Holding

The 1913 sale deed contains a valid acknowledgment of the mortgagor's right of redemption, resetting the limitation period, and the suit filed on 28 December 1968 was timely.

Summary

The appellant, successor to the original mortgagor, filed a suit for redemption of a property mortgaged on 22 May 1886. The suit was filed on 28 December 1968, well after the 60‑year limitation under the Limitation Act, 1908, but the appellant argued that a sale deed dated 1 November 1913 contained an acknowledgment by the mortgagee of the mortgagor's subsisting right of redemption, thereby resetting the limitation period. The High Court held the deed did not contain such acknowledgment and dismissed the suit, but the Supreme Court examined whether the recital in the deed satisfied the requirements of an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court held that the deed expressly acknowledged the outstanding mortgage money and the mortgagor’s right of redemption, thus constituting a valid acknowledgment that restarted the limitation period. Consequently, the suit filed on 28 December 1968 was within the seven‑year window prescribed by Section 30 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the Supreme Court restored the trial court’s decree for redemption, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the recital in the 1913 sale deed amounts to an acknowledgment of a subsisting right of redemption under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the suit for redemption filed on 28 December 1968 (or 18 April 1973) was within the limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1908s. 19
Limitation Act, 1963s. 19, s. 30

Subjects

limitationacknowledgmentmortgageredemptionsale deedSection 19Section 30Limitation Act 1963civil procedure

Judgment

REET MOHINDER SINGH SEKHON
A v.
MOHINDER PARKASH & ORS.

JULY 31, 1989

B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]

Limitation Act 1908: Suit for redemption of mortgage-limitation
period.

Limitation Act, 1963: Sections 19 and 30-When recital in sale 1
deed constitutes an acknowledgment for computation of perioa of~
c~~- .
The appellant is the successor in interest of the mortgagor of the
suit property. The suit property was mortgaged on 22.5.1886. In. the
normal course the suit for redemption should have been r.ted on or
D before 22.5.1946, the limitation for such a suit being 60 years under the
Limitation Act, 1906. The appellant, ho)'l'ever, r.ted the suit for
redemption only on 28.12.1968. The defence to tbe plea of limitation
urged was that the son of the original mortgagee, while selling the
property on l.11.1913, bad specifically acknowledged the right of the
mortgagor to redeem the property. It was clalmed that this acknow- l__
E ledgment constituted a fresh starting point for computing the period of
limitation. The Trial Court accepted the plea and granted decree for
redemption. The Additional District Judge however accepted the
appeal of the respondents. The High Court, in appeal, confirmed the
order of the Additional District Judge and held that the sale deed had
nowhere acknowledged the right of the mortgagor to redeem the land.
F Before this Court, it was contended oe behalf of the appellant that
the recital in the sale deed clearly contained a specific acknowledgment
by the mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemption in the mortgagor.
On the other band, it was contended that tbe said _recital did not serve
as an acknowledgment. It was further urged by the respondents that
even otherwise the suit should have been r.ted within 7 years of the
G coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, i.e., on or before
1-4.1971, and that it was actually instituted only on 18.4.1973.

Allowing the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Additional
District Judge and the High Court, and restoring the decree for
H redemption passed by the Trial Court, this Court,

610
R.M.S. SEKHON r. MOHINDER PARKASH IRANGANATHAN, J.] 61 l

HELD: (I) The period of limitation cannot be extended by a mere A
passing recital regarding the factom of the mortgage but the statement
on which the plea of an acknowledgment is based must relate lo a
sobsistiog liability. The words used mustindicate the jural relationship
between the parties and it must appear that such a statement is made
with the intention of admitting such jural relationship. [613G-614A)
B
Tilak Ram v. Nathu, AIR 1967 S.C. 935, referred to.

