Supreme Court of India
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASversusR. PERACHI & ORS.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 699
- Decided
- 19 September 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M PANCHAL
Holding
A transfer of a subordinate judicial officer on administrative grounds, even if it affects promotion prospects, is a valid incident of service when made by the Chief Justice authorized by a Full Court resolution, and is not punishable.
Summary
The respondent, a Sheristadar in the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Ministerial Service, was transferred from Thoothukudi to Ramanathapuram on administrative grounds following a vigilance report and a district judge’s opinion that his retention was undesirable. He later claimed the transfer was punitive because it barred him from promotion to Personal Assistant to the District Judge in Thoothukudi, and challenged the High Court’s order that set aside the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the transfer was an incident of service, authorized by a Full Court resolution that vested the Chief Justice with jurisdiction over vigilance matters, and that it was not punitive nor made by an incompetent authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and allowed the appeal. The Court also clarified that an employee has a right to be considered for promotion, not an absolute right to promotion, and that the High Court’s control under Article 235 includes authority to transfer subordinate staff.
Issues considered
- The Chief Justice of a High Court can unilaterally transfer a subordinate judicial officer on administrative grounds without a Full Court or committee decision.
- Whether a transfer that adversely affects an employee's promotion prospects is punitive and therefore invalid.
- Whether the transfer was made by a competent authority under the High Court's control under Article 235 of the Constitution.
- Whether an employee has a substantive right to promotion or merely a right to be considered for promotion.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 216, s. Article 229, s. Article 235
- Fundamental Rules of Tamil Nadu Governments. Rule 14(A)
- Tamil Nadu Judicial Ministerial Service Ruless. Rule 39
Subjects
Transfer of government employeeAdministrative ground transferHigh Court control under Article 235Punitive transferRight to promotionJudicial service discipline
Judgment
[2011] 12 S.C.R. 661
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT A
MADRAS
v.
R. PERACHI & ORS.
(Civil appeal No. 7936 of 2011)
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011 B
[J.M. PANCHAL AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]
Service law:
c
State Judicial Ministerial Service - Transfer of employee
in the subordinate judiciary on administrative grounds -
Decision of Chief Justice to transfer - On facts, respondent
working as Sheristadar in the State Judicial Ministerial
Service was transferred outside the District by the Chief
0
Justice - Writ petition - High Court held that the Chief Justice
had no power to transfer the respondent unilaterally and the
transfer was punitive and set aside the transfer because it
would affect his promotion as P.A., directing the High Court
to restore him in his District and confer him the post of P.A. - E
On appeal, held: Action of transfer against the respondent was
on the basis of the report of the Registrar {Vigilance) -
Relevant material clearly show that the Full Court had passed
a resolution under which the subject. of vigilance enquiries was
retained with the Chief Justice - District Judge had opined that
retention of the respondent in his district was undesirable from F
the administration point of view - More so, the respondent did
not dispute the power of the High Court to transfer him outside
the district, nor the Division Bench interfered on that ground
- Respondent himself clearly stated in his affidavit that there
was no malafide exercise in his transfer - Transfer is an G
incident of service - One cannot make grievance if transfer
is made on administrative grounds, without attaching any
stigma - Pay, position and seniority of the respondent was
not affected by the transfer, and thus, the transfer was not
661 H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 12 S.C.R.
A punitive merely because his promotional chances got affected
due to the transfer - There is no right of promotion available
to an employee - He has a right to be considered for
promotion - Furthermore, the integrity of the officers
functioning in the administration is of utmost importance to
8 retain the confidence of the litigants in the fairness of the
judicial system - If there is any complaint in this behalf, the
Chief Justice is expected to act on behalf of the High Court
to see to it that the stream of justice does not get polluted at
any level - Thus, the decision of Chief Justice to transfer
C respondent outside that district could not be faulted - Order
passed by the High Court is set aside.
Transfer of employee in the subordinate judiciary on
administrative grounds - Passing of judicial orders by the
High Courts - Scope of - Held: Is limited - Transfer is an
D incident of service - One cannot make grievance if transfer
is made on administrative grounds, without attaching any
stigma.
Constitution of India; 1950 - Control of the High Court
E over the subordinate courts under - Held: Includes general
superintendence of the working of the subordinate courts and
their staff, since their appeals against the orders of the District
Judges lie to the High Court - Word control in Article 235 is
used in the comprehensive sense - It includes the control and
1
F superintendence of the High Court over the subordinate
' courts and the persons manning them both on the judicial and
administrative side - Control over the subordinate courts
vests in the High Court as a whole - However, it does not
mean that a Full Court cannot authorize the Chief Justice in
G respect of any matter whatsoever.
Judicial Discipline - Judges deciding a subsequent case
· overlooking judgment of a co-ordinate Bench - Propriety of
- Held: Judges are bound by the earlier decision - They are
not expected to take a different view from point of view of
-l judicial discipline.
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 663
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI
First respondent was working as Sheristadar in the A
State Judicial Ministerial Service and was holding the
additional charge of the post of P.A. to the District Judge
at place 'P'. The first respondent along with two head
clerk were transferred outside the District by the order
issued by the appellant on behalf of the High Court on 8
administrative grounds. The two head clerks filed writ
petitions but the same were dismissed. The first
respondent did not challenge his transfer at that time and
joined the office at District 'R'. Thereafter, he came to
know that the post of P.A. to District Judge 'T' was being C
filled and he made a representation for consideration for
the said post. The first respondent learnt that he was not
considered for the post because he was alreaEly
transferred outside the District. Aggrieved, the first
respondent filed a Writ Petition; The Division Bench of the
High Court set aside the transfer of the first respondent 0
from District 'T' to District 'R' and directed the High Court
to restore him in District 'T' with his seniority and confer
on him the post of P.A. to the District Judge at place 'T'.
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal.
The appellant contended that the decision of the
Division Bench was erroneous on both the grounds on
which the Division Bench decided against the. appellant
viz. that the transfer was punitive and that it was not
passed by a competent authority. F
. Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The action of transfer against the first
respondent was on the basis of. the report of the.
