S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUDversusANJUM JEHAN & ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 233
- Decided
- 10 April 2013
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, restored the trial court decree, and held that the appellant was ready and willing to perform, entitled to specific performance of the sale deed (excluding land bought by respondent 6), and must refund compensation with interest.
Summary
The appellant, S. Kesari Hanuman Goud, filed a suit for specific performance of a 1977 agreement to sell land, asserting that he was always ready and willing to fulfil his part of the contract. The respondent, Anjum Jehan, contended that the appellant lacked the financial capacity and therefore was not ready, subsequently selling the land to third parties. The trial court held in favour of the appellant, finding him financially capable and ready, but the High Court reversed, holding him not ready and limiting the specific performance. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s finding was perverse, restored the trial court’s decree, affirmed the appellant’s entitlement to specific performance of the sale deed for all land except that purchased by a bona‑fide purchaser (respondent 6), and ordered the appellant to refund compensation with 9% interest. The Court also reiterated that a power‑of‑attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement to sell.
- Whether the High Court complied with Order XU Rule 31 CPC by considering all issues.
- Whether a holder of a power of attorney may give evidence in place of the principal.
- Whether the subsequent purchasers were bona‑fide purchasers without notice of the agreement.
- Whether the appellant must refund the compensation received with interest.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 96, s. Order III Rules 1 and 2, s. Order VIII Rule 9, s. Order XU Rule 31
- Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 2 S.C.R. 750
A S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD
v.
ANJUM JEHAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2885-2887 of 2005 etc.)
APRIL 10, 2013
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
c
s.96 read with 0. 41, r.31- First appeal before High Court
challenging the judgment and decree passed in a suit for
specific performance of agreement to sell - High Court holding
that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part
0 of contract - Held: Finding recorded by High Court on this
issue is perverse being contrary to evidence on record -
Further, High Court while deciding the first appeal u/s 96, did
not consider all the issues as is required under 0. 41, r.31 -
Judgment and decree passed by High Court set aside and
E that passed by trial court restored - Appellant directed to
refund the amount of compensation to first respondent along
with 9% interest.
0. 3, "· 1 and 2 - Recognized agent - Power of attorney
holder - Held: It is a settled legal proposition that power of
F attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal - Nor
can he depose for the principal in respect of a matter, as
regards which, only the principal can have personal
knowledge and in respect of which, the principal is entitled to
be cross-examined.
G
The appellant in C.A Nos. 2885-2887 of 2005 filed Suit
No. 30 of 1984 against respondent no. 1 (defendant no.
1) for specific performance of the agreement to sell
entered into between the parties on 15.10.1977 and for
H 750
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 751
directing respondent no. 1 to execute a registered sale A
deed in his favour ignoring the agreement to sell in
favour of respondents/defendants no. 3, 6 and 7 which
were entered into despite the public notice issued by the
plaintiff. It was the case of the plaintiff that he had always
been ready and willing to perform his part and it was the B
first defendant who evaded to perform her part of the suit
agreement. Respondent/defendant no. 1 denied the plaint
allegation and stated that when the plaintiff failed to raise
necessary money, he informed her that she was at liberty
to sell the property to anyone. Respondent no. 3/ c
defendant no. 7 also filed Suit No. 135 of 1984 for
perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff from
interfering with the construction of a theatre building
including the compound wall which was in close
proximity to his land. During the pendency of the suit 0
respondent no. 1 executed and got registered a sale deed
in favour of respondent no. 2/defendant no. 3 with
respect to a part of the suit property. Further, the GPA
holder also got registered another sale deed in favour of
respondent no. 2/defendant no. 3 with respect to a part
of the suit land. The trial court decreed the suit of the E
appellant except for a small area which had been
purchased by defendant no. 6. The suit filed by
respondent no. 3/defendant no. 7 was also dismissed. In
the appeals preferred by both sides, the High Court Jleld
that the plaintiff-appellant was not ready and willing to F
perform his part of contract. However, it held the plaintiff
entitled to get the sale deed execuited in respect of the
land excluding the land sold to defendants nos. 3, 6 and
7. Both the sides filed the appeals.
G
Disposing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The plaint contained a specific averment
that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to
perform his part. In the written statement the said
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.
A averment was simply denied. In the replication the
plaintiff stated that he was capable of raising necessary
finance. The appellant/plaintiff examined himself as PW.1,
and in his cross-examination he has denied any
suggestion made to him to the effect that he had ever
8 informed the power of attorney holder of respondent No.1
that he would be unable to raise the balance of the sale
consideration. With respect to the issue regarding
financial capacity to pay, the appellant/plaintiff examined
PW.2 and PW.3. They fully supported his case, deposing
c that he was a man of means, and that he had sufficient
properties and the means to purchase the said suit
property. The finding recorded by the High Court on this
issue is perverse being contrary to the evidence on
record. [para 8-12] [761-C-E;; 762-B-D; 763-A-B]
D 1.2 It is a settled legal proposition that the power of
attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal.
Provisions of 0. 3, rr. 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder
of the power of attorney to "act" on behalf of the
principal. The term "act", would not include depos~ng in
E place and irislead of the principal. Similarly, the power-
of-attorney holder cannot depose for the principal in
respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal
can have personal knowledge and in respect of which,
the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. [para 13]
F [763-C-F]
Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr., 1999 (1) SCR 1168 =
AIR 1999 SC 1441; Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. lndusind Bank
Ltd., 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 681 = (2005) 2 sec 217; MIS
G Shankar Finance and Investment v. State of A.P & Ors., 2008
(10) SCR 905 =AIR 2009 SC 422; and Man Kaur v. Hartar
Singh Sangha 2010 (12) SCR 515 = (2010) 10 SCC 512 •
relied on.
1.3 So far as the notice of the agreement between the
H appellant and respondent No. 1 is concerned, the trial
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 753
court after taking note of the recital of the said agreement A
in the agreement to sell.and sale deed also, has held, that,
so far as the land sold to the respondents other than
respondent no.6 is concerned, the parties had been fully
aware of the same. Only respondent no.6 had no such
notice. It has been conceded on behalf of the appellant B
that the same being a very small area, the appellant is not
willing to disturb the possession of respondent no.6.
(para 14] (763-G-H; 764-A]
2.The judgment and decree passed by the High Court
is set aside, and that passed by the trial court is restored. C
As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to get the sale
deed executed and registered, with respect to all the suit
land available (minus the land acquired and the land
purchased by respondent no.6). The appellant is directed
to refund the amount of compensation to respondent no. D
1 along with 9% interest. [para 16-17] [764-D-E]
Case Law Reference:
1999 (1) SCR 1168 relied on para 13
E
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 681 relied on para 13
2008 (10) SCR 905 relied on para 13
2010 (12) SCR 515 relied on para 13
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2885-2887 of 2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2003 of the
High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh in C.C.C. Appeal
Nos. 34, 33 of 1991 and 92 of 1993. G
WITH
C.A. Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005.
'
Anoop G. Chaudhari, A.T.M. Rangaramanuj_am, P. Vinay H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.
A Kumar, Vijay Prakash, Sohan Singh Rana, Bindra Rana,
Vikrant Rana, Piyush Kumar (For S.S. Rana & Co.), Vishal
Yadav, R. Santhan Krishnan, Praveen Kumar Pandey, Aditya
A., D~ Mahesh Babu, A.V. Rangam, Richa Bharadwaja, Abhijit
Sengupta for the Appearing Parties.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S.CHAUHAN, J.
Civil Appeal Nos. 2885-2887 of 2005
c 1. These appeals have been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 10.6.2003 by the High Court of
Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in C.C.C.A. Nos.34
. and 33 of 1991 and C.C.C.A.No. 92of1993, by way of which
the appeals filed by the respondents against the common
D judgment and decree dated 22.3.1991, in O.S. No.30of1984
and O.S. No.135 of 1984, passed by the court of the Additional
Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, have been partly
allowed, by modifying the said judgment and order of the trial
court.
E
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
are that:
A. The appellant/plaintiff was carrying on business prior to
F 1.1.1978 in the appurtenant land as a tenant, and had made
an offer to purchase the said premises, alongwith two other
premises belonging to the landlady Ms. Anjum Jehan -
respondent No.1 /defendant No.1 (hereinafter referred to as
'Res.No.1').
G B. The parties entered into an agreement dated
15.10.1977, for the sale of land admeasuring 1200 square
yards situated at Musheerabad, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh,
for a total consideration of Rs.1, 70,070/-. Out of which a sum
of Rs.25,000/- was paid as earnest money. The said agreement
H to sell, provided that the sale deed was to be executed within
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 755
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
a period of six months from the date of agreement, or upon A
intimation by the vendor, as she had to obtain permission from
the competent authority under Section 27 of the Urban Land
Ceiling Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1976), the
necessary income tax clearances and the sub division
permission from the municipal corporation. The aforesaid suit B
land was also in the possession of the landlady, and had partly
been occupied by defendant no. 2/respondent (Narsoji).
C. After the execution of the said agreement to sell, the
appellant/plaintiff paid non-agricultural assessment tax. A legal C
notice dated 18.6.1979 was received by the appellant from
Res. No.1 Ms. Anjum Jehan, stating that she had obtained
requisite permission from the statutory authorities under the Act
1976, from the income tax authorities, and also from the sub-
divisional authorities.
D
D. The appellant/plaintiff asked Res. No.1 vide letter dated
2. 7.1979, to send the copies of the aforesaid permissions, as
well as a copy of the General Povver of Attorney (hereinafter
referred to as the 'GPA'), that had been executed by her:
E
E. Instead of executing the sale-deed in favour of the
appellant/plaintiff, Res. No.1 tried to sell the suit property to other
persons. Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff got a public notice
published in local newspapers on 29.4.1980 and 30.4.1980, in
respect of the suit property, stating that an agreement to sell F
had been executed between the parties as regards the said
land, and that therefore, no other person mustpurchase the
same.
F. Despite the said notice, the GPA holder of Res. No.1
entered into two different agreements to sell with respondent G
no. 2/defendant no.3 (K.S.R.Murthy) on 29/30.4.1980, for open
land admeasuring 510 square yards.
G. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit bearing O.S. No. 30
of 1984 on 23.6.1983 for specific performance of the H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.
A agreement to sell dated 15.10.1977, directing the Res. No.1
to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the appellant/
plaintiff, and ignoring the agreement to sell in favour of
respondent/defendant nos.3, 6 and 7.
H. Respondent no.3/Defendant No. 7 (K.Y. Rajaiah} filed
8
Original Suit No. 135 of 1984 on 27.12.1983, for perpetual
injunction, restraining the appellant/plaintiff from interfering with
the construction of a theatre building, including the compound
wall of the same, which was in close proximity to his land.
C I. During the pendency of these two suits, Res.No.1
executed a sale deed, and she got the same registered on
29.4.1985, in favour of respondent no.2/defendant no.3 with
respect to the part of the suit property ad measuring 260 square
yards, and the recital of the sale deed acknowledged the
D agreement between the appellant/plaintiff and Res. No.1.
J. The GPA holder registered another sale deed in favour
of respondent no.2/defendant no. 3 on 30.4.1985, with respect
to the suit property admeasuring 260 square yards.
E K. The trial court, vide judgment and decree dated
22.3.1991 decreed the suit of the appellant/plaintiff except for
a small area admeasuring 65 square yards, which had been
purchased by defendant no.6 (represented by Lrs. defendant
nos.6 to 1O}, observing that the said defendant had no
F knowledge of any agreement to sell between the appellant/
plaintiff and Res. No.1. The trial court also dismissed Suit
No.135 of 1984 that had been filed by respondent no.3/
defendant No.7 (K.Y. Rajaiah}.
G L. The appellant/plaintiff was directed to deposit the
balance consideration amount in the trial court within a period
of four weeks, and the same was duly deposited by the
appellant/plaintiff on 6.4.1991.
M. Both sides preferred appeals before the High Court,
H
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 757
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
and all the appeals were disposed of by a common judgment A
dated 10.6.2003, as referred to hereinabove.
N. The High Court held, that the appellant/plaintiff was not
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, thus, in view
of the same, there was no occasion to decide issues regarding B
whether the subsequent purchasers were in fact, bonafide
purchasers for consideration without notice of the agreement
to sell between the appellant/plaintiff and Res. No.1. However,
the court further held, that the appellant/plaintiff would be entitled
to get the sale deed executed in respect of the said land,
excluding the land sold to defendant nos.3, 6 and 7 at the rate C
of Rs. 750/- per square yard, adjusting the amount that had
already been paid.
0. Res.No.1 filed a Review Petition before the High Court.
During the pendency of the said review petition, both the sides D
have preferred these appeals. The Review Petition filed by Res.
No.1 stood dismissed vide order dated 20.2.2004. The said
order is also under challenge before us in connected appeal
Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005.
E
Hence, these appeals.
3. Shri Anoop G. Chaudhari, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff, has submitted that
the High Court, while dealing with the first appeal, has decided
the same under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, F
1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the CPC'), giving strict
adherence to Order XU Rule 31 CPC, and thus that it ought to
have dealt with each and every issue, and appreciate all the
evidence on record. It was under an obligation to record
findings on each issue separately. The High Court has G
committed an error in appreciating the evidence on record, and
coming to the conclusion that the appellant/plaintiff was not
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as the
appellant/plaintiff had in fact been issuing public notices, with
the intention of making other people aware of the fact that they H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 2 S.C.R.
A must not indulge in any kind of transaction in respect of the suit
property, as the same belonged to him. He also had the
financial capacity to pay, which stood proved by the fact that
within a period of three weeks from the date of judgment and
decree of the High Court, he deposited the entire amount.
B Furthermore, the High Court ought to have appreciated the
evidence on record, with respect to whether the other
defendants/subsequent bonafide purchasers had purchased
the land without notice. Merely saying that the same was not
necessary, would mean that the court itself has violated the
c mandate of Order XU Rule 31 CPC. Res.No.1 (Ms. Anjum
Jehan) never appeared in the witness box and never filed a
written statement. The same was filed by her GPA holder. The
said GPA was in respect of various other properties, and the
GPA holder was not authorised to pursue suits in respect of
the suit property. Under no circumstance is the GPA holder
0
competent to enter the witness box and to give evidence as a
substitute for the original party. Thus, the appeals deserve to
be allowed, and the judgment and decree of the High Court, is
liable to be set aside.
E 4. Per contra Shri A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, Senior
Advocate, Shri R. Anand Padmanabhan, Shri Sohan Singh
Rana and Shri A.V. Rangam, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents, have opposed the appeals
contending that the High Court has appreciated the evidence
F on record and has reached the correct conclusion. The findings
of the fact recorded by the High Court are based on evidence,
and do not warrant any interference by this Court. The appellanV
plaintiff, has not furnished any explanation for the delay, as he
was duly informed by Res. No.1 of the fact that she had
G obtained the required sanctions/permissions. Had the
appellanVplantiff been in a position to perform his part of the
contract, he could not have waited for a period of more than 4
years to file the suit. During the pendency of the cases, a part
of the suit land stood acquired for widening the road. The
H appellant without having any title over the land, has claimed and
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 759
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
withdrawn a huge amount of compensation unauthorisedly/ A
fraudulently. Thus, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
parties, and perused the record.
6. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence on record B
came to the following conclusions:
Q The evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants
does not conclusively establish their plea to the
effect that the plaintiff himself had cancelled the c
agreement to sell {Ex.A-1), in view of his inability
to pay the balance of the sale consideration.
II) The plaintiff had the capacity to raise and pay the
balance of the sale consideration under Ex.A-1.
D
Thus, the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract.
HQ There were inconsistent versions with regard to the
extent of the land alleged to have been sold to
defendant nos.3 and 7. E
IV) The plaintiff had paid the amount towards non-
agricultural assessment tax and property tax for the
suit property.
V) The plaintiff had not rescinded the suit contract, and F
had not informed the first defendant that he was not
in a position to complete the sale transaction, and
that therefore, defendant no.1 was at liberty to sell
the suit land to any other person, as has been
contended by defendant no.1 G
VI) Defendant nos.3 and 6 were subsequent
purchasers for consideration without notice.
Defendant no.6 is a bonafide purchaser for value,
without notice of the agreement to sell {Ex.A-1). H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 2 S.C.R.
A 7. The High Court while deciding the first appeal filed
under Section 96 CPC, did not consider all the issues as is
required under Order XU Rule 31 CPC. On the other hand, it
dealt with only one issue elaborately, without making any
reference to the pleadings taken by the parties. The High Court
B held:
(i) No steps were taken by the appellant/plaintiff in
establishing his readiness and willingness to perform his
part of the contract.
c (ii) Only a nominal sum was paid by the appellant/plaintiff
in 1977 and till the date that the suit was filed, no effort
was made by the appellant/plaintiff to pay the balance
amount.
D (iii) There has been inordinate delay on the part of the
appellant/plaintiff in filing the suit. Had he been ready and
willing, he ought to have approached the court at the
earliest.
(iv) As per the evidence of defendant no. 7, the power of
E attorney holder (DW.1 ), did not call the appellant/plaintiff
and ask him to get the sale deed executed, in pursuance
of agreement dated 15.10.1977. The appellant/plaintiff
expressed his inability to get the sale deed executed as
he had no ready cash.
F
{v) There was no requirement in law to obtain permission
for separate sub-division and thus, Res.No.1 was not
required to obtain any such sanction. Furthermore, the said
property had already been sub-divided, and bore different
G numbers.
(vi) Res. No.1 had obtained the requisite permission from
the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities in December 1977,
and the appellant/plaintiff had handed over the draft sale
deed to Res. No.1.
H
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 761
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(vii) It was because the appellant/plaintiff was not willing A
and ready to perform his part of the contract, and was
resorting to dilatory tactics, that Res. No.1 had entered into
two agreements to sell with respondent nos.3 and 7.
(viii) In view of the above, there was no occasion to 8
examine the other issues, particularly those with respect
to whether the other respondents were bonafide
purchasers for consideration without notice, and the
appeals were hence disposed of, as has been referred to
hereinabove.
c
8. The plaint contained a specific averment in paragraph
7 as under:
''The plaintiff is and had always been ready and willing to
perform his part of the suit agreement and it is the first D
defendant, who evaded to perform her part of the suit
agreement and finally committed to refusal of the terms of
the suit agreement amounting to refusal on her part to so
perform her part of the suit agreement."
9. In the written statement, Res. No. 1 simply denied the E
said averment, and further averred that:
"The allegation in para 7 of the plaint that the plaintiff wa·s
always ready and willing to perform his part of the suit
agreement being incorrect is denied. The allegation that F
the defendant committed breach of the agreement and
failed to perform her part of the agreement being incorrect
is denied. The Defendant submits on the contrary that the
plaintiff failed to perform his part of the agreement thereby
committed a breach of the agreement The Defendant, G
submits that the Defendant performed her part of the
agreement and was ready to perform her part of the
agreement, It is submitted that finally when the plaintiff failed
to raise necessary money towards the sale price plaintiff
H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.
A informed the Defendant that she/is at liberty to sell the
property to anyone."
