Holding

The Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1980 and the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 are within State legislative competence under Entry 30 of List II and are saved by clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19, thus are upheld.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined challenges to the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1980 and the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976, which provide relief of agricultural indebtedness to small farmers, landless labourers and weaker sections. Money lenders and pawn‑brokers contended that the statutes were beyond State legislative competence under Entry 30 of List II and violated Articles 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution by extinguishing non‑agricultural debts. The Court held that the entry’s opening term "money‑lending and money‑lenders" is to be given its widest meaning and the subsequent words merely illustrate the purpose, so the Acts fall within State power. It further held that the relief measures are a valid exercise of the State’s power to achieve social and economic justice under Article 39 and are protected by the reasonable‑restriction clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19. Consequently, the statutes are not ultra vires, and the petitions and appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The legislative competence of State legislatures to enact the Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Debt Relief Acts under Entry 30 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.
Whether the Acts violate Article 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 14 by extinguishing debts of non‑agricultural nature.
Whether the inclusion of "relief of agricultural indebtedness" limits the scope of the entry.

Legislation cited

Subjects

legislative competenceEntry 30 List IIdebt reliefagricultural indebtednessArticle 19Article 14fundamental rightssocial justicestate legislation

Judgment

722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R. /

A 19(l)(f),(g) of the Constitution, as the Kamataka Act was passed before
19(1)(f) was omitted from tile Constitution; tllat it was a constitutional
policy for entrusting only such .,atters concerning agriculture to the
States and leaving the remaining field either for ~he Union's list I or the
Concurrent List Ill; that as a result oftbe proclamation of Emergency, the
B enforcement of the fundamental rights was suspended but the rights
themselves did not disappear; that when the Emergency was withdrawn,
the impediment by way of suspension of the enforcement of the rights
disappeared Hd the Act, if found to be in violation of the fundamental
rights had to be declared ultra vires; that as a direct result of the Kamataka
Act a particular class of debts automatically disappeared and the creditors
C were deprived of their right to hold their property in the shape of the loan
due to them.

Dismissing the writ petitions, appeals and Special Leave Petition,
this Court

D HELD : 1.01. The cardinal rule of interpretation that words should
be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning is subject to
this rider that while construing a constitutional document conferring
legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the
words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. [727G]
E
1.02. None of the items in the Usts is to be read in a narrow or
restricted/ sense, and that each general word should be held to extend to
all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said
to be comprehended in it. [728A] -
F Navinch,andra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay
City, [1955] 1 ·SCR 829 at 836-837; United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum
and others, (1940) F.C.R. UO;A.L.S.P.P.L. Subrahmanyam Chettiarv.Mut-
tuswami Goundan, (1940) FCR 188; Prafulla KJ/mar Mukherjee & Ors. v.
The Bank of Commerce Ltd. Klntinfl, Indian Appeals; (L.R. Vol. LXXIV) 23;
G Veefappa v. Chinnasam~ (1950) II M.W. 328; Mannikkasundara v. R.S.
Nayu.du, (1946) F.C.R. 67 and State of Madras v. Gannon Dynkerley;& Co.,
(Madras) Ltd., (1959] SCR 379, referred to.
r-
1.03. The purpose of inclusion of the subsequent words in entry No.
30 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was to illustrate
H the scope and the object of the legislation envisaged by the opening
SURANA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 723

expression. The latter part serves another purpose also. (7298) A
1.04. 11aere was some scope for controversy as to the area covered
by an entry limited to the first part or the present Entry No.JO. [7.29C]

1.05. The decision giving a wide meaning to the expression could not
be binding on the Supreme Court and so long the matter was not finally B
settled by this Court, the courts in the meantime could have been.flooded
by unnecessary litigation. This has been al·oided by including the second
part which should be treated as illustrating the scope and object or the
legislation in the first part. (7290)

