Holding

Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not preclude a High Court from taking suo motu cognizance and punishing criminal contempt of a subordinate court.

Summary

In a proceeding before the Uttar Pradesh Board of Revenue, the appellant S.K. Sarkar allegedly abused counsel Vinay Chandra Misra, using vulgar language, and was accused of committing criminal contempt of his own court and the High Court. Misra filed a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the Allahabad High Court took suo motu cognizance despite the absence of a reference from the subordinate court or a motion by the Advocate‑General, rejecting the appellant's preliminary objection. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that Section 15(2) of the Act barred the High Court from acting on its own motion in such cases. The Supreme Court held that Section 15(2) does not restrict the High Court’s power to take cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court on its own motion, provided the information is not frivolous and the contempt is serious. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s order upheld.

Issues considered

The scope of Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: whether it limits a High Court's power to take suo motu cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate court.
Whether the High Court may act suo motu without a reference from the subordinate court or a motion by the Advocate‑General.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 10, s. 12, s. 14, s. 15(1), s. 15(2), s. 16, s. 19
U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, 1950s. 209, s. 331A

Subjects

contempt of courtsuo motu jurisdictionHigh Court powersSection 15 Contempt Actcriminal contemptsubordinate courtprocedural safeguardsCourt of RecordArticle 215Article 129

Judgment

,
331

' S. K. SARKAR, MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE,
U.P., LUCKNOW
v.
VINAY CHANDRA MISRA
A

December 12, 1980
(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] B

Contemp1 of Courts Act 1971, S. 15(2)-Scope of Contempt of Subordi-
nate or inferior Court-Whether High Court can take suo .motu cognizance
of and punish . .

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by section 15(2) empowers the High
Colut in the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court. to take C
cognizance· on a reference made to it by the subordinate court, or on a motion
made by the Advocate-General, or in relation to a Union Territory by the
notified I.aw Officer.

In a proceeding under the U.P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act 1950,
the respondent-advocate, appeared as a counsel before the appellant who was
a Member of the Board of Revenue to oppooe the vacation of a stay ofder D
filed before the Board .
. The respondent, in his petition to the High Court under the Contempt of
Courts, 1971 alleged that in the course of arguments before the appellant in
the aforesaid proceeding, the appellant got infuriated, lost his temper and
abused him saying "Nalayak Gadhe Salle ko Jail Bhijwadunga; kis Idiot Ne
Advocate Bana Diya Hai", and that thereby the appellant had committed B
contempt of his own Court as well as that of the High Court as provided
in sections 15 and 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act which was punishable
under section 12 of the said Act.

Before the High Court, the appellant raised a prelin1inary objection stating
that the High Court was not competent to take cognizance of the alleged con·
tempt without any reference from the subordinate Court or without a motion
F
by the Advocate-General as envisaged by section 15(2) of the Act. The High
Court rejected the preliminary objection and held that the application was

-. n1aintainable.

Jn the appeal to this Court, on the question whether the High Court can
take suo motu cognizance of contempt of subordinate/inferior Court when it
is not moved in either of the two mcxles mentioned in section 15(2) of the G
• Act.
HELD : I. Sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act
1971, does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of and
punish contempt of a subordinate Court, on its own motion [339 A]
•
2. In the facts of the instant case the High Court has not acted improperly
or illegally in taking suo motu cognizance, on the petition of the respondent- H
advocate. [340 C]
•
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.R. '

A 3. Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and
the High Court, respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power '"'
to punish the contempt of itself. Parliament has, by virtue of Entry 77 of
List I of the Seventh Schedule, and Entry 14 of List Ill of the Seventh Sche-
dule, power to define and Jimit the power of the Courts in punishing contempt
of Court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. [337 A·B]

