
of Rs. 10 Lacs of which he would give 7 lacs to Sreesanth and
retain 3 lacs for himself. Jiju Janardhan further proposes to use
G some money of Sreesanth for purchase of mobile phones. The
circumstantial evidence clearly indicates that this Rs. 10 Lacs
is part of the amount deposited with Jiju Janardhan for
influencing Sreesanth for underperforming in the second over
of the match.
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13. The third piece of evidence is the actual conduct during the A
match itself where Sreesanth conceded 13 runs. The two tape
recordings reveal facts which reasonably match with the actual
developments in the second over on the field. The number of
runs conceded is only one less than promised. The sum of Rs.10
Lacs being promised as a part of the transaction fixed by Jiju
B
Janardhan is confirmed in the second audio recording. On being
asked to explain about this Rs.10 Lacs lying with Jiju Janardhan
as mentioned in the second audio recording, Sreesanth gave a
vague explanation stating that this may be reference by way of
a charity to an orphanage which he intended to be visiting. We
are not inclined to accept the said explanation. C
14. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that Sreesanth is
guilty of corruption under Article 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 of the
Code. We also find him guilty under Article 2.2.3 for betting
and Article 2.3.1 and Article 2.4.2 of the Code for bringing
disrepute to the game of Cricket and failure to disclose to the D
ACU BCCI full details of any approaches or invitations to
engage in conduct that would amount to breach of the Code.
We also hold him guilty of misconduct under Article 32, of the
BCCI Memorandum Rules and Regulations.”
8. On quantum of punishment following was directed: E
“Sh. Shreesanth – In view of the allegations of match fixing and
non-reporting of the offences, he is banned from playing or
representing for life. He shall during this period not be entitled to
be associated with any activities of the BCCI or its affiliates.”
9. In the criminal case chargesheet against the appellant and the F
other accused was submitted. The appellant filed an application for
discharge. The application for discharge was heard and by order dated
25.07.2015, the appellant was discharged from the offences. Against
the order of discharge an appeal has been filed which is pending, at
present, before the Delhi High Court. After passing of the order of G
discharge, appellant made a request before the disciplinary committee
of BCCI to review its order. On 18.10.2015 disciplinary committee
refused to review its earlier decision. The appellant through Kerala Cricket
Association addressed an e-mail to BCCI requesting to issue No

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A Objection Certificate to him to enable him to participate in the Scotland
Premier League. The BCCI by the communication dated 12.01.2017
refused to issue No Object Certificate. Another e-mail was sent by the
appellant on 11.02.2017 praying to revoke the ban imposed on him and
issue No Objection Certificate to him to participate in the Scotland Premier
League. The BCCI reiterated its earlier stand.
B
10. An Advocate’s notice was given by the appellant on 16.02.2017
to BCCI and thereafter a Writ Petition No. 6925 of 2017 was filed before
the Kerala High Court. In the writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for
quashing the proceedings of the disciplinary committee communicated
by letter dated 03.10.2013 and also prayed for a mandamus or other writ
C or order commanding the BCCI and its Chairman to lift the ban imposed
by the BCCI Committee by order dated 03.10.2013 so as to enable the
appellant to participate in the Cricket matches both in national and
international level. The appellant has also sought declaration that reports
are illegal and they were prepared without due compliance of law.
D 11. The BCCI filed a counter-affidavit in the writ petition. The
writ petition was heard and the learned Single Judge by order dated
07.08.2017 allowed the writ petition quashing the life ban and other
punishment imposed on the appellant pursuant to the disciplinary
committee proceedings. Learned Single Judge had observed that the
E appellant has suffered ban almost for four years and nothing more is
required in the matter. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single
Judge a writ appeal was filed before the Division Bench by the BCCI.
The Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 17.10.2017
allowed the writ appeal of the BCCI. The Division Bench held that the
High Court under Article 226 exercises the jurisdiction of judicial review
F and does not sit in appellate jurisdiction. It is held that there cannot be
reappraisal of the evidence. Learned Single Judge being of the opinion
that the appellant was guilty, the appellant cannot escape the punishment
and it is not open for the High Court to substitute its own notion of
justice. Aggrieved by the Division Bench judgment the appellant has
G filed this appeal in this Court.
12. We have heard Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel,
appearing for the appellant. Shri Parag P. Tripathi, learned senior counsel
has appeared for the BCCI.

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13. Shri Salman Khurshid submits that in the disciplinary enquiry A
held against the appellant principles of natural justice have been breached.
It is submitted that the disciplinary committee never confronted the
appellant with the telephone conversation relied by it for proving the
charge. The appellant never agreed and was not part of spot fixing nor
ever received amount of Rs.10 lakh as alleged. In the match played on
B
09.05.2013, the appellant played his normal game. There were no loose
bowls which is clear from cricket commentary broadcasted on that day.
It was alleged against the appellant that he fixed for conceding 14 runs
in the second over, which never happened. There are no evidence to
prove against the appellant something which never happened. In the
event any money was received by the appellant there has to be some C
evidence of asking to return the money. The Preliminary Report was
prepared ex parte which ought not to have been relied. Copies of the
transcripts relied in the Supplementary Report as well as by the
disciplinary committee were never made available to the appellant nor
he at any stage was confronted with the aforesaid transcripts so as to
D
give his version. The burden of proof was wrongly placed on the appellant
where as per Article 3.1. of the Anti-Corruption Code, the burden of
proof shall be on the designated Anti-Corruption Official and for serious
offences proof beyond reasonable doubt was required. The allegation
that the appellant conceded 14 runs in the second over having not been
proved the entire charge has to fall. The bowler cannot always control E
the runs which can be taken by a batsman more so when batsman of a
calibre, Gilchrist was playing. The telephone conversation of 06.05.2013
at 1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs with Jiju does not indicate that the appellant
was part of any spot fixing. Shri Khurshid has also challenged the
constitution of disciplinary committee. It is submitted that Shri Srinivasan
F
had stepped down as the President of the BCCI on 13.06.2013 and
thereafter Shri Jagmohan Dalmia took as the President. The disciplinary
committee not being properly constituted, the entire proceeding is vitiated.
14. Shri Parag P. Tripathi, learned senior counsel appearing for
the BCCI submits that the appellant was given full opportunity by
disciplinary committee. Show-cause notice contained the detail of charges G
and the appellant was asked to reply. The allegations which were made
against the appellant that he was part of the spot fixing, that in second
over, the appellant was to concede 14 runs and under the deal he shall

