Supreme Court of India
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR.versusJAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 712
- Decided
- 22 October 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- H L GOKHALE
Holding
Termination of a probationary judicial officer based on a stigmatic inquiry into alleged misconduct, without informing the officer of the charges and without a hearing, violates Article 311(2) and is therefore invalid.
Summary
The respondent, a Civil Judge on probation, was terminated after two inquiries—one discreet and a subsequent preliminary inquiry—without being informed of the charges or given a chance to be heard. She challenged the termination, alleging violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which requires a fair hearing before punitive dismissal. The Supreme Court examined whether the termination was a simple suitability assessment (which would not require a hearing) or a punitive action based on undisclosed allegations, finding that the latter applied. The Court held that the preliminary inquiry introduced stigma and therefore the respondent was entitled to the procedural safeguards of Article 311(2). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, the respondent was reinstated with continuity, seniority, and back wages limited to the period after the High Court’s decision, and the appellants were directed to implement the order.
Issues considered
- Whether termination of a probationary judicial officer for alleged unsuitability without a hearing violates Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
- Whether the preliminary inquiry conducted against the respondent was a mere suitability assessment or a punitive inquiry into alleged misconduct.
- Whether the High Court administration was required to afford the respondent an opportunity to defend herself before termination.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)
Subjects
Article 311probationary servicejudicial serviceterminationdue processhostile work environmentsubordinate judiciaryconstitutional lawservice law
Judgment
[2013] 11 S.C.R. 395
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & A
ANR.
# v.
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI
(Civil Appeal No. 9346 of 2013)
B
OCTOBER 22, 2013
[H.L. GOKHALE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
Service Law:
c
Judicial service - Subordinate judicial officer -
Termination of service - During probation period - Without
affording opportunity of hearing - Termination order set aside
by High Court on the ground that it was in breach of Art. 311
of the Constitution - Held: If the inquiry is conducted to 0
assess the suitability of the probationer, it cannot be faulted
- But if in the course of inquiry any a/legations are made
against the probationer, which results into a stigma, the
probationer ought to be afforded protection u!Art. 311(2) - In
the present case no opportunity was afforded to the officer -
The facts of the case, ·also do not establish her unsuitability E
to the post - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 311(2).
Judiciary - Subordinate judiciary - Protection of - It is
duty of the High Court to protect judicial officers against
unjustified allegations and to see that hostile work F
environment for junior judicial officers is eliminated, in order
to encourage them to put in good judicial work without fear or
favour.
The respondent, obtained a high rank in the selection G
for judicial service. She was given an independent
posting as a Civil Judge, Junior Division. During her
probation, discreet inquiry was conducted and thereafter
preliminary inquiry was conducted. On the basis of the
395 H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A report of the preliminary inquiry, the services of the
respondent were terminated. She challenged the
termination order by filing writ petition. The· High Court
allowed the petition and set aside the termination order
and directed her reinstatement with back wages, on the
B ground that the termination was in breach of Article 311
of the Constitution, inasmuch as she was not informed
of the charges against her, nor was she given the
opportunity of being heard in respect thereof. Hence the
present appeal.
c The question for consideration was whether the
present case was a case of termination simplicitor of the
services of a probationer on account of her unsuitability
for the post that she was holding, or whether it was a
termination of her services after holding an inquiry
D behind her back and without giving her an opportunity
to defend.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E HELD: 1.1. If a finding against a probationer is arrived
at behind his back on the basis of the inquiry conducted
into the allegations made against him, and if the same
formed the foundation of the order of discharge, the same
would be bad and liable to be set aside. If it is a case of
deciding the suitability of a probationer, and for that
F limited purpose any inquiry is conducted, the same
cannot be faulted as such. However, if during the course
of such an inquiry any allegations are made against the
person concerned, which result into a stigma, he ought
to be afforded the minimum protection which is
G contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of
India even though he may be a probationer. The
protection is very limited viz. to inform the person
concerned about the charges against him, and to give
him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. [Paras 27
H and 28] [421-F-G; 422-B-C]
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 397
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI
1.2. The facts of the present case indicate that apart A
from the fact that no opportunity was afforded to the
respondent, even the material placed on record did not
establish any such aspect which would lead to a
conclusion of unsuitability. The disposal of the
respondent was very good, and the complaints by the B
subordinate staff were clearly motivated. There was no
involvement of the respondent in the suicide by the wife
of another judicial officer, and all that the High Court
administration could lay hand on was the telephonic
conversations which the respondent had with the judicial c
officer. The inference of unsuitability drawn by the High
Court administration was therefore totally uncalled for.
The impugned judgment setting aside the termination
order issued on the ground of unsuitability is, therefore,
fully justified. [Para 31] [424-C-F]
D
1.3. High Court administration had first conducted a
discreet inquiry against the respondent, and thereafter
another inquiry called as preliminary inquiry. The initial
discreet inquiry was conducted by the then District
Judge, whereas the subsequent inquiry, was conducted E
by the then Registrar (Vigilance). The Registrar (Vigilance)
was earlier the District Judge, to whom the respondent
had made initial complaints about the behaviour of her
subordinate staff that they were not working properly,
and he had not taken any action on those complaints. F
Instead, he made certain adverse remarks on the
personal characteristics of the respondent, with respect
to politeness and courtesy that it required improvement.
Therefore, in view of his association with the controversy
at an earlier stage as the District Judge, the minimum that G
was expected of him was to recuse himself from the
preliminary inquiry. [Para 16] [412-G-H; 413-A-C]
1.4. It is also material to note that during the
preliminary inquiry, the Registrar (Vigilance) did not call
H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 11 S.C.R.
