REGENTA HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITEDversusM/S HOTEL GRAND CENTRE POINT AND OTHERS

                  [2026] 1 S.C.R. 206 : 2026 INSC 32

                  Regenta Hotels Private Limited
                               v.
             M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others
                        (Civil Appeal No. 90 of 2026)
                               07 January 2026
       [Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the Appellant
       has initiated arbitral proceedings after the expiry of 90 days period
       as prescribed u/s.9(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
       thereby resulting in automatic vacation of ad-interim injunction in
       terms of r.9(4) of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts)
       Rules, 2001.

                                   Headnotes†
       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.21, 9(2) –
       Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 –
       r.9 – “Commencement of arbitral proceedings” under the
       Act – Parties entered into a Franchise Agreement in 2019 –
       Disputes arose, Appellant filed application u/s.9 and certain
       IAs before the Trial Court seeking injunctive reliefs against
       the Respondent No.2 – Trial Court vide Order dtd.17.02.2024
       granted ad-interim injunction against Respondent No.2 –
       On 11.04.2024, appellant issued notice to the Respondents
       invoking arbitration – Respondent No.2 sent a reply on
       23.04.2024 refusing to concur with the nomination of the
       Arbitrator – Appellant filed petition u/s.11(6) before the High
       Court on 28.06.2024 seeking appointment of sole Arbitrator
       and for referring the parties to arbitration – IAs filed by the
       Appellant dismissed by Trial Court – Appeal filed by the
       Appellant, dismissed by High Court – Whether the High Court
       was correct in holding that the Appellant has initiated arbitral
       proceedings after the expiry of 90 days period as prescribed
       u/s.9(2), resulting in automatic vacation of ad-interim injunction
       in terms of r.9(4), 2001 Rules:
       Held: No – Arbitral proceedings, as commenced by the Appellant,
       are well within the statutory time frame provided u/s.9(2) and the
* Author
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                               207

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

     rigor of r.9(4), 2001 Rules is not applicable to the Appellant –
     The date on which the respondent receives a notice or request
     invoking arbitration is the moment at which the arbitral proceedings
     commence u/s.21 – A valid invocation requires the notice to
     articulate the dispute sought to be referred but once such notice
     is received, commencement is complete and effective for all legal
     purposes including limitation, maintainability of the s.11 Petition
     and the legal efficacy of any pre-arbitral measures – Trial Court
     passed the Order dtd.17.02.2024 granting ad-interim injunction to
     the Appellant – Period of ninety days as provided u/s.9(2) would
     end on 17.05.2024 – Appellant served a notice invoking arbitration
     on 11.04.2024 – Reply of Respondent No.2 dtd.23.04.2024 refusing
     to join in the appointment of an arbitrator entails that notice had
     indeed been received and understood as an invocation of the
     arbitral process by the Respondent No.2 – Even if 23.04.2024, the
     date on which the reply sent by the Respondent No.2, is taken to
     calculate the period of ninety days, as stipulated u/s.9(2) and the
     consequences thereof provided u/r.9(4), 2001 Rules, the arbitral
     proceedings have commenced well within the time and way before
     expiry of such periods – High Court treated the date of filing of
     the s.11 petition i.e. 28.06.2024 as the date of commencement of
     the arbitral proceedings resulting into the finding that ad-interim
     stay stood vacated and proceedings commenced after the expiry
     of ninety days period provided u/s.9(2) – This finding is not
     sustainable as it is contrary to the objective and purpose of the Act –
     Impugned Judgment of the High Court unsustainable, set aside –
     Order of the Trial Court dtd.01.10.2024 vacating the ad-interim
     injunction also set aside, restoring the earlier Order dtd.17.02.2024
     [Paras 22, 28, 31 ]

     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.21:
     Held: The commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory
     event defined exclusively u/s.21, wherein the respondent’s receipt
     of a request to refer the dispute to arbitration sets the arbitral
     proceedings in motion and no judicial application i.e. whether
     u/s.9 or s.11 petition, constitutes commencement – Therefore,
     the statutory consequences tied to commencement, including the
     mandate u/s.9(2), must be assessed solely with reference to the
     date of receipt of request invoking arbitration u/s.21. [Para 23]
     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.21 – Purpose of,
     explained. [Para 29]
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       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.21 – Conscious
       delinking of the commencement of arbitral proceedings from
       any judicial proceedings based on the UNCITRAL framework:
       Held: The very frame of s.21 provides that the Legislature has
       consciously delinked the commencement of arbitral proceedings
       from any judicial proceedings – This is a deliberate legislative choice
       modelled on the UNCITRAL framework, meant to ensure that the
       commencement of arbitral proceedings is clear and independent of
       procedural contingencies – The objective of this statutory scheme
       would be defeated if a court is permitted to substitute the date of
       commencement u/s.21 with the date of filing a s.11 petition – Resort
       to the proceedings u/s.11 would be necessitated only in case
       there is refusal or no response to the notice u/s.21 – High Court
       proceeded on the premise that since the petition u/s.11 was filed on
       28.06.2024, beyond three months from the date of ad-interim Order
       dtd.17.02.2024, the arbitral proceedings had not commenced within
       time – This view rests on a misconception regarding the statutory
       scheme – Article 21 of the Model Law of UNCITRAL. [Para 28]
       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.9(2), 21 – Rationale
       underlying s.9(2), discussed – If the commencement is to be
       construed from the date of filing of the petition u/s.11, the
       statutory scheme insisting on expedition in commencing
       arbitration after the grant of interim protection u/s.9 would
       be rendered incoherent – The applicant could serve notice
       u/s.21 but still be held non-compliant until a s.11 petition is
       filed, an interpretation which would be directly in contrast
       with the object and purpose of the Act – Permitting such an
       interpretation would mean that the parties would paradoxically
       be required to file the s.11 petition to prevent the lapse of
       interim measures granted u/s.9 even when the respondent
       is cooperating, the contractual appointment procedure is
       underway, or even when the s.21 notice has only recently been
       served – This is antithetical to the flexibility and autonomy
       provided in the Act. [Para 30]

       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.21, 9(2) – In absence
       of any other provision providing for the date of commencement
       of the arbitral proceedings, s.21 is to apply to all the provisions
       of the Act unless specifically provided otherwise – Plea of the
       Respondent No.2 that the commencement u/s.21 is only for
       the purpose of calculating limitation u/s.43(2):
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                               209

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

     Held: Not accepted – s.21 explicitly provides that arbitral proceedings
     commence on the date on which a request for dispute to be referred
     to arbitration is received by the respondent – In absence of any other
     provision providing for the date of commencement of the arbitral
     proceedings, s.21 is to be construed to apply to all the provisions
     of the Act unless specifically provided as not applicable – The
     only exception that is carved out in s.21 pertains to the arbitral
     agreement itself, providing that unless otherwise agreed by the
     parties, the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings must
     be from the date when notice or request invoking arbitration is
     received by the respondent – Therefore, as per the mandate of
     s.9(2), the arbitration proceedings shall commence within a period
     of ninety days from the date of such interim order or within such
     further time as the court may determine, and such commencement
     will be the date on which notice invoking arbitration is received by
     the respondent in consonance of s.21. [Para 23]

                               Case Law Cited
     Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. [1999] 1 SCR 89 :
     (1999) 2 SCC 479; Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited
     [2024] 3 SCR 73 : (2024) 5 SCC 313; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice
     Cream (P) Ltd. [2004] 3 SCR 854 : (2004) 7 SCC 288; Geo Miller
     and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut
     Utpadan Nigam Limited [2019] 11 SCR 1108 : (2020) 14 SCC
     643 – relied on.
     State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises [2011] 10 SCR 1026 : (2012)
     12 SCC 581 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Code of Civil Procedure,
     1908; Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001.

                              List of Keywords
     Section 9 (2), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21,
     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Commencement of arbitral
     proceedings” ; Rule 9(4), Arbitration (Proceedings Before the
     Courts) Rules, 2001; Date on which the respondent receives a
     notice or request invoking arbitration is the moment at which the
     arbitral proceedings commence; Arbitral proceedings initiated
     after the expiry of 90 days period prescribed under Section 9 (2),
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       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Franchise Agreement; Arbitral
       proceedings as commenced is well within the statutory time frame;
       Notice under Section 21, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996;
       UNCITRAL Model Law’s formulation; Model Law of UNCITRAL;
       Interim measures.

                              Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 90 of 2026
       With
       Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 189 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2024 of the High Court
       of Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 7168 of 2024

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Pranjal Kishore.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       M/S. Ahmadi Law Offices, Vivek Jain, Ms. Suchitra Kumbhat, Sadiq
       Noor, Ms. Benila B M, Rohit H Nair, Ms. Baani Khanna, Robin
       Singh, Kapil Balwani, Shrikant Thokchom, Atul Shankar Vinod.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       Augustine George Masih, J.

       Leave granted.
2.     The instant Civil Appeal assails the Judgment dated 14.11.2024
       (“Impugned Judgment”) passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
       Bengaluru (“High Court”), whereby it dismissed the Miscellaneous
       First Appeal No. 7168 of 2024 (AA) filed by the Appellant herein
       against the Order dated 01.10.2024 of the IXth Additional City Civil
       and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (“Trial Court”) in I.A. Nos. 5 to 7 in
       AA No. 4 of 2024 which has been filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1
       and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
       (“CPC 1908”) and Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
       1996 (“Act”) read with Rule 9 of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                         211

