Holding

The Court held that the equal‑status treatment, combined seniority list and the zone‑of‑consideration restriction are constitutionally valid and not arbitrary, and the petition is dismissed.

Summary

The petitioners, Superintendents of the Delhi High Court, challenged the treatment of their posts as equal status with Court Masters (Readers) and Private Secretaries, arguing that it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. They also contested the restriction of the "zone of consideration" for promotion to Assistant Registrar to three‑to‑five times the number of vacancies and the use of a combined seniority list for promotion. The Court held that an employer may reasonably treat diverse categories of employees as equal status posts if the discretion is exercised reasonably and does not breach constitutional equality. The combined seniority list and the zone‑of‑consideration restriction were found to be neither arbitrary nor mala fide, and the petition was barred by delay. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether treating Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries as equal status posts and using a joint seniority list violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether the restriction of the zone of consideration to a multiple of the vacancies for selection to Assistant Registrar is arbitrary or violative of the principle of selection on merit.
Whether the combined seniority list can be used for promotion as well as transfer.
Whether the petition is barred by delay/laches.
Whether administrative instructions can override the statutory rules governing promotion.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 229
Delhi High Court Act, 1966

Subjects

Article 14Article 16equal status postsseniority listpromotionselection on meritadministrative discretiondelaylachesDelhi High Court staff rulescombined seniorityzone of consideration

Judgment

S.B. MATHUR AND OTHERS.
A
v ..:1
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT,:
"AND OTHERS

AUGUST 31, 1988
B ·'
. ' [K.N. SINGH AND M.H. KANIA, JJ.J

Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and conditions of
service) Rules, 1972-Delhi High Court Staff (SeniOrity) Rules 1971-
Superintendents of Delhi High Court challenging the treatment of posts
of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers and Private Secretaries to
c Judges as equal status posts, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitu-
tion, and challenging joint seniority list of Superiniendents, Court
Masters and PriV<•te Secretaries for purposes ofpromotion" to the post of
As.m1a11t Registrars and claiming better rights of promotion.

D · .. The Superintendents of the Delhi High Court by writ petition
claimed better rights of promotion, objected to their being treated as on
par with the Private Secretaries to Judges and Court Masters; and
being included in a joint seniority list alongwith them, particularly as
far as the promotion to the next higher post of Assistant Registrar was
concerned_ '
E
The petitioners contended inter-alia that there was a violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution In treating the posts of Superintendents,
Court Masters or readers and Private Secretaries to Judges as equal ·
status p_osts; that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not
identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to
F these posts; that the duties of the incumbents of these posts were diffe-
rent; that in treating these posts as equal status posts, unequals had
been treated equally and the rule of ~quality had been violated.
(
Dismissing the petition, the Court,

G HELD: \Vhere an employer h3s a large number or employees9
;· __ performing diverse duties, he must enjoy some di.Scretion in treating
different categories of his employees as holding equal status post~r
equated posts, as questions of promotion or transfer of empIOyees inter
se will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of
the organisation- [781C-D]
H
772
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT 773

There is nothing mherently wrong in an employer treating certain
A
posts as equated posts or equal status posts, provided that in doing so he
exercises his discretion reasonably and does not violate the principles of
equality enshrined inArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [781D-E]

For treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it
is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform the identi- B
cal functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the
same, nor is it essential that the qualifications for appointments to the
posts must be identical. But, there must not be such difference.in the
pay-scales or qualifications of the incumbents of the posts or in their
duties or responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that it
would be unjust fo treat the posts alike and posts having substantially
higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier
c
responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior, cannot be
equated with the posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially
lower responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in
service. [7lHE-G]
D
The petitioners could not challenge the aforesaid posts being
treated as equal status posts as that had been done in accordance
with the Seniority Rules of 1971 the vires of which had not been
challenged. [782B]

Neither the combined seniority list nor the treating of the said E
posts as equal status posts could be said to be arbitrary in the absence of
any material, particularly in view of the fact that the Chief Justice and
the Judges of the High Court had taken the view that it was necessary in
order to provide adequate promotional opportunities to the various
sections of the employees. [784D]
F
The challenge to the said posts being treated as equal status posts
had come too late in 1970 to be entertained in a writ petition, after the
seniority Rules of 1971 became effective. This challenge could be
negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from other consi-
derations. [784E-G]
G
There was nothing unreasonable in the restriction that out of the
total number of candidates who satisfied the eligibility requirement, the
zone of consideration would be limited to a multiple of 3 to 5 times the
number of vacancies or in determining the persons to be considered on
the basis of their seniority in the combined seniority list. It was open to
the High Court to restrict the zone of consideration in any reasonable H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

· A manner, and limiting the zone of consideration to a multiple· of the
number of vacancies and basing it on seniority according to the com-
bined seniority list cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious or
ma la fide, nor can it<lle'said that such a restriction violates the, principle
of selection on because even experience in service is a relevant consi-
B deration in assessing merit. [791C-E]

It is not as if either Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules of 1972 or
Rule 5 of the seniority Rules of 1971 which provides for a combined
seniority list negatives tbe chance of promotion to the posts of Assistant
Registrars being granted to the Superintendents. [794A-B]

C So far as ·the zone of consideration is limited by the competent
authority in a manner not inconsistent with the Rules or in a manner
not arbitrary or capricious or mala fide, the validity of the decision
to limit the zone of consideration cannot be called in question on the
ground that the manner ·in which the zone was limited was not
uniform. [795D-E]
0
V. T. Khanzode & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr., [1982] 3
S.C.R. 411; Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1971) Suppl.
S.C.R. 900; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., [1968] l
S.C.R. 111; Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal & Ors., [1977] 1
E S.C.R. 377; Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors., etc. v. State of Haryana &
Ors., etc., [1985] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 657; VJ. Thomas and Ors. v. Union
of India & Ors., [1985] Suppl. S.C.C. 7; Madan Mohan Saran & Anr.
v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Ors., [1975] 2 S.L.R. 889 and Mahesh
Prasad Srivastava v. Abdul Khair, [1971] I S.C.R. 157, referred to.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 263 of
F
1979

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

D.D. Thakur, A. Minocha, Mrs. Veena Minocha, G.S.
Vashisht, T.R. Arti and B.S. Bali for the Petitioners.
G
Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, C.M. Nayar and
C.V. Subba Rao for Respondent Nos. 1and2.

Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, Ashok Srivasiava
and Ms. A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 3.
H
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT [KANIA, J.] 775

·Ms. A. Subhashini Advocate for the Respondent N6. 11.
A
A.K. Ganguli, A. Mariarputha and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the
Respondents Nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10.

