Supreme Court of India
ROJASARA RAMJIBHAI DAHYABHAIversusJANI NAROTTAMDAS LALLUBHAI (DEAD) BY LRS. & ANR.
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 70
- Decided
- 10 April 1986
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- A P SEN
Holding
The sale agreement was an absolute contract with an implied covenant to obtain necessary permissions, and the suit was not barred by limitation, warranting specific performance.
Summary
The appellant, an occupant of two plots of land, had earlier contracted to purchase the land from the former Girasdar, whose agreement required the Girasdar to obtain permission to convert the agricultural land into a village site before a sale deed could be executed. The appellant later entered into a second agreement to sell the same land to the respondents, obligating him to obtain the conversion permission at his own expense and to provide a certified copy of that permission before executing the conveyance. After the Girasdar failed to obtain the permission, the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 extinguished the Girasdar’s title and recognized the appellant as the lawful occupant, who subsequently secured the required conversion permissions in 1958 and 1959. The respondents sued for specific performance; the trial court dismissed the suit on grounds of limitation and contingency, but the High Court reversed, holding the contract was absolute and ordering specific performance. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court, ruling that the agreement was not a contingent contract, that an implied covenant required the vendor to obtain necessary permissions, and that the suit was within the three‑year limitation period.
Issues considered
- The agreement of sale dated 14 November 1949 was a contingent contract dependent on the earlier agreement with the Girasdar, making it incapable of specific performance.
- Whether the suit for specific performance filed on 6 September 1960 was barred by the limitation period under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the doctrine of "feeding the estoppel" under Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act applies to compel specific performance.
Legislation cited
Subjects
specific performancecontingent contractimplied covenantlimitation periodfeeding the estoppelland reformoccupancy certificatesale deedSaurashtra Land Reforms Act
Judgment
447
A
V•
JANI NAROTIAtlillS UIUJBHAI (DEAD)
BY UIS. & AHR.
APRIL 10, 1986
B
[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ,]
·I> A. Suit for specific performance - Agreement to sell
contains an implied covenant on the part of the vendor to do
- all things necessary to give effect to the Agreement,
including the obtaining of the permission for the transfer of
property - Vendor who has become the statutory occupant and
)' owner of the land and who has obtained necessary permission
c
subsequently as such occupant ref uses to execute the sale-deed
~1' on the plea that the agreement to sell entered into by him was
interdependent on his earlier Agreement to purchase the lands
from the Girasdar and contingent on his obtaining the
permission and since he failed, the Agreement to sell is D
incapable of performance - Contract Act, 1872, sections 31 &
32 - Whether the Court can order specific performance of
transfer - Specific Relief Act, 1877, section 13 - Doctrine of
1'- "feeding the estoppel", applicability.
B. Limitation Act, 1963, Article 113, applicability of - E
Computation of period of time from what date, explained.
i The appellant-defendant who was the owner of two plots
~ of land admeasuring 491 and 1599 square yards situate in
' village Dudheraj recorded as Girasdari agricultural land
entered into an agreement in writing (Ex.26), on October 19, F
'\ 1949, with the Girasdar, Rana Mohabat Singh to purchase the
said lands at Rs.2.50 per square yard and paid an earnest
money of Rs.1,001. The agreement stipulated that the vendor
was to apply for permission from the Collector to convert the
agricultural land into village site for non-agricultural use
and that the sale deed was to be executed after obtaining the G
requisite permission• On November 14, 1949 the appellant
i entered into another agreement to sell some property to the
respondents Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai and Thakur Dhirajlal
Dhaneshvar at Rs. 3. 75 per square yard agreeing to contend
that the appellant was to get the land converted into village
aite at his own expense and thereafter executed the sale-deed. H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
In 1950-51 Rana Mohabat Singh applied to the Collector -'·
for grant of permission to convert the land into village site
but since his application was rejected he refunded the earnest
money to the appellant. However, after coming into force of
the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, with effect from
September 1, 1951, the right and title of Rana Mohabat Singh
as the ex-Girasdar were extinguished and the appellant was
B
recognised to be an occupant thereof under the provisions of
the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1898. On 13 August, 1957, the ~
appellant made an application to the revenue authorities for
the grant of occupancy certificate, which was granted on
6.2.58 by the Mamlatdar, The occupancy certificate was to
come into effect from August 1, 1958. On two applications of
c the appellant dated June 23, 1958 and September 10, 1959 '(
revenue authorities granted permission for converting the -f.-
lands under his possession into village site, that is, for
D
non-agricultural use. On 5 October, 1959 the respondents
called upon the appellant to execute a conveyance of the
property in accordance with the agreement of sale between the
.