Registrar (Vigilance). Besides, the District Judge had also· G
opined that retention of the appellant in his district was
undesirable from the point of view of administration,
pending enquiry. Thus, it involved inter-district transfer.
I
The respondent No.1 did not dispute the power of the
High Court to transfer him outside the district, nor did the H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A Division Bench interfered therein on that ground. This is
apart from the fact that transfer is an incident of service,
and one cannot make a grievance if a transfer is made
on the administrative grounds, and without attaching any
stigma which was so done in the Instant case. [Para 21)
B [679-G-H; 670-A-B]
N.K Singh vs. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 423: 1994
(2) Suppl. SCR 772; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. S.S.
Kourav, AIR 1995 SC 1056: 1995 (1) SCR 482; Airports
Authority of India vs. Rajeev Ratan Pandey 2009 (8) SCC
C 337: 2009 (13) SCR 343 - referred to
2.1 The first ground on which the Division Bench of
the High Court interfered with the order of transfer was
that the transfer order was passed by the then Chief
o Justice initially, and he did not have the competence
therefore. The appellant produced the relevant material
before this Court which clearly shows that the Full Court
had passed a resolution under which. the subject of
vigilance enquiries was retained with the Chief Justice.
-
s:: It is, therefore, difficult to accept the view of the Division
Bench that the Chief Justice unilaterally transferred the
appellant outside the district, and the decision ought to
have been taken either by the Full Court or a Committee
appointed ·by the Full Court. [Para 26) [682-F-G; 683-F-H]
F 2.2 The control of the High Court over the
subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution
includes general superintendence of the working of the
subordinate courts and their staff, since their appeals
against the orders of the District Judges lie to the High
G Court. The word control referred to in Article 235 of the
Constitution has been used in the comprehensive sense
and Includes the control and superintendence of the High
Court over the subordinate courts and the persons
manning them both on the judicial and administrative
H side'. This control over the subordinate courts vests in
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 665
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI
the High Court as a whole. However, the same does not A
mean that a Full Court cannot authorize the Chief Justice
in respect of any matter whatsoever. [Para 26) [682-H;
683-A·C]
2.3 The Full Court of the Madras High Court had 8
passed a resolution way back in the year 1993 to retain
the subject of "Vigilance Cell" with the Chief Justice.
Therefore, it was fully within the authority of the then
Chief Justice to take the decision to transfer the appellant
outside district 'T'. The transfer was particularly C
necessary in view of the complaint that was pending
against him. The Division Bench observed that the
complaint was an anonymous one. Even so, the same
had been looked into by the Vigilance Cell, and the
District Judge had reported that departmental enquiries
were pending against the appellant and the other D
employees against whom the complaint had been made.
In view of all these factors, the Chief Justice had to take
the necessary decision. [Para 26) [683-D-G]
RM. Gurjar Vs. High Court of Gujarat AIR 1992 SC E
2000: 1992 (3) SCR 775; Gauhati High Court Vs. Ku/adhar
Phukan 2002 (4) SCC 524; High Court of Rajasthan Vs. P.P.
Singh & Anr. 2003 (4} sec 23 - relied on.
3.1 The other ground on which the Division Bench
interfered with the transfer order is that according to the F
Division Bench, but for this transfer order there was no
other impediment for the District Judge to promote the
respondent No.1. The Division Bench was of the view
that the first respondent had lost the opportunity of
getting promoted to the post of P.A. to the District Judge G
on account of this transfer, and therefore, the same was
punitive. The Bench ought to have noted that the transfer
is an incident of service, and the first respondent himself
had clearly stated in his affidavit in support of the petition
that there was no malafide exercise in the present H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A transfer. The transfer was purely on the administrative
ground in view of the pending complaint and
departmental enquiry against first respondent and other
employees, with respect to their integrity. When a
complaint against the integrity of an employee is being
B investigated, very often he is transferred outside the
concerned unit. That is desirable from the point of view
of the administration as well as that of the employee. In
the circumstances the decision of the then Chief Justice
to transfer him outside that district could not be faulted.
C [Para 27] [684-A-E]
3.2 There is no right of promotion available to an
employee. He has a right to be considered for promotion
which has been held to be a fundamental right. However,
D though a right to be considered for promotion is a
condition of service, mere chance of promotion is not.
[Para 28] [684-G]
S.B. Bhattacf)arjee Vs. S.D. Majumdar 2007 (10) SCC
513: 2007 (6) SCR 743; Mohd. Shujat Ali Vs. Union of India
E AIR 1974 SC 1631: 1975 (1) SCR 449 - referred to
3.3 The fact that the first respondent could not be
considered for promotion to the post of P.A. in district 'T'
was undoubtedly the consequence of this transfer
F outside that district. However, that itself cannot make his
transfer a punitive one. The then Registrar General rightly
stated in her affidavit before the High Court that the first
respondent would be retaining his original seniority
though he was transferred in another district. He was in
the cadre of Sheristadar and he continued in that cadre
G in district 'R' after he was transferred to that district. In
district 'T', he was officiating as P.A to the District Judge
since that post was vacant, but his substantive post was
that of Sheristadar. The officiating work did not create
any right in him to be continued in the post of P.A. That
H was not also his case, and that is how he had sought to
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 667
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI
be empanelled for being considered for the promotion to A
the post of P.A, though in district 'T'. Since the first
respondent was no longer in district 'T', obviously he
. could not be included in the panel prepared for
consideration for the post of P.A. in that district. [Para 29]
[684-H; 685-A-C] B
3.4 In the instant case, the pay, position and seniority
of the first respondent was not affected by the impugned
transfer, and therefore, the same could not be said to be
punitive merely because his promotional chances got C
affected due to the transfer. Thus, there was no question
of providing him any opportunity of hearing at that stage
before effecting the transfer, and the order of transfer
could not be faulted on that count as well. [Para 30] [685-
H; 686-A-B]
D
Paresh Chandra Nandi Vs. Controller of Stores, N. F.
