RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.versusSHASHI SHARMA & ORS.

                            [2016) 6 S.C.R. 488



A            RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
                                    v.
                       SHASHI SHARMA & ORS.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 9654of2016)
B                         SEPTEMBER23,2016
            [RANJAN GOGOi, PRAFULLA C. PANT AND
                   A.M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.]
           Compensation - Fatal accident - In motor accident - Of
    employee covered under Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the
c   Dependants of the Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 -
    Compensation under Motor Vehicles Act granted after deducting
    the amount received by the claimants under 2006 Rules - High Court
    held that the amount paid under 2006 Rules could not have been
    deducted - On appeal, held: In the matter of determination of
    compensation under 1988 Act, the two cardinal principles are that
D
    it must be just and adequate and that no double benefit should be
    passed on to the claimants - The claimants· claim for the subject
     'Pay and Wages' under 1988 Act, which is receivable under r.5(1)
    of the 2006 Rules, would result in double payment towards the same
    head - The harmonious approach for determining a just
E   compensation payable under 1988 Act, is to exclude the amount
    received or receivable by the dependants of deceased Government
    employee, under 2006 Rules - Howeve1; claim towards loss offuture
    escalation of income and other benefits, which are not covered under
    2006 Rules can be pursued under 1988 Act - Similarly other benefits
    extended in terms of Sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of r.5 of 2006
F
    Rules would remain unaffected and cannot be allowed to be
    deducted - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - ss. 167 and 168 - Haryana
    Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of the Deceased
    Government Employees Rules, 2006 - r.5.
          Words and Phrases:
G
         Words 'compensation' and 'just' - Meaning of. in the collfext
    of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
          Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
          HELD: 1. The term compensation has not been defined in
H
                               \    488
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                     489
                 SHARMA & ORS.

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. By interpretative process, it has      A
been understood to mean to recompense the claimants for the
possible loss suffered or likely to be suffered due to sudden and
untimely death of their family member as a result of motor
accident. [Para 15] [505-F-G]
      2. Two cardinal principles run through the provisions of        B
the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of determination of
compensation. Firstly, the measure of compensation must be just
and adequate; and secondly, no double benefit should be passed
on to the claimants in the matter of award of compensation.
Section 168 of the Act of 1988 makes the first principle explicit.
Sub-section (1) of that provision makes it clear that the amount
                                                                      c
of compensation must be just. The word "just" means - fair,
adequate, and reasonable. It has been derived from the Latin
word "justus", connoting right and fair. That however may depend
upon facts and circumstances of each case, as to what amount
would be a just compensation. [Para 15] [505-G-JI; 506-A-B]           D
      State of Harayana & Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur & Ors. (2003)
      7 SCC 484 : 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 245; Smt. Sar/a
      Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Am:
      (2009) 6 SCC 121 : 2009 (5) SCR 1098 - relied on.
      3. Loss of income is a significant head under which             E
compensation is claimed in terms of the Act of 1988. The
component of quantum of "loss of income", inter alia, can be "pay
and wages" which otherwise would have been earned by the
deceased employee if he had survived the injury caused to him
clue to motor accident. If the dependents of the deceased             F
employee, however, were to be compensated by the employer in
that behalf, as is predicated by the Haryana Compassionate
Assistance to the Dependants of the Deceased Government
Employees Rules, 2006 - to grant. compassionate assistance by
way of ex-gratia financial assistirncc on compassionate grounds
to the dependents of the deceased Govemment employee who              G
dies in harness, it is unfathomable that the dependents can still
be permitted to claim the same amount as a possible or likely
loss of income to be suffered by them to maintain a claim for
compensation under the Act of 1988. [Para 16] (506-C-E]
                                                                      H
490           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A            4. Rule 5 of 2006 Rules broadly deals with two aspects.
      Firstly, to compensate the dependents of the deceased
      Government employee by granting ex-gratia financial assistance
      on compassionate grounds for the loss of pay and other allowances
      for a specified period. The second part of Rule 5 is to compensate
      the dependents of the deceased Government employee by way
B
      of allowances and concessions - of retaining occupation of the
      Government residence on specified terms, of family pension and
      other allowance. As regards the second part, it deals with income
      from other source which any way is receivable by the dependants
      of the deceased Government employee. That cannot be deducted
c     from the claim amount, for determination of a just compensation
      under the Act of 1988. [Para 20] [509-A-C)
          5. The claimants are legitimately entitled to claim for the
    loss of "pay and wages" of the deceased Government employee
  · against the tortfeasor or Insurance Company, as the case may
D be, covered by the first part of Rule 5 under the Act of 1988. The
    claimants or dependents of the deceased Government employee
    (employed by State of Haryana), however, cannot set up a claim
    for the same subject falling under the first part of Rule 5 - "pay
    and allowances", which are receivable by them from employer
    (State) under Rule 5 (1) of the Rules of 2006. In that, if the
E deceased employee was to survive the motor accident injury,
    would have remained in employment and earned his regular pay
    and allowances. Any other interpretation of the said Rules would
    inevitably result in double payment towards the same head of
    loss of "pay and wages" of the deceased Government employee
F   entailing in grant of bonanza, largesse or source of profit to the
    dependants I claimants. Somewhat similar situation has been spelt
    out in Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Para 21]
    [509-C-F]
            6. Similar statutory exclusion of claim receivable under
G     the Rules of 2006 is absent. That, however, does not mean that
      the Claims Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the
      claim towards loss of Pay and wages of the deceased has already
      been or will be compensated by the employer in the form of ex-
      gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds under Rule
      5(1). The Claims Tribunal has to adjudicate the claim and
H
    RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHl                       491
                  SHARMA & ORS.

 determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be         A
 just. (Para 22) [510-A-B)
        7. The amount receivable by the dependants I claimants
  towards the head of pay and allowances in the form of ex-gratia
  financial assistance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time
  to the claimants. True it is, that the Rules of 2006 would come       B
  into play if the Government employee dies in harness even due
  to natural death. At the same time, the Rules of 2006 do not
  expressly enable the dependents of the deceased Government
  employee to claim similar amount from the tortfeasor or
  Insurance Company because of the accidental death of the
  deceased Government employee. The harmonious approach for              c
  determining a just compensation payable under the Act of 1988,
· therefore, is to exclude the amount received or receivable by
  the dependents of the deceased Government employee under
  the Rules of2006 towards the head financial assistance equivalent
  to "pay and other allowances" that was last drawn by the deceased      D
  Government employee in the normal course.[Para 22) [510-C-D)
        8. However it docs not mean that the amount or payment
 receivable by the dependents of the deceased Government
 employee under Rule 5 (1) of the Rules, is the total entitlement
 under the head of "loss of income". So far as the claim towards         E
 loss of future escalation of income and other benefits, if the
 deceased Government employee had survived the accident can
 still be pursued by them in their claim under the Act of 1988. For,
 it is not covered by the Rules of 2006. Similarly, other benefits
 extended to the dependents of the deceased Government
 employee in terms of sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5             F
 including family pension, Life Insurance, Provident Fund etc.,
 that must remain unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted,
 which, any way would be paid to the dependents of the deceased
 Government employee. [Para 22] [510-E-G]
       9. Appellants must succeed only to the extent of amount           G
 receivable by the dependents of the deceased Government
 employee in terms of Rule 5(1) of the Rules 2006, towards
 financial assistance equivalent to the loss of pay and wages of the
 deceased employee for the period specified. [Para 23] [510-H;
 511-A)                                                                  H
492           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A           10. There is no conflict of opinion between the co-ordinate
      Benches (of two Judges) of Supreme Coul't, in the case of *Bliakra
      Beas Management Board case on one hand and of **Helen C.
      Rebello am/ ***Patricia J. Malla}an cases on the other *Bllakra
      Beas Management Board is not an authority of having taken a
      contra view than the view expressed in **Hele11 C. Rebello and
B
      ***Patricia's case. No observation is found in the entire decision,
      to .have doubted the correctness of the dictum in **Helen C.
      Rebello and ***Patricia's cases. [Paras 8 and 14] [497-E; 505-E)
            **Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) & Ors. v. Maharashtra State
            Road Transport Corporation & Am: 1999 (1) SCC 90 :
c           1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 684; Oriental Insurance Co. v.
            Saroj Devi 2012 (t) PLR 761; New India Assurance
            Co. v. Smt. Santush 2010 (4) PLR 780; *Bhakra Beas
            Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal (Smt.) & Ors.
            2008 (11) sec 366 : 2008 (10) SCR 165; Gobald
D           Motor Service Limited v. R.MK. Veluswami 1962 (1) SCR
            929; Sheikhupura 'fransport Co. Ltd. \'. MJr/hern India
            Transport Insurance Co. 1971 (1) SCC 785; Vimal
            Kanwar & Ors. v. Kishore Dan & Ors. 2013 (7) SCC
            476; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. ~: Deo Parodi and
            Ors. 2009 (13) SCC 123: 2009 (8) SCR 791; ***United
 E          India Insurance Co. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors.
            2002 (6) SCC 281 : 2002 (3) SCR 1176 - referred
            to.
                            Case Law Reference

 F          21)12 (1) PLR 761               referred to       Para6
             2010 (4) PLR 780               referred to       Para6
            2002 (3) SCR 1176               referred to       Para6
            2008 (10) SCR 165               referred to       Para 7
G           1?62 (1) SCR 929                referred lo       Para 7
            1911 (1) sec 785                 referred to      Para 7
            2013 (7) sec 476                 referred to      Para7
            2009 (8) SCR 791                 l'eferred lo     Para 7
H
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                           493
                 SHARMA & ORS.

      1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 684            referred to     Para 8            A
      2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 245           relied on        Para 15
      2009 (5) SCR 1098                 relied on        Para 15
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9654
of2016.                                                                     B
      From the Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2012 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryanaat Chandigarh in FAO No. 503 of 2012.
                               WITH
      C. A. Nos. 9655, 9657, 9659, 9661, 9663-9664, 9666, 9669, 9671,
9677,9674,9673,9672,9675,9670,9667-9668,9665,9662,9660,9658,                c
9656 and 9676of2016.
       Dhruv Mehta, Mahabir Singh, Pallav Sisodia, Sr. Advs., Ms.
Prerna Mehta, Ms. Anupama Dlmrve, Yadav Narender Singh, Gaurav
Jain, Satish Kumar, Vishnu Mehra, Ms. Sakshi Mittal, Ms. Manjeet
Chawla, Abhishek Gola, Nikhil Jain, Gagandeep Sharma, Ms. Preeti D
Singh, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Bharat Bhushan, Rakesh Vishan,
Gaurav Jain, Dr. Meera Agarwal, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, K. K.
Mohan, Abhishek Gola, Viresh B. Saliarya, Ms. Meenakshi Midha,
Chander Shekhar Ashri, Anil Nag, Ravi Mehrotra, R. K. Sinha, (For ·
Bhaskar Y. Kulkarni), Anil Kumar Tandale, Karan Kapoor, Manik E
Kapoor,AkshatGoel, Dr. MonikaGusain, Dr. Kailash Chand,J\jay Singh,
NafisA. Siddiqui, Rakesh Dahiya, Raj Kumar, Devashish Bharuka, Ms.
Arpita Bishnoi, Vaibhav, Ms. Rani Bharuka, Anil Hooda, Ankit Gupta,
Kaushal Yadav, Nikhil Goel, Ashutosh, Ms. Tavishi Chandra, Karan
Chaudhary, Ms. K. V. Bharathi Upadhyaya, Dinesh Verma, Rajat
Sharma, Subhasish Bhowmick, Dr. Sudhir Bisla, Ms. Surnitra Bisla, F
Kamal Mohan Gupta, Ravinder Kumar, (For Mrs. Shiel Sethi), Advs.
for the appearing parties.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      A.M. KHANWILKAR, J. I. Delay condoned.
                                                                            G
      2. Leave granted.
       3. These matters have been placed before a three Judges' Bench
in terms of order dated 71h October, 2015. This order has not formulated
any specific question to be answered by the larger Bench.
                                                                            H
494               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            (2016] 6 S.C.R.



