ROSHNI DEVIversusTHE STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS

                  [2026] 2 S.C.R. 128 : 2026 INSC 41

                             Roshni Devi
                                   v.
                  The State of Telangana and Others
                      (Criminal Appeal No. 116 of 2026)
                                08 January 2026
           [J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the order of preventive detention passed by the
       Magistrate and upheld by the High Court u/s.3(2) of the Telangana
       Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986 valid in law.

                                   Headnotes†
       Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-
       Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
       Offenders, [Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders,
       Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration
       Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities
       Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual
       Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders,
       Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial
       Offenders] Act, 1986 – ss.2(a), 2(f), 3(2), 3(3) – Narcotics
       Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.8(c) r/w
       s.20(b)(ii) (b) – Preventive detention – Daughter of detenu
       challenged detention order – Detention based on three
       criminal cases under NDPS Act alleging possession and
       peddling of ganja, and was found to be “drug offender” –
       Apprehension recorded that if released on bail she would
       continue illegal activities – Detention order upheld by High
       Court – Correctness:
       Held: Order of detention merely refers to three crimes registered
       against the detenu – If the Detaining Authority was of the view that
       the detenu had violated any conditions of bail, steps for cancellation
       of her liberty could have been taken – That was not done – Mere
       apprehension on the part of the detaining authority that in the event
       of the detenu being released on bail, she was likely to indulge in


* Author
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                           129

           Roshni Devi v. The State of Telangana and Others


     similar crimes that would be prejudicial to maintenance of public
     order would not be a sufficient ground to order her preventive
     detention – Order of detention does not indicate in what manner the
     maintenance of public order was either adversely affected or was
     likely to be adversely affected so as to detain the detenu – Mere
     reproduction of the expressions mentioned in s.2(a) in the order
     of detention would not be sufficient – There is a fine distinction
     between “law and order” and “public order” – Mere registration
     of three offences by itself would not have any bearing on the
     maintenance of public order unless there is material to show that
     the narcotic drug dealt with by the detenu was in fact dangerous to
     public health under the Act of 1986, which is missing in the order
     of detention – Order of detention unsustainable and is quashed
     and set aside. [Paras 7-11]

                             Case Law Cited
     Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2011 INSC 267 : [2011] 4 SCR
     740; Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,
     2023 INSC 734 : [2023] 11 SCR 520; Ameena Begum v. the State
     of Telangana and Others, 2023 INSC 788 : [2023] 11 SCR 958;
     Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [1984] 3 SCR 435 : (1984) 3
     SCC 14 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers,
     Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders
     [Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders,
     Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document
     Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders,
     Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances
     Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White
     Collar or Financial Offenders] Act, 1986; Narcotics Drugs and
     Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

                             List of Keywords
     Preventive detention; Drug offender; Public order; Law and order;
     Subjective satisfaction; Extraneous considerations; Detaining
     authority; Bail; Judicial custody; Detention order; Possession and
     peddling of ganja; Illegal activities.
130                                                        [2026] 2 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


                            Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       116 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2025 of the High Court
       for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WP No. 12443 of 2025

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, Sr. Adv., Kumar Abhishek, Sunny Kumar,
       Vikash Pandey, Satyam Parashar, Devi Venkata Srikar Pagadala.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Kumar Vaibhaw, Ms. Devina Sehgal, Dhananjay Yadav, Ishaan
       Ojha.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

       Atul S. Chandurkar, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The appellant who is the daughter of the detenu-Aruna Bai alias
       Anguri Bai is aggrieved by the order of detention dated 10.03.2025
       passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Hyderabad under
       Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
       Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
       Offenders [Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide
       Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders,
       Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders,
       Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive
       Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and
       White Collar or Financial Offenders] Act, 1986 (for short, the Act of
       1986). She approached the High Court of Telangana by preferring
       Writ Petition No.12443 of 2025 for challenging the aforesaid order.
       The Division Bench of the High Court however refused to interfere
       with the order of detention and dismissed the said writ petition on
       28.10.2025. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present
       appeal.
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                         131