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

     the Courts) Rules, 2001 (“2001 Rules”). The Trial Court vide Order
     dated 01.10.2024 dismissed the application seeking temporary
     injunction restraining Respondent No.2.
3.   The Appellant herein is Regenta Hotels Private Limited, a company
     registered under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in carrying
     business, inter alia, of operating hotels and providing hospitality
     services in India and abroad. The Respondent No. 1 is M/s Hotel
     Grand Centre Point, a partnership firm registered under the
     Partnership Act, 1932. Respondents No.2 to 5 are brothers and
     partners of Respondent No.1 vide partnership agreement entered on
     01.04.2012, with each brother having 25% share in the partnership.
     Respondent No.1 is owner of a hotel premises located near Hatrick
     Restaurant, Raj Bagh, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir (“Hotel”).
4.   The abovementioned parties i.e., the Appellant and Respondent
     No.1 entered into a Franchise Agreement dated 23.03.2019. The
     terms of the agreement were such that the Appellant would aid and
     facilitate the business of Respondent No.1 by contributing through
     its brand reputation, technical know-how, training and expertise in
     running premium quality hotel businesses. In furtherance thereto,
     the management and operations of Respondent No.1 were being
     carried out as per the said agreement.
5.   Interregnum, the Respondents No. 2 to 5 were involved in a family
     dispute over rights on properties resulting into a settlement deed dated
     20.04.2022 providing that Respondent No. 5 will be responsible for
     operations of the Hotel for a period of two years and after the expiry
     of said period, the Hotel operation shall be conducted by such party
     who shall be nominated by the parties by voting. Profits of the Hotel
     were decided to be shared by Respondent No. 2 in the ratio of 25%
     and Respondent No. 5 in the ratio of 33.50% as also to include every
     month consideration for his responsibility to operate the Hotel. The
     remaining share was to be divided among Respondent No. 3 and 4
     in the ratio of 21.50% and 20% respectively.
6.   As transpires from the material on record, it is alleged that Respondent
     No.2 started to interfere in the functioning of the Hotel by shouting
     at staff and threatening to cancel bookings and taking away the
     records if not paid exorbitant sums separately over and above the
     agreed amount under the Franchise Agreement dated 23.03.2019.
     As a consequence to the alleged conduct of Respondent No. 2,
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       the Appellant on 16.02.2024 approached the Trial Court by way of
       an application under Section 9 of the Act being AA No.4 of 2024
       seeking various injunctive reliefs to restrain the Respondent No.2
       from interfering with the smooth functioning of the Hotel claiming that
       Clause 5.1 of the Franchise Agreement stipulates that Respondent
       No.1 will maintain a high moral and ethical standard and atmosphere
       at the Hotel premises. The Appellant also filed three applications
       being IA No.5 to 7 seeking interim reliefs to restrain Respondent
       No.2 from obstructing or impeding in smooth functioning, operations
       and management of the Hotel pending disposal of AA No.4 of 2024.
7.     The Trial Court vide Order dated 17.02.2024 granted ad-interim
       injunction against the Respondent No.2 as prayed for in IA No.5 to
       7 till next date of the hearing and issued notice to the Respondents.
8.     Thereafter, the Appellant on 11.04.2024 issued an Arbitration notice
       to the Respondents invoking arbitration in terms of Clause 19.1 of the
       Franchise Agreement for the adjudication of the disputes that have
       arisen between the parties. The Respondent No. 2, in response to the
       said notice dated 11.04.2024, sent a reply on 23.04.2024 refusing to
       concur with the nomination of the Arbitrator claiming that he has not
       signed any Franchise Agreement with the Appellant. The Appellant,
       on 28.06.2024 filed CMP No.314 of 2024 under Section 11(6) of Act
       before the High Court seeking appointment of sole Arbitrator and for
       referring the parties to arbitration under the Franchise Agreement
       dated 23.03.2019.
9.     The Respondent No.2 has filed written statement before Trial Court in
       AA No. 4 of 2024 denying allegations and contended that the suit itself
       is not maintainable claiming that Respondent No.2 is not a signatory
       to the Franchise Agreement. He contested that Respondent No.5
       is not allowing Respondent No.2 to inspect the books of accounts,
       ledgers or bills etc.
10. The Trial Court vide Order dated 01.10.2024 dismissed IA Nos.5
    to 7 filed by the Appellant with the observation that the Appellant
    failed to produce any document demonstrating that Respondent No.2
    granted consent for the contested Franchise Agreement, thereby
    failing to establish a prima facie case or the balance of convenience
    in its favour. It was further stated that AA No.4 of 2024 was filed
    on 16.02.2024, and more than six and a half months had elapsed
    without the Appellant producing any document except for the notice
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                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

