RAVADA SASIKALAversusSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.

                        [2017] 2 S.C.R. 379



                      RAVADA SASIKALA                                 A
                                   v.
            STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR.
              (Criminal Appeal Nos. 406-407of2017)
                       FEBRUARY 27, 2017                              B

         [DIPAK MISRA AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
        Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 326 and 448 - Acid attack on a
young girl by the boy trespassing into the girl's house - Due to non
acceptance of boy's proposal for marriage - Dis.figuration of some
part of the body due to acid attack - Conviction of the boy ulss.
                                                                      c
326 and 448 and sentenced to one year RI with fine - High Court
modified the sentence to the period already undergone, that is 30
days - On appeal, held: Acid attack on a young girl is an uncivilized
and heartless crime committed by the accused - Crime of this nature
does not deserve any kind of clemency - There is medical evidence D
that there was an acid attack on the young girl and the
circumstances proved by cogent evidence and the conviction was
upheld, there was no justification to reduce the sentence to the
period already undergone - It cannot be understood whether the
iudge was guided by some unknown notion of mercy or rqmained
                                                                      E
oblivious of the precedents relating to sentence or not careful about
the expectation of the collective from the court, for the society at
large eagerly waits for justice to be done in accordance with law -
Sentence imposed by the High Court is set aside and that of the
trial court is restored - As regards compensation, accused to pay "·"
compensation of Rs.50,0001- and the State to pay a compensation F
of Rs. 3 lakhs - Acid Attack.
       Allowing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 Protection o( society on the one hand and the
reformation of an individual are the facets to be kept in view. The
instant .case is an example of uncivilized and heartless crime        G
committed by .the respondent No. 2. It is completely unacceptable
that concept of leniency can be conceived of in such a crime. A
crime of this nature does not deserve any kind of clemency. It is
individually as well as collectively intolerable. The respondent
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                             379
380            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     No. 2 might have felt that his ego had been hurt by such a denial
      to the proposal or he might have suffered a sense of hollowness
      to his exaggerated sense of honour or might have been guided
      by the idea that revenge is the sweetest thing that one can be
      wedded to when there is no response to the unrequited love but,
      whatever may be the situation, the criminal act, by no stretch of
B
      imagination, deserves any leniency or mercy. The respondent
      No. 2 might not have suffered emotional distress by the denial,
      yet the said feeling could not to be converted into vengeance to
      have the licence to act in a manner like he has done. [Para 21]
      [390-F-G; 391-A-B]
c             1.2 The approach of the High Court shocks this Oourt.
      When there is medical evidence that there was an acid attack on
      the young girl and the circumstances having broug!tt home by
      cogent evidence and the conviction is given the stamp of approval,
      there was no justification to reduce the sentence to the period
D     already undergone. This Court is at a loss to understand whether
      the Judge has been guided by some unknown notion of mercy or
      remaining oblivious of the precedents relating to sentence or for
      that matter, not careful about the expectation of the collective
      from the court, for the society at large eagerly waits for justice to
      be done in accordance with law, has reduced the sentence. When
E     a substantive sentence of thirty days is imposed, in the crime of
      present nature, that is, acid attack on a young girl, the sense of
      justice, if this court allows itself to say so, is not only ostracized,
      but also is unceremoniously sent to "Vnaprastha". It is wholly
      impermissible. [Para 22] [391-C-E]
 F           1.3 The sentence imposed by the High Court is set aside
      and that of the trial court is restored. In addition to the said, on
      the issue of victim's compensation, the appellant is entitled to
      compensation that is awardable to a victim under the CrPC. [Para
      23] [391-F]
 G            1.4 The respondent No.2 is directed to pay a compensation
      of Rs.50,000/- and the State to pay a compensation of Rs.3 lakhs.
      If the accused does not pay the compensation amount within six
      months, he shall suffer further rigorous imprisonment of six
      months, in addition to what has been imposed by the trial court.
H
      The State shall deposit the amount before the trial court within
  RAVADA SASIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                     381
                       ANR.