The.Judgment of the Court was·delivered by

KANIA, J. This Writ Petition owes its origin to a dispute bet-
ween different groups of employees of the Delhi High Court, claiming
better rights of promotion for themselves, a type of dispute too com-
mon in services these days. The present Writ Petition has been filed by
some Superintendents in the Delhi High Court objecting to their being
treated on a par with the Private Secretaries to learned Judges and
Court Masters and being included in a joint seniority list along with c
them, particularly as far as the promotion to the next higher post of
Assistant Registrar is concerned. In order to appreciate the contro-
versy before us, it is necessary to keep in mind the background in
which the dispute has originated.

Prior to the Constitution of the Delhi High Court in 1966, there
was a Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court sitting at Delhi. By Act
26 of 1966, Parliament established an independent High Court for the
Union Territory of Delhi. By an order dated October 31, 1966;-effec-
tive from October 31, 1966, the Government of India created a staff
for the said High Court. The letter of the Government of India, which E
is Annexure-A to the Petition, sholvs that the President of India sanc-
tioned the creation of certain posts for the Delhi High Court with
effect from October 31, 1966 or from the date of setting up· of the High
Court, whichever was later, upto February 28, 1967. Amongst these
posts, there was a post of an Assistant Registrar having a pay-scale of
Rs.500-30-800 plus (scales of pay and dearness allowance as admissible F
in Punjab). Among the other posts created were six posts of Private
Secretaries to Hon 'ble Judges of the High Court in the pay-scale of
Rs.350-20-450-25-475, six posts of Readers. and seven posts of
Superintendents. The pay-scale of all these posts was the same,
namely, Rs.350-20-450-25-475. The Delhi High Court started function-
ing with effect from October 31, 1966. The staff of the Punjab & G
Haryana High Court working in Delhi was, for the· time being, treated
as on deputation to the Delhi High Court till they were permanently
absorbed.in the Delhi High Court. From the time of its formation till
1971, the Delhi High Court had no rules of its own regarding condi- ·
tions of service or regarding the salary or seniority in respect of its
staff. Section 7 of the Delhi High Court Act,· 1966 (Act 26 of 1966), in H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

brief, provided that, subject to the provisions of the said Act, the law
A
in force immediately before the Appointed Day (31.10.1966) with
respect to practice and procedure in the High Court of Punjab shall,
with the necessary modificat:;);;S, apply in relation to the Delhi High
Court and conferred powers on the High Court of Delhi to make rules
and orders with respect to its practice and procedure, such powers
B being the same as exerciseable by the High Court of Punjab
immediately before the Appointed Day. There was a proviso which
was to the effect that any rules or orders which were in force
immediately before the Appointed Day with respect to practice and
procedure in the High Court of Punjab shall, until varied or revoked
by rules or orders made by the High Court of Delhi, apply with the
necessary modifications in relation to practice and procedure in the
c High Court of Delhi as if made by that High Court. The Delhi High
Court started in 1966 with four Hon'ble Judges including the Chief
Justice and among its staff inter alia were four Superintendents, four
Readers and three Private Secretaries ~gains! the sanctioned strength.
Under the powers conferred by Article 229 of the Constitution, the
D Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court framed the Delhi High Court
Officers and Servants (Salaries, Leave, Allowances and Pension)
Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as "the Salary Rules of 1970") and
the Delhi High Court Staff (Seniority) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter refer-
red to as "the Seniority Rules of 1971"). Under the Salary Rules of
1970, the scale of pay for Superintendents, Readers and Private
E Secretaries was the same, namely, Rs.350-20-475. With the increase of
work and the extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High
Court, there was an increase in the number of Judges as well as staff of
the Court. According to the Petitioners, by March 1979, there were 21
Private Secretaries, 21 Readers and 13 Superintendents in the Delhi
High. Court. It appears that because of the increase in the number of
F Jµdges, the increase in the post of Private Secretaries and Readers was
at a somewhat higher rate than that in the posts of Superintendents.
We are informed that in March 1988, the position was that there were
27 Private Secretaries, 30 Readers and 24 Superintendents in the same
pay scale. We may mention that Readers are now called Court Masters.

G We may at this stage consider the Seniority Rules of 1971. Rule 3
of the said Rules provides that inter se seniority of confirmed
employees in any category of the High Court staff shall be determined
on the basis of the date of confirmation. Rule 5 of the said rules runs as
follows:

H "Joint inter se seniority of confirmed employees in cate-
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEFJUSTICEOFDELHIHIGHCOURT[KANIA,J.] 777

gories of equal status posts shall be determined according
A
to their dates of confirmation in any of those categories."

Rule 9, with which we are not directly concerned, provides that certain
credit for purposes of seniority shall be given to an employee who
before his appointment as Assistant in the High Court was working on
any of the posts mentioned in Clause IV of Schedule II. Rule 2 con- B
tains certain definitions for phrposes of the said Rules. Rule 2(ii) runs
as follows:

" 'Equated post' means any of the posts shown as equated
posts, from time to time, in Schedule I to these rules".

Clause (iii) of the said R11le runs as follows: c

" 'Equal status posts' rrians the posts shown to be ofequal
s.tatus, from time to time, in Schedule II to these rules".
' . .

Item (ii) of Schedule I under Rule 2 runs as follows: D

"Equated Posts:

(i) x x x x x x

(ii) Judgment writers/Personal Assistant to Judges of E
Punjab & Haryana High Court (from 7.11.1964) and
Private Secretaries to Judges."

The relevant portion Of S~hedule II (See Rule 2) runs thus:

"Equal Status Posts: F

(i) x x x x
•
(ii) Superintendents, Court Masters, Private Secretaries
to Jugdes ..... ".
(iii) x x x x
(iv) x x x x G
(v) x x x x"

In exercise of the powers vested in the Chief Justice of the Delhi
High Court, he framed certain rules which were notified on 15th
September, 1972, called Delhi High Court Establishment (Appoint-
ment and Conditions of Service) .Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A as "Establishment Rules of 1972"). Rule 7 of the said Rules runs as follows:

"7. Mode of Appointment.

Except for appointment on officiating, temporary or
ad hoc basis, the mode of and qualifications for appoint-
B ment to the posts specified in Schedule II to these rules
shall be as stated therein."