Mohd. lkranz Hussain v. The Stale of U.P., A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1625 referred
B to.
4. Section 15 does not specify the basis or the sources of the inforni::1tion
on which the High Court can act on its own motion. If the High Court acts
on information derived from its own sources, such as on a perusal of the records
of a .subordinate court or on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a public
speech, without there being any reference from the subordinate court or the
Advocate-General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion.
But if the High Court is directly moved by a petition by a private person feel-
ing aggrieved, not being the Advocate-General, the High Court, has, a discre-
tion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion
on the basis of the information supplied to it in that petition. If. the petitioner
is a responsible member of the legal profe~ion, it nray act suo motu. [339B-E]

f)
'· If the High Court is pri1na .facie satisfied that the information received
by it regarding the commission of contempt of a subordinate court is not fri-
volous, and the contempt alleged is not merely technical or trivial, it may, in
its discretion, act suo motu and commence the proceedings against the rontem-
ner. However, this mode of taking suo n1otu cognizance of contempt of a
subordinate court should be resorted to sparingly where the contempt concerned
is of a grave and serious nature. [339 F-G]

6. lf the intention of the Legislature was to take away the power of the
High Court to take suo 1notu cognizance of contempt, there was no difficulty
in saying so in unequivocal language, or in wording sub-section (2) of section
15 in a negative form. [338 H; 339 A]

7. The whole object of prescribing procedural mOOes of taking cognizance
in section 15 is to safeguard the valuable time of the High Court or of the
F Supreme Court from being wasted by frivolous complaints of contempt of
court. [339 El

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 294 •
of 1974.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.4.1978 of the Allahabad
G High Court in Criminal Misc. Contempt Case No. 115/73.
0. P. Rana for the Appellant.
J. P. Goyal and Pramod Swarup for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by •
H SARKARIA, J. fhis appeal is directed against an order, dated
April 10, 19 i'4. ol the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
•
, s. K. SARKAR v. V. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.) 333

Criminal Misc. Contempt Case No. 115 of 1973. It raises a question
• of law as to the jurisdiction and powers of a High Court to take
action suo motu under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. The material facts giving rise to this appear are as follows:

Raj Narain alias Raja Sharma, Ram Narain, Tapesh Narain alias
Trilok Narain and Hari Narain, respondents instituted Suit No. 89/ B
168 under Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari & Land Reforms Act
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) for ejectment of eleven defendants.

- Issue No. 6 framed in the case was referred uni;!cr Section 331A
of the Act to the Revenue Officer, Sub-Divisional Office, for seeking
declaration under Section 143 or 144 of that Act, with regard to the c
question as to whether the land in suit was abadi land before the
consolidation and even thereafter. The Revenue Officer by his order,
• dated September 3, 1970, dismissed the suit. Aggreived by the
dismissal of their suit, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the
Commissioner, Meerut, who, by his order dated April 29, 1972,
allowed the appeal and decreed the suit with costs. D

Against the decree of the Commissioner, the defendants preferred
Revenue Second Appeal No. 226(2) of 1971-72 before the Revenue
Board. Along with the petition of appeal, they made an application
for stay of the execution of the ejectmcnt decree. The Board of
Revenue passed an order on June 12, 1972, staying the execution of E
the decree. The opposite party therein, moved an application for
vacation of the cx-parte stay order. The application for vacation of
stay order came up for hearing before the appellant, herein, in his
capacity as Member of the Revenue Board, on October 23, 1973.
The respondent, Shri Vinay Chandra Misra appeared as a counsel in
that Court on behalf 9f the appellant therein, to oppose the vacation F
of the stay order. What happened thereafter on that day, according
to the allegations in the petition and affidavit, dated October 23,
1973, of Shri v. C. Misra, Advocate filed before the High Court,
;:
, was as follows:
"That on the said date the opposite party (appellant G
herein) heard the counsel of the parties in the case and was
pleased to confirm the stay order.
6. That even after passing of the order aforesaid the
counsel of (the respondent in that appeal) addressed the
Court (opposite party) further and during the course of his
• H
arguments, the opposite party (appellant herein) scored the
order and vacated the stay order and threw the file for get-
ting the signatures of the parties atnxed on the same .
•