           Roshni Devi v. The State of Telangana and Others


3.   The grounds of detention as referred to in the order of detention
     dated 10.03.2025 indicate consideration of the criminal history of the
     detenu. There is reference to Crime No. 243/ 2024 dated 16.09.2024
     registered under Section 8 (c) read with Section 20 (b) (ii) (b) of
     the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 at the
     Prohibition and Excise Station Dhoolpet, District Hyderabad. There
     is also reference to Crime No.270/2024 dated 12.12.2024 registered
     against the detenu under similar provisions as in the first crime. The
     detenu came to be arrested on 12.12.2024 and while she was in
     judicial custody, Crime No.42/2024 under similar provisions came
     to be registered at the same Police Station on 17.12.2024. “Ganja”
     came to be seized from the detenu in this process. The detenu was
     found to be a “drug offender” under Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1986
     and by observing that ill-effects of Ganja were harmful and injurious
     public health, power conferred by Section 3 (2) of the Act of 1986
     came to be exercised. The Collector and District Magistrate was
     also of the view that the detenu had moved an application for grant
     of bail in Crime Nos. 243/2024 and 270/2024 which were pending.
     He apprehended that if the detenu succeeded in obtaining bail,
     she would continue to engage in illegal activities. The proceedings
     registered against her under the ordinary law had no deterrent effect
     and hence it was found necessary to detain her as a last resort in
     interest of public at large. On this basis, the order of detention came
     to be passed on 10.03.2025. Approval to the aforesaid order came
     to be granted under Section 3(3) of the Act of 1986 by the General
     Administration Department on 15.03.2025. Thereafter on 15.04.2025,
     the order of detention came to be confirmed.
4.   The High Court was of the view that the repeated and well planned
     actions of the detenu were sufficient to raise the presumption of threat
     and alarm amongst the general public regarding their health which
     was the primary criteria for maintaining peace as well as law and
     order in society. It found that there was no reason to interfere with
     the subjective satisfaction record by the detaining authority and that
     the order of detention did not suffer from any irregularity warranting
     interference. On these findings the High Court declined to interfere
     with the order of detention.
5.   Mr. Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, learned Senior Advocate for the
     appellant submitted that in absence of any material for recording
     satisfaction that the detenu had acted in a manner prejudicial to
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       the maintenance of public order as required by Section 2 (a) of the
       Act of 1986, the detenu could not have been preventively detained.
       Merely because the detenu was found to be a “drug offender” under
       Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1986, there was no justification for passing
       the order of detention. The detenu had been enlarged on bail in
       Crime No.243 of 2024 and it could not be said that the conditions
       imposed while enlarging her were insufficient to prevent the detenu
       from committing any further offence. The order of detention was
       passed merely as an alternative to cancellation of bail. It was further
       submitted that merely by referring to the previous criminal history
       attributed to the detenu, the order of detention had been passed.
       In absence of any specific instance/s indicating the conduct of the
       detenu to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, there
       was no basis to direct her detention. Even if it was accepted that the
       detenu was involved in the offences as alleged, it could not be said
       that the same affected maintenance of public order. At the highest,
       the activities could be termed to be prejudicial to the maintenance
       of law and order. To substantiate the grounds as urged, reliance
       was placed on the decision in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu1.
       It was thus submitted that in absence of relevant material on the
       basis of which subjective satisfaction could have been recorded
       by the detaining authority indicating the acts of the detenu to be
       prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the order of detention
       was unsustainable. It was liable to be set aside.
6.     Mr. Kumar Vaibhaw, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
       supported the order of detention. It was urged that the detenu was a
       drug offender within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1986.
       Considering her continuing involvement in dealing with Ganja which
       was evident from the crimes registered against her, the detaining
       authority was justified in coming to the conclusion that the detenu’s
       activities adversely affected the maintenance of public order. Her
       continued illegal acts indicated that the provisions of ordinary law
       were insufficient so as to deter her from continuing such illegal acts
       in dealing with narcotic drugs. Her continuous acts were therefore
       rightly found to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The
       learned counsel referred to the affidavit dated 07.01.2026 filed on
       behalf of the Special Officer In-charge, Government of Telangana


1    2011 INSC 267
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                           133