parties dated 14. ll.1949 and on the appellant's failure to
comply, they filed a suit for specific performance. The Trial
Court upheld the pleas of the appellant, namely, (i) the suit
was barred by l '..J.tation; and (ii) the agreement between the ~
parties was a contingent contract depending upon the
contingency referred to in the agreement (Ex.26) dated 19
E
October, 1949 and since that contract became incapable of
execution by virtue of Rana Mohabat Singh failing to obtain a
permission of the Collector the agreement dated 14 November,
1949, and non-suited the respondents. On appeal the High Court ~
reversed the decree and held that the second agreement between
the parties had not been cancelled by 1111tual consent and that J
F
the suit was within time and that the time started, running r
only from 10th September, 1959, as the date on which
requisite permission was obtained from the Collector for the
use of the land as a village site.
Diamissing the appeal, on certificate, the Court,
G
llELD: 1.1 The agreement embodied in the suit Banakhat
(Ex.25) dated November 14, 1949 was not a contingent contract;
r
the contract was an absolute and unconditional one, and there
was no question of its performance being dependent on llhe
fulfilment of the condition under the earlier agreement
H
R.R. OOIYABHAI v. J. N, IALLUBHAI 449
A
*(F.x.26) by which the appellant's vendor Rana Mohabat Singh had
"I
undertaken upon himself the obligation of procuring the
necessary sanction from the Collector. Under the terms of the
suit Banakhat (F.x. 25), the appellant had undertaken the
obligation of getting the agricultural land converted into
village site. Under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951
B
there was an extinguishment of the right and title of Rana
Mohabat Singh as a girasdar of the suit land and the appellant
~ recognised to be an occupant thereof under the provisions
of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The contention that the
appellant had an imperfect title is therefore without any
' basis whatever. As such occupant, it is undisputed that the
appellant applied for and obtained the requisite permission c
yfrom the revenue authorities for conversion of the disputed
land into village site. There was therefore no legal
~impediment to the specific performance of the contract between
the parties. (454 C; 454 H; 455 A; E-F]
1.2 There is always in such contracts, an implied
D
covenant on the part of the vendor to do all things necessary
to give effect to the agreement, including tne obtaining of
the permission for the transfer of the property. Ex. 25, the
;.-suit Banakhat embodies an express covenant to that effect.
[457 C-D)
E
Da}enlrh M. Pancholi V• 'Die Qaarantee Life & Faployment
lllllurance Company Ltd. & Ore., A.l.R. 1947 P.C. 182, distin-
guished.
-1
F. Rpncbligc!ap V• Nattmll IHracbanc! & Co., [1951] Bom.
L.R. 491; Hotilal V• Nenhelal Gbasiraa, L.R. (1930) 57 Indian F
\ppeals 333; Hrs. Ownc1t,.... Widya Wati Hadden v. Dr• C. I..
Katia1, [1964) 2 s.c.R. 495; and Rmoesh a,,....uok & Anr. v.
QuDi. Lal Sabhuwal (Dead) by his I.rs. & Ore., [1971] 2 S.C.R.
573, referred to.