three months and the trial Judge on proper identification of the    A
victim, shall disburse it in her favour. [Para 28] [393-C-E]
       Chetan Dass v. Kam/a Devi (2001) 4 SCC 250: [2001]
       3 SCR 20; Sham Sunder v. Puran and another (1990)
       4 SCC 731: [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 662; Shyam Narain
       v._State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC 77 : [2013] 8           B
       SCR 951; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Najab Khan
       and others (2013) 9 SCC 509 : [2013] 8 SCR 301;
       Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat (2006) 2 SCC
       359 : [2006] 1 SCR 477; Ahmed Hussain Vali
       Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2009) 7 SCC
       254 : [2009] 8 SCR 719; Jameel v. State of Uttar             c
       Pradesh (2010) 12 SCC 532 : [2009] 15 SCR 712;
       Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka (2012) 8 SCC
       734 : [2012] 8 SCR 189; Sumer Sinf{h v. Surajbhan
       Singh & others (2014) 7 SCC 323; State of Punjab 1(
       Bawa Singh (2015) 3 SCC 441 : [2015] 1 SCR 709;              D
       State qf Madhya Pradesh v.Bablu (2014) 9 SCC 281 :
       [2014] 9 SCR 467; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
       Surendra Singh (2015) 1 SCC 222; Raj Bala v. State
       of Haryana and others (2016) 1 SCC 463 : [2015] 9
       SCR 113; B.G Goswami v. Delhi Administration (1974)
       3 SCC 85 : [1974] 1 SCR 222; Shanti Lal Meena v.             E
       State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 6 SCC 185 : [2015] 3
       SCR 579 - referred to.
       Ankush Shivc!ii Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra
       (2013) 6 SCC 770 : [2013) 8 SCR 863; Laxmi v. Union
       of India and others (2014) 4 SCC 427; State of MP.           F
       v. Mehtaab (2015) 5 SCC 197 : [2015) 1 SCR 1116;
       Suresh v. State of Haryana (2015) 2 SCC 227; State
       (Jf Himachal Pradesh v. Ram Pal (2015) 11 SCC 584 :
       [2015] 2 SCR 955; Manohar Singh v. State of
       Rajasthan and Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 449 - relied on.             G
                      Case Law Reference

[2001) 3 SCR 20               referred to            Para 1
[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 662       referred to            Para 14
                                                                    H
382            SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·                    [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     [2013] 8 SCR 951               referred to            Para 15
      [2013] 8 SCR 301               referred to            Para 16
      [2006] 1 SCR 477               referred to            Para 16
      [2009] 8 SCR 719               referred to            Para 16
B
      [2009] 15 SCR 712              referred to            Para 16
      [2012] 8 SCR 189               referred to            Para 16
      (2014) 1 sec 323               referred to            Para 17
c     [2015] 1 SCR 709               referred to            Para 18
      [2014) 9 SCR 467               referred to            Para 18
      (2015) 1 sec 222               referred to            Para 18

D     [2015) 9 SCR 113               referred to            Para 19
      [1974) 1 SCR 222               referred to            Para 20
      [2015) 3 SCR 579               referred to            Para 21
      [2013) 8 SC~ 863               relied on              Para 23
E
      (2014) 4 sec 427               relied on              Para 24
      [2015] 1 SCR 1116              relied on              Para 26
      (2015) 2 sec 221               relied on              Para 26
F
      [2015) 2 SCR 955               relied on              Para 27
      (2015) 3 sec 449              · relied on             Para 27
             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
      Nos. 406-407 of2017.
G
             From the Judgment and Order dated 09.08.2016 of the High
      Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1731 of2007
      and Transfer Criminal Appeal No. 1052of2013.
             Ms. Apama Bhat, Ms. Joshita Pai, Advs. for the Appellant.

H
     RAVADA SASJKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                              383
                          ANR.

       Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Vismai Rao, Shara!, Manjeet Kirpal, Guntur           A
Prabhakar, Advs. for the Respondents.
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       DIPAK MISRA, J. I. In Chetan Dass v. Kam/a Devi', this
Court had observed:-
                                                                                B
         "Matrimonial' 'matters are matters of delicate human and
         emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect,
         love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments
         with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social
         norms as we! I. ... "
                                                                                c
        2. Though the aforesaid observations were made in the context
of a matrimonial dispute arising out ofa proceeding under Section 13 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 praying for dissolution of marriage by
granting a decree of divorce, yet we have commenced our judgment
with the same as the facts of the present case painfully project what a
relation in close proximity can do to a young girl when his proposal for        D
his marriage is not accepted and he, forgetting the fundamental facet of
human dignity and totally becoming oblivious of the fact that marriage,
as a social institution, is an affirmance of civilized society order, allows
his unrequited love to be converted to complete venom that leads him on
the path of vengeance, and the ultimate shape of such retaliation is house      E
trespass by the accused carrying an acid bottle and pouring it over the
head of the girl, the appellant herein.
        3. The necessary facts. On the basis of the statement of the
injured, an FIR under Sections 448 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code
(JPC) was registered at police station Vallampudi. The injuries sustained
                                                                                F
by the victim-informant required long treatment and eventually after
recording the statements of the witnesses, collecting various materials
from the spot and taking other aspects into consideration of the crime,
the investigating agency filed the charge sheet for the offe11ces that
were originally registered under the FIR before the competent court
which, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session,                   G
Vizianagaram. The accused abjured his guilt and expressed his desire
to face the trial.
          4. The prosecution, in order to establish the charges against the
1
    (2001)4 sec 2so
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384            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     accused, examined 12 witnesses and got marked Ex. PI to P 14 besides
      bringing 11 material objects on record. The defence chose not to examine
      any witness. It may be noted that on behalf of the defence, one document
      Ex. D-1, was marked.
              5. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Yizianagaram did not
B     find the accused guilty under Section 307 IPC but held him guilty under
      Section 326 and 448 IPC. At the time of hearing of the sentence under
      Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the convict
      pleaded for mercy on the foundation of his support to the old parents, the
      economic status, social strata to which he belongs and certain other
      factors. The learned trial judge, upon hearing him, sentenced him to
c     suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and directed to pay a fine of
      Rs. 5,000/- with a default clause under Section 326 !PC and sentenced
      him to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence under Section 448 lPC
      with a default clause.
              6. The State prefen-ed Criminal Appeal No. 1731 of2007 under
D     Section 377(1) CrPC before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad
      for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh for
      enhancement of sentence. Being grieved by the judgment of conviction
      and order of sentence, the accused-respondent had preferred Criminal
      Appeal No. 15 of2006 before the Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram which
E     was later on transfen-ed to the High Court and registered as Transferred
      Criminal Appeal No. 1052 of2013.
              7. Both the appeals were heard together by the learned Single
      Judge who concurred with the view taken by the learned trial judge as
      regards the conviction. While dealing with the quantum of sentence, the
F     learned Judge opined thus:-
              "However, the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial
              Court for the offence under Section 326 I.P.C. is modified to the
              period which the accused has already undergone, while
              maintaining the sentence of fine for both the offences."
G              8. At the outset, we must note that the State has not assailed the
      said judgment. The appellant, after obtaining permission of this Court,
      filed the special leave petition which we entertained for the simon pure
      reason it has been asserted that the period of custody suffered by the
      accused is 30 days. It is apt to note here that the accused-respondent
      has not challenged the conviction and, therefore, it has to be assumed
H
   RAVADA SASIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                               385
               ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

that apart from accepting the judgment of conviction, he must have            A
celebrated the delight and jubilation of liberty inasmuch as despite the
sustenance of the judgment of conviction, he was not required to suffer
any further imprisonment.
        9. The centripodal question, indubitably a disquieting one, whether
the High Court has kept itself alive to the precedents pertaining to           B
sentencing or has been guided by some kind of unfathomable and
incomprehensible sense of individual mercy absolutely ignoring the plight
and the pain of the victim; a young girl who had sustained an acid attack,
a horrendous assault on the physical autonomy of an individual that gets
more accentuated when the victim is a young woman. Not for nothing,
it has been stated stains of acid has roots forever.                           c
         I 0. As the factual matrix gets unfolded from the judgment of the
learned trial Judge, the appellant after completion of her intermediate
course had accompanied her brother to Amalapuram of East Godavari
District where he was working as an Assistant Professor in B.V.C.
Engineering College, Vodalacheruvu and stayed with him about a week            D
prior to the occurrence. Thereafter, she along with her brother went to
his native place Sompuram. At that time, the elder brother ofthe accused
proposed a marriage alliance between the accused and the appellant for
which her family expressed unwillingness. The reason for expressing
the unwillingness is not borne out on record but the said aspect, needless     E
to say, is absolutely irrelevant. What matters to be stated is that the
proposal for marriage was not accepted. It is evincible from the material
brought on record that the morning of24.05.2003 became the darkest
and blackest one in her life as the appellant having a head bath had put
a towel on her head to dry, the accused trespassed into her house and
poured a bottle of acid over her head. It has been established beyond a        F
trace of doubt by the ocular testimony and the medical evidence that
some part of her body was disfigured and the disfiguration is due to the
acid attack.
        11. In this backdrop, the heart of the matter is whether the
imposition of sentence by the learned Single Judge is proportionate to         G
the crime in question.
        12. In this context, Ms. Aparna Bhat, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant submits that by no stretch of imagination, the period
undergone, that is, 30 days, can be regarded as appropriate for the offence
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386             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     under Section 326 IPC and definitely not when there is acid attack.
      She would further urge that in such a situation, the concept of justice
      feels embarrassed and a dent is created in the criminal justice system.
      Learned counsel would further submit that mercy "whose quality is not
      unstrained", may be considered as a virtue in the realm of justice but
      misplaced sympathy and exhibition of unwarranted mercy is likely to
B
      pave the path of complete injustice. She has commended us to certain
      authorities which we shall, in due course, refer to.
               13. Per contra, contends Mr. Y. Raja Gopala Rao, learned counsel
      for the respondent that the occurrence had taken place long back and
      with efflux of time, the appellant as well as the respondent have been
c     leading their.individual separate married lives and, therefore, it would
      not be appropriate to interfere with the sentence reduced by the High
      Court. It is canvassed by him that the respondent has not challenged
      the conviction before the High Court but he has been leading a reformed
      life and after a long lapse of time, to send him to custody would tantamount
D     to injustice itself.
                14. We have noted earlier that the conviction under Section 326
      IPC stands established. The singular issue is the appropriateness of the
      quantum of sentence. Almost 27 years back in Sltam Sunder v. Puran
      and anotlter', the accused-appellant therein was convicted under Section
      304 Part I IPC and while imposing the sentence, the appellate court
E     reduced the sentence to the term of imprisonment already undergone,
      i.e., six months. Howev~r, it enhanced the fine. This Court ruled that
      sentence awarded was inadequate. Proceeding further, it opined that:-
              "N o particular reason has been given by the High Court for
              awarding such sentence. The court in fixing the punishment for
 F            any particular crime should take into consideration the nature of
              the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the
              degree of deliberation shown by the offender. The measure of
              punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence.
              The sentence imposed by the High Court appears to be so grossly
              and entirely inadequate as to involve a failure ofjustice. We are
 G
              ofopinion that to meetthe ends of justice, the sentence has to be
              enhanced."
             After so stating the Court enhanced the sentence to one of
      rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years.
       ' <1990) 4 sec 731
 H
   RAVADA SASIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                                 387
               ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

        I 5. In Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi)', it has been               A
ruled that primarily it is to be borne in mind that sentencing for any
offence has a social goal. Sentence is to be imposed regard being had to
the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence !ias been
committed. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based
on the principle that the accused must realise that the crime committed
                                                                                 B
by him has not only created a dent in the life of the victim but also a
concavity in the social fabric. The purpose ofjust punishment is designed
so that the individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the
collective do not suffer time and again for.such crimes. It serves as a
deterrent. The Court further observed that on certain occasions,
opportunities may be granted to the convict for reforming himself but it         c
is equally true that the principle of proportionality between an offence
committed and the penalty imposed are to be kept in view. It has to be
borne in mind that while carrying out this complex exercise, it is obligatory
on the part of the court to see the impact of the offence on the society as
a whole and its ramifications on the immediate collective as well as its
                                                                                D
repercussions on the victim.
         16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Najab Khan and others',
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while maintaining the conviction
under Section 326 !PC read with Section 34 IPC, had reduced the
sentence to the period already undergone, i.e., 14 days. The two-Judge
Bench referred to the authorities in SIU1ilesh JasvanthlU1i v. Stale of          E
Gujarat', Ahmed Hussain Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat, Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh' and Guru BltSl!varaj v.
State of Karnataka' and held thus:-
        " In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the
        corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. The          F
        facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the
        crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the
        motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused,
        the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances
        are relevant facts which would enter into the area of                    G
'(2013) 1sec11
• (2013) 9 sec 509
'\2006) 2 sec 359
' \2009) 1 sec 254
1
   (2010) 12 sec 532
 '(2012) s sec 734                                                              H
388            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A             consideration. We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose
              inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice
              dispensation system to undermine the public confidence in the
              efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper
              sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the
              manner in which it was executed or committed. The courts must
B
              not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but
              also the society at large while considering the impositi0n of
              appropriate punishment."
              In the said case, the Court ultimately set aside the sentence
      imposed by the High Court and restored that of the trial Judge, whereby
c     he had convicted the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three
      years.
               17. In Sumer Singil v. S11mjbha11 Singh & others', while
      laborating on the duty of the Court while imposing sentence for an offence,
      it has been ruled that it is the duty of the court to impose adequate
D     sentence, for one of the purposes of imposition ofrequisite sentence is
      protection ·of the society and a legitimate response to the collective
      conscience. The paramount principle that should be the guiding laser
      beam is that the punishment should be proportionate. It is the answer of
      law to the social conscience. In a way, it is an obligation to the society
E     which has reposed faith in the court of law to curtail the evil. While
      imposing the sentence it is the court's accountability to remind itself
      about its role and the reverence for the rule of law. It must evince the
      rationalised judicial discretion and not an individual perception or a moral
      propensity. The Court further held that ifin the ultimate eventuate the
      proper sentence is not awarded, the fundamental grammar of sentencing
F     is guillotined and law does not tolerate it; society does not withstand it;
      and sanctity of conscience abhors it. It was observed that the old saying
      "the law can hunt one's past" cannot be allowed to be buried in an
      indecent manner and the rainbow of mercy, for no fathomable reason,
      should be allowed to rule. The conception of mercy has its own space
G     but it cannot occupy-the whole accommodation. While dealing with grant
      of further compensation in lieu of sentence, the Court ruled:-
              " We do not think that increase in fine amount or grant of
              compensation under the Code would be a justified answer in
              law. Money cannot be the oasis. It cannot assume the centre
H     '(2014) 7 sec 323
      RAVADA SASIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                               389
                  ANR. (DJPAK MISRA, J.]

         stage for all redemption. Interference in manifestly inadequate · A
         and unduly lenient sentence is the justifiable warrant, for the
         Court cannot close its eyes to the agony and anguish of the victim
         and, eventually, to the cry of the society."
        18. In State ofP1111jab v..Bawa Sinf(h' 0 , this Comt, after referring
to the decisions in Stale of Madhya Pradesh v. Bablu" and State of                B
Madhya Pradesh v. Surendra Singh'', reiterated the settled proposition
oflaw that one of the prime objectives of criminal law is the imposition
of adequate, just, proportionate punishment which is commensurate with
the nature of crime regard being had to the manner in which the offence
is committed. It has been further held that one should keep in mind the
social interest and conscience of the society while considering the
                                                                                  c
determinative factor of sentence with gravity ofcrime. The punishment
should not be so lenient that it would shock the conscience of the society.
  Emphasis was laid on the solemn duty of the court to strike a proper
balance while awarding the sentence as imposition of lesser sentence
encourages a criminal and resultantly the society suffers.                        D
        19. Recently, in Raj Ba[(I v. State of Haryana and otfters", on
reduction of sentence by the High Court to the period already undergone,
the Court ruled thus:-
         "Despite authorities existing and governing the field, it has come
         to the notice of this Court that sometimes the court of first            E
         instance as well as the appellate court which includes the High
         Cou1t, either on individual notion or misplaced sympathy or
         personal perception seems to have been carried away by passion
         of mercy, being totally oblivious of lawful obligation to the
         collective as mandated by law and forgetting the oft quoted saying       F
         of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, "Justice, though due to the
         accused, is due to the accuser too" and follow an extremely
         liberal sentencing policy which has neither legal permissibility
         nor social acceptability."
         And again:-                                                              G
         "A Judge has to keep in mind the paramount concept of rule of

