Holding

Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC is attracted only when the offence is committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding, and a court is not bound to make a complaint under Section 340 unless it is expedient in the interests of justice.

Summary

The appellant challenged the validity of a lease agreement, alleging it was forged, and the Kerala High Court's Single Judge ordered a criminal complaint under Section 340 of the CrPC based on a handwriting expert's report. The High Court set aside that order, holding that Section 340 could not be invoked because the alleged forgery did not occur after the document was produced as evidence in court, as required by Section 195(1)(b)(ii). The Supreme Court examined the conflicting interpretations in Sachidanand Singh v. State of Bihar and Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, and affirmed that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) applies only to offences committed with respect to a document while it is in "custodia legis". It further held that a court is not obligated to make a complaint under Section 340; it may do so only if it deems it expedient in the interests of justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision.

Issues considered

Whether Section 340 CrPC can be invoked for a forgery alleged before the document is produced as evidence in any court.
Interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC – the temporal scope of the embargo on court's cognizance.
Whether a court is bound to make a complaint under Section 340 CrPC when a forgery is alleged.
Maintainability of an appeal against an order made under Section 340 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 190, s. 195(1)(b)(ii), s. 340, s. 341, s. 343
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 463, s. 471, s. 475, s. 476

Subjects

forgerylease agreementSection 340 CrPCSection 195(1)(b)(ii)criminal complaintcustodia legisjudicial discretionpreliminary enquiry

Judgment

-t
"! RUGMINI AMMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. A
v.
V. NARA YANA REDDIAR AND ORS.

DECEMBER 13, 2007
B
[DR. ARIJIT P ASAYATAND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
--1

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.195(1)(b)(ii), 340-
Embargo contained in s.195 (I) (b)(ii)-Applicability and scope of-
Held: s. l 95(1)(b)(iij applicable only when offences enumerated therein C
had been committed with respect to document after it has been
produced or given in evidence in proceeding in any Court i.e. during
the time when the document was in custodia legis-Offence committed
should be of such type which directly affects the administration of
- 1 justice-However, Court is not bound to make a complaint in this D
regard-Such a course will be adopted only if the interest ofjustice
requires and not in every case.

The claim of respondent No.1 was that he was granted tenancy by
one 'D' by executing lease agreement Ext.R-4(a). The appellant filed E
writ petition challenging the validity of the said lease agreement.
Respondent No.1 filed a counter affidavit alongwith photocopy oflease
agreement. Thereafter the appellant filed CMP contending that the
purported lease agreement was a forged document and in support
submitted the report of handwriting expert. The Single Judge of High F
Court relied on the opinion given by handwriting expert and held that
Ext.R-4(a) was fabricated and hence there was reasonable likelihood
to establish the offences punishable under IPC and also directed the
Registrar of the Court to make a complaint and send it to the
Magistrate. G

Against that order, writ appeal was filed. The High Court allowed
the writ appeal holding that initiation of the proceedings under s.340
Cr.P.C. was without jurisdiction. Hence the present appeal.
587 H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A The appellant contended that there is a conflict in view between .......
the decision in *SachidaNand's case and **Surjit Singh 's case.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. S.190 Cr.P.C. provides that a Magistrate may take
-
B cognizance ofany offence (a) upon receiving a complaint offacts which
constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts, and (c)
upon information received from any person other than a police officer,
or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. S.195
Cr.P.C. is a sort of exception to this general provision and creates an
C embargo upon the power of the court to take cognizance ofcertain types
of offences enumerated therein. The procedure for filing a complaint
by the court as contemplated by s.195(1) Cr.P.C. is given in s340 Cr.P.C.
[Para 11] [592-G, H; 593-A-B]
D 1.2. In view of the language used in s.340 Cr.P.C., the court is not
bound to make a complaint regarding commission ofan offence referred
to in s.195(1 )(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of
opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that
such a course will be adopted only if the interest ofjustice requires and
E not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a
preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient
in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the
offences referred to in s.195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be
judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude ofinjury suffered by
F the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having
regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon
administration of justice. [Para 11] [594-D-G]
1.3. S.195(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the
offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with
G respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence
in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the docmr.mt was
in custodia legis. The High Court was, therefore, right in placing reliance
onSachidaNand'scase. [Paras 11and13] (597-A-C]
H
RUGMINI AMMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. V. NARAYANA 589
REDDIAR [PASAYAT, J.]
*Sachida Nand Singh andAnr. v. State o/Bihar andAnr., AIR (1998) A
SC 1121 and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005] 4 SCC
370, relied on.