A those persons to give evidence who had given
statements in favour of the respondent during the
discreet inquiry. This include,d her peon and senior staff
members. The staff member 'of the respondent who did
not get along with the respondent, had also given a
B statement in support of her during the course of the
discreet inquiry. Not less than 38 advocates had given a
statement in her favour, and pointed out that her
performance was in fact good, and also that there were
no behavioral problems with respect to her functioning.
c If this information was available to the Registrar
(Vigilance), through the report of the discreet inquiry,
which was conducted by the then District Judge, it was
expected of him to verify that material by calling the
persons concerned, and recording their statements. The
0 impugned judgment has noted this one-sided approach
of the Registrar (Vigilance), and called it as biased. [Para
16) [413-C-G)
1.5. The respondent is held to have completed her
probation satisfactorily. The appellants are directed to
E reinstate the respondent in her service with continuity and
all consequential benefits. She will be entitled to her
seniority as if she wa~ never terminated from her service.
She will be entitled to the backwages. However, the
backwages payable to her are restricted to the period
F subsequent to the decision of the High Court dated
15.5.2009. She will be given a fitment in salary on the basis
of her continuity in services, and the backwages will be
calculated and paid accordingly. [Para 35) [426-E-G]
G Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India AIR 1958 SC
36; 1958 SCR 828; Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and
Anr. 1974 (2) SCC 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814 - followed.
State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra 1970
(2) SCC 871: 1971 (2) SCR 191; Anoop Jaiswal vs. Govt. of
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 399
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATII
India 1984 (2) SCC 369: 1984 (2) SCR 453; Chandra A
Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Ors. 2000 (5) SCC 152:
2000 (3) SCR 529; Union of India and Ors. vs. Mahaveer C.
Singhvi 2010 (8) SCC 220: 2010 (9) SCR 246; Shamsher
Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 1974 (2) SCC 831: 1975
(1) SCR 814 - relied on. B
High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Sashikant S. Patil
and Anr. 2000 (1) sec 416: 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 205 -
distinguished.
Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry vs. Presiding Officer c
1998 (3) SCC 225; Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro
Industries Corporation Ltd. 1999 (2) SCC 21: 1998 (3) Suppl.
SCR 558 - referred to.
2.1. The Subordinate Judges are under the care and
custody of the High Court. This custody and care D
certainly requires the High Court to afford the
Subordinate Judges the minimum opportunity which is
otherwise available to every other civil servant under
Article 311 (2). In the present case instead of protecting
the respondent, an investigation was conducted against E
her without affording her any opportunity, though it
contained allegations against her character, and the
investigation was sought to be justified as determination
of her suitability for the post which she was holding.
[Paras 28 and 34) [422-E-F; 425-H; 426-A-B] F
Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 1974 (2)
sec 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814 .;... relied on.
2.2. The High Courts must see to it that the hostile
work environment for junior judicial officers, particularly G·
the lady officers, is eliminated. This is necessary to
encourage the young officers to put in good judicial work
without fear or favour. In the present case, the High Court
administration has clearly failed in this behalf. [Para 34)
[426-B-C] . H
.
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 11 S.C.R.
A lshwar Chand Jain vs. High Court of Punjab and
Haryana and Ors. 1988 (3) SCC 370: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR
396 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
B 1998 (3) sec 225 referred to Para 21
1998 (3) Suppl. SCR 558 referred to Para 21
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 205 relied on Para 22
1958 SCR 828 followed Para 23
c
1971 (2) SCR 191 relied on Para 24
1975 (1) SCR 814 followed Para 24
1984 (2) SCR 453 relied on Para 25
D
2000 (3) SCR 529 relied on Para 26
2010 (9) SCR 246 relied on Para 27
1975 (1) SCR 814 relied on Para 28
E 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 396 relied on Para 29
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9346 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 15.05.2009 of the High
F Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.
2880 of 2008.
Preetesh Kapur, Hemantika Wahi, Subhada Deshpande
for the Appellants.
G
R.P. Bhatt, Pradhuman Gohil, Vikash Singh, S. Hari Haran,
Taruna Singh, Charu Mathur for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 401
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATII
H.L. GOKHALE J. 1. Leave Granted. A
2. This appeal by Special Leave seeks to challenge the
judgment and order rendered by a Division Bench of Gujarat
High Court dated 15.5.2009, allowing the Special Civil
Application No.2880 of 2008, filed by the respondent herein.
B
3. The appeal raises the question with respect to the
disputed termination of services of the respondent herein as a
Civil Judge, Junior Division, in the Gujarat Judiciary. The
impugned judgment has accepted the contention of the
respondent that the termination of her services was a stigmatic c
one, and she was removed from her services after an inquiry
in which she was not informed of the charges against her, nor
was she given the opportunity of being heard in respect of those
charges, which are the minimum requirements under Article 311
(2) of the Constitution of India. As against that, the contention D
of the appellants has been that the respondent's service was
discontinued during the period of her probation, since she was
not found suitable for the post she was holding, and it was not
a stigmatic termination to attract Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution of India.
E
Facts leading to this appeal are this wise:-
4. The respondent appeared for the selection for the post
of a Civil Judge, Junior Division, in the year 2003, and obtained
7th rank out of 84 candidates, and was appointed as a Civil
Judge on 2.3.2005. To begin with, she was placed on probation F
for a period of two years. Her initial posting was at Rajkot to
undergo the training alongwith the District Judge. Subsequent
thereto, she was given a full-fledged posting as a Civil Judge
and Judicial Magistrate First Class, at Kodinar District
Junagadh, by the order of the High Court dated 30.12.2005. G
She took the charge of the said post on 7.1.2006.
5. It is her case that she was discharging her duties
faithfully and sincerely, but in the course of her work she found
that some of her subordinate staff members were not
conducting themselves properly, and were involved in taking the H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A court papers outside the court premises, which was something
that could not be permitted. She wrote letters to the then District
Judge, Junagadh Mr. B.U. Joshi, on 16.5.2006 and 19.5.2006,
with respect to the difficulties faced by her, due to the behavior
of the subordinate staff, and amongst other things she recorded
B this particular conduct on their part. There was no response to
these letters, but she received adverse remarks, vide the letter
dated 19.9.2006, addressed by the Registrar (Administration)
of the High Court of Gujarat. The said letter read as follows:-
"Confidential
c J.C. Upadhyay
Registrar (Administration)
High Court of Gujarat, at Sola
Ahmedabad-380 060
No. A. 072218'2
D
D.ated 19.9.2006
To
Miss J.C. Buddhabhatti,
Principal Civil Judge and
Judicial Magistrate,
E First Class, Kodinar
Through: The Principal District Judge, Junagadh
Subject: Adverse remark- Communication of ...
