S. SAKTIVEL (DEAD) BY LRS.versusM. VENUGOPAL PILLAI AND ORS

                    S. SAKTIVEL (DEAD) BY LRS.                                   A
                                 v.
                   M. VENUGOPAL PILLAI AND ORS.

                             AUGUST 10, 2000

                  [V.N. KHARE AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]                             B

       Indian Evidence Act 1872-Section 92 proviso 4-Suit for partition-
Plaintiff claiming a share on the basis of a registered settlement deed-
De.fendant alleging a subsequent oral .(amity arrangement modifying the terms
uf settlement-Whether parol evidence can be let in to substantiate a subse-      C
quent oral arrangement rescinding or modifying the terms of a registered
settlement deed-Held, no.

       The respondent - plaintiff, one of the three sons of deceased 'M' filed
a suit for partition against his brother viz. the appellants' father under a
registered settlement deed executed by the deceased 'M' in 1915. The             D
deceased defendant contended that as a result of a subsequent oral family
arrangement in 1941 the settlement was modified and the property was
allotted to him exclusively and other sons were given cash. Both the parties
in the trial court proceeded on the basis that the registered document Ex.
All is a settlement and not Will. The trial court dismissed the suit holding     E
that in view of proviso (4) to Section 92 of the Evidence Act the contesting
defendant can lead oral evidence to substantiate the subsequent oral ar-
rangements arrived at amongst the members of the family.

      The First Appeal filed by the plaintiff w;.s allowed holding that in
view of proviso (4) to section 92 of the Evidence Act it is not open to the      F
parties to let in oral evidence to modify, vary or subtract the terms of the
registered document. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by appellants was
dismissed.

      In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the view taken
by the High Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff was erroneous           G
inasmuch as the settlees under Ex. All got the suit property and by the
subsequent oral arrangement they agreed to work out their rights without
varying or substituting the terms of Ex. All and, therefore, the High Court
was not right in not considering the oral arrangement as pleaded by the
defendant/appellant and that Ex. All in fact is not a settlement deed but is     H
                                     361
    362                SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A   a Will and therefore parol evidence is admissible to substantiate the subse-
    quent oral arrangement.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

           HELD : 1. Before the trial Court the plaintiff and the defendants
B   agreed that Ex. All is a settlement deed and not a Will and the trial Court
    proceeded on the basis that the document Ex. All is a registered settlement
    deed. This Court is not deposed to entertain the contention of the appellant
    that it is a will and not a settlement. (367-B]

           2. Where under law a contract or disposition are required to be in
c   writing and the same has been reduced in writing, its terms cannot be
    modified or altered or substituted by oral contract or disposition. No parol
    evidence will be admissible to substantiate such an oral contract or dispo-
    sition. A document for its validity or effectiveness is required by law to be
    in writing and, therefore, no modification or alteration or substitution of
D   such written documents is permissible by parol evidence and it is only by
    another written document the terms of earlier written document can be
    altered, rescinded or substituted. [366-C-DJ

          3. The settlement deed is a registered document. The second part of
    proviso (4) to section 92 does not permit leading of parol evidence for
E   proving a subsequent oral agreement modifying or rescinding the regis-
    tered instrument. The terms of registered document can be altered, re-
    scinded or varied only by subsequent registered document and not other-
    wise. [366-E]

           4. Where there is a conferment of title to the property, Jaw requires it
F
    be in writing for its efficacy and effectiveness. A document becomes effec-
    tive by reason of the fact that it ls in writing. Once under law a document
    is required to be in writing parties to such a document cannot be permitted
    to let in parol evidence to substantiate any subsequent arrangement which
    has the effect of modifying earlier written document. If such parol evi-
G   dence is permitted it would divest the rights of other parties to the written
    document. The subsequent oral arrangement set up by the defendant·
    appellant cannot be proved by the parol evidence. Such an evidence is not
    admissible in evidence. [366-G-B; 367-AJ

           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1555 of 1990.
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             S. SAKTIVEL v. M. VENUGOPAL PILLAI [KHARE, J.]                 363
      From the JUdgment and Order dated 9.11.89 of the Madras High Court            A
in LP.A. No. 120 of 1986.

      S. Sivasubramaniam and Ms. S. Janani for the Appellants.

      Ex-parte
                                                                                    B
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      KHARE, J. The short question that arises in this appeal is whether any
parol evidence can be let irr to substantiate a subsequent oral arrangement
rescinding or modifying the terms of a registered settlement deed.

      The property in dispute in this appeal was self-acquired property of one
                                                                                    c
Muthuswamy Pillai. The said Muthuswamy Pillai had a concubine named
Papammal and through her three sons and one daughter were born. One of
the sons, Appavu Pillai died during the lifetime of Muthuswamy Pillai, leaving
defendant nos.2 to 4 as his legal heirs. Singaravaelu Pillai (defendant No. 1)
and Venugopal Pillai, plaintiff (respondent no. l herein) are second and            D
third sons of said Muthuswamy Pillai. Defendant No.6 who is the appellant
in this case is the son of Singaravaelu Pillai (defendant No. 1) who died
during the pendency of the suit. Muthuswamy Pillai who owned the
property, settled the same under a registered settlement deed dated 26.3.1915
(Ext. All) in favour of Papammal and children born through her. At the              E
time of execution and registration of settlement deed all the sons were
minors and, therefore, their mother was appointed as their guardian who
accepted the settlement in her capacity as a guardian of the minors.
Muthuswamy Pillai died in 1954 and Papammal also died subsequently in the
year 1957.
                                                                                    F
       The plaintiff Venugopal Pillai claimed share in the property in dispute
under the registered settlement deed. Since defendant no. l refused to give any
share in the property to the plaintiff, he brought a suit for partition and also
for other consequential reliefs. Defendant No. l filed written statement wherein
he contested the claim of the plaintiff and whereas defendant nos.2 to 5
                                                                                    G
accepted the case of the plaintiff. After the death of defendant No.I, defendant
No.6, who is the heir of defendant No. l was substituted in the suit as defendant
No. 6. Defendant-appellant adopted the written statement filed by his father.
In the written statement it was pleaded that as a result of the subsequent
arrangement arrived at amongst the members of the family of Muthuswamy
Pillai in the year 1941 the property in dispute was allotted to defendant no.I      H
    364                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A   exclusively and rest of the other sons were given money by cash. In sum and
    substance the case of defendant no.6 was that as a result of oral arrangement
    arrived in the year 1941, the settlement deed executed and registered on
    26.3.1915 stood modified and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any
    share in the property. The registered settlement deed was filed in the suit and
    was exhibited as Ex.NI. Before the trial court, a question arose as to whether
B
    the registered document is a settlement deed or a will. However, both the parties
    proceeded on the basis that document Ext. NI is a registered settlement deed
    and not a will. The trial Court treating the document Ex.NI as a settlement
    deed held that in view of proviso (4) to Section 92 of the Evidence Act the
    contesting defendant can lead oral evidence to substantiate the subsequent oral
c   arrangements arrived at amongst the members of the family and believing the
    arrangements as set up by the defendant-appellant, the trial court dismissed the
    suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent.

           In First Appeal filed by the plaintiff before the High Court the learned
    Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that in view of proviso (4) to
D   Section 92 of the Evidence Act it is not open to the parties to let in oral evidence
    to modify, vary or subtract the terms of the registered document. Consequently,
    the First Appeal was allowed and the suit for partition was decreed. The Letters
    Patent Appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by a Di vision Bench
    of the High Court. It is against the said judgment the appellant is in appeal
E   before us.

           Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the view taken
    by the High Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff was erroneous inasmuch
    as the settlees under Ex.NI got the suit property and by the subsequent oral
    arrangement, they agreed to work out their rights without varying or substitut-
F   ing the terms of Ex.NI and, therefore, the High Court was not right in not
    considering the oral arrangement as pleaded by the defendant/appellant. It is
    not disputed that disposition under Ex.NI in the present case is by way of grant
    and under the said disposition all the sons of Muthuswamy Pillai acquired
    rights. It is also not disputed that the settlement deed is a registered document
    and by virtue of alleged subsequent oral arrangement other sons of Muthuswamy
G
    Pillai were divested with the rights which they acquired under the settlement
    deed. Under such circumstances the question that arises for consideration is      as
    to whether any parol evidence can be let in to substantiate subsequent oral
    arrangement rescinding or modifying the terms of the document which, under
    law, is required to be in writing or is a registered document, namely, Ex.NI.
H   Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as thus:
                S. SAKTIVEL v. M. VENUGOPAL PILLAI [KHARE, J.]                 365
         "92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. - When the terms of any         A
         such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter
         required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been
         proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement
         or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such
         instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contra-
                                                                                       B
         dicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:

         Proviso (4) - The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement
         to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property,
         may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or
         disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been      C
         registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the
         registration of documents."

A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that what Section 92 provides is that
when the terms of any contract, grant or other disposition of the property, or
any matter required by law to be reduced in the form of document, have been            D
proved, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement is permissible for the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting the said written doc.u-
ment. However, this provision is subject to proviso 1 to 6 but we are not
concerned with other provisos except proviso 4, which is relevant in the present
case. The question then is whether the defendant-appellant can derive any              E
benefit out of proviso (4) to Section 92 for setting up oral arrangement arrived
at in the year 194l'which has the effect of modifying the written and registered
disposition. Proviso (4) to Section 92 contemplates three situations, whereby

         (i)     the existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement as to
                 rescind or modify any earlier contract, grant or disposition of the   F
                 property can be proved.

         (ii)    However, this is not permissible where the contract, grant or
                 disposition of property is by law required to be in writing.

         (iii) No parol evidence can be let in to substantiate any subsequent          G
               oral arrangement which has effect of rescinding a contract or
               disposition of property which is registered according to the law
               in force for the time being as to the registration of documents.

     In sum and substance what proviso (4) to Section 92 provides is that
where a contract or disposition, not required by law to be in writing, has been        H
    366                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A   arrived at orally then subsequent oral agreement modifying or rescinding the
    said contract or disposition can be substantiated by parol evidence and such
    evidence is admissible. Thus if a party has entered into a contract which is not
    required to be reduced in writing but such a contract has been reduced in
    writing, dr it is oral in such situations it is always open to the parties to the
    contract to modify its terms and even substitute a new by oral contract and it
B
    can be substantiated by parol evidence. In such kind of cases the oral evidence
    can be let in to prove that the earlier contract or agreement has been modified
    or substituted by new oral agreement. Where under law a contract or disposi-
    tion are required to be in writing and the same has been reduced in writing,
    its terms cannot be modified or altered or substituted by oral contract or
c   disposition. No parol evidence will be admissible to substantiate such an oral
    contract or disposition. A document for its validity or effectiveness is required
    by law to be in writing and, therefore, no modification or alteration or substi-
    tution of such written document is permissible by parol evidence and it is only
    by another written document the terms of earlier written document can be
D   altered, rescinded or substituted. There is another reason why the defendant/
    appellant cannot be permitted to let in parol evidence to substantiate the
    subsequent oral arrangement. The reason being that the settlement deed is a
    registered document. The second part of proviso (4) to Section 92 does not
    permit leading of parol evidence for proving a subsequent oral agreement
    modifying .or rescinding the registered instrument. The terms of registered
E   document can be altered, rescinded or varied only by subsequent registered
    document and not otherwise. If the oral arrangement as pleaded by the appel-
    lant if allowed to be substantiated by parol evidence it would mean re- writing
    of Ex.All and, therefore, no parol evidence is permissible.

           In view of the aforesaid legal position on interpretation of proviso (4)
F   to Section 92 we have to examine as to whether settlement deed Ex.All was
    required to be in writing under the law or not. It is not disputed that by
    settlement deed Ex.All which is a disposition Muthuswamy Pillai passed on
    right to property to all his sons who acquired right in the property. Where there
    is such conferment of title to the property, law requires it be in writing for its
G   efficacy and effectiveness. A document becomes effective by reason of the fact
    that it is in writing. Once under law a document is required to be in writing
    parties to such a document cannot be permitted to let in parol evidence to
    substantiate any subsequent arrangement which has effect of modifying earlier
    written document. If such parol evidence is permitted it would divest the rights
    of other parties to the written document. We are, therefore, of the view that the
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             S. SAKTIVEL v. M. VENUGOPAL PILLAI [KHARE, J.)                367
subsequent oral arrangement set up by the defendant-appellant cannot be            A·
proved by the parol evidence. Such an evidence is not admissible in evidence.

       The learned counsel for the appellant then urged that Ex.A/I in fact is
not a settlement deed but is a will and, therefore, parol evidence is admissible
to substantiate the subsequent oral arrangement. This controversy also arose
before the trial Court. Before the trial Court ihe plaintiff and the defendants    B
agreed that Ex.A/I is a settlement deed and not a will and the trial Court
proceeded on the basis that the document Ex.A/I is a registered settlement
deed. We are, therefore, not deposed to entertain the argument of learned
counsel for the appellant.

      For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is
                                                                                   c
accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

V.M.                                                        Appeal dismissed.