RUPALI DEVIversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

                         [2019] 6 S.C.R. 577                               577


                              RUPALI DEVI                                  A
                                      v.
               STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 2012)
                             APRIL 09, 2019                                B
       [RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, L. NAGESWARA RAO AND
                SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
        Penal Code, 1860: s.498A – Jurisdiction – Whether in a case
where cruelty had been committed in a matrimonial home by the
                                                                           C
husband or the relatives of the husband and the wife leaves the
matrimonial home and takes shelter in the parental home located at
a different place, the courts situated at the place of the parental
home of the wife have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under
s.498A – Held: In the normal course, it is the court within whose
local jurisdiction the offence is committed that would have the power      D
and authority to take cognizance of the offence in question – Under
s.179, Cr.P.C., if by reason of the consequences emanating from a
criminal act, an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, the
court in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance
– What is to be really determined is whether the exception carved
                                                                           E
out by s.179 Cr.P.C. would have any application to confer
jurisdiction in the courts situated in the local area where the parental
house of the wife is located – The provisions contained in s.498A
undoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical well-
being of the wife – Even the silence of the wife may have an
underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony –             F
Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directly
attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the
matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of the
acts committed at the matrimonial home – Such consequences, by
itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parental
                                                                           G
home where she has taken shelter – The adverse effects on the mental
health in the parental home though on account of the acts committed
in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty
within the meaning of s.498A at the parental home – The
consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home
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                                577
578            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home –
      This is the kind of offences contemplated under s.179 Cr.P.C –
      Therefore, the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after
      leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of
      acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would,
      dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain
B
      a complaint alleging commission of offences under s.498A – Code
      of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.177, 178, 179 – Crime against
      women – Evidence Act, 1972 – s.113A.
           Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 –
      Object behind its enactment – discussed.
C
            Words and phrases: Cruelty – Meaning of – Discussed.
            Disposing of the appeals, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
      contemplates that “every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into
D     and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was
      committed”. Therefore, in the normal course, it is the court within
      whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed that would have
      the power and authority to take cognizance of the offence in
      question. [Para 6][584-D]
E            1.2 Section 178 creates an exception to the “ordinary rule”
      engrafted in Section 177 by permitting the courts in another local
      area where the offence is partly committed to take cognizance.
      Also if the offence committed in one local area continues in
      another local area, the courts in the latter place would be
F     competent to take cognizance of the matter. Under Section 179,
      if by reason of the consequences emanating from a criminal act
      an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, the court in that
      jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance. Thus,
      if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in another;
      or if the offence is a continuing offence or where the consequences
G     of a criminal act result in an offence being committed at another
      place, the exception to the “ordinary rule” would be attracted
      and the courts within whose jurisdiction the criminal act is
      committed will cease to have exclusive jurisdiction to try the
      offence. [Para 8][585-A-D]
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      RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.                     579


      State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890 :             A
      [1973] 3 SCR 1004 – relied on.
      2. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was introduced
by the Criminal Law (second amendment) Act, 1983. In addition
to the said amendment in the IPC, the provisions of Sections 174
and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to            B
inquiries by police in case of death by suicides and inquiries by
magistrates into cause of such deaths were also amended.
Further by an amendment in the first schedule to the Cr.P.C. the
offence under Section 498A was made cognizable and non-bailable.
Of considerable significance is the introduction of Section 113A
in the Indian Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (second                 C
amendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment
of suicide by a married woman to be drawn if such suicide had
been committed within a period of seven years from the date of
marriage of the married woman and she had been subjected to
cruelty. The object behind these amendments, undoubtedly, was          D
to combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and the
relatives of the husband on the wife which leads to commission
of suicides or grave injury to the wife besides seeking to deal
with harassment of the wife so as to coerce her or any person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property, etc.
[Paras 12, 13][586-F-H; 587-A; D-E]                                    E

