Holding

The State Government's delegated rule‑making power under Section 4(2) does not include the authority to make retrospective rules.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether Section 4(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952 empowered the State Government to make rules with retrospective effect. The State had deleted certain sub‑rules, making the deletion operative from a date earlier than its enactment, and sought to collect tax from a respondent who had already paid it to Madras State. The Court held that a delegate cannot exercise the plenary legislative power to enact retrospective rules unless such power is expressly conferred, either by clear words or necessary implication. The requirement that rules be laid before the legislature does not, by itself, confer retrospective authority. Consequently, the deletion of the sub‑rules was ultra vires, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Does Section 4(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952 confer on the State Government the power to make retrospective rules?
Does the statutory requirement that rules be placed on the table of the legislature imply a power to make retrospective legislation?
Can a delegated authority exercise plenary legislative power absent an explicit conferment?

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952s. 4(1), s. 4(2)
Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1954s. 4(1)

Subjects

delegated legislationretrospective rulestatutory interpretationtaxationmotor vehicleslegislative competenceSupreme Court of India

Judgment

~627

REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER CHITTOOR ETC.
v.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, MADRAS (P) LTD. & ORS.
B
September 5, 1980
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]
Andhra Pradesh Motor VehiCles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act,
1954, ·Section 4(1}--Power to make rules under Section 4(1)-A delegate cannot
exercise the same power of the delegator unless there is svecial conferment
thereof.
c
Retrospectivity in the rule-making power-Mere fact that the rules framed
by the State Government (delegate) had to be ,placed on the ·table of the
Legislature does not automatically empower the former to make retrospective
rules. I
I
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court D
HELD : '(1) The legislature ha~ no doubt bienary power in the matter
of enactment of statutes and can itself make retrospective laws subject, of
course, to the constitutional limitations. But it is trite Jaw that a delegate
cannot exercise the same power unless there is special conferment thereof to
be spelled out from the express words of the delegation or by compelling
implication. In the present case the power under Section 4(2) docs not i".ldicate
either alternative. Therefore the authority of the State Government under
the delegation does not empower it to make retmopective rules. [629 A-B;
630B]
(2) The mere fact that the rules framed had to be placed on the table
of the legislature. was not enough, in the absence of a wider power in the
Section, fo enable the State Government to make retrospective rules. The whole
purpose of laying on the table of the legislature the rules framed by the State
Government is different. [629 EJ F
Hukum Chand v. Union of India, [1973] 1 S.C.R. 896 (902), followed.
Observation: The State Government should have been more careful in
giving effect to the resolution passed by the legislature and should not have
relied upon its delegated powers which did not carry with it the powers to
make retrospective rules. [629 CJ

CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303 of
1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1967 cf the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 138/63, 1256/63 ·and 1460/
63.
ll
A. V. V. Nair for the Appellant.
K. Rajendra Chowdhary for the Respondent.
628 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-We are in complete agreement with the rea·
soning and conclusions of the High Court and a brief statement of
the short point that arises for decision and of the grounds for dismis·
sing the appeal is all that is needed. The Motor Vehicles (Taxation of
B Passengers and Goods) Act passed by the Madras legislature in the
composite Madras State was made applicable to Andhra Pradesh when
that State was carved out. · There were certain difficulties in the matter
of levy of taxation on vehicles plying on inter-state routes and the
State of Andhra Pradesh thought it fit to enact its own legislation, which
it did in the form of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation
,C of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952, Section 4(2) whereof empowered
the State Govemm,ent to make necessary rules to effectuate the enact-
. ment. Pursuant to this power, certain rules were framed, of which
·rule 1 consisted of three sub-rul.es. On 19-6-1957 sub-rules (4) and
(5) were added to that rule and sub-rule (5) ran thus :
D "The proviso to sub-rule l of Rule 1 shall cease to ·be opera·
tive on and from 1st October, 1955 and the composition fee cal-
culated with r.eference to clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (1)
in respect of vehicle plying on inter State routes lying partly in
Madras State and partly in the Andhra State shall. with effect from
that date be paid in the State where the vehicles are registered
E and normally kept."
This sub-rule enabled operators of Motor Vehicles on inter-state
routes lying partly in the Madras State and partly in the State of
· Andhra Pradesh to pay the tax duly to either of these two Sitates. It
was, however, deleted along with sub-rules (3) and (4) on 29th March,
1963 with effect from 1st April, 1962 and it is the retrospectivity of
F the deletion that is challenged before us because the Andhra Pradesh
State sought to collect tax for the period commencing 1st April, 1962
from the respondent under the Act above referred to, although he
had already paid the same to the State of Madras. The ground of
invalidity was stated to be that S. 4(1) did not confer on the State
Government power to make rules with retrospective effect.
G
Thus, the only question which engages our attention is as to
whether S. 4(2) does confer on the delegate, namely, the State Gov-
ernment, the power to make retrospective rules. The High Court,
after an elaborate discussion on the jurisprudence of subordinate legis-
lation, came to the conclusion that no such power was conferred on
H the State Government and that consequently the deletion which resulted
in retrospective operation of the Iiabi.Jity to payment of tax was bad
in law.
' R. T. o. ClllTTOOR v. ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT (Krishna Iyer, J.) 629