KS. Dass v. State ofKera/a, (1992) 2 KLT 358 and **Surjit Singh
and Ors. v. Balbir Singh, (1996] 3 SCC 533, referred to.
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 564 of
2002.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 25.8.2000 of the High
Court ofKerala at Emakulam in W.A. No. 714of1999.
c
P. Krshnamoorthy and Romy Chacko for the Appellants.
E.M.S. Anam, G. Prakash, M.P. Vinod, Ajay K. Jain and Vimlesh
Kumar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the
judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court by which the
judgment of the learned Single judge wa5 set aside and the writ appeal
was allowed. E
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondent No.4 in CMP No.35930of1998 in 0.P. No.12701
of 1998 was the 4th respondent in writ petition also. According to the
respondent No. I he was the tenant of a building called 'Jaya building' F
Main Road, Kollam. The tenancy was given by one Durairaja Reddiar
by executing an agreement of lease dated 6.1.1994. This lease deed
enabled him to make alterations in the building. Accordingly he effected
some alterations in the building. When it was found that the alterations
were effected he received from the Kollam Municipality an order directing G
him to demolish the structure which according to the Municipality was
unauthorized. Against the order of the Municipality respondent No.1
approached the Government. The Government issued an order dated
22.6.1998 which was annexed as Ext.PS to the writ petition, directing
the respondent No. I to submit an application to the local authority seeking H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

· A regularization of the additional structure made by him. Rugmini Ammal,
the first respondent in the Writ Appeal filed a writ petition. The contention
raised by her was that there was no lease agreement and that the
construction was unauthorized. It was stated that the construction cannot
be legalized on other grounds.
B
3. Respondent No. I filed a counter-affidavit. Along with counter-
affidavit photocopy of the agreement of lease dated 6.1.1994 was
annexed. Thereafter Rugmini Ammal filed CMP No.35930 of 1998. The
contentions taken in the CMP was that the purported agreement of lease
C is a forged document. It was further stated that she sought the opinion of
Professor B.B. Kashyap, a renowned handwriting and finger print expert.
The signatures in the purported lease agreement, Exh. R4(a) was
compared with the admitted signatures ofDurairaj Reddiar in Ext. P7.
The expert gave his opinion, the copy of which was produced as Exh.Pl8.
D According to it the signatures in Exh.R4(a) did not tally with the admitted
signatures. Hence the handwriting expert was of the opinion that the five
disputed signatures were not written by the writer of the admitted
signatures.
4. A counter-affidavit was filed in CMP No.35930of1998. In the
E counter-affidavit, it was stated that Exh. R4(a) was produced before the
Government and Exh. P5 order itself goes to show that this was produced
before the Government. The fabrication ofExh.R4(a) was denied. A reply
affidavit was filed in which Rugmini Ammal denied the execution of certain
documents signed by Reddiar and produced by the appellant in the writ
F appeal. The prayer in CMP No.35930of1998 was to conduct enquiry
into the production ofExh.R4(a) forged document and made a complaint
thereof and forward it to the Magistrate of the First Class having
jurisdiction.

G
5. Learned Single Judge relied on the opinion given by the
handwriting expert and prima facie came to the conclusion that
Exts.R4(a), R4(e), R4(i) and R4G) were fabricated and hence there is a
reasonable likelihood to establish the offences punishable under Sections
463, 471, 475 and 476 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the
H 'IPC'). The learned Single Judge directed the Registrar of the Court to
RUGMINI AMMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. V. NARAYANA 591
REDDIAR [PASAYAT, J.]
make a complaint for the purpose in writing and send it to the Magistrate A
-w + of the First Class having jurisdiction. Against that order the writ appeal
was filed.
6. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that proceedings
under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short B
the 'Cr.P.C.') cannot be initiated because there was no allegation that the
fabrication was made after the document was produced. Certain other
"' --i stands were also taken with which we are not very much concerned.
7. Stand of the respondents in the writ appeal was that the writ
appeal was not maintainable and Section 341 ofCr.P.C. does not provide C
for an order passed by the High Court. It was submitted that Section 340
Cr.P.C. has been rightly initiated. The High Court was of the view that
though Section 341 Cr.P.C. does not provide for an appeal from an order
passed under Section 340 Cr.P.C. it does not mean that there was no
other provision by which appeal cannot be filed. In fact it was held that D
-- -\ Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act provides for such an appeal.
Reference in this context was made to a Five Judge Bench decision of
the High Court in K.S. Dass v. State of Kerala, (1992) 2 KL T 358.
Reference was also made to some other full Bench judgments.
E
8. Coming to the question about the applicability of Section 340 to
the facts of the case it was held that stage for initiation of the proceeding,
if any, under Section 340 Cr.P.C. had not come. Reference was made to
a decision of this Court in Schida Nand Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar
and Anr., AIR (1998) SC 1121. Therefore, it was held that initiation of F
the proceeding under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was without jurisdiction. The
writ appeal was accordingly allowed
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is a conflict
in view between the decision in Sachida Nand's case (supra) and Surjit
Singh and Ors. v. Balbir Singh, [1996] 3 SCC 533. G
10. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
supported the order of the High Court.
11. At this juncture it is to be noted that in view of the conflict of
H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A language between two decisions of this Court each rendered by a Bench
of three learned Judges in Sachida Nand's case (supra) and Surfit Singh 's .+ r
case (supra) regarding interpretation of Section 195(1 )(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. the
matter was placed before a five-judge Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah v.
Meenakshi Marwah, [2005] 4 SCC 370. After referring to the provisions
B contained in Sections 190, 195(1 )(b)(ii) and 340 Cr.P .C. it was held that
the decision in Sachida Nand's case (supra) correctly decided and the
view taken is the correct view. It was, inter alia, observed as follows:
"19. As mentioned earlier, the words "by a party to any proceeding
)'- .
in any court" occurring in Section 195(1 )( c ) of the old Code have
c been omitted in Section 195(1 )( b )( ii ) CrPC. Why these words
were deleted in the corresponding provision of the Code of C1iminal
Procedure, 1973 will be apparent from the 41 st Report of the Law
Commission which said as under in para 15.39:
D "15.39. The purpose of the section is to bar private
prosecutions where the course of justice is sought to be
i- '
perverted leaving to the court itself to uphold its dignity and
prestige. On principle there is no reason why the safeguard in
clause (c) should not apply to offences committed by
E witnesses also. Witnesses need as much protection against
vexatious prosecutions as parties and the court should have
as much control over the acts of witnesses that enter as a
component of a judicial proceeding, as over the acts of parties.
If, therefore, the provisions of clause (c) are extended to
F witnesses, the extension would be in conformity with the broad
principle which forms the basis of Section 195."
20. Since the object of deletion of the words "by a party to any
proceeding in any court" occurring in Section 195(1 )(c) of the old
Code is to afford protection to witnesses also, the interpretation
G
placed on the said provision in the earlier decisions would still hold
good.
~.
21. Section 190 CrPC provides that a Magistrate may take
cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts
H which constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts,
RUGMINI AMMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. V. NARAYANA 593
REDDIAR [PASAYAT, J.]
and (c) upon infonnation received from any person other than a A
police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has
been committed. Section 195 CrPC is a sort of exception to this
general provision and creates an embargo upon the power of the
court to take cognizance of certain types of offences enumerated
therein. The procedure for filing a complaint by the court as B
contemplated by Section 195(1) CrPC is given in Section 340
CrPC and sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof are being reproduced
below:
"340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195 .-{1)
When, upon an applkation made to it in this behalf or C
otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the
interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any
offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of Section
195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation
to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect D
of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if
any, as it thinks necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that effect; E
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused
before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable F
and the court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused
in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before
such Magistrate.
G
(2) The power conferred on a court by sub-section (1) in
.!<·
respect of an offence may, in any case where that court has
neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of
that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such
complaint, be exercised by the court to which such fonner H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of
Section. ,, ~

Section 341 CrPC provides for an appeal to the court to
which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of
sub-section (4) of Section 195, against the order refusing to
B make a complaint or against an order directing filing of a
complaint and in such appeal the superior court may direct
withdrawal of the complaint or making of the complaint. Sub- :r ....
section (2) of Section 343 lays down that when it is brought
to the notice of a Magistrate to whom a complaint has been
c made under Section 340 or 341 that an appeal is pending
against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out
of which the matter has arisen, he may, ifhe thinks fit, at any
stage, adjourn the hearing of the case until such appeal is
decided.
D
23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the ,. ,
court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission
of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section
is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is
E expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a
course will be adopted only ifthe interest of justice requires
and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court
may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect
that it is expedient in the interests ofjustice that enquiry should
F be made into any of the offences referred to in Section
195( 1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the
court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the
person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having
regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has
G upon administration ofjustice. It is possible that such forged
document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial
injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a
·~
very valuable property or status or the like, but such document
may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence
H in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced
RUGMINI AMMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. V. NARAYANA 595
REDDIAR [PASAYAT, J.]
and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept A
of administration of justice may be minimal. In such
circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the
interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of
clause (b)(i), as canvassed by learned counsel for the
appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged B
document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a
situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has
to be discarded.
There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub-
section (1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of a C
preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint
is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the court
and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded
and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an
appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing D
and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section
343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying the complaint to
adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an
appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial
proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these E
provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades
specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are
challenged in successive appellate fora which are time-consunung.
It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against
+ an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case F
is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show
that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by
the court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the
offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a
guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant G
to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important
consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation
sought to be placed upon clause(b)(ii).
25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(l)(b)(ii), whereby H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addl.) S.C.R.

A the bar created by the said provision would also operate where
after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently
produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in
Sachida Nand Singh 2 after preparing a forged document or
committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a
B proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either
by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the
document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from
prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police
until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses
c to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to
which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely.
Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest
of the society at large.
26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are
D
normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such
I -
a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give
an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged
to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause
(b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a
E
complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its
logical-end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with
the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be
avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd
Edn.), para 313, the principle has been stated in the following
F
manner:
"The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that
produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is
unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes,
G however, there are ove1riding reasons for applying such a
construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament
really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong."
In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion
that Sachida Nand Singh 2 has been correctly decided and the
H
RUGMINI AMMAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. V. NARAYANA 597
REDDIAR [PASAYAT, J.]
view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1 )(b)(ii) CrPC A
would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said
provision have been committed with respect to a document after
it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any
court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia
legis." B

12. The above position was highlighted in Iqbal Singh Marwah v.
• -.f Meenakshi Marwah (supra).
13. The High Court was, therefore, right in placing reliance on
Sachida Nand's case (supra). C
14. The appeal is, therefore, without merit and is, therefore,
dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.