       3. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The
impact on the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part
of the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of
being driven away from the matrimonial home and her
helplessness to go back to the same home for fear of being ill         F
treated are aspects that cannot be ignored while understanding
the meaning of the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section
498A IPC. The emotional distress or psychological effect on the
wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatize
the wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes          G
shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty
committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such
acts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt
that the mental trauma and the psychological distress cause by
the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that
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580           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     had compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and take
      shelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parental
      home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive
      and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the parental
      home even though there may not be any overt act of physical
      cruelty at such place. [Para 14][587-G-H; 588-A-C]
B
              4. The object behind the enactment of the Protection of
      Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is to provide a civil
      remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in
      criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498A IPC.
      The definition of the Domestic Violence in the Act of 2005
C     contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety,
      life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well as
      emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly have a close
      connection with Explanation A & B to Section 498A, IPC which
      defines cruelty. The provisions contained in Section 498A IPC,
D     undoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical
      well-being of the wife. Her sufferings at the parental home though
      may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by
      the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the
      consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home.
      Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences
E     committed at the parental home where she has taken shelter.
      The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home
      though on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home
      would amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of
      Section 498A at the parental home. The consequences of the
F     cruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeated
      offences being committed at the parental home. This is the kind
      of offences contemplated under Section 179 Cr.P.C which would
      squarely be applicable to the instant case as an answer to the
      question raised. [Para 15][589-D-H; 590-A]
G           5. The courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after
      leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of
      acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would,
      dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to
      entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under
      Section 498A IPC. [Para 16][589-B]
H
      RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.                        581


      Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police,                 A
      Chennai and Another (2004) 8 SCC 100 : [2004] 3
      Suppl. SCR 604 ; Ramesh and Others v. State of Tamil
      Nadu (2005) 3 SCC 507 : [2005] 2 SCR 493 ; Manish
      Ratan and Others v. State of Madhya Parade and
      Another (2007) 1 SCC 262 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR
                                                                          B
      226 ; Amarendu Jyoti and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh
      and Others (2014) 12 SCC 362 ; Sujata Mukherjee v.
      Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997) 5 SCC 30 :
      [1997] 3 SCR 1127 ; Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State
      of Bihar and Another (2011) 11 SCC 301 : [2011] 6
      SCR 83 ; State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal & Anr.                     C
      (2003) 11 SCC 126 – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 604           referred to            Para 3
[2005] 2 SCR 493                  referred to            Para 3           D
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 226           referred to            Para 3
(2014) 12 SCC 362                 referred to            Para 3
[1997] 3 SCR 1127                 referred to            Para 4
[2011] 6 SCR 83                   referred to            Para 4           E
(2003) 11 SCC 126                 referred to            Para 4
[1973] 3 SCR 1004                 relied on              Para 9
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 71 of 2012                                                            F
                                With
      Criminal Appeal Nos.619, 620, 621, 622 and 623 of 2012.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2011 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 16456 of
                                                                          G
2007.
       Pramod Swaroop, Sr. Adv., Ajay Kumar Srivastava, Vikrant Singh
Bais, Ashutosh Dubey, Sandeep Chaudhary, K. Uma Shankar, Ms. Shubhi
Bhardwaj, Raj Kishor Choudhary, Shakeel Ahmed, Anupam Bhati, Ashok
Kumar Shrivastava, Raj Sharma, Ms. Nidhi Singh Dubey, Ms. Sundri,
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582            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     Ms. Shalu Sharma, Subhro Sanyal, Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, S. Muthu
      Krishnan, Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, Amarjeet Singh Dheman, Ms. Nidhi
      Dwivedi, Ms. Alka Sinha, Ms. Malvika Trivedi, Anuvrat Sharma, Praveen
      Chaturvedi, Ms. Jyoti Chaturvedi, Ms. Addya. Mishra, Abhinav Mukerji,
      Ms. Purnima Krishna, Mr. Sunil Kumar Verma, Saju Jakob, Ms. Lily
      Thomas, Abhishek Jaiswal, Gopal Jha, Shreyash Bhardwaj, G. R. Pandey,
B
      Shyamal Kumar, Rajesh Kumar Chaurasia, Sunil Kr., Ms. Abha R.
      Sharma, D. S. Parmar, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Mahendra Singh,
      Parmanand Gaur, Ekansh Bansal, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi,
      B. N. Dubey, Mukesh Kumar, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Ashutosh Kumar
      Sharma, Ugra Shankar Prasad, Advs. for the appearing parties.
C           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            RANJAN GOGOI, CJI.
             1. “Whether a woman forced to leave her matrimonial home on
      account of acts and conduct that constitute cruelty can initiate and access
D     the legal process within the jurisdiction of the courts where she is forced
      to take shelter with the parents or other family members”. This is the
      precise question that arises for determination in this group of appeals.
            2. The opinions of this Court on the aforesaid question being sharply
      divided, the present reference to a larger Bench has been made for
E     consideration of the question indicated hereinabove.
            3. In
              (i) Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police,
                  Chennai and Another (2004) 8 SCC 100.
              (ii) Ramesh and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 3
F
                   SCC 507.
              (iii) Manish Ratan and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh
                    and Another (2007) 1 SCC 262.
              (iv) Amarendu Jyoti and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh
G                   and Others (2014) 12 SCC 362.
             a view has been taken that if on account of cruelty committed to
      a wife in a matrimonial home she takes shelter in the parental home and
      if no specific act of commission of cruelty in the parental home can be
      attributed to the husband or his relatives, the initiation of proceedings
H
       RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.                           583
                  [RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]