A            4. The leading appeal challenges the judgment of the Single Judge
      of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated February
      13, 2013 in FAONo.503/2012. That appeal was filed by the respondents
      (in appeal arising from SLP (Civil) No.14312/2013) against the Award
      of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jind, in MACT Case No.136
      dated 3rd November 2011. The said respondents had filed a claim petition
B
      after the death of Dr. Ashwini Sharma caused due to a motor accident
      on 241h October 2010 in front of Main gate of General Hospital at Jind.
      Be succumbed to the injuries sustained in that accident. The Tribunal
      partly allowed the claim petition. A sum of Rs.4,50,000/- was awarded
      as compensation to the claimants being the dependants of deceased Dr.
c     Ashwini Sharma; with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the
      date of filing of the claim petition till realization. The Tribunal directed
      the appellant-Insurance Company to pay the compensation amount as
      determined in the award to the claimants. The claimants, being aggrieved
      by the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal and in particular
      deduction of compensation amount received by them from other source,
D
      preferred appeal before the High Court. The High Court, relying on the
      decision of Division Bench of the same High Court dated December 21,
      2012, in the case of Re/i{lnce Gener"/ lnsur{l11ce Comp""Y Ltd. Vs.
      Purnima & Others,' acceded to the contention of the claimants that
      the amount receivable by the dependents of the deceased under the
E     Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the dependents of the Deceased
      Government Employees Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to "Rules of
      2006") cannot be deducted from the quantum of compensation fixed by
      the Tribunal. On that finding, the High Court allowed the appeal of the
      respondents in the following terms:
F                          "In view of the above, a sum of Rs.89,24,604/-
               (Rs. I ,00,957/- - 15%thereofbeingRs.15,143=Rs.85,814/
               - - l/J'd thereof being Rs.28,605/- = Rs.57,209 x 12
               =Rs.6,86,508/- x 13 = 89,24,604) towards loss of
               dependency, Rs. I 5,000/-towards loss of consortium of the
               I" appellant, Rs. I 5,000/- towards loss of estate, Rs. I 0,000/
G              - towards funeral expenses and Rs.5,000/- towards
               transportation expenses, in aggregate a sum ofRs.89,60,604/
               - with interest @ 7.5% for the enhanced portion of the
               compensation from the date of petition till the date of

       1
H          F.A.O No.1322 Of2010
     RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                           495
          SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       realization is awarded. The rate of interest applied and the          A
       mode of apportionment done by the Tribunal stands
       confirmed."
                                                                                   '.
       5. The High Court has adopted the same reasoning to disallow
deduction of compensation amount received by the claimants as per
Rules of 2006 in the respective companion cases listed for analogous         B
hearing. The sole contention advanced by the appellants - Insurance
Companies, in these appeals, is that, the High Court has erred in law in
disallowing the deduction ofamount received by the concerned claimants
under the Rules of 2006, from the quantum of compensation amount
payable to the claimants under the Act of I 988.
                                                                              c
        6. As the High Court has relied on the decision of the Division
Bench of the same High Court in Purnima's case (supra), it is apposite
to first advert to that decision. That decision was rendered
                                                     -•~" . on a reference
made to a larger Bench, on a question which has been canvassed by the
appellants - Insurance Companies even in the present appeals, in view
of the conflicting decisions of Singh: Judges of the same High Court in      D
the case of Oriental Insurance Co. vs. Saroj Devi 2 and in the case
of New India Assurance Co. vs. Smt. Santosh3 • The question
considered by the Division Bench was: "whether the compensation.
received from the Government under the Haryana Compassionate
Assistance to the Defendants of Deceased Governments Employees                E
Rules, 2006 (or otherwise) is to be deducted from the total compensation,
which is payable to the dependents of the deceased, who dies in an
accident, while computing financial benefits through ex-gratia payments
by the Government?" The Division Bench analysed the scheme and
intent of the Rules of2006 and held that the said Rules have been framed
by the Governor ofHaryana in exercise of powers conferred by proviso          F
to Article 309 of the Constitution of India; these Rules not only have
statutory force, but must be treated at par with the Statute enacted by
the Legislature; these Rules purport to assist the family of the deceased
to tide over hardship caused as a result of the employee dying in harness
(not merely because of motor accident) or who goes missing or whosr.i         G
whereabouts are not known, by providing ex-gratia financial assistance
to the family of the deceased employee; this financial assistance to the
dependents of the employee who dies in harness, has no correlation with

 '2012 (I) PLR 761
 3
  2010 (4) PLR 780                                                            H
496             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016) 6 S.C.R.