1.3 In the facts and circumstances of the case, it could G
not be said that the respondents' suit for specific
'i performance filed on September 6, 1960 was barred by
limitation inasmuch as permission to convert a portion of
the disputed land was obtained on August 26, 1958 and for the
remaining portion on September 10, 1959, and the suit was
therefore brought within three years from the date when the H
cause of action arose. The cause of action for the suit arose
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A
after the appellant had obtained the requisite permission fro~
the revenue authorities upon conferral of rights of an
occupant on him. [459 F-H]
CIVIL APPELi.ATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 315 of
1971.
B
From the Judgment and Decree dated 3/4 December, 1969 of
the Gujarat High Court in Appeal No. 160 of 1961. ,.4,
s. H. Sheth, Vandana Sharma and M. V. Goswami for the
Appellant.
c
S.T. Desai and B.B. Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. This appeal on certificate is directed against
D the judgment and decree of the Gujarat High Court dated
February 1, 1971 reversing those of the Civil Judge, Senior
Division, Surendranagar dated January 31, 1961, and decreeing
the plaintiffs' suit for specific performance.
-1'
Put very shortly, the essential facts are these. By an
E agreement in writing (Exh.26) dated October 19, 1949, the
appellant who was the defendant entered into an agreement to
purchase two plots of land admeasuring 491 and 1599 square
yards situate in Village Dudheraj recorded as Girasdari
agricultural land of which he was the tenant @ Rs. 2. 50 pef-
square yard from the Girasdar, Rana Mohabat Singh and paid Rs.
F 1,001 by way of earnest money in lieu thereof. The agreeme'!F
stipulated that the vendor Rana Mohabat Singh was to apply fpr
permission from the Collector to convert this agricultural
land into village site i.e. for non-agricultural use. The
sale-deed was to be executed by Rana Mohabat Singh after he
had obtained the requisite permission from the Collector.
G Within about a month therefrom i.e. on November 14, 1949, the
appellant by a contract (Exh.25) covenanted to sell the same
property to the respondents Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai an~
Thakur Dhirajlal Dhaneshvar who were the plaintiffs@ Rs. 3.75
per square yard. The agreement provided that the vendor i.e.
the appellant was to get the land converted into village site
H at his own expense.
R.R. DAHYABHAI v. J.N. LALLUBHAI [ SEN, J,] 451
A
In 1950-51, Rana Mohabat Singh applied to the Collector
for grant of permission to convert the land into village site
but his application was rejected and thereafter he refunded
the earnest amount to the appellant. The Saurashtra Land
Reforms Act, 1951 came into force w.e.f. September 1, 1951.
Under the provisions of the Act, there was an extinguishment B
of the right and title of Rana Mohabat Singh as the
",\. ex-Girasdar of the land and the appellant was recognised to be
an occupant thereof under the provisions of the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, 1898. On August 13, 1957, the appellant made an
application to the revenue authorities for the grant of an
occupancy certificate. The Mamlatdar by his order dated
February 6, 1958 directed the issue of an occupancy c
>;certificate in favour of the appellant on condition of his
~paying occupancy price in accordance with the provisions of
the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act. On that very day i.e. on
February 6, 1958, the occupancy certificate was issued to the
appellant on such payment being made but it was to come into
effect from August 1, 1958. On June 23, 1958, the appellant D
applied for converting 1000 square yards out of the two plots
which prior to 1958 were agricultural land into village site,
and on August 26, 1958 the revenue authorities granted such
~permission. Thereafter, on September 10, 1959 the revenue
authorities granted permission for converting the remaining
area of land into village site. Thus, by September 10, 1959 E
the appellant obtained permission for converting both the
plots for non-agricultural use. On October 5, 1959 the
-+respondents called upon the appellant to execute a conveyance
of the property in accordance with the agreement of sale
,between the parties and on his failing to comply, commenced
\he present suit on September 6, 1960. F
The material terms of the agreement between the parties
are to be found in the suit Banakhat (Exh.25) and they are to
the effect
"You can construct a house or building or a factory G
or put up a park, garden etc. on this land after
getting it converted into village site land. The
sale-deed in respect of this land is to be executed
after the land has been converted into such use • •
• • • • • The title of the land is free from any
doubt• No one has, any right, title or interest H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R.