rn (201si 3sec 441
 11
   (2014) 9 sec 2s1
 " (2015) 1 sec 222
 "(2016) I SCC463                                                                 H
390             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [20 I 7] 2 S.C.R.


A             law and the conscience of the collective and balance it with the
              principle of proportionality but when the discretion is exercised
              in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to relinquishment of duty
              and reckless abandonment of responsibility. One cannot remain
              a total alien to the demand of the socio-cultural milieu regard
              being had to the command oflaw and also brush aside the agony
B
              of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits with
              patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the. part
              of the society and when the criminal culpability is established
              and the discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said
              hope is shattered and the patience is wrecked."
c              20. Though we have referred to the decisions covering a period
      of almost three decades, it does not necessarily convey that there had
      been no deliberation much prior to that. There had been. In B.G.
      Goswami v. Delhi Administration", the Court while delving into the
      issue of punishment had observed that punishment is designed to protect
D     society by deterring potential offenders as also by preventing the guilty
      party from repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform the offender
      and recbim him as a law abiding citizen for the good of the society as a
      whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment thus
      play their due part in judicial thinking while determining the question of
      awarding ·appropriate sentence.
E
              21 . The purpose of referring to the aforesaid precedents is that
      they are to be kept in mind and adequately weighed while exercising the
      discretion pertaining to awarding of sentence. Protection of society on
      the one hand and the reformation of an individual are the facets to be
      kept in view. In Shanti Lt1/ Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi)'', the
F     Court has held that as far as punishment for offence under the Prevention
      of Corruption Act, 1988 is concerned, there is no serious scope for
      reforming the convicted public servant. Therefore, it shall depend upon
      the nature of crime, the manner in which it is committed, the propensity
      shown and the brutality reflected. The case at hand is an example of
G     uncivilized and heartless crime committed by the respondent No. 2. It is
      completely unacceptable that concept of leniency can be conceived of
      in such a crime. A crime of this nature does not deserve any kind of
      clemency. It is individually as well as collectively intolerable. The

      "(I9H) 3 sec 85
H     "(2015)6SCC 185
   RAVADA SASIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                                391
               ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

respondent No. 2 might have felt that his ego had been hurt by such a           A
denial to the proposal or he might have suffered a sense of hollowness
to his exaggerated sense of honour or might have been guided by the
idea that revenge is the sweetest thing that one can be wedded to when
there is no response to the unrequited love but, whatever mey be the
situation, the criminal act, by no stretch of imagination, deserves any
                                                                                B
leniency or mercy. The respondent No. 2 might not have suffered
emotional distress by the denial, yet the said feeling could not to be
converted into vengeance to have the licence to act in a manner like he
has done.
        22. In view of what we have stated, the approach of the High
Court shoc~s us and we have no hesitation in saying so. When there is
                                                                                c
medical evidence that there was an acid attack on the young girl and the
circumstances having brought home by cogent evidence and the conviction
is given the stamp of approval, there was no justification to reduce the
sentence to the period already undergone. We are at a loss to understand
whether the learned Judge has been guided by some unknown notion of             D
mercy or remaining oblivious of the precedents relating to sentence or
for that matter, not careful about the expectation of the collective from
the court, for the society at large eagerly waits for justice to be done in
accordance with law, has reduced the sentence. When a substantive
sentence of thirty days is imposed, in the crime of present nature, that is,
acid attack on a young girl, the sense of justice, if we allow ourselves to     E
say so, is not only ostracized, but also is unceremoniously sent to
"Vnaprastha". It is wholly impermissible.
        23 .. In view of our analysis, we are compelled to set aside the
sentence imposed by the High Court and restore that of the trial court.
In addition to the aforesaid, we are disposed to address on victim              F
compensation. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant is
entitled to compensation that is awardable to a victim under the CrPC.
Jn Ankusft Sftivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maftarasfttra", the two-Judge
                                               '"
Bench referred to the amended provision, 154 Law Commission Report
that has devoted entire chapter to victimology, wherein the growing             G
emphasis was on the victim.
       24. In L<1xmi v. Union of India and otfters 17 , this Court
observed thus:-
"(2013) 6 sec no
"t20I4) 4 sec 427                                                              H
392            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [20 I 7] 2 S.C.R.