A     the cause of death of the employee due to motor accident. In other
      words, on mere death of the employee dying in harness, be it natural
      death or due to illness or otherwise the Rules of 2006 would become
      :1pplicable; and. as a result of which the family of the deceased employee
      is entitled to receive financial assistance from the employer. The Division
      Bench held that the scheme of financial assistance postulated in Rules
B
      of 2006, is a service benefit which accrues to the dependents of the
      deceased and is in the domain of service matter/benefit given to the
      employee as a result of the service rendered by the deceased employee.
      The benefit accruing to the dependents of the deceased is in the nature
      of enhanced pension given as per the provisions of the Pension/Family
c     Pension Scheme, recognizing the fact that the pension is normally given
      for meritorious, long and faithful service by the employee. The Division
      Bench relying on the exposition of two Judges' Bench decision of this
      Court in Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) & Ors. vs. Maharashtra State
      Road Transport Corporation & Anr! and also in United India
      Insurance Co. vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. 5 , held that the
D
      tortfeasor or Insurance Companies cannot get their liability excused or
      reduced because the deceased's family would receive financial assistance
      from an alternative source (employer) by reason of the death of the
      deceased. It held that deductions are admissible from the amount of
      compensation in case the claimant receives the benefit as a consequence
E     of injuries sustained which otherwise he would not been entitled to; and
      does not cover cases when the payment received is not dependent upon
      an injury sustained on meeting with an accident. That the assistance
      received under Rules of 2006 is not dependent upon the death of an
      employee arising out of a motor accident only. Thus, it has no correlation
      with the manner in which the death occurs. Accordingly, the Division
F
      Bench held that the Insurance Company is not entitled to claim deduction
      of the amount given to the dependents under the Rules of2006, while
      calculating the compensation amount payable under the Motor Vehicles
      Act.
            7. The Insurance Companies, on the other hand, have relied on
G
      the decision of two-'Judges' Bench of this Court in Bhakra Beas
      Management Board vs. Kanta Aggarwal (Smt.) & Ors. 6 , to contend
      thatthe plea of the appellant in that case that the claimants have received
      '1999 (I) sec 90
      '2002 (6) sec 281
H     • 2008 (I I) sec 366
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                              497.
        SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

financial assistance from other source due to the death of her husband"       A
by way of salary amount on account of compassionate appointment and
also residence provided to her was deductible, has been accepted by
this Court; and was so deducted while determining a just compensation
amount payable under the Motor Vehicles Act. Reliance is also placed
on the dictum of three Judges' Bench in Gobald Motor Service
                                                                               B
Limited vs. R.M.K.Veluswami 7, which, according to the Insurance
Company, permits deduction of benefits such as compensation received
by the dependents of the deceased from the employer. Reliance is also
placed on two Judges' Bench decision in the case of Sheikhupura
Transport Co. Ltd. vs. Northern India Transport Insurance Co. 8 ;
another two Judges' Bench judgment in the case of Vimal Kanwar &               c
Ors. vs. Kishore Dan & Ors. 9 • Reliance is then placed on another
decision of two Judges' Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. vs. Deo Patodi and Ors. 10 for the principles to be reckoned
to determine a just compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act.
In substance, the contention of the Insurance Companies is that the
                                                                               D
claimants cannot be permitted to profiteer and receive double benefit on
account of the death of their family memberon the same head of"Loss
of income" to them.
       8. Besides the above noted stand of the Insurance Companies the
other incidental question to be considered is whether there is any conflict
of opinion between the coordinate Benches (of two Judges') of this             E
Court, in the case of Bhakra Beas Management Board (supra) on
the one hand, and that of Helen C. Rebelo and Patricia J.Mahajan
(supra) on the other.
        9. The decision in the case of Gobald Motor Service Ltd.
(supra) of three Judges' Bench of this Court has been carefully analysed       F
and distinguished by the two Judges' Bench in Helen's case (supra). In
that, the dictum in Gobald Motor's case was in relation to the provisions
regarding quantum of damages payable in terms of Sections I and 2 of
the Fatal Accident Act, 1855, which are held to be materially different.
On the other hand, the provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 enlarges      G
the scope for computation of compensation amount. The Court in Helen's
case held that the observation in Gobald's case cannot be the basis to
7
   1962 (1) SCR 929 =AIR 1962 SC I,
• 1971 <1l sec1ss
• 2013 (7) sec 476
10 2009 (13) sec 123
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498            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [20 I G] 6 S.C.R.