A ~
therein. If any amount is to be paid either to the
Government or to the Darbar in respect of the land,
then you are not liable for the same, but this
agreement has been entered into w:l.th you on the
footing that the land is to be considered as
village site land. We have to give you a certified
B copy of the permission whereby the land is
converted into village site land and all expenses4
in connection with the grant of such conversion are
to be borne by us."
It is common ground that the word - "we" refers to the vendor
c i.e. the appellant and "you" refers to the respondents i.e~
the purchasers.
-+-
The appellant contested the suit on various grounds. He
pleaded inter alia that (1) the agreement between the parties
as per Bsnakhat (Exh.26) was a contingent contract and not an
D absolute contract and that the appellant's vendor Rana Mohabat
Singh having failed to obtain permission of the Collector in
terms of the agreement (Exh. 25) entered into by him with the
appellant for converting the land into village site, and
execute a sale-deed in his favour, the agreement between tht
parties was incapable of performance and (2) the suit was
E barred by limitation. The Courts below have. differed in their
conclusion. The learned Civil Judge who tried the suit upheld
these pleas and non-suited the respondents. He held that the
suit was barred by limitation and further that the contrac~
between the parties being a contingent contract, the agreement
in view of the events that had happened made it unenf orceabl';{
F
On appeal, the High Court reversed the decree and held
that the agreement between the parties had not been cancelled
by mutual consent and that finding has not been challenged
before us, On the question as to whether the agreement was a
contingent contract or a contract creating absolute
G liabilities as between the parties without contemplating any
contingency, the High Court reproduced the material portion of
the agreement (Exh.25) set out above and held that t~
agreement clearly contemplated that the sale-deed was to be
executed after the requisite permission was obtained from the
Collector for use of the land as a village site and that the
H land was not to be sold as agricultural land but as village
R.R. DAflYABHAI v. J.N. IALLUBHAI [ SEN, J.) 453
A
site. In coming to that conclusion the High Court took into
·~consideration the agreement between the appellant and Rana
Mohabat Singh (Exh.26) which contained the recital :
"I will execute the registered sale-deed in your
favour immediately after permission to convert B
these plots into village site land has been
obtained."
"'between
In the light of that recital, it held that the agreement
the parties (Exh.25) contemplated that the sale-deed
was to be executed after permission was obtained from the
revenue authorities for use of the land as a village site and c
it was not being sold as agricultural land.
x .
-ly Following the decision of Chagla, CJ. in F.. )lanc:bbodas v.
liatlml Biracband & Co., [1951) Bom. LR 491 the High Court
held that the words "after the permission is obtained" in Exh.
26 and the words "after the land is converted" in Exh. 25 both D
indicate the point of time at which the sale-deed within the
contemplation of the parties had to be executed in accordance
with the terms of the document. In the circumstances, the High
court held that the contract could not be interpreted as a
t-'contingnent contract. Upon that view, it held that there was
no contingency whatsoever and even though Rana Mohabat Singh E
had failed to obtain the requisite permission to convert the
land into village site, as and when such permission was
"f' obtained by the appellant, the rights of the respondents for
_.. the performance of the agreement came into existence. It also
r held that the respondents were entitled to rely on the
doctrine of 'feeding the estoppel' embodied in s.13 of the F
~Specific Relief Act, 1963. It held that at the time when the
agreement was entered into between the parties in 1949, the
appellant had only a right to get the land in suit conveyed to
him by Rana Mohabat Singh in pursuance of the agreement
(Exh.26). However, by virtue of the provisions of the
Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, his title as an occupant became G
complete and he had obtained the permission to convert the
land into village site and the respondents were therefore
~ entitled to get specific performance of the agreement in
respect of the rights which he had at the date of the suit. It
further held that the permission to convert the disputed land
into village site having been obtained on August 26, 1958, H
A
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 2 s.c.R.
insofar as a part of the land was concerned and on September
10, 1959, as regards the balance thereof it could not be said Ji,.
that the respondents suit was barred by limitation. Upon these
B findings, the High court reversed the decree of the learned
Civil Judge and decreed the respondents suit for specific
performance.