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784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A tuck white towel in his visible pocket which actually he did in his second
over is ample proof of his complicity. The conversation dated 06.05.2013
which is brought by the appellant between Jiju Janardhan and Chandresh
Patel @ Chand clearly proves that deal was made for spot fixing which
was fixed. The appellant in his reply to show-cause has not explained
the amount of Rs. 10 lakh as referred to conversation dated 06.05.2013
B
at 1740 hrs between himself and Jiju Janardhan.
15. When the specific allegation was made against the appellant
it was his duty to speak and he having not satisfactorily explained the
allegations, disciplinary authority was fully entitled to confirm the
proceedings. No proper answer has been given with regard to the tucking
C of towel in the second over. His answer that he is superstitious was not
there in original reply. Answer relating to amount of Rs.10 lakh to charity
is not a complete answer to dispel the charge. The disciplinary proceedings
are in the nature of departmental inquiry against a public servant. The
decision of disciplinary authority on proof of charge is not to be interfered
D in exercise of judicial review by the constitutional courts. The judicial
review of the disciplinary proceedings is not an appellate jurisdiction so
as to enable the Court to substitute its opinion. The para meters of
judicial review are well settled. The interference with the disciplinary
proceedings by the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under
Article 32 cannot be on the basis of reappreciation of evidence. The
E Court cannot go on the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence. The
Court shall not interfere if there are some legal findings.
16. Shri Parag Tripathi further submitted that the Discharge Order
has no bearing on the disciplinary proceedings which are subject matter
of the present petition. It is trite law that proceedings by a disciplinary
F committee must be treated differently from a trial in a criminal case. It is
submitted that there is vast distinction in the scope of inquiry between a
criminal proceeding and a departmental inquiry. The question before the
Sessions Court was whether appellant is guilty of offences under the
aforementioned criminal statutes. On appreciation of the evidence, it
G may have been open for the Sessions Court to discharge the appellant
under those specific statutes. The Sessions Court, however, did not deal
with the question whether the appellant is guilty of violating the BCCI
Code. In contrast, the scope of inquiry in the disciplinary proceedings
initiated by respondent No.1 against the petitioner was entirely different
as it was restricted to an examination of whether the appellant had
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breached the BCCI Code. The clauses which the appellant breached A
under the BCCI Code are entirely different from the offences under
which the appellant had been charged before the Sessions Court. The
ingredients required to establish a breach of the BCCI Code are also
distinct and separate from the ingredients required to prove offences
under the aforementioned penal statutes. Furthermore, in a criminal case,
B
a defendant has a right to remain silent. However, on issuance of the
SCN, the appellant had a duty to appear before the disciplinary committee
and answer all relevant questions, to the satisfaction of the disciplinary
committee.
17. Respondent No.1 further submits that the standard of proof in
recording a finding of conviction in a criminal proceeding is distinct and C
different from a departmental proceeding.
18. It is submitted that the appellant has raised the issue of
jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee alleging that Shri Srinivasan
could not be a member of the disciplinary committee at the relevant
time. AT the outset, it is submitted that this argument a being raised for D
the very first time before this Court at the stage of the appellant filing a
rejoinder to respondent No.1’s counter affidavit and the same ought not
be allowed by this Court. The appellant had the option of challenging the
constitution of the disciplinary committee before the disciplinary
committee itself, or at the least at the stage of filing the writ petition/writ E
appeal or even at the stage of filing SLP. However, the fact that the said
argument is being raised for the first time at such a belated stage of the
proceedings only goes to prove that the argument is a mere afterthought.
19. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it is submitted that the
minutes of the Emergent Working Committee meeting held on July 28, F
2013 clearly record that the probe committee had submitted its report
and Shri Srinivasan could resume charge as the President of respondent
No.1. Further, the minutes of the Emergent Working Committee meeting
held September 01, 2013 prove that Shri Srinivasan attended the said
meeting as the President of respondent No.1.
G
20. It is submitted that even the orders dated September 27, 2013
and October 8, 2013 placed on record and relied upon by the appellant
do not suggest that this Court removed Shri Srinivasan from the post of
President of respondent No.1. By the order dated September 27, 2013,
this Court only ordered that the AGM of respondent No.1 scheduled on
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786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A September 29, 2013 and the scheduled election can proceed. With respect
to Shri Srinivasan, this Court held that if he is elected as President (in the
election to be conducted) he will not take charge until further orders.
The same was reiterated in the order dated October 8, 2013 passed by
this Court. Both these orders were admittedly passed after the disciplinary
committee passed its order on September 13, 2013 and, therefore, contrary
B
to the appellant’s submissions the composition of the disciplinary
committee was in accordance with the BCCI Code.
21. Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel for the appellant
in his rejoinder submits that till 29.09.2013, Shri Srinivasan was not the
President and he could not function as President. Replying the submission
C of Shri Tripathi that charge has been proved against the appellant it is
submitted that BCCI placed wrong burden of proof on the appellant.
The appellant has answered the allegations and burden was on the BCCI
to prove the charges. In any view of the matter, at best, the appellant
could have been charged with not disclosing to the BCCI of any
D information. Shri Khurshid submits that punishment of life ban was
excessive and maximum, the punishment which could have been imposed
on the appellant was upto five years. The appellant has always given
due respect and regard to the BCCI and always obeyed its instructions
and commands. The appellant has been acclaimed cricket player, whose
bright career has been cut short. The present is not the case where life
E ban ought to have been imposed. This Court may exercise its equitable
jurisdiction in interfering with the punishment awarded to the appellant.
22. From the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
parties and the materials on records following issues arise for consideration
in this appeal:
F
(1) Whether the disciplinary committee of the BCCI in passing
the order dated 13.09.2013 violated the principles of natural
justice in not providing the transcripts of telephone conversation
relied by it and further in not confronting the appellant with
transcript of the telephone conversations relied on by it?
G
(2) Whether the disciplinary committee was right in its conclusion
that there are sufficient materials on the record to hold the
appellant guilty of offences of corruption under Articles 2.1.1,
2.1.2, 2.1.3 of betting, under Article 2.2.3 and Article 2.4.1,
2.4.2 of the Anti-Corruption Code for bringing disrepute to the
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game and failure to disclose to the ACU BCCI full details of A
any approaches and invitations to engage in conduct that would
amount to breach of the Code?
(3) Whether there were sufficient grounds for the High Court
while exercising judicial review jurisdiction under Article 226
to hold that charges against the appellant were established and B
proved on the basis of materials on record?
(4) Whether the disciplinary committee has rightly placed burden
of proof on the appellant whereas according to Anti-Corruption
Code under Article 3.1. the burden of proof was on the
designated Anti-Corruption Official and by wrongly placing the C
burden of proof the disciplinary committee has erred in
recording its conclusion?
(5) Whether the discharge order dated 25.07.2015 has any effect
on the disciplinary proceeding of BCCI under Anti-Corruption
Code culminating in order dated 13.09.2013? D