10. A replication was filed by the appellant/plaintiff under
Order VIII Rule 9 CPC, wherein it has been submitted in
paragraph 6 thereof as under:
8
"The plaintiff is a big businessman having a business
turnover of more than 5 lakhs per year. He is always
capable of providing and raising the necessary finances
to complete the sale transaction"
c
11. These are the only pleadings taken by the parties so
far as the issue of readiness and willingness to perform part
of the contract by the appellant/plaintiff is concerned. The
appellant/plaintiff examined himself as PW.1, and in his cross-
D examination he has denied any suggestion made to him to the
effect that he had ever informed the power of attorney holder
of Res. No.1, namely, Shri S.S. Noor Ali, that he would be
unable to raise the balance of the sale consideration. Nor he
had ever told defendant no. 7 that he wanted to sell the
E agricultural land to raise money to purchase the suit property.
No question was put to him in the cross-examination, in
response to which he could establish that he was a man of
means, which he has thus stated in the replication, though he
has admitted that he has certain outstanding dues towards the
bank. He has denied the suggestion that he had neither a
F house, nor agricultural land, and that he had no capacity to pay
the sale consideration, and further, that he had falsely deposed
in respect of the same.
12. The allegation made in the written statement stating
G that the appellant/plaintiff had told Res. No. 1 that she was free
to sell the land, was not established by leading any evidence.
Additionally, Res. No. 1 lives in the USA. It is nobody's case
that the appellant/plaintiff had any communication with her. It was
not mentioned in the averments raised in the written statement,
H that she had been informed anyone of the same through the
S. KESARI HANUMAN GOUD v. ANJUM JEHAN 763
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
power of attorney holder. Further, with respect to the issue A
regarding financial capacity to pay, the appellant/plaintiff
examined K. Narayana Reddy (PW.2) and Laxman Gore
(PW.3). They fully supported his case, deposing that he was a
man of means, and that he had sufficient properties and the
means to purchase the said suit property. B
Thus, the finding recorded by the High Court on this issue
is perverse being contrar)' to the evidence on record.
13. It is a settled legal proposition that the power of
attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal. C
Provisions of Order Ill, Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder
of the power of attorney to "act" on behalf of the principal. The
word "acts" employed therein is confined only to "acts" done
by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the power
granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term "acts", D
would not include deposing in place and instead of the
principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has
preferred any "acts" in pursuance of the power of attorney, he
may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he
cannot depose for the principal for acts done by the principal, E
and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in
respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal can
have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the principal
is entitled to be cross-examined. (See: Vidhyadhar v.
Manikrao &Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1441; Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani F
v. lndusind Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217; MIS Shankar
Finance and Investment v. State of A.P & Ors., AIR 2009 SC
422; and Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC
512).
14. So far as the notice of the agreement between the G
appellant and Res. No. 1 is concerned, the trial court after taking
note of the recital of the said agreement in the agreement to
sell and sale deed also, has held, that, so far as the land sold
to respondents other than respondent no.6, the parties had
been fully aware of the same. Only respondent no.6 had no such H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 2 S.C.R.
A notice. Shri A. G. Chaudhari, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that the same being
a very small area, the appellant is not willing to disturb the
possession of defendant no.6.
15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the
8
appellant has not yet acquired any title over the land, he has
no right to receive compensation to the tune of Rs.
29,47, 112/-. However, he withdrew the said amount by giving
an undertaking to return the said amount to Res. No. 1 in case
C any such order was passed by the court in this regard.
16. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The
judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside,
and the same passed by the trial court is restored. As a
consequence, the appellant is entitled to get the. sale deed
D executed and registered, with respect to all the suit land
available now (minus the land acquired and the land purchased
by the respondent no.6).
17. The appellant is directed to refund the amount of
E compensation received by him to Res. No. 1 within a period
of three months, alongwith 9% interest from the date of receipt
till the date of payment.
Civil Appeal Nos. '2888 and 4459 of 2005
F In view of the judgment and order in Civil Appeal Nos.
2885-2887 of 2005, these appeals are dismissed.
R.P. Appeals Disposed of.
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