Two questions are raised upon this appeal. First of these
is whether the agreement embodied in the suit Banak.hat .I,
c (Exh.25) dated November 14, 1949 was a contingent contract and
as the contingency failed, there was no contract which could
be made the basis for a decree for specific performance, and
the second is that the suit as framed was barred by limitation
under Art.113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, As to the first
contention, it is urged that the High Court proceeded on the )(._
erroneous belief that the grant of permission by the Collector'f-
was a certain event and therefore its finding that the
contract was an absolute and unconditional one, is vitiated.
It is said that the appellant's vendor Rana Mohabat Singh
having failed to obtain percission from the Collector in
1950-51 in terms of the agreement (Exh.26) entered into by him
E with the appellant for converting the land into village site
and execute a deed of conveyance in his favour, the appellant
had an imperfect title and therefore the right to specific i
performance of the suit Banakhat (Exh.25) did not arise
inasmuch as the conversion of the Girasdari lands at the
instance of Rana Mohabat Singh was a condition on which the
F lllltual rights and obligations of the parties would arise. The
submission proceeds on the basis that the two transactions
were interdependent and Rana Mohabat Singh' s application for 'r
permission for conversion of the agricultural land to
non-agricultural purposes having been rejected, the appellant f.
was relieved of his obligation to convey the suit lands under '
G the Banakhat (Exh.25). In support of the contention, reliance
is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Dal snkh M.
Pancholi v. The Guarantee Life & l!aployment Insurance Company
Ltd. &Ors., A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 182,
We do not see any basis for the submission that the
H contract between the parties as embodied in the suit Banakhat ~
(Exh.25) was a contingent contract, the performance of which
was dependent upon fulfilment of the condition under the
R.R. IlAHYABHAI v. J,N, IALLUBHAI [ SEN, J,] 455
A
"*arlier agreement (Exh.26) by which the appellant's vendor
Rana Mohabat Singh had undertaken upon himself the obligation
of procuring the necessary sanction from the Collector. As to
the appellant having an imperfect title the question is purely
hypothetical. May be, initially the two transactions were not
independent of each other but were inter-dependent, for the B
performance of one depended upon the fulfilment of the other
~greement. If there was no abolition of proprietory rights, it
~ould well be said that the suit Banakhat (Exh.25), being
subject to the fulfilment by Rana Mohabat Singh of the terms
of the earlier agreement (Exh.26), the appellant had an
imperfect title and therefore the contract between the parties
was contingent on Rana Mohabat Singh obtaining the approval of C
~he Collector and as he could not secure such approval and
~xecute a conveyance in favour of the appellant, no effective
agreement came into being which could be ordered to be speci-
fically enforced. But the contention that unless the
appellant's vendor Rana Mohabat Singh conveyed title by execu-
tion of a proper conveyance, the contract as between the D
parties became impossible of performance and further that for
want of such conveyance the appellant had an imperfect title,
does not take into account the subsequent events.
It is common ground that shortly thereafter, the
Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 came into force w.e.f. E
- September 1, 1951. Under the provisions of the Act, there was
an extinguishment of the right and title of Rana Mohabat Singh
as a Girasdar of the suit land and the appellant· was
1fecognised to be an occupant thereof under the provisions of
the Bombay Land Revenue Code. It would, therefore, appear that
»e contention that the appellant had an imperfect title is F
>l'~thout any basis whatever. With the extinction of the title
of Rana Mohabat Singh and the conferral of the rights of an
occupant an the appellant, the property became transferable by
him. As such occupant, it is undisputed that the appellant
made an application to the reven~ authorities permitting the
conversion of the disputed ·1and into village site. lbereafter, G
there was no legal impediment in the way of the appellant in
~ecuting a sale-deed. Under the terms of the suit Banakhat
(Exh.25), the appellant had undertaken the obligation of
getting the land converted into village site. As indicated,
the word 'we' in the document (Exh. 25) refers to the vendor
i.e. the appellant .and 'you' refers to the respondents. lbe H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.P..