A     claim deduction of amount receivable by the dependents of the deceased
      from whatever source, in the context of provisions of the Motor Vehicles
      Act as in force. Even the decision in the case of Sheikhupura
      Transport (supra) has been explained and distinguished on the same
      lines.
B           I 0. The question is: whether the principle expounded by the two
      Judges' Bench in Helen's case, in paragraphs 32 to 35, in particular,
      can be doubted? In that case the Court was called upon to answer as to
      whether it will be permissible to disallow the deduction of amount
      receivable by the dependants of the deceased towards "Life Insurance
      Policy", from the amount of compensation payable under the provisions
c     of Motor Vehicles Act (in that case Sections I !OB, 92A and 92B of the
      Act of 1939 corresponding to Sections 168, 140 and 141 of the Act of
      1988). Paragraphs 32 to 35 read thus:
               "32.      So far as the general principle of estimating
            damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled
D           that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing
            on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary
            benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death
            with the "pecuniary advantage" which from whatever
            source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words,
E           it is the balancing ofloss and gain of the claimant occasioned
            by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent
            a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in
            the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
            It is veiy clear. to which there could be no doubt that his
            Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account
F           of accidental injuiy or death. not on account of any other
            death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this
            Act has to be deciphered, correlating with the accidental
            death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vt.hicles
            Act is on account of the pecuniary Joss to the claimant by
G           accidental injury or death and not others forms of death. If
            there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness,
            including even death by accident, through train, air flight
            not involving a motor vehicle, it would not be covered under
            the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of the general
            principle under the common law of loss and gain for the
H
     RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                        499
          SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       computation of compensation under this Act must correlate          A
       to this type of injury or death, viz., accidental. Ifthe words
       "gecuniaQ'. advantage" from whatever source are to be
       intergreted to mean an)' form of death under this Act, it
       would dilute all gossible benefits conferred on the claimant
       and would be contra[)'. to the SQirit of the law. If the
                                                                           B
       "pecuniary advantage" resulting from death means
       pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then
       it will include all the assets moveable, immovable, shares,
       bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable under
       any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including
       what is willed by the deceased etc. this would obliterate          c
       both, all possible conferment of economic security to the
       claimant by the deceased and the intentions of the legislature.
       B)' such an interyretation, the tort feasor in sgite of his
..     wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death,
       would have in man)' cases no liabili!)' or meager liabili!)'. In
                                                                          D
       our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and
       gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be
       interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and
       the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus. under
       the gresent Act, whatever gecunia1:x advantage is received
       b)' the claimant, from whatever source, would onl)' mean            E
       which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental
       death and not other forms of death. The constitution of the
       Motor Accident Claims Tribunal itselfunder Section 110 is,
       as the section states:
                         " ......... forthe purpose of adjudicating        F
       upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents
       involving the death of, or bodily injury to, ...... "
       33. Thus, it would not include that which the claimant
       receives on account of other forms of deaths, which he
       would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus,         G
       such pecuniary advantage would have no corelation to the
       accidental death for which compensation is computed. An)'
       amount received or receivable not onl)' on account of the
       accidental death but that which would have come to the
       claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the
                                                                           H
500      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A     "pecuniary advantage''. liable for deduction. However,
      where the employer insures his employee, as against injury
      or death arising out of an accident, any amount received
      out of such insurance on the happening of such incident
      may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our
      legislatu~e has taken note of such contingency through the
B
      proviso of Section 95. Under it the liability of the insurer is
      excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of and in
      the course of employment of an employee.
       34. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the
       happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from
c     two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the
       wisdom of the legislature or through the principle of loss
      and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant
       twice arising from the same transaction, viz., the same
       accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources,
D      viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the
       employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is
       either statutory or through the security of the employer
       securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the
       amount without his contribution. How thus an amount
       earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's
E      wealth, savings. etc either for himself or for his family which
       such person knows under the law has to go to his heirs
      .after his death either by succession or under a Will could
       be said to be the "pecuniary gain" only on account of one's
       accidental death. This, of course, is a pecuniary gain but
F      how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount
       to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicle
       Act. There is no correlation between the two amounts.
       Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain
       of one contract be made applicable to the loss and gain of
       another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under
G      a statute has any correlation with arfamount earned by an
       individual. Principle ofloss and gain has to be on the same
       plane within the same sphere, of course, subject to the
       contract to the contrary or any provisions of law.
      35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident
H
RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                      501
     SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

  fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution         A
  made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such
  employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount
  irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured,
  is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor
  Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the
                                                                    B
  happening of the event, viz., accident, which may not take
  pl!lce at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an
  employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his
  contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions
  receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive
  family pension even otherwise than the accidental death.          c
  No corelation between the tw.o. Similarly, life insurance
  policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the
  insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which
  the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is
  receivable even by the insured ifhe lives till maturity after
                                                                    D
  paying all the premiums. In the case of death, the insurer
   indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of
  the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is
   receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental
   death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a
   step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the     E
   amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares fixed
   deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage
   receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all
   these have no corelation with the amount receivable under
   a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death.
                                                                    F
   How could such an amount come within the periphery of
   the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ''pecuniary
   advantage" liable for deduction. When we seek the principle
   of loss and gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane
   having nexus, inter se, between them and not to which there
   is no semblance of any corelation. The insured (deceased)        G
   contributes his own money for which he receives the amount
   which has no corelation to the compensation computed as
   against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the
   accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as
   compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or
                                                                    H
502            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A           death without making any contribution towards it, then how
            can the fruits of an amount received through contributions
            of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable
            under the Motor Vehicles act. The amount under this Act
            he receives without any contribution. As we have said, the
            compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is
B
            statutory while the amount receivable under the life
            insurance policy is contractual."
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
             11. This decision has analysed the legal position regarding the
c     application of the general principle for estimating damages under the
      common law. It has also noted the distinguishing features between the
      provisions of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, before its amendment by Act (3
      of 1951) and thereafter. It then found that in Gobald's case the Court
      decided the issue placing reliance on English decisions - as the provisions
      applicable at that time were similar to Section 9 of the English Fatal
D     Accidents Act, 1846. The Court was neither called upon to determine
      damages under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 nor consider as to any
      form of deductions are justified under the Motor Vehicles Act. The
      Court noted that the language of Section 110-B of the Act of 1939
      (corresponding to Section 168 of the Act of 1988) is different from
E     Section I A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. It held that Section 110-B
      of the Act of 1939 empowers the Tribunal to determine the compensation
      which appears to it to be "just". The Court held that this provision
      widens the scope for detennination of compensation, which is neither
      permissible under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 nor under the
      English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. The Court then went on to analyse
F     the decisions of this Com1 and held that there is a deliberate departure in
      the language of the Act of 1939, revealing the intent of the legislature to
      confer wider discretion on the Tribunal. Therefore, the decisions based
      on the principles applicable to previous law cannot be invoked while
      adjudicating the compensation payable to the claimant under the Motor
G     Vehicles Act. In Paragraph 28, the Court observed thus:
            "28 ......... This show that the word "just" was deliberately
            brought it Section 110 B of the 1939 Act to enlarge the
            consideration in computing the compensation which, of
            course, would include the question of deductibility, if any.
H           This leads us to an irresistible conclusion that the principle
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                               503
        SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

      of computation of the compensation both under the English                A
      Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and under the Indian Fatal
      Accidents Act, 1855 by the earlier decisions, were restrictive
      in nature in the absence of any guiding words therein, hence
      the courts applied the general principle at the common law
      ofloss and gain butthat would not apply to the considerations
                                                                                B
      under Section 110-B of the 1939 Act which enlarges the
      discretion to deliver better justice to the claimant, in
      computing the compensation, to see what is just. Thus, we
      find that all the decisions of the High Courts, which based
      their interpretation on the principles of these two Acts, viz.,
      the English 1846 Act and the Indian 1855 Act to hold that                 c
      deductions were valid cannot be upheld. As we have
      observed above, the decisions even with reference to the
      decision of this Court in Gobald Motor Service where the
      question was neither raised nor adjudicated and that case
      also, being under the 1855 Act, cannot be pressed into
                                                                                D
      service. Thus, these courts by giving a restrictive
      interpretation in computation of compensation based on the
      limitation of the language of the Fatal Accidents Act, fell
      into an error, as it did not take into account the change of
      language in the 1939 Act and did not consider the widening
      of the discretion of the Tribunal under Section 110-B. The                E
      word "just", as its nomenclature. denotes equitability, fairness
      and reasonableness having a large peripheral field. The
      largeness is, of course, not arbitrary: it is restricted by the
      conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it
      exceeds: it is termed as unfair, unreasonable, un-equitable,
      not just. Thus, this field of wider discretion of the Tribunal
                                                                                F
      has to be within the said limitations and the limitations under
      any provision of this Act or any other provision having the
      force of law."
                                               (emphasis supplied)
                                                                                G
        12. The principle expounded in this decision that the application of
general principles under the common law to estimate damages cannot
be invoked for computing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Further, the "pecuniary advantage" from whatever source must correlate
to the injury or death caused on account of motor accident. The view so
                                                                                H
504            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A     taken, is the correct analysis and interpretation of the relevant provisions
      of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, and must apply proprio vigore to
      the corresponding provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This
      principle has been restated in the subsequent decision of two Judges'
      Bench in Patricia S.Mahajan's case (supra), to reject the argument of
      the Insurance Company to deduct the amount receivable by the
B
      dependents of the deceased by way of"social security compensation"
      and "Life Insurance Policy".
              13. In the case of Bhakra Beas Management Board (supra),
      ostensibly, it may appear that a departure has been made in allowing
      deduction of the pecuniary advantage received by the claimants from
c     other source on account of death of her husband. However, on a closer
      analysis of the said decision, two aspects become prominent. Firstly, the
      grievance of the appellant Board was that the claimants had filed an
      appeal before the High Court for enhancement of compensation of
      amount, which was still pending. However, the appeal preferred by the
D     Board against the same decision was dismissed by the High Court. The
      grievance of the appellant was essentially about the inappropriate
      approach of the High Court in dismissing its appeal. That can be discerned
      from the observation in paragraph 13 of the reported decision. From the
      observation found in para 14 of the reported decision, it is seen that the
      High Court judgment has been held to be clearly unsustainable. That
E     must be understood as disapproving the approach of the High Court in
      dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants, though cross appeal filed
      by the claimants for enhancement of compensation amount was pending
      before it. The second aspect, is that, the Court, to do complete justice
      between the parties and for bringing quietus to the long pending Iitigation
F     ( 14 years) between them, including to dispose of appeal of the claimants
      pending before the High Court, passed an order for full and final settlement
      of all the claims inter partes. That can be discerned from paragraphs
      13 and 14, which read thus:
              "13. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the
G           judgment and additionally submitted that appeal of
            respondent I is pending. In normal course, when two
            appeals are directed against the common judgment, both
            the appeals should be heard by the same bench of the High
            Court. But we find that the High Court had lost sight of the
            fact that the benefits which the claimant receives on account
H
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHl                              505
        SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

      ofthe death or injury have to be duly considered while fixing           A
      the compensation. It is pointed out that Respondent 1 was
      getting Rs.4,700/-p.m. and a residence has been provided
      to her and actually the compassionate appointment was
      given immediately after the accident.
      "14. In view of what has been stated above, the High                    B
      Court'' judgment is clearly unsustainable. However, the
      accident took place more than 14 years back and it would
      not be desirable to send the matter back to the Tribunal for
      fresh consideration. A sum of rupees five lakhs has been
      deposited vide this Court's order dated 1-11-2004. We are
      of the considered view that in view of the background facts,            c
      it is just and proper that the sum of rupees five lakhs already
      deposited shall be permitted to be withdrawn by the
      claimants in full and final settlement of the claim relatable
      to the death of the deceased. It is forthe Tribunal to fix the
      quantum of fixed deposit and the amount to be released to               D
      the claimants."
                                               (emphasis supplied)
       14. Thus understood, it is not an authority of having taken a contra
view than the view expressed in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia's
case. As a matter of fact, in para 11 of the reported decision, paragraphs     E
32 to 34 of Helen C. Rebello's case has been reproduced in its entirety.
No observation is found in the entire decision, to have doubted the
correctness of the dictum in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia's case.
       15. Be that as it may, the term compensation has not been defined
in the Act of 1988. By interpretative process, it has been understood to       F
mean to recompense the claimants for the possible loss suffered or likely
to be suffered due to sudden and untimely death of their family member
as a result of motor accident. Two cardinal principles run through the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of detennination
of compensation. Firstly, the measure of compensation must be just and
                                                                              G
adequate; and secondly, no double benefit should be passed on to the
claimants in the matter of award.of compensation. Section 168 of the
Act of 1988 makes the first principle explicit. Sub-section ( 1) of that
provision makes it clear that the amount of compensation must be just.
The word "jusf"·means - fair, adequate, and (easonable. It has been
                                                                               H
506                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2016] 6 S.C.R.



A     derived from the Latin word "justus'', connoting right and fair. Jn para 7
      of Sf(lfe of H"ray"na & Anr. vs. J"sbir Kaur & Ors.", it has been
      held that expression "just" denotes that the amount must be equitable,
      fair, reasonable and not arbitrary. In para 16 of Smt. Sari" Vernw &
      Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corpomtion & Anr. ' 2 , this Court has observed
      that the compensation "is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source
B
      of profit''. That however may depend upon facts and circumstances of
      each case, as to what amount would be a just compensation.
             16. The principle discernable from the exposition in Helen
      C.Rebello's case (supra) is that if the amount "would be due to the
      dependants of the deceased even otherwise'', the same shail not be
c     deductiblefrom the compensation amount payable under the Act of 1988.
      At the same time, it must be borne in mind that loss of income is a
      significant head under which compensation is claimed in terms of the
      Act of 1988. The component of quantum of"loss of income", inter alia,
      can be "pay and wages" which otherwise would have been earned by
D     the deceased employee ifhe had survived the injury caused to him due
      to motor accident. If the dependents of the deceased employee, however,
      were to be compensated by the employer in that behalf, as is predicated
      by the Rules of2006 - to grant compassionate assistance by way of' ex-
      gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds to the dependents
      of the deceased Government employee who dies in harness, it is
      unfathomable that the dependents can still be permitted to claim the
      same amount as a possible or likely loss of income to be suffered by
      them to maintain a. claim for compensation under the Act of 1988.
             17. A perusal of the scheme of Rules of 2006 would reinforce
      the position that the dependents of the deceased Government employee
F                                     a
      are suitably compensated for specified period by way of financial
      assistance in the form of ex-gratia payment on compassionate grounds
      equivalent to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the
      deceased employee in the normal course without raising a specific claim.
      Here, we may advert to the recital of the Rules of 2006, which reads
G     thus:
                "No. G.S.R. 19/Const./Art.309/2006.-ln exercise of the
                powers conferred by the proviso to article 309 of the
                Constitution of India, The Governor of Haryana hereby
       11
            <2003 l 1 sec 484
H      12
            (2009) 6 sec 121
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                              507
        SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

      makes the following rules to grant the compassionate                    A
      assistance by way of ex-gratia financial assistance on
      compassionate grounds to members of the family of a
      deceased Government employee who dies while in service/
      missing Government emplo~ namely:-
                                              (emphasis supplied)             8
       Rule 2 stipulates the objects of the Rules, namely, to assist the
family of a deceased/missing Government employee of Group C and D
category, in tiding over the emergent situation, resulting from the loss of
the bread-earner while in regular service by giving financial assistance.
Rule 3 of the said Rules provides for eligibility to receive financial        c
assistance under the Rules. As per Rule 4, the eligible family members
are required to submit an application in Form A for compassionate
financial assistance. Rule 5, is of some significance which provides for
the extent of financial assistance. The same reads thus:
      "5.(1) On the death ofany Government employee, the family               D
      of the employee would continue to receive as financial
      assistance a sum equal to the pay and other allowances
      that was last drawn by the deceased employee in the normal
      course without raising a specific claim.,-
        (a)for a period of fifteen years from the date of death of             E
           the employee, ifthe employee at the time of his death
           had not attained the age of thirty-five years;
        (b)for a period of twelve years or till the date the em-
         - ployee would have retired from Government service
           on attaining th.e age of superannuation, whichever is               F
           less, if the employee at the time of his death had at-
           tained the age of thirty-five years but had not attained
           the age of forty-eight years;
        (c)for a period of seven years or till the date the employee
           would have retired from Government service on attain-
                                                                              G
           ing the age of superannuation, whichever is less, if the
           employee had attained the age of forty-eight years.
      (2) The family shall be eligible to receive family pension as
      per the normal rules only after the period during which he