             Roshni Devi v. The State of Telangana and Others


      as well as the documents filed along with it. The learned counsel
      referred to the decision in Pesala Nookaraju Vs. Government of
      Andhra Pradesh & Ors.2 to urge that since the order of detention
      had been passed after recording subjective satisfaction that there
      was likelihood of breach of public order, no interference with the
      same was called for. It was thus submitted that the appeal was
      liable to be dismissed.
7.    Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused
      the documentary material on record we are satisfied that the order
      of preventive detention is liable to be set aside.
8.    The order of detention merely refers to three crimes registered against
      the detenu on 16.09.2024, 12.12.2024 and 17.12.2024. It may be
      noted that pursuant to Crime No.270/2024 dated 12.12.2024, the
      detenu had been arrested and was in judicial custody when Crime
      No.42/2024 dated 17.12.2024 came to be registered. On the premise
      that if the detenu was released on bail she was likely to indulge in
      serious offences, the detaining authority proceeded to record that it
      was satisfied that cases registered against her under the ordinary
      law had no deterrent effect in preventing her prejudicial activities.
      Whether the conditions imposed while enlarging the detenu on bail
      in the earlier offences were insufficient to prevent her from indulging
      in similar offences has not been adverted to. It would be profitable to
      refer to the reason for detention as recorded by the Detaining Authority
      in the detention order. The relevant portion thereof reads as under:
             “I am aware that you were arrested on 12-12-2024 in Crime
             No.270/2024 dated 12-12-2024 and 243/2024 dated 16-09-
             2024 of Prohibition & Excise Station Dhoolpest and Crime
             No.42/2024 dated 17/12/2024 (produced before the Hon’ble
             Court through P.T. Warrant) of Excise Station Narayanguda
             Hyderabad and in Judicial Custody at Special Prison for
             Women Hyderabad at Chenchalguda. Subsequently, you
             have moved bail petition before the Hon’ble Sessions Court
             in Crime No. 243/2024 and 270/2024 vide Crl M.P. No.
             695/2025 and 696/2025 Dt 11-02-2025 and granted bail.
             You have also filed bail petition in Crime No. 42/2024 vide
             Crl. M.P. No. 370/2025 and is pending before the Hon’ble
             Sessions Judge for orders, hence still in judicial custody.


2    2023 INSC 734
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             Considering entire material, including the bail petitions and
             the orders passed therein, I apprehend that if you succeed
             in obtaining bail and you being released on bail in due
             course, keeping in view that on the earlier occasions during
             the period 2016 to 2023, though you were released on
             bail, but did not mend your habitual nature of committing
             similar offences and again in the recent past during the
             year 2024 you have committed (3) more similar offences,
             I strongly believe though you are in judicial custody in
             Cr.No.42/2024 and your bail petition is pending, in case
             of being granted bail in the said case and after your
             release on bail you would again resort to similar unlawful
             activities of peddling of Ganja, and keeping in view your
             antecedents and considering the ill effects of Ganja on the
             public health and particularly youth and students and its
             impact on the society and having satisfied that the cases
             registered against you under the ordinary law have no
             deterrent effect in preventing your prejudicial activities,
             I strongly believe that you are not amenable to ordinary
             law, unless you are detained by an appropriate order of
             detention as a last resort, in the interest of public at large.
             It is imperative to prevent you from acting in any manner
             prejudicial to maintenance of Public Order, I feel that
             recourse to normal law would involve considerable time
             and may not be effective deterrent in preventing you from
             indulging in further activities prejudicial to maintenance of
             public order in and around Hyderabad District.”
       From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Detaining
       Authority intended to detain the mother of the appellant at any cost.
       Her conduct during the period from 2016 to 2023 has been kept in
       mind. If the Detaining Authority was of the view that the detenu had
       violated any conditions of bail, steps for cancellation of her liberty
       could have been taken. That has not been done here.
9.     In this regard, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Ameena
       Begum Vs. the State of Telangana and Others3, wherein the effect
       of extraneous factors weighing in the mind of the Detaining Authority


3    2023 INSC 788
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                             135

           Roshni Devi v. The State of Telangana and Others


     while passing an order of detention has been considered. Incidentally,
     the order of detention therein was also passed under the Act of 1986.
     It has been observed in paragraphs 49 to 52 as under: -
           “……..At the same time, the detaining authority ought to
           ensure that the order does not manifest consideration
           of extraneous factors. The detaining authority must be
           cautious and circumspect that no extra or additional
           word or sentence finds place in the order of detention,
           which evinces the human factor - his mindset of either
           acting with personal predilection by invoking the stringent
           preventive detention laws to avoid or oust judicial scrutiny,
           given the restrictions of judicial review in such cases, or
           as an authority charged with the notion of overreaching
           the courts, chagrined and frustrated by orders granting
           bail to the detenu despite stiff opposition raised by the
           State and thereby failing in the attempt to keep the detenu
           behind bars.
           50. What we have expressed above is best exemplified
           by the observations of the Commissioner in the Detention
           Order under challenge, which are considered appropriate
           to be quoted. Therein, the Commissioner inter alia stated
           as follows:
                “The proposed detenu and his associate are
                notorious offenders and rowdy sheeters….
           The proposed detenu was surrendered before the Hon’ble
           Court in Cr.No.35/2023 of Falaknuma PS and the Hon’ble
           Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody, he moved
           bail petitions in Cr.Nos. 18/2023 of Golconda PS and
           35/2023 of Falaknuma PS. The prosecution has filed
           suitable counters strongly opposing the grant of bail to
           him, but the Hon’ble Magistrate granted bail to him in both
           the cases and ordered for his release. Subsequently, he
           was released from judicial remand on bail.
           As seen from his past criminal history, background and
           antecedents and also his habitual nature of committing
           crimes one after the other and his efforts to come out of
           the prison, I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal
136                                                       [2026] 2 S.C.R.