Railway AIR 1971 SC 359 - referred to.
3.5 Noting that the respondent No. 1 was transferred
on account of an anonymous complaint, the Division E
Bench had referred to a few judgments wherein this
Court has emphasized the responsibility of the Higher
Judiciary to guard the judicial officers in the Subordinate
Courts against unjustified complaints. In the instant case,
a Sheristadar was transferred on receiving a complaint,
although an anonymous one, but against whom a
F
departmental inquiry is pending. He was transferred to
another district though retaining him in the same cadre
with the same pay as well as his seniority. Such an action
was fully justified and within the authority of the High
Court. No observations were made against him, nor was G
any sti~ma attached. The reliance on the said three
judgments to interfere in such an order clearly shows a
non-application of mind by the Division Bench to the
problem which the High Court Administration was faced
with, and which was being attended in accordance with H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R
A the relevant rules. [Paras 31, 32] [686-C-H; 687-A-B]
/shwar Chand Jain Vs. High Court Punjab and Haryana
1988 (3) SCC 370: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 396; K.P. Tiwari Vs.
State of M.P. 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 540:1993 ( 3) Suppl. SCR
497; Ramesh Chander Singh Vs. High Court Allahabad 2007
8
(4) SCC 247: 2007 (3) SCR 198 - referred to.
4. The Division Bench also erred in ignoring that the
first respondent had been transferred under a common
order alongwith two other employees-Head Clerks. The
C writ petitions filed by them had been dismissed. Besides,
a judgment of a co-ordinate bench in A.K. Vasudevan's
case was cited before the Division Bench wherein the
facts were almost identical. It was therefore, not expected
of the Division Bench to take a different view from the
D point of view of judicial discipline. [Para 33] [687-F-H]
Sri Venkateswara Rice Ginn;,1g & Groundnut Oil Mill Vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 51: 1972 (1) SCR 346
- relied on.
E The Registrar of High Court of Madras Vs. Vasudevan,
A.K. 1996 (1) MLJ 153 - referred to.
5. It cannot be ignored that the integrity of the officers
functioning in the administration is of utmost importance
F to retain the confidence of the litigants in the fairness of
the judicial system. If there is any complaint in this behalf,
the Chief Justice is expected to act on behalf of the High
Court to see to it that the stream of justice does not get
polluted at any level. The decisions on the judicial side
G such as the one in the instant case create unnecessary
difficulties for the High Court Administration. (Para 34]
(688-A-D]
High Court Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. Ramesh Chand
Pa/iwa/ (1998) 3 SCC 72: 1998 (1) SCR 961- relied on.
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 669
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L
6. The impugned judgment and order are wholly A
unsustainable, and in complete disregard of the law laid
down by this Court. The judgment and order dated
passed by the High Court is set-aside. [Para 35) (689-C-
D]
B
Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana 1997 (6) SCC 538;
High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shirishkumar
Rangrao Patil, (1997) 6 SCC 339: 1997 (3) SCR 1131 Centre
for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India 2005 (8) SCC
202: 2005 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 77 - referred to
c
Case Law Reference:
1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 772 Referred to Para 22
1995 (1) SCR 482 Referred to Para 23
2009 (13) SCR 343 Referred to Para 23 D
1992 (3) SCR 775 Relied on Para 26
2002 (4) sc_c 524 Relied on Para 2.6
2003 (4) sec 239 Relied on Para 26 E
AIR 1971 SC 359 Referred to Para 30
2007 (6) SCR 743 Referred to Para 28
1975 (1) SCR 449 Referred to Para 28
F
AIR 1971 SC 359 Referred to Para 30
1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 396 Refered to Para 31
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 497 Referred to Para 31
2007 (3) SCR 198 Referred to Para 31 G
1972 (1) SCR 346 Relied on Para.33
1998 (1) SCR 961 Relied on Para 34
1997 (6) sec 538 Referred to Para 15
H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A 1997 (3) SCR 1131 Referred to Para 16
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 77 Referred to Para 17
1996 (1) MLJ 153 Referred to Para 17, 18,
33
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7936 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 28.08.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras, Madurai bench in W.P. (MD)
C No. 7121 of 2007.
V. Balachandran for the Appellant.
T.R.B. Siva Kumar, K.V. Vijayakumar for the Respondents.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H.L. GOKHALE, J. 1. Leave Granted.
2. This-appeal by Special Leave seeks to challenge the
judgment and order dated 28.08.2008 passed by a Division
E Bench of the Madras High Court (at Madurai Bench) in W.P.
(MD) No.7121/2007. The Division Bench has.allowed the writ
petition filed by the first respondent who is working as a
Sheristadar in the District Judicial Service in the State of Tamil
Nadu.
F
3. The Division Bench by its impugned judgement and
order has quashed and set-aside the transfer of the first
respondent from District Thoothukudi to District
Ramanathapuram, and directed the High Court to restore him
G in District Tho.othukudi with his seniority, and confer on him the
post of Personal Assistant (P.A.) to the District Judge,
Thoothukudi.
Facts leadings to this appeal are as follows ·
H 4. The first respondent joined the Tamil Nadu Judicial
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 671
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
Ministerial Service as a Typist on 11.4.1979, and was initially A
posted in the Court of Judicial Magistrate II Class at Kovilpatti
in District Thoothukudi (formerly known as Tuticorin). Over the
period he was promoted from time to time and from
15.10.2001 onwards he was working as Sheristadar Category
I in Court of Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi. He was also B
holding the additional charge of the post of P.A. to the District
Judge, Thoothukudi, since that post had fallen vacant. It is his
case that he was expecting the regular promotion in the post
of P.A. to the District Judge.