F Madam,
With reference to the subject noted above, I am directed
by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice and Judges, to
state that the following remarks have been passed in the
G Confidential Report in Form No. Ill in respect of you:-
(4) Personal characteristics:
(8) Politeness and courtesy Required
improvement
H (5) The District Judge's Assessment Of the Civil Judge
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 403
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
regarding hislher- A
(x) Attitude towards the public Requires
and the bar improvement
I am, therefore, directed by their Lordships to request you
to be so good as to try to show improvement in these B
respects in future.
Yours faithfully
Sdl-
Registrar (Admn.)"
c
6. The respondent replied to the said communication by
her letter dated 14.11.2006, in which she pointed out that the
disposal of cases by her had been good. She had disposed
of 509 Civil and 1619 Criminal cases totaling to 2128 cases
during the period January 2006 to October 2006. She stated 0
in her letter that it would not have been possible to do so without
her good attitude, and also without the cooperation of the bar
and public. In any event, she assured in her reply that she will
try to improve politeness and courtesy, and also improve her
attitude towards the public and the bar.
E
7. Thereafter, the respondent received a letter dated
25.7.2007 from the Registrar Administration, High Court of
Gujarat communicating adverse remarks for the subsequent
period. This letter reads as follows:-
"No.A.0722182 F
Date: 25-7-2007
To
Miss J.C. Buddhabhatti
Principal Civil Judge and G
Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Kodinar.
Through : The Principal District Judge, Junagadh.
Subject: Adverse remarks- Communication of... H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A Madam,
With reference to the subject noted above, I am
directed by the Honourable the Chief Justice and Judges
to state that, the following remarks have been passed in
the Confidential Report in Form No.IV in respect of you:-
B
(3) Character:
(c) Whether she mixes in Yes, it is heard so.
such company as she
c should not.
(d) Whether she maintains No, it is heard so.
Judicial aloofness By limited contact.
(4) Personal characteristics
D
(4) Clarity of thought and Required
expression in correspond- improvement
ence and discussion
(8) Politeness and courtesy Required
E improvement
(5) The District Judge's
Assessment of the Civil
Judge regarding his I her
F
(i) Ability Now appears, not
able for
independent
station.
G (vi) Judicial qualities Now appears it
required
Improvement
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 405
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
(vii) (A) Administrative capacity, Now appears A
Knowledge of administra- inadequate
tive work and office routine
(x) Attitude towards the public Required
And the Bar improvement
B
(xi) Any other remarks She has
threatened the Staff
in the name of
District Judge.
Hence She is not C
reliable and Hence
it is not possible
For the D.J. to
enter in Her
Chamber without D
third person.
I am, therefore, directed by Their Lordships to
request you to be so good as to show improvement in
these respects in future.
E
Yours faithfully,
Registrar (Admn.)
8. The respondent replied the said letter on 24.8.2007 and
her reply reads as follows:-
F
"Confidential
No.2412007
Principal Civil Court
Kodinar.
Dt. 24-08-2007 G
From
Miss J.C. Buddhbhatti,
Principal Civil Judge and
Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Kodinar. H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 11 S.C.R.
A To,
The Hon'ble Registrar (Administration)
High Court of Gujarat, at Sola
Ahmedabad- 380060.
Through: The Principal District Judge. Junagadh
8
Subject: Clarification in respect of communication of
Adverse Remarks.
Ref: Your Honour's Letter No.A.0722182.Dt.27fl/07
c Respected Sir,
With reference to the subject noted above, I have honour
to submit my reply as under, kindly consider the same.
D (1) The remarks in respect of my characters as shown
3(c)(d), are based on hearsay because as a judicial
officer I maintain judicial aloofness and I am not keeping
any relation or company with any person which should
not.
E (2) The remarks in respect of my personal characteristic
as shown in para-4 - I will follow the instructions and
will improve the requirement as shown in said remarks.
(3) With reference to remarks shown in para-5(i) - I have
F to state that I have disposed of total cases3317
(834+2483) Civil as well as criminal case during my
tenure in independent station and tried to minimize the
arrears. So I believe that I am able to work in independent
station. Further, I will try to improve judicial qualities as
G mentioned in para-5(vi).
(4) In respect of remarks mentioned in para-5(vii)(a). I
submit that I am fresh recruited and require experience
in respect of administrative work even though I am trying
to see that office routine work should run smoothly and I
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 407
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
am confident in near future I will able to achieve perfect A
administrative capacity and knowledge of administrative
work and office routine work.
(5) In respect of remarks in para-(x), I have disposed total
3317 (834+2483) civil as well as criminal cases during 8
my tenure. It is not easy to do so without my good attitude
and also without the co-operation of Bar and Public. My
relation with public and Bar is cordial. Further Bar
Association has no complaint against me.
(6) With reference to remarks in para-5(xi). I submit that C
some of the staff members including Registrar, criminal
clerk and senior clerk were mischievous and tried to
hamper administrative works. I complained against the
criminal clerk and Registrar and account clerk to the
District Jude in writing. Some of the staff members were D
impolite and uncontrollable and did not maintain the
dignity of a lady Judge. I have not threatened them in the
name of District Judge but most of the male staff
members from Junagadh and working in Kodinar Court,
they threatened me in the name of District Judge. Those E
members of the staff are already transfeffed from this
station and senior clerk Mr. M.H. Tanna, was convicted
for offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal
Code. So at present relationship between the presiding
officer and staff members are quite good and F
administrative work runs smoothly. I have every respect
for my District Judge and never shown any disregard for
him. During my tenure District Judge Shree B. U. Joshi
Saheb and Shree R. D. Kothari Saheb has periodically
visited my court and I behaved politely with them and G
have not shown disregard for them so as superior officer
naturally. District Judge Saheb can enter in my Chamber
during the visit. Further I have never been instructed by
my superior officers in any occasion during their visit for
any untoward incident.