                     Supreme Court Reports


       is set free, his activities would not be safe to the society
       and there is an imminent possibility of his committing
       similar offences by violating the bail conditions in one of
       the cases, which would be detrimental to public order,
       unless he is preventively detained from doing so by an
       appropriate order of detention.”
       With respect to the stage of proceedings in the offences
       which form its basis, the Detention Order states that despite
       being contested by the State, bail has been granted to the
       Detenu in Crimes No. 4 and 5. Insofar as grant of bail to
       the Detenu is concerned, the Commissioner states that:
            “I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal
            is set free his activities would not be safe to
            the society and there is an imminent possibility
            of his committing similar offences by violating
            the bail conditions in one of the cases, which
            would be detrimental to public order, unless he
            is preventively detained from doing so by an
            appropriate order of detention.”
       51. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid excerpts from
       the Detention Order lay bare the Commissioner’s attempt
       to transgress his jurisdiction and to pass an order of
       detention, which cannot be construed as an order validly
       made under the Act. The quoted observations are reflective
       of the intention to detain the Detenu at any cost without
       resorting to due procedure. It is neither the case of the
       respondents that the Detenu had not complied with the
       terms of the notice issued under section 41-A of the Cr.
       PC, nor has it been alleged that the conditions of bail had
       been violated by the Detenu. It is pertinent to note that
       in the three criminal proceedings where the Detenu had
       been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of
       bail had been moved by the State. In the light of the same,
       the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute,
       should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law
       provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions
       leading to the impugned Detention Order. There may have
       existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders,
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                               137

             Roshni Devi v. The State of Telangana and Others


            but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of
            ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary
            measure of the law of preventive detention.
            52. In Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar4, Hon’ble
            E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)
            observed:
                      32. ...It is well settled that the law of preventive
                      detention is a hard law and therefore it should
                      be strictly construed. Care should be taken that
                      the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless
                      his case falls squarely within the four corners of
                      the relevant law. The law of preventive detention
                      should not be used merely to clip the wings
                      of an accused who is involved in a criminal
                      prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose
                      of keeping a man under detention when under
                      ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to
                      resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the
                      material available is such as would satisfy the
                      requirements of the legal provisions authorising
                      such detention. When a person is enlarged on
                      bail by a competent criminal court, great caution
                      should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of
                      an order of preventive detention which is based
                      on the very same charge which is to be tried
                      by the criminal court.”
                                           (underlining ours, for emphasis)”

     Thus, mere apprehension on the part of the detaining authority that
     in the event of the detenu being released on bail, she was likely to
     indulge in similar crimes that would be prejudicial to maintenance of
     public order would not be a sufficient ground to order her preventive
     detention.
10. Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1986 enables the Government, if it is
    satisfied that a drug offender ought to be prevented from acting in



4   (1984) 3 SCC 14
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                               Supreme Court Reports


       any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order to make
       an order of preventive detention. The expression “acting in any
       manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” has been
       defined by Section 2(a) of the Act 1986. As per the Explanation to
       the said provision, if any of the activities of the person concerned
       causes or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a
       feeling of insecurity among the general public or a section thereof or
       in case of a grave widespread danger to life or public health is likely
       to be caused, such power can be exercised. The order of detention
       does not indicate in what manner the maintenance of public order
       was either adversely affected or was likely to be adversely affected
       so as to detain the detenu. Mere reproduction of the expressions
       mentioned in Section 2(a) of the Act of 1986 in the order of detention
       would not be sufficient. The detention order ought to indicate the
       recording of subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in that
       regard. It is well settled that there is a fine distinction between “law
       and order” and “public order”. Mere registration of three offences by
       itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order
       unless there is material to show that the narcotic drug dealt with by
       the detenu was in fact dangerous to public health under the Act of
       1986. This material is found to be missing in the order of detention.
11. For aforesaid reasons, we find that the order of detention dated
    10.03.2025 to be unsustainable. It is accordingly quashed and set
    aside. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 28.10.2025 in
    Writ Petition No. 12443 of 2025 passed by the Division Bench of
    the High Court is also quashed. The detenu be released forthwith
    if not required in any other proceedings. The appeal is allowed in
    aforesaid terms leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain