RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS.versusMANJIT KAUR & ORS.

1138                      [2020]REPORTS
                SUPREME COURT   8 S.C.R. 1138                 [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A                    RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS.
                                          v.
                             MANJIT KAUR & ORS.
                          (Civil Appeal No. 7764 Of 2014)
 B                                 JULY 31, 2020
        [A. M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
              Registration Act, 1908 – s. 17 – Document of family settlement
       – The predecessor of the appellants asserted that his ownership
       and possession in respect of the suit land comprising Khasra No.
 C
       935/1 and 935/2 including constructions thereon of 16 shops, a
       service station and a boundary wall with Samadhi of his wife in the
       land, was accepted and acknowledged by his two brothers in a
       family settlement – However, dispute arose between predecessor of
       the appellants and his brothers regarding the suit land – Thereafter,
 D     a memorandum of family settlement dated 10.03.1988 was executed
       between the parties – The brothers of the predecessor of the
       appellants, however, again raised new issues to resile from the family
       arrangement – As a result, a suit was filed by plaintiff/predecessor
       of the appellants against his brothers, original defendant nos. 1 &
       2 for a declaration that he was the exclusive owner of the suit land
 E
       – The trial Court decreed the suit partly in favour of the plaintiff –
       However, the First Appellate Court declared the plaintiff as the owner
       of the suit land – The First Appellate Court also held that the
       document dated 10.03.1988 was indisputably executed by the parties
       and the said document was merely a memorandum of family
 F     settlement and not a document containing terms and recitals of the
       family settlement made thereunder – Being a memorandum of family
       settlement, it was not required to be registered – In the second appeal,
       the High Court set aside the conclusion recorded by the First
       Appellate Court and opined that the document which for the first
       time create a right in favour of plaintiff in an immovable property
 G
       in which he has no pre-existing right would require registration,
       being the mandate of law – Accordingly, the High Court restored
       the decree passed by the trial Court – On appeal, held: The
       Jamabandi for the year 1984-85 of the property in dispute reveals
       that Khasra No. 935/1/1/1 (5-19) shows name of original defendant
 H
                                        1138
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1139


nos. 1 & 2 as owners, whereas the name of plaintiff is shown against      A
khasra No. 935/1/1/2 (5-18) as owner – Although the ownership of
the suit property recorded in Jamabandi is of the concerned
defendant, the plaintiff had carried constructed thereupon and was
in possession – The possession of the plaintiff is admitted and he
came in possession with the consent of his brothers – Notably, this
                                                                          B
finding has not been disturbed by the High Court – That apart, it is
also established from records that a plot in the name of plaintiff
was given to original defendant no. 2, which was otherwise in
possession of original defendant no. 1 – Further, a plot purchased
by the plaintiff in the name of his son was given to original defendant
no. 1 and his wife – These facts clearly establish that there was not     C
only univocal family arrangement between the parties, but it was
acted upon by them without any exception – Now, it was not open to
resile from the same – They were estopped from contending to the
contrary – The High Court committed manifest error in interfering
with and in particular reversing the well-considered decision of the
                                                                          D
First Appellate Court, which had justly concluded that the document
dated 10.03.1988 was merely a memorandum of family settlement,
and it did not require registration – Therefore, impugned judgment
and decree of the High Court is set aside – The judgment and decree
passed by the First Appellate Court is restored in favour of the
plaintiff (appellants).                                                   E
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. The first appellate Court has also justly opined
that the parties had acted upon the stated family settlement and
if this Court may say so, to the prejudice of the other party. In
that, the property in the name of plaintiff at Prem Basti was given       F
to original defendant No. 2, which was otherwise in possession of
original defendant No. 1. Further, the plot purchased by the plaintiff
in the name of his son was given original defendant No. 1 and his
wife, but that plot was admittedly sold by them to another person.
Being a case of a family settlement between the real brothers             G
and having been acted upon by them, it was not open to resile
from the same. They were estopped from contending to the
contrary. This crucial aspect has been glossed over by the High
Court and if this Court may say so, the second appeal has been
disposed of in a most casual manner. [Para 15][1155-C-E]
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1140            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A           2. Be that as it may, the High Court has clearly misapplied
       the dictum in the relied upon decisions. The settled legal position
       is that when by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement,
       members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a
       near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle
       and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and
 B     for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete
       harmony and goodwill in the family, such arrangement ought to
       be governed by a special equity peculiar to them and would be
       enforced if honestly made. The object of such arrangement is to
       protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives
 C     which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred
       and bad blood between the various members of the family, as
       observed in Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation &
       Ors.. [Para 16][1155-H; 1156-A-C]
              3. The view so taken is backed by the consistent exposition
       in previous decisions referred to and duly analysed in the reported
 D
       judgment. The question formulated by the High Court, in opinion
       of this Court, stands answered in favour of the appellants (plaintiff),
       in light of exposition of this Court in Kale. A priori, this Court has
       no hesitation in affirming the conclusion reached by the first
       appellate Court that the document Exhibit P-6 was nothing but a
 E     memorandum of a family settlement. The established facts and
       circumstances clearly establish that a family settlement was
       arrived at in 1970 and also acted upon by the concerned parties.
       That finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court being
       unexceptionable, it must follow that the document Exhibit P-6
       was merely a memorandum of a family settlement so arrived at.
 F     Resultantly, it was not required to be registered and in any case,
       keeping in mind the settled legal position, the contesting
       defendants were estopped from resiling from the stated
       arrangement in the subject memorandum, which had recorded
       the settlement terms arrived at in the past and even acted upon
 G     relating to all the existing or future disputes qua the subject
       property amongst the (signatories) family members despite
       absence of antecedent title to the concerned property. [Para
       16][1159-C-D; 1160-A-B]
            4. Considering the above, this Court has no hesitation in
       concluding that the High Court committed manifest error in
 H
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1141


interfering with and in particular reversing the well-considered        A
decision of the first appellate Court, which had justly concluded
that document dated 10.3.1988 executed between the parties was
merely a memorandum of settlement, and it did not require
registration. It must follow that the relief claimed by the plaintiff
in the suit, as granted by the first appellate Court ought not to
have been interfered with by the High Court and more so, in a           B
casual manner, as adverted to earlier. [Para 19][1162-B-C]
      Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation &
      Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 119 : [1976] 3 SCR 202 – relied
      on.
                                                                        C
      Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC
      709 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 466; Hans Raj & Ors. v.
      Mukhtiar Singh (1996) 3 RCR (Civil) 740; Hari
      Shankar Singhania & Ors. v. Gaur Hari Singhania &
      Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 658 : [2006] 3 SCR 726; Som Dev
      & Ors. v. Rati Ram & Anr. (2006) 10 SCC 788 : [ 2006]             D
      5 Suppl. SCR 778; Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand
      Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481 : [1955] SCR 22; Ram Charan
      Das v. Girjanandini Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323 : [1965]
      SCR 841; Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil,
      AIR 1966 SC 292; Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi                        E
      Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836; Krishna Biharilal v.
      Gulabchand (1971) 1 SCC 837 : [1971] Suppl. SCR
      27; S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973)
      2 SCC 312 : [1973] 1 SCR 570; Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal
      Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145 : [1952] SCR 478; T.V.R.
      Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities v. M. Gaghava                     F
      Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797 : [1961] SCR 624 –
      referred to.
      Jagdish & Ors. v. Ram Karan & Ors. PLR (2003) 133
      P&H 182; Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna
      Narain, ILR 33 All 356; Mt. Hiran Bibi v. Mst. Sohan              G
      Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44; Ramgopal v. Tulshi Ram, AIR
      1928 All 641; Sitala Baksh Singh v. Jang Bahadur
      Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 347; Mst. Kalawati v. Sri
      Krishna Prasad, AIR 1944 Oudh 49; Bakhtawar v.
      Sunder Lal, AIR 1926 All 173; Awadh Narain Singh v.
                                                                        H
1142            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A           Narain Mishra, AIR 1962 Pat 400; Ramgouda
             Annagouda v. Bhausaheb, AIR 1927 PC 227;
             Brahmanath Singh v. Chandrakali Kuer, AIR 1961 Pat
             79; Mst. Bibi Aziman v. Mst. Saleha, AIR 1963 Pat 62;
             Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70; Rachbha v.
             Mt. Mendha, AIR 1947 All 177; Chief Controlling
 B
             Revenue Authority v. Smt. Satyawati Sood, AIR 1972
             Delhi 171 (FB); Shyam Sunder v. Siya Ram, AIR 1973
             All 382 – referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
 C     [1976] 3 SCR 202                  relied on            Para 7
       [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 466           referred to         Para 12
       [2006] 3 SCR 726                  referred to          Para 12
       [1955] SCR 22                     referred to          Para 16
 D     [1965] SCR 841                    referred to          Para 16
       AIR 1966 SC 292                   referred to          Para 16
       [1971] Suppl. SCR 27              referred to         Para 16
       [1973] 1 SCR 570                  referred to          Para 16
 E     [1952] SCR 478                    referred to          Para 16
       [1961] SCR 624                    referred to          Para 16
       [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 778           referred to         Para 17
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7764
 F     of 2014.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.2007 of the High Court
       of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 946 of 2004.
            Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv. Rishi Malhotra, Utkarsh Singh,
       Ms. Neelmani Pant, Mohit Chaudhary, Prem Malhotra, Parveen Kumar
 G     Aggarwal, Surinder Singh Pannu, Abhishek Grover, Pareekshit Bishnoi,
       Nage Nanya, Sanjay Jain, Advs. for the appearing parties.



 H
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1143


       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               A
       A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
       1. This appeal emanates from the judgment and decree dated
27.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh1 in R.S.A. No. 946/2004, whereby the second appeal filed
by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (heirs and legal representatives of Mohan         B
Singh - original defendant No. 1) came to be allowed by answering the
substantial question of law formulated as under: -
       “Whether the document Ex.P-6 required registration as by way
       of said document the interest in immovable property worth more
       than Rs.100/- was transferred in favour of the plaintiff?”               C
       2. Briefly stated, the suit was filed by the predecessor of the
appellants herein - Harbans Singh, son of Niranjan Singh, resident of
Sangrur, Punjab against his real brothers Mohan Singh (original defendant
No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2) for a declaration that
he was the exclusive owner in respect of land admeasuring 11 kanals 17
marlas comprising khasra Nos. 935/1 and 935/2 situated at Mohalla Road          D
and other properties referred to in the Schedule. He asserted that there
was a family settlement with the intervention of respectable persons
and family members, whereunder his ownership and possession in respect
of the suit land including the constructions thereon (16 shops, a samadhi
of his wife – Gurcharan Kaur and one service station with boundary              E
wall) was accepted and acknowledged. Structures were erected by him
in his capacity as owner of the suit land. It is stated that in the year 1970
after the purchase of suit land, some dispute arose between the brothers
regarding the suit land and in a family settlement arrived at then, it was
clearly understood that the plaintiff – Harbans Singh would be the owner
of the suit property including constructions thereon and that the name of       F
Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original
defendant No. 2) respectively would continue to exist in the revenue
record as owners to the extent of half share and the plaintiff would have
no objection in that regard due to close relationship between the parties.
However, the defendants raised dispute claiming half share in respect of        G
which Harbans Singh (plaintiff) was accepted and acknowledged to be
the exclusive owner and as a result of which it was decided to prepare
a memorandum of family settlement incorporating the terms already
settled between the parties, as referred to above. The stated memorandum
1
    For short, “the High Court”
                                                                                H
1144            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     was executed by all parties on 10.3.1988. However, after execution of
       the memorandum of family settlement dated 10.3.1988, the defendants
       once again raised new issues to resile from the family arrangement. As
       a result, Harbans Singh (plaintiff) decided to file suit for declaration on
       9.5.1988, praying for a decree that he was the owner in possession of
       the land admeasuring 11 kanals 17 marlas comprising of khasra Nos.
 B
       935/1 and 935/2 situated at Mohalla Road. An alternative plea was also
       taken that since plaintiff was in possession of the whole suit property to
       the knowledge of the defendants openly and adversely for more than
       twelve years, he had acquired ownership rights by way of adverse
       possession.
 C            3. The suit was resisted by the defendants by filing written
       statement. Harbans Singh (plaintiff) filed replications. On the basis of
       rival pleadings, the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sangrur in Suit No.
       187/1988 B.T. No. 185 of 18-1-95 (18-1-95) framed following issues: -
             “1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of suit land? OPP
 D
             2. Whether there was any family settlement between the parties
             on 10.3.1988 and memo of family settlement was executed by
             parties on that day? OPP
             3. Whether the plaintiff constructed shops, a service station and
             boundary wall around the disputed property? OPP
 E
             4. Whether the plaintiff has become owner of suit land by adverse
             possession? OPP
             5. Whether the property in dispute was purchased out by the
             income of Joint Hindu Family coparcenary property and
 F           construction on the suit land was also purchased by Joint Hindu
             Family coparcenary property? OPD
             6. Whether Sohan Singh, Mohan Singh and Harbans Singh
             constitute a Joint Hindu Family? OPD
             7. Whether the defendants are estopped from denying the
 G           execution of memo of family settlement by their act and conduct?
             OPP
             8. Relief.”
              During the pendency of the suit, Harbans Singh (plaintiff) expired
       and, therefore, the appellants herein were brought on record being his
 H
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1145
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

legal heirs. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.1.2000,         A
partly decreed the suit in the following terms: -
      “RELIEF
      30. In view of my discussion on various issues above, the suit of
      the plaintiff partly succeeds and partly fails. Therefore, his suit is
      decreed partly to the extent that he is declared to be owner in          B
      possession of khasra no. 935/1/1/2 (5-18) and to the extent of ½
      share in khasra no. 935/1/1/1 (5-19) with construction there upon.
      Keeping in view the relationship between the parties and the
      circumstances of the case, no order as to cost. Decree sheet be
      prepared accordingly. File be consigned to the record room.”             C
       4. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellants/plaintiffs filed first
appeal before the District Judge, Sangrur being Civil Appeal No. 45 of
5-2-2000 B.T. No. 60 of 11-6-2001. The first appellate Court, after
reappreciating the pleadings and evidence on record, was pleased to
allow the appeal and modify the judgment and decree passed by the trial        D
Court. The first appellate Court declared the original plaintiff as owner
of the suit land alongwith constructions including 16 shops, a service
station and boundary wall with samadhi in the land. The operative order
passed by the first appellate Court, dated 29.11.2003, reads thus: -
      “18. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed and     E
      the judgment passed by the learned trial court is modified and the
      suit of the plaintiff is decreed. The plaintiff is declared owner of
      the land measuring 11 kanals 17 marlas comprised in rectangle
      and killa no. 935/1/1/1 (5-19), 935/1/1/2 (5-18) situated in Mehlan
      Road, Sangrur along with construction including 16 shops, a service
      station and boundary wall with samadh in the land. In view of the        F
      peculiar circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear
      their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared and copy of the
      judgment be placed on the file of the learned trial court and the
      same be returned immediately to the successor court of Smt.
      Harreet Kaur PCS, the then Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sangrur.       G
      This court file be consigned to the record room.”
      5. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 being legal representatives of
Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) preferred second appeal before
the High Court being R.S.A. No. 946/2004. The learned single Judge
answered the substantial question of law reproduced in paragraph 1
                                                                               H
1146                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     above in favour of the said respondents. The High Court was pleased to
       set aside the conclusion recorded by the first appellate Court and opined
       that the document which, for the first time, creates a right in favour of
       plaintiff in an immovable property in which he has no pre-existing right
       would require registration, being the mandate of law. Accordingly, the
       second appeal came to be allowed and the judgment and decree passed
 B
       by the lower appellate Court was set aside, thereby restoring the decree
       passed by the trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 27.11.2007.
              6. The appellants have questioned the correctness of the view
       taken by the High Court and in particular, reversing the conclusion
       reached by the first appellate Court. When the present appeal was taken
 C     up for hearing, the Court referred the matter to a larger Bench of three-
       Judges to answer the question as to whether the acquisition of title by
       adverse possession can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65 of the
       Limitation Act, 1963 and is there any bar under the Limitation Act to sue
       on aforesaid basis in case of infringement of any rights of a plaintiff.
 D     The appeal accordingly proceeded before the three-Judge Bench, which
       in turn answered the said question vide judgment dated 7.8.2019 2 in
       favour of the plaintiff. As a result, the matter has been placed before us
       for consideration of the appeal on its own merits.
              7. The appellants would contend that the High Court disposed of
 E     the second appeal in a casual manner and more so, without dealing with
       the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court in favour of the
       plaintiff. It is urged that the first appellate Court, after noticing the
       admitted factual position, proceeded to first examine the question whether
       the document dated 10.3.1988 (Exhibit P-6) was executed by the parties
       or not. That fact has been answered in favour of the plaintiff (appellants)
 F     after analysing the evidence on record. It has been held that the stated
       document was indisputably executed by the parties. The next question
       considered by the first appellate Court was whether the stated document
       required registration or not, which has been justly answered in favour of
       the plaintiff (appellants) on the finding that it was merely a memorandum
 G     of family settlement and not a document containing terms and recitals of
       the family settlement made thereunder. For that, the first appellate Court
       noted that the plaintiff had constructed 16 shops and a samadhi including
       boundary wall on the suit land on his own, which fact was indisputable
       and established from the evidence on record. Further, the plaintiff was
       2
           Reported as (2019) 8 SCC 729
 H
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1147
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

in possession of the suit land. Even this finding is supported by the            A
evidence on record and is well-established. It is also established from
record that as per the family settlement, the plot in Prem Basti belonging
to Harbans Singh (plaintiff) was given to Sohan Singh (original defendant
No. 2), which was in possession of Mohan Singh (original defendant
No. 1) and that another plot purchased by plaintiff in the name of his son
                                                                                 B
Vikramjit Singh was given to Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1)
and his wife. Notably, the Defendant Witness No. 1 (DW-1) admitted
that the said property was sold thereafter to one Surjit Kaur. In substance,
it is established that the parties had acted upon the family settlement,
which was recorded in the form of document - Exhibit P-6 being a
memorandum of family settlement. In other words, the concerned parties           C
had acted upon the family arrangement as per the settlement terms
decided in 1970 and reinforced by the document Exhibit P-6
(memorandum of family settlement). Being a memorandum of family
settlement, it was not required to be registered and, in any case, the
parties having acted upon the terms of the said settlement to the prejudice
                                                                                 D
of the other party, it was not open to them to resile from the said
arrangement. Thus, they are estopped from disowning the arrangement
already reached, acted upon and so recorded in the memorandum of
family settlement. Thus understood, the plaintiff was accepted and
acknowledged to be the owner of the suit property by all the family
members who were also party to the memorandum of family settlement               E
(Exhibit P-6). The appellants have placed reliance on the decision of this
Court in Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.3
They pray for restoration of the decree passed by the first appellate
Court and setting aside the impugned judgment.
       8. On the other hand, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 would contend            F
that the High Court has rightly considered the document Exhibit P-6 as
containing terms and recitals of family settlement and for which reason
it was essential to get the same registered. It is urged that there was no
pre-existing title in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property,
as the same was purchased in the name of concerned defendant by way
of a registered sale deed. The parties were not in possession of Joint           G
Hindu Family property as such and therefore, the question of partition of
that property does not arise. The plea that there was no Joint Hindu
Family property was taken by the plaintiff in the replication filed before

3
    (1976) 3 SCC 119                                                             H
1148             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     the trial Court. This plea was taken in the context of the assertion made
       by the defendants in the written statement that the suit property was
       jointly owned by Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan
       Singh (original defendant No. 2). The contesting respondents have
       reiterated the stand that there was no family settlement in 1970, as stated
       by the plaintiff and that the signature of the defendant No. 2 appearing
 B
       in document Exhibit P-6 is forged and fabricated. Further, the High Court
       has justly non-suited the plaintiff and preferred to restore the partial
       decree passed by the trial Court on the conclusion that the document
       Exhibit P-6 is inadmissible in evidence, as it has not been registered
       despite the transfer of title in immovable property worth more than
 C     Rs.100/-. In other words, the High Court answered the substantial question
       of law against the plaintiff and as a result of which it rightly allowed the
       second appeal filed by the defendants (respondent Nos. 1 to 3). The
       view so taken by the High Court is unexceptionable.
              9. We have heard Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel for
 D     the appellants and Mr. Parveen Kumar Aggarwal, learned counsel for
       the respondents.
               10. The core issue involved in this appeal is: whether the document
       Exhibit P-6 was required to be registered as interest in immovable
       property worth more than Rs.100/- was transferred in favour of the
 E     plaintiff?
             11. It is not in dispute that the parties are closely related. Mohan
       Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant
       No. 2) were real brothers of Harbans Singh (original plaintiff). Original
       defendant No. 4 – Harjinder Kaur is the wife of Sohan Singh (original
 F     defendant No. 2). The father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2
       died during minority of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The defendants had
       proved the copy of sale deed dated 16.4.1970 (Exhibit DW-3/A), whereby
       Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original
       defendant No. 2) purchased land admeasuring 5 kanals 19 marlas
       comprised in khasra No. 935/1. Harbans Singh (plaintiff) had appeared
 G     on behalf of the purchaser at the time of execution of the sale deed.
       Jamabandi for the year 1984-1985 of the property in dispute (Exhibit D-
       1) reveals that khasra No. 935/1/1/1 (5-19) shows the name of Mohan
       Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant
       No. 2) as owners, whereas the name of Harbans Singh (plaintiff) is
 H     shown against khasra No. 935/1/1/2 (5-18) as owner. Mohan Singh
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1149
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