A
terms of the document are clear and explicit and admit of no~
ambiguity. The appellant had by the contract bound himself to
fornish a certified copy of the permission whereby the land
was converted into village site apart from bearing all
expenses in connection with the grant of such permission.
B In our opinion, the decision in Dalsukh M. Pancholi 's
case is clearly distinguishable on facts. It is clear from the
terms of the offer and acceptance in that case, that the'-
parties had contemplated that, to make the contract effective
the 'approval of the attaching Court' must be obtained. The
learned Subordinate Judge held that the term 'subject to the
c approval of the Court' was not an essential condition, but in
the High Court it was conceded that it was an essential term~
The facts of the case show that there was good reason for
insisting on this condition for at the time of execution of~
the agreement it was well-known to the parties that the
property was under attachment by various courts. In those
D circumstances, the Privy Council observed :
"In their Lordships' opinion there can be no doubt
that the condition was an essential one. It was
essential not for one party alone, but for both"'*
parties. From the point of view of the purchaser it
E is unnecessary to observe that he would get a clear
title to the property only if the creditors,
through the Court, consented to take Rs. 6,50,000 ,_
in full satisfaction of their decrees against the
vendor's family. The purchaser was not willing to 't"
risk even the payment of the earnest money without
F the knowledge of the attaching Court for it was t~
be paid only to the nominee of the Court named a)i'
the time of giving the approval to the transaction.
The condition was not exclusively for the benefit
of the purchaser; it was equally important from the
standpoint of the vendors also. Ram Jas would
G accept the offer only with the proviso "subject to
the approval of the Court". The family was heavily
indebted. It was important for Ram Jas that he)>
should get effective discharge of all the
liabilities of the family by the payment of
Rs.6,50,000; thus, it was necessary from his
H standpoint also, that the sale should be subject to
R.R. DAHYABHAI V• J,N, IALLUBHAI [ SEN, J,] 457
the approval of .the attaching Court." A
It was accordingly held that the contract was a contingent one
and as the contingency failed, there was no contract which
could be made the basis for a decree for specific performance.
Although Rana Mohabat Singh having failed to fulfil the B
terms of his contract with the appellant and execute a
~ sale-deed in his favour might have rendered the contract
between them incapable of performance, but with the extinction
of the title of Rana Mohabat Singh and the conferral of the
rights of an occupant on the appellant, the property became
transferable subject, of course, to the express covenant on
y: the part of the appellant to do all things necessary to give c
effect to the agreement. Here, the suit Banakhat (Exh. 25)
-.r embodies an express covenant to that effect. There is always
in such contracts an implied covenant on the part of the
vendor to do all things necessary to give effect to the agree-
ment, including the obtaining of the permission for the trans-
fer of the property. The principles on which a term of this D
nature may be implied in contracts are well -settled. It is
enough to refer to Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 8, 3rd
;-- Edn;, P• 121 where the principles are summarised as follows :
"In construing a contract, a term or condition not E
expressly stated may, under certain circumstances
be implied by the Court, if it is clear from the
nature of the transaction or from something actual
found in the document that the contracting parties
must have intended such a term or condition to be
part of the agreement between them. Such an F
implication must in all cases be founded on the
presumed intention of the parties and upon reason,
and will only be made when it is necessary in order
to give the transaction that efficacy that both the
parties must have intended it to have, and to
prevent such a failure of consideration as could G
not have been within the contemplation of the
parties."
Chitty on Contract, Vol.I, 23rd Edn., paragraphs 694-95 points
out that a term would be implied if it is necessary in the
business sense, to give efficacy to the contract. R
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) 2 s.c.R.