The legislaure has no doubt a plenary power in the matter of . . A
·enactment of statutes and can itself make retrospective laws subject,
·Of course, to the Constitutional limitations. But it is trite law that a ·
·delegate cannot exercise the same power unless there is special confer-
ment thereof to be spelled out from the express words of the delegation
or by compelling implication. In the present case the. power under
· s. 4(2) does not indicate either alternative. The position has been B
· -considered by the High Court at length and there is no need for us
to go throug? the exercise over· again. Indeed, considerable reliance
was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on two circumstances.
He argued that the impugned rule was framed in pursuance of a desolu-
tion passed by the legislature. The fact does not have any bearing c
·on the question under consideration' except for us to make the ()bser-.
vation that the State Government should have been more careful in
giving effect to the resolution and should not have relied upon its dele·
gated power which did not carry with it the power to make retrospective
· rules. The second ground pressed before us by learned counsel for
the appellant is that the rules had to be placed on the table of and D
. approved by the legislature. This was sufficient indication, . in his
submission. for us to infer that retrospectively in the rule-making power
was implicit. We cannot agree. The mere fact that the rules fr::imed
had to be placed on the table of the legislature was not enough, in the·
: absence of a wider power in the Section, to enable the State Govern-
. ment to make retrospective ruies. The whole purpose of laying on E
the table of the legislatu!'e the rules framed by the State Government
is different and the effect of any one of the three alternative modes
· of so placing the rules has been explained by this Court in Hukam
· Chand v. Union of lndia,( 1) Mr. Justice Khanna speaking for the
Bench observed:
F
"The fact that the rules framed under the Act have to be
laid before each House of Parliament would not confer validity
on a rule if it is made not in conformity with Section 40 of the
Act. It would appear from the observations OJ) pages 304 to 306
of the Sixth Edition of Craies on Statutes Law that there are
three kinds of laying : G
(i) Laying without further procedure :
(ii) Laying subject to negative resolution :
(iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution.
\_ The laying referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 40 is of
the second category because the above sub-section contemplates H
that the rules would have effect unless modified or annulled by
(I) [19731 1 S.C.R. 896, 902.
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] r S.C:R.

·\A the House of Parliament. The act of the Central Government in·
laying the rules before each House of Parliament would not, how-
ever, prevent the courts from scrutinising the validity of the rules
and holding them to be ultra vires if on such scrutiny the rules ,A
are found to be beyond the rule making power of the Central
Government."
B
It is, therefore, plain that the authority of the State Government
under the delegation does not empower it to make retrospective rules .
. With this position clarified there is no surviving submission for appel-
lant's counsel. The appeal must be dismissed and we do so with
costs· (one set).
S.R.
Appeal dismissed!.

;. :.