A            "12. Section 357-A came to be inserted in the Code of Criminal
             Procedure, 1973 by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31-12-2009. Inter alia,
             this section provides for preparation of a scheme for providing
             funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his
             dependants who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the
             crime and who require rehabilitation.
B
             13. We are informed that pursuant to this provision, 17 States
             and 7 Union Territories have prepared "Victim Compen~ation
             Scheme" (for short "the Scheme"). As regards the victims of
             acid attacks, the compensation mentioned in the Scheme framed
             by these States and Union Territories is un-uniform. While the
c            State of Bihar has provided for compensation of Rs 25,000 in
             such Scheme, the State ofRajasthan has provided for Rs 2 lakhs
             of compensation. In our view, the compensation provided in the
             Scheme by most of the States/Union Territories is inadequate. It
             cannot be overlooked that acid attack victims need to undergo a
D            series of plastic surgeries and other corrective treatments. Having
             regard to this problem, the learned Solicitor General suggested
             to us that the compensation by the States/Union Territories for
             acid attack victims must be enhanced to at least Rs 3 lakhs as
             the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. The suggestion of the learned
             Solicitor General is very fair."
E
              25. The Court further directed that the acid attack victims shall
      be paid compensation of at least Rs 3 lakhs by the State Government/
      Union Territory concerned as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. Of
      this amount, a sum of Rs. I lakh was directed to be paid to such victim
      within 15 days of occurrence of such incident (or being brought to the
F     notice of the State Government/Union Territory) to facilitate immediate
      medical attention and expenses in this regard. The balance sum ofRs.2
      lakhs was directed to be paid as expeditiously as possible and positively
      within two months thereafter and compliance thereof was directed to be
      ensured by the Chief Secretaries of the States and the Administrators of
G     the Union Territories.
              26. In State of M.P. v. Me/1taab", the Court directed
      compensation ofRs.2 lakhs to be fixed regard being had to the limited
      final resources of the accused despite the fact that the occurrence took
      place in 1997. It observed that the said compensation was not adequate
H     "(2015)5SCCl97
   RAVADA SASIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH &                                393
               ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

and accordingly, in addition to the said compensation to be paid by the        A
accused, held that the State was required to pay compensation under
Section 357-A CrPC. For the said purpose, reliance was placed on the
decision in Suresh v. State of Haryana''.
        27. In State of Hinwclwl Pradesh v. Ram Pal'°, the Court
opined that compensation of Rs. 40,000/- was inadequate regard being            B
had to the fact that life ofa young girl aged 20 years was lost. Bestowing
anxious consideration the Court, placing reliance on Sureslt (supra),
Manolrar Singh v. State ofRajastlran and Ors." and Melrtaab (supra),
directed that ends of justice shall be best subserved if the accused is
required to pay a total sum of Rs. I lakh and the State to pay a sum of
Rs.3 lakhs as compensation.
                                                                                c
        28. Regard being had to the aforesaid decisions, we direct the
accused-respondent No. 2 to pay a compensation of Rs.50,000/- and
the State to pay a compensation of Rs.3 lakhs. If the accused does not
pay the compensation amount within six months, he shall suffer fu1iher
rigorous imprisonment of six months, in addition to what has been imposed       D
by the trial court. The State shall deposit the amount before the trial
court within three months and the learned trial Judge on proper
identification of the victim, shall disburse it in her favour.
         29. The criminal appeals are allowed to the extent indicated
above.                                                                          E


Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeals allowed.




"(2015) 2 sec 221
'"(20\5) 11 sec 584
" (2015) 3 sec 449