Holding

The Supreme Court may, under Article 32, order monetary compensation as a remedial measure for the deprivation of the fundamental right to liberty.

Summary

Rudul Sah was kept in prison for more than 14 years after being acquitted by a trial court. He filed a habeas corpus petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking his release and compensation for the illegal detention. The State of Bihar informed the Court that he had already been released, but the petition continued to address his claim for compensation. The Supreme Court examined whether, under Article 32, it could order monetary compensation for the violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The Court held that the power under Article 32 is not limited to ordering release and may include compensation as a palliative for the breach of fundamental rights. Consequently, it directed the State to pay an additional Rs 30,000 to the petitioner, besides the Rs 5,000 already paid, without prejudice to a later suit for full damages.

Issues considered

Whether the Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 32, can award monetary compensation for violation of the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21.
Whether a claim for compensation must be pursued through a civil suit or can be entertained within a writ petition under Article 32.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 32

Subjects

habeas corpusArticle 32Article 21compensationunlawful detentionfundamental rightsSupreme Court jurisdictionstate liability

Judgment

Jo8
RUDULSAH
A
• v.

STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER

August 1, 1983
8
(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., AMARENDRA NATH SEN
AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ;J

Constitution Of lndia-Arl. 32-Scope of-Whether in a lulbeas corpus'
petition under Art. 32 Supreme Court can grant compensation for .deprivation of a
c fundamental right.

CorJstifUtion of India-Ari. 21-Scope of-Whethei covers right to
compensation for its violation.

The petitioner who was detained in prison for over 14 years after his
D acquittal filed a habeas corpus petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
praying for his release on the-ground that his detention in the jaiJ was unlaw-
ful. He also asked for certain other reliefs including compensation for his
·'· illegal detention. When the petition came up for hearing the Court was
informed by the respondent State that ·the petitioner had already been released
from the jail.

lil .
Allowing the petition,

HELD : The petitioner's detention in the prison after his acquittal was
wholly unjustified.

Article 32 confers power on the Supren1e Court to issue directions or

' orders or appropriate writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part III of the Constitution. Article 21 which guarantees the right to life
and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court
were limited io passing orders of felease from illega I detention. One of the
teliing ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented
and due compliance with the rnaridate of Article ~1 secured, is to mulct its
violators in the payme11;t of monetary compensation. The right. to compensation
is some palliative for the Unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the
name of public interest and which preSent for their protection the powers of
the State as a shield. Respect-for the rights of illdividuals is the true baStion
of demoCracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers
to their rights. [513 A-C, 514 B-EJ
H
In the circumstances of the instant case the refusal to pass an order of
compensation in favour of the petitiorier wHl be doing mere lip-service to his
fundamental right to liberty which t~e State Government has so grossly
!ltiriUL SAH v. BIHAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 5o9
Violated. Therefore, as an interim measure the State must pay to the prti·
tioner a further sum of Rs. 30,000 in addition to the Sum Of Rs. 5,000 already A
paid by it. This order will not preclude the petidoner from bringing a suit to re.:
criver appropr_iate damages from the State ind its erring officials. [514 B, F, HJ

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1987
of 1982.
B
(Under Article 32 of tM Constitution of India)

Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Petitioner.

.
D. Goburdhan for the Respondent. .
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by .

CllANDRACHUD, C.J. : This Writ Petition discloses a sordid
and disturbing state of affairs. Though the petitioner was acquitted
by the Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on June 3, 1968 he D
was released from the jail on October 16, 1982, that is to say, more
than 14 years after he was acquitted. By this Habeas Corpus
petition, the petitioner asks for his release on the gro.und that his
detention in the jail ·is unla-wful. He has also as"ked for certain
ancillary reliefS like ·rehabilitation, reimbursements of expenses which
I he may incur for medical treatment and compensation for the illegal E
incarceration.

This petition came up before us on' November 22, 1982 when
we were informed by Shri Goburdhan, counsel for the State of Bihar,
that the petitioner was already released from the jail. The relief F
sought by. the petitioner for his release thus became infructuous but
despite that, we directed that a Notice to show cause be issued to
the State of Bihar regarding prayers 2, 3 and 4 of the petition. By '
prayer No. 2 the petitioner asks for medical treatment at Government
expense, by prayer. No. 3 he asks for an ex gratia payment for his
rehabilitation, while by prayer No. 4 he asks· for compensation for G
his illegal detention in the jail for over 14 years.