The material portion of Schedule II runs as follows:

Schedule-II (See Rule 7)
c S. No. Category Minimum qualifi- Mode of appointment
of post cations prescribed
for appointment to
the posts

D "J x x x
1a x x x
2 x x x
3 Assistant Registrar By selection on merit
(Selection post) from confirmed offi-
E
cers of categories 5,
6 & 7 of Class II
mentioned in
Schedule I.
x x x x x x x"
F
We may mention that Schedule ,I framed under Rule 4 mentions
the various categories of posts. Category 4 comprises Assistant
Registrars, Categories 5, 6 and 7 of Class II are Superintendents,
Court Masters and Private Secretaries to Judges, respectively.

The above provisions make it clear that certain posts were
G treated as equated posts under Schedule I and certain posts were
treated as equal status posts under Schedule II to the said Seniority
Rules of 1971. It is clear that these provisions were made with a view to
provide transferability among persons holding these posts and to pro-
vide for channels of promotion to certain categories of employees who
H did not en joy a chance for promotion earlier with the result that there
was stagnation and frustration in the categories concerned. It may be
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICEOFDELHIHIGHCOURT[KANIA,J.] 779

noticed here that the posts of Judgment Writers, Personal Assistants
to Judges and Private Secretaries to Judges have been treated as A
equated posts and the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters and
Private Secretaries to Judges have been treated as equal status posts.
Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules of 1971 set out by us earlier provides for a
joint seniority list of confirmed employees in categories of equal status
posts presumably with the same object as aforestated. B
It may be noticed that prior to October 31, 1966 the position
relating to pay-scales was as follows:

1. Superintindent 350-20-500-30-650 Gazetted Post
2. Reader 250-20-450 Non-Gazetted Post c
3. P. S. (Private Secretary) 150-10-300 Non-Gazetted Post.

Later on, there was a revision of scales of pay of these posts. It is not
necessary to consider all these revisions, but it may be noticed that at
the relevant time and thereafter under the Salary Rules of 1970 the o
Scales of Pay of the said three posts are the same, namely, Rs.350-25-
575. The said Rules have been framed as early as 1970 and the same
have not been challenged before us. It was under the Seniority Rules
of 1971 that the said posts were treated as equal status posts and Mr.
Thakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioners made it clear that he wa;
not challenging this portion of the Rules. In fact, in his opening he E
made it clear that he would not challenge any of the aforesaid Rules set
out earlier. However, we must mention that in the rejoinder an
attempt was made to challenge the joint seniority. list which would
imply a challenge to Rule 5 of the said Seniority Rules of 1971.

A joint seniority list of Superintendents, Readers and Private F
Secretaries was framed on May 8, 1972 but it was quashed on February
24th, 1975 when the seniority list of Readers was challenged. The
seniority list of Readers was quashed on October 10, 1975. A direction
was given in both the cases when the said joint seniority list was
quashed that a fresh list should be prepared in accordance with the
observations made in the judgment whereby the said list was quashed. G
Accordingly, fresh lists were made after hearing objections thereto
and were finalized in December, 1976. Occasions then arose for
temporary appointments to the posts of Assistant Registrars. That the ·
appointments to be made were temporary is not of much consequence
as later the confirmations were made in that very order. Under Rule 7
\ of the Establishment Rules of 1972 appointments to the post of H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

Assistant Registrar are to be made by selection on merit from the three
A
categories, Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries. It
appears that it was felt that it would not be feasible to consider all the
incumbents of the posts in the said three categories because a proper
selection among such a large group would be impracticable and
extremely difficult. This appears to be the basis underlying the deci-
B sion of the Administrative Judges at Annexure XVI to the Petition.
For delimiting the zone of consideration or field of choice in making,
the appointments which had to be made by selection on merits, after
considering various modes for delimiting the zones of consideration, it
was decided at the meeting of the Administrative Committee of the
Judges of the Delhi High Court held on February 3, 1977 that the zone
of consideration or field of choice should be limited to the first five
c names in the finalized joint seniority list of Superintendents, Readers
and Private Secretaries, that is, for each post of Assistant Registrar to
be filled in by selection on merits, five persons from the finalized joint
seniority list had to be considered in order of seniority, and the selec-
tion between tlrem made on merits. In other words, if appointments
D were to be made to two posts of Assistant Registrars, the first ten
employees in the joint seniority list would be included in the zone of
consideration. It was further decided that no written test or interview
was to be held for the purposes of selection. We are not referring here
to any individual promotion made on this basis because the grievance
made is against this mode of selection itself and not against any
E particular promotion. We may mention here that, as set out earlier,
when the Delhi .High Court Started functioning, the authorised
strength in the relevant categories was six Private Secretaries to the
Judges, six Readers (same as Court Masters) and seven Superinten-
dents. With the passage of time the number of posts in three categories
has risen fairly sharply. As aforestated by March 1979, according to
the Petitioners, there were 21 Private Secretaries, 21 Readers and 13
Superintendents and by March 1988 there were 27 Private Secretaries
to Judges, 30 Readers or Court Masters and 24 Superintendents.
Although there is a little controversy regarding these figures, it is not
of any consequence irl the case before us. All that need be noticed is
that the increase in the number of Readers and Private Secretaries has
G been higher percentagewise than that in the case of Superintendents
because with increasing work and increase in the number of Judges,
the number of Private Secretaries and Readers had necessarily to rise
in proportion whereas the number of Superintendents had not gone up·
quite in the same proportion. It may be mentioned that there was some
grievance made regarding differences in the method of selection
H employed on different occasions when vacancies arose of requiring
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICEOFDELHIHIGH COURT [KANIA, J.J 781

temporary appointments to the posts of Assistant Registrars. There is, A
however, not much substance in that grievance as we shall point out
later.

The first submission of Mr..- Thakur, learned Counsel for the
petitioners is that there is a vioiation of Article 14 of the Constitution
in treating the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers B
and Private Secretaries \o the Judges as equal status posts. It was
urged by him that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not
identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to
these posts. He also pointed out that the duties of the incumbents of
these posts were different. It was submitted by him that in treating
these posts as equal status posts unequals were treated equally and
hence the rule .of equality was violated. In appreciating this submis- C
sion, it must be borne in mind that it is an accepted principle that
where there is an employer who has a large number of employees in his
service performing diverse duties, he must en joy a certain measure of
discretion in treating different categories of his employees as holding
equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of promotion or trans- D
fer of employees inter se will necessarily arise for the purpose of main-
taining the efficiency of the organisation.. There is, therefore, nothing
inherently wrong in an employer treating certain posts as equated
posts or equal status posts provided that, in doing so, he exercises his
discretion reasonably and does· not violate the principles of equality
enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also clear that E
for treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it is not
necessary that the holders of these posts must perform completely the
same functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be
the same nor is it essential that qualifications for appointments to the
posts must be identical. All that is reasonably required is that there
must not be such difference in the pay-scales or qualifications of the F
incumbents of the posts concerned or in their duties or responsibilities
· or regarding any other relevant factor that it would be unjust t~ treat
the posts alike or, in other words, that posts having substantially
higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier
• responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior are not
equated with posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially G
lower .responsibilities and,duties or enjoying much lower status in
service.