- 1.06. The second part has been included by way of abundant caution.
The use of the word "relief' is also conscious so as to emphasise the wide
range of orders which can be passed bestowing benefits on the debtors of
C

various kinds. Taking a hypothetical case where the debtor has rec.eived
grains as loan on a condition to return the same in larger quantity, it is
open to the legislature to ~duce the burden or the debtor by providing ror D
a monetary relief to be calculated in a particular manner. [729E]

1.07. The word "indebtedness" by itself also could have given occasion
for controversy on the ground of vagueness; but in the context it has been
mentioned in the Entry, there is no room for doubt left. [729F]
y E
1.08. There is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel that
a scheme was adopted in the Constitution with respect to distribution of
the subjects in the three lists to the Seventh Schedule, and that the State
legislature was entrusted only with agricultural matters. The larg~ number
of entries in List II negative such an inference. [729G]
F
A.L.S.P.P.L. Subrahmanyam Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan, (1940)
FCR 188; Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Kunja Behari Km and Upendra Chandra
Kar, (1944) FCR 370; Praful/a Kumar Mukherjee & Ors. v. The Bank of
Commerce Ltd., Khulna, Indian Appeals, (L.R. Vol. LXXIV) 23; Pathumma
and others v. State of Kera/a and others, [1978] 2 SCR 537; Fatechand G
Himmatlal and others v. State of Maharashtra etc., [1977) .2 SCR 828 and
Vora Saiyedbhai Kadarbhai v. Saiyed Intajam Hussen Sedumiya and others,
AIR 1981 Gujarat 154, referred to.

2.01. So far sub-clause(g) of Article 19(1) is concerned the impugned
law is not putting any restriction on the carrying of the business at all. H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
1

A What it purports to do is to relieve the burden only of a category of \.......

dehtors, who by reason of their poverty des.~rve assistance. [731G]

2.02. Both the Acts of Tamil Nadu and Kamataka have identified
this group in neel of help. The liability flf the other debtors is untouched.
I'
The legislative measures, thus taken, are clearly in furtherance of the
B >
directive principles of the State policy as mentioned in Part IV of the
Constitution, specially Article 39 and are protected by the provisions of
clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19. [731H-732AJ

2.03. The· issue cannot be decided merely by examining the past

--
C conduct or those who are chosen for relieving the burden of an under-
privileged class. [732C]

2.04. With a view to secure social and economic justice, the matter
has to be examined from the standpoint of the in~erest of the general public
and the standard of reasonableness will vary from age to age and be
D related to the adjustments necessary to solve .the problems which com-
munities face from time to time. The unfortunate plight of that section of
the people who, placed socially and economically at a disadvantage, land
themselves in debt trap is well-known for ages. [732D]

2.05. The State legislatures by enacting the laws under consideration
E are only fulfilling their obligation by extending social justice to them. In
the Kamataka Act the group deserving the protection, has been identified
as either a small farmer, or a landless agricultural labourer, or a person
belonging to the weaker section of the people; and with a view to avoid any
vagueness these three sub-classes have been given precise definitions in
F the spirit in which the statute has been passed. It is natural to expect that
the debts, thus covered by the beneficial provisions must have been smaller ·
than those left untouched. [732E]

2.06. Section 3 of the Tamil Nado Act has also limited the benefits
G of the laws to the less privileged section of the society. The debtors, placed
comparatively in better economic circumstances, contracting loans due to
extravagant habits or for urgently meeting some sudden demand or for
similar reason have been de,prived from the benefits of the Acts. This is a
matter of policy to be decided by the State. The legislature is presumed to
be in a position to appreciate the needs of the people and to judge as to
H what remedial reforms are called for. [732GJ
SURANA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHARMA, J.] 725.