under Section 498A in the courts having jurisdiction in the area where        A
the parental home is situated will not be permissible. The core fact that
would be required to be noted in the above cases is that there were no
allegations made on behalf of the aggrieved wife that any overt act of
cruelty or harassment had been caused to her at the parental home after
she had left the matrimonial home. It is in these circumstances that the
                                                                              B
view had been expressed in the above cases that the offence of cruelty
having been committed in the matrimonial home the same does not amount
to a continuing offence committed in the parental home to which place
the aggrieved wife may have later shifted.
       4. In Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee
(1997) 5 SCC 30; Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar and                  C
Another (2011) 11 SCC 301 and State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal
& Anr. (2003) 11 SCC 126 a seemingly different view has been taken.
However, the said view may appear to be based in the particular facts
of each of the cases in question. For instance, in Sujata Mukherjee
(Supra) there was a specific allegation that the husband, after committing    D
acts of cruelty in the matrimonial home, had also gone to the parental
house of the wife where she had taken shelter and had assaulted her
there. On the said facts this court in Sujata Mukherjee (Supra) held
that the offence is a continuing offence under Section 178 (c) of the
Cr.P.C. In Sunita Kumari Kashyap (Supra), there was an allegation that
the wife was illtreated by her husband who left her at her parental home      E
and further that the husband had not made any enquiries about her
thereafter. There was a further allegation that even when the wife had
tried to contact the husband, he had not responded. In the said facts,
this court took the view that the consequences of the offence under
Section 498A have occurred at the parental home and, therefore, the           F
court at that place would have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
offence alleged in view of Section 179 of the Cr.P.C. Similarly in State
of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal (Supra) as the miscarriage was caused
to the wife at Jabalpur, her parental home, on account of cruelty meted
out to her in the matrimonial home, it was held that the court at the place
of the parental home of the wife would have jurisdiction to entertain the     G
complaint under Section 179 Cr.P.C.
      5. The above two views which the learned referring bench had
considered while making the present reference, as already noticed, were
founded on the peculiar facts of the two sets of cases before the Court.
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584             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     It may be possible to sustain both the views in the light of the facts of the
      cases in which such view was rendered by this court. What confronts
      the court in the present case is however different. Whether in a case
      where cruelty had been committed in a matrimonial home by the husband
      or the relatives of the husband and the wife leaves the matrimonial home
      and takes shelter in the parental home located at a different place, would
B
      the courts situated at the place of the parental home of the wife have
      jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 498A. This is in a
      situation where no overt act of cruelty or harassment is alleged to have
      been committed by the husband at the parental home where the wife
      had taken shelter.
C            6. A look at the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) dealing with the jurisdiction of the Criminal
      Court in inquires and trials will now be required. Section 177 of the
      Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates that “every offence shall
      ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local
D     jurisdiction it was committed”. It is, therefore, clear that in the normal
      course, it is the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence is
      committed that would have the power and authority to take cognizance
      of the offence in question.
             7. Sections 178 and 179 are exceptions to the above rule and may
E     be set out hereinunder:
            “178.Place of inquiry or trial.-
            (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence
            was committed, or

F           (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and
            partly in another, or
            (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be
            committed in more local areas than one, or
            (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,
G           it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over
            any of such local areas.”
            “179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence
            ensues.- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which
            has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence
H
       RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.                           585
                  [RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]

      may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local             A
      jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has
      ensued.”
        8. Section 178 creates an exception to the “ordinary rule”
engrafted in Section 177 by permitting the courts in another local area
where the offence is partly committed to take cognizance. Also if the         B
offence committed in one local area continues in another local area, the
courts in the latter place would be competent to take cognizance of the
matter. Under Section 179, if by reason of the consequences emanating
from a criminal act an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, the
court in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance.
Thus, if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in another;   C
or if the offence is a continuing offence or where the consequences of a
criminal act result in an offence being committed at another place, the
exception to the “ordinary rule” would be attracted and the courts within
whose jurisdiction the criminal act is committed will cease to have
exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence.                                    D
      9. At this stage it may also be useful to take note of what can be
understood to a continuing offence. The issue is no longer res integra
having been answered by this court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran
Nenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890. Para 5 may be usefully noticed in this
regard.                                                                       E
      “5. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance
      and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and
      for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to
      obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves
      a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its      F
      requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that
      such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there
      is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds
      of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an
      offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues,
      and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion       G
      on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence,
      there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is
      absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act
      or omission is committed once and for all.”
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586            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A            10. The question that has posed for an answer has nothing to do
      with the provisions of Section 178 (b) or (c). What has to be really
      determined is whether the exception carved out by Section 179 would
      have any application to confer jurisdiction in the courts situated in the
      local area where the parental house of the wife is located.
B           11. To answer the above question, one will have to look into the
      Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Criminal Law [2nd Amendment
      Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983)] by which Section 498A was inserted in the
      Indian Penal Code. The section itself may be noticed in the first instance:
             “498A.Husband or relative of husband of a woman
C           subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the
            relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty
            shall be pun-ished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
            to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
            Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
D           (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
            drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
            danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
            woman; or
            (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a
E           view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
            unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on
            account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet
            such demand.”
             12. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was introduced by the
F     Criminal Law (second amendment) Act, 1983. In addition to the aforesaid
      amendment in the Indian Penal Code, the provisions of Sections 174 and
      176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to inquiries by
      police in case of death by suicides and inquiries by magistrates into cause
      of such deaths were also amended. Section 198A was also inserted in
      the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to prosecution of offences
G
      under Section 498A. Further by an amendment in the first schedule to
      the Cr.PC the offence under Section 498A was made cognizable and
      non-bailable. Of considerable significance is the introduction of Section
      113A in the Indian Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (second
      amendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment of
H
       RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.                           587
                  [RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]

suicide by a married woman to be drawn if such suicide had been               A
committed within a period of seven years from the date of marriage of
the married woman and she had been subjected to cruelty. Section
113A is in the following term:
      “113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
      woman.– When the question is whether the commission of suicide          B
      by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of
      her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within
      a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that
      her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to
      cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other
      circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by        C
      her husband or by such relative of her husband.
      Explanation.– For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall
      have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal
      Code (45 of 1860).”
                                                                              D
       13. The object behind the aforesaid amendment, undoubtedly, was
to combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives
of the husband on the wife which leads to commission of suicides or
grave injury to the wife besides seeking to deal with harassment of the
wife so as to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property, etc. The above stated object of the amendment        E
cannot be overlooked while answering the question arising in the present
case. The judicial endeavour must, therefore, always be to make the
provision of the laws introduced and inserted by the Criminal Laws
(second amendment) Act, 1983 more efficacious and effective in view
of the clear purpose behind the introduction of the provisions in question,   F
as already noticed.
       14. “Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence under Section 498A
IPC is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to mean “The intentional and
malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature,
esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage (Abuse, inhuman treatment,           G
indignity)”. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The impact
on the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the husband
or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of being driven away from
the matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the same home
for fear of being illtreated are aspects that cannot be ignored while
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588             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     understanding the meaning of the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section
      498A of the Indian Penal Code. The emotional distress or psychological
      effect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to
      traumatize the wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and
      takes shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physicalcruelty
      committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such actsdo
B
      not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental
      trauma and the psychological distress cause by the acts of the husband
      including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leave
      the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continue
      to persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical
C     cruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in
      the parental home even though there may not be any overt act of physical
      cruelty at such place.
             15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as
      the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a civil remedy
D     to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law
      which is what is provided under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
      The definition of the Domestic Violence in the Protection of Women
      from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries that
      endanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or
      physical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly,
E     for reasons stated above, have a close connection with Explanation A &
      B to Section 498A, Indian Penal Code which defines cruelty. The
      provisions contained in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,
      undoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical well-being
      of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element
F     of an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental
      home though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty
      by the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the
      consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Such
      consequences, by itself, would amount to distinctoffences committed at
      the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects on
G     the mental health in the parental home though on account of the acts
      committed in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount
      to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the
      parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the
      matrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at the
H
        RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.                              589
                   [RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]

parental home. This is the kind of offences contemplated under Section            A
179 Cr.P.C which would squarely be applicable to the present case as
an answer to the question raised.
       16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the
wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial
home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his                B
relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction
to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code.
       17. All the appeals are disposed of in terms of the above.
                                                                                  C

Devika Gujral                                              Appeals disposed of.




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