                                                                              H
508            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A           receives the financial assistance as above is completed.
            (3) The family of a deceased Government employee who
            was in occupation of a Government residence would
            continue to retain the residence on payment of normal rent/
            license fee for a period of one year from the date of death
B           of.the_ employee.
            ( 4) Within fifteen days from the date of death of a
            Government employee, an ex-gratia assistance of twenty
            five thousand rupees shall be provided to the family of the
            deceased employee to meet the immediate needs on the
c           loss of the bread earner.
            (5) House Rent Allowance shall not be a part of allowance
            for the purposes of calculation of assistance."
             18. Rule 6 pertains to pending cases of ex-gratia assistance, with
      which we are not concerned in the present appeals. But to complete the
D     narrative, we may refer to the said provision. It postulates that all pending
      cases of ex-gratia assistance shall be covered under the new Rules (i.e.
      Rules of2006). Further, the calculation of the period and payment shall
      be made to such cases from the date of notification of the new Rules. It
      further provides that the families will have the option to opt for the lump
 E    sum ex-gratia grant provided in the Rules, 2003 or 2005, as the case
      may be, in lieu of the monthly financial assistance provided under the
      new Rules.
              19. Reverting back to Rule 5, sub-clause (I) provides for the period
      during which the dependents of the deceased employee may receive
      financial assistance equivalent to the pay and other allowances that was
 F
      last drawn by the deceased employee in the normal course without raising
      a specific claim. Sub-rule (2) provides that the family shall be eligible to
      receive family pension as per the normal Rules only after the period
      during which they would receive the financial assistance in terms of
      sub-rule ( 1). Sub-rule (3) guarantees the family of a deceased Government
G     employee of a Government residence in occupation for a period of one
      year from the date of death of the employee, upon payment of normal
      rent/license fee ..BY virtue of sub-rule (4), an ex-gratia assistance of
      25,000/- is provided to the family of the deceased employee to meet the
      immediate needs on the loss of the bread earner. Sub-rule (5) clarifies
      that house rent allowance shall not be a part ofallowance for the purposes
 H
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                            509
        SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKA~, J.]

of calculation of assistance.                                               A
        20. Rule 5 broadly deals with two aspects. Firstly, to compensate
the depen<,lents of the deceased Government employee by granting ex-
gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds for the loss of pay
and other allowances for a specified period. The second part of Rule 5
is to compensate the dependents of the deceased Government employee         B
by way of allowances and concessions - of retaining occupation of the
Govemment residence on specified terms, of family pension and other
allowance. As regards the second part, it deals with income from other
source which any way is receivable by the dependants of the deceased
Government employee. That cannot be deducted from the claim amount,
for determination of a just compensation under the Act of 1988.              c
        21. The claimants are legitimately entitled to claim for the loss of
"pay and wages" of the deceased Government employee against the
tortfeasor or Insurance Company, as the case may be, covered by the
first part of Rule 5 under the Act of 1988. The claimants or dependents
of the deceased Government employee (employed by State ofHaryana), ·o
however, cannot set up a claim for the same subject falling under the
first part of Rule 5 - "pay and allowances", which are receivable by
them from employer (State)' under Rule 5 (1) of the Rules of 2006. In ·
that, if the deceased employee was to survive the motor accident injury,
would have remained in employment and earned-his regular pay and E
allowances. Any other interpretation of the said.Rules wo1,1ld inevitably
result in double payment towards the same head of loss of "pay and
wages" of the deceased Government employee entailing in grant of
bonanza, largesse or source of profit to the dep~ndants I claimants.
 Somewhat similar situation has been spelt out in Section 167 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, which reads thus:                                        F

       "167. Option regarding claims for compensation in
       certain ca.ses.- Notwithstanding anything contained in
       the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8of1923) where
       the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a
       claim for compensation under this Act and also under the              G
       Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to
       compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of
       Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those.
       Acts but not under both."
                                               (emphasis supplied)           H
510            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A            22. Indeed, similar statutory exclusion of claim receivable under
      the Rules of 2006 is absent. That, however, does not mean that the
      Claims Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim towards
      loss of Pay and wages of the deceased has already been or will be
      compensated by the employer in the form ofex-gratia financial assistance
B     on compassionate grounds under Rule 5 (1). The Claims Tribunal has to
      adjudicate the claim and determine the amount of compensation which
      appears to it to be just. The amount receivable by the dependants I
      claimants towards the head of pay and allowances in the form of ex-
      gratia financial assistance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time
      to the claimants. True it is, that the Rules of2006 would come into play
c     if the Government employee dies in harness even due to natural death.
      At the same time, the Rules of 2006 do not expressly enable the
      dependents of the deceased Government employee to claim similar
      amount from the tortfeasor or Insurance Company because of the
      accidental death of the deceased Government employee. The harmonious
D     approach for determining a just com pen~ :ition payable under the Act of
      1988, therefore, is to exclude the amount received or receivable by the
      dependents of the deceased Government employee under the Rules of
      2006 towards the head financial assistance equivalent to "pay and other
      allowances" that was last drawn by the deceased Government employee
E     in the normal course. This is not to say that the amount or payment
      receivable by the dependents of the deceased Government employee
      under Rule 5 {I) of the Rules, is the total entitlement under the head of
      "loss ofincome". So far as the claim towards loss offuture escalation of
      income and other benefits, if the deceased Government employee had
      survived the accident can still be pursued by them in their claim under
F     the Act of 1988. For, it is not covered by the Rules of2006. Similarly,
      other benefits extended to the dependents of the deceased Government
      employee in terms of sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 including
      family pension, Life Insurance, Provident Fund etc., that must remain
      unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted, which, any way would
G     be paid to the dependents of the deceased Government employee,
      applying the principle expounded in Helen C.Rebello and Patricia Jean
      Mahajan's cases (supra).
            23. A Priori, appellants must succeed only to the extent ofamount
      receivable by the dependents of the deceased Government employee in
H
   RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SHASHI                               511
        SHARMA & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

terms of Rule 5(1) of the Rules 2006, towards financial assistance             A
equivalent to the loss of pay and wages of the deceased employee for
the period specified.
      24. As no other point arises for consideration, the appeals must
succeed in part to the extent indicated above.
                                                                                B
      25. Accordingly, the appeals are partly allowed in the above terms
with no order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy                                Appeals partly al1011·cd.


                                                                                c