2.07. In interpreting the constitutional provisions for judging the A
-~ impact of an enactment on the fundamental rights of the citizens, the court
has to take into account the social setting of the country, the increasing
needs of the nation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issue
facing the people which the legislature in its wisdom seeks to solve through
beneficial legislation; and the judicial approach in this should be dynamic B
rather than_ static, pragmatic rather than pedantic and elastic rather than
rigid. [733A]

2.08. The temper of the times and the living aspirations and the
-~\
feelings of the people must be taken into consideration while striking a
just balance between the fundamental rights and the larger and broader C

-
interests of society. Judged from this angle both the Acts have to be upheld
by virtue of clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19. (7338]

Pathumma and others v. State of Kera/a and others, (1978] 2 SCR 537,
,)... referred to.
D
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 2603-2611
of 1982 etc. etc.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

C.S. Vaidyanathan, Krishnamani, G.L. Sanghi, K. Ram Kumar, P.R. E,
1· Ramasesh, Raju Ramachandran, Sadhana Ramachandra, Abani Kr. Sahu,
Mrs. Indu Malini Anantchari, K.R. Chowdhar}', P.N. Ramalingam, V.
Balachandran, S. Srinivasan, S. Ghana Sambandan, R. Mohan, T. Raja, R.

- Nedumaran, A.V. Rangam and M. Veerappa for the appearing parties.

. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F

:,..: SHARMA, J. Since similar questions have been raised against the
. validity of some of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1980
(Taniil Nadu Act 13 of 1980) and the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976
(Karnataka Act 25of1976), these cases have been heard together and are G
being disposed of by this common judgment.

- ~
2. The case of the petitioners, who are money lenders and pawn
brokers, is that since their business is not related to agricultural indebted-
ness, the State legislatures are not vested with legislative power to enact a
law granting any relief of non-agricultural indebtedness, adversely affecting H
J
~

7UJ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.

A their interest. On this ground those provisions of the two Acts, which
purport to extinguish the debts of all kinds incurred by small farmers, _....__
landless labour and persons belonging to weaker classes before a certain
date, are challenged as ultra vires.

3. Mr. Krishnamani, appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Writ
B Petition No. 5431-33 of 1985 (the term "petitioners" will also include the
appellants in the Civil Appeals) and Mr. G.L. Sanghi, representing some
other writ petitioners, have confined the ground of challenge to alleged
lack of legislative competence on the part of the State legislatures in ~-
relation to debts which are not agricultural. Mr. Vaidyanathan, counsel for
c the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 13'1£J of 1979, has, besides raising the
question of lack of legislative competence, contended that the impugned
provisions are violative of the guarantee under Article lQ(l) sub-clause (g),
as also under sub-clause (f), as the Karnataka Act was passed before the
clause 1 (f) of Article 19 was omitted from the Constitution.
-
D ~
4. So far the question of legislative competence is concerned, the
matter arising out of a similar Act passed by the Maharashtra legislature
was considered by this Court in Fatehchand Himmatlal and others v. State
of Maharashtra etc., [1977] 2 SCR 828 and the Act was upheld as a valid
piece of legislation. The learned counsel for the petitioners have contended
E that the reported judgment did not take into account many vital relevant ~

considerations, which have remained undisposed of till now and, therefore, "(
it cannot be treated to be a binding precedent in the present cases, which
relate to Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Acts. The argument is that the one
small single paragraph in the reported judgment at page 854F to page 855B
F does not even mention the points which are being raised before us and
-
which have direct bearing on the issue to be decided, and the reported
judgment, therefore, is not helpful in deciding the present cases; Mr. \1
Vaidyanathan has further added that so far the grounds based on Article """-
19 (1) (f) and (g) are concerned, they were not available when Fateh
Chand's case was decided by this Court as the result of proclamation of
G Emergency, and have to be considered for the first time in the present
cases. Reliance was also.placed on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court
in Vora Saiyedbhai Kadarbhai v. Saiyed Intajam Bussen Sedumiya and
others, AIR 1981 Gujarat 154. The learned advocates appearing in the r
,
~

other case have adopted the arguments addressed by the counsel men-
H tioned above.
SURANA v. STAIB OF TAMIL NADU (SHARMA, J.] 727