5. It so transpired that the first respondent alongwith other
c
two employees in the District, that is one S. Kuttiapa Esakki,
Sheristadar, Sub-Court, Kovilpatti and one T.C. Shankar, Head
. Clerk in the Court of Principal District Judge, Thoothukudi came
to be transferred outside the district by order dated 19.9.2006
issued by the appellant on behalf of the High Court on D
administrative grounds. These other two employees filed writ
petitions bearing nos. WP (MD) No.9378 and 10528 of 2006
before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, but the
petitions came to be dismissed by the High Court by its order
dated 20.4.2007. The first respondent did not challenge his E
transfer at that time and joined at the place where he was
transferred in district ,Ramanathapuram.
6. The first respondent came to know that the post of P.A.
to the District Judge, Thoothukudi was being filled, and on F
21.4.2007 he made a representation to the Principal District
Judge, Thoothukudi, the respondent no.2 herein for being
considered .for that post. The first respondent learnt that the
fourth respondent was promoted to that post of P.A. to the
District Judge though he was due to retire shortly on 31.8.2007. G
He is junior to the first respondent as well as to the third
respondent. Third respondent went on medical leave in July
2007 and that is how fourth respondent was promoted to that
post. Later on, the first respondent learnt that he was not
considered for this post for the reason that he was already H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A transferred outside that district, and the reasons for the decision
were recorded in the proceeding of the second respondent
dated 6.6.2007.
7. At this stage the first respondent obtained necessary
information by filing an application under the Right to
8
Information Act, 2005 and then filed a writ petition on 24.8.2007
bearing W.P. (MD) No.7121/2007 before the Madurai Bench,
and prayed that the proceeding dated 6.6.2007 bearing
No.2697 concerning his non-consideration for that post be
C called from the file of the second respondent, and be quashed
and set-aside. He also prayed that a selection panel be
prepared for the post of P.A. to the District Judge, Thoothukudi
by including his name in that panel, and necessary orders be
passed. The Principal District Judge was joined as the first
respondent, the High Court was joined as the respondent no.2,
D and the two concerned employees were joined as respondent
no.3 and 4 in that petition.
8. The first respondent ,Gontended in his petition that in
spite of his transfer from District Thoothukudi, he retained his
E lien on his post in that district. That was the basis of his prayers.
He did not challenge his transfer from that district. It is material
to note what is stated in paragraph 8 of his affidavit in support
of his writ petition. This para reads as follows:-
"8. I submit that the 2nd respondent is well within his
F powers to transfer any employee from one district to
another district on administrative grounds and there was
no malafide exercise in the present transfers. However,
the 3rd and 4th respondents were left out though they too
were the candidates. In any case, one cannot challenge
G the transfers but the same shall not have the effect of
obliterating the lien I hold and any right to be considered
for the promotion as PA to the District Judge,
Thoothukudi."
H Thus, it would be seen that the first respondent accepted
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 673
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
that it was within the powers of the appellant, i.e. the Registrar A
General representing High Court Administration to transfer the
employees from one district to another, and there was no
malafide exercise in the present transfer. His only submission
was that he retained his lien on his post in district Thoothukudi
in spite of his transfer therefrom, and hf' should be considered s
for promotion to the post of P.A. in that district.
\
9. The writ petition was opposed by the' second
respondent herein i.e. by the District Judge, Thoothukudi by
filing an affidavit dated 20.3.2008. He pointed out that the first C
respondent was transferred outside district Thoothukudi
alongwith earlier mentioned two employees S. Kuttiapa Esakki
and T.C. Shankar by the High Court under a common order on
the basis of a confidential letter received from the then Principal
District Judge, Thoothukudi. The District Judge also pointed out
in his affidavit that the first respondent can claim appropriate D
promotion in the district where he was transferred on the basis
of his original seniority, but he can no longer claim it in district
Thooihukudi wherein he had lost his lien. He referred to Rule
14(A) (d) of the Fundamental Rules of Tamil Nadu Government
which lays down that the lien of a Government servant on his E
post shall stand terminated on his acquiring !ien on another
permanent post.
10. It was therefore, pointed out in the affidavit that after
the writ petitions filed by the earlier mentioned two employees F
were dismissed, the employees who were in the zone of
consideration were considered for the promotion to the post
of P.A. to District Judge, Thoothukudi, and the selection was
made after considering the merit, ability and seniority of the
candidates concerned as per rules 8 and 19 of Tamil Nadu G
Judicial Ministerial Service Rules. As far as the claim of the first
respondent to the lien on a post in Thoothukudi is concerned,
it was pointed out that first respondent had not challenged his
transfer from Thoothukudi. It was, therefore, submitted that the
petition be dismissed. Since, the above referred Rule 14-A was H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 12 S.C.R.
A relied upon, we may quote the same which reads as follows:-
"14-A:
(a) Except as provided in clauses (c) and (d) of this
rule, a Government servant's lien on a post may, in
8 no circumstances be terminated, even with his
consent, if the result will be to leave him without a
lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post.
(b) Deleted.
c (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 14(a), the
lien of a Government servant holding substantively
a permanent post shall be terminated while on
refused leave granted after the date of retirement
under Rule 86 or corresponding other rules. Vide
D G.0.829, Personnel and Administrative Reforms
Department, dated 26.8.1985.
(d) A Government servant's lirn on a post shall stand
terminated on his acquiring a lien on a permanent
E post (whether under the Government or the Central
Government or any other State Governments)
outside the cadre on which he is borne."
11. A counter affidavit dated 18.7.2008 was filed by the
F then Registrar of the High Court, and it was pointed out that
the first respondent himself had not alleged any malafides to
challenge his transfer. He had also admitted that transfer was
within the powers of the High Court Administration. The affidavit
stated that the transfers were effected on the basis of the
report/directions received from the Vigilance Cell of the Madras
G High Court, however, the transferred employee will retain his
seniority in the Ramanathapuram district under explanation 1
of Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Judicial Ministerial Service Rule
right from the date of his first appointment in Thoothukudi
district.
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 675
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
12. In view of these affidavits filed in reply to his petition, A
the first respondent amended his petition nearly after nine
months by filing an application dated 21.4.2008 with supporting
affidavit, and now sought to add the prayer that the records
relating to the transfer order dated 19.9.2006 be also called
from the files of the High Court, and the same be quashed and B
set-aside.