(original defendant No. 1) had stated that the land standing in the name     A
of Harbans Singh (original plaintiff) was purchased by him from the
funds of joint family, but that fact has not been proved or established by
the contesting defendants. In that sense, it may appear from the revenue
record that the concerned parties were owners in respect of separate
properties and not as joint owners. The fact remains that Harbans Singh
                                                                             B
(original plaintiff), Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan
Singh (original defendant No. 2) are closely related being real brothers.
Further, although the ownership of the suit property recorded in Jamabandi
is of concerned defendant, Harbans Singh (plaintiff) had constructed 16
shops, samadhi of his wife – Gurcharan Kaur and a boundary wall on
the property and was in possession thereof. Pertinently, the trial Court     C
had opined in paragraph 24 of its judgment that all the three brothers –
Harbans Singh (plaintiff), Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and
Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2), as noted in Exhibit P-6, owned
various properties, on which possession of Harbans Singh (plaintiff) being
the eldest brother is admitted. However, it was a permissive possession.
                                                                             D
The first appellate Court has also opined in paragraph 16 of the judgment
that Harbans Singh (plaintiff) came in possession of the suit property
with the consent of the defendants. Notably, this finding of fact has not
been disturbed by the High Court. That apart, it is established from the
record that plot at Prem Basti belonged to Harbans Singh (plaintiff),
which was given to Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2) after taking       E
possession thereof from Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1). Further,
plot purchased by Harbans Singh (plaintiff) in the name of his son was
given to Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and his wife. It has
been admitted by DW-1 that later on the said plot was sold to one Surjit
Kaur. These facts clearly establish that there was not only univocal
                                                                             F
family arrangement between the parties, but it was even acted upon by
them without any exception. This factual position has not been doubted
by the High Court.
       12. As a matter of fact, the High Court has not bothered to even
advert to this aspect, whilst analysing the correctness of the finding of
fact recorded by the first appellate Court, which was the final fact-        G
finding Court. From the impugned judgment, it is noticed that after giving
the basic facts, the High Court first extracted the relevant portion from
the trial Court’s judgment (paragraphs 17-21 thereof) and thereafter
adverted to the finding and conclusion recorded by the trial Court on
other issues. The High Court then went on to extract paragraph 16 of         H
1150              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     the judgment of the first appellate Court in its entirety, running into about
       8 pages and then formulated the substantial question of law. For
       answering the said substantial question of law, the High Court first
       adverted to the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh
       Major & Ors.4 and reproduced paragraphs 12, 13, 16 and 18 thereof.
       After that, the relevant portion of the decision of the same High Court in
 B
       the case of Hans Raj & Ors. vs. Mukhtiar Singh5 has been extracted.
       After doing so, the High Court then referred to the contention of the
       appellants herein and extracted paragraphs 44 and 54 of the judgment in
       Hari Shankar Singhania & Ors. vs. Gaur Hari Singhania & Ors. 6
       The High Court then adverted to a decision of the same High Court in
 C     Jagdish & Ors. vs. Ram Karan & Ors.7 and reproduced paragraph
       14 thereof. Only after reproducing the aforesaid extracts inextenso,
       learned single Judge of the High Court adverted to the factual aspects
       of the present case in the following words, to allow the appeal: -
              “On a consideration of the matter, I find that a document which,
 D            for the first time, creates a right in favour of plaintiff in an immovable
              property in which he has no pre-existing right, then registration is
              required. The presumption of pre-existing right can only be inferred
              if a consent decree is passed where such claim is admitted by the
              other party, but a document which is not disputed by the party and
              there is no admission regarding the acceptance of a right and suit
 E            is based on such a document under which the right is transferred
              to the plaintiff in a property in which he has no pre-existing right,
              then it would not require registration as is the ratio of the judgment
              of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Som Dev and others
              (supra). In view of this proposition of law if the matter is considered,
 F            the question of law, as framed, has to be answered in favour of
              the appellants.
                     In the present case, it may be noticed that the property in
              dispute was purchased by way of two sale deeds and the ownership
              of the parties was duly reflected in the revenue record. The plaintiff
 G            claimed right to the property under the deed of family settlement
              Exhibit P-6. Thus he claimed that the defendants had relinquished

       4
         (1995) 5 SCC 709
       5
         (1996) 3 RCR (Civil) 740 (paragraphs 7 to 9)
       6
         (2006) 4 SCC 658
       7
 H       PLR (2003) 133 P&H 182
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1151
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

      their right in the immovable property in his favour under the             A
      memorandum of family settlement which was alleged to have
      been executed much earlier. In any case, it has to be held that the
      document transferring title in an immovable property worth more
      than Rs.100/- rupees, even if it was by way of relinquishment, the
      same required registration. Thus, the learned trial Court was right
                                                                                B
      in holding that no title passed on to the plaintiff under Exhibit P-6
      i.e. family settlement entered into between the parties. This view
      of mine finds support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
      Court in the case of Hari Chand (dead) through LRs vs. Dharampal
      Singh Baba, 2007 (4) Herald (SC) 3028, wherein the Hon’ble
      Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that the family                C
      settlement could only be if one has lawful right over the property
      and then alone family settlement could be executed. When there
      is no lawful rights of the parties over the property, there was no
      occasion to file the suit on the basis of family settlement.
             In view of what has been stated and discussed above, this          D
      appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the
      learned lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the learned
      trial Court is restored, but with no order as to costs.”
       13. As against this, the first appellate Court thoroughly examined
the pleadings and the evidence, oral as well as documentary, placed on          E
record by the concerned parties. In the first place, it examined the question
whether the document Exhibit P-6 was executed by the parties or not.
After adverting to the relevant evidence, the first appellate Court opined
that the trial Court was right in concluding that Exhibit P-6 was executed
by the parties referred to therein. That being concurrent finding of fact,
needs no further scrutiny. The High Court has not reversed this finding         F
of fact, as is noticed from the extracts of its judgment reproduced above.
The first appellate Court then went on to examine whether the document
required registration. The High Court has reproduced paragraph 16 of
the judgment of the first appellate Court in its entirety. What is relevant
to notice is that the first appellate Court adverted to the pleadings and       G
oral and documentary evidence produced by the respective parties and
found that the plaintiff had proved the compromise (Exhibit CX) dated
15.5.1992 between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3, namely,
Sohan Singh and Harjinder Kaur. Harjinder Kaur had stepped into witness
box and admitted the said fact. She also admitted the fact of execution
                                                                                H
1152             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     of a family settlement. Thus, the dispute was between the successors of
       Harbans Singh (plaintiff) and successors of Mohan Singh (original
       defendant No. 1). The first appellate Court thus accepted the stand of
       the plaintiff that in the year 1970, after purchase of land, dispute arose
       between the parties regarding the suit land and in that family settlement,
       plaintiff was held to be owner of the suit property including its
 B
       constructions. The first appellate Court in that context observed thus: -
              “16. … The specific case of the plaintiff that he constructed with
              his personal money 16 shops on the suit land, one service station
              with boundary wall and also samadh of Smt. Gurcharan Kaur. It
              is admitted that samadh of Gurcharan Kaur is in the suit property.
 C            If the plaintiff was not acknowledged the owner of the suit property
              then there was no question of construction of samadh of
              Gurcharan Kaur his wife by the plaintiff on the suit property. So
              the version of the defendant that no dispute arose in the year
              1970 and no family settlement took place can not be accepted…”
 D            The first appellate Court then analysed the evidence of defendant
       witnesses and held that the same were not reliable or trustworthy as
       they did not know any fact regarding the suit property. The first appellate
       Court then adverted to another crucial fact and noted that Mohan Singh
       (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2)
 E     were residing in house situated at Prem Basti prior to 1988, which
       belonged to Harbans Singh (plaintiff). As noted earlier, this property as
       per the family arrangement was given to Sohan Singh and has been so
       recorded in the memorandum of family settlement (Exhibit P-6). The
       first appellate Court found that the defendants had failed to prove that
       they were in possession of the suit property or remained in possession
 F     thereof. On the other hand, the evidence on record clearly established
       that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property. The first appellate
       Court then interpreted document Exhibit P-6 and found that it was not
       with regard to khasra No. 935 (11-17), but it referred to other properties.
       After analysing the relevant evidence, the first appellate Court held that
 G     Exhibit P-6 cannot be construed as a document containing terms and
       recitals of a family arrangement, but only a memorandum of family
       arrangement. It went on to observe as follows: -
              16. … Document Ex.P-6 is not with regard to khasra no. 395
              (11-17) but other property is also included in the said document.
 H            A plot situated in Prem Basti which was in the name of Harbans
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1153
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

    Singh and Gurcharan Kaur was already got vacated from Mohan            A
    Singh and was given to Sohan Singh and Harjinder Singh. A plot
    measuring 17 marlas which was purchased by Vikaramjit Singh
    was given to Manjit Kaur and Mohan Singh and Manjit Kaur DW-
    1 has admitted that she had already sold that plot to Surjit Kaur.
    So it can be concluded that said document was acted upon.
                                                                           B
    Although few sentences of the said documents are in the present
    tense but the court is to see from the material on record whether
    the said document created right in the immovable property or rights
    were already created but the document was written by way of
    memorandum. The said document does not pertain to khasra no.
    935/1/1/1 (5-19) but entire khasra no. 935/1 (11-17). Had the said     C
    document created right in khasra no. 935/1/1/1 (5-19) then there
    was no question of throwing khasra no. 935/1/1/2 in common pool
    and other property of the parties. There is specific recital that on
    the basis of sale deeds Harbans Singh was owner in possession
    of the suit property and was coming in possession of the same.
                                                                           D
    Harbans Singh has constructed 16 shops and service station there.
    In other words, it proves that Harbans Singh was being
    considered as owner in possession of the suit property.
    Prior to execution of the said document on that day they
    compromised not to raise any dispute regarding his
    ownership. So this document was a writing with regard to               E
    fact which was already being considered and admitted by
    the parties. So it cannot be said that this document, copy of
    which is Ex.P-6 created right for the first time in the
    immovable property.…..”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)     F
    And again, as follows: -
    “16.      ….. Since the parties were closely related to each
    other and document was executed with regard to the fact-
    which they were already admitting so I am of the view that
    document dated 10.3.1988 copy of which is Ex.P-6 did not               G
    require registration. In case Hans Raj cited supra the matter
    was got compromised and document itself created right in the
    property. In case Hari Singh vs. Shish Ram & others cited supra
    it was held that document between the parties was partitioned
    and consideration was passed from one party to other. In Shishpal      H
1154      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     vs. Vikram cited supra it was held that during life time of Gyani
       Ram the plaintiff filed suit so there could not be any family
       settlement. In case Smt. Karamjit Kaur and another versus Smt.
       Sukhjinder Kaur and others cited supra vide compromise the
       plaintiff and defendant no. 1 to 4 had agreed to take 30 bighas of
       land out of 90 bighas left by Mohinder Singh so it was held that
 B
       said compromise has created right in favour of defendants no. 5
       and 6 to the property of more than Rs.100/- So require registration.
       All the above said authorities cited by counsel for defendants are
       distinguishable on facts and ratio of said authorities cannot be
       applied to the facts of the present case. Since plaintiff is proved
 C     to be in existence in possession of the suit property. So construction
       of shops land service station on the said property was done by the
       plaintiff himself and not from funds of joint family. This fact is
       further corroborated by writing dated 10.3.1988 copy of which is
       Ex. P-6. Since said document did not require registration so plaintiff
       is proved to be owner of the suit property. The defendants estopped
 D
       from denying the execution of the family settlement. Defendants
       have failed to prove that Harbans Singh, Mohan Singh and Sohan
       Singh constituted Joint Hindu Family Property and construction
       of the suit property was raised from the Joint Hindu Family Funds.
       Thus, finding recorded by the learned Trial Court on issues No. 3,
 E     5 and 7 are set aside and it is held that the plaintiff constructed
       shops and service station and boundary wall on the suit property
       with his own funds. The defendant has failed to prove that property
       in dispute was purchased by the income of the Joint Hindu
       coparcenary property and Sohan Singh, Mohan Singh and Harbans
       Singh constituted Joint family. So these issues are decided in favour
 F
       of the plaintiff. Parties executed document Ex.P-6 dated
       10.3.1988 by way of memorandum of family settlement and
       it did not require registration. The defendants are estopped
       from denying the execution of the said document and
       plaintiff is proved to be owner in possession of the suit
 G     land. Issues No. 1 and 2 and 7 are also decided in favour of the
       plaintiff. Since the plaintiff came in possession of the suit property
       with the consent of the defendants and his possession never become
       adverse to the interest of the defendants so finding of the learned
       trial Court on issue no. 4 is affirmed.”
 H                                                     (emphasis supplied)
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1155
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       14. As noticed from the extracted portion of the judgment of the         A
High Court in paragraph 12 above, it is amply clear that the High Court
has not dealt with the factual aspects adverted to by the first appellate
Court to conclude that the document Exhibit P-6 was only a memorandum
of family settlement and not a document containing the terms and recitals
of a family settlement. Being the former, no registration was necessary.
                                                                                B
For which reason, relief claimed by the plaintiff founded on the family
settlement between the real brothers arrived at in 1970, acted upon
without any exception and documented on 10.3.1988, ought to follow.
        15. The first appellate Court has also justly opined that the parties
had acted upon the stated family settlement and if we may say so, to the
prejudice of the other party. In that, the property in the name of plaintiff    C
at Prem Basti was given to Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2),
which was otherwise in possession of Mohan Singh (original defendant
No. 1). Further, the plot purchased by the plaintiff in the name of his son
was given to Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and his wife, but
that plot was admittedly sold by them to one Surjit Kaur. Being a case of       D
a family settlement between the real brothers and having been acted
upon by them, it was not open to resile from the same. They were
estopped from contending to the contrary. This crucial aspect has been
glossed over by the High Court and if we may say so, the second appeal
has been disposed of in a most casual manner. Inasmuch as, the impugned
judgment of the High Court merely contains extraction of the judgment           E
of the trial Court and first appellate Court and of the relied upon judgments
(precedents). The only consideration is found in two concluding
paragraphs, which are extracted above (paragraph 12). Even on liberal
reading of the same, it is not possible to conclude that the High Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction (second appeal) had undertaken proper    F
analysis and scrutiny of the judgment of the first appellate Court in right
perspective, much less keeping in mind the limited scope of jurisdiction
to entertain second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The impugned judgment is bordering on a casual
approach by the High Court in overturning the well-considered decision
of the first appellate Court. Although the impugned judgment runs into          G
36 pages, the manner in which it proceeds leaves us to observe that it is
cryptic. We say no more. On this count alone, impugned judgment does
not stand the test of judicial scrutiny.
      16. Be that as it may, the High Court has clearly misapplied the
dictum in the relied upon decisions. The settled legal position is that         H
1156            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     when by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, members of a
       family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to
       sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting
       claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind
       and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family, such
       arrangement ought to be governed by a special equity peculiar to them
 B
       and would be enforced if honestly made. The object of such arrangement
       is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives
       which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and
       bad blood between the various members of the family, as observed in
       Kale (supra). In the said reported decision, a three-Judge Bench of this
 C     Court had observed thus: -
             “9.        ….. A family arrangement by which the property is
             equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve
             an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same
             in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the
 D           administration of social justice. That is why the term “family” has
             to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold
             not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who
             may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or
             even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are
             sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se
 E           and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile
             litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work
             in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore,
             leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead
             of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds.
 F           Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers
             from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is
             pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the
             person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to
             unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family
             arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some
 G           material benefits. …..”
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
             In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the
       contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: -
 H
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1157
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