(2) lo the instant case, it is not correct to treat the recitals in the
-~ document as a mere narration of the previous mortgage that had been
created on the property. The words speU out a clear intention that the
moneys doe ooder the mortgage still remained unpaid and also that the
mortgagor had a subsisting right of redemption which he could enforce
c
against the mortgagee. [614E-F)

(3) lo the Trial Court the plaintiff-appeUaot had adverted to the
provisions of the .Limitation Act, 1963 and the position that the suit
sboold have been filed within 7 years of the application of the new Act, D
and had orged that the suit was within time. The Trial Court had
accepted the contention of the plaintiff-appeUaot on this point. It could
not have been so accepted if the suit had in fact been iostitnted only in
1973. lo the cause title of the suit in the Trial Court the date of iostltn-
tioo is set oot as 28.12.1968/18.4.1973. This position does not appear to
have been specificaUy challenged either in the Trial Court or in the first E

- Appellate Court. The High Court. in its judgment has pointed out that
the snit had been filed on 28th of December, 1968. In this state of the
record, this Court has to proceed on the basis that the suit had been
. filed OD 28th of December, 1968 and therefore to hold that the suit had
-~- been filed in time. [61SB-C)
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3108
of 1989.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.1.86 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1510of1977.
G
~ Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Appellant.

Jitender Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
RANGANATHAN, J. We grant leave in the Sp~ial Leave Peti-
',, .
__
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.

A tion and proceed to dispose of the appeal on the merits after hearing
both sides.

The appellant is the successor in interest of the mortgagor of the
suit property. The suit property was mortgaged on 22.5.1886. In the
normal course the suit for redemption should have been filed on or ""'
B before 22.5.1946, the limitation for such a suit being 60 years under the
Limitation Act, 1908. The appellant, however, filed the suit for
redemption only on 28. U.1968. He sought to meet the plea of limita-
tion by urging that the son of the original mortgagee, while selling the
property on 1.11.1913, had specifically acknowledged the right of the ·.J,
mortgagor to redeem the property. It was claimed that this acknow- ·
ledgment constituted a fresh starting point for computing the period of ~
c limitation.

If the plea of the mortgagor were right and the Limitation Act,
1908, had continued to be operative, the suit for redemption could
have been filed on or before the Ist of November, 1973. However, in
D the meantime the Limitation Act, 1963 replaced the Limitation Act of
1908. The period of limitation for a suit for redemption was reduced
under the new Act to 30 years. Section 30 of the Act, however. pro-
vided as follows:
.t
S. 30. Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed
E period is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian
· Limitation Act, 1908.
•
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act-

(a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter ~
F than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limi-
tation Act, 1908, may be instituted within a period of seven
years next after the commencement of this Act or within
the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation
Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier:

G xxxxxxxxx

By virtue of this provision, the suit for redemption could have been
filed, if the appellant's plea that the sale deed dated 1.11.1913 con-
stituted a fresh starting point for computation of the period of limita-
tion is accepted, on or before the Isl of January, 1971, having regard to
H the fact that the Limitation Act. 1963 came into force on 1.1.1964.
R.M.S. SEKHON v. MOH!NDER PARKASH IRANGANATHAN, J.) 613

., The first question for consideration in this appeal is whether the .A
sale deed of.;, J L 1913 contained an acknowledgement by the original
mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemption on the part of the mort-
gagor as on the date of the sale deed viz. l.11. 1913. The sale deed
contained the following recitals:
··~
"Now I of my own accord have sold all my mortgagee rights B
along with the original mortgage consideration and interest
which according to the terms of the aforesaid mortgage
deed bas accrued and is payable to the instant vendor
, ......... The rights and interest regarding recovery of
original mortgage money and interest according to mort-
gage deeds executed by Jangi Khan original mortgagor
deceased and redemption of the mortgaged land which C
hence to fore vested in the instant vendor stand vested in
the purchaser .....
(underlining by us)

On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that the words D
extracted above clearly contained a specific acknowledgement by the
mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemption in the mortgagor. On the
other band. for the respondents, it is contended-and this contention
was accepted by the High Court-that the recitals mentioned above do
not serve as an acknowledgment ..The High Court observed:
E
"The mortgagee Moo! Raj gave the description of the
• mortgage only with a view to showing his status but no-
where did be acknowledge his liability for redemption of
the mortgage. According to the recital in the deed, what-
ever rights as a mortgagee he had in the suit land were
transferred to the vendee. There was nothing more than F
this. The right of the mortgagor to redeem the land, and his
liability to redeem the same, was nowhere acknowledged."

The respondents strongly rely on this finding and also rely on the
decision of this court in Tilak Ram v. Nathu, AIR 1967 S.C. 935.
G
We are of the opinion that the High Court erred in accepting the
above contention. It is true, as pointed out in Tilak Ram v. Nathu, that
the period of limitation cannot be extended by a mere passing recital
regarding the factum of the mortgage but that the statement on which
the plea of an acknowledgement is based must relate to a subsisting
liability.. The words used must indicate the jural relationship between H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19891 3 S.C. R.