In- this context reference may be made to the decision of ~
the Privy Council in Kotilal v. NanbeW Gbasiraa, L.R. [1930)
57 Indian Appeals 333, There, the facts were these. In that
case, the plaintiff Mst. Jankibai entered into an agreement to
purchase from Raibahadur Seth Jiwandas of Jabalpur four annas
proprietary share of Mauja Raisalpur together with the sir and
khudkast lands appurtenant thereto, with cultivating rights in
the sir lands. The property was subject to the provisions of
the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920. She filed a suit for -4
specific performance of the said contract. The Privy Council
held that the contract was for a transfer of the sir lands
without reservation of the right of occupancy, and that the
sanction of the Revenue Officer to the transfer was necessary
under s. 50(1) of the Act, which was in these terms : '(
" S. 50( 1) : If a proprietor desires to transfer f-
the proprietary rights in any portion of his sir
land without reservation of the right of occupancy
specified in s. 49, he may apply to a revenue-
officer and, if such revenue-officer is satisfied
that the transferor is not wholly or mainly an
agriculturist, or that the property is self-
acquir<>d or has been acquired within the twenty -t
years last preceding, he shall sanction the
transfer."
It was contended before the Privy Council that a decree for
specific performance of the agreement of sale could not be y
made, because such performance would necessitate ·an
application by or on behalf of the vendor to the Revenue f
Officer for sanction to transfer the cultivating rights in the -.
sir land, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to require
the vendor to make such an application. In repelling the
contention, the Privy Council observed that in view of their
construction of the agreement, namely, that the vendor agreed
to transfer the cultivating rights in the sir land :
"(T)here was, in their Lordships' opinion, an ~
implied covenant on the part of the vendor to do
all things necessary to effect such transfer, which
would include an application to the Revenue Officer
to sanction the transfer."
R.R. DAHYABHAI v. J,N. LALLUBHAI [ SEN, J.] 459
'
A
-+It was further observed that it was not necessary for their
Lordships to decide whether in that case the application for
sanction to transfer 1111st succeed, but that it was material to
mention that no facts were brought to their Lordships' notice
which would go to show that there was any reason why such
sanction should not be granted. After making the said observa- B
tions, the Privy Council held that in those circumstances the
Court had jurisdiction to enforce the contract under the
,..Specific Relief Act, 1877 and Order 21, r. 35 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 by a decree ordering the vendor to apply
·for sanction and to execute a conveyance on receipt of such
sanction. The decision of the Privy Council in Motilal v.
Nanehalal Ghasiraa, supra, therefore is an authority for the C
proposition that if the vendor agrees. to sell the property
):which can be transferred only with the sanction of some
-~vernment authority, the Court has jurisdiction to order the
vendor to apply to the authority within a specified period,
and if the sanction is forthcoming to convey to the purchaser
within a certain time. See also : Mrs. a.a~ Widya Vati D
Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial, (1964] 2 s.c.R. 495 and Ramesh
Oiandra Owidiak & Anr. v. Qnmi Lal Sabharwal (dead) by his
Lrs. & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 573 where this Court following
the Privy Council decision in MotiW v. Nanehlal Qiasir11111's
r-case supra, reiterated the same principle.
E
The next and the last contention that the suit brought by
•
the appellant was barred by limitation is wholly devoid of
substance. Under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the
"flimitation prescribed for a suit for specific performance is a
period of three years which runs from the date when the cause
of action accrues. In the facts and circumstances of the case, F
~e respondents were required to have a conveyance executed
immediately upon the conferral of occupancy rights on the
abolition and the permission granted by the revenue
authorities to him to convert the suit land into village site.
As already stated, the permission to convert the disputed land
into village site having been obtained on August 26, 1958 G
insofar as a part of the land admeasuring 1,000 square yards
and on September 10, 1959 as regards the remaining portion, it
1could not be said that the respondents' suit filed on
September 6, 1960 was barred by limitation.
H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) 2 S.C.R.
A
The result therefore is that the appeal nllst fail and is
dislldssed. The judgment and decree of the High Court decreeing ~
th.? plaintiff's suit for specific performance are upheld. The
respondents shall be entitled to their costs throughout.
B
S.R. Appeal dismissed.
•
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