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A Further I assure I will try to do my level best to comply
the suggestions for improvement as per your Honours
desire.
Thanking you,
B Yours Faithfully,
(Miss J.C. Buddhbhatti)
Principal Civil Judge and
J.M. F. C. Kodinar."
c 9. Then followed the termination of the service of the
respondent vide a notification No.CJM/1020041340/D (Part)
dated 14.12.2007. The termination letter reads as follows:-
"GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT
LEGAL DEPARTMENT
D Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar
Dated : 14th December, 2007
NOT/FICA TION NO. CJM/1020041340/D (Part)
Miss J.C. Buddhabhati, Principal Judge and JMFC,
Kodinar was appointed in cadre of Civil Judge (JD) by
E
this department Notification No. CJM-102004-340-D
(Part) dated 2. 3. 2005 on probation for two years.
The Hon'ble High Court, on the strength of material on
record relating to period of probation of Miss J.C.
F Buddhabhati, Civil Judge and JMFC, has found that her
performance is not good and satisfactory and that she is
not suitable for the post she holds, and therefore
recommended to terminate her probation period
immediately and she should not be continued to officiate
G for long term.
The Government of Gujarat accordingly accepts the
recommendation of Hon'ble High Court and terminates
appointment on probation period of Miss J.c.
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 409
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
Buddhabhatti, Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Kodinar A
with immediate effect.
By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.
(V. K. PUJARA)
Deputy Secretary to Government B
Legal Department"
10. The respondent was naturally shocked to receive this
order, and made a representation on this termination letter on
4.1.2008, in which she pointed out that if she was given an
opportunity of being heard, she could have clarified the position C
with respect to whatever material that was there on record,
relating to her probation period, and on the basis of which her
performance was held not to be good and satisfactory. As far
as her merit is concerned, she submitted that during her tenure
she had rendered 271 judgments in civil matters, and 523 D
judgments in criminal cases. She was one of the very few
candidates who were given independent postings at the
beginning of their career. She pointed out that as per the norms
of disposal, an average judicial officer holding an independent
charge was supposed to decide six civil matters and eight E
criminal matters in a month, and her disposal was far more than
the required average. Her performance was rated as very good
for the period from 7.4.2006 till 31.12.2006, and also during
the year 2007. She added that to the best of her information
115 Judges were appointed during her time which included F
some 80 Judges of her batch, and none of them had given as
many judgments as she had, both on civil as well as on criminal
side. She further stated that as per her information only 25 of
her judgments were carried in appeal to the appellate court, and
one up to the High Court which got confirmed.
G
11. The respondent thereafter pointed out that as Principal
Civil Judge and JMFC, she was supposed to conduct some
Miscellaneous cases (such as concerning liquor prohibition)
alongwith civil and criminal matters. When she joined as a
Judge, some 835 Misc. cases were pending in her court, out H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 11 S.C.R.·
A of which she disposed of 613 cases in the year 2007. She
pointed out in her representation that because of her industry
and integrity, some of her subordinate staff members who were
otherwise dishonest, started behaving in an uncouth, uncivilized
and non-chivalrous manner. She was therefore, constrained to
B record in her letters dated 7.9.2006 and 30.9.2006 to the then
District Judge of Junagadh, Mr. B.U. Joshi, with respect to the
misconduct of Mr. D.R. Weghela, clerk in charge of criminal
matters, and C.O C. Mr. R. R. Sewak. She had also given an
oral complaint against another clerk, one Mr. M.H. Tanna, to the
c District Judge regarding his misconduct, since he had
demanded alcohol from an accused, and remained drunk while
he was on duty. She also recorded that Mr. Tanna threatened
her that she was on probation, and if she did not toe his line,
she would not be confirmed. She recorded that this very person
was an accused in another case under Section 302 of 1.P.C,
0
and at that time he was enlarged on bail, but subsequently had
come to be convicted by judgment and order dated 4.9.2006
passed by the Sessions Judge, Junagadh.
12. Thereafter, the respondent recorded in that letter, that
E she had reported to the then District Judge, Mr. B.U. Joshi that
despite her warning time and again, the above referred three
persons used to come in a drunken state to the court premises,
and used to threaten her by calling names in vulgar Gujarati
slang. She had given a written complaint, dated 3.2.2007,
F against Mr. R.R. Sevak and night watch-man Mr. V.B. Solanki,
to the District Judge who succeeded Mr. B.U. Joshi. In view of
her complaint, the said Mr. Solanki was transferred from the
post of night watchman, but still at night time he used to come
without her permission outside her residence in a drunken state
G along with some advocates. The advocates also used to send
their clients in a drunken state to her residence. Having been
made to face such hostility from a few members of the bar and
the criminal elements in the staff, she asked: 'In the face of such
hostile members of the bar and the criminal members (of the
H staff) can an unmarried woman be safe?' She had been given
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 411
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
no protection despite all these hardships, and yet she continued A
to do her best, but in return had been served with the order of
termination. She specifically stated that the vigilance officer of
the High Court Mr. B.U. Joshi, who was the earlier District Judge
of Junagadh, had protected and encouraged the staff members
against whom she had made complaints, and had therefore. B
made adverse remarks in the year 2006. In any case, she
pointed out that those adverse remarks were contrary to the
material on record.
13. By the time of sending of this reply, the respondent had C
come to know that the officer conducting the inquiry, had given
credence to an allegation of her being involved with one Mr.