I
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

7. That on this, the deponent (Shri V. N. Mishra)
requested the opposite party to hear him and when he
resisted, the opposite party got infuriated, Jost his temper •
and abused the applicant and ordered the Court peon to throw
the deponent physically out of the Court. .... "
On the preceding facts, Shri Misra, on October 23, 1973, filed
B a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against
the appellant, herein, in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
alleging that since the, facts stated in the petition and the affidavit,
supporting it, show that the "opposite party (appellant herein) com-
mitted the contempt of his own Court as that of the High Court as •
provided under Section 15/16 of the Contempt of Courts Act
c punishable under Section 12 of the said Act, he deserves to be
punished for the same in order to save the dignity, decorum and
honour of his Court and that of the Hon'ble High Court". Shri
V. C. Misra further prayed that the High Court "be pleased to take
suo motu action under Section 15 (1) of the aforesaid Act against
D the contemner-opposite party or be pleased to pass such other and
further order as the Court deems fit."
In Annexure 'l' to his petition, Shri V. N. Misra gave particulars
of the alleged criminal conduct of the appellant and of the con-
temptuous words uttered by him. In that Annexure, he alleged,
inter alia, that the appellant had used these abusive words in respect
E of him (Shri Misra) "Nalayak Gadhe Sale ko Jail Bhijwadunga;
Kis Idiot Ne Advocate Bana Diya Hai".
On receiving this .petition, the High Court straight-away issued
notice to the appellant, herein, to show cause why he be not pro-
ceeded against for committing contempt o{ Court. The appellant
received this notice on November 5, 1973 and filed his reply sup-
F ported by an affidavit dated November 8, 1973, in which he denied
the allegations in the petition levelled by Shri V. C. Misra. The
latter also filed a rejoinder aff.davit dated December 10, 1973, in

G
which he reiterated the allegations in his petition and in the
Annexures thereto.
A preliminary objection was taken by the appellant before the
High Court, that the latter was not competent to take cognizance of
\ -
the contempt alleged to have been commited in the petition moved
by Shri Misra without any reference from the subordinate court or
without a motion by the Advocate-General. Reliance in this con-
nection was placed on sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. The
H High Court rejected this preliminary objection with these observations:
"Since Article 215 (of the Constitution) states that every
High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the
•
• s. K. SARKAR v. v. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.) 335

powers of such a Court, it follows that through that Article .
the Constitution preserved to the High Courts its power as
a Court of Record to puuish contempt of subordinate Courts.
No doubt a special reference is made in Article 215 to the
power of the High Court to punish contempt of itself. That
has only been done to emphasise that particular power of the
High Court. The aforesaid words do not exclude what the B
preceding part of Article 215 preserves to or confers on the
High Court. ....

• The result of incorporating Article 215 in the Constitu-
. tion is that the power of every High Court as a Court of
Record to punish contempt of the subordinate courts now c
carries a constitutianal sanction behind it and that the power
cannot be done away with except through an amendment of
the Constitution .

. . Section 2 of the 1926 Act and Section 3 of the 1952
Act do not confer any new power but recognise the power D
that a High Court already possesses as a Court of Record;
it can be said that equal force about Sectian 10 of the 1971
Act that it does not confer any new jurisdiction in the High
Court but only recognised the jurisdiction which was initially
inherent in every High Court as a Court of Record and which
E
now has the sanction of the Constitution behind it by virtue
of Article 215. . '

If Section 15, sub-section ( 2) is interpreted to mean that
a High Court cannot take cognizance of the contempt com-
mitted of a subordinate court, whether committed by the
court itself or by a stranger, except in one of the modes speci- F
fied therein it can lead to anomalous results ............ .

" ... Interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 15 in that
• y
manner would be inconsistent with Section 10 of the Act
and shall be violative of the powers of this Court as a Court
of Record, which powers now carry Constitutional sanctian G
by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution .
. . Section 10 of 1971 Act explicitly states that every High
Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power
and authority in accordance with the same procedure and
• practice in respect of the contempt of Courts subordinate H
to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of
itself, .... "
•
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R. •

A Aggrieved by the order of the High Court rejecting the prelimi-
nary objection, the appellant has now come in appeal before us. •
At the outset, a preliminary objection has been taken by Shri
Goyal, learned counsel for the respondent, that under Section 19 (1)
of the Act, only a final order whereby the contemner is
punished is apP"alable; that since the impugned order is not such an
order, this appeal is incompetent. In this connection Shri Goyal has
referred to several decisions, including that in Purslwttam Das Goyal
v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice 8. S. Dhil/on( 1 ), whereby it has been held that
it could not be the inrontion of the, legislature to provide for an appeal
to this Court as a matter of right from each and every interlocutory
c order passed in the proceedings initiated under Section 17 of the Act,
by the High Court. An order or decision in order to be ap!"'alable
nnder Section 19 ( 1} of the Act, must be such that it decides some
bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of '
the party aggrieved. Reference has also been made to the decision of
this Court in V. C. Shukla v. State(').
D
This objection of Shri Goyal has been rendered merely academic,
because as a matter of abundant caution, the appellant herein has
filed a petition for grant of special leave under Article 136 of the
Constitution, also. The matter being important, the leave to appeal has
been granted to him.
E
The controversy in this appeal cenlres round the question, whether
the High Court can take suo motu cognizance of contempt of a
subordinate/inferior court when it is not moved in either of the two
modes mentioned in Section 15(2) of the Act.

Before dealing with this contention, it is necessary to have a look
F at the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Act.
Article 215 of the Constitution provides :
"Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall
have all the powers of such. a court including the power to ' ....
punish for contempt of itself."
G Entry 14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is to this effect : "Contempt
of Court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court." A pro- •
vision analogous to Article 215 is Article 129 which preserves to the
Supreme Court all the powers of a Court of Record including the
power to punish for contempt of itself. Entry 77 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule is relatable to Article 129. •
H
(1) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 510.
(2) A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 62
•
s. K. SARKAR v. V. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.) 337

Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court A
and the High Court, respectively, as a Court of Re<:ord which include
• the power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this
Court in MoM. Jkram Hussain v. The State of U.P.( 1 ), !here are no
curbs, on the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself
except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129
and 215 do not define as to what constitutes contempt of court. &
Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid Entries in List I and List
III of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and limit the powers of
the courts in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their pro-
cedure in relation thereto. Indeed, this is what is stated in the Preamble
of the Act of 1971.
c·
Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal contempt". Section 9
empha~ises that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as
implying tlmt any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is
punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable
apart from this Act". Section 10 runs as under :
"Every High Court shall have and exercise the same
jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the
same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of
courts subordinate to it as it bas and exercises in respect of
contempts of itself."
Then, there is a proviso which is not material for our purpose. The E"
provision in Section I 0 is but a replica of Section 3 of the 1952 Act.
The pl1rase "courts subordinate to it" used in Section 10 is wide
enough to include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the
High Court, even though administrative control over them under
Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in the High Court. Under
Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court has the power of super- F
intendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue
Board, therefore, in the instant rase, is a court "subordinate to the
., High Court" within the contemplation of Section 10 of the Act.
Section 14 provides for the procedure where contempt is commit- G·
ted in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 is
• very material for our purpose. It provides in regard to cognizance of
'criminal contempt' in cases other than those falling under Section 14.
The material portion of Section 15 reads thus :
" ( 1) In the rose of a criminal contempt, other than a 8'
contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Conrt or
(I) A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1625

•
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.