13. The amended petition was opposed by the then
Registrar General of the High Court by filing one more affidavit
dated 1.8.2008. She pointed out that the first respondent was C
transferred along with two other employees outside the district
Thoothukudi on administrative grounds by the High Court under
administrative proceeding dated 19.9.2006. She also pointed
out that a complaint had been received from the staff of the
judicial department of that district by the Vigilance department D
of the High Court on 2.1.2006. The complaint stated that the
first respondent along with some other employees had formed
a coterie in the District Court and they were dominating the
District Administration-whereby the Court was suffering in its
work, and therefore these employees be transferred to other
district. That letter was forwarded to the District Judge, E
Thoothukudi for his comments, who in turn wrote back to the
High Court on 28.4.2006 placing it on record that departmental
enquiries were pending against the first respondent and three
other employees on the charges of corruption. The District
Judge had also opined that if these employees were continued F
in the district, the administration would be very much spoiled.
It is, therefore, that the High Court Administration directed that
the first respondent and the concerned employees be
transferred outside the district on administrative grounds. There
was no malafide intention whatsoever in these transfers. · G
14. Thereafter the first respondent sent a mercy petition
to the High Court submitting that he was on the verge of
promotion to a higher post viz., that of P.A., and therefore, he
may be promoted in district Thoothukudi and if necessary be H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 12 S.C.R.
A transferred to the nearest district Tirunelveli. The High Court
considered that representation but rejected it by its proceeding
dated 8.5.2007. Incidentally, Ramanathapuram is also a district
adjoining Thoothukudi.
B 15. The writ petition was thereafter considered by a
Division Bench of the Madras High Court at Madurai which
passed the impugned order. The High Court did not accept the
plea of the first respondent that he retained a lien in district
Thoothukudi. It held that his lien in that district stood terminated
in view of the above referred Rule 14 (A) (d) of the Fundamental
C Rules, and also in view of the proposition laid down by this
Court in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana reported in [1997
(6) sec 538), that an employee cannot simultaneously claim
a lien on two posts. The Division Bench also did not find any
error in the proceeding I order dated 6.6.2007 of the Principal
D District Judge, Thoothukudi wherein he had recorded that the
first respondent could not be taken up for consideration for
promotion in district Thoothukudi, since he had been
transferred outside .that district.
E 16. The Division Bench, however, held that although the
High Court had the power to transfer the first respondent from
one District unit to another unit, it had to be seen whether such
power had been exercised by a competent authority or not. The
Division Bench further held in para 20 of its judgment that as
F per Article 216 of the Constitution, High Court means 'the Chief
Justice and his companion Judges and the matter should have
been placed before the full Court'. The bench also observed
that in any case no committee had been constituted by the High
Court in that matter before taking the decision to transfer, and
G the impugned transfer was a unilateral decision taken by the
then Honourable Chief Justice of Madras High Court. If such
prior steps were taken, the order could have been held to be
valid as per the judgment of this Court in High Court of
Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 677
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.)
-eported in (1997 (6) SCC 339]. At the end of para 20 of its A
-udgment, the Court held as follows:-
. "20 ................ At the cost of repetition it is to be
held that no such Committee has been appointed or the
matter has been placed before the Full Court and painfully
8
the impugned decision has been taken unilaterally by the
then Honourable Chief Justice of the Madras High Court,
which has been communicated through the second
respondent/Registrar General, which cannot be said to be
satisfying the meaning of 'High Court' embodied in the
Constitution. On this ground also, the impugned transfer C
order is liable to be set aside."
17. The Division Bench thereafter noted that the impugned
order of transfer had been passed on an anonymous letter and
thereafter on the basis of a report from the District Judge and O
after ordering of a vigilance enquiry. The Division Bench
referred to three judgments of this Court in lshwar Chand Jain
Vs. High Court Punjab and Haryana r$ported in [1988 (3) SCC
370], K.P. Tiwari Vs. State of M.P. reported in [1994 Suppl.
(1) SCC 540] and Ramesh Chander Singh Vs. High Court E
Allahabad·reported in [2007 (4) SCC 247] and also to Centre
for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India reported in
[2005 (8) sec 202) and thereafter observed in paragraph 25
and 26 as follows:-
"25. Thus, it has been time and again held by the F
Honourable Apex Court that it is the duty of the higher
judiciary to protect the officers of the lower judiciary from
the persons, who make reckless, baseless and unfounded
·allegations, by way of anonymous petitions. The same
reasoning would apply even in the case of staff members. G
Admittedly, in the case on hand, the impugned action has
been initiated pursuant to an anonymous petition
received .......... "
26. None of these aspects have been taken into H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A consideration before ordering transfer of the petitioner. No
doubt, transfer is an incidence of service. But, since in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case on hand,
where the impugned order of transfer has served as a
punishment on the petitioner, that too without conducting
B any enquiry, since it has impaired his chances of promotion
besides reducing his cadre to that of the Sheristadar of
the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court from that of the P.A
to the District Judge, which he was enjoying even though
as an additional charge, as there are many more seniors
c in the Ramanathapuram District, now a question would
arise as to whether such an order of transfer which worked
as a punishment on the petitioner, is sustainable under
law."
18. The appellant had drawn the attention of the Division
D Bench to the judgment of another Division Bench of Madras
High Court in the case of The Registrar of High Court of
Madras Vs. Vasudevan, A.K. reported in [1996 (1) MLJ 153).
In that matter complaints were received against court bailiffs
working in the City Civil Court at Madras. After the vigilance
E cell held discreet enquiries, they were transferred to various
courts outside Madras on administrative grounds. A Single
Judge had set-aside those transfers by holding them to be
punitive. Allowing the Writ Appeal, the Division Bench had held
that the employer is entitled to consider whether the particular
F employee is suitable to work in a particular place or to continue
there. It is however to be seen that transfer has not affected the
service conditions in any way. The Division Bench held that the
order of transfer had not affected any of the service conditions
of the bailiffs and their chances of promotion were also not
G diluted. Therefore, there was no question of providing any
hearing as well.