A the parties and it must appear that such a statement is made with the
intention of admitting such jural relationship. But, in our opinion, the
recitals in the sale deed on 1.11.1913 fulfil the above requirements.
The fact of Nanak Chand having obtained a mortgage with possession
had already been recited in an earlier part of the sale deed. The pas-
sages in the sale deed, which have been extracted by us above, contain
B two specific recitals. The first is that "the original consideration and
interest under had accrued and was payable to the instant vendor."
These words acknowledge that the mortgage had not been redeemed
and that the mortgage moneys remained outstanding to the mortgagee
from the mortgagor as on the date of the sale deed. The second recital ~·
is even more specific. It says that what stands transferred to the pur-
e chaser is not only the right of the mortgagee for recovering the princi-
pal amounts and interest according to the mortgage deed (which, as
earlier stated, still remained outstanding) but also "the rights and
interest" regarding the redemption of .the mortgaged land. These
words are, of course, a little inappropriate because the right of
redemption is in the mortgagor and not in the mortgagee. But, read as
D a whole, the second sentence we have quoted here from the sale deed
clearly manifests an intention on the part of the mortgagee to ack-
nowledge that his right to recover the moneys under the mortgage
deed as well as his liability to have the property redeemed by the
mortgagor in the event of his paying off the moneys due under the
instrument both stand vested in the purchaser. We are of the opinion
E that it is not correct to treat the recitals in the document as a mere
narration of the previous mortgage that had been created i:in the pro-
perty. The words spell out a clear intention that the moneys due under ...
the mortgage still remained unpaid and also that the mortgagor had a
subsisting right of redemption which he could enforce •gainst the
mortgagee. In this view of the matter the contention on behalf of the
F appellant that the recitals in the document of 1.11.1913 constituted an
acknowledgement of liability for redemption within the meaning of
section 19 of the Limitation Act deserves to be accepted.

On behalf of the respondents it is submitted that, even if the
above position is accepted, the suit should have been filed on or before
G 1.4.1971 but that it was actually instituted only on 18.4.1973. Our
•attention is drawn to the cause title of the suit in the trial court where
the suit is described as Case Civil Suit No. 204 of 1973 and the date of
institution is set out as 28.12.1968/18.4.1973. It is submitted that
perhaps the suit had been filed on 28.12.1968 with defects and that the
defects had been rectified subsequently so that the suit can be properly
H 1said to have been instituted only on 18.4.1973. It has been numbered
R.M.S. SEKHON v. MOHINDER PARKASH [RANGANATHAN, J.J 615

~ only as a suit of 1973, It is, therefore, contended that in any event the A
suit was barred by limitation being beyond 1.4.1971. This contention is
without force. This point does not appear to have been specifically
taken either in the trial court or in the first appellate court. On the
other hand in the trial court the plaintiff bad adverted to the provisions
·~ of the Limitation Act and the position that the suit should have been
filed within 7 years of the application of the new Act and urged that the B
suit was within''time. This contention was accepted by the trial court. It
could not have been so accepted if the suit bad in fact been instituted
only in 1973 as at present submitted. That apart the High Court in the
~ ~ourse of its judgment bas pointed out that the present suit bad been
' filed on 28th of December, 1968. 1n this state of the record we have to
proceed on the basis that the suit bad been filed on 28th of Derember, c
't ··1968, and, therefore hold, for the reasons stated earlier,'it had been
filed in time.

For the reasons above mentioned, we set aside the order of the
High Court confirming the order of the Additional District Judge and
restore the decree for redemption passed by the trial court. We would D
only like to clarify that there were two mortgage deeds the redemption
of wbch bad been sought by the plaintiff in the suit. We are concerned
in this appeal only with the property mortgaged under the deed of
mortgage dated 22.5.1986 by Jangi Khan in favour of Nanak Chand
and sold on 1.11.1913 by Mool Raj, son of Nanak Chand, to the
predecessor-in-interest of the present respondent. The concurrent E
findings of the three courts in respect of the other mortgage are not, in
any way, disturbed by our judgment.

The appeal, therefore, stands allowed and the appellant will be
entitled to his costs.
F
R.S.S. Appeal allowed.