As far as the case before us is concerned, although Mr. Thakur,
learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that aforesaid posts,
namely, Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers could not H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l19S8] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A be treated as equated posts or equal status posts, he was unable to
point out to us specifically any such difference in respect of the re-
quisite qualifications of the holders of different categories of these
posts or regarding the duties and responsibilities carried by these posts
as were so marked or significant that it would be unfair or violative of
the rule of equality to treat these posts as equal status posis. In fact, it
B may be mentioned that at one stage in his opening, Mr. Thakur specifi-
cally stated that he did not challenge the vires of any of the said
Seniority Rules of 1971. If that is so, we fail to see how he can
challenge the aforesaid posts being treated as equal status posts as that
has been done under the said Seniority Rules of 1971 which have been
framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred upon
him under Article 229 of the Constitution of Ihdia. Even if one is to
c examine the contention on merits, we are afraid, it must fail. A perusal
of items 5, 6 and 7 of Schedule I to the said Salary Rules of 1970 shows
that under the said Rules which were framed as early as 1970, the
salary scale of Superintendents, Court Masters (Readers) and Private
Secretaries is the same, viz., Rs.350-25-575. There is, therefore, no
D difference in the scales of salary. As far as the qualifications for
appointment are concerned, under rule 7 it is provided that these
qualifications are as specified in Schedule II. Items 4, 5 and 6 of the
said Schedule inter alia provide for the qualifications for appointments
to the said posts and it is undoubtedly true that the qualifications
required for appointment to these posts are not identical. In the case
E of Superintendents, it appears, very briefly stated, that appointments
to 25 per cent of these posts are to be made on the basis of seniority-
cum-suitability from the joint seniority list of categories 9, 10, 11, 13,
14 and 16 of Class III mentioned in Schedule I and 75 per cent of the
posts are to be filled by selection on merit from the same categories.
The categories of posts from whieh promotions or selections can be
made to the posts of Court Masters are substantially the same. As far
as the Private Secretaries are concerned, the mode of appointment is
by selection and the qualifications prescribed are that a graduate
degree is reqnired for appointment of the said post and a further
requirement is a speed of not less than 120 words per minute in
shorthand and 45 words per minute in typewriting. A perusal of the
G said provisions shows that the.qualifications required for appointment
to the post of a Private Secretary are certainly higher than the qualifi-
cations required for appointment to the post of a Superintendent or a
Court Master although for the latter two categories, probably, more
experience would be required. Thus, one fails to see how any grie-
vance can be made by the Superintendents on this score. As far as the
duties these posts carry. are concerned, undoubtedly they are not the
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHIHIGH COURT [KANIA, J.) 783

same, But Rule 8(c) of the Establishment Rules of 1972 provides that
A
. any person appointed to the post in one category may be transferred to
a post of equal status in any other category. The validity of this Rule
has not been challenged before us. This would show that even if the
duties and responsibilities attached to these posts are not the same,
they were not so materially different as to render it inequitable that
these posts should be treated on the same footing for the purposes of B
promotion and transfer. It may be that because of the requirement that
a Court Master must be a graduate and having a certain typing speed,
Superintendents could not be generally transferred to the posts of
Private Secretaries. But one fails to see how any grievance can be
made on that score by the Superint~ndents.

The view which we have taken, as set out earlier, finds support
c
from the decision of this Court in V. T. Khanzode & Ors. v. Reserve
Bank of India & Anr., [1982] 3 S.C.R. 411 rendered by a Bench
comprising three learned Judges of this Court. In that case, by
Administrative Circular No. 8 dated January 7, 1978 the Reserve Bank
of India stated that it had decided to combine the seniority list of all D
officers on the basis of their total length of service (including officiat-
ing service) in Group I (Se.ction A), Group II and Group III. The
seniority of all officers in each of the tb.ree Groups was to be combined
with effect from May 22, 1974 on the basis of their total length of
service, including officiating service, in the grade in which they were
then posted on a regular basis. The Circular introduced combined E
seniority with retrospective effect from May 22, 1974 (the date of an
earlier Administrative Circular No. 15) as it was "fair and equitable to
the officers as a class". The effect of this decision was that the
groupwise system of seniority which was in existence in the bank for
more than 27 years stood substituted by a combined seniority for offi-
cers in the aforesaid grades with retrospective effect. This adversely F
affected the existing seniority of many officers, particularly those in
Group I. The validity of this Administrative Circular was challenged.
This Court held that ihe said Administrative Circular N,,, 'l and the
draft combined seniority list prepared pursuant to it did not 'iolate the
rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether there should be a combined seniority in different cadres or G
groups is a matter of policy which does not attract the applicability of
the equality clause. The Court pointed out that the past events showed
that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank of India were
grouped and regrouped from time to time. Such adjustments in the
administrative affairs of the Bank were a necessary sequel to the grow-
ing demands of new situations which are bound to arise in any develop- H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988J Supp. 2 s.c.R.

A ing economy. The Court pointed out further that no scheme governing
service matters can be fool-proof and some section or the other of
employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations
being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality,
perversity and ma/a [ides will of course render any scheme unconstitu-
tional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of
8 every employees is not evidence of these. This decision clearly leads to
a conclusion that grouping and regrouping of differrent categories of
employees is inevitable in a large organisation with a view of meeting
changing situations and needs of a live organisation. Merely because
the chances of promotion of some employees are adversely affected by
such grouping or regrouping, that does not lead to a conclusion that it
is against the law. We may point out that in the case before us, there is
c no contention urged before us that the equating of posts or the com-
bined seniority list was promoted by any malafides. We fail to see how
the combined seniority list or the treating of the said posts as equal
status posts can be said to be arbitrary in the absence of any material
and, particularly, in view of the fact that the learned Chief Justice and
D the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court considered the facts and
took the view that it was necessary in order to provide for transfers
from one department to another and to provide adequate promotional
opportunities to various sections of the employees of the Delhi High
Court.

E Apart from this, it must be observed that the challenge to the
said posts being treated as equal status posts comes much too late to
the entertained in the writ petition. These posts were treated as equal
status posts under Rule 2 read with the Schedules to the said Seniority
Rules of 1971 and certain promotions have also been made under the
•.
said Rules. These Rules became effective in 1971 and it is much too
fl late to seek to challenge them in 1979, long after the Rules have been
given effect to. It may be mentioned that, although they did make
representations, the petitioners chose to file the Writ Petition only as
late as in 1979. In our view, the challenge to the Rules providing for
the said posts being treated as equated posts or equal status posts can
be negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from other
d considerations.

The next submission of learned Counsel, Mr. Thakur, which he
stated was his main submission, is that under the relevant Rules an
appointment to the post of Assistant Registrar has to be made ·by
selection from Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers or
H Court Masters and hence all employees holding these posts in a perma-
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OFDELHIHIGH COURT [KANIA,J.] 785

nent capacity must be considered to be eligible and within the zone of
A
consideration f~r selection to these posts. It was not open to the
learned 'Chief Justice, Respondent no. 1 herein, to limit that zone of
consideration in any manner. He drew our attention to the Establish-
ment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules of 1972 and in
particular Item No. 3 of Schedule II thereof framed under Rule 7 of
the said Rules. He pointed out that under the said item, the appoint- B
ment to the post of Assistant Registrar, which is a selection post is to
be made by selection on merit from categories of officers of categories
5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule I, namely, Superintendents,
Court Masters (Readers) and Private Secretaries. It was submitted by
him that this Rule excluded any reference to seniority and even if it
was open to the appointing authority to limit or restrict the zone of
consideration it could not be. limited with reference to seniority. C

It was urged by Mr. Thakur that the rule that the promotion was
to be made on the basis of selection on merit prescribed by the Chief
Justice in conscious exercise of his powers conferred under Article 229
of the Constitution the decision to restrict the zone of consideration to o,
four or five times the number of posts available on the basis of senio:
rity under the combined seniority list was a mere administrative
instruction or decision. It was submitted by him that the said
administrative instruction or decision is in conflict with the rules
prescribing the method of selection by merit and hence it is bad in law.
We propose to proceed on the assumption that Mr. Thakur may be E
right in his contention that mere administrative instructions cannot
override rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Arti-
cle 229 of the Constitution although the person issuing the administra-
tive instruction may be the same person who prescribes the rules, as in
the case before us. Even then, it has to be considered whether the said
administrative instructions or decision in any way conflicts with the F
rules. In this connection Mr. Thakur drew our attention to the decision
of this Court in the case of Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan and
Ors., [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 900. The few facts which need to be noticed
in connection with this case are that in 1965 the State of Rajasthan
decided to introduce the system of making promotions to the service
on the basis of merit alone in addition to the existing system of making G
promotions on the basis oJ seniority-cum-merit. On December 14,
1965, Rule 28B was incorporated into Rajasthan Administr.ative Sewice
Rules, i954, providing for appointment by promotion to posts in the
'service on the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit in
the proportion of 50:50 and prescribing that the· number of eligible
·candidates to be considered for promotion was to be 10 times the total H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

number of vacancies to be filled up on the basis of merit as well as
A
seniority-cum-merit. Prior to August 26, 1966, Rule 2SB was amended
but we .are not concerned with such amendments.. On that date, Rule
28B was further amended by providing that the proportion of promo-
tion to be made by selection on the basis of merit and seniority-cum-
merit was to be 1:2 instead of 50:50. On the same date, a proviso was
B also added to sub-rule (2) of Rule 28B providing that only officers who
have been in service for not less than 6 years in the lower grade of the
cadre will be eligible for being considered for the first promotion in the
cadre. There was, however, a circular issued subsequently, that is,
after the said Rules were framed which provided that 50 marks were to
be given for the record of 5 years prior to the period of 5 years preced-
ing the selection; and for the five years preceding the selection the
marking of 25 was to be given on the basis of confidential rolls. The
validity of this Circular was challenged on various grounds. This Court
took the view that from the Circular it was clear that an officer who has
rendered less than five years of service will not be eligible to get a
single mark out of 50 which is provided for the record for the period
D preceding five years for the simple reason that he will have no such
record. An officer who has put in less than five years of service has
been straightaway denied 50 marks out of 75 marks and he has to
establish his worth within the small range of 25 marks on the basis of
his confidential rolls which will be available for a period of less than
five years. It was held that this formula which was prescribed in the
E circular was opposed to Rule 28B and Rule 32 which ensured that
merit and merit alone was to form the basis of promotion as against the
quota fixed for merit, in contradistinction to seniority-cum-merit. It
may be pointed out that in that case the circular in question stated that
the instructions contained therein should be s,trictly kept in view when •
persons are being considered for promotion. In view of this the Circu-
F Jar was held to be invalid. In our view, this decision does not lend
support to the submission of learned Counsel, Mr. Thakur. This Court
pointed out that Rule 28B of the Rajasthan Administrative Service
Rules, 1954, in brief, provided for two methods of selection; one based
on merit and the other based on seniority-cum-merit. In other words,
the rule provides that the promotion based on merit for 50 per cent of
G the posts in contradistinction to that based on seniority-cum-merit
prescribed for the other 50 per cent of the posts and that the selection
on merit shall'be strictly on the basis of merit. Rule 32 was similar to
Rule 28B. It was pointed out that by this Court the word 'merit' is not
capable of easy definition, but it can be safely said that merit is the sum
total of various qualities and attributes of an employee such as his
H. academic qualifications, his distinction in the University, his charac-
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OFDELHIHIGHCOURT [KANIA, J.J 787

ter, integrity, dtvotion to duty and the mannerjn-whiCh he discharges
his duties. Allied to this may be othe;.matters or factors such as his A
punctuality in work, the quality and out-turn of work done by him and
the manner of his dealing with his superiors and subordinate officers
and .the general public and his rank in the service. Rule 32 in essence
adopts what is stated in Rule 28B. It was held that the restriction
contained in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 28B. providing that B
before an officer in the junior scale could be considered fit for promo-
tion to the senior scale, he should have worked on post in the service at
least for some period of time, was quite reasonable. The provisions con-
tained in sub-rule (2) confining the selection to seniormost officers not
exceeding 10 times the number of total vacancies was also held to be
reasonable. Such a provision would encourage the members of the
service aspiring for promotion to make themselves eligible by increas- C
ing their efficiency in the discharge of their duti.es. However, the im-
pugned Circular was bad in law as it left no discretion to the Selection
or Promotion Committee to adopt any method other than that indi-
cated in the Circular in making selections for promotion and the
me~IJ.od prescribed was so rigid and so worded as to impede the selec- D
tion being made on merit. It was held that the Circular was violative of
the rule prescribing selection on merit. We.may point out that this
decision does not take the view that where selection is to be on merit,
seniority cannot be taken as a relevant factor for limiting the zone of
consideration provided of course, that this is not done so rigidly as to
exclude a proper selection on merit being m.ade. In fact, it runs to the E
contrary effect. We may refer, in this connection, to the case of Sant
Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan andAnr., [1968] 1 S.C.R. 111 where
it was inter alia contended on behalf of the petitioners that in the
absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade
posts, the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and
such instructions cannot impose any restriction not found in the rules F
already framed. A Bench comprising five learned Judges.of this Court
dealt with the c.ontention as follows (p. 119):

"We proceed to consider the next contention of Mr. N.C.
Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules
governing promotions to selection grade posts the Govern- G
ment cannot issue administrative instructions and such
administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions
not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to
accept this argument as correct.'It is true that therejs no
specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of
promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules
A
are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue
"administrative instructions regarding the principle to be
followed in promotions of the officers concerned to the
selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot
amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative
B instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular
point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the
rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules
already framed."

We may also refer, in this connection to the decision of this
Court in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal & Ors., [1977] 1
c S.C.R. 377 which was cited before us although the decision is not
directly relevant to the case before us. In that case a challenge was
made to the combined seniority scheme adopted by the Reserve Bank
of India. The High Court had taken the view that the scheme adopted
by the Reserve Bank was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
D Constitution inter alia on the ground that the said combined seniority
list framed persuant to the scheme had the effect of prejudicing the
promotional opportunities assured to the petitioners under the Optee
Scheme which had previously been adopted by the Bank and it dis-
criminated against the petitioners in relation to the clerical staff in the
General Department who either did not exercise the option under the
E Optee Scheme or having exercised the option were not selected. It was
observed by this Court (p. 393) that there can be no doubt that it is
open to the State to lay down any rule which it thinks appropriate for
determining seniority in the service and it is not competent to the
Court to strike down such rule on the ground that in its opinion
another rule would have been better or more appropriate. The only
F enquiry which the Court can make is whether the rule laid down by the
State is arbitrary and irrational so that it results in inequality of
opportunity amongst employees belonging to the same class. The
Court pointed out that in the case before it, the employees from the
non-clerical cadres were being absorbed in the clerical cadre and,
therefore, a rule for determining their seniority vis-a-vis those already
G in the clerical cadre had to be devised. If the non-clerical service
rendered by the employees from non-clerical cadres were wholly
ignored, it would be unjust to them. Equally, it would have been
unjust to employees in the clerical cadre, if the entire non-clerical
service of those coming from non-clerical cadres was taken into
account for non-clerical service cannot be equated with clerical service
H and the two cannot be treated on the same footing. The Reserve Bank,
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICEOFDELHIHIGHCOURT [KAN~cJ.T 789

therefore, decided that one-third of the non-clerical service rendered
A
by employees coming from non-clerical cadres should be·taken into
account for the purpose of determining seniority. It was held that this
rule attempted to strike .ii just balance between the conflicting claims
of non-clerical and clerical staff and it cannot be condemned as
arbitrary or discriminatory.
B
We may also refer here to the decision of a Bench comprising
four learned Judges of this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors. etc.
etc. v. State of Haryana & Ors. etc. etc., [1985) Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 657.
Rule 9 clause (1) of th.e Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch),
Rules, 1930 prescribes a competitive examination for recruitment to
posts in Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and other allied services.
The relevant regulation (Regulation 5) lays down that the compulsory
c
subjects carry in the aggregate 400 marks and there is also viva-voce
examination which is compulsory and which carries 200 marks and
each optional subject carries 100 marks. Thus, the written examination
carries an aggregate of 700 marks for candidate~ in general and for
ex-servicemen it carries an aggregate of 400 marks as they were D
exempted from appearing in optional papers and the viva-voce test
carries 200 marks. Regulation 3 provides that no candidate shall be
eligible to appear in the viva-voce test unless he obtains 45 per cent
marks in the aggregate of all subjects. In the written examination held
. l'.>y Haryana Public.Ser\'ice Commission for recruitment to 61 posts in
the Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and other allied services over E
1300 candidates obtained more than 45 per cent marks and thus
qualified for being called for interview for viva-voce examination. The
Haryana Public Service Commission invited all the said candidates for
' the viva-voce examination with the result the interviews lasted for
about half a year. In the meantime, further vacancies arose as 191
posts became available for being filled and, on the basis of total marks F
optained in the written examination as well as viva-voce test, 119
candidates were s~lected and recommended by the Haryana Public
Service Commission to the State Government. The petitioners before
the High Court failed to get selected on account of poor marks
obtained by them in the viva-voce test, although they had obtained
high marks in the written examination. They made several alllegations G
regarding the competence of the members of the Public Service Com-
mission as well as regarding favouratism and so on. The contention
with which we are concerned b the contention urged by the petitioners
that the number of candidates called for the interview was almost 20
times the number of vacancies and this widened the scope for arbitrari-
ness in selection by making it possible for the Haryana Public Service H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

Commission to boost up or deflate the total marks which might 15e
A
obtained by candidates and this invalidated the selection made. The
Pun jab and Haryana High Court held that the selection made by the
Haryana Public Service Commission was bad in law and decided in :
favour of the petitioners. On an appeal by special leave to Supreme
Court, the Division Bench of the Supreme Court observed as follows
B (p. 690):

"We must admit that the Haryana Public Service Commis-
sion was not right in calling for interview all the 1300 and
odd candidates who secured 45 per cent or more marks in
the written examination. The respondents sought to justify
the action of the Haryana Public Service Commission by
c relying on regulation 3 of the Regulations contained in
Appendix I of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch)
Rule, 1930 which were applicable in the State of Haryana
and contended that on a true interpretation of that Regula-
tion, the Haryana Public Service Commission was bound to
D call for interview all the candidates who secured a
minimum of 45 per cent marks in the aggregate at the
written examination. We do not think this contention is
well founded. A plain reading of Regulation 3 will show
that it is wholly unjustified. We have already referred to
Regulation 3 in an earlier part of the judgment and we need
E not reproduce it again. It is clear on a plain natural con-
struction of Regulation 3 that what it prescribes is merely a
minimum qualification for eligibility to appear at the viva-
voce test. Every candidate to be eligible for appearing at
the viva-voce test must obtain at least 45 per cent marks in
the aggregate in the written examination. But obtaining of
F minimun 45 per cent marks does not by itself entitle a
candidate to insist that he should be called for the viva-voce
test. There is no obligation on the Haryana Public Service
Commission to call for the viva-voce test all candidates who
satisfy the minimum eligibility requirement. It is open to
the Haryana Public Service Commission to say that out of
G the candidates who satisfy the eligibility critarion of
minimum 45 per cent marks in the written examination,
only a limited number of candidates at the top of the list
shall be called for interview."

The Bench, however, went on to hold that, in its view, merely
H because the Haryana Public Service Commission had called all the
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT [KANIA, J.] 791

1300 candidates who obtained 45 per cent or more marks in the written
A
examination to appear in the interview that did not invalidate the
selection made. This decision points out that the minimum eligibility
qualification has to be kept distinct from the zone of consideration and
even if there are a large number of candidates who satisfy the
minimum eligibility requirement it is not always required that they
should be included in the zone of consideration, it being open to the B
authority concerned to restrict the zone of consideration amongst the
eligible candidates in any reasonable manner.

In the case before us, zone has been restricted by prescribing that
out of the total number of candidates who satisfy the eligibility
requirement, the zone of consideration will be· limited to a multiple of
3 to 5 times of the number of vacancies and the persons to be con- c
sidered will be determined on the basis of their seniority in the com-
bined seniority list. It appears to us that there is nothing unreasonable
in this restriction. It was open to the Delhi High Eourt to restrict the
zone of consideration in any reasonable manner andlimiting the zone
of consideration to a multiple of the number of vacancies and basing it D
on seniority according to the combined seniority list, in our view, it
ca11not be regarded as arbitrary or capricious or ma/a fide. Nor can it
be said that such restriction violates the principle of selection on merit
because even experience in serv-ice is a relevant consideration in asses-
sing merit. We may also refer, in this connection, to the decision of
this Court in V.J. Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India, & Ors., [1985] E
Suppl. S.C.C. 7. where it has been pointed out that even though
minimum eligibility criterion as fixed for enabling one to take the
examination, yet the examination can be confined on a rational basis
to recruits up to a certain number of years. In adopting such a policy
which underlay the Note to clause (4) of Appendix I to the new Rules
in question, there is nothing which is arbitrary or amounting to denial f'
of equal opportunity in the matter of promotion. It had the desired
effect of not having a glut of Junior Engineers taking examination
compared to fewer number of vacancies. Length and experience were
given recognition by the Note. The promotion can be thus by stages
exposing the promotional avenue gradually to persons having longer
experience. This seems to be the policy underlying the Note and there G
was nothing arbitrary or imconstitutional in it. Such a limitation caters
to a well-known situation in service jurisprudence that there must be
some ratio of candidates to vacancies. If for taking an examination this
aspect of classification is introduced, it is based on rational and intel-
ligible differentia which has a nexus to the object sought to be
achieved (see p. 13). In view of what we have pointed out above, the H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. 2 S.C.R.

submission of Mr. Thakur in this connection must also be rejected.
A
In fairness to learned Counsel for the petitioners, we must at this
stage refer to the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court in Madan Afnhan Saran & Anr. v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and
Ors., , [1975) 2 S.LR. 82J on which strong reliance was placed by
B learned Counsel. In that case, the petitioner before the Allahabad
High Court challenged 3 orders passed by the Chief Justice containing
general principles for fixation of seniority of the staff holding posts in
various grades in the Establishment of the High Court and the Grada-
tion List of 1951, the Draft Gradation List of 1967 & the Final Grada-
tion List of 1969 in so far as certain respondents were shown as senior
to the petitioners. We are not concerned with the other reliefs prayed
c for by the petitioners in that case. One of the contentions of the
petitioner (see paragraph 31 of the report) was that before making a
promotion to the post of Assistant Superintendent· or a Superinten-
dent, the entire field of eligibility had to be considered .and an .omiS- •
sion on the part of respondents nos. 1 and 2 to do so rendered .the
.D promotion made invalid and that this was what happened when certain
respondents were promoted. The Division Bench pointed out that
there was no allegation in the counter-affidavit that a scrutiny of the
entire field of eligibility was made before the respondents were
appointed. Rule 9 of the Allahabad High Court (Conditions of Service
of Staff) Rules, 1946 being the relevant rule found place under the
E heading "Promotion to the posts of responsibility etc." Posts of
Assistant Superintendents and Superintendents were posts of res-
ponsibility and trust and were covered by Rule 9. The said rule pro-
vided that promotion to such posts of responsibility or trust or which
require special qualifications "shall be made by selection irrespective
of seniority". Relying upon the interpretation given to the expression
F "selection irrespective of seniority" in Mahesh Prasad Srivasiava v.
Abdul Khair, [1971) 1 S.C.R. 157 the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Madan Mohan Saran case (supra) held that "The use of
the words ·selection, irrespective of seniority' shows that the fielcl of
eligibility takes within its embrace even the juniormost member of
each department. Being a selection post, promotion has not to be
G confined to the members of the particular department in which the
vacancy has occured; and the Rule requires respondents Nos. I and 2
to take into consideration members of the entire Establishment,
irrespective of seniority, in making their choice for promotion
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The question of merit enters
primarily in the reckoning. In our view, the petitioner is right in his
H contention that the ranking or position in the Gradation List does not
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT [KANIA, J.l 793

confer any right on the respondents to be promoted and that it is a well
A
established rule that promotion to such posts is to be based primarily
on merit and not seniority alone". In our view, this decision has no
application to the case before us because the words "irrespective of
merit" which were used in Rule 9 of the Rules in question are nowhere
to be found in the relevant Rules or Schedules before us. In fact, if it
was the intention of the rule-making authority that all the persons B
eligible for the post should be considered in making the selection on
merit, expression like "irrespective of seniority'.' or "without regard to
seniority" or "on merit alone" could have been used in the Rules or
the Schedule. We do not find any such words in Rule 5 of the said
seniority Ruleii;- 1971 or in Rule 7 or Item 3 of Schedule II of the said
Establishment Rules of 1972. The mode of appointment to the post of
Assistant Registrar, set out in the said Item 3 of Schedule II, merely C
states that the appointment will be no selection on merits· from con-
firmed officers of categories 5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule
I and the said Item contains no such expression as we have set out
earlier or any other equivalent expression.
D
Coming to the next submission of Mr. Thakur, it was submitted
by him that the interpretation placed by the Chief Justice and the
learned Judges of the Delhi High Co.mt on Rule 7 of the said Appoint-
ment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1972 was incorrect. It was
urged by him that, even if the Combined Seniority List is valid, it could
not be applied for the purpo~e of promotion. In dealing with this E
argument, we may again briefly refer to Rule 5 of the said Seniority
Rules of 1971 which clearly provides that joint inter se seniority of
confirmed employees in categories. of equal status posts shall be
determined according to their dates of confirmation in any of these
categories. The posts of Superintendents, Court Masters awl Private
Secretaries to the Hon'ble Judges are treated as equaC.status posts F
unaer Schedule I to the said Seniority Rules, 1'171, framed under Rule
2 thereof. Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules of 1972 merely states
that, except for appointment on officiating, temporary or ad hoc basis,
the mode of and qualifications for appointment to the posts specified
in Schedule II to the said Seniority Rules of 1971 shall be stated the-
rein and Item 3 of the said Schedule II to which we have already G
referred earlier shows that the appointment of Assistant Registrar is to
be made on selection on merits from confirmed officers in categories 5,
6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule I. The only ground on which
the validity of the said Rule· 7 is challenged is that if it is applied and
the zone of consideration res.tricted on the basis of the said Combined
Seniority List, the prospects of promotion which the Superintendents H
794 SUPREME COURT REPOll.TS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

enjoyed would be redµced. We find ourselves totally unable to
A appreci'ate this ¥gume!1t. In the first place, it is not as if either the said
Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules of 1972 or Rule 5 of the Seniority
Il'ules of 1971 which provides for a Combined or Joint Seniority List
negatives the chance of any promotion to the posts of Assistant
Registrars being granted to the Superintendents. In fact, several
B Superintendents have been promoted to the posts of Assistant
Registrars after the said Rules became effective. All that could be
pointed out by Mr. Thakur was that under the Combined Seniority list,
for some time, relatively fewer Superintendents will be within the zone
of consideration for the posts of Assistant Registrars as compared to
Private Serretaries to the Hon'ble Judges and Court Masters. We fail
to see how any of the said Rules or the said Combined or Joint Senio-
C rity List can be struck down on the basis of such a consequence. In the
first place, it is well settled that no employee has a right to promotion
as such. As we have already pointed but the Rule does not exclude the
possibility of Superintendents getting promoted to the posts of
Assistant Registrars. It may happen that for an year or two, the
D number of Superintendents in the zone of consideration might be_
fewer compared to the number of Court Masters and Private
Secretaries within the zone. But that situation might well be reversed a
few years later and it is infpossible to hold that any of the said provi-
sions is bad in law on that ground. It was next submitted ih this connec·
tion that in the mode of appointment set out in Item 3 of Schedule II to
E the Establishment Rules of 1972 it is stated that for the posts of
Assistant Registrars, selection' on merits had to be made from con-
firmed officers of categories 5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule
I. It was urged that the reference to categories 5, 6 & 7 without refer-
ence to the Combined or Joint Seniority List indicated that even if the
zone of consideration was to be restricted on the basis of seniority this
F could be done only according to separate seniority lists for each of
these three categories and that the Combined Seniority List was not to
be used for the purposes of limiting the zone of consideration. Accord-
ing to learned Counsel, the Combined Seniority List was applicable
only for the purpose of transfers. In our view, this argument is
unsound and cannot be accepted. The reference to categories 5, 6 & 7
(j in Item 3 of Schedule II to the said Establishment Rules of 1972 is
merely made with a view to set out the categories from whcih promo-
tion or selection has to be made to the posts of Assistant Registrars.
The language of Item 3 nowhere indicates that there was any idea to
create anything like a quota for each of the said three categories and in
fact reading .fairly the relevant Rules and Item in the Schedule, it
H appears to us that the intention is to treat all these categories as form-
S.B. MATHUR v. CHIEF JUSTICEOFDELHIHIGHCOURT [KANIA,J.] 795

ing a single class or category for purposes of promotion to the posts of
A
the Assistant Registrars. There is no warrant for limiting the use of the
Combined Seniority List :nerely to purpose of transfers. In fact, it
appears to us that Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules of 1971 and the.
Combined Seniority List framed pursuant thereto were intended to
provide for a combiqed seniority for purposes of transfer as well as for
p,urposes of promotion. B

Finally, it was pointed out by learned Counsel for the Petitioners
that no uniform policy has been followed in the past regarding the
limitation of zone of consideration as far as the selection to the posts of
Assistant Registrars is concerned. This may be so. But, we are afraid,
by itself that circumstance cannot lead to a conclusion that promo-
tions are made arbitrarily because the failure to follow one uniform c
policy in respect of limiting the zone of consideration would not, by
itself, necessarily render the limitation of the zone of consideration
invalid on the ground of arbitrariness. So long as the zone of consi-
deration is limited by the competent authority in a manner not
inconsistent with the Rules or in a manner which is not arbitrary or D
capricious or mala fide, the validity of the decision to limit the zone of
consideration cannot be successfully called in quesiion on the ground
that the manner in which the zone of consideration was limited was not
uniform. The zone might have been limited on each occasion keeping
in view the relevant circumstances including the number of posts
vacant and on a basis having a nexus to the purpose of selection. E
Although, the main grievance of the Petitioners as disclosed in the oral
arguments is· regarding the limitation of the zone of consideration to 3
times the number of vacancies that grievance is not reflected in the
' prayer sought and the prayer to the petition only relates to the decisibn
of the Administrative Committee of the learned Judges of the Delhi
High Court arrived at on 3.2.1977 to fill in the vacancy in the post of F
Assistant Registrar by selection from the five seniormost persons from
the joint seniority list of Superintendents, Court Masters and' Private
Secretaries which list was finalised under the said Seniority Rules of
1971 read with the Establishment Rules of 1972. This decision is at
annexure 16 to the petition and it has been arrived at by a Committee
of Administrative Judges comprising the then learned Chief Justice G
and four other learned Judges-of the Dellii High Court. Nothing has been
shown to us to indicate that this decision of the Committee was in any
manner capricious, arbitrary or mala fide. The only contention is, as 1 f
we have already pointed out, that it was not open to the Committee· to
limit the wne of consideration at all and secondly, that this' could not
be done with reference to the joint seniority list both of which conten- H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A lions we have already rejected earlier. In view of this, tl!e challenge to
this decision must fail.

In the result, the petition fails and must be dismissed. However,
looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that
the parties should bear their own costs. Hence, the petition is dismis-
B
sed and rule discharged with no order as to costs.

S.L. Petition dismissed.