19. The impugned judgment distinguished the judgment in
Vasudevan's case by .observing that the promotional prospects
of the first respondent were affected in the present matter which
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 679
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
was not so in Vasudevan's case. The Division Bench observed A
that after obtaining the remarks of the District Judge, the
appellant ought to have issued a notice and sought the
explanation from the first respondent. It was therefore, of the
view that the first respondent had not been provided with any
opportunity to explain and the transfer was punitive. The Court, B
therefore, passed an order setting aside the transfer, directing
the appellant and the District Judge to immediately restore the
respondent •no.1 and 2 at District Thoothukudi alongwith his
seniority, and confer on him the post of P.A. in that district,
since, according to the Division Bench except the order of c
impugned transfer, there was no other impediment for his
promotion. It is this order which is challenged in this appeal.
This Court has passed an order of status quo with respect to
that order during the pendency of this appeal.
Consideration of rival submissions - D
20. We have heard the counsel for the appellant and for
respondent. No. 1. There is no appearance for the other
respondent$ though served. It was submitted on behalf of the ·
appellant that the decision of the Division Bench was erroneous E
on both tbe grounds on which the Division Bench decided
against the appellant viz. (i) that the transfer was punitive and
(ii) that it was not passed by a competent authority. On the other
hand, the counsel for the first respondent reiterated the
submissions made on his behalf before the High Court, and F
submitted that the order did not deserve to be interfered with
in any manner whatsoever.
21. We have considered the submissions of both the
counsel. As far as the action of transfer against the first
respondent was concerned, the same was on the basis of the G
report of the Registrar (Vigilance). Besides, the District Judge
had also opined that retention of the appellant in his district was
undesirable from the point of view of administration. Thus, it_
involved inter-district transfer. The respondent no.1 had not
H
•
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 12 S.C.R.
A disputed the power of the High Court to transfer him outside
the district, nor did the division bench interfere therein on that
ground. This is apart from the fact that transfer is an incident
of service, and one cannot make a grievance if a transfer is
made on the administrative grounds, and without attaching any
B stigma which was so done in the present case.
22. In the context of transfer of a govt. servant we may refer
to the dicta of this Court in N.K. Singh Vs. Union. of India
reported-Jn [AIR 1995 SC 423) where this Court observed in
para 22 as follows:-
C
"22 .. ... Transfer ol a government servant in a transferable
service is a necessary incident of the service career.
Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the
superiors taking into account several factors including
D suitability of the person for a particular post and
exigencies of administration. Several imponderables
requiring formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere
may Pe involved, at times. The only realistic approach
is to- leave it to the wisdom of the hierarchical superiors
E to make the decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by
ma/a fides or infraction of any professed norm of principle
governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinized
judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards
for scrutinizing all transfers and the courts lack the
F necessary expertise for personnel management of all
government departments. This must be left, in public
interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited
judicial scrutiny indicated."
23. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. S.S. Kourav reported
G in [AIR 1995 SC 1056], the Administrative Tribunal had
interfered with the transfer order of the respondent and directed
him to be posted at a particular place. It is relevant to note that
while setting aside the order of the tribunal this Court observed
in para 4 of its judgment as follows:- •
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 681
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
"4 ...... The Courts or Tribunals are not appellate A
forums to decide on transfers of officers on administrative
grounds. The wheels of administration should be allowed
to run smoothly and the Courts or Tribunals are not
expected to interdict the working of the administrative
system by trancferring the officers to proper places. It is B
for the administration to take appropriate decision and
such decisions shall stand unless they are vitiated either
by ma/a fides or by extraneous consideration without any
factual background foundation. In this case we have seen
that on the administrative grounds the transfer orders c
came to be issued. Therefore, we cannot go into the
expediency of posting an officer at a particular place."
We may mention that this Court has reiterated the legal position
recently in Airports Authority of India Vs. Rajeev Ratan Pandey
reported in [2009 (8) SCC 337] that 'in a matter of transfer of D
a govt. employee, the scope of judicial review is limited and
the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly,
be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the
courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of
transfer.' E
24. The Division Bench has however interfered with the
order of transfer on the ground that the transfer order was
passed by the then Chief Justice unilaterally, and he did not
have the competence therefor. In rebuttal, the appellant relied F
upon a Full Court Resolution dated 19.7.1993, and the text
thereof was placed before this Court. Item 3 thereof was
regarding services of Judicial Officers, and Ministerial and
Menial Staff. The subject of "Vigilance Cell" alongwith certain
other subjects was specifically included therein as falling within G
the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice alone. It was submitted that
all residuary subjects not allocated to the committee of Judges
or any individual Judge, remain within the jurisdiction of Chief
Justice. Further, the Chief Justice has to supervise the
admini~tration in the subordinate Courts also and has to take
H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A the decisions in emergencies, on all necessary matters. It was
also submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Division
Bench erred in not accepting the propositions emanating from
the judgment of the other Division Bench in the case of A.K.
Vasudevan (supra) which judgment had been left undisturbed
B by this Court when a Special Leave Petition against the same
was dismissed.
25. The other ground on which the Division bench has set-
aside the transfer of the first respondent is that the transfer
affected the promotional prospects of the first respondent, and
C therefore it was punitive in nature. According to the Division
Bench but for the transfer there was no impediment for the
promotion of the first respondent, and therefore it directed his
promotion. The appellant pointed out in this behalf that an
employee does not have a right of promotion as such. He has
D only a right to be considered for promotion, and even in the
present case the District Judge had considered a panel of
persons who came in the zone of consideration, and thereafter
effected the promotion. The first respondent could not be
included in that panel since he was already transferred outside
E that district. It was therefore, submitted that the Division Bench
had erred in directing the promotion of the first respondent to
the post of P.A. to the District Judge and the order deserved
to be set-aside.