N.P. Thakkar, who was also a trainee Judge alongwith her at
Rajkot. Hence, by way of caution, sensing that the action
against her had perhaps been taken due to those allegations,
she explained her position in that behalf. She accepted that D
sometimes she did discuss legal problems with her senior
judges and co-trainee judges like Mr. Thakker. Sometimes S!JCh
discussions lasted for some longer time, but that was all. After
her joining as Civil Judge, at Kodinar she had never met Mr.
Thakker, who was posted as the Civil Judge and JMFC, at E
Jetpur. Unfortunately, it so happened that the wife of Mr.
Thakker committed suicide on 1.1.2007, and her mother lodged
an F.l.R at Jetpur against Mr. Thakker, for the offences under
Section 498 A, 306, 114 of l.P.C read with Section 3 & 7 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In that F.l.R, a doubt was F
raised regarding the involvement of Mr. Thakker with another
woman. The name of the respondent was not mentioned therein
but the local daily newspapers of Saurashtra blamed the
respondent for the incident, and damaged her reputation, as if
she was responsible for that incident. Thereafter, the respondent G
specifically stated in her reply that Vigilance Officer had made
a one-sided report, and had not heard her, as well as majority
of the members of the bar, regarding the allegations against
her. It is on the basis of such a prejudiced report that her
probation period was being terminated. H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A 14. In her letter the respondent specifically asserted as
follows and it is relevant to quote:-
"/ have proved my mettle and potential in the face
of hostile staff and some members of the Bar, and in the
B
face of hostile male dominant society, and in the face of
dishonest yellow journalism."
The respondent therefore, requested that her case be reviewed,
and sought reinstatement with continuity, backwages, and
consequential benefits.
c
15. The aforesaid representation was however not
considered, and that led her to file a Writ Petition in the High
Court. The appellants filed a reply and vigorously contested the
Writ Petition. The High Court on the judicial side however held
D that the termination of the respondent was in breach of Article
311, inasmuch as she was not informed of the charges against
her, nor was she given the opportunity of being heard in respect
thereof. The Court held that, this was not a case of termination
simpficiter of a probationary officer, and therefore, set-aside the
E termination of her services, and directed her reinstatement with
backwages. It is this order which is under challenge in the
present matter. Mr. Preetesh Kapur, learned counsel has
appeared for the appellants, and Mr. R.P. Bhatt learned senior
counsel has appeared for the respondent.
F Consideration of the material on record:-
16. When we go through the record, one thing is clear that
the High Court administration first conducted a discreet inquiry
against the respondent, and thereafter another inquiry called as
G preliminary inquiry. The initial discreet inquiry was conducted
by the then District Judge, Junagadh, Mr. Kothari, whereas the
subsequent inquiry, was conducted by Mr. B.U. Joshi, who had
by that time become the then Registrar (Vigilance). It is material
to note that _same Mr. B.U. Joshi was the District Judge when
H the respondent made her initial complaints about the behaviour
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 413
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATII [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
of her subordinate staff that they were not working properly, and A
Mr. Joshi had not taken any action on those complaints. Instead,
he made certain adverse remarks on her personal
characteristics with respect to politeness and courtesy that it
required improvement. Therefore, in view of his association with
the controversy at an earlier stage as the District Judge, the B
minimum that was expected of Mr. B.U. Joshi was to recuse
himself from the preliminary inquiry. The impugned judgment
has, therefore. characterized him, in para 12 .16 thereof, as
being prejudiced even before the initiation of the preliminary
inquiry. It is the report of this preliminary inquiry which has led c
to the termination of the probation period of the respondent as
unsatisfactory. It is also material to note that during this
preliminary inquiry, Mr. B.U Joshi, in his capacity as the
Registrar (Vigilance), did not call those persons to give
evidence who had given statements in favour of the respondent D
during the discreet inquiry. This included her peon and senior
staff members. What is quite relevant to note is that the earlier
mentioned Mr. Sewak, who did not get along with the
respondent, had given a statement in support of her during the
course of the discreet inquiry. Not less than 38 advocates had E
given a statement in her favour, and pointed out that her
performance was in fact good, and also that there were no
behavioral problems with respect to her functioning. If this
information was available to Mr. B.U. Joshi as the Registrar
(Vigilance), through the report of the discreet inquiry, which was
conducted by the then District Judge Mr. Kothari, it was F
expected of him to verify that material by calling the persons
concerned, and recording their statements. The impugned
judgment has noted this one-sided approach of the Registrar
(Vigilance), and called it as biased. The preliminary inquiry laid
an emphasis on the fact that the respondent used to talk to the G
aforementioned Mr. Thakker on telephone, and that those talks
had crossed the prescribed limit. The impugned judgment
records that it is not uncommon for a colleague to talk to
another colleague, and merely because one colleague is male
and the other is female, it is no reason to suspect that H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 11 S.C.R. ·-
A permissible lines had been crossed and then to draw an
adverse inference against the character of the lady Judge.
17. What is most significant to note is that the inquiry report,
has referred to the suicide by the wife of Mr. Thakker, and it
contains certain observations involving the respondent as
8
follows:-
"Thereafter, it was respectfully submitted by the Registrar
(Inspection) to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the
Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Kapadia that, in connection with
C the suicide committed by Smt. Archana wlo Mr. N.P.
Thakker, Addi. Civil Judge & JMFC, Jetpur, the mother
of the deceased has lodged the complaint bearing C.R.
No.119107 with Jetpur City Police Station against Mr. N.P.
Thakker and his family members. It is alleged in the said
D complaint that due to i//icit relations between Mr. N.P.
Thakkar and Ms. JC Buddhabhatti Smt. Archana has
committed suicide."
18. What is rather disturbing is that no such material was
E produced before the High Court involving the name of the
respondent. On the other hand, Shri R.P. Bhatt, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent, has drawn our attention
to the deposition of the mother of the deceased in the Criminal
Case concerning the death of the wife of Mr. N.P. Thakker. She
F has not named the respondent therein.
19. The question, therefore, comes for consideration, as
stated earlier, as to whether this is a case of termination
simpliciter of the services of a probationer on account of her
unsuitability for the post that she was holding, or whether it is a
G termination of her services after holding an inquiry behind her
back, and without giving her an opportunity to defend.
20. The legal position in this behalf has evolved over the
years, and there are numerous judgments which govern this
H kind of a situation in the li~ht of Article 311 (2) of the
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 415
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATII [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
Constitution, which have been pronounced from time to time A
over the years. The learned counsel for the appellants as well
as for the respondent have drawn our attention to the relevant
judgments holding the field, and we shall refer to the salient
ones amongst them.
B
Legal submissions of behalf of the appellants:-
21. The principal submission on behalf of the appellants
has been that this is a case of termination simpliciter of the
services of a probationer during the extended period of
probation, without any stigma attached, and therefore, the High C
Court, on the judicial side, had no reason to interfere. The initial
discreet inquiry, and the subsequent preliminary inquiry were
both for the purpose of ascertaining the suitability of the
respondent, and not for establishing any allegations against her.
If that is so, they submit, that there was no reason for the High D
Court on the judicial side to interfere in the decision arrived at
by the High Court administration, to discontinue the services
of the respondent on the ground of unsuitability. The appellants
thus relied upon a judgment of this Court in Oswal Pressure Die
Casting Industry v. Presiding Officer reported in 1998 (3) SCC E
225. In that matter, it was held that once it was found that the
assessment made by the employer was supported by some
material and was not mala-fide, it was not proper for the High
Court to substitute its satisfaction in place of that of the ·
employer. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in F
Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries
Corporation Ltd. reported in 1999 (2) SCC 21, which is a case
wherein it is held that if a regular departmental inquiry is started,
a charge memo is issued, reply obtained, and an inquiry officer
is appointed, and thereafter also if the inquiry is dropped and G
a simple notice of termination is issued, even than the action
will not be held to be punitive.
22. Lastly, the judgment of this Court in High Court of
Judicature at Bombay v. Sashikant S. Patil and Anr. reported
in AIR 2000 SC 22 (equivalent to 2000 (1) SCC 416), was H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A relied on, wl1ere this Court has held that when a constitutional
function was exercised on the administrative side of the High
Court, any judicial review thereof, should be made with great
care and circumspection, and confining strictly to the
parameters set by this Court in the decisions holding the field.
B
Submissions of behalf of the respondent:-
23. The respondent relied upon the law laid down from
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India reported in AIR 1958
SC 36 onwards. In that case it was held by the constitution
C bench that if the Government has, by contract or under the rules,
the right to terminate the employment without going through the
procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal
or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may choose
to punish the servant, and if the termination of service is sought
D to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification, then it is a punishment, and the requirements
of Article 311 must be complied with.
24. The next judgment cited is one of three Judges of this
E Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra
reported in 1970 (2) sec 871 wherein it is observed as
follows:-
"5...... So far as we are aware no such rigid
. principle has ever been laid down by this court that one
F has only to look to the order and if it does not contain
any imputation of misconduct or words attaching a stigma
to the character or reputation of a Government Officer it
must be held to have been made in the ordinary course
of administrative routine and the court is debarred from
G looking at all the attendant circumstances to discover
whether the order had been made by way of
punishment ...... "
These judgments have been followed by a bench of seven
H Judges in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 417
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.J
in AIR 1974 SC 2192 (equivalent to 1974 (2) SCC 831), where A
this Court was concerned with the termination of the services
of a probationary judicial officer on the basis of a vigilance
inquiry, which was conducted by the State Government on the
request of the High Court. The Court held the termination to be
bad, and while doing so laid down the law in this behalf in no B
uncertain terms in paragraphs 63 to 66 (of the sec report)
which read as follows:- ·
"63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that
where the services of a probationer are terminated without C
saying anything more in the order of termination than that
the services are terminated it can never amount to a
punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case.
If a probationer is discharged on the ground of
misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without
a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable D
opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may
in a given case amount to removal from service within
the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution.
64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority E
concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the
work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is
suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules
governing a probationer in this respect the authority may
come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy F
for the job or for any temperamental or other object not
involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for
the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment
is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be
of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result G
in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases
the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply
discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a
chance to make good in other walks of life without a
stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the
H
other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and
if his services are terminated without following the
provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection. In
Gopi Kishore Prasad v. Union of lndia 1 it was said that if
the Government proceeded against the probationer in the
B direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty
or competence, his discharge would not have the effect
of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking the
easy course, the Government chose the more difficult
one of starting proceedings against him and branding
c him as a dishonest and incompetent officer.
65. The fact of holding an enquiry is not always
conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really
by way of punishment (see State of Orissa v. Ram
Narayan Das 2 ). If there is an enquiry the facts and
D circumstances of the case will be looked into in order to
find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance
(see Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab3). In R. C. Lacy v.
State of Bihar4 it was held that an order of reversion
passed following an enquiry into the conduct of the
E probationer in the circumstances of that case was in the
nature of preliminary inquiry to enable the Government
to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken. A
probationer whose terms of service provided that it could
be terminated without any notice and without any cause
F being assigned could not claim the protection of Article
311 (2) (see R. C. Banerjee v. Union of lndia 5 ). A
preliminary inquiry to satisfy that there was reason to
dispense.with the services of a temporary employee has
been held not to attract Article 311 (see Champaklal G.
G
1. AIR 1960 SC 689: (1960) 2 SCR 982: (1960) 1 Lab LJ 262
2. (1961) 1 SCR 606: AIR 1961 SC 177: (1961) 1 SCJ 209
3. (1963) 3 SCR 716: AIR 1963 SC 531: (1963) 2 SCJ 185
4. Civil Appeal No. 590 of 1962, decided on October 23, 1963
H 5. (1964) 2 SCR 135: AIR 1963 SC 1552: (1964) 1 SCJ 578
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 419
· JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
Shah v. Union of lndia6). On the other hand, a statement A
in the order of termination that the temporary servant is
undesirable has been held to import an element of
punishment (see Jagdish Mitter v. Union of lndia7).
66. If the facts and circumstances of the case 8
indicate that the substance of the order is that the
termination is by way of punishment then a probationer
is entitled to attract Article 311. The substance of the
order and not the form would be decisive. (see K.H.
Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra8)"
c
25. These propositions have been reiterated in a number
of judgments thereafter, and the counsel for the respondent
referred to Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India reported in 1984
(2) SCC 369, where this Court held that, the Court can go
behind the formal order of discharge to find out the real cause D
of action. In that matter, the order of discharge of the
probationer on the ground of unsuitability was actually based
upon the report/recommendation of the concerned authority
indicating commission of an alleged misconduct by the
probationer. The Court held that the order was punitive in E
nature, and in the absence of any proper inquiry it amounted
to violation to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India.
At the end of paragraph 13 of the judgment this Court
observed as follows:-
F
"13 ...... .. Even though the order of discharge may
be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the
noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant,
the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The
recommendation of the Director which is the basis or G
foundation for the order should be read along with the
6. (1964) 5 SCR 190: AIR 1964 SC 1854: (1964) 1 Lab LJ 752
7. AIR 1964 SC 449: (1964) 1 Lab LJ 418
8. 1971 Supp SCR 118: (1971) 1 sec 790 H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R
A order for the purpose of determining its true character. If
on reading the two together the Court reaches the
conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the
cause of the order and that but for that incident it would
not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order
B of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant
has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself as provided in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution."
26. The propositions in this behalf, as to what constitutes.
a motive, and what constitutes a foundation for the action were
C once again crystallized in the judgment of this Court in Chandra
Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2000 (5)
sec 152, where in paragraph 28 and 29 of the judgment of
this Court laid down the relevant propositions which are as
follows:-
D
"28. The important principles which are deducible
on the concept of "motive" and "foundation'; concerning
a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold
the post and his services can be terminated at any time
E during or at the end of the period of probation on account
of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the
determination of suitability of the probationer for the post
in question or for his further retention in service or for
confirmation, an inquiry is held ana it is on the basis of
F that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his
service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if
there are a/legations of misconduct and an inquiry is held
to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order
terminating the service is passed on the basis of that
inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the
G
inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability
of the employee for the post in question, but to find out
the truth of a/legations of misconduct against that
employee. In this situation, the order would be founded
on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of "motive".
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 421
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
29. "Motive" is the moving power which impels A
action for a definite result, or to put it differently, "motive"
is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act.
An order terminating the services of an employee is an
act done by the employer. What is that factor which
impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the B
factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post
held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If,
however, there were allegations of serious misconduct
against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held
behind his back to ascertain the truth of those a/legations c
and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order,
having regard to other circumstances, would be founded
on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be
true in the preliminary inquiry."
27. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of a Bench of D
three Judges of this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mahaveer
C. Singhvi reported in 2010 (8) sec 220, where a probationer
was discharged from his services. The findings were arrived
at against him behind his back as recorded in paragraph 46
of the judgment, and although the termination was claimed to E
be a termination simpliciter, the High Court had found that it
was a camouflage for the real intention of the petitioners. This
Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, following the law
laid down from time to time as aforesaid, and held that if a
finding against a probationer is arrived at behind his back on F
the basis of the inquiry conducted into the allegations made
against him, and if the S;ime formed the foundation of the order
of discharge, the same would be bad and liable to be set aside.
On the other hand if no inquiry was held or contemplated, and
the allegations were merely a motive for the passing of an order G
of discharge of a probationer without giving him a hearing, the
same would be valid. The facts of that case were held as not
falling under the latter category, and it is submitted that the
present case also does not fall under that category.
H.
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A Consideration of the legal submissions:-
28. Having gone through the salient judgments on the issue
in hand, one thing which emerges very clearly is that, if it is a
case of deciding the suitability of a probationer, and for that
limited purpose any inquiry is conducted, the same cannot be
8
faulted as such. However, if during the course of such an inquiry
any allegations are made against the person concerned, which
result into a stigma, he ought to be afforded the minimum
protection which is contemplated under Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution of India even though he may be a probationer. The
C protection is very limited viz. to inform the person concerned
about the charges against him, and to give him a reasonable
opportunity of being heard. Having noted the facts as they have
emerged on the record, can the preliminary inquiry conducted
against the respondent in the present case be said to be an
D innocent one only to assess her suitability? Is it not apparent
that certain aspersions were cast on the character of the
respondent during the course of the conduct of this inquiry on
her suitability? If that was so, was it not expected from a High
judicial institution like the High Court to afford her the minimum
E opportunity to defend herself? In Shamsher Singh (supra) this
Court has observed that the Subordinate Judges are under the
care and custody of the High Court. This custody and care
certainly requires the High Court to afford the Subordinate
Judges the minimum opportunity which is otherwise available
F to every other civil servant under Article 311 (2).
29. Having noted the aforesaid legal position, we must pay
heed to the lament of this Court as expressed in· the case of
/shwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana and
G Ors. reported in 1988 (3) SCC 370. In that matter, the
probationary service of an Additional District and Sessions
Judge was terminated on the basis of High Court's conclusion
regarding suitability. This Court, however, found that the action
taken against the appellant was basically because of some
grievances made by the members of the Bar, and there was
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 423
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
no justifiable material available on the record of the Court. The A
members of the Bar Association had passed a resolution
condemning him on a trifling matter, as observed by this court.
This Court observed in the end -of paragraph 7 in following
words:-
8
"7•....... If the members of the Bar Association pass
resolution against the presiding officers working in
subordinate courts without there being any justifiable
cause it would be difficult for judicial officers to perform
their judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities C
in an objective and unbiased manner. We are distressed
to find that the High Court instead of protecting the
appellant took this incident into consideration in
assessing the appellant's' work and conduct."