5. The State legislature proceeded to enact the Acts which are in A
__...( question before us under entry 30 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution, which is in the following terms :

"30. Money-lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural
indebtedness."
B
The argument is that the expression "Money lending and mo_!ley
lenders" cannot, in the context it has been used, be given the wider meaning
.. --( as a result of addition of the words "relief of agricultural indebtedness"
which follow. If the first part of the entry is construed to cover the larger
·field, the argument proceeds, the effect would be to render the second part c
- .redundant and otiose, which according to the established rule of construe-
tion has to be avoided. Referreing to entry No. 27 of the Provincial
Legislative List being List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Government
of India Act, 1935 Mr. Vaidyanathan argued that the relevant part of the
~>-- entry was simply "money lending and money lenders" without any further D
words to follow, and in this background the expression was understood as
having a wide application. Now, when the _Constituent Assembly con~
sidered it fit to subject this part of the entry with further words, it must be
presumed that the intention was to curtail the scope of the first part of
entry 30 and confine it to cover only agricultural loans and debts. The
learned counsel placed the entries No. 82, 86, 87 and 88 in List I, entries E
-,- No. 14, 18, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 in List II and entries 6 and 7 in List III
and invited us to discern, a constitutional policy fof ·entrusting only such
matters as may be concerning agriculture to the States and leaving the

- remaining field either for the Union's List I or the Concurrent List III. We
have given our anxious consideration to the points raised by the learned F
counsel, but do not find ourselves in agreement with them and we proceed
to indicate our reasons.
~

6. The principle to be followed while construing constitutional
provisions is well-settled and need not detain us long. The cardinal rule of .
interpretaion that words should be read in their ordinary, natural and G
grammatical meaning is subject to this rider that while construing a con-
stitutional document conferring legislative power the most liberal construc-
1

""'( 1
tion should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their
widest amplitude (see Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of
Income-Tax, Bombay City, (1955) 1 SCR 829 at 836-837). The Federal H
71}!, SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A Court of India earlier in the United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and
Others, (1940) F.C.R. 110, had observed that none of the items in the Lists
)...__
is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word
should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can
fairly and reasonably be said to be \•comprehended in it. The scope of the
latter part of Item No. 21 of List Il of the Government of India Act, 1935
B referred to by Mr. Vaidyanathan was the subject-matter of the decision of
the Federal Court in A.L.S.P.P.L. Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami
Goundan, (19·~-0) F.C.R. 188. The agrument was that the Item could not
clothe the Provincial Government with the power to legislate with respect
to promissory notes. The plea was rejected by the majority judgment on ~ ~

c the ground that if the provincial law, in pith and substance, dealt with

-
money-lending it was not ultra vires if it incidentally affected promissory
notes as security for loan. This interpretation was accepted as correct by
the Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee & ors. v. The Bank of
Commerce Ltd., Khulna, Indian Appeals, (L.R. Vol. LXXIV) 23 and later
D by this Court. A similar objection raised on behalf of the creditors against
the law providing for relief against indebtedness was rejected by the
Madras High Court in Veerappa v. Chinnasami, (1950) II M.LJ. m. The
High Court declared that the whole gamut of debt liquidation is within the
State legislature's competence under Entry No. 30, List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, including the scaling down of loans, discharg-
E ing or reducing the principal or interest et cetera. The learned counsel for
the petitioners also do not suggest that the first part of the Entry, that is,
"Money-lending and money-lenders" does not, by itself, cover the wider ·y
field so as to include· the present Acts. Their argument is that if this
expression by itself and without addition of any further words had con-
F stituted the Entry, there was no difficulty but, as a result of the addition of
the further words "relief of agricultural ·indebtedness", the scope of the first
part gets reduced so as to exclude non-agricultural indebtedness. We do
not find any merit in this argument. A query is posed on behalf of the
petitioners : what is the object of inserting in the entry the latter part. There
are several reasons for doing so.
G
7. The argument that if the opening general t~rm in an entry is
followed by some more words or phrases the wide application of the
opening term should be interpreted to have been restricted has been
addressed earlier and rejected by this Court disapproving the application
.,,_ '
H of such a rule of construction. The Federal Court in Mannikkasundara v.
SURANA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHARMA, J.] 729