F 26. As far as the first ground on which the High Court has
interfered with the order of transfer is concerned, namely that
it was not passed by a competent authority, the appellant has
produced the relevant material before this Court which clearly
shows that the Full Court had passed a resolution under which
G the subject of vigilance enquiries was retained with the Chief
Justice. Besides, in view of the pending inquiry against the
appellant, the District Judge of Thoothukudi had expressed that
it was not desirable to retain the appellant in that district. The
control of the High Court over the subordinate courts under
Article 235 of the Constitution includes general superintendence
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 683
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
of the working of the subordinate courts and their staff, since A
their appeals against the orders of the District Judges lie to the
High Court. (see R.M. Gurjar Vs. High Court of Gujarat
reported in AIR 1992 SC 2000). 'The word control referred to
in Article 235 of the Constitution has been used in the
comprehensive sense and includes the control and B
superintendence of the High Court over the subordinate courts
and the persons manning them both on the judicial and
administrative side'. (see para 14 of Gauhati High Court Vs.
Ku/adhar Phukan reported in [2002 (4) SCC 524]. This control
over the subordinate courts vests in the High Court as a whole. c
'However, the same does not mean that a Full Court cannot
authoriz.e the Chief Justice in respect of any matter whatsoever'.
(see para 18 and 19 of High Court of Rajasthan Vs. P.P.
Singh & Anr. [2003 (4) SCC 239]. The Full Court of the Madras
High Court had passed a resolution way back in the year 1993 D
to retain the subject of "Vigilance Cell" with the Chief Justice.
Therefore, it was fully within the authority of the then Chief
Justice to take the decision to transfer the appellant outside
district Thoothukudi. The transfer was particularly necessary in
view of the complaint that was pending against him. The E
Division Bench has observed that the complaint was an
anonymous one. Even so, the same had been looked into by
the Vigilance Cell, and the District Judge had reported that
departmental enquiries were pending against the appellant and
the other employees against whom the complaint had been
made. The District Judge had also opined that it was F
undesirable to retain the appellant in his district from the point
of view of the administration of that district. In view of all these
factors, the Chief Justice had to take the necessary decision.
It is, therefore, difficult to accept the view of the Division Bench
that the Chief Justice unilaterally transferred the appellant G
outside the district, c;ind the decision ought to have been taken
either by the Full Court or a Committee appointed by the Full
Court. In view of what is pointed· out above, there was no
reason for the Division Bench to take such a view in the facts
of the present matter. H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A 27. The other ground on which the Division Bench has
interfered with the transfer order is that according to the
Division Bench, but for this transfef order there was no other
impediment for the District Judge to promote the respondent
no.1. The Division Bench was of the view that the first
B respondent had lost the opportunity of getting promoted to the
post of P.A. to the District Judge on account of this transfer,
and therefore the same was punitive. As far as this finding of
the bench is concerned, it ought to have noted that the transfer
is an incident of service, and the first respondent himself had
c clearly stated in para 8 of his affidavit in support of the petition
that there was no malafide exercise in the present transfer. As
seen above, the transfer was purely on the administrative
ground in view of the pending complaint and departmental
enquiry against first respondent. When a complaint against the
D integrity of an employee is being investigated, very often he is
transferred outside the concerned unit. That is desirable from
the point of view of the administration as well as that of the
employee. The complaint with respect to the first respondent
was that he was dominating the administration of the District
E Judiciary, and the District Judge had reported that his retention
in the district was undesirable, and also that departmental
enquiries were pending against him and other employees, with
respect to their integrity. In the circumstances the decision of
the then Chief Justice to transfer him outside that district could
not be faulted.
F
28. Besides, there is no right of promotion available to an
employee. He has a right to be considered for promotion which
has been held to be a fundamental right (see para 13 of S.B.
Bhatfacharjee Vs. S.D. Majumdar, [2007 (10) SCC 513].
G However, though a right to be considered for promotion is a ·
condition of service, mere chance of promotion is not (see para
15 of the Constitution Bench judgment in Mohd. Shujat Ali Vs.
Union of India, [AIR 1974 SC 1631].
29. The fact that the first respondent could not be
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT QF JUDICATURE 685
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACl:ll [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
' '
considered for promotien to the post of P.A. in district A
Thoothukudi was undoubtedly the consequence of this transfer
outside that district. However, in view of what is stated above •.
that itself cannot make· his transfer a punitive one. As rightly
stated by the then Registrar General in her affidavit before the
High Court, the first respondent would be retaining his original 8
seniority though he was transferred in another district. He was
in the cadre of Sheristadar and he continued in that cadre in
district Ramanathapuram after he was transferred to that district.
In district Thoothukudi, he was officiating as P.A to the District
Judge since that post was vacant, but his substantive post was C
that of Sheristadar. The officiating work did not create any right
in him to be continued in the post of P.A. That was not also his
case, and that is how he had sought to be empanelled for being
considered for the promotion to the post of P.A, though in district
Thoothukudi. Since the first respondent was no longer in district D
Thoothukudi, obviously he could not be included in the panel
prepared for consideration for the post of P.A. in that district.
30. The first respondent was contending that his transfe(o
was punitive only because his promotional chances were
affected. This controversy is no longer res-integra. In Paresh E
Chandra Nandi Vs. Controller of Stores, N.F. Railway [AIR
1971 SC 359] the situation was almost similar though the
grievance of the appellant was that on accou.nt of transfer of
respondents 4 to 8 into his department alongwith their lien, his
chances for promotion were materially affected. The appellant F
was working in the stores department of the North East Frontier
Railway. This Court however, noted that the transfer was
effected under the relevant rules on administrative grounds, and
it did not affect his pay in any way. The court held that the
transfer of a permanent employee alongwith the consequent G
transfer of his lien cannot be challenged when the transfer is to
a permanent post in the same cadre not carrying less pay, even
if such transfer materially affects chances for promotion. In the
present case the pay, position and seniority of the first
respondent was not affected by the impugned transfer, and H ·
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 12 S.C.R.
A therefore, the same could not be said to be punitive merely
because his promotional chances got affected due to the
transfer. Hence, there was no question of providing him any
opportunity of hearing at that stage before effecting the transfer,
and the order of transfer could not be faulted on that count as
8 well.
31. Noting that the respondent No. 1 was transferred on
account of an anonymous complaint the Division Bench had
referred to a few judgments wherein this Court has emphasized
the responsibility of the Higher Judiciary to guard the judicial
C officers in the Subordinate Courts against unjustified
complaints. lshwar Chand Jain (supra) was a case where the
Advocates who were not satisfied with the orders passed by
the Appellant Judicial Officer had made unjustified complaints
against him. This Court had set-aside the order of termination
D of services of the appellant which was based on these
complaints, and in that context observed that if complaints are
entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which
may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side,
no judicial officer would feel protected. In K.P. Tiwari (supra)
E the High Court had made disparaging remarks, against the
appellant, a Judicial Officer, while recalling an unjustified bail
order granted by him. This Court had deprecated attributing of
improper motives to the subordinate officers. In Ramesh
Chandra Singh (supra) disciplinary proceedings were initiated
F by the High Court against the Appellant Judicial Officer for a
bail order which order could not be said to be unjustified. The
Disciplinary action was disapproved by this Court and the
matter was remitted to the Full Court for its consideration.
32. As can be seen from these judgments, they were al'
G rendered in altogether different context. In the present case we
are concerned with a Sheristadar who has been transferred on
receiving a complaint, although an anonymous one, but against
whom a departmental inquiry is pending. He has been
transferred to another district though retaining him in the same
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 687
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
cadre with the same pay as well as his seniority. Such an action A
was fully justified and within the authority of the High Court. No
observations were made against him, nor was any stigma
attached. The reliance on the above three judgments to interfere
in such an order clearly shows a non-application of mind by the
Division Bench to the problem which the High Court B
Administration was faced with, and which was being attended
in accordance with the relevant rules. In Centre for Public
Interest Litigation (supra), the grievance was with respect to
the likely appointment of respondent No. 3 to the post of Chief
Secretary, Uttar Pradesh when she was facing criminal c
prosecution. This Court had therefore directed that she be
transferred to some other post in the cadre/grade to which she
belonged. It was in this context that the Court made a general
observation that, postings in sensitive posts should be made
in transparent manner so that there is no scope for making D
grievance, though grievances can be made for ulterior motive
with the intention of damaging the reputation of an officer who
is likely to be appointed in a sensitive post. These observations
have also no application in the present case since all that has
happened is that first respondent has been transferred from one
district to another in view of a complaint received against him E
and a pending inquiry. It cannot be said that the action was with
a view to deny him any post. In fact the first respondent himself
had stated in his Writ Petition to the High Court that there was
no malafide exercise in his transfer.
F
· 33. The Division Bench also erred in ignoring that the first
respondent had been transferred under a common order
alongwith two other employees i.e. S. Kuttiapa Esakki, and one
T.C. Shankar. The Writ Petitions filed by them had been
dismissed. Besides, a judgment of a co-ordinate bench in A.K. G
Vasudevan was cited before the Division Bench wherein the
facts were almost identical. It was therefore, not expected of
the Division Bench to take a different view from the point of view
of judicial discipline. To put it in the words of this Court in Sri
Venkateswara Rice Ginning & Groundnut Oil Mill Vs. State H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 12 S.C.R.
A of Andhra Pradesh reported in [AIR 1972 SC 51], 'it is
regrettable that the learned Judges who decided the latter case
overlooked the fact that they were bound by the earlier decision'
(para 9 of the report in AIR).
34. We cannot ignore that the integrity of the officers
8
functioning in the administration is of utmost importance to
retain the confidence of the litigants in the fairness of the judicial
system. If there is any complaint in this behalf, the Chief Justice
is expected to act on behalf of the High Court to see to it that
C the stream of justice does not get polluted at any level. We are
pained to observe but we must state that the decisions on the
judicial side such as the one in the present case create
unnecessary difficulties for the High Court Administration. In
High Court .Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. Ramesh Chand
Paliwal reported in [1998 (3) SCC 72], the order under
) challenge was with respect to the issue whether the post of
Deputy Registrar should be filled from amongst the officers
belonging to the establishment of the High Court, or from the
judicial side. A Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court had
opined that the subject be placed before the Full Court, since
E according to the bench the Chief Justice ought not to have
brought in the officers from the judicial side for an administrative
post. This Court set-aside that direction by holding that it
amounted to encroachment upon the authority of the Chief
Justice, and was contrary to the constitutional scheme. This was
F a matter concerning an officer of the High Court covered under
Article 229 of the Constitution. What the Apex Court has
observed in para 38 of this judgment is quite relevant for the
present matter and worth reproducing. This para 38 reads as
follows:-
G
"38. As pointed out above, under the constitutional
scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the
other Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High
Court are concerned, have no role to play on the
administrative side. Some Judges, undoubtedly, will
H
REGISTRAR GEN., HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 689
AT MADRAS v. R. PERACHI [H.L. GOKHALE, J.]
become Chief Justices in their own turn one day, but it is A
imperative under the constitutional discipline that they work
in tranquillity. Judge~ have been described as "hermits".·
They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no
desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their
mission is to supply light and not heat. This is necessary B
so that their latent desire to run the High Court
administration may not sprout before time, at least, in
some cases."
35. Thus it is very clear that the impugned judgment and c
order are wholly unsustainable, and in complete disregard of
the law laid down by this Court. This Court has, therefore, to
allow this appeal and to set-aside the judgment and order dated
28.8.2008 passed by the Madras High Court on W.P.(MD) No.
7121 of 2007. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the order D
dated 28.8.2008 passed by the Madras High Court on Writ
Petition (MD) No. 7121 of 2007 is set-aside. The said writ
petition shall stand dismissed. There will, however, not be any
order as to the costs.
N.J. _Appeal allowed. E
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