(6) Whether the constitution of disciplinary committee was vitiated
by including Shri Srinivasan as President who had already
stepped down on 02.06.2013 resulting in vitiation of entire
proceedings?
E
(7) Whether disciplinary committee while imposing sanction under
Article 6 has considered the relevant para meters as laid down
in paragraphs 6.1.1. and 6.1.2?
(8) Whether the disciplinary committee erred in imposing maximum
sanction of life time ban on charges under Article 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 F
of the Anti-Corruption Code?
(9) The relief to which, if any, the appellant may be entitled.
ISSUE NO.1
G
23. The Supplementary Report dated 08.07.2013 submitted by
Commissioner of Inquiry, BCCI refers to two audio conversations
between Sreesanth and Jiju Janardhan recorded on 06.05.2017 at 1740
hrs. and 2032 hrs. The Commissioner in his Report has referred to
transcripts of two audio conversations received from Delhi Police copy
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788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A of which was annexed to the Report. along with the show-cause notice
both Preliminary as well as Supplementary Reports were enclosed. As
noted above, the Supplementary Report has referred to two conversations
between Sreesanth and Jiju Janardhan dated 06.05.2013. Reference of
telephonic conversation between Jiju and Chandresh Patel was also made
in paragraph 8(1) of the show-cause notice. Reply to the said show-
B
cause notice was submitted by the appellant on 11.09.2013. It is relevant
to note that in the reply appellant did not complaint of not providing copy
of transcripts of telephone conversations. Violation of principles of natural
justice by the Commissioner while submitting the Preliminary Report
was alleged on behalf of the appellant. The Commissioner in the
C Preliminary Inquiry Report has clearly mentioned that he has not been
able to question the appellant since he was in the Police Custody and
when the appellant was released from the Police Custody his statement
was taken by the Commissioner on 24.06.2013 and after considering the
statement of the appellant, Supplementary Report was submitted by the
Commissioner on 08.07.2013. Before us additional documents have been
D
filed by the appellant as Annexure A1 by which the transcripts of
telephone conversation between Sreesanth and Jiju dated 06.05.2013 at
1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs. has been brought on the record. Another
conversation dated 09.05.2013 at 12.30 p.m. with Jiju Janardhan and
Chandresh Patel has also been taken on the record. The appellant does
E not deny that the above transcripts of the telephone conversations were
given to the appellant by the Police when chargesheet was submitted in
the criminal case in FIR No.20 of 2013. The present is not a case where
telephone conversations have been referred without they not being
available to the appellant. The transcripts of telephone conversations
were received by the appellant from the Police much before issuance of
F
the show-cause notice issued by the disciplinary committee. The appellant
in his reply has not made any complaint of non-receipt of transcripts.
24. Learned Single Judge in paragraphs 3 and 24 of his judgment
has made following observations:
G “3. The decision of BCCI was rendered after affording an
opportunity of hearing to Sreesanth by a disciplinary committee
constituted to enter into the allegations……”
“24……However, Sreesanth cannot pretend ignorance to the
contents of the telephonic conversation, as the contents of it have
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INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

been exhaustively considered in a discharge application filed by A
him before the Patiala House Courts, New Delhi (MCOCO
court)…………”
25. The submission of Preliminary Report without taking statement
of the appellant was in the circumstances that the appellant was in the
Police custody and under the order of this Court the Commissioner had B
to submit report within 15 days. The Commissioner himself has noted
that he has not confronted the appellant because of the above fact.
When the appellant was released from the custody, his statement was
taken and after considering his statement further Supplementary Report
was submitted. In the show-cause notice with respect to the material
relied by the disciplinary committee, the appellant was given full C
opportunity to have his say. We are not in agreement with the submission
of the appellant that there was any violation of principles of natural justice
by the disciplinary committee of the BCCI.
ISSUE NOS. 2 AND 3
D
26. Both the issues being inter-related, are taken together.

27. In the show-cause notice the charge which was levelled on
the appellant of spot fixing and other allegations have been noticed. The
allegations made against the appellant as contained in paragraph 8 has
E
already been extracted above. In the substance, the allegation was that
in the match played on 09.05.2013 between Rajasthan Royals and Kings
XI Punjab at Mohali in exchange of sum of Rs.10 lakh, the appellant
agreed to concede 14 or more runs in the second over of bowling spell
and in order to confirm the fix, appellant was required to place a hand
towel in his visible pocket while ensuring there was no such towel during F
the first over. In support of this, audio conversation between Jiju Janardhan
and Chandresh Patel was referred to in the Preliminary and
Supplementary Reports. It is on the basis of the conversations between
Jiju Janardhan and Sreesanth dated 06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs. and 2032
hrs., the allegation of charge of receipt of Rs. 10 lakh was sought to be
G
proved. The conversation between Sreesanth and Jiju which took place
on 06.05.2013 where Jiju on telephone informed that Rs.10 lakh was
available out of which Rs.7 lakh will be given to the appellant, has not
been satisfactorily explained by the appellant before the disciplinary
committee. The disciplinary committee in its order has relied on the
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790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A telephone conversation between Jiju Janardhan and Sreesanth dated
06.05.2013. It was also noted that Delhi Police along with the charges
had given copy of the transcripts to the appellant. In paragraph 12 of the
order the disciplinary committee has come to the following conclusion:
“12. Even if Sreesanth wants to distance himself from the said
B audio recording which he was not privy, there is a cross reference
to this conversation on record at 17.40 hours on 6.5.2013 between
Jiju Janardhan and Sreesanth. In the said conversation, Jiju
Janardhan admits being in possession of Sreesanth’s money Jiju
Janardhan is head referring to receipt of Rs. 10 Lacs of which he
would give 7 lacs to Sreesanth and retain 3 lacs for himself. Jiju
C Janardhan further proposes to use some money of Sreesanth for
purchase of mobile phones. The circumstantial evidence clearly
indicates that this Rs. 10 Lacs is part of the amount deposited
with Jiju Janardhan for influencing Sreesanth for underperforming
in the second over of the match.”
D 28. The explanation given by the appellant with regard to Rs. 10
lakh laying with Jiju Janardhan was found to be vague and was not
acceptable. The disciplinary committee on the basis of the evidence
available before it was entitled to draw its own conclusion.
29. The disciplinary committee, under the relevant Anti-Corruption
E Code, is primarily entrusted with the duty, after considering the reply of
show-cause notice and hearing the appellant was entitled to give a decision
on various allegations made against the appellant.
30. The disciplinary inquiry conducted by disciplinary committee
of BCCI is akin to disciplinary inquiry conducted against a public servant
F under the relevant statutory rules except few distinctions which we shall
notice later. This Court has time and again considered the scope of judicial
review in reference to departmental inquiry conducted against the public
servant. This Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Chitra Venkata
Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, had laid down the para meters of judicial
review. In paragraph 21 following has been laid down:
G
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries
has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down
by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is
no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer
is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in
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criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by A
evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court
must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal
of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a
B
court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court
is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the C
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function
of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere
D
where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the
mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous
to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing E
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where
the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is
F
some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can
be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding
for a writ under Article 226.”
31. This Court further held that jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court does G
not exercise a jurisdiction of an appellate court. The findings of the fact
reached by a tribunal as result of the appreciation of the evidence cannot
be questioned in the writ proceedings. In paragraph 23 of the judgment
following has been laid down:
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A “23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226
is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an
appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court
or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not
reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which
is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,
B
but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal
had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence,
or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has
C influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based
on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which
can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded
by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient
or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
D
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.”
32. This Court again in Union of India and others vs. P.
Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, reiterated the same principles
E regarding judicial review of disciplinary proceedings. In paragraphs 12
and 13 following has been laid down:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to
note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before
F the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court
is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High
Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
G Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf;
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(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in A
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by B
irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived
at such conclusion;
C
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmis-
sible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. D
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same E
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings F
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
33. To the same effect is the decision of this Court reported in G
Central Industrial Security Force and others vs. Abrar Ali, (2017)
4 SCC 507. In paragraphs 13 and 14 following has been laid down:
“13. Contrary to findings of the disciplinary authority, the High
Court accepted the version of the respondent that he fell ill and
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A was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons.
It was held by the disciplinary authority that the unit had better
medical facilities which could have been availed by the respondent
if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the
delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local
doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of
B
facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled
law that reappreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya,
this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 587, para 7)
C
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible
on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the
D question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings
in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere
with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except
where such findings are based on no evidence or where they
E are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts
will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters,
if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala
F fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and
High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S.
Patil.)””
G 34. There being specific allegations made against the appellant in
the show-cause notice as noticed above it was incumbent on the appellant
to have explained the evidence and circumstances which were sought
to be relied against the appellant. In the disciplinary proceedings a
delinquent has to explain circumstances and evidence relied against him.
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INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

It is true that the charges have to be proved by the BCCI for taking any A
action under the Anti-Corruption Code. The disciplinary committee of
the BCCI had jurisdiction to form its own opinion after considering the
evidence on record including the telephone conversation between
Sreesanth and Jiju Janardhan and other evidence on the record. The
conclusion drawn by the disciplinary committee on the basis of the material
B
which is recorded in paragraphs 12 and 13 as noted above cannot be
said to be suffering from any infirmity which may warrant judicial review
by the constitutional courts. The learned Single Judge held that “If the
evidence as a whole is appreciated, it can easily be concluded that
Sreesanth had no direct link in spot fixing or betting”. Further, learned
Single Judge held that “Assuming that Sreesanth had knowledge of such C
betting, this Court is of the view that the punishment already suffered by
him of 4 years of the ban from all format of the cricket, nationally and
internationally, is sufficient to meet ends of justice”. As noted above
constitutional court in exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review of
disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Code of Conduct framed
D
by the BCCI will interfere only when conclusions of the disciplinary
committee are perverse or based on no evidence. On appreciation of
evidence, it is not open for the High Court or this Court to substitute its
own opinion based on the appreciation of material on record on the
charges proved.
35. We, thus, are of the opinion that for the decision of the E
disciplinary committee holding charges under Articles 2.1.1., 2.1.2, 2.1.3
and 2.2.3 and Article 2.4.1. and 2.4.2 proved, there are no grounds for
this Court to take a different view. Issue Nos. 2 and 3 are answered
accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4 F

36. One of the submissions which has been made by the learned
counsel for the appellant is that the disciplinary committee has wrongly
placed the burden of proof on the appellant. Learned counsel for the
appellant has relied on Article 3.1 in this context. Article 3.1 is as follows:
G
“STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE
3.1 Unless otherwise described herein the Designated Anti-
Corruption Official(or his/her designee) and the standard of proof
in all cases brought under this Anti-corruption Code shall be
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796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A whether the BCCI Disciplinary Committee is comfortably satisfied,
bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation that is being made,
that the alleged offence has been committed. This standard of
proof in all cases shall be determined on a sliding scale from, at a
minimum, a mere balance of probability (for the least serious
offences) up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt (for the most
B
serious offences).”
37. Article 3.1 deals with burden of proof and standard of proof.
The initial burden of proof shall be on the Designated Anti-Corruption
Official i.e. disciplinary committee which has to form its opinion about
the commission of Designated Offences by the delinquent. Before taking
C the decision when show-cause notice is served on the appellant making
allegations and referring to relevant materials in support of the said
allegation, it was incumbent on the appellant to have satisfactorily explained
each and every circumstances or evidence referred to and relied. When
the explanation submitted by the appellant was not found satisfactory,
D he having not been able to satisfactorily explain the allegations which
were noticed from the telephone conversation between the appellant
and Jiju Janardhan, it cannot be said that the burden of proof has wrongly
been placed on the appellant. Initial burden as referred to in Article 3.1
shall stand discharged when the allegation referring to materials and
evidence are communicated to delinquent. Standard of proof as referred
E to in Article 3.1 is that the BCCI disciplinary committee is to be
comfortably satisfied, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation
that is being made, that the alleged offence has been committed. Of
course, on mere doubt the disciplinary committee cannot hold offences
proved there has to be a positive evidence and finding regarding the
F proof of offences. We are, thus, not persuaded to accept the submission
of the learned counsel for the appellant that burden of proof was wrongly
placed on the appellant.
ISSUE NO.5
38. There is a vast distinction in the scope of inquiry between a
G criminal trial on one hand and disciplinary inquiry against a public servant
or disciplinary inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI on other
hand. We find substance in the submission of Shri Parag P. Tripathi that
question before the Sessions Court was whether the appellant is guilty
of offences under the criminal statutes and on appreciation of evidence,
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it may have been open for the Sessions Court to discharge the appellant A
under the specific statutes. The Sessions Court had not to deal with the
question whether the appellant is guilty of violating Anti-Corruption Code
of BCCI. The clauses which the appellant breached under the Anti-
Corruption Code of BCCI are entirely different from the offences under
which the appellant had been charged before the Sessions Court. The
B
ingredients required to establish a breach of the BCCI Code are also
distinct and separate from the ingredients required to prove offences
under the penal statutes in question. We record our agreement to the
abovenoted submissions.
39. The standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry and in a trial of
a criminal case are entirely different. In a criminal case it is essential to C
prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt wherein in departmental
inquiry preponderance of probability is to serve the purpose. This Court
in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh, (2006)
4 SCC 265, following has been stated in paragraph 12:
“12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in D
recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a
departmental proceeding are distinct and different. Whereas in a
criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable
doubt, in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability
would serve the purpose. (See Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of E
W.B., 2002 (1) SCC 555.)”
40. A caveat needs to be put to whatever has been said above.
We have upheld the decision of disciplinary committee of the BCCI on
proof of charges which upholding of the decision of the disciplinary
committee shall have no effect in the criminal appeal which is pending F
against the appellant against the discharge order. The conclusions and
observations as recorded in the disciplinary proceedings under Anti-
Corruption Code are entirely different from proof of criminal charges
which are on higher yardstick to prove. It is a well settled principle that
criminal charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt which is not
applicable in disciplinary proceedings initiated by the disciplinary committee G
of the BCCI. We, thus, clarify that any observation in this judgment shall
have no effect on the criminal appeal which is pending against the
appellant pertaining to discharge order.

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798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A ISSUE NO. 6
41. The argument pertaining to proper constitution of disciplinary
committee was not raised before the High Court by the appellant at any
stage neither in his reply to show-cause nor before the High Court any
ground was taken that disciplinary committee was illegally constituted.
B In this context, we, however, have noted submission made by the appellant
regarding Constitution of the disciplinary committee and reply given by
the learned counsel for the BCCI regarding constitution of disciplinary
committee. The appellant’s case is that on 02.06.2013, Shri Srinivasan
stepped down from the office of President, BCCI and one Shri Jag
Mohan Dalmia took over as the Acting President. Shri Parag Tripathi
C replying his submission submitted that although Shri Srinivasan stepped
down on 02.06.2013 but the working committee meeting held on
28.07.2013 clearly record that the probe committee has submitted its
report that Shri Srinivasan could resume charge as the President of BCCI,
Shri Srinivasan was again re-elected on 29.09.2013 as President. We
D are satisfied that there was no legal impediment in Shri Srinivasan
participating in the disciplinary committee in the meeting of 13.09.2013
as President. The appellant having not taken this ground even in the
grounds of this appeal, he cannot be allowed to question the constitution
of disciplinary committee at this stage. Issue No.5 is answered
accordingly.
E
ISSUE NOS.7, 8 AND 9
42. All these issues are being taken together. Article 2(Offences
Under this Anti-Corruption Code), of the Anti-Corruption Code
provides for different offences which are as follows:-
F “ARTICLE 2
OFFENCES UNDER THIS ANTI-CORRUPTION CODE
The conduct described in Articles 2.1 – 2.4, if committed by a
Participant, shall amount to an offence by such Participant under
this Anti-Corruption Code:
G
2.1 CORRUPTION:
2.1.1 Fixing or contriving in any way or otherwise influencing
improperly, or being a party to any effort to fix or contrive in
any way or otherwise influence improperly, the result,
H progress, conduct or any other aspect of any Match or Event.
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 799
INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

2.1.2 Seeking, accepting, offering or agreeing to accept any bribe A
or other Reward to fix or to contrive in any way or otherwise
to influence improperly the result, progress, conduct or any
other aspect of any Match or Event.
2.1.3 Failing or refusing, for Reward, to perform to one’s abilities
in a Match. B
2.1.4 Soliciting, inducing, enticing, instructing, persuading,
encouraging or facilitating (a) any Participant to commit an
offence under any of the foregoing provisions of this Article
2.1 and/or (b) any other person to do any act that would be
an offence if that person were a Participant. C
2.2 BETTING:
2.2.1 Placing, accepting, laying or otherwise entering into any Bet
with any other party (whether individual, company or
otherwise) in relation to the result, progress, conduct or any
other aspect of any Match or Event. D
2.2.2 Soliciting, inducing, enticing, instructing, persuading,
encouraging, facilitating or authorising any other party to enter
into a Bet for the direct or indirect benefit of the Participant
in relation to the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect
of any Match or Event. E
2.2.3 Ensuring the occurrence of a particular incident in a Match
or Event, which occurrence is to the Participant’s knowledge
the subject of a Bet and for which he/she expects to receive
or has received any Reward.
F
2.3 MISUSE OF INSIDE INFORMATION:
2.3.1 Using, for Betting purposes, any Inside Information.
2.3.2 Disclosing Inside Information to any person (with or without
Reward) before or during any Match or Event where the
Participant might reasonably be expected to know that G
disclosure of such information in such circumstances could
be used in relation to Betting.
NOTE:Any potential offence under this Article will be
considered on its own set of facts and the particular
circumstances surrounding any relevant disclosure. For H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Example, it may be an offence under this clause to disclose
inside information. (a) to journalists or other members
of the media; and/or (b) on social networking websites
where the Participant might reasonably be expected to
know that disclosure of such information in such
circumstances could be used in relation to Betting.
B
However, nothing in this Article is intended to prohibit
any such disclosure made within a personal relationship
(such as a member of the Participant’s family) where it is
reasonable for the Participant to expect that such
information can be disclosed in confidence without being
C subsequently used for Betting.
2.3.3 Soliciting, inducing, enticing, persuading, encouraging or
facilitating (a) any Participant to commit an offence under
any of the foregoing provisions of this Article 2.3 and/or
(b) any other person to do any act that would be an
D offence if that person were a Participant.

2.4 GENERAL:
2.4.1 Providing or receiving any gift, payment or other benefit
(whether of a monetary value or otherwise) in circumstances
E that the Participant might reasonably have expected could
bring him/her or the sport of cricket into disrepute.

NOTE: This Article is only intended to catch ‘disrepute’ that
when considered in all relevant circumstances, relates
F (directly or indirectly) to any of the underlying imperatives
of and conduct prohibited by this Anti-Corruption Code
(including as described in Article 1.1)
Where any substantial gift payment or other benefit is
received by any Participant from an unknown person or
G organization and/or for no apparent reason, such Participant
is advised to report such receipt to the Designated Anti-
Corruption Official (or his/her designee). Where such
Participant does not make such a report, then it is likely to
constitute strong evidence of the commission of this offence.

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2.4.2 Failing or refusing to disclose to the ACU BCCI (without A
undue delay) full details of any approaches or invitations
received by the Participant to engage in conduct that would
amount to a breach of this Anti-Corruption Code.
2.4.3 Failing or refusing to disclose to the ACU BCCI (without
undue delay) full details of any incident, fact, or matter that B
comes to the attention of a Participant that may evidence an
offence under this Anti-Corruption Code by a third party,
including (without limitation) approaches or invitations that
have been received by any other party to engage in conduct
that would amount to a breach of this Anti-Corruption Code.
C
NOTE: All Participants shall have a continuing obligation to
report any new incident fact, or matter that may evidence
an offence under this Anti-Corruption Code to the ACU
BCCI even if the Participants’ prior knowledge has
already been reported.
D
2.4.4 Failing or refusing, without compelling justification, to
cooperate with any reasonable investigation carried out by
the Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her
designee) in relation to possible offences under this Anti-
Corruption Code, including failure to provide any information
and/or documentation requested by the Designated Anti- E
Corruption Official (or his/her designee) (whether as part
of a formal Demand pursuant to Article 4.3 or otherwise)
that may be relevant to such investigation.”
43. The Anti-Corruption Code uses the word “offences” and
offences are enumerated under the Code for which sanction is provided F
in Article 6. Sanction under Article 6 is nothing but punishment on
commission of the offences and akin to sentencing in the criminal
jurisprudence. The principles of sentencing as applicable in offence under
Indian Penal Code may not be strictly applicable to one of punishment/
sanction under the Anti-Corruption Code but principles of sentencing as
G
applicable in the criminal jurisprudence may be relevant for imposing
sanction in Anti-Corruption Code. In the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973,
there are no structured sentencing guidelines. In March, 2003, the
Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System (the Malimath