    “10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of   A
    a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be
    reduced into the form of the following propositions:
       “(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to
       resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable
       division or allotment of properties between the various members    B
       of the family;
       (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be
       induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;
       (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which
       case no registration is necessary;                                 C

       (4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only
       if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing.
       Here also, a distinction should be made between a
       document containing the terms and recitals of a family
       arrangement made under the document and a mere                     D
       memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had
       already been made either for the purpose of the record
       or for information of the court for making necessary
       mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not
       create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and        E
       therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of
       the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily
       registrable;
       (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement
       must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a          F
       possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the
       parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the
       settlement has no title but under the arrangement the
       other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour
       of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole
       owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and               G
       the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will
       find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;
       (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may
       not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family
                                                                          H
1158            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A               arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement
                 is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.”
                                                             (emphasis supplied)
              Again, in paragraph 24, this Court restated that a family
       arrangement being binding on the parties, clearly operates as an estoppel,
 B     so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the
       agreement from revoking or challenging the same. In paragraph 35, the
       Court noted as follows: -
             “35. … We have already pointed out that this Court has widened
             the concept of an antecedent title by holding that an antecedent
 C           title would be assumed in a person who may not have any title but
             who has been allotted a particular property by other party to the
             family arrangement by relinquishing his claim in favour of such a
             donee. In such a case the party in whose favour the relinquishment
             is made would be assumed to have an antecedent title. …..”
 D           And again, in paragraph 36, the Court noted as follows: -
             “36. … Yet having regard to the near relationship which the brother
             and the son-in-law bore to the widow the Privy Council held that
             the family settlement by which the properties were divided between
             these three parties was a valid one. In the instant case also putting
 E           the case of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 at the highest, the position
             is that Lachman died leaving a grandson and two daughters.
             Assuming that the grandson had no legal title, so long as the
             daughters were there, still as the settlement was made to end the
             disputes and to benefit all the near relations of the family, it would
 F           be sustained as a valid and binding family settlement. …”
              While rejecting the argument regarding inapplicability of principle
       of estoppel, the Court observed as follows: -
             “38. … Assuming, however, that the said document was
             compulsorily registrable the courts have generally held that
 G           a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would
             operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after
             having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile
             from the same or try to revoke it. …..”
                                                             (emphasis supplied)
 H
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1159
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       And in paragraph 42, the Court observed as follows: -                       A
       42. ..… In these circumstances there can be no doubt that
       even if the family settlement was not registered it would
       operate as a complete estoppel against Respondents Nos.
       4 and 5. Respondent No. 1 as also the High Court, therefore,
       committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the              B
       doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases.
       …”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)
       The view so taken is backed by the consistent exposition in previous
decisions8 referred to and duly analysed in the reported judgment. The             C
question formulated by the High Court, in our opinion, stands answered
in favour of the appellants (plaintiff), in light of exposition of this Court in
Kale (supra). A priori, we have no hesitation in affirming the conclusion
reached by the first appellate Court that the document Exhibit P-6 was
nothing but a memorandum of a family settlement. The established facts             D
and circumstances clearly establish that a family settlement was arrived
at in 1970 and also acted upon by the concerned parties. That finding of