A the High Court may take action on its own motion or on
a motion made by- •
( a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the
Advocate-General.
8
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordi-
nate court, the High Court may Pake action on a reference
made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by
the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union Territory,
by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf... "
)
c
The operation of sub-section (1) appears to be confined to cases of
'criminal contempt' of the Supreme Court or the High Court, itself.
Criminal contempt of a subordinate court is dealt with in sub-section '
(2).
D A comparison between the two snb-sections would show that
whereas in sub-section ( 1) one of the three alternative modes for
taking cognizance, mentioned is "on its own motion", no such mode
is expressly provided in sub-section (2). The only two modes of
taking cognizance by the High Court mentioned in sub-section (2) are :
(i) on a reference made to it by a subordinate court; or (ii) on a
E motion made by the Advocate-General, or in rehttion tu a Union Ter-
ritory by the notified Law Officer. Does the omission in Section
15 (2) of the mode of taking suo motu cognizance indicate a legislative
intention to debar the High Court from taking cognizance in that mode
of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court '! If this question is
answered in the affirmative, then, such a construction of sub-section
F
(2) will be inconsistent with Section 10 which makes the powers of
the High Court to punish for contempt of a subordinate court, co-
extensive and congruent with its power to Runish for its own con-
tempt, not only in regard to quantum or pre-requisites for punishment,
but also in the matter of procedure and practice. Such a construc-
G tion which will bring Section 15(2) in conflict with Section 10, has
to be avoided, and the other interpretation which will be in harmony
with Section 10 is to be accepted. Harmoneously construed, sub-
section (2) of Section 15 does not deprive the High Court of the
power of taking cognizance of criminal contempt of a. subordinate
, court, on its own motion, also. If the intention of the Legislature
H , was to take away the power of the High Court to take suo motu
•cognizance of such contempt, there was no difficulty in saying so in
. unequivocal language, or by wording the sub-section in a negative
•
.. s. K. SARKAR v. v. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.) 339

form. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with A
the High Court, that sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly cons-
trued, does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cogni-
zance of and punish contempt of a subordinate court, on its own
motion.

It is, however, to be noted that Section 15 does not specify the 3
basis or the source of information on which the High Court can act
on its own motion. If the High Court acts on information derived
from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records of a sub-
• ordinate court or on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a
public speech, without there being any reference from the subordi- c
nate court or the Advocate-General, it can be said to have taken
cognizance on its own motion. But if the High Court is directly
moved by a petition by a private person feeling aggrieved, not beingi
' the Advocate-General, can the High Court refuse to entertain the
same on the ground that it has been made without the consent in
writing of the Advocate-General ? It appears to us that the High D
Court, has, in such a situation, a discretion to refuse to entertain
the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion on the basis of
the information supplied to it in that petition. If the petitioner is a
responsible member of the legal profession, it may act suo motu,
more so, if the petitioner-advocate, as in the instant case, prays that
the court should act suo motu. The whole object of prescribing E
these procedural modes of taking cognizance in Section 15 it to safe-
guard the valuable time of the High Court or the Supreme <:;ourt
from being wasted by frivolous complaints of contempt of court. If
the High Court is prima fade satisfied that the information received
by it regarding the commission of contempt of a subordinate court is
not frivolous, and the contempt alleged is not merely technical or F
trivial, it may, in its discretion, act suo motu and commence the pro-
ceedings against the contemner. However, this mode of taking suo
motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court, should be resor-
.' ted to sparingly where the contempt concerned is of a grave and seri-
ous nature. Frequent use of this suo motu power on the information G
furnished by an incompetent petition, may render these procedural
safeguards provided in sub-section (2), otiose. In such cases, the
High Court may be well advised to avail of the advice and assistance
of the Advocate-General before initiating proceedings. The advice
Md opinion, in this connection, expressed by the Sanyal Committee
• is a pertinent reminder. "In the case of criminal contempt, not being H
contempt committed in the face of the court, we are of the opinion
that it would lighten the burden of the court, w\thout in any way inter-
•
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

fering with the sanctity of the administration of justice, if action is
taken on a motion by some other agency. Such a course of action
would give considerable assurance to the individual charged and the •
public at large. Indeed .• some High Courts have already made rules
for the association of the Advocate-General in some categories of cases
at least ...... the Advocate-General may, also, move the Court not
8 only on bis own motion but also at the instance of the court concerned."
In the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, we do not think
that the High Court has acted improperly or illegally in taking suo
motu cognizan~e, on the petition of the respondent-advocate.

c We, therefore, dismiss this appeal and send the case back to the
High Court for further proceedings in accordance with law.
As a matter of caution, we would add that nothing in this judg-
ment shall be construed as an observation relating to the merits of
the allegation levelled by Shri V. C. Misra against the appellant. '
D
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

' -

•
•