R.S. Nayudu, 1946 F.C.R. ·67 observed that the subsequent words and A
phrases are not intended to limit the ambit of the opening general term or
--C
phrase; on the contrary to illustrate the scope and objects of the legislation
envisaged as comprised in the opening term or phrase. These observations
were approved by the Supreme Court in the State of Madras v. Gannon
Dynkerley& Co., (Madras) Ltd., (1959] SCR379. The purpose of inclusion
B
of the subsequent words in entry No.30 was to illustrate the scope and the
objects of the legislation envisaged by the opening expression.

• _.j
\
8. The latter part serves another purpose also. Mr. Vaidyanathan
himself referred to the case where the creditors had unsuccessfully at-
c
tempted to construe the words "money-lending and money lenders" in a

-.. narrow sense excluding non-agricultural indebtedness, which indicated that
there was some scope for controversy as to the area covered by an entry
limited to the first part of the present Entry No.30. It has to be appreciated
that the decision giving a wide meaning to the expression could not be
;.._ binding on the Supreme Court and so long the matter was not finally settled D
by this Court, the courts in the meantime could have been flooded by

• unnecessary litigation. This has been avoided by including the second part
which should be treated as illustrating the scope and object of the legisla-
tion in the first part. In other words, we can say that the second part has' ,
been included by way of abundant caution. The use of the word "relief' is
also conscious so as to emphasise the wide range of orders which can ·be E.
y passed bestowing benefits on the debtors of various kinds. Taking a
\
hypothetical case where the debtor has received grains as loan on a •
condition to return the same in larger quantity, it is open to the legislature
to reduce the burden of the debtor by providing for a monetary relief to
be calculated in a particular manner. The word "indebtedness" by itself also F
could have given occasion for controversy on the ground of vagueness; but
in the context it has been mentioned in the Entry, there is no room for
doubt left.

9. We also do not find any merit in the agrument of the learned I G

... -"(
counsel that a scheme was adopted in the Constitution with respect to
distribution of the subjects in the three lists to the Seventh Schedule, and
that the State legislature was entrusted only with agricultural matters. The
large number of entries in List II, other than those referred to by Mr. 1

- Vaidyanathan in his argument, negative such an inference. H
SURANA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHARMA, J.) 731

was limited to making laws regulatory in nature and did not extend beyond, A
_J so as to extinguish the debts altogether. This objection again.has no merit.
The learned counsel is attempting to put a restricted and limited meaning
on the Entry which is not called for. There are no words in the Entry to
call for restricting the covered field which is quite wide otherwise.

12. The Karnataka Act has further been challenged on the ground of B
violation of Article 19(1)(t), (g) and Article 14. Mr. Vaidyanathan has
pointed out that the Act was passed in 1976 when sub-clause (t) of Article
--.( 19 (1) was in existence and it was only in 1979 that it was omitted from the
Constitution. As a result of the proclamation of Emergency, the counsel
proceeded to urge, the enforcement of the fundamental rights was c
,. suspended but the rights themselves did not disappear. As soon as the
Emergency was withdrawn in March, 1977, the impediment by way of
suspension of the enforcement of the rights disappeared, and the Act, if
found to be in violation of the fundamental rights, had to be declared ultra
vires, and it can be done so now. The contention is that as a direct re.suit
D
of the Act a particular class of debts have automatically disappeared. In
other words, the creditors are deprived of their right to hold their property
in the shape of the loan due to them, without any compensation what-
soever. With respect to the protection under clause (5), it has been
contended that the impugned provisions being unreasonable cannot be
saved. E
y
13. It is urged that the decision in Pathumma and others v. State of
..
_
Kera/a and others, (1978] 2 S.C.R. 537, is distinguishable on the ground that
by the offending provisions in that case, relief was granted to an agricul-
turist, only if his interest in some immovable property had been sold in F
execution of a decree for recovery of a debt. So far the pawn-brokers are
~
concerned they are being deprived of not only the interest but the capital
itself, and they may not now be able to carry on thei,r business any further.
As a direct consequence of the impugned provisions, the petitioners claim
that they are being deprived of the right guaranteed to them by Article
19(1)(g). We do not find any substance in this argument either. So far sub- G
clause (g) is concerned the impugned law is not putting any restriction on
. the carrying of the business at all. W~at it purports to do is to relieve the
burden only of a category of debtors, who by reason of their poverty
deserve assistance. Both the Acts of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have
identified this group in need of help. The liablity of the other debtors is H