8
 Lala Khunni Lal vs. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain, ILR 33 All 356
 Mt. Hiran Bibi vs. Mst. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44
 Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481                             E
 Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323
 Tek Bahadur Bhujil vs. Debi Singh Bhujil, AIR 1966 SC 292
 Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836
 Krishna Biharilal vs. Gulabchand, (1971) 1 SCC 837
 S. Shanmugam Pillai vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312
 Ramgopal vs. Tulshi Ram, AIR 1928 All 641
 Sitala Baksh Singh vs. Jang Bahadur Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 347                      F
 Mst. Kalawati vs. Sri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1944 Oudh 49
 Bakhtawar vs. Sunder Lal, AIR 1926 All 173
 Awadh Narain Singh vs. Narain Mishra, AIR 1962 Pat 400
 Ramgouda Annagouda vs. Bhausaheb, AIR 1927 PC 227
 Brahmanath Singh vs. Chandrakali Kuer, AIR 1961 Pat 79
 Mst. Bibi Aziman vs. Mst. Saleha, AIR 1963 Pat 62
 Kanhai Lal vs. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70
                                                                                   G
 Dhiyan Singh vs. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145
T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities vs. M. Gaghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797
Rachbha vs. Mt. Mendha, AIR 1947 All 177
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Smt. Satyawati Sood, AIR 1972 Delhi 171
(FB)
Shyam Sunder vs. Siya Ram, AIR 1973 All 382                                        H
1160                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     fact recorded by the first appellate Court being unexceptionable, it must
       follow that the document Exhibit P-6 was merely a memorandum of a
       family settlement so arrived at. Resultantly, it was not required to be
       registered and in any case, keeping in mind the settled legal position, the
       contesting defendants were estopped from resiling from the stated
       arrangement in the subject memorandum, which had recorded the
 B
       settlement terms arrived at in the past and even acted upon relating to all
       the existing or future disputes qua the subject property amongst the
       (signatories) family members despite absence of antecedent title to the
       concerned property.
              17. As regards the decision in Bhoop Singh (supra) and Som
 C     Dev & Ors. vs. Rati Ram & Anr.9, the same dealt with the question of
       necessity to register any decree or order of a Court governed by clause
       (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act, 190810. In the present case,
       however, clause (v) of sub-Section 2 of Section 17 of the 1908 Act is
       attracted. Section 17 as applicable when the cause of action arose (prior
 D     to amendment of 2001) reads thus: -
                                             “Part III
                               OF REGISTRABLE DOCUMENTS
                 17.     Documents of which registration is compulsory.-
 E               (1)     xxx                             xxx                      xxx
                 (2)     Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to
                         –
                         (i) xxx              xxx               xxx
 F                       (ii) xxx             xxx               xxx
                         (iii)xxx             xxx               xxx
                         (iv)xxx              xxx               xxx
                 (v)     any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting
 G                       or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of
                         one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable
                         property, but merely creating a right to obtain another


       9
           (2006) 10 SCC 788
       10
 H          For short, “the 1908 Act”
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. v. MANJIT KAUR & ORS. 1161
             [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

             document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign,     A
             limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or
             …..”
       18. In our considered view, reliance placed by the High Court on
the decisions of this Court will be of no avail to alter or impact the
conclusion recorded by the first appellate Court. As aforementioned, in       B
Bhoop Singh (supra) and Som Dev (supra), the Court was dealing with
the issue of compulsory registration of a decree or order of Court. In
the context of the applicable clause (vi) in sub-Section (2) of Section 17,
the Court in Bhoop Singh (supra) went on to hold as follows: -
      “18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the        C
      aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below:
      (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
      compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty and
      frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require
      registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration.   D
      (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right,
      title or interest in immovable property of the value of Rs.100 or
      upwards in favour of any party to the suit the decree or order
      would require registration.
                                                                              E
      (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of sub-
      section (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid
      Privy Council and this Court’s cases, it is apparent that the decree
      would not require registration.
      (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise,
                                                                              F
      as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of
      compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed
      of because of the compromise in question.
      (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the “subject-
      matter of the suit or proceeding”, clause (vi) of sub-section (2)
      would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by           G
      Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of
      the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would
      have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not
      litigated.”
                                                                              H
1162                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A            In the present case, as noted earlier clause (v) of Section 17(2) is
       attracted, which pertains to execution of any document creating or
       extinguishing right, title or interest in an immovable property amongst
       the family members. Thus, the dictum in Kale (supra) is attracted in the
       fact situation of this case.
 B            19. Considering the above, we have no hesitation in concluding
       that the High Court committed manifest error in interfering with and in
       particular reversing the well-considered decision of the first appellate
       Court, which had justly concluded that document dated 10.3.1988 executed
       between the parties was merely a memorandum of settlement, and it did
       not require registration. It must follow that the relief claimed by the
 C     plaintiff in the suit, as granted by the first appellate Court ought not to
       have been interfered with by the High Court and more so, in a casual
       manner, as adverted to earlier.
              20. Having said that, it is unnecessary to examine the alternative
       plea taken by the plaintiff to grant decree as prayed on the ground of
 D     having become owner by adverse possession. For the completion of
       record, we may mention that in fact, the trial Court had found that the
       possession of the plaintiff was only permissive possession and that finding
       has not been disturbed by the first appellate Court. In such a case, it is
       doubtful that the plaintiff can be heard to pursue relief, as prayed on the
 E     basis of his alternative plea of adverse possession.
               21. Be that as it may, we deem it appropriate to set aside the
       impugned judgment and restore the judgment and decree passed by the
       first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs (appellants herein).
              22. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and
 F     decree of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and decree passed
       by the first appellate Court is restored in favour of the plaintiff (appellants
       herein). Decree be drawn up accordingly. There shall be no order as to
       costs. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

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       Ankit Gyan                                                      Appeal allowed.




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