     and reply for initiation of arbitral proceedings as mandated after filing
     an application under Section 9 of the Act nor was any substantive
     material produced to satisfy the requirements under Section 21 of the
     said Act, as Respondent No.2 had not agreed to refer the dispute to
     arbitration. The Trial Court also observed that all partners held equal
     rights under the partnership deed and must obtain mutual written
     consent for any substantive decision or agreement.
11. This Order dated 01.10.2024 was challenged by the Appellant in
    Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 7168 of 2024 (AA) before the High
    Court. The High Court vide Impugned Judgment dismissed the
    appeal holding that Section 9(2) of the Act read with Rule 9(4) of
    the 2001 Rules mandate that arbitral proceedings must commence
    within 90 days or three months from the date of an interim order
    or presentation of the Section 9 application, failing which any
    interim relief granted stands vacated automatically. The High Court
    reiterated that arbitral proceedings commence only when a request
    for reference to arbitration is received by the respondent, and mere
    issuance of notice does not constitute such commencement. The
    petition under Section 11 of Act was filed on 28.06.2024 which was
    beyond the permissible period, as arbitral proceedings ought to have
    been initiated by 17.05.2024. The High Court, however, rejected
    the contention of the Respondent No. 2 that he is not a signatory
    to Franchise Agreement and noted that the Trial Court erred in
    relying upon clauses of the partnership deed to conclude absence
    of a prima facie case or existence of Franchise Agreement dated
    23.03.2019 as the same evidenced consent among partners and
    was acted upon as the Hotel kept running as per agreement and the
    partners kept quiet from 2019 to 2023. The High Court nevertheless
    upheld the dismissal of the Appellant’s application, holding that
    failure to initiate arbitration within 90 days rendered the interim order
    unsustainable, and issuance of notice alone could not be construed
    as commencement of arbitration.
12. It would not be out of way to mention here that the above finding of
    High Court with respect to the existence of the Franchise Agreement
    dated 23.03.2019 has not been challenged by the Respondent
    No.2. It is only the Appellant being aggrieved by the dismissal of the
    Appeal by the High Court on the ground of arbitration proceedings
    having not commenced within 90 days from the date of ad-interim
    injunction, is before this Court.
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13. This Court, on 17.12.2024, while issuing notice to the Respondents
    had granted interim injunction in terms of Order dated 17.02.2024
    of the Trial Court and continued it till the disposal of the Appeal.
14. The learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the arbitration
    proceedings commence on the date of receipt of notice given under
    Section 21 of the Act unless parties agree otherwise. The phrase
    commencement is defined under Section 21 of the Act, and it is
    also used in Section 9, 43(2) and 85(2) of the Act. In all these
    contexts, this Court has held that it is the date of receipt of notice
    under Section 21 that is determinative of the commencement of
    arbitration proceedings. Reliance is placed on Sundaram Finance
    Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd.1, Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech
    Limited2, Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd.3, Geo Miller
    and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut
    Utpadan Nigam Limited4. He submits that the dispute between
    the brothers, who are partners of the Respondent No.1, have no
    bearing on the Franchise Agreement and in any case, it has been
    decided in favour of the Appellant by the High Court by the Impugned
    Judgment which has not been challenged by the Respondents either
    by filing an appeal or by cross-objections. The learned counsel further
    submits that the Respondent No.2 and other partners suppressed an
    agreement dated 09.10.2025 entered into between them by which
    they have decided to close the hotel in violation of this Court’s interim
    order dated 17.12.2024.
15. The learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 submits that the
    Appellant’s right in the management of the Hotel is limited to getting
    royalty payment of 5% each month along with taxes, while the
    Respondent No.1 retains and exercises direct management and
    control over the day-to-day operations of the Hotel, which was the duty
    Respondent No.5 has undertaken and despite completion of two years
    has not stepped down. The Respondent No.5 has not taken written
    consent of all the partners while signing the Franchise Agreement
    on behalf of the Respondent No.1. He submits that Section 21 of



1   (1999) 2 SCC 479
2   (2024) 5 SCC 313
3   (2004) 7 SCC 288
4   (2020) 14 SCC 643
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                         Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                     M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

         the Act is a deeming provision whereby the date of commencement
         of arbitral proceedings relates back to the date on which the notice
         invoking arbitration was received. Section 43(2) of the Act provides
         that an arbitration is deemed to have commenced from the date
         referred in Section 21 of the Act. Reliance is placed on State of
         Goa v. Praveen Enterprises5, contending that the primary object
         of Section 21 of the Act is to determine the date of commencement
         of the arbitral proceedings to decide if claims were ex-facie time
         barred. The learned counsel further submits that “commencement”
         in Section 21 is not for the purpose of Section 9(2) of the Act but
         for Section 43, which explicitly mentions Section 21.
16.      Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and upon perusal
         of material on record, it emerges that the finding as returned by the
         High Court with regard to the existence of Franchise Agreement
         dated 23.03.2019 is not challenged by the Respondent No.2 by
         way of cross-objection in this appeal nor is there any material on
         record to show that any other petition is filed in this regard. The
         said finding has thus attained finality to the effect that the consent
         of Respondent No.2 was there to the Franchise Agreement.
16(A). The only issue which concerns the present Appeal is whether
       the High Court was correct in holding that the Appellant has
       initiated arbitral proceedings after the expiry of 90 days period
       as prescribed under Section 9(2) of the Act, thereby resulting in
       automatic vacation of ad-interim injunction in terms of Rule 9(4)
       of the 2001 Rules.
17.      Before delving into the jurisprudential foundation governing the
         commencement of the arbitral proceedings under the Act, let us
         reproduce the relevant provisions of the Act for convenience.
18.      Sections 9, 21 and 43(2) of Act read as follows:
              “9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.––(1) A party may,
              before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after
              the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced
              in accordance with section 36, apply to a court—



5     (2012) 12 SCC 581
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       (i)    for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a
              person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral
              proceedings; or
       (ii)   for an interim measure of protection in respect of any
              of the following matters, namely:—
              (a)   the preservation, interim custody or sale of
                    any goods which are the subject-matter of the
                    arbitration agreement;
              (b)   securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
              (c)   the detention, preservation or inspection of any
                    property or thing which is the subject-matter of
                    the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any
                    question may arise therein and authorising for
                    any of the aforesaid purposes any person to
                    enter upon any land or building in the possession
                    of any party, or authorising any samples to
                    be taken or any observation to be made, or
                    experiment to be tried, which may be necessary
                    or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full
                    information or evidence;
              (d)   interim injunction or the appointment of a
                    receiver;
              (e)   such other interim measure of protection as may
                    appear to the Court to be just and convenient,
       and the Court shall have the same power for making
       orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any
       proceedings before it.
       (2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral
       proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim
       measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral
       proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety
       days from the date of such order or within such further
       time as the Court may determine.
       (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court
       shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1),
       unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which
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                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

           may not render the remedy provided under section 17
           efficacious.
           21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings.––Unless
           otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in
           respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on
           which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration
           is received by the respondent.
           43. Limitations.––(1) . . .
           (2) For the purposes of this section and the Limitation Act,
           1963 (36 of 1963), an arbitration shall be deemed to have
           commenced on the date referred in section 21.”
19. The jurisprudential foundation governing the commencement of
    arbitral proceedings under the Act stands on a principled and
    consistent line of authority emanating from this Court. In Sundaram
    Finance Ltd. (supra), this Court, while dealing with the issue as to
    whether a court has jurisdiction to pass interim orders under Section
    9 of the Act even before the arbitral proceedings commence, has
    observed that reading of Section 21 of the Act clearly shows that the
    arbitral proceedings commence on the date on which a request for
    a dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.
20. The contours of this principle were later given sharper precision in
    Milkfood Ltd. (supra), wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court
    held that the Legislature has deliberately adopted the UNCITRAL
    Model Law’s formulation, whereby the arbitral proceedings commence
    upon respondent’s receipt of a request or notice that the dispute be
    referred to arbitration. The provisions under Section 21 of the Act
    are consistent with Article 21 of the Model Law of UNCITRAL. The
    Court further observed that the issuance of notice under Section
    21 is required to be interpreted broadly and not for the purpose of
    limitation only but for other purposes also.
21. In Geo Miller (supra), this Court reaffirmed the principles of Milkfood
    Ltd. (supra), holding that for the purpose of determining which law
    applies or for computing limitation, the date of commencement is
    invariably the date on which the notice invoking arbitration is received
    by the respondent. The Court clarified that the procedural route
    adopted thereafter i.e., whether the parties agree on an arbitrator
    or whether a Section 11 petition becomes necessary, is irrelevant
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       to the date of commencement, which remains tethered exclusively
       to Section 21 of the Act.
22. In Arif Azim (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
    consolidated and restated what is being held in Milkfood Ltd.
    (supra) and Geo Miller (supra). The Court re-emphasized that
    the date on which the respondent receives a notice or request
    invoking arbitration is the moment at which the arbitral proceedings
    commence under Section 21 of the Act. It further clarified that a
    valid invocation requires the notice to articulate the dispute sought
    to be referred but once such notice is received, commencement is
    complete and effective for all legal purposes including limitation,
    maintainability of the Section 11 Petition and the legal efficacy of
    any pre-arbitral measures. The relevant portion in paras 88 to 91,
    are reproduced herein:
           “88. Section 21 of the 1996 Act provides that the arbitral
           proceedings in relation to a dispute commence when a
           notice invoking arbitration is sent by the claimant to the
           other party:
                ‘21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings.—
                Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral
                proceedings in respect of a particular dispute
                commence on the date on which a request for that
                dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by
                the respondent.’
           89. In Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. [(2004) 7
           SCC 288] , it was observed thus : (SCC pp. 301-302 &
           307, paras 26-27, 29 & 49)
                ‘26. The commencement of an arbitration proceeding
                for the purpose of applicability of the provisions of
                the Indian Limitation Act is of great significance.
                Even Section 43(1) of the 1996 Act provides that
                the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the arbitration
                as it applies to proceedings in court. Sub-section
                (2) thereof provides that for the purpose of the said
                section and the Limitation Act, 1963, an arbitration
                shall be deemed to have commenced on the date
                referred to in Section 21.
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                           219

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

                27. Article 21 of the Model Law which was modelled
                on Article 3 of the Uncitral Arbitration Rules had been
                adopted for the purpose of drafting Section 21 of the
                1996 Act. Section 3 of the 1996 Act provides for as
                to when a request can be said to have been received
                by the respondent. Thus, whether for the purpose
                of applying the provisions of Chapter II of the 1940
                Act or for the purpose of Section 21 of the 1996 Act,
                what is necessary is to issue/serve a request/notice
                to the respondent indicating that the claimant seeks
                arbitration of the dispute.
                                          ***
                29. For the purpose of the Limitation Act an arbitration
                is deemed to have commenced when one party to
                the arbitration agreement serves on the other a
                notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator.
                This indeed is relatable to the other purposes also,
                as, for example, see Section 29(2) of the (English)
                Arbitration Act, 1950.
                                          ***
                49. Section 21 of the 1996 Act, as noticed hereinbefore,
                provides as to when the arbitral proceedings would
                be deemed to have commenced. Section 21 although
                may be construed to be laying down a provision for
                the purpose of the said Act but the same must be
                given its full effect having regard to the fact that the
                repeal and saving clause is also contained therein.
                Section 21 of the Act must, therefore, be construed
                having regard to Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act.
                Once it is so construed, indisputably the service of
                notice and/or issuance of request for appointment of
                an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement must
                be held to be determinative of the commencement
                of the arbitral proceeding.’
           90. Similarly, in BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd.
           [(2021) 5 SCC 738], it was held by this Court thus: (SCC
           p. 766, para 51)
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               ‘51. The period of limitation for issuing notice of
               arbitration would not get extended by mere exchange
               of letters, [S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC
               582 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 50; Union of India v. Har Dayal,
               (2010) 1 SCC 394; CLP (India) (P) Ltd. v. Gujarat
               Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 185] or mere
               settlement discussions, where a final bill is rejected
               by making deductions or otherwise. Sections 5 to 20
               of the Limitation Act do not exclude the time taken on
               account of settlement discussions. Section 9 of the
               Limitation Act makes it clear that: ‘where once the
               time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or
               inability to institute a suit or make an application stops
               it’. There must be a clear notice invoking arbitration
               setting out the “particular dispute” [ Section 21 of
               the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.] (including
               claims/amounts) which must be received by the other
               party within a period of 3 years from the rejection of
               a final bill, failing which, the time bar would prevail.’
          91. In the present case, the notice invoking arbitration was
          received by the respondent on 29-11-2022, which is within
          the three-year period from the date on which the cause
          of action for the claim had arisen. Thus, it cannot be said
          that the claims sought to be raised by the petitioner are
          ex facie time-barred or dead claims on the date of the
          commencement of arbitration.”
23. Upon perusal of the binding decisions of this Court and provisions
    of the Act, there is no doubt left with regard to the correct
    conceptualization of “commencement of arbitral proceedings” under
    the Act. The settled position as emerged is that the commencement
    of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under
    Section 21 of the Act, wherein the respondent’s receipt of a request
    to refer the dispute to arbitration sets the arbitral proceedings in
    motion and no judicial application i.e. whether under Section 9 or
    Section 11 petition, constitutes commencement. Therefore, the
    statutory consequences tied to commencement, including the
    mandate under Section 9(2) of the Act, must be assessed solely
    with reference to the date of receipt of request invoking arbitration
    under Section 21 of the Act.
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                         221