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802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Committee), a body established by the Ministry of Home Affairs, issued
a report that emphasized the need to introduce sentencing guidelines in
order to minimise uncertainty in awarding sentences. The Indian Penal
Code prescribe offences and punishments for the same. For many
offences only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some
offences the minimum punishment is also prescribed. Various jurists and
B
writers have tried to enumerate circumstances which may mitigate the
gravity of offences. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Jagmohan
Singh vs. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 held that law gives
very wide discretion in the matter of punishment to the Judge. In
paragraph 24 following has been laid down:
C “24. The policy of the law in giving a very wide discretion in the
matter of punishment to the Judge has its origin in the impossibility
of laying down standards. Take, for example, the offence of
Criminal Breach of Trust punishable under Section 409 of the
Indian Penal Code. The maximum punishment prescribed for the
D offence is imprisonment for life. The minimum could be as low as
one day’s imprisonment and fine. It is obvious that if any standards
were to be laid down with regard to several kinds of breaches of
trust by the persons referred in that section, that would be an
impossible task. All that could be reasonably done by the
Legislature is to tell the Judges that between the maximum and
E minimum prescribed for an offence, they should, on balancing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as disclosed in the case,
judicially decide what would be the appropriate sentence. Take
the other case of the offence of causing hurt. Broadly, that offence
is divided into two categories—simple hurt and grievous hurt.
F Simple hurt is again sub-divided—simple hurt caused by a lethal
weapon is made punishable by a higher maximum sentence—
Section 324. Where grievous hurt is caused by a lethal weapon, it
is punishable under Section 326 and is a more aggravating form
of causing grievous hurt than the one punishable under Section
325. Under Section 326 the maximum punishment is imprisonment
G for life and the minimum can be one day’s imprisonment and fine.
Where a person by a lethal weapon causes a slight fracture of
one of the un-important bones of the human body, he would be as
much punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code as a
person who with a knife scoops out the eyes of his victim. It will
be absurd to say that both of them, because they are liable under
H
the same section should be given the same punishment………”
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 803
INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

44. On principles of sentencing Constitution Bench judgment of A
this Court in Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684,
is a locus classicus. The Constitution Bench speaking through Sarkaria,
J. in paragraph 163 laid down following:
“163………The present legislative policy discernible from Section
235(2) read with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of B
punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences,
including one under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court should
not confine its consideration “principally” or merely to the
circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give
due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal.”
C
45. Further the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh has
emphasized that the sentencing principle may not only confine to the
nature of the crime but may also focus on the criminal. In paragraph 201
following was laid down:
“201………As we read Sections 354(3) and 235(2) and other D
related provisions of the Code of 1973, it is quite clear to us that
for making the choice of punishment or for ascertaining the
existence or absence of “special reasons” in that context, the
court must pay due regard both to the crime and the criminal.
What is the relative weight to be given to the aggravating and
mitigating factors, depends on the facts and circumstances of the E
particular case. More often than not, these two aspects are so
intertwined that it is difficult to give a separate treatment to each
of them. This is so because ‘style is the man’………”
46. Before the Constitution Bench various mitigating factors were
suggested. After noticing the various mitigating factors suggested by the F
counsel the Constitution Bench laid down following in paragraphs 207
and 209:
“207. We will do no more than to say that these are undoubtedly
relevant circumstances and must be given great weight in the
determination of sentence. Some of these factors like extreme G
youth can instead be of compelling importance. In several States
of India, there are in force special enactments, according to which
a “child”, that is, “a person who at the date of murder was less
than 16 years of age”, cannot be tried, convicted and sentenced
to death or imprisonment for life for murder, nor dealt with
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A according to the same criminal procedure as an adult. The special
Acts provide for a reformatory procedure for such juvenile
offenders or children.
209. There are numerous other circumstances justifying the passing
of the lighter sentence; as there are countervailing circumstances
B of aggravation. “We cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer
all such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an
imperfect and undulating society.” Nonetheless, it cannot be over-
emphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in
the area of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive
construction by the courts in accord with the sentencing policy
C writ large in Section 354(3)…………”
47. Justice Arijit Pasayat speaking for this Court in Shailesh
Jasvantbhai and another vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2006) 2
SCC 359, held that the practice of punishing all serious crimes with
equal severity is now unknown in civilized societies. This Court further
D held that disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical
consequences. In paragraph 10 following has been laid down:
“10. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected
in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong
influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of
E punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown
in civilised societies, but such a radical departure from the principle
of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent
times. Even now for a single grave infraction, drastic sentences
are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for
F any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration
that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those
considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out
of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment
has some very undesirable practical consequences.”

G 48. This Court in Gopal Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2013)
7 SCC 545, laid down that principle of just punishment is the bedrock of
sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. In paragraph 18 following
was laid down:
“18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While
the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind,
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simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime A
and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of
just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal
offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive.
The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to
the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In
B
certain cases, the nature of culpability, the antecedents of the
accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to
become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to
lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect —
propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes
lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in C
the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the
relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine
of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may
be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain
illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner. We may hasten
D
to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable
theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the
facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the
personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision
nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any
play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. E
Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency
solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real
requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has
been committed and other concomitant factors which we have
indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of
F
pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences
are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of
fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just
punishment.”
49. A three-Judge Bench in Mukesh and another vs. State
(NCT of Delhi)and others, (2017) 6 SCC 1, to which one of us, G
(Ashok Bhushan, J.) was also a member, has reviewed the principle of
sentencing as was noticed and elaborated in different judgments of this
Court. Justice Dipak Misra, as he then was, speaking for the Bench
referred to the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances
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806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A as noted by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh (supra). Referring
to Bachan Singh following was held in paragraph 343:
“343. In Bachan Singh case, the Court has also held thus: (SCC
p. 751, para 209)
“209. … It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that
B courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated by
us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous
care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of
legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that for persons
convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death
C sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity
of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s
instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of
rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably
foreclosed.””