We expected a prompt _respon.se to the Show Cause Notice
from the Bihar Government at least at this late stage, but they H
offered no explanation for over four months. The Writ Petition
was listed before us on March 31, 1983 when Shri Goburdhan
restated that the petitioner had been already released from the jail.
.510 sui>&BME couit1 REroRTS h983j ls.c.i .
We passed a specific order on that date to the effect that the release
A of the petitioner canno.t be the end of the matter and we called upon
the Government of Bihar to submit a written explanation supported
by an affidavit as to why the petitioner was kept in the jail for over
14 years after his acquittal. On April 16, 1983, Shri -Alakh Deo
Singh, Jailor, Muzaffarpur Central Jail, filed an affidavit in pursuance
,:B of that order. Shorn of its formal recitals, the affidavit reads thus :

"2. That the petitioner was received on 25.3.67
from Hazaribagh Central Jail and was being produced
regularly before the Additional Sessions Judge,
Muzaffarpur and on 30.8.68 the learned Judge passed the
C following order :

"The accused is acquitted but he should 'be
detained in prison till further order of the State
Government and I.G. (Prisons), Bihar."

D (A true copy of the same is attached as
Annexure I).

3. That accused Rudul Sah was of unsound mind ·at
the time of passing the above order. This infor-
E ,,. mation was sent to the Law Department in letter
No. 1838 dated 10.5.74 of the Superintendent,
Central Jail, Muzaffaqiur through District Magis·
trate, Muzaffarpur.

4. That the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur, reported ori
F 18.2.77 that accused Rudul Sah was normal and
this information was communicated to the 'Law
Department on 21.2. 77.

S. That the petitioner, Rudul Shah was treated well in
G accordance with the rules in .the Jail Manual, Bihar,
during the period of his detention.

6. That the petitioner was released on 16.10.82 in
compliance with the letter No. 11637 dated 14.10.82
H of the Law Department."

The Writ Petition came up before us on April 26, 1983 when
we adjourned it to the first week of August 1983 since it was n 9t
RUDUL SAH v. BIHAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 511
•
clear either from the affidavit filed hy the Jailor . or from the order
of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur, which is A
annexed to the affidavit as Annexure I, as· to what was the basis on
which it was stated in the affidavit that the petitioner was of unsound
mind or the reason why the learned Additional Sessions Judge
directed the detention of the petitioner .in jail, until further orders
of the State Government and the Inspector General of Prisons. B
The writ petition bas come up for hearing once again before
us today. If past experience is any guide, no ·useful purpose is
·likely to be served by adjourning the petition in th~ hope that the
State authorities will place before us satisfactory material to explain
the conti~ued detention of the petitioner in jail after bis aquittal. c
We apprehend that the present state of affairs, in which we are left
to guess whether the petitioner was not released from the prison
for the benign reason that he was insane, is not likely to improve
in the near future.
D
The Jail or" s affidavit leaves much to be desired. It narrates
with an air of candidness what is notorious, for example, that the
petitioner was not released from the jail upon his acquittal and that
. he was reported to be insane. But it discloses no data on the basis ·
of which he was adjudged insane, the specific measures taken to clire E
him of that affliction and, what is most important, whether it took
14 years to set right bis mental imbalance. No medical opinion is ,.
.produced in support' of the diagnosis that be was insane nor indeed
js any jail record produced to show what kind of me'tlieal treatment
was prescribed for and administered to him and for hew long. The F
letter (No. 1838) dated May 10, 1974 which, according to paragraph
3 of the affidavit, was sent to the I aw Department by the Superin-
tendent of the Central fail, Muzaffarpur, is not produced before us.
There is nothing to show that the petitioner was found insane on
the very date of his acquittal. And, if he was insane on the date of
acquittal, he co~ld not have been tried at all for the simple reason
G
...,.. that an insane person cannot enter upon bis defence. Under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, insane persons have certain statutory
rights in regard to the procedure governing_ their trial. According
1 io paragraph'.4 of the affidavit, the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur,
reported on February 18, 1977 that the petitioner was normal and
H
that this information·was communicated to the Law Department on
February 21, 1977. Why was the petitioner not released for over
St years thereafter? It was on October 14, 1982 that the Law
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983} 3 S.C.R.
•
Department of the. Government of Bihar directed that the petitioner
should be released. Why was the Law Department so insensitive
A
to justice? We are inclined to believe that the story of the peti·
tioner's insanity is an afterthought and is exaggerated out of prop~r
tion. If indeed he was insane, at least a skeletal medical record
could have been produced to show that he was l:>eing treated for
B insanity. In these circumstances, we are driven "to the coni:Iusion
that, if at all the p~titioner was found insane at any point of time,
t]le insanity must have supervened as a consequence of his unlawful
detention in jail. - A sense of helplessness and frustration can create
despondency and persistent despondency can lead to a kind of mental
imbalance.
c
The concerned Department of the Government of Bihar could
have afforded to show a little more courtesy to this Court and to
display a greater ·awareness of its responsibilities by asking one of
D its senior officers to file ari affidavit in order to explain the callous-
ness which pervades this case. Instead,_ the Jailor has been made a
·scapegoat to own up vicariously the dereliction of -duty on the part
of the higher officers who ought to have known better. This is not
an isolated case of its kind and we feel concerned that there is dark·
E ness all around in the prison administration of the State of Bihar.
The Bhagalpur blindings should have opened the eyes of the Prison
-. Administration of the State. But that bizarre episode has taught no
lesson and has failed to evoke any response in· ·the Augean Stables.
Perhaps, a Herculs heas to be found who will clean them by diverting
two rivers through them, not the holy Ganga though. We hope (and
F pray) that tlie higher officials of the State will find time to devote
their personal attention to the breakdown of Prison Administration
in the State and re~tify the grave injustice which is being perpetrated
on helpless persons. The High Court of Patna should itself examine
this matter and call for statistical data from the Home Department
G of the Government of Bihar ·on the question of_ unlawful detentions
in the State fails. A tabular statement from each jail should be
called for, disclosing how many convicts have been in jail for more
than 10 years, 12 years, f4 years and for over 16 years. The High
Court will then be in a positiou to release prisoners who are in un-
H lawful detention in the jails and to ask the Stat~ Government to take
steps for their rehabilitation by payment of adequate compensation
wherever necessary:
RUDUL SAH v. BIHAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 513

That takes us to the question as to how the grave injustice
which has been perpetrated upon the petitioner can be rectified, in so A
far as it lies within our power to do in the exercise of our writ
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. That article confers
power on the Supremt'. Court to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the B
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. The right to
- move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforce-
ment of the rights conferred by Part III is "guaranteed", that is to
say, the right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Consti-
tution is itself a fundamental right. c
It is true that Article·32 cannot be used as a substitute for the
enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced
efficaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts, Civil and
Criminal. A money claim has therefore to· be agitated in and adjudi- D
cated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent
to try it. But the important question for our consideration is whether
in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 32, this Court can pass
an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature
of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental
right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner E
·was detained illegally in the prison for over fourteen years after his
acquittal in a fult-dressed trial. He filed a Habeas Corpus petition
in this Court for his release from illegal detention. He obtained that
relief, our finding being that his detention in the prison after his
acquittal was wholly unjustified. He contends that he is entitled to
..be compensated for his illegal detention and that .we ought to pass F
appropriate order for the payment of compensation in this Habeas
Corpus petition itself.

We cannot resist this argument. We see no effective answer to G
it save the stale and sterile objection that the petitioner may, if so
advised, file a suit to recover damages from the State Government.
Happily, the State's Counsel has not raised that objection, The
petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit
if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in the sense
that a civil court may or may not have upheld his clail"· But w~
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) 3 S.C.R.
·y
have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for
A his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed
in that suit; though it is not possible to predicate, in the absence of
evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his favour.
In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of
compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip-service
to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has
B so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and
liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this
Court were limited to passing orders to release from illegal detention.
One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can
reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of
c Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violaters in the payment of monetary
compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringe-
ments of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method
open to the judiciary to adopt. The ·right to compensation is some
·palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the
name of public interest and which present for their protection the
D powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this
country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer
mention, it is neeessary to educate ourselves into accepting that,
respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy.
.--.---.
Therefore, the State must repair the .damage done by its officers
E to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those
officers.

Taking into consideration the great harm done_ to the petitioner
by the Government of Bihar, we are of the opinion that, as an interim
F measure, the State must pay to the petitioner a further sum of
· Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty-thousand) in addition to the sum of
Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand) already paid by it. The amount shall
be paid within two weeks from today. The Government of Bihar
agrees to make the payment though, we must clarify, our order is not
based on their consent.
G
This order will not preclude the petitioner from bringing a suit
to recover appropriate damages from the state and its erring officials.
The order of compensation passed by us is, as we said above, in the
H nature of a palliative. We cannot leave the petitioner penniless until
the end of his suit, the many appeals and the execution proceedings.
/\ full-dre?sed debate on the nice points of fact and law which takes
RUDUL SAil v. BIHAR (Chandrachud, C.J.) 515

place leisurely in compensation suits will have to await the filing of
such a suit by the poor Rudul Sah. The Leviathan will have liberty A
to raise those points in that suit. Until then. we hope, there will be
no more Rudul Sahs in Bihar or elsewhere.

H.L.C. Petition allowed.
B

,

j