...
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A untouched. The legislative measures, thus taken, are clearly in furtherance
)..__
of the directive principles of the State policy as mentioned in Part IV of
the Constitution, specially Article 39 and are protected by the provisions
of clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19.

14. The learned counsel has characterised the hardship placed on the
B
petitioners as unreasonable within the meaning of clauses (5) and (6) of
Article 19 and on that basis contended that the impugned statutes are
violative of sub-clauses (f) and (g). It was stated by both, Mr. Krishnamani
and Mr. Vaidyanathan, that the petitioners who are now before this Court }-
have not been accused of any violation of the earlier laws, and they,
c
-
therefore, do not deserve the loss in their business caused by the impugned
laws. We are afraid this suggested approach to test the reasonableness of
the laws is not correct. The issue cannot be decided merely by examining
the past conduct of those who are chosen for relieving the burden of an
underprivileged class. With a view to secure social and economic justice,
D the matter has to be examined from the standpoint of the interest of the ~
general public and as has been pointed out by this Court earlier, the
standard of reasonableness will vary from age to age and be related to the
"'
adjustments necessary to solve the problems which communities face from

E
'°
time to time. The unfortunate plight of that section of the people who,
placed socially and economically at a disadvantage, land themselves debt-
trap ·is well-known for ages. The State legislatures by enacting the laws
under consideration are only fulfilling their obligation by extending social )'
justice to them. In· the Karnataka Act the group deserving the protection,
has been identified as either a small farmer, or a landless agricultural
labourer, or a person belonging to the weaker section of the people; and ......
F with a view to avoid any vagueness these three sub-classes have been given
precise definitions in the spirit in which the statute has beeQ passed. It is
natural to expect that the debts, thus covered by the beneficial provisions
must have been smaller than those left untouched. Similarly section 3 of 7<
the Tamil Nadu Act has also limited the benefits of the laws to the less
previliged ·section of the society. The debtors, placed comparatively in
G better economic circ;:umstances, contracting loans due to extravagant habits

... or for urgently meeting some sudden demand or for similar reason have
been deprived from the benefits of the Acts. This is a matter of policy to
·v-
.;_
be decided by the State. The legislatute is presumed to be in a position to J

appreciate the needs of the people and to judge as to what remedial
H reforins are called for. It has bee~ held in Pathumma's case (supra) that
SURANA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHARMA, J.) 733 '
in· interpreting the constitutional provisions for judging the impact of an A
enactmen~ on the fundamental rights of the citizens, the court has to take
into acc0unt the social setting of the country, the increasing needs of the
nation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issue facing the
people which the legislature in its wisdom seeks to solve through beneficial
legislation; and the judicial approach in this should be dynamic rather than B
static, pragmatic rather than pedantic and elastic rather than rigid. The
temper oft.he times and the living aspirations and the feelings of the people
must be taken into consideration while striking a just balance between the
fundamental rights and ,the larger and broader interests of society. We,
therefore, hold that judged from this angle both the Acts have to be upheld
by virtue of clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19. Accordingly all the writ C

- petitions, civil ~ppeals and the special leave petition is dismissed, but in
the circumstances without costs.

V.P.R. Petitions/Appeals dismissen

--