D 50. Justice R. Banumathi delivering her concurring opinion in
paragraph 486 has laid down following:
“486. Question of awarding sentence is a matter of discretion
and has to be exercised on consideration of circumstances
aggravating or mitigating in the individual cases. The courts are
E consistently faced with the situation where they are required to
answer the new challenges and mould the sentence to meet those
challenges. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the
avowed object of law. It is expected of the courts to operate the
sentencing system as to impose such sentence which reflects the
social conscience of the society. While determining sentence in
F heinous crimes, Judges ought to weigh its impact on the society
and impose adequate sentence considering the collective
conscience or society’s cry for justice. While considering the
imposition of appropriate punishment, courts should not only keep
in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim
G and the society at large.”
51. In the above noted cases this Court has laid down that awarding
sentence is a matter of discretion of the Judge which has to be exercised
on consideration of circumstances aggravating or mitigating in the
individual cases. As observed above, the principle of sentencing as
applicable in the criminal cases may not be strictly applicable for
H
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 807
INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

considering the issue of punishment/sanction under the Anti-Corruption A
Code but the principles noticed pertaining to sentencing serve a safe
guideline for exercise on jurisdiction under Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption
Code.
52. We may notice that this Court in Board of Control for
Cricket in India(BCCI) (supra) has held that a zero tolerance towards B
any wrong-doing alone can satisfy the cry of clinching the Cricket. The
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court while allowing the writ petition
filed by the BCCI has also observed that Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI
clearly envisaged zero tolerance to corruption. There cannot be any
quarrel to the proposition as laid down by this Court as noted above.
What was meant by the zero tolerance is that any offence committed C
within the meaning of Anti-Corruption Code cannot be ignored or to be
leniently dealt with. Zero tolerance emphasis taking cognizance of such
offences and awarding suitable punishment. However, zero tolerance
approach cannot dilute consideration of relevant factors while imposing
sanction under Article 6. In Board of Control for Cricket in D
India(BCCI) (supra) this Court has laid down that the quantum of
sanction/punishment can vary depending upon the gravity of the
misconduct of the persons committing the same. In paragraph 116
following has been laid down:
“116…………We have also while answering those questions held E
that the misconduct against these two individuals is actionable as
per the relevant rules to which we have referred in detail. Not
only that, we have held that action under the Rules can also be
taken against the franchisees concerned. We have noticed that
the quantum of sanction/punishment can vary depending upon the
gravity of the misconduct of the persons committing the same.” F

53. Further, in paragraph 63 this Court has clearly laid down that
disciplinary committee of the BCCI is empowered to impose an
appropriate sanction in terms of Article 6 of the Code upon consideration
of relevant factors. Paragraph 63 of the judgment is as follows:
G
“63. In terms of Article 6 of the Code, upon consideration of
relevant factors the Disciplinary Committee of BCCI is empowered
to impose an appropriate sanction upon the delinquent having
regard to the provisions of Article 6.2 and the Table appearing
thereunder. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that even
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808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A under the Anti-Corruption Code for Participants, any act like betting
can attract sanctions not only for the person who indulges in such
conduct but also for all those who authorise, cause, knowingly
assist, encourage, aid, abet, cover up or are otherwise complicit in
any act of omission or commission relating to such activity.”
B 54. We, thus, have to look into Article 6 to find out the manner and
procedure for imposing punishment/sanction by disciplinary committee
of the BCCI. We have noticed that various mitigating and aggravating
circumstances have been noticed by this Court in different judgments
while considering the sentencing policy under criminal jurisprudence. If
we look into Article 6, Article itself enumerates aggravating and mitigating
C circumstances. Article 6 contains a heading ‘Sanctions’. Para 6.1 provides
that in order to determine the appropriate sanction that is to be imposed
in each case, the disciplinary committee must first determine the relative
seriousness of the offence, including identifying all relevant factors that
it deems to. Article 6.1 is as follows:
D “6.1 Where it is determined that an offence under this Anti-
Corruption Code has been committed, the BCCI Disciplinary
Committee will be required to impose an appropriate sanction upon
the participant from the range of permissible sanctions described
in Article 6.2. In order to determine the appropriate sanction that
E is to be imposed in each case, the BCCI Disciplinary Committee
must first determine the relative seriousness of the offence,
including identifying all relevant factors that it deems to:
6.1.1 aggravate the nature of the offence under this Anti-
Corruption Code, namely
F 6.1.1.1 a lack of remorse on the part of the Participant;
6.1.1.2 whether the Participant has previously been found guilty
of any similar offence under this Anti-Corruption Code and/or
any predecessor regulations of the BCCI and/or the ICC Anti-
Corruption Code and/or anti-corruption rules of other National
G Cricket Federation;
6.1.1.3 where the amount of any profits, winnings or other
Reward, directly or indirectly received by the Participant as a
result of the offence(s), is substantial and/or where the sums of
money otherwise involved in the offence(s) are substantial;
H
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 809
INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

6.1.1.4 where the offence substantially damaged (or had the A
potential to damage substantially) the commercial value and/or
the public interest in the relevant match(es) or event(s);
6.1.1.5 where the offence affected (or had the potential to affect)
the result of the relevant match(es) or event(s);
6.1.1.6 where the welfare of a participant or any other person B
has been endangered as a result of the offence;
6.1.1.7 where the offence involved more than one participant or
other persons; and/or
6.1.1.8 any other aggravating factor(s) that the BCCI Disciplinary C
Committee considers relevant and appropriate.”
55 Further, Article 6.1.2 enumerates the mitigating circumstances.
Articles 6.1.2, 6.1.2.1 to 6.1.2.9 are as follows:
“6.1.2 mitigate the nature of the offence under the Anti-Corruption
Code, namely: D
6.1.2.1 any admission of guilt (the mitigating value of which
may depend upon its timing);
6.1.2.2 the participant’s good previous disciplinary record;
6.1.2.3 the young age and/or lack of experience of the participant; E
6.1.2.4 where the participant has cooperated with the Designated
Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her designee) and any investigation
or demand carried out by him/her;
6.1.2.5 where the offence did not substantially damage (or have
the potential to substantially damage) the commercial value and/ F
or the public interest in the relevant match(es) or event(s);
6.1.2.6 where the offence did not affect (or have the potential to
affect) the result of the relevant match(es) or event(s);
6.1.2.7 where the Participant provides Substantial Assistance to
G
the Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her designee), that
result in the Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her
designee) discovering or establishing an offence under this Anti-
Corruption Code by another Participant or another cricket
Participant bound by such regulations or that results in a criminal
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810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A or disciplinary body discovering or establishing a criminal offence
or the breach of professional rules by another Participant or other
third party;
6.1.2.8 where the participant has already suffered penalties under
other laws and/or regulations for the same offence; and/or
B 6.1.2.9 any other mitigating factor(s) that the BCCI Disciplinary
Committee considers relevant and appropriate.”
56. The Anti-Corruption Code which has articles containing
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are necessarily to be taken
into consideration while imposing punishment/sanction under Article 6.
C Article 6.2 contains table in three columns, (i) Anti-Corruption Code of
Offence; (ii) Range of permissible period or ineligibility and (iii) additional
discretion to impose a fine. It is useful to extract entire Article 6.2 to the
following effect:
6.2 Having considered all of the factors described in Articles 6.1.1
D and 6.1.2, the BCCI Disciplinary Committee shall then determine,
in accordance with the following table, what the appropriate
sanction(s) should be:
ATI- RAGE OF ADDITIOAL
CORRUPTIO PERMISSIBLE DISCRETIO TO
CODE OF PERIOD OF IMPOSE A FIE
E OFFECE IELIGIBILITY
Articles 2.1.1, 2.1.2, A minimum of five (5)
2.1.3 and 2.1.4 years and maximum of a AND, IN ALL
(Corruption) life time CASES :
Articles 2.2.1, 2.2.2 A minimum of two (2)
and 2.2.3 (Betting) years and a maximum of the BCCI Disciplinary
five (5) years Committee shall have
F Articles 2.3.1 and A minimum of two(2) the discretion to
2.3.3 (as it relates to years and a maximum of Impose a fine on the
an offence under five(5) years Participant upto a
Article 2.3.1) Misuse maximum of the
of inside information) value of any Reward
Articles 2.3.2 and A minimum of six (6) Received by the
2.3.3 (as it relates to months and a maximum Participant directly or
an offence under of five (5) years indirectly, out of or in
G Article 2.3.2) (Misuse relation
of inside information) to the offence
Articles 2.4.1 and A minimum of one (1) committed under this
2.4.2 (General) year and a maximum of Anti-Corruption
five (5) years Code.
Articles 2.4.3 and A minimum of six (6)
2.4.4 (General) months and a maximum
H of two (2) years
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 811
INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

57. In the present case life ban has been imposed on the appellant A
on offences under Article 2.1.1., 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.14(corruption), for
which as per second column a minimum of five years and maximum of
life time ineligibility is provided for. Whether in case where offence under
Article 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 is proved, the disciplinary committee
is obliged to award a life time ban. The answer has to be that life ban
B
cannot be imposed in all cases where such offences are proved. When
range of ineligibility which is minimum five years, maximum life ban is
provided for, the discretion to choose either minimum or maximum or in
between has to be exercised on relevant factors and circumstances.
58. The disciplinary committee’s order dated 13.09.2013 does not
advert to the aggravating and mitigating factors as enumerated in Article C
6.1.1. and 6.1.2. Without considering the relevant provisions of Anti-
Corruption Code the disciplinary committee has imposed life time ban
which sanction cannot be held to be in accordance with the Anti-
Corruption Code itself. The disciplinary committee had not even adverted
to Article 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 which enumerates the aggravating and mitigating D
circumstances. When the Anti-Corruption Code itself mandates
consideration of relevant factors and this Court in Board of Control
for Cricket in India (supra) had laid down that the disciplinary committee
of the BCCI is empowered to impose appropriate sanction in terms of
Article 6 of the Code upon consideration of relevant factors, without
considering the relevant factors imposition of maximum punishment E
cannot be sustained. Apart from factors as noted above the subsequent
conduct of the appellant also shows obedience to BCCI. Initially when
the life time ban was imposed on 13.09.2013, appellant has not even
challenged the said order, it was only after the appellant was discharged
from the criminal case on 25.07.2015 and when the appellant got F
opportunity to play and participate in the Scotland Premier League on e-
mail was sent through Kerala Cricket Association on 11.01.2017. It was
only thereafter when No Objection Certificate was not granted to the
appellant and the BCCI refused to modify the ban, writ petition was
filed in February 28, 2017 in the Kerala High Court.
G
59. In so far as charges proved under Article 2.2.3, 2.4.1 and
2.4.2 the maximum sanction is of 5 years, the award of punishment of
five years shall also satisfy the requirement under Code, which need no
separate consideration for the purposes of this case. As per Article 6.3.2

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812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A all sanction imposed on appellant shall run concurrently. As on date the
period of 5 years sanction has come to an end.
60. In view of the foregoing discussion we arrive on the following
conclusions:
(1) In the disciplinary proceedings held against the appellant under
B the Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI the principles of natural
justice were not violated.
(2) The conclusions drawn by the disciplinary committee of the
BCCI on the basis of materials as referred to in paragraphs
12 and 13 of the order cannot be said to be suffering from
C any infirmity which may warrant judicial review by the
constitutional courts. The constitutional courts in exercise of
jurisdiction of judicial review will interfere only when
conclusions of the disciplinary committee are perverse or
based on no evidence. It is not open for the High Court or
D this Court to substitute its own opinion based on the materials
on record on the proof of charges.
(3) The standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry and in a trial of
a criminal case are entirely different. In a criminal case it is
essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt
E wherein in disciplinary inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code
of BCCI the preponderance of probability is to serve the
purpose.
(4) We although have upheld the decision of the disciplinary
committee of the BCCI on proof of charges, which upholding
F of the decision of the disciplinary committee shall have no
effect on the criminal appeal which is pending against the
appellant against the discharge order. The conclusions and
observations as recorded in the disciplinary committee under
Anti-Corruption Code are entirely different from proof of
criminal charges which require higher yardstick to prove.
G
(5) There was no legal impediment in Shri Srinivasan participating
in the disciplinary committee proceedings dated 13.09.2013
as President. The appellant having not questioned the
constitution of disciplinary committee even in the grounds of
this appeal he cannot be allowed to challenge the constitution
H of disciplinary committee at this stage.
S. SREESANTH v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN 813
INDIA & ORS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

(6) Sanction under Article 6 of Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI is A
nothing but punishment on commission of the offences and
akin to sentencing in criminal jurisprudence. The principles
of sentencing as applicable in offence under the Indian Penal
Code may not be strictly applicable to one of punishment/
sanction under the Anti-Corruption Code but principles of
B
sentencing as applicable in the criminal jurisprudence may be
relevant for imposing sanction under the Anti-Corruption
Code.
(7) In cases where offences under Article 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and
2.1.4 are proved, the disciplinary committee is not obliged to
award a life time ban in all cases where such offences are C
proved. When range of ineligibility which is minimum five
years, maximum life time ban is provided for, the discretion
to which, either minimum or maximum or in between has to
be exercised on relevant facts and circumstances.
(8) The disciplinary committee order dated 13.09.2013 does not D
advert to the aggravating and mitigating factors as enumerated
in Articles 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Without considering the relevant
provisions of Anti-Corruption Code, the disciplinary committee
has imposed a life time ban on the appellant which sanction
cannot be held to be in accordance with the Anti-Corruption E
Code itself.
(9) Due to subsequent events also, we are of the view that the
disciplinary committee of BCCI should revisit the quantum
of punishment/sanction to be imposed on the appellant.
61. In view of the foregoing discussion, we partly allow the appeal F
in the following manner:
(i) The order dated 13.09.2013 of the disciplinary committee only
to the extent of imposing sanction of life time ban is set aside.
(ii) The disciplinary committee of the BCCI may reconsider the
G
quantum of punishment/sanction which may be imposed on
the appellant as per Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption Code.
The appellant may be given one opportunity to have his say
on the question of quantum of punishment/sanction.

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814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A (iii) The disciplinary committee may take decision as indicated
above on the quantum of punishment/sanction at an early date
preferably within a period of three months from today.
(iv) Appellant shall await the decision of the disciplinary committee
and future course of action shall be in accordance with the
B decision of the disciplinary committee so taken. Parties shall
bear their own costs.

Devika Gujral Appeal partly allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H