In this matter, the Bar Association passed a resolution against D
the Additional Sessions Judge for not detaining a witness on
the request of the counsel for the party to enable him to bring
summons for effecting serilice on him, without there being any
requisition from the court of the Chief Judicial Magisjrate. This
Court noted that if such resolutions are passed, it will be difficult E
for the judicial officers to perform their function in an objective
and unbiased manner. This Court was constrained to observe
that the High Court had failed to protect the appellant. What had
distressed this Court was that the High Court, instead of
protecting the appellant had taken into account the unjustified F
allegation made by the bar, while assessing the work and
conduct leading to discontinuation of his probation services.
The same appears to be the situation in the present case.
30. Shashikant Patil (supra) was altogether a different
case. That was a matter where a full-fledged departmental G
inquiry was conducted against the respondent. It is true that the
inquiry report had exonerated the respondent, and the
disciplinary committee had reversed that decision. The High
Court on the judicial side had interfered with the decision of the
disciplinary committee. It is this decision of the High Court which H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A came to be upturned in this case, and it was in this context that
this Court observed: "when such a constitutional function was
exercised by the administrative side of the High Court, any
judicial review thereon should have been made not only with
great care and circumspection, but confining strictly to the
s parameters set by this Court." The present case can not be
said to be one where the High Court on judicial side has erred
as in Shashikant Patil (supra) in exercising its powers as
claimed by the appellants.
31. As held by this Court time and again, it is the
C responsibility of the High Court to protect honest judicial
officers. As the facts in this case indicate, apart from the fact
that no opportunity was afforded to the respondent, even the
material placed on record did not establish any such aspect
which would lead to a conclusion of unsuitability. The disposal
D of the respondent was very good, and the complaints by the
subordinate staff were clearly motivated. There was no
involvement of the respondent in the suicide by the wife of Shri
N.P. Thakkar, and all that the High Court administration could
lay hand on was the telephonic conversations which the
E respondent had with Mr. Thakkar. The inference of unsuitability
drawn by the High Court administration ·was therefore totally
uncalled for. The impugned judgment setting aside the
termination order dated 14th December 2007 issued on the
ground of unsuitability is, therefore, fully justified.
F
32. One of the submissions which was advanced on behalf
of the appellants was that, in such a situation the High Court,
on its judicial side, ought to have given a further opportunity to
the High Court administration to conduct a further inquiry against
G the respondent. In our view, keeping in mind the material on
re,cord, such a further exercise was not called for, and in any
case certainly no more. The services of the respondent have
---been terminated way back in 2007. Six long years have gone
• thereafter, and for no fault of hers, the respondent has suffered.
Directing any further inquiry would add salt to the injury. The
H
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT v. 425
JAYSHREE CHAMANLAL BUDDHBHATTI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
conclusion arrived at by the High Court administration that the A
performance of the respondent was not good and satisfactory,
and that she was not suitable for the post she was holding was
on the face of it for extraneous reasons. Consequently with a
view to do complete justice, the Respondent will have to be held
as having completed her probation satisfactorily, and that she B
was entitled to continue in the post that she was holding.
33. We may however, note that in spite of this position, Mr.
R.P. Bhatt, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent
has stated that though the decision of the High Court C
administration has seriously affected her personal life, the
respondent is basically interested in vindicating her position.
He has, therefore, fairly made a statement, on instructions, that
the respondent is confining her prayer for backwages to the
period subsequent to her being vindicated by the judgment of
the High Court, dated 15.5.2009 pronouncing that the D
termination of her services was unjustified, and bad in law.
34. Before we conclude, we must once again reflect on the
facts that have emerged in the present case. As noted earlier,
the respondent was a candidate who had obtained a high rank E
in the selection for the judicial service, and was given an
independent posting in a rural area, where she was living all
alone. Her disposal of cases had been very good to say the
least. The complaints made by her, regarding the misbehaviour
of the staff, and the harassment to her by a section of the bar, F
were not heeded by the then District Judge, leave aside making
an attempt to understand the difficulties faced by her. Instead,
certain unjustified adverse remarks were made against her.
Subsequently, the then District Judge conducted the
preliminary inquiry against her, in his capacity as the vigilance G
officer, wherein without any justification he tried to connect her
with the death of the wife of another judicial officer. It is the duty
of the District Judge and also of the High Court to protect the
judicial officers against unjustified allegations. However, what
we find in the present case is that instead of doing the same,
H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 11 S.C.R.
A an investigation was conducted against the respondent without
affording her any opportunity, though it contained allegations
against her character, and the investigation was sought to be
justified as determination of her suitability for the post which she
was holding. We would like to take this opportunity to
B emphasise that the High Courts must see to it that the hostile
work environment for junior judicial officers, particularly the lady
officers, is eliminated. This is necessary to encourage the
young officers to put in good judicial work without fear or favour.
We are constrained to say that in the prese·nt case the High
c Court administration has clearly failed in this behalf. In the
circumstances, we have no. reason to interfere in the judgment
and order of High Court and we confirm the same.
35. Hence, we pass the following order:-
D J(i) The appeal is dismissed without any order as to the
costs.
(ii) The respondent is held to have completed her
probation satisfactorily. The appellants are directed to
reinstate the respondent in her service with continuity and
E
all consequential benefits. She will be entitled to her
seniority as if she was never terminated from her service.
The order of reinstatement and posting will be issued within
four weeks from today.
F (iii) The respondent will be entitled to the backwages.
However, the backwages payable to her are restricted to
the period subsequent to the decision of the High Court
dated 15.5.2009. She will be given a fitment in salary on
the basis of her continuity in services, and the backwages
G will be calculated and paid accordingly.
(iv) We direct the appellants to make the fitment in salary
and calculate and pay the backwages within 8 weeks
hereafter.
H K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Article 311"Sign in to search