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

24. The contention of the Respondent No.2 that the commencement
    under Section 21 of the Act is only for the purpose of calculating
    limitation under Section 43(2) of the Act does not find force with us.
    Section 21 explicitly provides that arbitral proceedings commence on
    the date on which a request for dispute to be referred to arbitration
    is received by the respondent. In absence of any other provision
    providing for the date of commencement of the arbitral proceedings,
    Section 21 is to be construed to apply to all the provisions of the Act
    unless specifically provided as not applicable. The only exception
    that is carved out in Section 21 pertains to the arbitral agreement
    itself, providing that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
    date of commencement of arbitral proceedings must be from the
    date when notice or request invoking arbitration is received by the
    respondent. Therefore, as per the mandate of Section 9(2) of the
    Act, the arbitration proceedings shall commence within a period
    of ninety days from the date of such interim order or within such
    further time as the court may determine, and such commencement
    will be the date on which notice invoking arbitration is received by
    the respondent in consonance of Section 21 of the Act.
25. At this stage, it requires to be mentioned that the consequences
    flowing from the non-compliance of mandate under Section 9(2)
    of the Act are not provided for in the said Act. To fill in this gap
    reference is required to be made at this juncture to Rule 9 of 2001
    Rules framed by the High Court as per the powers conferred on it
    under Section 82 of the Act, which reads as follows:
           “Rule 9. Application for interim measure, etc.––
           (1) When an application is made for an interim measure,
           under Section 9 of the Act, the Court shall in all cases,
           except where it appears that the object of granting the
           interim measure would be defeated by the delay, before
           passing the interim order, direct notice of the application
           to be given to the opposite party:
           Provided that, where it is proposed to make an order
           by way of interim measure without giving notice of the
           application to the opposite party, the Court shall record
           the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the
           interim measure would be defeated by delay, and require
           applicant.––
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          (a)   to deliver to the opposite party, or to sent to him by
                registered post, immediately after the order granting
                the interim measure has been made, a copy of the
                Application for interim order together with:
                (i)    a copy of affidavit filed in support of the
                       application;
                (ii)   copies of documents on which the applicant
                       relies;
          (b)   to file, on the day on which such interim order is
                granted or on the day immediately following that day,
                an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have
                been so delivered or sent.
          (2) Where an interim order has been granted without
          giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make
          endeavours to finally dispose of the Application within
          thirty days from the date on which the interim order was
          granted and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its
          reasons for such inability.
          (3) In an application for interim measure filed under Section
          9, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings,
          the applicant shall specifically refer to the steps, if any,
          already taken to seek arbitration and that he is willing and
          prepared to take necessary steps with utmost expedition
          to seek reference to arbitration in terms of the Arbitration
          Agreement/Clause.
          (4) In the case of an application for interim measure
          made before initiating arbitral proceedings, if the arbitral
          proceedings are not initiated within three months from the
          date of the presentation of the Application under Section 9,
          any interim order granted shall stand vacated without any
          specific order being passed by the Court to that effect.”
26. Upon the reading of Section 9 of the Act, it is evident that the said
    section does not provide for the consequences of non-compliance
    with its mandate of commencing arbitral proceedings within ninety
    days, however, the said vacuum stands statutorily filled through
    Rule 9(4) of the 2001 Rules. According to this Rule where an interim
    order has been granted on an application made under Section 9 of
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                         223

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

     the Act but no arbitral proceedings are initiated within three months
     from the date of presentation of the application, the interim order
     shall stand vacated automatically.
27. It requires to be noted and mentioned here that Rule 9(4) employs
    the expression “initiated” whereas Section 9(2) uses the expression
    “commenced” in the context of arbitral proceedings. As per Concise
    Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Edition, Revised), the term
    “initiation” connotes the act of causing something to begin or taking
    the first step towards beginning a process, whereas “commencement”
    denotes the actual beginning of the process itself, which is a step
    further than mere initiation. Thus, linguistically, initiation precedes
    commencement and as per Rule 9(4) the initiation shall be within three
    months from the date of presentation of such application, which would
    be before the commencement as per Section 21 of Act and would
    ideally be the date on which the notice invoking arbitration is sent by a
    party. However, the expression “initiated” occurring in Rule 9(4) cannot
    be interpreted in isolation or in a manner divorced from the statutory
    context in which it appears. Rule 9 has been framed in aid of, and
    to give procedural effect to, Section 9 of the Act, and therefore the
    terminology employed therein must be construed harmoniously with
    the parent provision. If “initiation” in Rule 9(4) were to be understood
    as something short of “commencement” as contemplated under
    Section 21 of the Act, the mandate under Section 9(2) prescribing
    a strict timeline for commencement of arbitral proceedings would be
    rendered otiose and susceptible to circumvention. Consequently, for
    the purposes of Rule 9(4), the expression “initiated” has necessarily
    to be read as “commenced” within the meaning of Section 21 of the
    Act. It follows that upon failure to commence arbitral proceedings
    within three months, the period stipulated under Rule 9(4) of 2001
    Rules attracts the consequence as provided therein, namely, the
    interim order shall stand vacated automatically.
28. In the case at hand, the High Court proceeded on the premise that
    since the petition under Section 11 was filed on 28.06.2024, beyond
    three months from the date of ad-interim Order dated 17.02.2024,
    the arbitral proceedings had not commenced within time. This view
    of the High Court rests on a misconception regarding the statutory
    scheme. The very frame of Section 21 provides that the Legislature
    has consciously delinked the commencement of arbitral proceedings
    from any judicial proceedings. This Court, in Milkfood Ltd. (supra)
224                                                          [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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       described this as a deliberate legislative choice modelled on the
       UNCITRAL framework, meant to ensure that the commencement
       of arbitral proceedings is clear and independent of procedural
       contingencies. The objective of this statutory scheme would be
       defeated if a court is permitted to substitute the date of commencement
       under Section 21 with the date of filing a Section 11 petition. Resort
       to the proceedings under Section 11 would be necessitated only in
       case there is refusal or no response to the notice under Section 21
       of the Act.
29. The High Court in the Impugned Judgment conflates the trigger
    for arbitral proceedings with remedial mechanism made available
    when the respondent obstructs or declines to participate. The
    purpose of Section 21 is to specify the date of commencement of
    arbitral proceedings in order to determine whether a claim is barred
    by limitation and whether a party has complied with the requisite
    statutory or contractual time limit for initiation of arbitration. If the
    date of filing of the Section 11 petition is to be treated as the date
    of commencement of arbitral proceedings, as has been observed by
    the High Court in the Impugned Judgment, that would result into the
    displacement of commencement of arbitral proceedings as provided
    under Section 21 and would be contrary to the text and purpose of
    the Act. Such a position is impermissible as has been consistently
    held in the dicta of this Court from the decision in Sundaram Finance
    Ltd. (supra) to that in Arif Azim (supra).
30. The rationale underlying Section 9(2) of the Act is that the arbitral
    proceedings shall be commenced within ninety days from the grant
    of interim protection. This prevents a party from abusing Section 9 to
    obtain interim protection without submitting to the arbitral forum and
    it also ensures that interim measures remain tied to the arbitration
    they are meant to support. If this safeguard is interpreted in a manner
    that contradicts the statutory definition of the commencement, to
    do so would allow courts to rewrite Section 21 sub silentio. If the
    commencement is to be construed from the date of filing of the
    petition under Section 11 of the Act, the statutory scheme insisting
    on expedition in commencing arbitration after the grant of interim
    protection under Section 9 would be rendered incoherent. The
    applicant could serve notice under Section 21 but still be held non-
    compliant until a Section 11 petition is filed, an interpretation which
    would be directly in contrast with the object and purpose of the Act.
[2026] 1 S.C.R.                                                         225

                    Regenta Hotels Private Limited v.
                M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others

     Permitting such an interpretation would mean that the parties would
     paradoxically be required to file the Section 11 petition to prevent the
     lapse of interim measures granted under Section 9 of the Act even
     when the respondent is cooperating, the contractual appointment
     procedure is underway, or even when the Section 21 notice has
     only recently been served. This is antithetical to the flexibility and
     autonomy provided in the Act.
31. The legal position as settled when applied to the present factual
    matrix yields a clear conclusion. The Trial Court passed the Order
    dated 17.02.2024 granting ad-interim injunction to the Appellant. The
    period of ninety days as provided under Section 9(2) of the Act would
    end on 17.05.2024. The Appellant served a notice invoking arbitration
    on 11.04.2024. The reply of Respondent No. 2 dated 23.04.2024
    refusing to join in the appointment of an arbitrator entails that notice
    had indeed been received and understood as an invocation of the
    arbitral process by the Respondent No.2. Under Section 21 of the
    Act, the date of receipt of the notice is the date of commencement
    of arbitral proceedings. Even if 23.04.2024, the date on which the
    reply sent by the Respondent No.2, is taken to calculate the period
    of ninety days, as stipulated under Section 9(2) of the Act and the
    consequences thereof provided under Rule 9(4) of the 2001 Rules,
    the arbitral proceedings have commenced well within the time and
    way before expiry of such periods. The High Court, however, in
    the Impugned Judgment treated the date of filing of the Section 11
    petition i.e. 28.06.2024 as the date of commencement of the arbitral
    proceedings resulting into the finding that ad-interim stay stood
    vacated and proceedings commenced after the expiry of ninety
    days period provided under Section 9(2) of the Act. This finding of
    the High Court cannot sustain as it is contrary to the objective and
    purpose of the Act. The arbitral proceedings, as commenced by
    the Appellant, is well within the statutory time frame provided under
    Section 9(2) of the Act and the rigor of Rule 9(4) of the 2001 Rules
    cannot be attracted to the Appellant.
32. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion and perusal of material
    on record, the Impugned Judgment of the High Court is set aside
    for being unsustainable in law. As a consequence thereof, the
    Order dated 01.10.2024 of the Trial Court vacating the ad-interim
    injunction also stands set aside, restoring the earlier Order dated
    17.02.2024.
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33. Before parting, it is essential that we request the High Court to
    expeditiously decide the Section 11 petition filed by the Appellant for
    appointment of the arbitrator on its own merits and in accordance
    with law, if already not decided. Nothing stated in this judgment will
    influence or prejudice the arbitral process in any manner.
34. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
35. As the appeal stands allowed, we would not like to proceed as of
    now with the Contempt Petition (C) No.189 of 2025 as filed by the
    appellant and the same is disposed of at this stage.
36. There shall be no order as to costs.
37. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed, Contempt Petition disposed of.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey